Index




                               Appendix 3

Related Documents:
    Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
      Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
      Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972)...................   424
    Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral 
      Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States 
      of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
      the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (May 26, 1972)...   427
    Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the 
      United States of America and the Government of the Union of 
      Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a 
      Standing Consultative Commission (December 21, 1972).......   430
    Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America 
      and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
      Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3, 1974)   431
    Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or 
      Destruction and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and 
      Their Components (July 3, 1974)............................   432
    Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures 
      Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and 
      Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components 
      of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976).........................   433
    Agreed Statements of November 1, 1978........................   434
    Statement by U.S. SCC Commissioner Buchheim..................   436
    Statement by Soviet SCC Commissioner Ustinov.................   437
    Common Understanding of June 6, 1985.........................   438
    Standing Consultative Commission Documents (September 26, 
      1997)......................................................   438
    Five-Year ABM Treaty Reviews.................................   440
    Public Law 106-38--July 22, 1999, Short-Titled the ``National 
      Missile Defense Act''......................................   453
    Statement by the President of the United States on Signing 
      Public Law 106-38..........................................   454
    Statement by Senator Thad Cochran on the Statement of the 
      President of the United States on Signing Public Law 106-38   454
    Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess 
      the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States..........   456
    June 16, 1997 Letter from Chairman Gilman to President 
      Clinton and November 21, 1997 response from the President..   476
    March 3, 1998 Letter from Chairman Gilman and Chairman Helms 
      to President Clinton and May 21, 1998 response from the 
      President..................................................   479
    August 14, 1998 Letter from Chairman Gilman to President 
      Clinton, October 5, 1998...................................   481
    Letter from Senators Lott, Helms, Nickles, Mack, Craig, 
      Coverdell, Kyl, and Smith to President Clinton, and 
      December 17, 1998 response from the President..............   482
    Presidential Message 35 (May 14, 1997).......................   484
    Presidential Message 36 (May 14, 1997).......................   485
    Condition #9 of Executive Report 105-1, Resolution of 
      Ratification for the Flank Document to the Conventional 
      Armed Forces in Europe Treaty..............................   485





S. Hrg. 106-339 BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations <snowflake> Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director (ii)
APPENDIX 3 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972 Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972 Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972 Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty. Article II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are: (a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed. Article III Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above- mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars. Article IV The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges. Article V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Article VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward. Article VII Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Article VIII ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Article IX To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. Article X Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Article XII 1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms. 2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five- year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty. Article XV 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: richard nixon President of the United States of America for the union of soviet socialist republics: l. i. brezhnev General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU ______ AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING TILE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES 1. Agreed Statements The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added): Agreed Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems [A] The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained. [B] The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million. [C] The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers. [D] In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. [E] The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead. [F] The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. [G] The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the United States and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. 2. Common Understandings Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations: A. Location of ICBM Defenses The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: ``The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.'' In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].) B. ABM Test Ranges The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that ``the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.'' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to ``additionally agreed test ranges'' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges. On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to ``additionally agreed'' test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges. C. Mobile ABM Systems On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on development of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. sides interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971? On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter. D. Standing Consultative Commission Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972: The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treatys Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,\1\ agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow- on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971. Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could --------------------------------------------------------------------------- agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding. E. Standstill On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents. In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval. The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement. 3. Unilateral Statements The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation: A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position. B. Tested in an ABM Mode On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term ``tested in an ABM mode,'' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of ``tested in an ABM mode,'' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be ``tested in an ABM mode'' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria. C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self- explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution. D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the United States would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to- air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement. ______ MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission. II. The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures. III. Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary. IV. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner. V. The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate. VI. The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed. Done in Geneva, on December 21, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the Government For the Government of the of the United States of America Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics ______ PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975 Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976 Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976 Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976 Entered into force May 24, 1976 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972, Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security, Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti- ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol. 2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article 111(b) of the Treaty. Article II 1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years of periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once. 2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty. 3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission. Article III The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty. Article IV This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: richard nixon President of the United States of America for the union of soviet socialist republics: l.i. brezhnev General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU ______ PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol. The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines: 1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; 2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; 3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction; 4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars; 5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty; 6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and 7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement. This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET OF AMERICA: SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Secretary of State Minister of Foreign Affairs ______ SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS OF JULY 3, 1974 Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and in implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment to this Supplementary Protocol. This Supplementary Protocol and the attached Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Supplementary Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. DONE at Geneva on October 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. COMMISSIONER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ______ Geneva--November 1, 1978 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION agreed statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached mutual understanding regarding the following: I. test ranges referred to in article iv of the treaty 1. The test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are any test ranges at which an ABM system or at least one ABM launcher, regardless of whether or not it contains an ABM interceptor missile, or one ABM radar is located or constructed for purposes of testing. 2. Any other types of weapons or military equipment may also be located at such test ranges for testing according to their mission or for range safety purposes. Such location, testing, or use of these other types of weapons or military equipment, provided it is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, shall not constitute a basis for considering them ABM system components. 3. The current test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are those test ranges which each Party had on the date of signature of the Treaty, that is, on May 26, 1972. Both the USA and USSR had on May 26, 1972, and have at the present time, two current test ranges: for the USA in the vicinity of White Sands, New Mexico, and on Kwajalein Atoll and for the USSR in the vicinity of Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 4. Each Party may establish test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty as ``additionally agreed'' and locate therein for testing ABM systems or their components as they are defined in Article II of the Treaty, provided that the establishment of such ranges is consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and, in particular, with the obligations of each Party provided for in Article I of the Treaty not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense. 5. In the event of establishment of an additional test range by either Party, the Party carrying out such action shall provide, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, notification of the location of such a test range no later than thirty days after the beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with locating or constructing at that test range an ABM launcher or antenna (array), ABM radar antenna structures, or an antenna pedestal support which is not a part of an ABM radar building. After presentation of such notification and, if necessary, clarification in the Standing Consultative Commission of any aspects of this notification which are not clear to the Party being notified, the test range being newly established will be considered an ``additionally agreed test range,'' referred to in Article IV of the Treaty. II. the term ``tested in an abm mode'' used in the treaty 1. The term ``tested in an ABM mode,'' which is used in Article II of the Treaty for defining ABM system components, refers to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, which are tested in an ABM mode separately or in conjunction with other ABM system components after the date of signature of the Treaty, that is after May 26, 1972. The term does not refer to components which were tested by the Parties in an ABM mode prior to that date. 2. Testing in an ABM mode is the testing, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty regarding locations of ABM systems or their components, is carried out only at test ranges or in an ABM system deployment area, for the purpose of determining the capabilities of an ABM system or its individual components (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars) to perform the functions of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. 3. As applied to testing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the term ``strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,'' used in the Treaty, also refers to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements. 4. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' used in Article II of the Treaty refers to: (a) an ABM interceptor missile if while guided by an ABM radar it has intercepted a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory regardless of whether such intercept was successful or not; or if an ABM interceptor missile has been launched from an ABM launcher and guided by an ABM radar. If ABM interceptor missiles are given the capability to carry out interception without the use of ABM radars as the means of guidance, application of the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to ABM interceptor missiles in that event shall be subject to additional discussion and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission; (b) an ABM launcher if it has been used for launching an ABM interceptor missile; (c) an ABM radar if it has tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guided an ABM interceptor missile toward them regardless of whether the intercept was successful or not; or tracked and guided an ABM interceptor missile; or tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM radar, which is tracking a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guiding an ABM interceptor missile toward them or is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile. 5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section shall be applied taking into account Article VI, subparagraph (a), of the Treaty concerning the obligations of the Parties not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM system components, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, or to radars, including phased-array radars, used for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification. 6. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. 7. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to a radar, including a phased-array radar, which is not an ABM radar or a radar referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, if strategic ballistic missiles or their elements passed through the field of view of the radar while it was operating in accordance with its mission, and it was not, at that time, performing functions inherent only to an ABM radar, and it was not functioning in conjunction with an ABM radar. In the event that ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, the Parties, in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will consider such questions in the Standing Consultative Commission and resolve them on a mutually acceptable basis. 8. Deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except as provided in Articles III and IV of the Treaty, to carry out any functions would be inconsistent with the obligation of each Party not to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country. III. utilization of air defense radars at the test ranges referred to in article iv of the treaty 1. Utilization of air defense radars located at or near a test range to carry out air defense functions, including providing for the safety of that range, is not limited by the provisions of the Treaty and is independent of the testing carried out at that range. 2. When air defense components and ABM system components are co- located at a test range, the Parties, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, will refrain from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system components at that range. 3. In utilizing air defense radars as instrumentation equipment at test ranges the Parties will not use such radars to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. ______ STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER BUCHHEIM November 1, 1978 Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed. FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that: (a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to, in Article IV of the ABM Treaty; (b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing; (c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty; (d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode. If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty. ______ STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER USTINOV November 1, 1978 Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed. FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that: (a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty; (b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing; (c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty; (d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode. If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty. ______ Geneva--June 6, 1985 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COMMON UNDERSTANDING related to paragraph 2 of section iii of the agreed statement of november 1, 1978, regarding certain provisions of articles ii, iv, and vi of the treaty between the united states of america and the union of soviet socialist republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems of may 26, 1972, and the utilization of air defense radars at the test ranges referred to in article iv of that treaty In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto, in further development of the agreement recorded in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, with a view to precluding the possibility of ambiguous situations at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty, have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additionally agreed that: each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of such a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components located at that range; in agreeing to the foregoing the Parties recognize the possibility of circumstances--the appearance of a hostile or unidentified aircraft--in which, for the purpose of providing for air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense components, located at the test range for carrying out air defense functions including providing for range safety, may arise unexpectedly during the launch of a strategic ballistic missile to the area of the test range or during the launch of an ABM interceptor missile at that range. Should such an event occur, the Party which had such a concurrent operation will, as soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification to the other Party describing the circumstances of the event. It will, if necessary, on a voluntary basis, also inform the other Party about the event or hold consultations with it within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, as provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission. This Common Understanding constitutes a component part of the agreement reached between the Parties with regard to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and does not affect other provisions of that Agreed Statement or the provisions of the common understandings thereto reached by Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission on November 1, 1978. The provisions of this Common Understanding will be used by the Parties in their implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, beginning on the date of signature of this Common Understanding, that is, June 6, 1985. COMMISSIONER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ______ September 26, 1997 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 The United States of America, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to for purposes of this Memorandum as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Successor States, Recognizing the importance of preserving the viability of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, with the aim of maintaining strategic stability, Recognizing the changes in the political situation resulting from the establishment of new independent states on the territory of the former USSR, Have, in connection with the Treaty, agreed as follows: Article I The United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty. Article II The USSR Successor States shall assume the rights and obligations of the former USSR under the Treaty and its associated documents. Article III Each USSR Successor State shall implement the provisions of the Treaty with regard to its territory and with regard to its activities, wherever such activities are carried out by that State, independently or in cooperation with any other State. Article IV For purposes of Treaty implementation: (a) the term ``Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'' shall mean the USSR Successor States; (b) the terms ``national territory'' and ``territory of its country'' when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the combined national territories of the USSR Successor States, and the term ``periphery of its national territory'' when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the periphery of the combined national territories of those States; and (c) the term ``capital'' when used to refer to the capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, shall continue to mean the city of Moscow. Article V A USSR Successor State or USSR Successor States may continue to use any facility that is subject to the provisions of the Treaty and that is currently located on the territory of any State that is not a Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State, and provided that the use of such facility shall remain consistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Article VI The USSR Successor States shall collectively be limited at any one time to a single anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployment area and to a total of no more than fifteen ABM launchers at ABM test ranges, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents, including the Protocols of July 3, 1974. Article VII The obligations contained in Article IX of the Treaty and Agreed Statement ``G'' Regarding the Treaty shall not apply to transfers between or among the USSR Successor States. Article VIII The Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, shall function in the manner provided for by the Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, as well as by the Regulations of the Conmiission, which shall reflect the multilateral character of the Treaty and the equal legal status of the Parties in reaching decisions in the Commission. Article IX 1. This Memorandum shall be subject to ratification or approval by the signatory States, in accordance with the constitutional procedures of those States. 2. The functions of the depositary of this Memorandum shall be exercised by the Government of the United States of America. 3. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date when the Governments of all the signatory States have deposited instruments of ratification or approval of this Memorandum and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. 4. Each State that has ratified or approved this Memorandum shall also be bound by the provisions of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: Madeleine Albright for the republic of belarus: I. Antonovich for the republic of kazakhstan: K. Tokayev for the russian federation: Y. Primakov for ukraine: H. Udovenko ______ September 26, 1997 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION FIRST AGREED STATEMENT RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached agreement on the following: 1. Land-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, other than anti- ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively, shall be deemed, within the meaning of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty, not to have been given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to have been tested in an ABM mode, if, in the course of testing them separately or in a system: (a) the velocity of the interceptor missile does not exceed 3 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; (b) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile does not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and (c) the range of the ballistic target-missile does not exceed 3,500 kilometers. 2. The Parties have additionally agreed on reciprocal implementation of the confidence-building measures set forth in the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997. 3. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: Stanley Riveles for the republic of belarus: S. Agurtsou for the republic of kazakhstan: K. Zhanbatyrov for the russian federation: V. Koltunov for ukraine: 0. Rybak ______ COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS RELATED TO THE FIRST AGREED STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1997, RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 I. The term ``interceptor missile,'' as used in the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile: (a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or (b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or (c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target-missile. With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches. II. The provisions of paragraph 1 of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, do not supersede or amend any provision of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and do not alter the meaning of the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' as that term is used in the Treaty, including the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978. III. The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth. IV. The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec. These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof. ______ September 26, 1997 STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SECOND AGREED STATEMENT RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty, Expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, Emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, Recognizing the fundamental significance of the Treaty for the above objectives, Recognizing the necessity for effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, Considering it their common task to preserve the Treaty, prevent its circumvention and enhance its viability, Relying on the following principles that have served as a basis for reaching this agreement:
  • the Parties are committed to the Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability;
  • the Parties must have the option to establish and to deploy effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, and such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the Treaty;
  • systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles may be deployed by each Party which will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party and which will not be tested to give such systems that capability;
  • systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles will not be deployed by the Parties for use against each other; and
