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The Proliferation Primer
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
A Majority Report - January 1998

Russia

Although China has earned the distinction as the world's most prolific supplier of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology, in recent years Russia has become increasingly active as a supplier of these sensitive technologies. 1 The Russian government has agreed to sell nuclear reactors to Iran and India, and Rus-sian defense and aerospace organizations have sold a variety of missile technology to Iran and Iraq. 2 Because Russia is a major supplier, its cooperation is essential if ef-forts to combat proliferation are to succeed. 3 As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn noted recently in Senate testimony, "Russia is clearly a key player in international efforts to prevent pro-liferation. Its cooperation is indispensable. Its failure to cooperate potentially is very harmful." 4

Russia's sales of sensitive weapons technology occur amid great tumult in Russian society. Workers are some-times paid months late or never, crime is rampant, and housing is insufficient. Hunger, draft evasion, poor train-ing, and aging equipment plague the Russian military, which remains one of the world's largest. 5 Conditions in the Russian military are so bad that 314 soldiers report-edly committed suicide during the first nine months of 1997. 6

Russia's premier defense facilities have not been im-mune to disruptions. Strategic missile facilities have suf-fered repeated power cutoffs in recent months due to unpaid electric bills. During late 1996, thieves report-edly often disrupted Strategic Rocket Forces communi-cations to operational units on numerous occasions by mining copper and other metals from communications cables.

Despite the danger posed by transfers of sensitive tech-nology to proliferators like Iran, Russia's cash- starved nuclear and defense industries have pursued such sales. It is unclear how much control central government offi-cials have over these sales. Senior Russian officials have approved some deals, and Moscow appears unwilling or unable to halt others. As Mr. Einhorn noted in Senate testimony, "[ t] he current situation in Russia, including powerful pressures to export, the evolving relationship between central governmental authorities and an increas-ingly privatized industrial sector, and a relatively new and unproven export control system has led to questionable exports in cooperation with some countries of prolifera-tion concern, particularly Iran." 7

President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and other senior Administration officials have held numerous discussions with Russian officials to persuade Moscow to adhere to international nonproliferation norms and to cancel questionable deals with countries of concern. 8 As a result, Russia agreed to join the MTCR and to restrict the scope of its nuclear cooperation with Iran. 9 Moscow also agreed to halt future sales of conventional arms, including ballistic missiles, to Iran, although reports indicate it has not complied with these agreements. 10

In Senate testimony, Mr. Einhorn said the Administration's "... nonproliferation agenda with Russia will involve both incentives and disincentives, including the implementation of U. S. sanctions laws whenever applicable." 11 Thus far, however, the Administration has opposed Congressional initiatives to modify Russia's behavior by targeted sanctions and restrictions on foreign aid, without saying what other incentives or disincentives it would support. Instead, the Administration has relied on high- level diplomacy, appointing a special envoy in July 1997 to hold additional discussions with Moscow on international and bilateral nonproliferation commitments.

Nuclear Cooperation with Iran

Examples of an emerging close relationship with Tehran include the following: in January of 1995, Russia announced an $800 million contract to construct a nuclear reactor in Iran. 12 It calls for a 1,000- megawatt light- water reactor to be built at the Bushehr nuclear power plant near the Persian Gulf coast by August 2000. 13 Moscow also signed a $30 million deal to provide nuclear fuel for the reactor for 20 years after completion and to take back spent fuel for reprocessing. 14 In addition, Russia agreed to train Iranian nuclear technicians to operate the plant and agreed in principle to construct up to three additional reactors there when the first contract is com-plete. 15

Since its inception, the United States has opposed the Bushehr deal and related contracts, arguing that any form of nuclear assistance would directly and indirectly contribute to Tehran's efforts to develop nuclear weap-ons. As Robert Einhorn explained in Senate testimony in June of 1997, "[ i] n our view, this is a large reactor project. It will involve hundreds of Russians being in Iran, hundreds of Iranians or more being in Moscow, being trained. And this large scale kind of project can provide a kind of commercial cover for a number of activities that we would not like to see, perhaps much more sensitive activities than pursuing this power reactor project. It also will inevitably provide additional training and expertise in the nuclear field for Iranian technicians. In our view, given Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons we do not want to see them move up the nuclear learning curve at all, and we believe this project would contribute to moving them up that curve." 16

Although Moscow was unwilling to cancel the Bushehr project, in 1995 the Administration did persuade President Yeltsin to limit the scope of Russian nuclear assistance. Yeltsin approved the sale of nuclear reactors, but ordered Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to drop plans to provide equipment and advice to Iran's effort to mine uranium ore and process it to use as reactor fuel -- assistance that would have given Iran an independent source of fissile material for nuclear weapons. 17 As Mr. Einhorn said, "[ w] e've raised our concerns forcefully and persistently, and at the highest levels, and we believe that Moscow has limited the scope and pace of its planned cooperation. For example, Russia's leadership has ruled out the transfer of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, heavy water moderated nuclear reactors, and other tech-nologies that are directly useful militarily." 18

The German firm Siemens began construction of two reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Tehran's first such facility, in 1974. 19 Siemens abandoned the project after Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution with 80% of the first and 60% of the second reactor reportedly completed. 20 No construction occurred between 1980- 1988 during the Iran- Iraq War, when the facility was bombed and dam-aged during Iraqi air raids. 21 Tehran filed suit against Siemens in international court in August of 1996, seek-ing $5.4 billion in damages for failure to complete the plant and refusing to turn over documents and parts. 22 Tehran's Minister of Atomic Energy claims Iran has al-ready spent $10 billion to construct the plant. 23

