AMERICAN MISSILE PROTECTION ACT OF 1998

Congressional Documents

59 010 Calendar No. 345
105 th Congress 2d Session
SENATE Report 105 175

April 24, 1998.--Ordered to be printed

Mr. Thurmond , from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the

following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany S. 1873]

[Includes cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (S.

1873) having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without

amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

S. 1873 would establish that it is the policy of the United States to

deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile

Defense (NMD) system capable of defending the territory of the United

States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,

unauthorized, or deliberate).

S. 1873 does not mandate specific architectural elements of the NMD

system, specific deployment dates, or changes to any arms control

agreements. It allows the Defense Department complete flexibility in

designing the NMD system, and, according to the Congressional Budget

Office, ``the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary impact.''

SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

The Committee is reporting S. 1873 to the Senate for the following

reasons:

Value of national missile defense

A commitment to deploying NMD will have two crucial impacts on the

security of the United States. First, it will signal to nations that

aspire to possess ballistic missiles with which to coerce or attack the

United States that pursuit of such capabilities is a waste of both time

and resources. In this sense, it will have a deterrent effect on

proliferation. Second, if some aspiring states are not deterred, a

commitment to deploy an NMD system will ensure that American citizens

and their property are protected from limited ballistic missile attack.

Need for a national missile defense

Current administration policy on NMD--embodied in the so-called

``3+3'' ``Deployment Readiness'' program--assumes that the United States

will be able to clearly discern the emergence of a ballistic missile

threat to the United States in sufficient time to deploy a defense. The

Committee's review found that this policy bases the security of the

United States against ballistic missile attack on three faulty premises:

(1) that no threat currently exists or is emerging; (2) that when a

threat does emerge, it will be clearly discernable; and (3) that when

the threat emerges or is emerging, the United States will have

sufficient time to put a defense in place to deal with it. S. 1873 would

rectify this insufficient policy by basing the security of the United

States against the extant and emerging threat of ballistic missile

attack on a firmer foundation, committing to deployment of NMD as soon

as the technology is ready.

As the findings in S. 1873 clearly document, a threat of ballistic

missile attack on the United States already exists. Although unlikely,

the threat of unauthorized or accidental launches from Russia or China

is real, and may be heightened as the armed forces of former Soviet

Union undergo their transition to a post-Cold War posture.

But there is also an imminent threat that stems from the growing,

widely acknowledged proliferation problem. The President has for four

consecutive years declared the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and their delivery systems to be a national emergency. The

seriousness of this problem has been articulated on numerous occasions

by other senior administration officials and by Congress.

Evidence of this growing threat abounds. The range of ballistic

missiles possessed by proliferant states has been steadily increasing,

sometimes in sudden leaps. North Korea, for example, first purchased 300

kilometer (short-range) Scud-B missiles in the 1980s, then developed the

500 kilometer Scud-C, is now deploying the 1000 kilometer No-Dong, and

is developing both a 2000 kilometer medium-range ballistic missile and a

6000 kilometer intercontinental ballistic missile. Most recently, Iran

has made dramatic and sudden progress in its Shahab-3 and Shahab-4

medium range ballistic missiles, and Pakistan recently tested a missile

with a range of 1500 kilometers, five times greater than its next most

capable missile.

The proliferation of technology, expertise and hardware with which to

build a long-range ballistic missile is accelerating rapidly, spurred by

advances in information technology and growing demand for space launch

vehicles, which is essentially a ballistic missile without warheads. A

stark reminder of this surfaced on April 4, 1998, when the New York

Times reported that the Justice Department has launched a criminal

investigation into two American companies whose technical assistance,

intended to troubleshoot a failed satellite launch rocket, instead may

have helped China solve critical guidance problems with its

intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to a Pentagon assessment,

because of this assistance ``U.S. national security has been harmed.''