  • the scale of deployment--in number and geographic scope--of systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles by any Party will be consistent with programs for ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles confronting that Party; Have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, hereinafter referred to as systems covered by this Agreed Statement, reached agreement on the following: 1. Each Party undertakes that, in the course of testing, separately or in a system, land-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and radars, of systems covered by this Agreed Statement, which are not anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, respectively: (a) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile will not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory; and (b) the range of the ballistic target-missile will not exceed 3,500 kilometers. 2. Each Party, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings related to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy space-based interceptor missiles to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, or space-based components based on other physical principles, whether or not part of a system, that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles. 3. In order to enhance confidence in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall implement the provisions of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, with respect to systems covered by this Agreed Statement and not subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement on the date of its entry into force. Each such system shall become subject to the provisions of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement no later than 180 days in advance of the planned date of the first launch of an interceptor missile of that system. All information provided for in the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement shall initially be provided no later than 30 days after such a system becomes subject to the provisions of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement. 4. In order to ensure the viability of the Treaty as technologies related to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles evolve, and in accordatice with Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties undertake to hold consultations and discuss, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, questions or concerns that any Party may have regarding activities involving systems covered by this Agreed Statement, including questions and concerns related to the implementation of the provisions of this Agreed Statement. 5. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: Stanley Riveles for the republic of belarus: S. Agurtsou for the republic of kazakhstan: K. Zhanbatyrov fpr the russian federation: V. Koltunov for ukraine: O. Rybak ______ COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS RELATED TO THE SECOND AGREED STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1997, RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 I. The term ``interceptor missile,'' as used in the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a missile: (a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or (b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or (c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a ballistic target-missile. With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches. II. The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to the Earth. III. The Parties have agreed that for the purposes of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec. IV. For systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, that become subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the Parties understand that, in connection with the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, detailed information on such systems shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties. These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute an integral part thereof. ______ September 26, 1997 AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER BALLISTIC MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES The States that have signed this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Desiring to promote reciprocal openness, greater trust between the Parties, and the preservation of strategic stability, Declaring their intention to implement, on a reciprocal basis, confidence-building measures with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, Have agreed as follows: I. General Provisions 1. Systems subject to this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America--the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and the Navy Theater-Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program, known to the other Parties by the same names; for the Russian Federation--the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; for the Republic of Belarus--the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; for Ukraine--the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; and other systems as agreed upon by the Parties in the future. 2. The Parties shall conduct an initial exchange of information and notifications, as provided for in this Agreement, no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement, reflecting the status as of the date of its entry into force, and update this information annually, unless otherwise agreed. Information shall be updated reflecting the status as of January 1 of each year and provided no later than April 1 of each year. II. Notifications 1. Each Party shall provide notifications to the other Parties of test ranges and other test areas where launches of interceptor missiles of systems subject to this Agreement will take place. Notifications of test ranges and other test areas shall include the names of ranges (test areas) and their locations. Such notifications shall be provided either within 30 days after entry into force of this Agreement, or no later than 90 days in advance of the first launch of an interceptor missile of a system subject to this Agreement at each test range (test area). 2. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Parties of each launch of an interceptor missile of systems subject to this Agreement, if during that launch a ballistic target-missile is used. In this connection: (a) an interceptor missile launch notification shall specify the name of the test range (test area) where the interceptor missile launch will take place; the type (designation) of the interceptor missile; the planned date of the interceptor missile launch; the planned launch point of the interceptor missile (geographic coordinates; for air-based systems the geographic coordinates of the projection of the planned launch point of the interceptor missile onto the Earth's surface shall be specified); the planned launch point of the ballistic target-missile (geographic coordinates); (b) each interceptor missile launch notification shall be provided no later than 10 days in advance of the planned date of the interceptor missile launch and shall be effective for seven days beginning with the planned date of that launch; and (c) if the launch of the interceptor missile will not occur or has not occurred within the specified 7-day period, the Party that planned to carry out the launch of the interceptor missile shall provide a notification thereof no later than 24 hours after the expiration of the 7-day period. Such a notification shall state that the interceptor missile launch has not occurred and shall either specify a new launch date, which will establish the beginning of a new 7-day period, or state that a notification of a new launch date will be made in accordance with the procedure specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. III. Demonstrations of Systems and Observations of Tests Any Party may on a voluntary basis arrange, for any other Party or Parties, a demonstration of its systems or their components subject to this Agreement or an observation of their tests. In each specific case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the purpose of, and the arrangements for, such demonstrations and observations. IV. Assurances Each Party shall provide assurances that it will not deploy systems subject to this Agreement in numbers and locations so that these systems could pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party. The measures used to provide such assurances shall include: 1. Each Party shall provide to the other Parties, in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties, an assessment of the programs with respect to the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, other than strategic ballistic missiles, confronting that Party. 2. For each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information: (a) the name, type (designation), and basing mode of the system as well as of its interceptor missiles, launchers, and associated radars; (b) the general concept of operation; the status of plans and programs; and, in addition, for systems in testing, the number of systems it plans to possess; the information shall be provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties; (c) the class and type of basing platform: (i) for land-based systems: the number of launchers in a battalion; (ii) for sea-based systems: the class and type of each ship, and the number of launchers on a ship of that class capable of launching interceptor missiles of each type; (iii) for air-based systems: the type of each aircraft, and the number of interceptor missiles each aircraft is capable of carrying; (d) the number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher. 3. For components of each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information: (a) for a completely assembled interceptor missile: the number of stages, the length, the maximum diameter, the type of propellant (solid or liquid), maximum velocity demonstrated during launches, and the length and diameter of the interceptor missile launch canister; (b) for the interceptor missile launcher: the maximum number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher; and (c) for the radar: the frequency band (in designations adopted by the International Telecommunication Union) and potential, expressed as a value that is not exceeded by the radar's potential. The potential of a radar shall mean the product of its mean emitted power in watts and its antenna area in square meters. V. Additional Voluntary Measures Each Party may provide on a voluntary basis any other information or any other notifications not specified elsewhere in this Agreement. The topics, amount, and time frame for such information and notifications shall be such as each Party determines. VI. Implementation of the Agreement 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission established in accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, shall consider: (a) issues concerning implementation of the obligations assumed under this Agreement, as well as related situations which may be considered ambiguous; and (b) amendments to the provisions of this Agreement and other possible proposals on further increasing its viability. 2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center channels or the equivalent government-to-government communications links for providing the notifications and for exchanging the information provided for in Sections II, IV and V of this Agreement. VII. Confidentiality Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information provided pursuant to this Agreement except with the express consent of the Party that provided such information. VIII. Entry into Force and Duration This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and shall remain in force so long as either of those Agreed Statements remains in force. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: Stanley Riveles for the republic of belarus: S. Agurtsou for the republic of kazakhstan: K. Zhanbatyrov for the russian federation: V. Koltunov for ukraine: O. Rybak ______ September 26, 1997--New York City STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT ON THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER BALLISTIC MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES 1. The Parties understand that in implementing the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, each Party will provide information annually on the status of its plans and programs with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles that includes: (a) whether or not that Party has plans before April 1999 to test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/ sec over any part of their flight trajectory; (b) whether or not that Party has plans to develop such systems with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air- based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; and (c) whether or not that Party has plans to test such systems against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles. 2. The Parties understand that should any Party have questions or concerns regarding activity related to any change in the statement on plans of any other Party, the Parties will, in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty, and Section VI of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, conduct consultations, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss such questions or concerns, as well as possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty, including possible proposals to amend the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997. S.R. (United States of America) S.A. (Republic of Belarus) K.Z. (Republic of Kazakhstan V.K. (Russian Federation) O.R. (Ukraine) ______ September 26, 1997 REGULATIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION In accordance with Article VIII of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have agreed as follows: I. 1. Each Party shall have the right to be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. 2. Each Party shall designate a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, and such members, advisors, and experts of its delegation to the Commission as it deems necessary. 3. Each Party shall have the right to participate in all activities of the Commission. II. 1. At any time, Commissioners may raise for discussion any matter that is within the competence of the Commission. 2. Commissioners may also, at any time, transmit to or request from the other Commissioners, oral or written communications. 3. Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of matters to be raised for discussion in the Commission. 4. Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings of a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed. 5. Each Party may direct that the authorities and functions of a Commissioner may be exercised by a Deputy Commissioner or other authorized person. 6. The Commission may establish working groups to undertake such activities as it may direct, including studying and preparing specific matters. III. 1. The Commission shall be convened for sessions no less than twice a year. Such sessions proposed during the intersessional period shall be convened on a date, no later than 45 days after the date initially proposed, and with a duration agreed to by the United States of America and at least one other Party. 2. Agreement on the commencement date and duration of a forthcoming session may be reached by consensus during a session in progress. 3. During the intersessional period, any Commissioner may propose convening a session of the Commission by making a proposal or counter- proposal to the other Commissioners on the commencement date and duration of the forthcoming session at least 30 days in advance of the proposed commencement date of the session. 4. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall include all matters proposed by any Commissioner and communicated to the other Commissioners in advance of the session. Any matter raised during the session by any Commissioner may be considered in the Commission. 5. Sessions of the Commission shall be held in the city of Geneva, unless otherwise agreed. IV. 1. Any matter within the competence of the Commission may be the subject of an agreement. 2. Agreements may be recorded in any form acceptable to the Parties participating in the session. 3. The negotiation of the text of an agreement during a session of the Commission shall be done on the basis of consensus of the Parties participating in the session. 4. The United States of America shall notify, through diplomatic channels, all Parties not represented in a session of the Commission, of the final text of an agreement no later than 15 days after the final text has been negotiated in that session of the Commission. 5. A Party shall approve an agreement negotiated in the Commission by signing it in the Commission or by submitting an instrument of approval. In addition, an agreement shall be considered approved by a Party if it fails to submit a diplomatic note in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of this Section, or if its objections are withdrawn pursuant to subparagraph 7(b) or paragraph 8 of this Section. 6. Each agreement negotiated in the Commission shall be considered adopted when all Parties have approved the agreement in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section and shall enter into force on the date of its adoption, unless all Parties have agreed on a later date. 7. A Party that has not approved an agreement negotiated during a session of the Commission shall be bound by the agreement in one of two ways: (a) if it submits an instrument of approval to all other Parties; or (b) if it fails to submit a diplomatic note, specifying its objections to the agreement, to all other Parties within 30 days after receipt of a notification pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section. Withdrawal of all of its objections by a Party shall be regarded as its approval of that agreement. 8. Any diplomatic note submitted in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of this Section shall include the express intention of the objecting Party to address its objection in the next session of the Commission. Failure of an objecting Party to attend such session shall be considered its withdrawal of its objection unless that objection is renewed by diplomatic note to all other Parties prior to the closing of that session. 9. If the text of an agreement, negotiated in the Commission in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, is amended in order to resolve any Party's objection or for any other reason, the amended agreement shall constitute a new agreement subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Section. V. 1. Matters raised and discussed in the Commission, as well as the results of discussions, and any agreements reached, may be recorded in documents which shall be done in English and Russian, both texts being equally authentic, and each Party shall be provided with a complete set of such documents. 2. The Commission shall conduct its proceedings in private and may not make its proceedings public without the express consent of all Commissioners. The texts of agreements adopted by the Parties may be made public, unless otherwise agreed. 3. The official languages of the Commission shall be English and Russian. 4. Each Party shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission. VI. 1. These Regulations shall supersede the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission approved in accordance with the Protocol of May 30, 1973. The provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall apply to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of these Regulations. 2. These Regulations shall enter into force simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. The Commission may revise, repeal, or replace these Regulations to the extent and in such manner as the Commission deems necessary. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. for the united states of america: Stanley Riveles for the republic of belarus: S. Agurtsou for the republic of kazakhstan: K. Zhanbatyrov for the russian federation: V. Koltunov for ukraine: O. Rybak ______ Geneva--November 21, 1977 COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972 In accordance with the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties to the Treaty, together conducted a review of the Treaty after five years of its operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from November 4 to November 21, 1977, in a special session of the Standing Consultative Commission which was convened for that purpose. The Parties agree that the Treaty is operating effectively, thus demonstrating the mutual commitment of the USA and the USSR to the goal of limiting nuclear arms and to the principle of equal security, serves the security interests of both Parties, decreases the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, facilitates progress in the further limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, and requires no amendment at this time. The Parties note, in connection with the conduct of the review, that during the aforementioned period of operation of the Treaty consultations and discussions have been held in the Standing Consultative Commission on matters pertaining to promoting the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty. These consultations and discussions have been productive and useful in clarifying the mutual understanding of the Parties concerning certain provisions of the Treaty, in working out appropriate procedures for implementation of its provisions, and in resolving a number of questions related to complete and precise implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Mindful of their obligation to conduct together a review of the Treaty at five-year intervals, the Parties will continue the process of consultation concerning the implementation, as well as the enhancement of the viability and effectiveness, of the provisions of the Treaty. The Parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and their resolve to maintain and further increase the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. ______ Geneva--December 15, 1982 COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE SECOND REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI- BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Pursuant to the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties together conducted a review of the Treaty after its second five-year period of operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from November 9, 1982, to December 15, 1982, in a session of the Standing Consultative Commission specially convened for that purpose. During the course of the review, the Parties carefully examined the Preamble and Articles of the Treaty and Protocol and evaluated their implementation in the period covered by the review. The United States and the Soviet Union each reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty, and to the process of consultation within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission to promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974. ______ Geneva, Switzerland--August 31, 1988 United States Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third Review of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions of that Treaty. The Review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August 31, 1988. The U.S. Delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. During the Review, the United States emphasized the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the viability of the Treaty. Throughout the Review Conference, the Soviet Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands. Specifically, the United States discussed with the Soviets its serious concern that the Soviet Union's deployment of a large phased- array radar near Krasnoyarsk constitutes a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty. Such radars take years to build and are a key to providing a nation-wide defense--which is prohibited by the Treaty. The Treaty's restrictions on the location, orientation, and functions of such radars are, thus, essential provisions of the Treaty. Hence, the Krasnoyarsk violation is very serious, particularly when it is recognized that the radar constitutes one of a network of such radars that have the inherent potential for attack assessment in support of ballistic missile defense. In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The United States has been urging the Soviet Union for more than five years, both in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Treaty and in other diplomatic channels, to correct this clear violation by dismantling the radar. During the Review, the U.S. outlined the specific Soviet actions necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. The United States has also made clear that the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. The United States has observed a slowdown in construction, but this slowdown, or even a full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact of the violation. The United States cannot continue indefinitely to tolerate this clear and serious Treaty violation. The violation must be corrected. Until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, it will continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses. Nothing that occurred during the Review Conference or its completion should be interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty. Since the Soviet Union was not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference, the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing violation a material breach of the Treaty. In this connection, the United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future. During the ABM Treaty Review, the United States also discussed the violation of the ABM Treaty involving the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. The U.S. also reserves its rights to respond to this violation in an appropriate and proportionate manner. The United States also discussed with the Soviet Union a number of ABM-related compliance concerns, the totality of which suggests that the Soviet Union may be preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. This is a particularly serious concern. As the President has noted, such a development ``would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its capability.'' The U.S. continues to have deep, continuing concerns about the implications of the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty. As President Reagan observed in December 1987: No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. . . . correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters. The U.S. will not accept Soviet violations or a double standard of Treaty compliance, and reserve the right to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future. ______ September 1, 1988 Soviet Statement in Connection with the Third Review of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, talks were held in Geneva August 24-31, 1988 between representatives of the USSR and the United States to review the Treaty after another five years of its operation. The Soviet side proceeded on the basis that the review should lead to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which is of key significance for ensuring further progress in the disarmament sphere and strengthening strategic stability and international security. The preservation and strengthening of this Treaty is the common concern of its participants--the USSR and the United States. The USSR delegation conducted all the discussions in a non- confrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable decisions both as regards the political reaffirmation of the sides' commitment to the objectives and tasks of the Treaty, and as regards the quest for concrete technical decisions that could lead to the removal of mutual concerns in unclear situations that have arisen in the exchange of opinions between the sides. The Soviet delegation sought to ensure that the reaffirmation of commitment to the Treaty and the agreed outlines concerning ways of eliminating the two sides' concerns would be reflected in a joint statement or communique, that would be published as a result of the review of the Treaty's operation. Unfortunately, this proved impossible because of the American side's reluctance to give practical consideration to the Soviet side's concerns and its desire to reduce the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the Kranoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist. On the basis of the results of the discussion, the American side published a unilateral statement which gives an unobjective assessment of the existing situation. The present statement by the USSR delegation sets forth the facts that give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions that took place. On the question of the radar station under construction in the Krasnoyarsk region, the Soviet side once again confirmed that this station is intended for the tracking of space objects and does not come under the ABM Treaty restrictions. Despite this, the United States continues to attribute missile attack warning functions to it. These American claims are based not on facts, but on assumptions, and subjective evaluations. In order to show goodwill, and in an attempt to remove the concern that had arisen on the part of the United States, we expressed readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that would be verifiable and would cause the United States no doubts, if an accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. The American side also expressed concern in connection with the relocation of individual components of radar stations known in the United States as ``Pawn Shop'' and ``Flat Twin'' from the Sary Shagan testing range to the Gomel region, which the American side regards, without foundation, as the start of the deployment of ABM radar stations. On the basis of the facts we cited and a visit by U.S. official representatives to the Gomel region, the American side saw for itself that in fact the individual components of the ``Flat Twin'' radar station and the ``Pawn Shop'' van are being used in the region in question in order to set up measurement testing grounds for the testing and tuning of mirror antennas that are used widely in the country's national economy. These operations are in no way contrary to the ABM Treaty. At the same time, we stated that in the context of removing the two sides' concerns over questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side would be prepared for a radical solution to the question of the remaining individual components of the ``Flat Twin'' radar station and the ``Pawn Shop'' van to which the American side refers. The American side once again raised the question that the Soviet Union could be preparing an ABM defense system for its territory. Here, the assertions cited earlier were enumerated, assertions to which the Soviet side had supplied the necessary replies. Neither any one of the questions raised individually nor all of them together provide grounds for the expression of such concern by the United States. The Soviet side also submitted a number of constructive proposals which, in the event of their implementation, would promote the resolution of other questions raised on both sides, namely:
  • To draw up an accord to the effect that the sides would inform each other beforehand about plans for the construction of large phased-array radar stations and indicate their purpose.