Russian construction of the plant appears to have started in early 1996. In March of that year, Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy stated the first shipment of construction materials for the plant was scheduled for delivery in April or May. 24 In June, the Russian press service Interfax reported that Russian experts had com-pleted a $2 million analysis of the construction site in Bushehr, and that Moscow planned to spend $60 million on construction of the plant by the end of 1996. 25 By November, 200 Russian nuclear technicians and 500 Ira-nian experts were reportedly working on it. 26 According to Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, 500 Russian nuclear specialists will eventually work on this Iranian plant. 27

The Bushehr project has encountered serious technical and financial difficulties. Construction, originally slated to begin in late 1995, was delayed due to Iran's failure to make initial payments. According to Defense Week, Iran made its first payments of $20 million for survey work and a $58 million advance payment to Russia in December of 1995, only after Russia's ambassador to Iran announced that failure to pay would delay construction. 28 Nucleonics Week reported last September that technical difficulties continue to surround the plan to equip the existing, unfinished reactor shells configured for German vertical generators with horizontal Russian generators based on completely different materials and chemistry. 29 In addition, the IAEA has reportedly prepared an "inch- thick" technical report with numerous recommendations on the seismic conditions at the site and is considering organizing a safety mission to Iran to assist with construction. 30

Iran has denied having a nuclear weapons program, insisting the Russian reactor will be used in its civilian nuclear power program. 31 President Clinton, Vice Presi-dent Gore, and other senior administration officials have discussed U. S. concerns with Russian officials on numer-ous occasions. 32 Russia's willingness to transfer nuclear technology to Iran appears motivated primarily by com-mercial interests and to a lesser extent to improve rela-tions with Tehran. In January of 1997, Russia's cash-starved nuclear industry announced plans to boost exports to $3.5 billion per year by the year 2000 by increas-ing sales to China, Iran, and India. 33 Russia defended the sale, saying Iran has the right to obtain nuclear tech-nology for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is under full- scope IAEA safeguards. 34 Russian officials accused the U. S. of applying a double- standard, since in 1994 the U. S., South Korea, and Japan agreed to supply North Korea with light- water reactors. These reactors, which would replace North Korea's graphite- moderated, heavy- water reactors, are better suited to produce material for nuclear weapons. 35

According to the Washington Times, Western intelligence agencies believe Iran is using its civilian nuclear power program as a cover for acquiring the technology and expertise to build nuclear weapons, a concern also expressed by Mr. Einhorn in Senate testimony. 36 The Times reported that in 1994 the CIA estimated Iran was 8- 10 years away from building nuclear weapons, but could shorten that timetable with foreign assistance. 37 Although light- water reactors are not well- suited to produce nuclear material for weapons, the U. S. is concerned the reactors might still be used for this purpose. While not ideally suited for a nuclear weapon, the U. S. Department of Energy confirmed during a test in the 1960's that reactor- grade plutonium can be used to make a nuclear weapon. 38 In addition, the Russian reactors would im-prove Iran's nuclear base and might encourage other nations to engage in nuclear cooperation with Tehran.

Nuclear Cooperation with India

On another front, Russia is negotiating to sell two nuclear reactors to India. The $2.6 billion deal calls for the construction of two 1,000 megawatt light- water reactors at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in southern India. 39 The Russian reactors are the same as the type being supplied to Iran, and although India has not signed the NPT, the reactors will be placed under IAEA safeguards. 40

The reactor deal was originally signed in 1988 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and Soviet President Gorbachev, when the Soviet Union still extended generous financing to client states. 41 Since the Soviet disintegration in 1992, India has been unable to finance the reactors. 42 If built, they would double India's nuclear power capacity, which currently accounts for less than three percent of the country's total electricity production. 43

India has an ambitious plan to expand its current nuclear power capacity to 5,000 megawatts by the year 2000. 44

India conducted a nuclear test in 1974 and is widely believed to have nuclear weapons. 45 The Indian govern-ment denies it possesses nuclear weapons and claims to have only retained a "nuclear option." 46

In 1992, Russia and the other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed not to sell nuclear tech-nology to undeclared weapons states which have not ac-cepted IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities. 47 The Administration has raised concerns about the Indian sale with the Russian government, saying it violates the spirit of the 1992 NSG agreement, but Moscow defends it say-ing the deal was concluded in 1988 and therefore pre-dates the 1992 agreement. 48 As Mr. Einhorn testified to the Senate in June of 1997,

We have opposed it, frankly, less because we think that the transfer would contribute mate-rially to India's nuclear weapons program than we think that the transfer would be inconsis-tent with Russia's commitments as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As a member of the so- called NSG, Russia has committed not to engage in nuclear cooperation with countries that do not have IAEA safeguards on all of the nuclear activities. India, of course, does not have safeguards on all of its nuclear activities. There is a provision in that commitment that says pre-existing deals can go forward. Russia is attempt-ing to grandfather an old 1988 U. S. S. R.- India, government to government agreement under that provision. In our view, this is not legiti-mately grandfathered. In 1988 there was no spe-cific contract, no financial arrangements con-cluded. There are still no financial arrangements concluded. So we tell the Russians that this was not the kind of deal, pre- existing deal, that can be grandfathered, and that it should not go for-ward with this sale of two power reactors to In-dia. So even though the transfer itself probably does not involve substantial proliferation risks, because we doubt the Indians, who have their own access to unsafeguarded plutonium, would actually divert plutonium from the safeguarded reactors. We nonetheless have urged Russia not to go forward. 49

In late March of 1997, Indian Prime Minister Gowda discussed the reactor sale in Moscow with Russian President Yeltsin. 50 The two countries were unable to finalize financing terms during Gowda's visit, but Yeltsin reassured India that Russia would ignore U. S. objections to the sale and promised to personally supervise the deal to ensure its smooth progress. 51 Despite this high- level diplomacy, the project's future remains dim. "If there is a saving grace in this story, it is that prospects actually for consummating this nuclear deal may be small," said Mr. Einhorn in recent Senate testimony, explaining, "... the Indian government may not be prepared ultimately to devote the very substantial resources to purchasing two large power reactors from Russia." 52

Missile Sales to Iran

During talks between Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in June of 1995, Moscow agreed to halt conventional arms sales to Iran and join the MTCR. 53 The agreement permitted Russia to fulfill existing contracts, but not to conclude new agree-ments. 54 On July 24, 1995, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree allowing Rus-sia to enter the MTCR. 55 Moscow participated in its first meeting as a full member of the regime on September 10, 1995. 56 In 1997, however, a series of reports on sales of Russian missile technology to Iran have become public.