Continuing technological surprise

The Intelligence Community has been repeatedly surprised by advances

in ballistic missile technology achieved by less developed countries,

calling into question its ability to anticipate precisely when the

United States will be threatened by long-range ballistic missiles. In

1997, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) testified that Iran

could have a medium-range missile by 2007. One year later the DCI told

the Senate, ``since I testified, Iran's success in getting technology

and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous
Iranian advances, means that it could have a medium-range missile much

sooner than I assessed last year.'' A Department of State official

testified in September, 1997 that Iran could develop this missile in

``maybe one to one-and-a-half years, and it may be shorter than that,''

meaning as much as nine years sooner than had been predicted only a year

earlier by the DCI.

Experience has shown that variables like the amount of outside

assistance provided to rogue nations--factors which can significantly

speed the acquisition of ballistic missiles--cannot be predicted

reliably. On April 6, 1998, for example, Pakistan launched a ballistic

missile capable of reaching a range of 1500 kilometers. In November

1998, the Defense Department published ``Proliferation: Threat and

Response,'' its analysis of the world's weapons of mass destruction and

delivery systems. That publication contained no mention of any effort by

Pakistan to develop such a capability, crediting Pakistan with, at best,

a 300 km. short-range ballistic missile. Yet less than six months later,

Pakistan successfully launched a missile with five times the range of

its previous most capable weapon. Pakistan claims its achievements were

indigenous, the government of India charges China with providing

assistance, and United States government officials suggest North Korea

may have provided the technology for the Ghauri missile. Whatever the

source of technological aid, one thing is clear: the United States has

once again been surprised by the ballistic missile achievements of

another state.

There are numerous other examples of our intelligence community's

uneven record in anticipating ballistic missile developments in other

countries. This does not suggest incompetence or a lack of diligence on

the part of the Intelligence Community, which is staffed by competent

and dedicated people. But it underscores that evidence of technological

developments is often difficult to obtain, and that even when such

evidence is available, it is oftentimes difficult to discern just what

it means until after the fact. Indeed, the DCI told the Senate in 1997

that ``gaps and uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly when

`rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''

Given this track record, the Committee believes the security of

American lives and property cannot be based on a hope that the United

States will see the next major advance in ballistic missiles long before

it is available to coerce or harm our nation. There may be other

ballistic missiles in development now that seem as far off today as the

Shahab-3 seemed to the DCI only a year ago.

Deployment preparedness is questionable under current policy

Despite United States experience with the technical challenges

presented by missile defense, the administration's policy of not

committing to NMD deployment is based on the assertion that the United

States can continue to tinker indefinitely with NMD technology, and at

any time after 2000 deploy a system within three short years. The

Committee believes this assertion is faulty for at least two reasons.

First, ``technology development'' does not necessarily lead to

deployment readiness. The purpose of a United States acquisition program

is, according to DOD regulation 5000.2, to ``provide the needed

capability to the warfighter in the shortest practical time.'' This

means that alternative technological approaches must be narrowed, and

critical design trade-offs made so that the system can advance toward

deployment. The absence of an end-point--a deployment goal--eliminates

the driving force that moves a system towards readiness for the field.

Second, the U.S. experience has shown that missile defenses are well

within the realm of technical possibility but still technically

challenging. The administration's assertion that it will be able to

spring from technology development to a deployed capability in three

years does not accord with experience.

It is an inefficient aberration of DOD policy and practice to manage

a Major Defense Acquisition program so that it goes into a circling

pattern at some point in its development while awaiting the Intelligence

Community's detailed characterization of some future threat. The United

States is developing and deploying the F 22, for example, because a new

air superiority fighter will be

necessary in the middle of the next decade. Development of

this aircraft is not being put on hold while the United States awaits

information on the thrust-to-weight ratio or low observability of a new

enemy fighter that might appear at some time in the future. The United

States does not take this approach with any other Major Defense

Acquisition Program other than NMD.