  • To agree on features making it possible to distinguish ABM radar stations from other radar stations.
  • To draw up procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ABM radar stations on testing ranges.
  • To permit Soviet representatives to visit the American radar station in Greenland and the construction of a launch site for ``balloon rockets'' on Shemya Island, to enable the Soviet Union to study on the basis of factual material .U.S actions which, according to the information available, it assesses either as a violation of the Treaty (the Greenland radar station) or as a situation causing concern (the Shemya Island construction site). Unfortunately, our proposals did not meet with a positive response from the American side. Contrary to the true state of affairs, it continues to issue unfounded denials or to claim that it does not see that serious Soviet concerns exist with regard to U.S. compliance with Treaty commitments. The American side did not respond to some of our proposals, and its answers on the other questions cannot be deemed satisfactory. Nor did the American side show willingness to take any steps to rectify the violations of the ABM Treaty which it has conmiitted. Since 1975, the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the U.S. deployment of large phased-array radar stations of the ``Pave Paws'' type on U.S. territory and elsewhere. The essence of our concern is that these large radar stations have parameters sufficient to carry out the tasks of ABM radar stations. In conjunction with the radar station at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a radar base for an ABM defense of US territory, which is incompatible with the provisions of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty prohibiting the creation of a base for ABM defense of the country's territory. Particular concern is caused on the Soviet side by the U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of a new ``Pave Paws'' large phased-array radar station in Greenland after the Treaty came into force, and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain. Under the ABM Treaty, the deployment of large phased-array radar stations having a potential exceeding 3 million watts is strictly regulated, taking into account the purpose of such radar stations. Missile attack warning radar stations with the above characteristics are permitted to be deployed only on the periphery of the national territory, oriented outward. The American large phased-array radar station at Thule (Greenland) has a potential considerably in excess of 3 million watts. The Thule region does not constitute a position on the perimeter of U.S. national territory. The American side itself has indicated that the radar station at Thule is intended for missile attack warning. Consequently, the deployment of a large phased-array radar station in the Thule region is a violation of the ABM Treaty. The construction that has begun of a similar radar station at Fylingdales (Britain) is a similar violation. The Soviet side also expressed other concerns with regard to U.S. compliance with the provision of the ABM Treaty. Seeking to find solutions to the specific issues that have arisen, the Soviet side demonstrated in practice its readiness to eliminate the two sides' concerns. Naturally, the quest for solutions should take place on a reciprocal basis and should not distract attention from the most important thing--the sides' reaffirmation of their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty. Through no fault of ours, it proved impossible to achieve positive solutions to the questions examined at the talks. However, the Soviet side believes that joint efforts with the aim of seeking fundamental solutions could be continued, and we will work toward this. In particular a mechanism established by the Treaty exists for the examination of concerns expressed by the sides--the Standing Consultative Commission. The next session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva in the fall of this year should be used specifically for this work, including work in accordance with instructions that could be given to the Standing Consultative Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the USSR Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State. ______ October 1, 1993 JOINT COMMUNIQUE: FOURTH REVIEW OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY The Fourth Review of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems was conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, from September 27 to October 1, 1993. The delegations that were present at the Review, representing the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, exchanged views on the operation of the Treaty, on rights and obligations under the Treaty, and on the question of state succession. Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty. ______ PUBLIC LAW 106-38--JULY 22, 1999 113 STAT. 205 Public Law 106-38 106th Congress An Act To declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``National Missile Defense Act of 1999''. SEC. 2. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY. It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense. SEC. 3. POLICY ON REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES. It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Approved July 22, 1999. _______________________________________________________________________ legislative history H.R. 4 (S. 257) (S. 269): house reports: No. 106-39, Pt. 1 (Comm. on Armed Services). senate reports: No. 106-4 accompanying S. 257 (Comm. on Armed Services). congressional record, Vol. 145 (1999): Mar. 18, considered and passed House. May 18, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of S. 257 May 20, House concurred in Senate amendment. weekly compilation of presidential documents, Vol. 35 (1999): July 23, Presidential statement. ______ For Immediate Release--July 23, 1999 THE WHITE HOUSE office of the press secretary STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT I have signed into law H.R. 4, the ``National Missile Defense Act of 1999.'' My Administration is committed to addressing the growing danger that rogue nations may develop and field long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies. Section 2 of this Act states that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for NMD. By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, the legislation makes clear that no decision on deployment has been made. This interpretation, which is confirmed by the legislative record taken as a whole, is also required to avoid any possible impairment of my constitutional authorities. Section 3 of the Act states that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Thus, section 3 puts the Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, reaffirming my Administration's position that our missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Next year, we will, for the first time, determine whether to deploy a limited National Missile Defense, when we review the results of flight tests and other developmental efforts, consider cost estimates, and evaluate the threat. Any NMD system we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In making our determination, we will also review progress in achieving our arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the ABM treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible NMD deployment. ______ Statement of Senator Thad Cochran on the Statement of the President of the United States on Signing Public Law 106-38 NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT (Senate--July 26, 1999) Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this morning I noticed in the Washington Times newspaper that President Clinton has signed the bill we authored here in the Senate, the National Missile Defense Act. This is very important legislation which the Senate passed after a lot of debate. The House and the Senate then reconciled differences between the House-passed measure and the Senate bill and sent the bill to the President. The President made a statement in connection with his signing the bill which raises some questions that I thought should be addressed by a comment this morning. After talking about the fact that he is signing the bill to address the growing danger that rogue nations may develop and field long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies, he then has this to say in his message. He is referring to the fact that authorization and appropriations measures will be a part of the process in terms of when and how and to what extent the funding is available for national missile defense. This interpretation, which is confirmed by the legislative record taken as a whole, is also required to avoid a possible impairment of my constitutional authorities. The President is suggesting that the bill doesn't mean what it says. I think that has to be brought to the attention of the Senate. The bill is very clear. It provides that it is the policy of the United States, upon enactment of this law, to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. That is unequivocal. It does not say ``but if.'' It is a change in policy of our Government. It has passed both Houses by a large majority, and now the President has signed the statute. It seems to me the President is trying to reinterpret the bill to justify changing his position on this issue. He signed the bill; he didn't veto it. This is not a veto message. He could have vetoed the bill, if he disagreed with the terms, and given Congress an opportunity to review that veto message and override the veto or sustain it, as the Congress' will dictates. I point this out to suggest that it is clear we have changed our policy, irrespective of the President's qualms about the new policy, and we now are committed as a nation to deploy a national missile defense system. We will do so in the orderly course of authorization and appropriation bills that we pass, as required. We have an annual appropriations bill funding all of the activities of the Department of Defense. But it is clear that one of those activities will be the continued research, development, and deployment of a national missile defense system. I think it is very timely to point this out because the Prime Minister of Russia is coming to the United States. There will be talks this week with the President. I am hopeful, and I urge the President to be honest with the Russian leadership about the need to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because the first part of that treaty says that neither signatory will deploy a missile defense system to protect the territory of its nation. But we have just changed the law of the United States to say that is our intention. We are committed to deploying a missile defense system that will protect the territory of the United States. So, insofar as that is inconsistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the treaty needs to be changed, and our President should say that to the Prime Minister of Russia unequivocally--not we ``may'' change our mind when it comes time to authorize a deployment or to fund a deployment. The decision has been made to deploy a system, and when technology permits us to deploy an effective missile defense system under the terms of this act, we are going to do it irrespective of the provisions of that treaty. So we must change the treaty. And we want to assure the Russians that we are not targeting them. We are not trying to create a new era of tension or competition or to make this a more dangerous relationship--just the opposite; we want to be aboveboard, candid, and honest with the Russians. ______ Report of the COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Pursuant to Public Law 201--104th Congress July 15, 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Washington, DC, July 15, 1998. The Honorable Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: In accordance with section 1323 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201), we hereby submit the report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. The Commission was established to ``assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States'' and to ``submit to the Congress a report on its findings and conclusions.'' The Commission's report is unanimous. It has been an honor to serve. Respectfully submitted, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman Barry M. Blechman G. Lee Butler Richard L. Garwin William R. Graham William Schneider, Jr. Larry D. Welch Paul D. Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey [Copies to:] The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. The Honorable Tom Daschle, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Enclosure. Members of The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States were nominated by the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate and the Minority Leaders of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman Dr. Barry M. Blechman General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) Dr. Richard L. Garwin Dr. William R. Graham Dr. William Schneider, Jr. General Larry D. Welch, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz The Honorable R. James Woolsey and appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence I. Charter and Organization a. statutory charter of the commission The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States was established pursuant to Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Section 1321. The mandate of the Commission was as follows: ``The Commission shall assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States. In carrying out its duties, the Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and any other United States Government official responsible for providing the Commission with analyses, briefings and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. The Commission shall, not later than six months after the date of its first meeting, submit to the Congress a report on its findings and conclusions.'' The Commission examined the ballistic missile threat posed to the 50 states. Our assessment included threats posed by ballistic missiles:
  • Deployed on the territory of a potentially hostile state.
  • Launched from a surface vessel or submarine operating off the coasts of the U.S. or from an aircraft.
  • Deployed by a potentially hostile nation on the territory of a third party to reduce the range required of its ballistic missiles to strike the United States. The Commission examined the potential of both existing and emerging powers to arm ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction. The examination included the domestic design, development and production of nuclear material and nuclear weapons as well as the potential for states to acquire--through clandestine or covert sale, transfer or theft--either technology; material or weapons. The Commission examined biological and chemical weapons programs of the ballistic missile powers, as well as the potential means for delivering such agents by ballistic missiles. The Commission reviewed U.S. collection and analysis capabilities to gain an appreciation for the capability of the U.S. Intelligence Community, today and into the future, to warn of the ballistic missile threat. The Commission did not examine in detail the threat posed to U.S. territories or possessions or to U.S. forward-deployed forces, allies and friends. Nevertheless, a short discussion of the threat to U.S. forward deployed forces, allies and friends is presented. The Commission did not assess the cruise missile threat. A detailed examination would have taken it beyond its charter. However, the Commission is of the view that cruise missiles have a number of characteristics which could be seen as increasingly valuable in fulfilling the aspirations of emerging ballistic missile states. The Commission did not address in detail the impact of ballistic missile threats on U.S. military strategy and doctrine, but noted the difficulty the U.S had in dealing with Iraqi missiles during the Persian Gulf War. A brief discussion is presented of the possible impact of the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem on the ballistic missile threat. A brief discussion is also presented of the relationship of ballistic missile threats to the ongoing revolution in military affairs. The Commission was not asked to address the policy issues on which its assessment would bear. Responses to the threat as assessed by the Commission are matters of considerable public interest. Debate and agreement on the appropriate responses to the ballistic missile threat are needed. The Commission hopes that the following assessment will be helpful in that regard. b. organization of the report This is an unclassified Executive Summary of the classified Report of the Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, which runs to more than 300 pages, including text and graphics. The full Report is accompanied by two classified appendices and one unclassified appendix (the table of contents of Appendix III is listed in Attachment 2). The full Report includes discussions of a number of additional states, such as Libya and Syria, which are not included in this Executive Summary. The full Report includes as well a discussion of the full range of supplier states, particularly Western powers, including the United States. II. Executive Summary a. conclusions of the commissioners The nine Commissioners are unanimous in concluding that:
  • Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which the United States is not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions. The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.
  • The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.
  • The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding. This erosion has roots both within and beyond the intelligence process itself. The Community's capabilities in this area need to be strengthened in terms of both resources and methodology.
  • The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios--including re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, shortened development programs that might include testing in a third country, or some combination of these--the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment. Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning. b. the commission and its methods The Commissioners brought to their task the perspectives of former senior policymakers from outside the Intelligence Community who have decades of experience and a variety of views as users of the Intelligence Community's products. We shared an informed understanding of intelligence processes. In making our assessment, we took into account not only the hard data available, but also the often significant gaps in that data. We had access to both data and experts drawn from the full array of departments and agencies as well as from sources throughout the Intelligence Community. We also drew on experts from outside that Community and on studies sponsored by the Commission. Our aim was to ensure that we were exposed to a wide range of opinion and to the greatest possible depth and breadth of analysis. We began this study with different views about how to respond to ballistic missile threats, and we continue to have differences. Nevertheless, as a result of our intensive study over the last six months we are unanimous in our assessment of the threat, an assessment which differs from published intelligence estimates. This divergence between the Commission's findings and authoritative estimates by the Intelligence Community stems primarily from our use of a somewhat more comprehensive methodology in assessing ballistic missile development and deployment programs. We believe that our approach takes more fully into account three crucial factors now shaping new ballistic missile threats to the United States:
  • Newer ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programs no longer follow the patterns initially set by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These programs require neither high standards of missile accuracy, reliability and safety nor large numbers of missiles and therefore can move ahead more rapidly.
  • A nation that wants to develop ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction can now obtain extensive technical assistance from outside sources. Foreign assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact.