According to these reports, numerous institutes and companies, once an integral part of the state- owned military complex of the former Soviet Union, have provided a variety of equipment and material that can be used to design and manufacture ballistic missiles. They are also helping Iran to develop two new ballistic missiles, the Shahab- 3 and Shahab- 4. 57 The Shahab- 3 is reportedly based on North Korea's No Dong 1 ballistic missile and will have a range of 1,300 kilometers with a 700 kilogram payload, sufficient to target Israel and U. S. forces in the region. 58 On September 18, 1997, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk testified that Iran could complete development of the Shahab- 3 in as little as 12 to 18 months. 59

The Shahab- 4 is said to be based on the Russian SS-4 medium- range ballistic missile and will have a range of 2,000 kilometers with a payload over 1,000 kilograms. 60 Russia's stockpile of SS- 4 missiles was destroyed under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. 61 According to Jane's Defense Weekly, during the Cold War, Russia armed some SS- 4's with nuclear payloads. 62 When completed, the Shahab- 4's longer range will enable Tehran to reach targets as far away as Central Europe. 63 According to the Washington Times, an Israeli intelligence report indicates the Shahab- 4 could be completed in as little as three years. 64 Israeli intelligence sources reportedly also told Defense News that the long-term goals of Iran's missile program are to develop missiles with ranges of 4,500 and 10,000 kilometers. 65 The lat-ter missile could reach the East Coast of the United States. 66

Press reports on Russian missile cooperation with Iran first appeared in the Los Angeles Times on February 12, 1997. 67 The Times reported Vice President Gore had issued a diplomatic warning to visiting Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin after receiving intelligence reports indicating Russia had recently transferred SS- 4 missile technology to Iran. 68 According to the Times, the transfer involved detailed instructions on how to build the missile and some unspecified components. 69 The following day, the Washington Times indicated the transfer included SS- 4 guidance components. 70

Several of the Russian organizations providing mis-sile assistance to Iran have been identified in the press. According to Defense News, NPO Trud, which developed liquid- propellant engines for Soviet ICBM's and space launch vehicles including the failed N- 1 Moon rocket program, is assisting Tehran with the development of rocket engines. 71 The Polyus Research Institute in Mos-cow is reportedly supplying guidance systems, and Russia's Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TSAGI) has conducted wind tunnel tests. 72


On September 18, 1997, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk testified that Iran could complete development of the Shahab-3 in as little as 12 to 18 months.


TSAGI is also helping Iran improve its infrastruc-ture and ability to design ballistic missiles. 73 On May 22, 1997, the Washington Times reported that "sensitive intelligence reports" indicate the institute signed nearly a dozen contracts worth about $150,000 with Iran's Defense Industries Organization between February and July of 1996 for assistance with the construction of a wind tunnel, manufacture of missile models, and the sale of missile design software. 74

In May of 1997, the Times also reported that a Rus-sian scientific center named Inor was negotiating to sell laser equipment, special mirrors, maraging steel, and tungsten- coated graphite material to Tehran. 75 Five months later, the paper reported that the Director of Inor, L. P. Chromova, and A. Asgharazadeh, the director of an unidentified Iranian factory, had completed a deal calling for Inor to supply 620 kilograms of special metal alloys used in ballistic missiles. 76 Inor reportedly agreed to supply high strength steel alloy bars, which Iran would shape into missile- casing material, and three types of alloy foil in thin sheets between 0.2 and 0.4 millimeters thick, used to shield guidance equipment in missiles. 77

Russia's arms export agency Rosvoorouzhenie has also been identified in the press as involved in transferring missile technology to Iran, and according to Russia's internal security service, Iranians are studying "rocket con-struction" at Russian institutes, including Baltic State University in St. Petersburg and Bauman State Technical University in Moscow. 78 The service, however, claims the students only study "generally accessible" information. 79

In addition to discussing Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran and India, the Clinton Administration has also engaged in a series of high- level talks intended to persuade Moscow to halt missile assistance to Iran. President Clinton raised the issue with President Yeltsin at a U. S.- Russia summit meeting in Helsinki in March of 1997, and in private meetings at the P- 8 economic summit in Denver in June of that year. 80 Vice President Gore had similar discussions with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in February, June, and September of 1997. 81 Secretary of State Albright did the same with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov in Malaysia in July of 1997, and the U. S. has reportedly sent over a dozen diplomatic protest notes to Moscow. 82 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have also raised the issue with President Yeltsin. 83

In July, President Clinton appointed an experienced diplomat, Ambassador Frank Wisner, as special envoy for the problem. 84 President Yeltsin assigned Russian Space Agency Director Yuri Koptev to a similar role for Russia. 85 Messrs. Wisner and Koptev held three rounds of talks in August, October, and November of 1997, at which Wisner reportedly described for the Russians the details of involvement by Russian organizations and urged the Russian government to put a stop to it. 86 According to the Washington Times, an Israeli intelligence report suggested that the lack of Russian action was due to the fact that Mr. Koptev himself was "directly involved" in the transfer of missile technology to Iran, a charge he denies. 87

Deputy Assistant Secretary Einhorn summarized the results of this high- level U. S. diplomacy in testimony to the Senate, stating, "[ w] e have pressed the Russian leadership at the highest levels. And, as I mentioned, we have been told that it is not Russia's policy to assist Iran's long-range missile programs." 88 He added, "[ w] e have provided them information available to us to demonstrate that we know what we are talking about, and we have urged them to investigate seriously and to prevent any activity that would be inconsistent with what they state is their own national policy." 89