Testifying on NMD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology told the House Military Procurement and Military Research and

Development Subcommittees in February, 1998, ``There will be a system

deployed. There is absolutely no question the nation will have to have

missile defense in the future. The question is when.'' Given the

inevitability of the need for NMD, acknowledged by the administration,

the Committee believes the NMD program must be put on a more rational

acquisition path, which includes a commitment to deploy as soon as the

technology is ready.

Summary

The Committee believes the need for deployment of NMD is clear. The

threat exists and continues to grow. The United States has been

regularly surprised at the pace and character of its progress. The

ability of the United States to clearly discern those threats well in

advance of their arrival is limited. And confidence in our ability to

respond rapidly to these threats must be tempered by realistic

assessments of the technical challenges and the ability of the technical

community to deal with them. S. 1873, by committing to deployment of

NMD, will ensure the United States is prepared to meet that threat.

COMMITTEE ACTION

In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as

amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, there is set

forth below the committee vote to report the American Missile Protection

Act of 1998 (S. 1873).

In favor: Senators Thurmond, Warner, McCain, Coats, Smith,

Kempthorne, Inhofe, Santorum, Snowe and Roberts.

Opposed: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Glenn, Byrd, Robb and

Cleland.

Not Voting: Senator Lieberman.

Vote: 10 7.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

On April 15, 1998, the Congressional Budget Office issued a cost

estimate for S. 1873. According to this estimate ``the bill, by itself,

would have no budgetary impact.'' The complete cost estimate and cover

letter from the Congressional Budget Office are shown below.

U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, April 22, 1998.

Hon. S trom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

D ear Mr. Chairman: T he Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has

prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1873, the American Missile

Protection Act of 1998.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to

provide them. The CBO staff contact is Raymond Hall.

Sincerely,

June E. O'Neill, Director.

Enclosure.

S. 1873--American Missile Protection Act of 1998

S. 1873 would state that it is U.S. policy to deploy as soon as

technologically possible an effective national missile defense system

capable of defending the United States against limited ballistic missile

attack.

CBO estimates that the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary

impact. Because it would not affect direct spending or receipts,

pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. Any budgetary impact would

stem from separate implementing legislation or from annual authorization

and appropriation bills. How the costs of implementing the policy

enunciated in S. 1873 would compare with costs likely to be incurred

under current law would depend on the systems and time frame required by

subsequent legislation.

Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 excludes from

the application of that act any legislative provisions that are

necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that all

provisions of this bill fit within that exclusion.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Raymond Hall. This

estimate was approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant Director

for Budget Analysis. AEMD11 AF

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate

requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in

the report on the bill. The committee finds that there is no regulatory

impact in the cost of S. 1873.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

S. 1873 does not include any changes in existing law.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR SMITH

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I chair, has looked closely

at the challenges of creating a workable and adequate schedule for

national missile defense, as well as at the threats which impel these

programs. I strongly believe that the threat is here today and growing.

This legislation calls for placing national missile defense on the same

footing as any other defense system: an executable program based on

sound technology in response to a real threat. It should be adopted.

During the Armed Services Committee's deliberations regarding S. 1873

it was asserted that this legislation would commit the United States to

deploying a National Missile Defense (NMD) system without considering

issues related to cost, technology, the threat of arms control. These

views were also expressed, to varying degrees, in letters to the

committee from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. A

careful reading of S. 1873 reveals these assertions to be without basis.

Establishing a policy to deploy an NMD system as soon as

technologically possible in no way means that a rigorous acquisition

program should not be followed. Quite the opposite is true: it

specifically implies that such a program would be implemented. Every DOD

acquisition program must pass a series of technical reviews, undergo

strict cost and operational effectiveness assessments and be able to

complete rigorous testing at every stage of the program. S. 1873 would

in no way alter this for NMD. In this sense, S. 1873 would require the

NMD system to become a more ``normal'' acquisition program than is

currently the case with the Clinton Administration's ``3+3'' program,

which the Director of BMDO has characterized as an ``extremely high

risk'' approach.