  • Nations are increasingly able to conceal important elements of their ballistic missile and associated WMD programs and are highly motivated to do so. c. new threats in a transformed security environment The Commission did not assess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs on a global basis. We considered those countries about which we felt particular reason to be concerned and examined their capabilities to acquire ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. All of the nations whose programs we examined that are developing long-range ballistic missiles have the option to arm these, as well as their shorter range systems, with biological or chemical weapons. These weapons can take the form of bomblets as well as a single, large warhead. The knowledge needed to design and build a nuclear weapon is now widespread. The emerging ballistic missile powers have access to, or are pursuing the acquisition of, the needed fissile material both through domestic efforts and foreign channels. As our work went forward, it became increasingly clear to us that nations about which the U.S. has reason to be concerned are exploiting a dramatically transformed international security environment. That environment provides an ever-widening access to technology, information and expertise that can be and is used to speed both the development and deployment of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It can also be used to develop denial and deception techniques that seek to impede U.S. intelligence gathering about the development and deployment programs of those nations. 1. Geopolitical Change and Role for Ballistic Missiles A number of countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their regions and have not accepted it passively. Because of their ambitions, they want to place restraints on the U.S. capability to project power or influence into their regions. They see the acquisition of missile and WMD technology as a way of doing so. Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the roles of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have both evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons. For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these nations can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward- based forces and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies. Whether short- or long-range, a successfully launched ballistic missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the United States. 2. Russia With regard to Russia, the principal cloud over the future is lingering political uncertainty. Despite enormous changes since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia is in an uncertain, in some ways precarious, transition. It may succeed in establishing a stable democracy allied with the West in maintaining peace and extending freedom. Or it may not. Or it might be torn by internal struggles for an extended period. In its present situation, accurate U.S. intelligence estimates are difficult to make. Russia continues to pose a ballistic missile threat to the United States, although of a different character than in the past. The number of missiles in its inventory is likely to decline further compared with Cold War levels in that large numbers of Soviet strategic missiles deployed in the 1970s and 1980s are scheduled to be retired. Still, Russian ballistic missile forces continue to be modernized and improved, although the pace of modernization has been slowed from planned schedules by economic constraints. The Russian ballistic missile early warning system and nuclear command and control (C2) system have also been affected by aging and delays in planned modernization. In the context of a crisis growing out of civil strife, present early warning and C2 weaknesses could pose a risk of unauthorized or inadvertent launch of missiles against the United States.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ An unauthorized launch is one that has not received the required authorizations from senior political leaders and that might be conducted by elements within the General Staff or subordinate commanders. An inadvertent launch is one resulting from a mistaken assessment of sensor data, including from ballistic missile early warning systems, or a misinterpretation of the strategic situation or some combination of the two, especially in times of crisis generated either by domestic or international events. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With the Cold War ended, the likelihood of a deliberate missile attack on the U.S. from Russia has been greatly lessened but not entirely eliminated. However, Russia's leaders issued a new national security policy in 1993 that places greater reliance on nuclear deterrence, very likely in response to Russia's economic difficulties and decline in its conventional military capabilities. At the same time, the risk of an accident or of a loss of control over Russian ballistic missile forces--a risk which now appears small--could increase sharply and with little warning if the political situation in Russia were to deteriorate. Also, quite apart from these risks, Russia poses a threat to the U.S. as a major exporter of enabling technologies, including ballistic missile technologies, to countries hostile to the United States. In particular, Russian assistance has greatly accelerated Iran's ballistic missile program. 3. China As in the case of Russia, China's future is clouded by a range of uncertainties. China, too, is going through a transition, but one which has been going on for 20 years. The improvement in Sino-U.S. relations, interrupted in 1989, has resumed. Although the U.S. and China are developing a more cooperative relationship, significant potential conflicts remain, and China is less constrained today by fear of Russia than it once was by fear of the Soviet Union. Taiwan is an obvious potential flashpoint. Other flashpoints could arise as China pursues its drive for greater influence in Asia and the Western Pacific. Even now China has conflicts with several of its neighbors, some of which could involve the U.S. in a confrontation. China is modernizing its long-range missiles and nuclear weapons in ways that will make it a more threatening power in the event of a crisis. China's 1995-96 missile firings in the Taiwan Strait, aimed at intimidating Taiwan in the lead-up to its presidential election, provoked a sharp confrontation with the United States. For example, a pointed question was posed by Lt. Gen. Xiong Guang Kai, a frequent spokesman for Chinese policy, about U.S. willingness to trade Los Angeles for Taipei. This comment seemed designed to link China's ballistic missile capabilities with its regional priorities. China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid- fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with a design for a nuclear weapon and additional nuclear weapons assistance. It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi Arabia (the 3,100-km-range CSS-2) and Pakistan (the 350-km-range M-11). The behavior thus far of Russia and China makes it appear unlikely, albeit for different reasons--strategic, political, economic or some combination of all three--that either government will soon effectively reduce its country's sizable transfer of critical technologies, experts or expertise to the emerging ballistic missile powers. 4. Countries With Scud-Based Missile Infrastructures The basis of most missile developments by emerging ballistic missile powers is the Soviet Scud missile and its derivatives. The Scud is derived from the World War II-era German V-2 rocket. With the external help now readily available, a nation with a well-developed, Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure would be able to achieve first flight of a long-range missile, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range,\2\ within about five years of deciding to do so. During several of those years the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. Early production models would probably be limited in number. They would be unlikely to meet U.S. standards of safety, accuracy and reliability. But the purposes of these nations would not require such standards. A larger force armed with scores of missiles and warheads and meeting higher operational standards would take somewhat longer to test, produce and deploy. But meanwhile, even a few of the simpler missiles could be highly effective for the purposes of those countries. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ An ICBM has a range greater than 5,500 km. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The extraordinary level of resources North Korea and Iran are now devoting to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interests and its allies. While these nations' missile programs may presently be aimed primarily at regional adversaries, they inevitably and inescapably engage the vital interests of the U.S. as well. Their targeted adversaries include key U.S. friends and allies. U.S. deployed forces are already at risk from these nations' growing arsenals. Each of these nations places a high priority on threatening U.S. territory, and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. a. North Korea There is evidence that North Korea is working hard on the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ballistic missile. The status of the system's development cannot be determined precisely. Nevertheless, the ballistic missile test infrastructure in North Korea is well developed. Once the system is assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six months of a decision to do so. If North Korea judged the test to be a success, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly. It is unlikely the U.S. would know of such a decision much before the missile was launched. This missile could reach major cities and military bases in Alaska and the smaller, westernmost islands in the Hawaiian chain. Light-weight variations of the TD-2 could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk western U.S. territory in an arc extending northwest from Phoenix, Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin. These variants of the TD-2 would require additional time to develop and would likely require an additional flight test. North Korea has developed and deployed the No Dong, a medium-range ballistic missile \3\ (MRBM) using a scaled-up Scud engine, which is capable of flying 1,300 km. With this missile, North Korea can threaten Japan, South Korea and U.S. bases in the vicinity of North Korea. North Korea has reportedly tested the No Dong only once, in 1993. The Commission judges that the No Dong was operationally deployed long before the U.S. Government recognized that fact. There is ample evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of No Dongs have been produced. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ An MRBM has a range of 1,000 to 3,000 km. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In light of the considerable difficulties the Intelligence Community encountered in assessing the pace and scope of the No Dong missile program, the U.S. may have very little warning prior to the deployment of the Taepo Dong 2. North Korea maintains an active WMD program, including a nuclear weapon program. It is known that North Korea diverted material in the late 1980s for at least one or possibly two weapons. North Korea's ongoing nuclear program activity raises the possibility that it could produce additional nuclear weapons. North Korea also possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the capability to deploy chemical or biological warheads on missiles. North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses-- missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise--to other countries of missile proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and others. b. Iran Iran is placing extraordinary emphasis on its ballistic missile and WMD development programs. The ballistic missile infrastructure in Iran is now more sophisticated than that of North Korea, and has benefited from broad, essential, long-term assistance from Russia and important assistance from China as well. Iran is making very rapid progress in developing the Shahab 3 MRBM, which like the North Korean No Dong has a range of 1,300 km. This missile may be flight tested at any time and deployed soon thereafter. The Commission judges that Iran now has the technical capability and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to the TD-2 (based on scaled-up Scud technology), within five years of a decision to proceed--whether that decision has already been made or is yet to be made. In addition to this Scud-based long-range ballistic missile program, Iran has acquired and is seeking major, advanced missile components that can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the United States. For example, Iran is reported to have acquired engines or engine designs for the RD-214 engine, which powered the Soviet SS-4 MRBM and served as the first stage of the SL-7 space-launch vehicle. Iran is known to have an interest in even more advanced engines. A 10,000 km-range Iranian missile could hold the U.S. at risk in an arc extending northeast of a line from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to St. Paul, Minnesota. Iran has also developed a solid-fueled rocket infrastructure; it already produces short-range solid-fueled rockets. It is seeking long- range missile technology from outside sources, purportedly for a space- launch vehicle. Both contribute directly to Iran's ballistic missile technology base. Iran is known to rely heavily on imports of missile technology from foreign sources, particularly Russia and North Korea. These imports have allowed Iran's missile programs to proceed swiftly, and they can be incorporated into Iran's domestic infrastructure as well. Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction. It has a nuclear energy and weapons program which aims to design, develop and, as soon as possible, produce nuclear weapons. The Commission judges that the only issue as to whether or not Iran may soon have or already has a nuclear weapon is the amount of fissile material available to it. Because of significant gaps in our knowledge, the U.S. is unlikely to know whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons until after the fact. While Iran's civil nuclear program is currently under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it could be used as a source of sufficient fissile material to construct a small number of weapons within the next 10 years if Iran were willing to violate safeguards. If Iran were to accumulate enough fissile material from foreign sources, it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only one to three years. Iran also has an active chemical weapon development and production program and is conducting research into biological weapons. c. Iraq Iraq has maintained the skills and industrial capabilities needed to reconstitute its long-range ballistic missile program. Its plant and equipment are less developed than those of North Korea or Iran as a result of actions forced by United Nations (U.N.) Resolutions and monitoring. However, Iraq has actively continued work on short-range (under 150 km) liquid- and solid-fueled missiles, programs allowed by the U.N. Resolutions. Once U.N.-imposed controls are lifted, Iraq could mount a determined effort to acquire needed plant and equipment, whether directly or indirectly. Such an effort would allow Iraq to pose an ICBM threat to the United States within 10 years. Iraq could develop a shorter range, covert, ship-launched missile threat that could threaten the United States in a very short time. Iraq had a large, intense ballistic missile development and production program prior to the Gulf War. The Iraqis produced Scuds and then modified Scud missiles to produce the 600-km-range Al Hussein and 900-km-range Al Abbas missiles. The expertise, as well as some of the equipment and materials from this program remain in Iraq and provide a strong foundation for a revived ballistic missile program. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq could have had nuclear weapons in the 1993-1995 time frame, although it still had technical hurdles to overcome. After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq began a crash program to produce a nuclear device in six to nine months based on highly enriched uranium removed from the safeguarded reactor at Tuwaitha. Iraq has the capability to reconstitute its nuclear weapon program; the speed at which it can do so depends on the availability of fissile material. It would take several years to build the required production facilities from scratch. It is possible that Iraq has hidden some material from U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection or that it could acquire fissile material abroad (from another ``rogue'' state, for example). Iraq also had large chemical and biological weapons programs prior to the war and produced chemical and biological warheads for its missiles. Knowledge, personnel and equipment related to WMD remain in Iraq so that it could reconstitute these programs rapidly following the end of sanctions. 5. India India is developing a number of ballistic missiles from short-range to those with ICBM-class capabilities, along with a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a short-range, surface ship-launched system. India has the infrastructure to develop and produce these missiles. It is aggressively seeking technology from other states, particularly Russia. While it develops its long-range ballistic missiles, India's space-launch vehicles provide an option for an interim ICBM capability. India has detonated several nuclear devices, and it is clear that it is developing warheads for its missile systems. India has biological and chemical weapons programs. Since the Pakistani nuclear tests, India has announced its intention to increase its spending on missiles and nuclear weapons. India's program to develop ballistic missiles began in 1983 and grew out of its space-launch program, which was based on Scout rocket technology acquired from the United States. India currently has developed and deployed the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile \4\ (SRBM), and is developing longer range, liquid- and solid-fueled missiles. They include the Prithui II SRBM, the Agni, Agni-Plus and Agni-B intermediate-range ballistic missiles \5\ (IRBMs), a sea- launched ballistic missile and an SLBM, the Sagarika. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ An SRBM has a range of less than 1,000 km. \5\ An IRBM has a range of 3,000 to 5,500 km. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, conducted a test series in May 1998, and it is clear that it is developing warheads for its missile systems. Indian leaders recently declared that India has developed nuclear weapons for deployment on the Prithui SRBM and the Agni Plus MRBM. India his acquired and continues to seek Russian, U.S. and Western European technology for its missile programs. Technology and expertise acquired from other states, particularly from Russia, are helping India to accelerate the development and increase the sophistication of its missile systems. For example, Russian assistance is critical to the development of the Indian SLBM and its related submarine. But India is rapidly enhancing its own missile science and technology base as well. Many Indian nationals are educated and work in the U.S., Europe and other advanced nations; some of the knowledge thereby acquired returns to the Indian missile program. While India continues to benefit from foreign technology and expertise, its programs and industrial base are now sufficiently advanced that supplier control regimes can affect only the rate of acceleration in India's programs. India is in a position to supply material and technical assistance to others. 6. Pakistan Pakistan's ballistic missile infrastructure is now more advanced than that of North Korea. It will support development of a missile of 2,500-km range, which we believe Pakistan will seek in order to put all of India within range of Pakistani missiles. The development of a 2,500-km missile will give Pakistan the technical base for developing a much longer range missile system. Through foreign acquisition, and beginning without an extensive domestic science and technology base, Pakistan has acquired these missile capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea are Pakistan's major sources of ballistic missiles, production facilities and technology. Pakistan currently possesses nuclear-capable M-11 SRBMs acquired from China, and it may produce its own missile, the Tarmuk, based on the M-11. In 1998, Pakistan tested and deployed the 1,300-km-Ghauri MRBM, a version of the North Korean No Dong, and the Commission believes Pakistan has acquired production facilities for this missile as well. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons that employ highly-enriched uranium and conducted its first nuclear weapon test series in May 1998. A new Pakistani nuclear reactor has been completed that could be used for the production of plutonium. In addition to its nuclear weapons, Pakistan has biological and chemical weapons programs. Chinese assistance has been crucial to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan are not hostile to the United States. The prospect of U.S. military confrontation with either seems at present to be slight. However, beyond the possibility of nuclear war on the subcontinent, their aggressive, competitive development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses three concerns in particular. First, it enables them to supply relevant technologies to other nations. Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-- India from Russia, Pakistan from North Korea and China--because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. Third, their growing missile and WMD capabilities have direct effects on U.S. policies, both regional and global, and could significantly affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia. d. a new non-proliferation environment Since the end of the Cold War a number of developments have made ballistic missile and WMD technologies increasingly available. They include:
  • A number of nations have chosen not to join non- proliferation agreements.
  • Some participants in those agreements have cheated.
  • As global trade has steadily expanded, access has increased to the information, technology and technicians needed for missile and WMD development.
  • Access to technologies used in early generations of U.S. and Soviet missiles has eased. However rudimentary compared to present U.S. standards, these technologies serve the needs of emerging ballistic missile powers.