Although Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has acknowledged the transfer of ballistic missile technology would violate Russia's pledge not to conclude additional arms sales to Iran, he has publicly denied any such assistance has been given to Tehran. 90 Other Russian leaders, too, deny missile cooperation is occurring. In September of 1997, Foreign Minister Primakov categorically stated no official or unauthorized missile assistance had been provided to Iran and insisted Moscow would not allow such allegations to deter it from developing closer economic ties to Iran. 91 "Not a single project via government channels has been undertaken by Russia with Iran," Primakov told a press conference in Moscow, adding, "no leaks of the type which could assist Iran in creating either nuclear arms or long- range missiles have taken place via non- government channels either." 92

Later that month, after talks with French President Chirac, President Yeltsin told reporters "[ w] e are being accused of supplying Iran with nuclear or ballistic technologies. There is nothing further from the truth. I use this occasion to refute decisively these rumors." 93 As recently as November, Mr. Koptev has also denied that Russia has provided missile technology to Iran. 94

Russian government officials have acknowledged Iran's attempts to purchase missile technology, but claim Russia's internal security service has thwarted all such attempts. 95 In an interview with the Russian news agency Tass in October of 1997, an unnamed official admitted "... cases of cooperation with Iran which could have resulted in Russian deliveries violating international agreements." 96 But "... they had all been detected at an early stage," the official said, "and a stop has been put to them." 97 The Russian statement specifically mentioned Russia had foiled an Iranian attempt to have parts manufactured for a liquid- propellant missile by NPO Trud. The official said the parts were being disguised as gas compressors or pumps. 98

In November of 1997, the Russian security service announced it had arrested and deported an Iranian diplomat caught attempting to buy missile designs. Its statement said, "[ o] n Nov. 14, security organs caught an Iranian citizen red- handed, thwarting his attempt to obtain for money design documents for missile technology from Russian specialists." 99 Russia's NTV television station reported that Russian security agents followed the diplomat for two weeks before arresting him after he contacted employees of Russian defense organizations and offered to buy missile drawings. 100 Iran's ambassador to Russia denied the individual had attempted to purchase missile designs, claiming he was only a student in Moscow with no connection to the Iranian Embassy. 101

The day before the Russian announcement, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had complained about the continuing flow of technology to Iran. Netanyahu called the Russian assistance "absolutely critical" to Iran's capabilities, and warned that, "[ i] f the supply of Russian technology is not stopped then within a year Iran would become self- sufficient and would be able to create those missiles on its own." 102

Mr. Einhorn summarized the dangerous consequences of continuing Russian missile assistance to Iran, stating, "Iran's acquisition of a long- range missile delivery capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would pose a grave threat to U. S. forces and friends, and to regional stability in general. We do not believe that

Russia has transferred any long- range missiles to Iran, but Iran is now not giving priority to importing complete missiles. Rather, it is actively seeking various types of technical assistance and cooperation that would enable it to produce its own long range missiles indigenously." 103

Transfer of Missile Components to Iraq

Twice in recent years, U. N. weapons inspectors have seized shipments of Russian missile guidance components in or enroute to Iraq. In November of 1995, Jordan seized 115 sets of Russian guidance components for long- range, intercontinental missiles (ICBM's) at the Amman airport. 104 The equipment was reportedly shipped in August of 1995 on flights originating in Moscow, and has been valued at over $25 million by the United Nations. 105 The Washington Post reported that U. S. and U. N. officials stated the components were clearly marked Russian-made. 106

About a month later, on December 9, 1995, divers working for the U. N. fished a second shipment of 30 Russian gyroscopes out of the Tigris River near Baghdad. 107 The gyroscopes came from the submarine-launched SS-N-18 ICBM, which has a maximum range of nearly 5,000 miles and can carry up to seven nuclear warheads. 108 The SS-N-18 is being destroyed under the terms of the START I treaty. 109

According to Vladimir Orlov, Director of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, research provided "100 percent certainty" that the 30 gyroscopes came from the Scientific Testing Institute of Chemical Machine Building, a plant north of Moscow that dismantles missiles from submarines under START I. 110 According to a report prepared by Orlov's center, the missile components were diverted after an unidentified Lebanese businessman offered to buy some of the equipment taken from the missiles. 111 A suburban Moscow company called TASM, headed by a retired general and specializing in delivery of optical equipment like binoculars and gun sights, from Russia's military industrial complex reportedly helped to facilitate the deal. 112

The report indicates fake documents were drawn up which labeled the gyroscopes as "electrical measuring equipment." The components were then shipped air freight to Jordan. 113 It is unclear how the gyroscopes were delivered to Iraq or why they were later dumped or hidden in the Tigris. According to Orlov, they were diverted to Iraq without the involvement of senior Russian officials. 114 Rather, he said, the smugglers and middlemen were motivated by profit and got through Russian customs without detection. 115

Moscow has denied all knowledge of the shipments, which would violate its pledge to adhere to both the MTCR and the trade embargo imposed on Iraq by the U. N. Security Council after the 1991 Gulf War. 116 As Mr. Einhorn told the Senate, "[t]hose gyroscopes, those guidance components that were found by [the U. N.] should not have been sent to Iraq. This was clearly a viola-tion of the embargo. The question is who is responsible for this violation." 117 Einhorn further noted that "... what we do know of it leads us to the conclusion that this was a kind of black market action, a ren-egade action, and not the con-scious decision of Moscow." 118

Iraq has denied purchasing the guidance components, but according to the Washington Post, documents obtained by the U. N. indicate the parts were ordered by the Karama research center near Baghdad, where Iraq continues to work on missiles with a range of less than 150 kilometers. 119 Such short- range missiles are allowed by the cease- fire resolutions approved by the U. N. 120