Regarding the ABM Treaty, nothing in S. 1873 requires or encourages

the United States to abrogate or violate the ABM Treaty. However, the

bill would make clear that discussions between Russia and the United

States must commence relatively soon so that the sides can develop a

cooperative path for amending or otherwise altering the existing ABM

Treaty to allow for deployment of a limited NMD system. Such discussions

are necessary since it now appears that no NMD system capable of

defending all 50 states can be deployed within the current ABM Treaty

restrictions. The ``3+3'' program, on the other hand, allows the parties

to defer commencement of such discussions until such time as the threat

requiring deployment of an NMD system is imminent. In all likelihood, as

a result of this situation, the United States would be faced with a

choice of abrogating the treaty or not deploying an NMD system at all.

This would create forced and unstable conditions for ABM negotiations, a

situation detrimental to both U.S. and Russian interests.

If the administration is concerned about cost and technical risk, it

should welcome S. 1873. Under ``3+3'' the United States might have to

deploy an NMD system four years from now, even though such a program

would be virtually impossible to implement. Indeed, if ``3+3'' were a

real program, this is precisely what DOD would have to do, since a new

threat to the United States before the year 2003 has already been

forecast as possible by the Intelligence Community. Such a program would

truly be what the Welch report called a ``rush to failure.'' The policy

envisioned in S. 1873, on the other hand, would allow DOD to develop a

program characterized by adequate testing and risk reduction. The

timeframe associated with such a program would certainly be adequate to

address concerns regarding the ABM Treaty.

As the Senate considers the red herring arguments concerning cost,

technology, the threat and the ABM Treaty, it is important to bear in

mind that S. 1873 would establish an overarching policy, not a detailed

implementation plan. That would appropriately be left to the Department

of Defense. This was recognized by the Congressional Budget Office when

it concluded that ``the bill, by itself, would have no budgetary

impact.'' As CBO correctly noted, costs would be determined by

subsequent legislation. Since most of this legislation would be annual

authorization and appropriation bills, the administration would play a

key role in determining the cost and schedule of the systems being

developed.

In the end, the only legitimate argument against S. 1873 is one based

on outright opposition to ever deploying an NMD system. If this is the

true basis for opposition to this bill it should be publicly stated and

not cloaked in misleading rhetoric related to issues not even addressed

by the legislation.

Bob Smith. AEMD11 AF

ADDITIONAL VIEWS FROM SENATOR COATS

I fully support the essential policy position of S. 1873; namely,

that we must deploy an effective National Missile Defense as soon as

technologically feasible. However, I am concerned that the program may

suffer from the high-risk development approach that already has led to

significant delays in operational capability in the theater

high-altitude air defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) systems.

According to the Welch Panel's Report on Reducing Risk in Ballistic

Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, the failures have had little to do

with technology. Rather, the panel cites an approach to general planning

and execution that is ``inconsistent with the complexity of the task.''

The panel goes on to state that the additional risk inherent to a

concurrent development approach has ``produced little discernible

benefit and has actually delayed operational capability.''

Such delays--and the increased expense that they necessarily

entail--would be an issue of concern at any time, but are especially

worrisome in this era of fixed defense budgets.

I believe it's time to get things back on track. Missile defense is a

difficult, complex endeavor, and we need to pursue far more rigorous

test and development regimes as a consequence.

Dan Coats.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS LEVIN, KENNEDY, BINGAMAN, GLENN, BYRD, ROBB,

AND CLELAND

We cannot support S. 1873, the ``American Missile Protection Act of

1998,'' as it has been reported to the Senate by the Armed Services

Committee. In our view, and in the view of the Secretary of Defense and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this legislation would

undermine the carefully designed National Missile Defense (NMD)

development and acquisition program currently in place by making a

deployment decision now, before development is completed, without

permitting consideration of all the critical factors that should inform

a deployment decision. The result, in the worst case, could be to cause

an increase in ballistic missile threats to the United States and a

decrease in our security.