  • Among those countries of concern to the U.S., commerce in ballistic missile and WMD technology and hardware has been growing, which may make proliferation self-sustaining among them and facilitate their ability to proliferate technology and hardware to others. Some countries which could have readily acquired nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles--such as Germany, Japan and South Korea--have been successfully encouraged not to do so by U.S. security guarantees and by non-proliferation agreements. Even though they lack such security guarantees, other countries have also joined nonproliferation agreements and abandoned development programs and weapons systems. Some examples are Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 1. Increased Competence of and Trade Among Emerging Ballistic Missile Powers Conversely, there are other countries--some of which are themselves parties to various non-proliferation agreements and treaties--that either have acquired ballistic missile or WMD capabilities or are working hard to do so. North Korea, Iran and Iraq, as well as India and Pakistan, are at the forefront of this group. They now have increased incentives to cooperate with one another. They have extensive access to technology, information and expertise from developed countries such as Russia and China. They also have access through commercial and other channels in the West, including the United States. Through this trade and their own indigenous efforts, these second-tier powers are on the verge of being able to provide to one another, if they have not already done so, the capabilities needed to develop long-range ballistic missiles. 2. U.S. as a Contributor to Proliferation The U.S. is the world's leading developer and user of advanced technology. Once it is transferred by the U.S. or by another developed country; there is no way to ensure that the transferred technology will not be used for hostile purposes. The U.S. tries to limit technology transfers to hostile powers, but history teaches that such transfers cannot be stopped for long periods. They can only be slowed and made more costly, and even that requires the cooperation of other developed nations. The acquisition and use of transferred technologies in ballistic missile and WMD programs has been facilitated by foreign student training in the U.S., by wide dissemination of technical information, by the illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment and by the relaxation of U.S. export control policies. As a result, the U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated weapons of mass destruction. 3. Motives of Countries of Concern Recent ballistic missile and nuclear tests in South Asia should not be viewed as merely a sharp but temporary setback in the expanding reach of non-proliferation regimes. While policymakers may try to reverse or at least contain the trends of which these tests are a part, the missile and WMD programs of these nations are clearly the results of fundamental political calculations of their vital interests. Those nations willing and able to supply dangerous technologies and systems to one another, including Russia, China and their quasi-governmental commercial entities, may be motivated by commercial, foreign policy or national security interests or by a combination thereof. As noted, such countries are increasingly cooperating with one another, perhaps in some instances because they have reciprocal needs for what one has and the other lacks. The transfer of complete missile systems, such as China's transfer to Saudi Arabia, will continue to be available. Short of radical political change, there is every reason to assume that the nations engaged in these missile and WMD development activities will continue their programs as matters of high priority. 4. Readier Market Access to Technology In today's increasingly market-driven, global economy, nations so motivated have faster, cheaper and more efficient access to modern technology. Commercial exchanges and technology transfers have multiplied the pathways to those technologies needed for ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These pathways reduce development times and costs, lowering both technical and budget obstacles to missile development and deployment. Expanding world trade and the explosion in information technology have accelerated the global diffusion of scientific, technical and industrial information. The channels--both public and private, legal and illegal--through which technology; components and individual technicians can be moved among nations have increased exponentially. 5. Availability of Classified Information and Export-Controlled Technology Trends in the commercial sector of a market-driven, global economy have been accompanied, and in many ways accelerated, by an increased availability of classified information as a result of:
  • Lax enforcement of export controls.
  • Relaxation of U.S. and Western export controls.
  • Growth in dual-use technologies.
  • Economic incentives to sell ballistic missile components and systems.
  • Extensive declassification of materials related to ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
  • Continued, intense espionage facilitated by security measures increasingly inadequate for the new environment.
  • Extensive disclosure of classified information, including information compromising intelligence sources and methods. Damaging information appears almost daily in the national and international media and on the Internet. e. alternative ballistic missile launch modes In evaluating present threats, it is misleading to use old patterns of development as guides. The history of U.S. and Soviet missile and WMD development has become irrelevant. Approaches that the U.S. considered and specifically rejected on grounds of safety, reliability, accuracy and requirements for high volume production are in many cases well-suited to nations less concerned about safety and able to meet their needs with only a few, less accurate, less reliable weapons. Analytical approaches the Intelligence Community could realistically rely on in the past need to be restudied and reevaluated in light of this newer model. The Commission believes the U.S. needs to pay attention to the possibility that complete, long-range ballistic missile systems could be transferred from one nation to another, just as China transferred operational CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia in 1988. Such missiles could be equipped with weapons of mass destruction. One nation's use of another nation's territory also needs to be considered. The U.S. did this during the Cold War and the Soviet Union tried to do it in Cuba in the early 1960s. For example, if Iran were to deploy ballistic missiles in Libya, it could reduce the range required to threaten the U.S. as well as Europe. Given the existing patterns of cooperation the Commission has already seen, both testing by one country on the territory of another and deriving data from other- country tests are also distinct possibilities. Sea launch of shorter range ballistic missiles is another possibility. This could enable a country to pose a direct territorial threat to the U.S. sooner than it could by waiting to develop an ICBM for launch from its own territory. Sea launching could also permit it to target a larger area of the U.S. than would a missile fired from its home territory. India is working on a sea launch capability. Air launch is another possible mode of delivering a shorter range missile to U.S. territory. The key importance of these approaches is that each would significantly shorten the warning time of deployment available to the United States. f. erosion of warning Precise forecasts of the growth in ballistic missile capabilities over the next two decades--tests by year, production rates, weapons deployed by year, weapon characteristics by system type and circular error probable (CEP)--cannot be provided with confidence. Deception and denial efforts are intense and often successful, and U.S. collection and analysis assets are limited. Together they create a high risk of continued surprise. The question is not simply whether the U.S. will have warning of an emerging capability, but whether the nature and magnitude of a particular threat will be perceived with sufficient clarity in time to take appropriate action. Concealment, denial and deception efforts by key target countries are intended to delay the discovery of strategically significant activities until well after they had been carried out successfully. The fact that some of these secret activities are discovered over time is to the credit of the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, the fact that there are delays in discovery of those activities provides a sharp warning that a great deal of activity goes undetected. Both technical and human intelligence are inherently more difficult to collect in those countries where the U.S. has limited access, which include most of the ballistic missile countries of concern. The U.S. is not able to predict and anticipate with confidence the behavior and actions of emerging ballistic missile powers and their related political decision-making. Their ballistic missile programs often do not follow a single, known pattern or model, and they use unexpected development patterns. These are not models of development the U.S. follows or that intelligence analysts expect to see. For example, Pakistan's test launch in April 1998 of its Ghauri MRBM--its version of the North Korean No Dong--could not be predicted on the basis of any known pattern of technical development either for MRBMs generally or Pakistan in particular. Similarly, North Korea's decision to deploy the No Dong after what is believed to be a single successful test flight is another example. Based on U.S. and Russian experience, the Intelligence Community had expected that a regular test series would be required to provide the confidence needed before any country would produce and deploy a ballistic missile system. Yet North Korea deployed the No Dong. The Commission believes that the technical means of collection now employed will not meet emerging requirements, and considerable uncertainty persists whether planned collection and analysis systems will do so. g. methodology In analyzing the ballistic missile threat, the Commission used an expanded methodology. We used it as a complement to the traditional analysis in which a country's known program status is used to establish estimates of its current missile capabilities. We believe this expanded approach provides insights into emerging threats that the prevailing approaches used by the Intelligence Community may not bring to the surface. To guide our assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, we posed three questions:
  • What is known about the ballistic missile threat, including the domestic infrastructure of a ballistic missile power; the efforts of a power to acquire foreign technology, materials and expertise; and the scale, pace and progress of its programs?
  • What is not known about the threat in each of those three categories?
  • Can a power intent on posing a ballistic missile threat to any part of the United States, including the use of but not limited to ICBM-range missiles, use the open market, the black market and/or espionage to secure the needed technology and expertise and then carry out its program in ways that will minimize the interval between the time the U.S. becomes aware of the threat and the fielding of that capability? In seeking answers to these questions, we familiarized ourselves with the current state of knowledge as well as the depth of analytic capability within the Intelligence Community related to ballistic missile and WMD threats. The Commission used its broad access to individuals, special compartmented intelligence and special access programs. We consulted with experts in the broader government and private analytic and policy communities. We reviewed the strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of current and planned human and technical collection efforts and capabilities, especially in light of the increasingly sophisticated means and methods available to target countries to hide from U.S. intelligence collection. We reviewed with scientists, engineers and program managers from the public and private sectors the technical issues associated with the design, development and testing of ballistic missiles and the means and methods available to the emerging ballistic missile powers to meet the challenges associated with long-range ballistic missile development and testing. The Commission analyzed the available information in order to develop an understanding of the threat from three perspectives:
  • We examined the known size and quality of the deployed forces, the doctrine and the command and control systems that govern the forces and the availability of weapons of mass destruction to arm the forces. We reviewed the infrastructure supporting the programs and the extent of past and present foreign assistance available to those programs from Russia, China and other countries, including the West.
  • We examined the ways in which the programs of emerging ballistic missile powers compared with one another. For example, we traced the development histories of the related programs of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan and the relationships among them. This comparison helped in identifying the similarities between programs, the extent to which each had aided one another in overcoming critical development hurdles and, importantly, the pace at which a determined country can progress in its program development.
  • We reviewed the resources (``inputs'') available and the ways in which they provide indicators of the prospects for successful missile development. By integrating these perspectives, we were able to partially bridge a significant number of intelligence gaps. Emphasizing inputs makes two important contributions to the analysis. Inputs include domestic opportunity costs, the foreign technology and expertise sought and obtained, the urgency with which facilities are constructed both above and below ground and the willingness to absorb cost and time penalties in order to hide activities from detection by U.S. intelligence. Attention to inputs across all elements of a program helps develop an understanding of the scale and scope of a program before traditional output indicators, such as testing and production rates, can be observed and evaluated. When combined with observed outputs and the application of engineering judgments, the understanding of the scale and scope of a program that this provided helped us to measure the probable pace and magnitude of a program and its potential products. We were then able to make what we believe to be reasonably confident estimates of what the various programs can achieve. Rather than measuring how far a program had progressed from a known starting point, the Commission sought to measure how close a program might be to demonstrating the first flight of a long-range ballistic missile. This approach requires that analysts extrapolate a program's scope, scale, pace and direction beyond what the hard evidence at hand unequivocally supports. It is in sharp contrast to a narrow focus on the certain that obscures the almost-certain. The approach helps reduce the effects of denial and deception efforts. When strategically significant programs were assessed by narrowly focusing on what is known, the assessments lagged the actual state of the programs by two to eight years and in some cases completely missed significant programs. We chose to focus on what is left to be accomplished in the programs of potentially threatening ballistic missile powers and alternative paths they can follow to attain their goals. We reviewed program histories and current activities, including foreign assistance, to determine whether a ballistic missile program acquired the means to overcome its identified problems. We considered the multiple pathways available for completing its development given the combination of expertise and technology available to it and the circumstances in which it is operating. This approach accepts as a basic premise that a power determined to possess a long-range missile, knowing that the U.S. is trying to track its every action but aware of U.S. intelligence methods and sources, will do its best to deny information and to deceive the U.S. about its actual progress. Because of these options available to emerging ballistic missile powers, the Commission, unanimously recognizing that missile development and deployment now follows new models, strongly urges the use of an expanded approach to intelligence that assesses both inputs and outputs in other countries' ballistic missile programs. We believe this approach is needed in order to capture both sooner and more accurately the speed and magnitude of potential ballistic missile proliferation in the post-Cold War world and to assess, in time, the various threats this proliferation poses to the United States. The Commission's key judgments are derived from applying this methodology and examining the evidence in light of the individual and collective experience of the nine Commissioners. h. summary Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States. This is not a distant threat. Characterizing foreign assistance as a wild card is both incorrect and misleading. Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling and often the preferred path to ballistic missile and WMD capability. A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means of delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero. The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the U.S. and to deceive the U.S. about the pace, scope and direction of their development and proliferation programs. Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning. Attachment 1. a. year 2000 (y2k) computer problem The widely-discussed Year 2000 (Y2K) problem concerns computer hardware with embedded clocks and software with date recognition functions that still designate years with only two digits and are programmed to interpret ``00'' as the year 1900 rather than 2000. The tasks of reprogramming are immense and complex, and uncertainties surrounding their pace and outcome plague many aspects of life and commerce. The Commission judges that military and intelligence operations are not immune to the effects of the Y2K problem. Not only at the millennium but for some undetermined time before and after it the Y2K problem can affect U.S. and Russian ballistic missile forces and, to a lesser extent, those of China, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France. The U.S. particularly and Russia somewhat less so depend on computer-based and computer-aided intelligence and surveillance and on automated processes to assure that their ballistic missile forces will function under all conceivable circumstances. The Y2K problem can potentially upset some of those calculations by interfering with the capacity of the U.S. and Russia to:
  • Monitor the activities of each other at the strategic level, including the disposition and posture of their conventional military forces.
  • Provide tactical warning of military operations, particularly ballistic missile operations, through collection of data from space-, air- and ground-based sensors.
  • Process and fuse the data received from sensors in the command and control nets.
  • Maintain positive control over ballistic missile forces and, if automated responses to false data and warnings are triggered, retain or regain control by the national military and political leadership. Y2K problems are complex and not easy to deal with. Efforts are underway to isolate critical systems from the problem, but they may not totally eliminate vulnerabilities for two reasons:
  • No system is completely isolated. Command centers may have new software installed, but if the support services--electric, water, gas and communications, for example--are not self- contained the center may fail. Even if support services are self-contained, the need for the center to function via computer or by computer-dependent communication systems makes it vulnerable to Y2K problems up or downstream from it.