Iraq probably wanted to stockpile the guidance components until it could produce or acquire other components for a long- range missile. As Tim McCarthy, senior analyst at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, noted, sophisticated guidance components are a key element in the quest by Iraq and other countries to build missiles that can carry weapons of mass destruction. 121 "If you are developing a long- range missile, for instance, to hit London and Washington and New York, you have to guide it," McCarty said. 122 "It's very difficult to develop this technology indigenously. It requires tremendous exper-tise and equipment. You need high- technology guidance systems, and you need to purchase them." 123 If the guid-ance systems can be obtained, he added, they "... fill a gap the Libyans, Iraqis, and Iranians cannot fill themselves." 124

Conclusion

Russia has recently emerged as a principal supplier of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to countries of pro-liferation concern. Therefore, Moscow's cooperation is essential if the spread of these sensitive weapons technologies is to be curtailed.

Of particular concern is the transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran. As the Washington Post noted in an editorial on September 30, 1997, "There is no country that people everywhere would rather see without missiles and nuclear, chemical or biological warheads than Iran. The regime flouts the international rules and menaces other states with terrorism, subversion and anathema." 125

Despite Iran's dangerous reputation, Russia's leaders steadfastly defend their decision to sell nuclear reactors to Tehran. In September of 1997 Foreign Minister Primakov flatly stated, "[ w] e will build the nuclear power station in Bushehr. Nothing will change this stance as it has nothing to do with..." suspicions of unauthorized assistance to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. 126 He added: "At the same time, it [the Bushehr deal] is quite important for Russia in terms of the economy." 127 Although some transfers may have occurred without Moscow's approval, Russian nuclear deals with Iran and India appear to enjoy the backing of President Yeltsin and other senior officials.


"Iran's acquisition of a long-range missile delivery capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would pose a grave threat to U. S. forces and friends, and to regional stability in general. We do not believe that Russia has transferred any long range missiles to Iran, but Iran is now not giving priority to importing complete missiles. Rather, it is actively seeking various types of technical assistance and cooperation that would enable it to produce its own long range missiles indigenously."

Robert Einhorn, Dep. Asst. Secretary of State for Nonproliferation


Iran's interests are by no means limited to nuclear tech-nology. As the DCI noted in a recent report to Congress, "Iran continues to be one of the most active countries seek-ing to acquire all types of WMD technology and advanced conventional weapons. Its efforts in the last half of 1996 have focused on acquiring production technology that will give Iran an indigenous production capability for all types of WMD. Numerous interdiction efforts by the U. S. government have interfered with Iranian attempts to purchase arms and WMD- related goods, but Iran's acquisition ef-forts remain unrelenting." 128

The purchase of nuclear reactors from Russia and other nuclear facilities from China seem to be part of an effort to obtain and produce weapons of mass destruction. The reactor project will also provide Iran with the commercial cover necessary to purchase dual- use nuclear technologies. In addition, although Moscow has agreed to limit the scope of its nuclear dealings with Iran, and has canceled some forms of cooperation that were more directly useful militarily, reports indicate Moscow may not have complied fully with these restrictions. 129

On July 3, 1997, the Washington Post reported the Administration had privately complained to Moscow that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran exceeded the limits of President Yeltsin's promise two years earlier. 130 The Post said the U. S. complaint was based on "intelligence reports documenting a series of high- level technical exchanges between Russian and Iranian engineers and technicians," which covered mat-ters beyond the civilian nuclear reactors to be built at Bushehr. 131 The newspaper also quoted an unidentified U. S. official as saying, "from time to time, we get reports that the scope is not constrained." 132

Apparently Russian experts were still advising Iran on how to mine uranium ore and process it for eventual use in its nuclear program. 133 If Iran acquires the ability to mine and process uranium, it could either enrich it to weapons- grade material or use it to make fuel rods that could be irradiated to produce plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon. 134 Oil-rich Iran has little, if any, other use for this ore. The fact that Russian engineers and technicians are working in Iran on the Bushehr reactor project increases the concern that unauthorized transfers of nuclear equipment and expertise could occur.

Iran's increasingly advanced ballistic missile programs also pose an immediate threat. According to press reports and U. S. government officials, Russian assistance has been the critical accelerator of Iran's missile program and may enable Tehran to complete the 1,300 kilometer range Shahab- 3 missile, which could reach Israel, in as little as 12- 18 months. 135 Development of the 2,000 kilometer range Shahab- 4 could be completed in as little as three years, placing U. S. forces and friends as far away as Central Europe at risk from attack by ballistic missiles armed with mass destruction warheads. 136 Most troubling is an assessment that if the flow of Russian missile technology to Iran is not stopped within a year, Tehran's missile program will become largely self- sufficient and less vulnerable to international pres-sure. 137

Russia's disorderly transition from central planning toward the free market makes credible reports of the trans-fer of sophisticated missile guidance components to Iraq without government approval. While the extent of government approval is unclear in the case of missile assis-tance to Iran, Moscow is aware of the transactions, if only because of U. S. diplomatic protest notes and high-level discussions between American and Russian officials. During these talks, Russian officials, including President Yeltsin, deny any Moscow policy to assist Iran's missile program. But as Mr. Einhorn said in Senate testimony, "... the problem is this: There is a disconnect between those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we believe is actually occurring." 138

In light of persistent reports of Russian assistance to Iran's missile program, the pattern of assurances and flat denials by President Yeltsin and other senior Russian officials is troubling indeed. Russia must move beyond denials to controls which will stop the hemorrhage of missile technology over its borders. As Senator Carl Levin noted during a recent Senate hearing, "Russia needs to improve its ability and desire to root out and prevent proliferation. That may mean at times finding incentives for responsible behavior and disincentives for irresponsible behavior, whether at the government or private sector level." 139


"Russia is either incapable of controlling such [missile] exports, or is unwilling to control them, or both, in spite of such capability and willingness being key criteria for membership in the MTCR."