The key provision of the bill is the statement of policy in Section 3:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as

soon as is technologically possible an effective National

Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of

the United States against limited ballistic missile attack

(whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate).

We share Secretary of Defense Cohen's commitment to ensuring the

American people receive protection from missile threats to the United

States when they need it. That is why we support the current National

Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is also known as the

``3 plus 3'' program. Under this program the Defense Department is

developing the technology for the NMD system for three years so that it

will be in a position to make a deployment determination in fiscal year

2000. If there is a threat that warrants deployment, if the system is

cost-effective, and if deployment would not jeopardize arms reduction

agreements, the system could be deployed in three years, or as early as

fiscal year 2003. If these conditions do not warrant deployment, the

technology would continue to be developed to improve the capability of

the system that could be deployed if and when deployment is warranted.

Last year the Congress endorsed the 3 plus 3 NMD program in the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 by requiring the

Secretary of Defense to structure the NMD program in order to meet the 3

plus 3 goals, and to provide Congress with his plan for doing so.

S. 1873 is inconsistent with the 3 plus 3 NMD program in a number of

very significant ways: it ignores the issue of the likelihood and extent

of ballistic missile threats to the United States; it ignores the issue

of affordability and cost-effectiveness; and it ignores the impact on

current and future arms reduction agreements. These points are made in

letters provided to the Committee by Defense Secretary William Cohen,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, and Defense

Department General Counsel Judith Miller, which are included at the end

of these views.

The threat

One of the critical factors affecting any decision to deploy a

national missile defense system should be an assessment of the threat to

be countered by such a system. If there is not a threat sufficient to

warrant deployment of an NMD system, the United States can continue to

develop the NMD technology so that the capability of the system

continues to improve. This is the current DOD plan, which we believe

makes sense.

By committing to deploy an NMD system solely on the basis of whether

it is ``technologically possible'', S. 1873 ignores the issue of whether

there is any threat that warrants deployment. In his letter to the

Committee, dated April 21, 1998, Secretary Cohen noted that S. 1873

``would alter the `3 plus 3' strategy so as to eliminate taking into

account the nature of the threat when making a deployment decision. This

could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less capable of

defending the American people if and when a threat emerges. Because of

this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the bill.''

There are two concerns about the missile threat to the United States:

the emergence of a rogue nation missile threat to the United States, and

the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental missile launch from

Russia or China, the only two nations other than Great Britain and

France with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that can reach

the United States today.

As Secretary Cohen noted earlier this year in his Annual Report to

the President and the Congress, the threat of an ICBM reaching the

United States from a country other than Russia or China in the next 15

years is currently very low:

The Intelligence Community has concluded that the

only rogue nation missile development which could conceivably

have the range to strike the United States is the North Korean

Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or the

far-western Hawaiian Islands, but the likelihood of its being

operational by 2005 is very low. With this exception, no

country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will develop

or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years

that could threaten the United States, although outside

assistance is a wild card that could shorten time lines to

deployment.

Some have questioned the ability of the Intelligence Community to

accurately assess the emergence of a ballistic missile threat to the

United States. These questions, however, are generally based on examples

of short- or medium-range theater ballistic missile developments which

do not pose a direct threat to the United States, rather than on

long-range ICBMs.

It is important to understand the distinction between theater

ballistic missiles and ICBMs. The examples of unanticipated missile

developments cited by the majority in this report are theater-range

systems that cannot be converted into ICBMs. The United States has a

vigorous and robust program of theater missile defenses--which we

support--that are designed to counter the growing theater missile threat

that exists today. ICBMs have considerably more indicators of

development than these short- or medium-range systems, take considerably

longer to develop and test, and are more easily tracked by the

Intelligence Community.