  • Efforts to correct the problem provide their own attractive opportunities for unfriendly agents and powers to tamper with mission-critical software. Errors can be programmed which are designed to appear only much later and in circumstances that cannot be anticipated. The Commission is troubled by the amount of Y2K software work being performed in foreign countries, particularly India, for U.S. industry and for the U.S. Government--including elements of the Intelligence Community. b. revolution in military affairs and information warfare The term ``Revolution in Military Affairs'' (RMA) is used to describe the impact of leading-edge military technologies and information warfare on the conduct of military operations from the tactical to the strategic level. Key RMA technologies include precision-guided munitions, stealth technology and the use of space- based assets for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as modern computational capabilities to integrate these functions. The U.S. military is adopting new weapon systems and tactical, operational and strategic concepts based on the elements of the RMA. The objective is to make U.S. forces lighter but more lethal so that fewer personnel with less equipment can strike over longer distances and with a far more powerful effect. This gives prospective adversaries greater incentives to find new ways of offsetting the new RMA-based capabilities of the U.S. and in particular to come up with new ``asymmetric'' strategies--that is, strategies that can cripple U.S. ability to use its forces without the adversary having to confront those forces directly. These asymmetric strategies of potential adversaries of the U.S. could well include ballistic missile operations against ports, airfields, communications centers or urban and industrial areas. Attacking ports and airfields the U.S. might use could severely hamper operations and could undercut the military advantages U.S. technological superiority provides. Interrupting communications channels would make it more difficult to plan, organize and conduct operations. Strikes by an adversary on urban and industrial centers could change the nature of the conflict from what the U.S. prefers--one confined to precision attacks against military forces in the field and point targets in urban and industrial settings--to one of indiscriminate damage to civilians and the infrastructure supporting them. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi ballistic missiles threatened to undermine the coalition's political strategy, and the coalition's military responses failed to halt Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. Doctrinal shifts in Russia and China have placed added emphasis on ballistic missile operations. Together, these highlight the vulnerability to such operations of the U.S., its forces and its allies, whether conducted by Russia, China or emerging ballistic missile powers. A number of other nations are incorporating technical features of the RMA into their forces. These features include space- based surveillance and reconnaissance. They also include communications using either space-based networks (perhaps using civilian assets) or land-based fiber-optic networks, guidance from the space-based global positioning system/global navigation satellite system (GPS/GLONASS) to increase the accuracy of missiles and the computational capabilities needed to plan, organize and conduct operations. Their capacity to conduct asymmetric operations with ballistic missiles, including attacks on RMA sites in the U.S., will increase. Attachment 2. Unclassified Working Papers table of contents for appendix iii: unclassified working papers Roundtable Topics, Panelists and Summaries of Panelists' Remarks: Iran/Iraq: W. Seth Carus, Michael Eisenstadt, Ken Katzman and Ken Timmerman Russia/Ukraine: Bruce Blair, Stephen Blank, Daniel Goure and Nadia Schadlow China/Japan/Korea: Gerrit W. Gong, Selig Harrison, Robert Manning and David Wright India/Pakistan: Daniel Goure, Michael Krepon and David Tanks North Africa/Israel: W. Seth Carus and Dov Zakheim Technology Transfers: David C. Isby, John M. Myrah and Henry Sokoiski Pathways for Transfer: Dennis M. Gormley, Aaron Karp and Richard T. Cupitt Supplier Nations: Robbin Laird, Tim McCarthy, Keith Payne and David Smith Roundtable Papers: Bruce Blair, ``The Plight of the Russian Military and Nuclear Control'' Stephen J. Blank, ``Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian Strategy'' W. Seth Carus, ``Ballistic Missiles in Iran and Iraq: 1988-1998'' W. Seth Carus, ``Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments'' Richard T. Cupitt, ``Export Controls and Missile Technology Transfer'' Michael Eisenstadt, ``Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq and Iran: Current Developments and Potential for Future Surprises'' Gerrit W. Gong, ``Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat: China-Japan- Korea-Taiwan Issues'' Dennis M. Gormley, ``Transfer Pathways for Cruise Missiles'' Daniel Goure, ``The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Forces: Working to a Plan'' Daniel Goure, ``WMD and Ballistic Missiles in South Asia'' Selig S. Harrison, ``Missile Capabilities in Northeast Asia: Japan, South Korea and North Korea'' David C. Isby, ``Barriers to Proliferation and Pathways to Transfer: Building Ballistic Missile Capabilities Under MTCR'' Aaron Karp, ``Technology Pathways to Ballistic Missiles in Iran'' Kenneth Katzman, ``Iran's Long-Range Missile Capabilities'' Kenneth Katzman, ``Iraq's Long-Range Missile Capabilities'' Michael Krepon, ``India, Pakistan and the Ballistic Missile Threat'' Robbin Laird, ``Rethinking the Role of Western States as Supplier Nations'' Robert A. Manning, ``Missile Proliferation Threats in Northeast Asia'' John M. Myrah, ``The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: What Should We Do to Stop It?'' Keith Payne, ``The Missile Technology Control Regime: European Involvement and Compliance Issues'' Nadia Schadlow, ``Patterns of Ukrainian Conduct'' David J. Smith, ``Friendly Countries and Missile Proliferation: Dealing With Different Perceptions'' Henry Sokolski, ``Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation'' David R. Tanks, ``Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Are ICBMs a Future Possibility?'' Kenneth R. Timmerman, ``Rogue States and Ballistic Missiles: Lessons and Prospects'' David C. Wright, ``An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program'' Additional Papers: Kurt Guthe and Keith Payne, ``The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion: The Chinese Case'' Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, ``The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion'' Gilbert Siegert, ``The Chinese Space Program'' Gilbert Siegert, ``Potential Threats from Global Commercial Space Capabilities'' System Planning Corporation, ``Non-Proliferation Issues'' 1. France 2. Great Britain 3. Germany 4. Japan 5. South Korea Attachment 3. a. resumes of commission members The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman Mr. Rumsfeld is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gilead Sciences, Inc. Previously he served in a variety of government posts, including: Naval Aviator (1954-57), Member of Congress (1963-69), U.S. Ambassador to NATO (1972-74), White House Chief of Staff (1974-75), Secretary of Defense (1975-77) and Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (1983-84). He also served as Chairman of the Rand Corporation (1981-86; 1995-96) and as Chairman and CEO of G. D. Searle & Co. (1977- 85) and of General Instrument Corporation (1990-93). He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977. Dr. Barry M. Blechman Dr. Blechman is the president and founder of DFI International (in 1984) and chairman and co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center beginning in 1989. He served as Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1977-80). He was previously affiliated with the U.S. Army (1964-66), the Center for Naval Analyses (1966-71) and Brookings Institution (1971-77). He also was affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment (1980-82) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1982-84). He is the author of Face Without War and The Politics of National Security, among others. Dr. Blechman has a Ph.D. in international relations. General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) General Butler served as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command and Strategic Air Command (1992-94) and as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-91). In 1987, he was the Director of Operations at USAF Headquarters and served as the Inspector General of the Strategic Air Command (1984-86). From 1982 to 1984, he was the Commander of the 96th and 320th Bomb Wings. General Butler was an Olmsted Scholar. Dr. Richard L. Garwin Dr. Garwin is a Senior Fellow for Science and Technology with the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been an IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center since 1993 and was a Fellow from 1952 to 1993. He has served as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee twice, from 1962 to 1965 and from 1969 to 1972, and he served on the Defense Science Board (1966-69). In 1996, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community awarded him the R.V. Jones Award for Scientific Intelligence, and the President and the Department of Energy awarded him the Enrico Fermi Award. Dr. Garwin has a Ph.D. in physics. Dr. William H. Graham Dr. Graham is the Chairman of the Board and President of National Security Research (1996 to present). He previously was the Director of the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy (1986-89) and the Deputy Administrator of NASA (1985-86). He has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering. Dr. William Schneider, Jr. Dr. Schneider is the President of International Planning Services, Inc. (1986 to present). He previously served as the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (1982-86) and the Chairman of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (1987-93). He has a Ph.D. in economics. General Larry D. Welch, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) General Welch is the President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses (1990 to present). He previously served as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force (1986-90) and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (1985-86). Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz Dr. Wolfowitz is Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (1994 to present). He previously served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (1989- 93), the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia (1986-89), the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1982-86) and Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff (1981-82). He was a member of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United-States Intelligence Community (1995-95). He has a Ph.D. in political science. The Honorable R. James Woolsey Mr. Woolsey is a partner in the law firm of Shea & Gardner (1995 to present, 1991-93, 1979-89). He previously served as Director of Central Intelligence (1993-95), Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1989-91) and Under Secretary of the Navy (1977-79). He was a Delegate-at-Large to the U.S.-Soviet START and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (1983-85). He served as a member of the Scowcroft Commission (Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1983) and the Packard Commission (Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1985-86). b. resumes of core staff of the commission Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Staff Director. Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (1993 to present). Director, Strategic Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1990-93); Deputy Director of Strategic Analysis, SRS Technologies (1986-90); Staff Analyst, Los Alamos National Laboratory (1982-86). Ph.D. in political science. Dr. Steven A. Maaranen. Policy Planning Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratory (1980 to present). Chief, Defense and Space Division, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1987-88); Assistant Professor, Claremont McKenna College (1976-80). Ph.D. in political science. Eric Desautels. Member of Technical Staff TASC, Inc. (1994-98). Masters in international security. David H. Dunham. Member of Technical Staff TASC, Inc. (1994-98); Assistant Director of the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute (1994); Special Assistant, Safe and Secure Dismantlement Delegation; Deputy Executive Director, General Advisory Committee, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1991-94). Jason W. Roback. Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy and National Security Research, Inc. (1997 to present). M.S. in defense and strategic studies. Bernard C. Victory. Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy (1988 to present). Congressional Research Service (1987-88). M.A. in international affairs. Delonnie Henry. Administrative Assistant, National Defense University (1993-98). M.Ed. dci liaison Richard Haver. Chief of Staff of the National Intelligence Council. Formerly: National Intelligence Officer for Special Activities, Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy and Deputy Director for Naval Intelligence. c. commission meetings and agendas ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date Subject or Activity Visitor ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jan. 14 Organization of Commission ............................................. Jan. 15 U.S. Technical Collection Capabilities ............................................. Simulation, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), ............................................. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Foreign Instrumentation Signals ............................................. Measures and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) ............................................. Jan. 29 Russia ............................................. Changing Political and Economic Circumstances ............................................. Military Changes ............................................. Nuclear Doctrine ............................................. Strategic Force Projections ............................................. Warning, Inadvertent Launch, Anti-Ballistic ............................................. Missile Status C3I, Unauthorized and Accidental Launch ............................................. Jan. 30 China ............................................. Political Overview Taiwan ............................................. Economic Overview ............................................. Military Overview ............................................. China's Space Program ............................................. Nuclear Doctrine ............................................. Force Structure and Projections ............................................. Chinese C3I ............................................. Feb. 4 Deception and Denial ............................................. Analytic Depth: China ............................................. Feb. 5 External Proliferation Concerns ............................................. Technology Transfer and End Use ............................................. China ............................................. Hard Target ............................................. Missile Program and ............................................. Russian Assistance ............................................. Infrastructure and Government Oversight ............................................. Feb. 9 Nuclear Programs ............................................. Feb. 19 Nonproliferation Center and Methodological ............................................. Challenges of Proliferation Russia ............................................. The Spread of Underground Facilities ............................................. Hard Target ............................................. Military Missile and Technological ............................................. Infrastructure External Proliferation Concerns ............................................. The Russian-Iranian Connection ............................................. Mar. 4 Iran ............................................. Collection Challenges ............................................. Ballistic Missile Program ............................................. Engine Testing ............................................. Missile Infrastructure ............................................. Alternate Launch Modes ............................................. Nuclear Program ............................................. Biological Weapons ............................................. Chemical Weapons ............................................. Buyer, Seller, Broker ............................................. Mar. 5 North Korea ............................................. Collection Challenges ............................................. Ballistic Missile Program ............................................. Buyer, Seller, Broker ............................................. Forces and Doctrine ............................................. Chemical Weapons ............................................. Biological Weapons ............................................. Nuclear Program ............................................. Mar. 19 The Honorable George Tenet Director of Central Intelligence Ambassador Rolf Ekeus Ambassador of Sweden to the U.S. The Honorable Andrew Marshall Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense David Osias Defense Intelligence Officer David Ivry Director-General, Israeli Ministry of Defense (Ret.) Mar. 24 Saudi Arabia ............................................. Algeria ............................................. Egypt ............................................. Libya ............................................. Syria ............................................. Mar. 25 Meeting of Commissioners at the National ............................................. Security Agency Mar. 30 Iraq ............................................. Collection Overview ............................................. IAEA/UNSCOM Inspection Program ............................................. Missile Program ............................................. Chemical Weapons ............................................. Biological Weapons ............................................. Nuclear Program ............................................. Mar. 31 India and Pakistan ............................................. Hard Target ............................................. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Motivations, ............................................. Decisionmakers and Doctrine Missile Systems: Capabilities and Production ............................................. India's Naval Development ............................................. India's Space Program ............................................. Foreign Proliferation Assistance ............................................. Missile Forces in 2015 ............................................. Chemical & Biological Weapons ............................................. Nuclear Programs ............................................. Broker and Seller: Issues of Safety and ............................................. Security Collection Overview ............................................. Apr. 7 Intelligence Process ............................................. The Honorable Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr. President and CEO, Aerospace Corporation Project West Wing ............................................. Iranian and North Korean Ballistic Missile ............................................. Program Ballistic Missile Technical Hurdles and Work-a- ............................................. Rounds 6Apr. 8 Deception and Denial ............................................. Yamantau and Russian Underground Activity ............................................. Apr. 16 Admiral William Studeman, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Hurdles of Long-range Ballistic Missiles and ............................................. Work-a-Rounds: 1. Liquid Rocket Propulsion ............................................. 2. Solid Rocket Propulsion ............................................. 3. Aerodynamics, Reentry Vehicle ............................................. 4. Design and Missile Materials ............................................. Russian Command and Control Modernization ............................................. Apr. 20 Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, U.S. Air Force Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, U.S. Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Dr. Fred Ikle Former Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Analysis of Pakistan's Ghauri/No Dong Launch ............................................. Apr. 21 Emerging Long-Range Threat to the U.S Boeing Corporation Ambassador Frank Wisner Former U.S. Ambassador to India and Special Ambassador to Russia Apr. 27 Counterintelligence Brief Industrial Espionage ............................................. Legal Snooping 1993 No Dong Flight ............................................. Foreign Missile Threats ............................................. Scope of Ballistic Missile Proliferation ............................................. Activities Non-Proliferation Methodologies ............................................. Dr. Sidney Drell Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center May 7 Foreign Missile Assessment Lockheed Martin Corporation Payload Fabrication and Delivery ............................................. Commercial Space-Launch Vehicles, Peacekeeper Orbital Sciences Corporation Conversion Contemporaneous History of Iran's Missile ............................................. Programs May 8 Gordon Oehler Former Director, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center The Honorable William Reinsch Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration May 18 Naval Intelligence Briefing ............................................. Contemporaneous History of North Korea's ............................................. Missile Program Assessment of a Hypothetical Taepo Dong III Dr. William J. Perry Former Secretary of Defense Lt. General William Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.) Former Director of the National Security Agency May 19 Drafting of Final Report ............................................. May 27 Dr. James Schlesinger Former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 3 Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 4 Dr. Harold Brown Former Secretary of Defense Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 11 Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 16 The Honorable Caspar Weinberger Former Secretary of Defense Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 17 Office Call with the Honorable William S. Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon Cohen Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 23 Information Warfare ............................................. Dr. John Deutch Former Director of Central Intelligence Brief on Israel ............................................. Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 24 General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (Ret.) Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Air Force Former National Security Advisor to the (Ret.) President Cruise Missiles ............................................. Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 29 Office Call with General Henry H.Shelton, U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon Army Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jun. 30 Drafting of Final Report ............................................. Jul. 7 Office Call with the Honorable Samuel R. Assistant to the President for National ``Sandy'' Berger Security, The White House Foreign Students in the United States ............................................. Jul. 8 Information Warfare ............................................. Space Reconnaissance ............................................. Y2K Problem in Russia ............................................. Collection Capabilities ............................................. Jul. 15 Deliver Report to Congress Senior Leadership of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, The Capitol ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. site visits \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ All sites except the National Air Intelligence Center were visited by one or more Commissioners. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- March 6: National Air Intelligence Center Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio March 10: Sandia National Laboratories, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico March 16: Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, California March 25: National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland April 3: Center for International Security Affairs, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico April 22: National Reconnaissance Office, Sterling, Virginia May 6: Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, Andrews Air Force Base, Suitland, Maryland May 15: Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama June 5: U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado June 8: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California e. interviews Dr. Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr., former Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office The Honorable Samuel R. ``Sandy'' Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Honorable Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense The Honorable Dr. John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Sidney Drell, Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency David Ivry, former Director-General of the Ministry of Defense of Israel Dr. Frederick Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense David A. Kier, Deputy Director for the National Reconnaissance Office Lieutenant General Lester Lyles, U.S. Air Force, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization The Honorable Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense Barbara McNamara, Deputy Director, National Security Agency Lieutenant General William Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director of the National Security Agency Gordon Oehler, former Director Nonproliferation Center, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence David Osias, Defense Intelligence Officer for Acquisition Support, Counter-proliferation and Arms Control The Honorable Dr. William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense General Colin A. Powell, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Advisor to the President The Honorable William A. Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration The Honorable Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Energy Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former National Security Advisor to the President General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Studeman, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and Director, National Security Agency The Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence The Honorable Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense Ambassador Frank Wisner, former U.S. Ambassador to India f. acknowledgments The Commissioners wish to express their appreciation to the men and women of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Over 300 of them took time to meet with the Commissioners on the subject of the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In particular, the Commissioners express their thanks to the Honorable George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence, and to the directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Office of Naval Intelligence for making the time of their analysts available to the Commission and for providing a level of access to information infrequently granted. Special thanks are extended to Rich Haver, the DCI's liaison to the Commission. His knowledge of the issues, familiarity with the ways of the Intelligence Community and his unfailing good humor made the task of the Commission far easier than it might otherwise have been. The Commissioners would like to thank those analysts and managers of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), Defense Technology Security Administration (Department of Defense), CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO and NIMA who served as the points of contact for their respective agencies. Their efforts to schedule briefings and to provide information is greatly appreciated. The Commissioners would also like to thank the support staff provided by the Central Intelligence Agency who served in the Commission office and those in the Multimedia Production Group, Cartography Department and Printing and Photography Group who assisted in the design and publication of the final version of the Report. ______ U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC, June 16, 1997. The President The White House Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: Last week the House of Representatives approved H.R. 1758, the ``European Security Act of 1997.'' I originally introduced this legislation on April 24th of this year with the cosponsorship of Dick Armey, Jerry Solomon, Porter Goss, Curt Weldon, and others to address a number of issues bearing on U.S. relations with Russia. Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the European Security Act as passed by the House has been appended to H.R. 1757, the ``Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999.'' Inasmuch as the Senate companion measure to H.R. 1757 is scheduled for Senate floor action this week, it appears likely that the European Security Act will be addressed in a House-Senate conference committee in the very near future. As we prepare for conference on the European Security Act, we find it necessary to ask for additional information relevant to one of the bill's provisions relating to multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Section 6(c)(1) of the European Security Act states that: It is the sense of the Congress that until the United States has taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation (such state being the only successor state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed or realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system), no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered for approval for entry into force with respect to the United States. . . . I am aware that, subsequent to the introduction of the European Security Act, the Senate on May 14th approved Treaty Doc. No. 105-5, a resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the CFE Flank Agreement. Condition 9 of this resolution required the President to: . . . certify to Congress that he will submit for Senate advice and consent to ratification any international agreement . . . that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty . . . I am further aware that, on May 15th, you submitted to Congress the certification required by Condition 9 of Treaty Doc. No. 105-5. In order to help the conferees on the European Security Act understand the degree to which section 6(c)(1) of that bill has been addressed (and perhaps rendered unnecessary) by Condition 9 of Treaty Doc. 105-5, I would appreciate receiving your prompt response to the following questions: 1. In the view of the Administration, what countries in addition to the United States are today parties to the ABM Treaty? 2. What countries sent representatives to the most recent meeting of the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva? 3. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response to question no. 1 includes countries in addition to those identified in response to question no. 2, does the Administration believe that those additional countries have the legal right to send representatives to meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission and otherwise participate in the administration of the ABM Treaty? . 4. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response to question no. 1 includes countries in addition to those identified in response to question no. 2, why are those additional countries not currently participating in the Standing Consultative Commission? Are those additional countries aware that, in the view of the United States Government, they are parties to and are bound by the ABM Treaty? On what date were they informed of this fact by the United States Government? 5. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response to question no. 2 includes countries in addition to those identified in response to question no. 1, what is the legal justification for the participation of those additional countries in the Standing Consultative Commission? 6. Does the Administration currently intend to conclude with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, or any other of the newly independent states an agreement or agreements regarding ABM Treaty succession? 7. In the event that the Senate fails to act on an agreement submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what countries in addition to the United States will, in the view of the Administration, be parties to the ABM Treaty? 8. In the event that the Senate votes to reject an agreement submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what countries in addition to the United States will, in the view of the Administration, be parties to the ABM Treaty? 9. Apart from the consequences that would flow from Senate approval of, rejection of, or inaction on an agreement submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what other developments, if any, may lead to a change in the list of countries that are today parties to the ABM Treaty? 10. Apart from the consequences that would flow from Senate approval of, rejection of, or inaction on an agreement submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what other developments, if any, may lead to a change in the list of countries legally entitled to send representatives to meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission and otherwise participate in the administration of the ABM Treaty? I appreciate your cooperation in this matter. With warmest regards, Sincerely, Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman. ______ THE WHITE HOUSE washington November 21, 1997 The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As you know, after discussion between our staffs, we deferred this formal response to your letter pending completion of the ABM-related agreement, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession. These documents were signed on September 26, 1997, and mark, along with the START II documents that were signed the same day, a significant step forward. The MOU, as well as the agreements relating to the demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missile defense systems, will be provided to the Senate for its advice and consent. Thus, the Congressional concerns that you raised related to approval of these agreements have been directly addressed. You raised a number of questions on ABM Treaty discussion generally. Let me make a few background points. The MOU on succession was the result of detailed negotiations spanning several years. When the USSR dissolved at the end of 1991, it became necessary to reach agreement as to which former Soviet states would collectively assume its rights and obligations under the Treaty (which clearly continued in force by its own terms). The United States took the view that, as a general principle, agreements between the United States and the USSR that were in force at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union would be presumed to continue in force as to the former Republics. It became clear, however, particularly in the area of arms control, that a case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary. In dealing with matters of succession, a key U.S. objective has been to preserve the substance of the origina1 treaty regime as closely as possible. This was true with respect to the elaboration of the MOU as well. Accordingly, the MOU works to preserve the original object and purpose of the Treaty. For example, it restricts the four successor states to only those rights held by the former Soviet Union by limiting them collectively to no more than 100 interceptors on 100 launchers at a single ABM deployment area and precluding the transfer of ABM systems and components to states that are not Party to the Treaty. Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972. Our willingness to work with key successor states, in addition to Russia, on strategic arms control issues has served, and will continue to serve, U.S. national security interests. Under the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the successor states on whose territory, all strategic offensive arms of the former Soviet Union were based and all declared START-related facilities were located, assumed the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the START I Treaty. The Protocol also obligated Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to adhere to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Both the Bush Administration and Clinton Administration engaged in major diplomatic initiatives to ensure implementation of the Lisbon Protocol, especially with respect to the removal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the accession at these successor states to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the entry into force of START I. For certain key successor states to the former Soviet Union, ABM Treaty succession was, and remains, a priority issue. Ukraine, in particular, has made clear to us that it considers Ukraine's legal status under the ABM Treaty to be the same as under the INF Treaty (to which it is considered a Party) and that, in its view, its succession status with regard to both Treaties should be the same. There are many complex factors in our strategic relationship with the former Soviet states. Had we been unwilling to engage with states in addition to Russia on key arms control agreements (START, INF and ABM), it is unlikely that we would have achieved the kind of comprehensive resolution of issues related to the disposition of strategic assets that has been achieved. A change in course at this time that would exclude key successor states from the ABM succession formula could place at risk continued progress on strategic arms and other nuclear matters. Since the last review of the ABM Treaty in 1993, (required every five years by the terms of the Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine--each of which have ABM Treaty-related assets on its territory--have been the only former Soviet republics that have participated in the ABM Treaty-related discussions held in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). While the other eight former Soviet republics have been informed of SCC sessions, none has participated, and three--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova--have expressed their lack of interest in being considered as Parties to the Treaty. Indeed, it became clear over the past four years of negotiations that, in addition to Russia, the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have substantial interest in the specific subject matter of the Treaty. For these reasons, prior to the signing of the MOU, the United States notified the other eight new independent states of our intentions to bring the succession issue to closure and to sign the MOU with Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, recognizing that these four successor states, along with the United States, constitute the Parties to the ABM Treaty. Upon its entry into force, the MOU will confirm the four former Soviet states participating in the SCC as the successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty. This does not constitute a substantive modification of rights and obligations under the Treaty; rather, it is a recognition of the status of those former Soviet republics in light of the dissolution of the USSR. As a practical matter, the recently signed SCC regulations make clear that the increased SCC participation will be structured in a way similar to, and having the same effect as, that which has been successful for the United States in working with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine in implementing the START and INF Treaties. As to your question regarding the possibility that the Senate might fail to act upon or might reject the MOU on succession, we believe that the case for all the ABM-related agreements, including the MOU on succession, will prevail on its merits. We further believe that the package of agreements serves U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. If, however, the Senate were to fail to act or to disagree and disapprove the agreements, succession arrangements will simply remain unsettled. The ABM Treaty itself would clearly remain in force. We appreciate this opportunity to clarify the record in this area and look forward to future opportunities to communicate and consult with you on these matters. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. ______ U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, March 3, 1998. The President The White House Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: We appreciate your response of November 21, 1997, to Chairman Gilman's letter of June 16, 1997, regarding the proposed multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We appreciate as well your making Administration lawyers available to meet with congressional staff on January 30, 1998, to elaborate on your November 21st response. The most important legal question that arises in connection with multilateralization of the ABM Treaty is the first question posed in Chairman Gilman's letter: In the view of the Administration, what countries in addition to the United States are today parties to the ABM Treaty? Your response to this question appears to be: Until an agreement on succession to the ABM Treaty comes into force, the identity of the other party or parties to the ABM Treaty is ``unsettled.'' Indeed, when asked on January 30th whether Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, or any other country that emerged from the Soviet Union is today prohibited by the ABM Treaty from deploying an ABM system at more than one site, Administration lawyers stated repeatedly that it is ``unclear'' whether any of these countries is so bound. The Administration's response is profoundly disturbing. If it is unclear as a matter of law whether Russia or any other country that emerged from the Soviet Union is today bound by the ABM Treaty, then it also should be unclear whether the United States is so bound. Yet the Administration has insisted for years that the United States remains fully bound by the ABM Treaty. With regard to ballistic missile defense, for example, the Administration has argued consistently that the United States should not test or deploy certain systems that could provide our nation highly effective protection against ballistic missile attack because such systems would violate our nation's obligations under the ABM Treaty. It now appears, however, that the Administration views the United States, at least for the time being, as the only country that is clearly subject to those obligations. It is obvious to us, however, that under basic principles of international law a treaty requires more than one state party in order to give rise to binding legal obligations. If the Administration is unable to identify any country in addition to the United States that is today clearly bound by the ABM Treaty, then there is no country that the United States can look to today to uphold the obligations previously imposed on the Soviet Union by the Treaty, and no country that today is entitled to complain if the United States fails to uphold the Treaty. If, in fact, the Administration does not consider the United States to be the only country that is today clearly bound by the ABM Treaty, we would appreciate your identifying for us the other country (or countries) that is today party to--and bound by--the Treaty. In the absence of such clarification, we will have no choice but to conclude that the ABM Treaty has lapsed until such time as the Senate approves a succession agreement reviving the Treaty. Thank you for your attention to this inquiry. With best wishes, Sincerely, Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Committee on International Relations. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations. ______ THE WHITE HOUSE washington May 21, 1998 The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As I said in my letter of November 21, 1997, the Administration will provide to the Senate for its advice and consent the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession, which was signed on September 26, 1997. Moreover, the MOU will settle ABM Treaty succession. Upon its entry into force, the MOU will confirm Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty and make clear that only these four states, along with the United States, are the ABM Treaty Parties. In your letter of March 3, you state that if the Administration is unable to identify any country in addition to the United States that is clearly bound by the Treaty, then you would have no choice but to conclude that the Treaty has lapsed until such time as the Senate approves a succession agreement reviving the Treaty. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ten of the twelve states of the former Soviet Union initially asserted a right in a Commonwealth of Independent States resolution, signed on October 9, 1992, in Bishkek, to assume obligations as successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty. Only four of these states have subsequently participated in the work of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), and none of the other six has reacted negatively when we informed each of them that, pursuant to the MOU, it will not be recognized as an ABM successor state. A principal advantage of the Senate's approving the MOU is that the MOU's entry into force will effectively dispose of any such claim by any of the other six states. In contrast, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine each has ABM Treaty- related assets on its territory; each has participated in the work of the SCC; and each has affirmed its desire to succeed to the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Treaty. Thus, a strong case can be made that, even without the MOU, these three states are Parties to the Treaty. Finally, the United States and Russia clearly are Parties to the Treaty. Each has reaffirmed its intention to be bound by the Treaty; each has actively participated in every phase of the implementation of the Treaty, including the work of the SCC; and each has on its territory extensive ABM Treaty-related facilities. Thus, there is no question that the ABM Treaty has continued in force and will continue in force even if the MOU is not ratified. However, the entry into force of the MOU remains essential. As I pointed out in my letter of November 21, the United States has a clear interest both in confirming that these states (and only these states) are bound by the obligations of the Treaty, and in resolving definitively the issues about ABM Treaty succession that are dealt with in the MOU. Without the MOU, ambiguity will remain about the extent to which states other than Russia are Parties, and about the way in which ABM Treaty obligations apply to the successors to the Soviet Union. Equally important, maintaining the viability of the ABM Treaty is key to further reductions in strategic offensive forces under START II and START III. I appreciate this further opportunity to clarify the record in this area. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. ______ U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC, August 14, 1998. The President The White House Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letters of November 21, 1997 and May 21, 1998, responding to inquiries from me and Chairman Helms about succession to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. As stated in our letter to you of March 3, 1998, the most important question that arises in this connection is the following: In the view of the Administration, what countries in addition to the United States are today parties to the ABM Treaty? I understand from your letter of May 21st that the Administration's answer to this question is that Russia ``clearly'' is a party to the Treaty, and that with regard to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, ``a strong case can be made that . . . these three states are Parties to the Treaty.'' In other words, you draw a distinction between Russia on the one hand and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on the other, and believe that Russia succeeded automatically to the USSR's obligations under the ABM Treaty, while Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may not have succeeded automatically to those obligations. But you do not rule out the possibility that, upon further consideration, the Administration may conclude that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine automatically succeeded as well. This answer raises several additional questions that are set forth below: 1. To the degree that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may have succeeded automatically under international law to the obligations of the USSR under the ABM Treaty, would that succession result in a series of bilateral ABM Treaties (U.S.-Belarus, U.S.-Kazakhstan, and U.S.- Ukraine, as well as U.S.-Russia), or one multilateral ABM Treaty to which all of these countries are parties? 