Richard Speier Former Bush Administration Official


Russia could, for instance, improve its export control system. As Mr. Einhorn said in Senate testimony, "Russian export controls are new, and clearly they need further strengthening." 140 But Russia has rejected such steps and has refused U. S. assistance. Mr. Einhorn fu-ther noted, "[ w] e have under the Nunn- Lugar program made funds available for export control assistance to Russia, and we have sought to interest the Russian government in a very serious technical exchange aimed at strengthening their capabilities in this area. And there has been some cooperation, but it has not gone very far, not because of a reticence on our part, but for a variety of reasons I think the Russian government is reluctant for us to be too closely engaged with them in this effort." 141

Former Bush Administration official Richard Speier assessed the situation in 1997, stating, "Russia is either incapable of controlling such [missile] exports, or is unwilling to control them, or both, in spite of such capability and willingness being key criteria for membership in the MTCR." 142 But the primary response of the Clinton Administration has been to engage in a series of high-level discussions with Russia, including the appointment of a special envoy to hold such talks on a regular basis.

While these talks continue, Iran's missile program is becoming self- sufficient and Tehran moves ever closer to the moment when it can launch ballistic missiles with chemical or biological warheads against Israel and U. S. forces. Despite Mr. Einhorn's testimony to the Senate, "[ p] ursuing our nonproliferation agenda with Russia will involve both incentives and disincentives," the Administration's incentives to influence Russia's behavior appear to consist entirely of continued Nunn- Lugar funding and abstaining from imposing sanctions. 143 Furthermore, the Administration has opposed calls from the U. S. Congress to use disincentives like economic sanctions and restrictions on U. S. aid.

The Administration can and should do more to halt the dangerous Russian- Iranian trade. As Richard Speier said, "I think what we are talking about is the question of the cost/ benefit calculus of these exports. If there is a penalty to making these exports then they are less likely to be made than if they get a free ride." 144 Speier also explained, "[ w] e really have not been too active in missile -related sanctions in recent years. If we were, we might see a different behavior on the part of these exporters." 145

That the Russian government may or may not have approved various transfers of missile technology to Iran should not be used to excuse this cooperation. Russia has a responsibility to control its own borders. The United States has offered assistance to improve Russian export controls and has shared sufficient intelligence with Mos-cow to enable the government to crack down on errant firms. But Russia has rejected U. S. export control assistance and has not halted the flow of missile technology to Iran.

Although the Israeli government has also held high-level talks with Russian officials, it has been more willing than the United States to use economic incentives and disincentives to influence Russian behavior. In September of 1997 Prime Minister Netanyahu suspended negotiations on a $4 billion natural gas purchase to protest the sale of nuclear and missile technology to Iran. 146 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin tried to downplay the cancellation, saying, "[ t] hey, not we, need the gas." 147 But Russia needs hard currency earnings to aid its ailing economy. Beyond applying economic disincentives, Israel has worked on its defense against the Iranian missile threat by accelerating development of the Arrow-2 theater missile defense system, pushing up deployment by a full year. 148

Throughout 1997, the U. S. Congress has urged the Administration to take stronger steps. In September of 1997, 33 Senators and 63 Representatives signed a letter to President Clinton stating, "[ t] he time has come for the United States to urge the Russian government to go further than merely investigate the origin of the allegations. We, therefore, call on the Administration to demand that the Russian government take appropriate steps." 149

The Administration's lack of success has prompted Congress to adopt a Concurrent Resolution in protest. The resolution, which was passed unanimously in the Senate and by a vote of 414 to 8 in the House of Representatives, called on Russia to halt assistance to Iran's missile program and said if Moscow did not do so "... the United States should impose sanctions on the responsible Russian entities." 150

Congress also placed restrictions on aid to Russia in the fiscal year 1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. 151 The legislation calls for withholding 50 percent of the aid for Russia unless the President certifies to Con-gress that "... the Government of Russia has terminated implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability." 152

If the President is unable to make this certification, he may still provide U. S. aid to Russia if he notifies Congress that, "... making such funds available (A) is vital to the national security interest of the United States, and (B) that the Government of Russia is taking meaningful steps to limit major supply contracts and to curtail the transfer of ..." nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran. 153

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have worked to forge closer ties and eliminate the animosity that characterized their relationship since the end of the Second World War. Together with this effort, the establishment in Russia of democratic institutions and a market economy will serve the long term interests of the United States. But the U. S. cannot overlook Russian sales of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to a radical regime in Tehran. As the Washington Post said in an editorial on September 30, 1997, "[ t] he many strands of American policy toward Russia slow the Clinton Administration's march on Iranian proliferation. This is wrong if it means American balance is making it easier to arm provocatively a regime whose hints of domestic moderation have yet to find reflection in its foreign policy. At some point Israel and Iran, like Israel and Iraq, must be brought into the circle of coexistence in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the deterrence of war by the denial of Ira-nian proliferation -- an objective Americans share with Israelis, Saudis, Europeans and many others -- comes first." 154

The Administration should do more than engage in discussions with Russia's leaders. Just as with China, sanctions alone will not stop proliferation. But allowing this trade to go on cost- free signals Russia that the United States is not as serious about nonproliferation as it pur-ports to be.

ENDNOTES

1 Director of Central Intelligence Report to Congress, "The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July- December 1996," June 1997, p. 6. Hereafter cited as DCI Report.

2 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7, and David Hoffman, "Russian Missile Gyroscopes Were Sold to Iraq," Washington Post, September 12, 1997, p. A1.

3 DCI Report, p. 6.

4 U. S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Hearing on Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, June 5, 1997, p. 4. Hereafter cited as Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies.