Our senior military leaders have a high degree of confidence that our

Intelligence Community will be able to provide sufficient warning of an

ICBM threat to the United States to allow us to deploy effective

defenses. In General Shelton's letter of April 21, 1998, he states:

I disagree with the bill's contention that the

United States ability to anticipate future ballistic missile

threats is questionable. It is possible, of course, that there

could be surprises, particularly were a rogue state to receive

outside assistance. However, given the substantial

intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am

confident that we will have the 3 years' warning upon which

our strategy is based.

Similarly, General Howell Estes, the Commander in Chief of the North

American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Space Command who

would have operational command of any NMD system, testified to the

Committee last year:

Let me reemphasize that the Administration 3 plus 3

program will enable us to deploy an NMD system in time to

field a missile defense system before the threat places our

citizens at risk.

The United States Intelligence Community also believes the risk of an

accidental or unauthorized launch by a declared nuclear power is highly

unlikely. George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified

in open session last year that the Intelligence Community assessment is

that it is a ``remote'' risk because of considerable precautions or

procedures taken by Russia and China.

General Eugene Habiger, Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic

Command, reinforced this view when he testified to the Committee this

year on the Russian command and control measures, which he has witnessed

first-hand, to prevent an accidental or unauthorized launch of an ICBM

against the United States. He has publicly stated that Russia has some

mechanisms and procedures more stringent than our own for nuclear

command and control. General Habiger, who has had a unique opportunity

to visit Russian strategic nuclear weapon bases--including an ICBM base,

a strategic submarine base, a bomber base, a nuclear command and control

center, and a nuclear weapon storage site--has stated publicly that he

does not worry about accidental or unauthorized launches from Russia.

Affordability and cost-effectiveness

S. 1873 also completely ignores the question of cost-effectiveness

and affordability. In effect, it decides now to deploy a system,

regardless of the cost and regardless of whether the system is

cost-effective. This is the first instance we know of where Congress

would legislatively mandate the deployment of a military weapon system

before it is developed and

before we know what it will eventually cost and whether it is

cost-effective.

Any decision to deploy a national missile defense system should

include an understanding of the system's cost and its

cost-effectiveness. It would be very unwise to commit to deployment and

then discover that the cost was unaffordable. Likewise, if there is no

threat warranting deployment, deploying the first technology possible

may require considerable additional expense to deploy a more capable

system later if the threat requires it. As Secretary Cohen pointed out

in his letter to the Committee, a premature decision to deploy an NMD

system ``could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less capable

of defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.''

General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, made the same point when he testified before the Committee last

year that the current 3 plus 3 NMD program is structured to deploy the

most capable and cost-effective system if and when we need it:

The NMD Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the

potential for an effective National Missile Defense System. If

the decision is made to deploy a NMD system in the near term,

then the system fielded would provide a very limited

capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be

avoided, DOD can continue to enhance the technology base and

the commensurate capability of the NMD system that could be

fielded on a later deployment schedule. The objective here is

to be in a position to be three years away from deployment, so

America can respond to the emergence of a threat. This

approach fields the most cost-effective capability that is

available at the time the threat emerges.

A premature decision to deploy an NMD system would also have serious

consequences for funding higher priority military programs. In her

letter to the Committee, DOD General Counsel Judith Miller concludes:

``Commitment to deploy now, in the absence of a threat, would divert

vital defense funds from more pressing military needs and would result

in premature commitment to a technological option that may be outdated

when the threat emerges.''

Arms control impact

Finally, S. 1873 ignores the impact of deciding to deploy a national

missile defense system on arms control reductions, and thus ignores the

possibility that deployment might stop the reduction of hundreds of

ICBMs and SLBMs with thousands of warheads that would otherwise not be

able to threaten us. Before making any deployment decision, we should

understand the impact of deployment on arms reductions.