2. If the response to the previous question is that the result of automatic succession by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would be one multilateral ABM Treaty, please identify the historical precedents, if any, for such a succession. In other words, please describe any other bilateral treaties that, upon the dissolution of one of the parties to the treaty, were converted automatically by operation of international law into multilateral treaties involving two or more of the successor states. 3. Will Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine participate in future meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and in the next five-year review conference of parties to the ABM Treaty? 4. If the response to the previous question is that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine will participate in future SCC meetings and the next five-year review conference, what will be the legal basis for such participation? To the degree that such participation does not rest on a conclusion that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine succeeded automatically under international law to the ABM Treaty, please explain why such participation is not inconsistent with (1) Article IX(3) of the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty of September 26, 1997, and (2) your certification to the Congress of May 15, 1997, in accordance with Condition 9 of the Senate resolution advising and consenting ratification of the CFE Flank Agreement (Treaty Doc. No. 105-5). I look forward to your prompt response to these questions. With warmest regards, Sincerely, Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman. ______ U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, October 5, 1998. The President The White House Washington, DC. Dear Mr. President: Your May 21, 1998, letter regarding the status of the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is clearly at odds with historical fact, your administration's past representations regarding this issue, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on succession itself. Moreover, your letter seeks to repudiate your pledge to the Senate, made in a treaty-related certification on May 14, 1997, that you would respect your Constitutional obligation to seek the advice and consent of the Senate for any agreement adding parties to the ABM Treaty, or changing its geographic scope. If your administration persists in the assertions made in the letter of May 21, 1998, the validity of the ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, also known as the CFE Flank Agreement, will be called into question. Your recent letter directly contravenes your certification of May 14, 1997, raising the inescapable conclusion that the instrument of ratification for the CFE Flank Agreement deposited on behalf of the United States is defective under U.S. constitutional law. Failure to reconsider your position not only will make further cooperation between Congress and your Administration on arms control matters difficult; it will undermine both the credibility of your administration, and of the United States, in the international affairs of the nation. In a November 21, 1997 letter to Representative Gilman, and in accompanying briefings by Administration lawyers, your administration stated that ABM Treaty succession arrangements were ``unsettled'' and would remain so in the absence of a new agreement (which you certified you would submit for Senate approval). Moreover, your letter to Mr. Gilman takes note of no distinction between the legal status of Russia and that of the other states proposed as ABM Treaty parties. Indeed, you stated in that letter: Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972. However, in your May 21, 1998, letter, you reversed course by asserting that ``the United States and Russia clearly are parties to the Treaty.'' Russia's desire to become a party, its participation in the treaty's activities, and the presence of ``ABM-Treaty related facilities''--a newly-invented term found nowhere in the ABM Treaty--on its territory are cited as reasons for this conclusion. You also decline to identify Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as parties, although you assert that ``a strong case can be made that even without the MOU, these three states are Parties to the Treaty,'' citing substantially the same factors that supposedly make Russia a party. Mr. President, there is no basis for any distinction between the legal status of Russia and that of the other states you mention. In a briefing to congressional staff on January 30, 1998, Administration lawyers were asked directly whether Russia was the only other clear party to the Treaty. They stated definitively that this was not the case. Numerous Administration representations and public statements, including the State Department's publication of ``Treaties in Force,'' have been consistent in making no legal distinction among the former Soviet states who are potential successors to the ABM Treaty. Article VIII of the MOU itself notes that regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission ``shall reflect the equal legal status of the Parties.'' Further, we are confident that the record of negotiation on the succession issue is replete with expressions by the United States of the view that the potential successors to the Soviet Union all have the same legal status. In short, your recent letter has no basis in historical fact. Moreover, your May 21, 1998, assertion that ``a strong case could be made'' that four countries could today be parties to the treaty is directly contradicted by Article I of the MOU, which states that the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia ``upon entry into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the Treaty.'' Very clearly, the entry-into-force of the MOU is the triggering event--and one that has not yet occurred--by which these states may become parties to the ABM Treaty. In short, none of the potential successors were identified as parties to the ABM Treaty during the period of negotiation, nor at any time preceding your certification. Nothing has transpired since that time that would constitute formal recognition of any state as a party to the ABM Treaty. Your assertion that Russia is a Party to the ABM Treaty, and your claim that the three other states might be, imply that the issue of the ABM treaty's status is fundamentally settled. Mr. President, this matter is most definitely not settled unless and until the Senate approves the MOU, or a similar agreement, through the exercise of the advice and consent powers assigned to it by the Constitution. It is the Senate's constitutional responsibility, and its duty, to advise on and consent to treaty arrangements made on behalf of the United States. Any such arrangements are invalid without the Senate's consent. Consent was given to the CFE Flank Agreement on condition that you would certify to the Congress of the United States that you would submit for the advice and consent of the Senate: . . . any international agreement (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term ``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty. On May 14, 1997, you made this certification. Since it is impossible to resolve the ABM Treaty's status without meeting one of these two conditions, your certification put to rest any question about whether ABM Treaty succession requires the advice and consent of the Senate. Your assertion now that Russia, and perhaps Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are parties to the ABM Treaty ``even without the MOU'' is, a repudiation of your certification. It implies that Senate advice and consent is not only unnecessary, but also irrelevant, and that these states may already have succeeded to the Treaty without Senate approval. The Senate's advice and consent powers are not ceremonial or pro forma. They do not exist for the convenience of the executive branch in order to clarify ``ambiguity,'' as your letter states. They are the powers by which the legislative branch--and the legislative branch alone--decides whether, how, and with whom the United States is bound by treaty. In light of the numerous and irreconcilable inconsistencies between your letters of November 21, 1997, and May 21, 1998, the internal contradictions within your most recent letter, the disregard for the negotiating record and historical fact, and other contrivances without basis in the treaty, we have no choice but to conclude that the ABM Treaty did not survive the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it is our position that the ABM Treaty has lapsed and is of no force and effect unless the Senate approves the MOU, or some similar agreement, to revive the treaty. We strongly urge that you reconsider your position of May 21, 1998, and reaffirm your pledge of more than a year ago. Sincerely, Trent Lott Jesse Helms Don Nickles Connie Mack Larry E. Craig Paul Coverdell Jon Kyl Bob Smith ______ THE WHITE HOUSE washington December 17, 1998 The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As I said in my two previous letters on this subject, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession, which was signed on September 26, 1997, will be provided to the Senate for its advice and consent. While I respect the fact that the MOU will not enter into force without the advice and consent of the Senate, there is no question the ABM Treaty has continued in force following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. If the Senate were to fail to approve the MOU, ambiguity would remain about the extent to which states other than Russia are Parties; however, the ABM Treaty would continue in force. The United States has a clear interest in resolving definitively the issues about ABM Treaty succession that are dealt with in the MOU. I am confident that any differences of views regarding the MOU, or additional questions you may have, will be debated fully as the Senate considers the MOU. In the interim, I suggest our staffs continue their dialogue regarding the technical legal aspects of ABM Treaty succession. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. ______ Presidential Message 35 (May 14, 1997) TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (``the CFE Flank Document''), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, I hereby certify that: In connection with Condition (2), Violations of State Sovereignty, the United States and the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom have issued a joint statement affirming that (i) the CFE Flank Document does not give any State Party the right to station (under Article IV, paragraph 5 of the Treaty) or temporarily deploy (under Article V, paragraphs 1 (B) and (C) of the Treaty) conventional arms and equipment limited by the Treaty on the territory of other States Parties to the Treaty without the freely expressed consent of the receiving State Party; (ii) the CFE Flank Document does not alter or abridge the right of any State Party under the Treaty to utilize fully its declared maximum levels for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty; and (iii) the CFE Flank Document does not alter in any way the requirement for the freely expressed consent of all States Parties concerned in the exercise of any reallocations envisioned under Article IV, paragraph 3 of the CFE Flank Document. In connection with Condition (6), Application and Effectiveness of Senate Advice and Consent, in the course of extension of the period of provisional application of the CFE Flank Document or a change of a minor administrative or technical nature; (ii) secure the adoption of a new United States obligation under, or in relation to, the CFE Treaty or the CFE Flank Document, unless such obligation is solely of a minor administrative or technical nature; or (iii) secure the provision of assurances, or endorsement of a course of action or a diplomatic position, inconsistent with the principles and policies established under conditions (1), (2), and (3) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Flank Document. In connection with Condition (7), Modifications of the CFE Flank Zone, any subsequent agreement to modify, revise, amend or alter the boundaries of the CFE flank zone, as delineated by the map entitled ``Revised CFE Flank Zone'' submitted to the Senate on April 7, 1997, shall require the submission of such agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, if such changes are not solely of a minor administrative or technical nature. In connection with Condition (9), Senate Prerogatives on Multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, I will submit to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification any international agreement (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term ``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty. In connection with Condition (11), Temporary deployments, the United States has informed all other States Parties to the Treaty that the United States (A) will continue to interpret the term ``temporary deployment,'' as used in the Treaty, to mean a deployment of severely limited duration measured in days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years; (B) will pursue measures designed to ensure that any State Party seeking to utilize the temporary deployments provision of the Treaty will be required to furnish the Joint Consultative Group established by the Treaty with a statement of the purpose and intended duration of the deployment, together with a description of the object of verification and the location of origin and destination of the relevant conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and (C) will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party to use the right of temporary deployment under the Treaty (i) to justify military deployments on a permanent basis; or (ii) to justify military deployments without the full and complete agreement of the State Party upon whose territory the armed forces or military equipment of another State Party are to be deployed. William J. Clinton THE WHITE HOUSE, May 14, 1997. ______ Presidential Message 36 (May 14, 1997) TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: I am gratified that the Senate has given its advice and consent to the ratification to the CFE Flank Document and I look forward to the entry into force of this important agreement. It will reaffirm the integrity of one of the CFE Treaty's core provisions and will facilitate progress on CFE adaptation and, thus, NATO enlargement, key elements for advancing United States and European security. I must, however, make clear my view of several of the Conditions attached to the resolution of advice and consent to ratification, including Conditions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11. These Conditions all purport to direct the exercise of authorities entrusted exclusively to the President under our Constitution, including for the conduct of diplomacy and the implementation of treaties. The explicit limitation on diplomatic activities in Condition 3 is a particularly clear example of this point. As I wrote the Senate following approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a condition in a resolution of ratification cannot alter the allocation of authority and responsibility under the Constitution. I will, therefore, interpret the Conditions of concern in the resolution in a manner consistent with the responsibilities entrusted to me as President under the Constitution. Nevertheless, without prejudice to my Constitutional authorities, I will implement the Conditions in the resolution. Condition (9), which requires my certification that any agreement governing ABM Treaty succession will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, is an issue of particular concern not only because it addresses a matter reserved to the President under our Constitution, but also because it is substantively unrelated to the Senate's review of the CFE Flank Document. It is clearly within the President's authorities to determine the successor States to a treaty when the original Party dissolves, to make the adjustments required to accomplish such succession, and to enter into agreements for this purpose. Indeed, throughout our history the executive branch has made a large number of determinations concerning the succession of new States to the treaty rights and obligations of their predecessors. The ABM Succession MOU negotiated by the United States effectuated no substantive change in the ABM Treaty requiring Senate advice and consent. Nonetheless, in light of the exceptional history of the ABM Treaty and in view of my commitment to agree to seek Senate approval of the Demarcation Agreements associated with the ABM Treaty, I have, without prejudice to the legal principles involved, certified, consistent with Condition (9), that I will submit any agreement concluded on ABM Treaty succession to the Senate for advice and consent. William J. Clinton THE WHITE HOUSE, May 14, 1997. ______ Condition #9 of the Executive Report 105-1, Resolution of Ratification for the Flank Document to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (9) Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the abm treaty.-- (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings: (i) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337) states that ``the United States shall not be bound by any international agreement entered into by the President that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution''. (ii) The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) states ``. . . the accord on ABM Treaty succession, tentatively agreed to by the administration, would constitute a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, which may only be entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution''. (B) Certification required.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that he will submit for Senate advice and consent to ratification any international agreement-- (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term ``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty. (C) ABM treaty defined.--For the purposes of this resolution, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, with related protocol, signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. ______ Condition 9: Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the ABM Treaty Condition (9) protects the Senate's constitutional prerogatives by requiring the President to agree that any agreement to multilateralize the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent since any such agreement would, by definition, substantively alter the rights and obligations of the United States and others under the ABM Treaty. This condition builds upon a clear and unambiguous legislative history. The Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act requires that any agreement that ``substantively modifies'' the ABM Treaty must be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Act states that any agreement to add signatories to the ABM Treaty would constitute a substantive change to the treaty requiring Senate advice and consent. The majority of the committee views multilateralization of the ABM Treaty as a substantive modification requiring Senate advice and consent for a variety of reasons. (This was the one condition with which questions were raised.) The committee noted with interest a June 6, 1996 study by the American Law Division of the Library of Congress. While the study concludes that ``an apportionment of the rights and obligations of the USSR under the ABM Treaty to its successor states would not, in itself, seem to require Senate participation,'' it does not contemplate just how those rights and obligations are to be apportioned. Indeed, the study does not seem even to take into account the actual Memorandum of Understanding relating to ABM Treaty successorship. Accordingly, the sentence preceding the June 6, 1996, study's conclusion is highly relevant, stating that ``a multilateralization agreement could include matters that would alter the substance of the ABM Treaty and require Senate advice and consent.'' Thorough analysis of how the addition of new States Parties to the ABM Treaty would alter its functioning reveals a number of problems which must be addressed by the Senate. First, new Parties to the ABM Treaty cannot be added without specially-negotiated, limited rights, but there is no way to do this within the existing provisions of the treaty. Yet such is necessary if the United States does not want to entitle each new successor to an ABM-system and ABM test-ranges. Thus the multilateralization agreement must add or alter provisions in the current treaty to ensure that ABM capabilities on the territory of the Soviet Union are not multiplied. Second, multilateralization inevitably will change the amount of territory covered by the ABM Treaty. In so doing, it will also change the geographic scope and coverage of the ABM Treaty. Since several fundamental limitations in the treaty (such as location of ABM radars) are defined in terms of ``national territory,'' any change to this definition changes the basic limitation in the treaty. For example, Russia continues to operate large-phased array radars which used to be ``on the periphery'' of the Soviet Union (as required by Article VI(b)) but which are now in Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Kazakhstan. A new agreement would conflict with ABM periphery requirements if Russia (or another country) were suddenly able to build a new string of radars along its borders. But if Russia is forbidden to do this, then the agreement must necessarily ``grandfather'' Russia's continued owning and operating of radars in other countries. By providing Russia extraterritorial treaty-rights and a military presence in another country, this agreement would most certainly constitute a significant change to the treaty (and a major legal/political issue for countries which want Russian troops withdrawn from their territories). Further, if a country of the former Soviet Union opts not to join the multilateralization agreement, the committee is concerned to know whether they would be free (in the future) to develop ABM systems. If so, this too significantly alters the geographic coverage of the treaty. Third, multilateralization of the ABM Treaty cannot be done without permanently, and significantly, altering United States rights under the treaty. New Parties doubtless will be given an official say at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which interprets and administers the ABM Treaty. Under the bilateral ABM Treaty, the United States may take actions as approved through bilateral agreements. Yet with multilateralization, the United States presumably will no longer have this ability. Expanding the bilateral consensus arrangement into a multilateral consensus process means that, in the future, one country (such as Belarus) could effectively block U.S. actions or demand U.S. concessions even if Russia and the others agreed with the United States. A second alternative would be to alter the SCC to operate by means of a majority vote. Yet, if this occurs the United States could find itself overruled on matters where currently it cannot be. The history of succession agreements to the various treaties concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union further supports the case for Senate consideration of any ABM successorship document. The United States has engaged in a case-by-case review of treaty successorship issues. In the one case of the INF Treaty, where the treaty carried a negative obligation--namely to not possess any intermediate-range nuclear missiles--the treaty could be multilateralized without Senate advice and consent. No treaty terms were altered and the United States incurred no modification or new treaty rights or obligations. Thus advice and consent was not necessary. Multilateralization of the START Treaty under the Lisbon Protocol, on the other hand, required Senate advice and consent. In this case, multilateralization had clear implications for the treaty's text and object and purpose. The Lisbon Protocol determined the extent to which countries other than Russia would be allowed to possess strategic nuclear weapons. Similarly, ratification of the Lisbon Protocol also effectively determined successorship questions to the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under the protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to a legally-binding commitment to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Finally, the Senate specifically considered the question of multilateralization of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) under Condition (5) of the resolution of ratification for the CFE Treaty. Moreover, the ABM Treaty specifically provides that any amendment to the treaty be considered under Senate advice and consent procedures. Article 14 of the Treaty states that ``agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.'' In other words, An amendment is to be adopted through the ratification process. Under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the Senate holds a co-equal treaty making power. John Jay made one of the most cogent arguments in this respect, noting that ``of course, treaties could be amended, but let us not forget that treaties are made not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and consequently that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter * * * them.'' -  -