5 Lee Hockstader, "Rampages by Russian Troops Illustrate Army Erosion," Washington Post, June 4, 1997, p. A27.

6 "314 Suicides Reported by Russian Serviceman," Richmond Times- Dispatch, November 20, 1997, p. 4.

7 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 4.

8 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1; Bill Gertz, "Russian Missile Assurance Challenged," Washington Times, June 6, 1997, p. 10; David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35; Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washing-ton Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1.

9 Richard Boudreaux, "Russia Agrees to Stop Selling Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1995, p. A1, and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7.

10 Richard Boudreaux, "Russia Agrees to Stop Selling Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1995, p. A1.

11 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 6.

12 Martin Sieff, "Christopher Backs Aid to Russia, Hits Iran Deal," Washington Times, March 30, 1995, p. A21.

13 "Iran Now Paying Russia to Build Nuclear Reactor," Dow Jones News Service, Feb. 6, 1996.

14 "Russia Nuclear Plant in Iran to be Completed on Schedule," Deutsche Presse- Agentur, November 23, 1996, and Martin Sieff, "Re-port of Reactor Sale Leads to Probe," Washington Times, August 29, 1995, p. A7.

15 "Russia to Train Iranians for Nuclear Plant," Agence France-Presse, October 12, 1996.

16 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 11.

17 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7.

18 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 5.

19 "Russia Nuclear Plant in Iran to be Completed on Schedule," Deutsche Presse- Agentur, November 23, 1996.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 "Iran Sues Germany's Siemens Over Incomplete Nuclear Plant, Dow Jones News Service, August 28, 1996.

23 "Russia, China Brush Aside U. S. Objections," Dow Jones News Service, August 20, 1996.

24 "Russia to Invest $60 MLN in Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant," Interfax, June 4, 1996.

25 Ibid.

26 "Russia Nuclear Plant in Iran to be Completed on Schedule," Deutsche Presse- Agentur, November 23, 1996.

27 "Progress in Work on Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant," Dow Jones News Service, March 4, 1996.

28 "Iran Slow to Pay Russia for Plant, Sub," Defense Week, Janu-ary 16, 1996.

29 Mark Hibbs, "Russia- Iran Bushehr PWR Project Shows Little Concrete Progress," Nucleonics Week, September 26, 1996.

30 Ibid.

31 "Tehran, Russia Sign Accord Affecting Nuclear Deals," Reuters, December 24, 1996.

32 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1; David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35; David Hoffman, "Gore Says Probe Shows Iran Seeks Technology to Build Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, September 24, 1997, p. 26; Bill Gertz, "Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin," Washington Times, February 13, 1997.

33 "Russian Says Nuclear Exports to Reach $3.5 Bln by 2000," Dow Jones News Service, January 19, 1997.

34 "Russia is Very Cautious in Transfers of Nuclear Technology," Letter to the Editor by Vladimir Derbenev, Press Counselor, Russian Embassy, Washington D. C., Washington Times, March 9, 1995, p. A20.

35 Ibid.

36 James Phillips, "Iran's Ominous Nuclear Ambitions," Wash-ington Times, January 19, 1995, p. A18, and Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies.

37 Phillips, "Iran's Ominous Nuclear Ambitions," p. A18.

38 U. S. Department of Energy press release, June 27, 1994.

39 Andrei Ivanov, "Russia: Nuclear Reactor Sales On, Despite U. S. Objections," Inter Press Service, February 18, 1997, and Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Russian Reactors to Revive Flagging Energy Program," Inter Press Service, March 27, 1997.

40 Ibid.

41 "India: Gowda's Visit to Russia to Hasten Cryogenic Tech. Deal," The Hindu, March 25, 1997.

42 Ibid.

43 Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Russian Reactors to Revive Flag-ging Energy Program," Inter Press Service, March 27, 1997.

44 Ibid.

45 Andrei Ivanov, "Russia: Nuclear Reactor Sales On, Despite U. S. Objections," Inter Press Service, February 18, 1997, and Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Russian Reactors to Revive Flagging Energy Program," Inter Press Service, March 27, 1997.

46 "India Prime Minister: Will Keep Nuclear Options Open," Dow Jones News Service, September 9, 1997.

47 Andrei Ivanov, "Russia: Nuclear Reactor Sales On, Despite U. S. Objections," Inter Press Service, February 18, 1997.

48 Ibid.

49 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 12.

50 Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Russian Reactors to Revive Flagging Energy Program," Inter Press Service, March 27, 1997.

51 Ibid., and "Still No Nuclear Plant Deal Between Russia and India" Agence France- Presse, March 25, 1997,

52 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 17.

53 Richard Boudreaux, "Russia Agrees to Stop Selling Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1995, p. A1.

54 Ibid.

55 Alexsandr Krasulin, "Decree on Missile Technology Export Controls," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), August 18, 1995, p. 14.

56 "MTCR Expands," Arms Sales Monitor, December 5, 1995, p. 4.

57 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran By Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1; Bill Gertz "Russia Disregards Pledge to Curb Iran Missile Output," Wash-ington Times, May 22, 1997, p. 3; Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1; Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4; David Hoffman, "Gore Says Probe Shows Iran Seeks Technology to Build Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, September 24, 1997, p. 26.

58 Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1, and Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4.

59 U. S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing, September 18, 1997, p. 41.

60 Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4.

61 Bill Gertz," Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin," Washington Times, February 13, 1997.

62 Ed Blanche, "Israel Objects to Russian Missile Sales to Iran," Jane's Defense Weekly, March 12, 1997, and Carole Landry, "Netanyahu Urges Halt to Missile Transfers to Iran, Iraq, Syria...," Agence France- Presse, February 14, 1997.

63 Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1.

64 Ibid.

65 Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4.

66 Ibid.

67 Robin Wright, "Russia Warned on Helping Iran Missile Program," Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1997, p. A1.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 "Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin," Washington Times, February 13, 1997.

71 Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4.