If we deploy an NMD system that violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile

(ABM) Treaty, Russia is likely to withdraw from START I and not ratify

START II. In May, 1996, General Shalikashvili wrote to the Committee,

``I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will result in

Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons,

thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may face.''

In its December, 1997 report, the Congressionally-mandated National

Defense Panel concluded that ``Defensive systems will be more effective

if they are coupled to arms control agreements that limit offensive

capabilities.'' Before we decide to deploy an NMD system, we should

understand the security implications of deployment. We certainly do not

want to deploy a system that decreases our security.

General Shelton's letter of April 21 concludes with a crucial point

about elements of the current hedge strategy embodied in the 3 plus 3

program that would be ignored and undermined by S. 1873: ``Finally, the

bill does not consider affordability or the impact a deployment would

have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms reductions. Both points

are addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness Program and should be

included in any bill on NMD. [emphasis added]''

Conclusion

S. 1873 would commit the United States to deploy a national missile

defense system before we know what the nature of the threat will be at

the time of deployment; before we know the cost of such a system and the

impact that funding this system would have on other high priority

military programs; and before we know whether the decision to deploy

such a system would jeopardize current and future nuclear arms

reductions.

We share the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision to deploy a national missile

defense system before it is even developed is a decision we do not need

to, and should not, make at this time, particularly without considering

the threat, the cost and the impact on nuclear arms reductions.

For these reasons, we cannot support S. 1873, and we urge the Senate

to reject this legislation. As the senior civilian and military

leadership of the Defense Department have clearly and repeatedly stated,

the current 3 plus 3 National Missile Defense program is a prudent

course to address the problem of emerging ballistic threats to the

United States.

Carl Levin.

Ted Kennedy.

Jeff Bingaman.

John Glenn.

Robert C. Byrd.

Chuck Robb.

Max Cleland.

The Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.

Hon. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your request for the

views of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, the American Missile

Protection Act of 1998.

The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we properly

protect the American people and America's national security interests.

This requires that we have a carefully balanced defense program that

ensures that we are able to meet threats to our people and vital

interest wherever and whenever they arise. A key element of our defense

program is our National Missile Defense (NMD) program, which as you know

was restructured under Secretary Perry and with the support of Congress

as a ``3+3'' deployment readiness program. Under this approach, by 2000

the United States is to be in a position to make a deployment decision

if warranted by the threat, and if a decision to deploy were made at

that time the initial NMD system would be deployed by 2003. If in 2000

the threat assessment does not warrant a deployment decision,

improvements in NMD system component technology will continue, while an

ability is maintained to deploy a system within three years of a

decision.

The Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed this approach, although it

also determined that the ``3+3'' program was inadequately funded to meet

its objectives. Accordingly, I directed that an additional $2.3 billion

be programmed for NMD over the Future Years Defense Plan. It must be

emphasized, though, that even with this additional funding, NMD remains

a high risk program because the compressed schedule necessitates a high

degree of concurrency.

I share with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American people

receive protection from missile threats how and when they need it. S.

1873, however, would alter the ``3+3'' strategy so as to eliminate

taking into account the nature of the threat when making a deployment

decision. This could lead to the deployment of an inferior system less

capable of defending the American people if and when a threat emerges.

Because of this, I am compelled to oppose the adoption of the bill.

Please be assured, however, that I will continue to work closely with

the Senate and House of Representatives to ensure that our NMD program

and all of our defense programs are designed and carried out in a manner

that provides the best possible defense of our people and interests.

Sincerely,

Bill Cohen,

Secretary of Defense.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Washington, DC, April 21, 1998.

Hon. Carl M. Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the

American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873). I agree that the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery

systems poses a major threat to our forces, allies, and other friendly

nations. U.S. missile systems play a critical role in our strategy to

deter these threats, and the current National Missile Defense (NMD)

Deployment Readiness Program (3+3) is structured to provide a defense

against them when required.