72 Ibid., Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4, and "Russian Space Industry -- Samara Science and Technical Complex named after N. D. Kuznetsov," http://www.fas.org/spp/civil/russia/nkengine.htm, December 3, 1997.

73 Bill Gertz, "Russia Disregards Pledge to Curb Iran Missile Output," Washington Times, May 22, 1997, p. A3.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals," Washington Times, October 20, 1997, p. A1.

77 Ibid.

78 David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35, and Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1.

79 Ibid.

80 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1, and Bill Gertz, "Russian Missile Assurance Challenged," Washington Times, June 6, 1997, p. 10.

81 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1; David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35; David Hoffman "Gore Says Probe Shows Iran Seeks Technology to Build Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, September 24, 1997, p. 26; Bill Gertz, "Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin," Washington Times, February 13, 1997; "U. S. Gore Meets Kazakstan, Ukraine, Russia Leaders" Dow Jones News Service, June 23, 1997.

82 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1, and Bill Gertz, "Missiles in Iran of Concern to State," Washington Times, September 11, 1997, p. A1.

83 John Morrison, "Russia Still Giving Iran Missile Help -- Netanyahu," Reuters, November 11, 1997.

84 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1.

85 Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals," Washington Times, October 20, 1997, p. A1.

86 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Telling Russia to Bar Aid to Iran by Arms Experts," New York Times, August 22, 1997, p. A1; David Hoffman, "Gore Says Probe Shows Iran Seeks Technology to Build Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, September 24, 1997 p. 26; Anatoly Verbin, "Russia Deports Iranian for Trying to Buy Missile Designs," Reuters reprinted in Washington Times, November 25, 1997, p. A8; Bill Gertz, "U. S., Israel Target Missile Aid to Iran," Washington Times, September 13, 1997, p. A1.

87 Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1, and Anne Eisele, "Official Denies Russia Transfers Missile Technology to Iran," Defense News, Sep. 15- 21, 1997, p. 8.

88 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 15.

89 Ibid.

90 Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year," Defense News, Oct. 6- 12, 1997, p. 4, and Bill Gertz, "Gore Raises Sale to Iran with Chernomyrdin," Washington Times, February 13, 1997.

91 "Primakov Denies Russian Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Arms Projects," Interfax, September 15, 1997.

92 Ibid.

93 "Yeltsin Denies Helping Iran to Design Missiles," Reuters, September 26, 1997.

94 Anatoly Verbin, "Russia Deports Iranian for Trying to Buy Missile Designs," Reuters reprinted in Washington Times, Novem-ber 15, 1997, p. A8.

95 David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35, and Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Blocks Iran on Missiles," Associated Press, October 2, 1997.

96 Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Blocks Iran on Missiles," As-sociated Press, October 2, 1997.

97 David Hoffman, "Russia Says It Thwarted Attempt by Iran to Get Missile Technology," Washington Post, October 3, 1997, p. A35.

98 Ibid., and Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Blocks Iran on Missiles," Associated Press, October 2, 1997.

99 Anatoly Verbin, "Russia Deports Iranian for Trying to Buy Missile Designs," Reuters reprinted in Washington Times, Novem-ber 15, 1997, p. 8.

100 Ibid.

101 "Iranian Accused in Arms Case to Be Expelled From Rus-sia," Washington Post, November 18, 1997, p. A16.

102 John Morrison, "Russia Still Giving Iran Missile Help -- Netanyahu," Reuters, November 13, 1997.

103 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 5.

104 "Russia Denies Role in Alleged Iraq Missile Cargo," Reuters, December 9, 1995.

105 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U. N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq- Bound Military Equipment," Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p. A30.

106 Ibid.

107 David Hoffman, "Russian Missile Gyroscopes Were Sold to Iraq," Washington Post, September 12, 1997, p. A1.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.

116 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U. N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq- Bound Military Equipment," Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p. A30.

117 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 13.

118 Ibid.

119 R. Jeffrey Smith, "U. N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq- Bound Military Equipment," Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p. A30.

120 Ibid.

121 David Hoffman, "Russian Missile Gyroscopes Were Sold to Iraq," Washington Post, September 12, 1997, p. A1.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 "Those Iranian Missiles," Washington Post, September 30, 1997, p. A20.

126 "Primakov Denies Russian Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Arms Projects," Interfax, September 15, 1997.

127 Ibid.

128 DCI Report, p. 4.

129 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation with Iran," Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 U. S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing, September 18, 1997, p. 41.

136 Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, September 10, 1997, p. A1.

137 John Morrison," Russia Still Giving Iran Missile Help -- Netanyahu," Reuters, November 13, 1997.

138 Hearing, Proliferation: Russian Case Studies, p. 15.

139 Ibid., p. 3.

140 Ibid., p. 5.

141 Ibid., p. 16.

142 Ibid., p. 35.

143 Ibid., p. 6.

144 Ibid., p. 44.

145 Ibid.

146 Steve Rodan, "Israel Ban on Russian Sales Excludes De-fense Business," Defense News, Sep. 22- 28, 1997, p. 3.

147 Bill Gertz, "U. S., Israel Target Missile Aid to Iran," Wash-ington Times, September 13, 1997, p. A1.

148 "Israel to Deploy Arrow Missile a Year Early," Jane's De-fence Weekly, November 12, 1997.

149 U. S. Senator Jon Kyl, press release, "Sen. Kyl and Rep. Jane Harman Urge President to Act to Stop Russian Missile Sales to Iran," September 30, 1997.

150 U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 1997, p. S12064, and U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., p. H10123.

151 Library of Congress Web Site, "Bill Summary and Status for the 105th Congress," http://thomas.loc.gov/HR2159, December 8, 1997. The Act was adopted by the House and Senate on November 13, and signed into law by the President on November 26, 1997.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 "Those Iranian Missiles," Washington Post, September 30, 1997, p. A20.



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