The bill and the NMD program are consistent on many points; however,

the following differences make it difficult to support enactment. First

and most fundamental are the conditions necessary for deployment. The

bill would establish a policy to deploy as soon as technology allows.

The NMD program, on the other hand, requires an emerging ballistic

missile threat as well as the achievement of a technological capability

for an effective defense before deployment of missile defenses.

Second, the bill asserts that the United States has no policy to

deploy an NMD system. In fact, the NMD effort is currently a robust

research and development program that provides the flexibility to deploy

an initial capability within 3 years of a deployment decision. This

prudent hedge ensures that the United States will be capable of meeting

of need for missile defenses with the latest technology when a threat

emerges.

Third, I disagree with the bill's contention that the U.S. ability to

anticipate future ballistic missile threats is questionable. It is

possible, of course, that there could be surprises, particularly were a

rogue state to receive outside assistance. However, given the

substantial intelligence resources being devoted to this issue, I am

confident that we will have the 3 years' warning on which our strategy

is based.

Fourth, the bill uses the phrase ``system capable of defending the

territory of the United States.'' The NMD program calls for defense of

only the 50 states. Expanding performance coverage to include all U.S.

territories would have considerable cost, design, and location

implications.

Finally, the bill does not consider affordability or the impact a

deployment would have on arms control agreements and nuclear arms

reductions. Both points are addressed in the NMD Deployment Readiness

Program and should be included in any bill on NMD.

Please be assured that I remain committed to those programs that

discourage hostile nations from the proliferation of WMD and the

missiles that deliver them. In that regard, I am confident that our

current NMD program provides a comprehensive policy to counter future

ballistic missile threats with the best technology when deployment is

determined necessary.

Sincerely,

Henry H. Shelton,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Counsel of the

Department of Defense,

Washington, DC, April 20, 1998.

Hon. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for the views

of the Department of Defense on S. 1873, 105th Congress, a bill, ``To

state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a

missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United

States against limited ballistic missile attack.''

The Department of Defense and the Administration object to the

American Missile Protection Act of 1998. In response, the Department of

Defense would note that the Administration's National Missile Defense

Deployment Readiness Program is correct, prudent, and positions the

United States to deploy a defense when a threat emerges.

S. 1873 would seek to make it United States policy ``to deploy as

soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense

system capable of defending the territory of the United States against

limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or

deliberate).''

The Administration's National Missile Defense program is premised on

the view that not only must the technology be developed to allow for an

effective defense, but that deployment should be based on an emerging

rogue ballistic missile threat to the United States. To do otherwise is

to waste scarce Defense resources and to forego deploying the most

effective defense when the threat actually emerges.

The Intelligence Community has concluded that a long-range ballistic

missile threat to the United States from a rougue nation, other than

perhaps North Korea, is unlikely to emerge before 2010 but could be

accelerated if those nations acquired this capability from beyond their

borders. The Intelligence Community concluded that the only rogue nation

missile in development that could strike the United States is the North

Korean Taepo Dong 2, which could strike portions of Alaska or the

far-western Hawaiian Islands. However, as Secretary Cohen stated in his

1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the likelihood of

the Taepo Dong 2 being operational by 2005 is very low. The

Administration is not complacent about this assessment. The National

Missile Defense program is designed to account for the uncertainty about

when and where threats may emerge by developing a National Missile

Defense capability that can be deployed well ahead of this estimate. The

Administration agrees that the United States must work to defend all 50

states against potential limited missile threats from rogue nations. The

National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program will position the

United States to deploy an initial capability as early as 2003. But, the

Administration opposes S. 1873 because it would commit the United States

to deploy a National Missile Defense system in the absence of an

emerging rogue state ballistic missile threat. The crucial difference is

in timing of a deployment decision. Commitment to deployment now, in the

absence of a threat, would divert vital defense funds from more pressing

military needs and would result in premature commitment to a

technological option that may be outdated when the threat emerges.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint

of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the

presentation of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

Judith A. Miller.