Index




                              May 4, 1999
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Is the United States Ready for A 
                          Decision to Deploy?

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared 
  statement......................................................    92
Garwin, Dr. Richard L., Philip D. Reed senior fellow for science 
  and technology, Council on Foreign Relations...................    74
    Prepared statement of........................................    78
Graham, Dr. William R., former Director of the White House Office 
  of Science and Technology Policy...............................    63
    Prepared statement of........................................    66
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared 
  statement......................................................    60
Piotrowski, Gen. John, former Commander in Chief, Space Command, 
  Colorado Springs, CO...........................................    73
Shelby, Hon. Richard C., U.S. Senator from Alabama...............    61
    Prepared statement of........................................    62
Wright, Dr. David C., research fellow, Security Studies Program, 
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA...........    81
    Prepared statement of........................................    85




S. Hrg. 106-339 BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations <snowflake> Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director (ii)
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY: IS THE UNITED STATES READY FOR A DECISION TO DEPLOY? ---------- TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1999 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Helms, Biden and Lugar. The Chairman. Today's hearing is the third hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee's series on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Today the committee will move from an examination of the missile threat to a discussion of the technological feasibility of missile defense. We are privileged to have with us today to open this hearing the very distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Richard Shelby. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby knows the urgency of the missile threat better than anyone else, certainly anyone else in the Senate. As the senior Senator from Alabama, home of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense, he knows the programmatic aspects of national missile defense inside and out, and if you want to find out how much he knows, engage him in a conversation. I do that occasionally, and I learn more from Richard Shelby than anybody in this general field. Following Chairman Shelby, we will hear from several other distinguished experts: Dr. Bill Graham, former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and General John Piotrowski, former Commander in Chief of Space Command. If I have mispronounced your name, I am sorry. We also welcome Dr. Richard L. Garwin, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dr. David Wright, a fellow at MIT. As I noted, this hearing is devoted to an examination of the technological feasibility of national missile defense, and I am convinced that after years of investment in the SDI Program, a national missile defense is eminently doable. The United States has proven that missiles can be intercepted with other missiles, but the task now is to do it consistently and reliably. The task is also to make certain that we can consistently strike incoming reentry vehicles even as other countries take countermeasures to penetrate our defenses. The technological path our NMD program is taking, since it was first initiated by Dr. Graham under SDI, is the natural course for all technological developments. Consider, for example, the effort to break the sound barrier, and so forth and so on. In the interest of time, I am going to ask unanimous consent, and I think I will get it, that the balance of my statement be made a part of the record. Senator Shelby, we welcome you and appreciate you coming. [The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms Today's hearing is the third hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee's series on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Today the committee will move from an examination of the missile threat to a discussion of the technological feasibility of missile defense. We are privileged to have with us today, to open this hearing, the very distinguished chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Shelby. As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby knows the urgency of the missile threat better than anyone else. And as the senior Senator from Alabama--home of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense (BMDO)--he knows the programmatic aspects of national missile defense inside and out. Following Chairman Shelby, we will hear from several other distinguished experts: Dr. Bill Graham, former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and General John Piotrowski, former Commander in Chief of Space Command. We also welcome Dr. Richard L. Garwin, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dr. David Wright, a fellow at MIT. As I noted, this hearing is devoted to an examination of the technological feasibility of national missile defense. I am convinced that, after years of investment in the SDI program, a national missile defense is eminently ``doable;'' in fact, the United States has proven that missiles can be intercepted with other missiles. But the task now is to do it consistently and reliably. And the task is to make certain that we can consistently strike incoming reentry vehicles (RV's) even as other countries take counter-measures to penetrate our defenses. The technological path our NMD program is taking, since first initiated by Dr. Graham under SDI, is the natural course for all technological developments. Consider, for example, the effort to break the sound barrier. Even as of the late 1940's, many scientists thought this technically impossible. Yet we ultimately succeeded despite the dangers, and failures, and--in this case--the tragic loss of life. Now the sound barrier is broken routinely, day in and day out, by passenger airplanes flying the Atlantic. No doubt, we may hear today from scientists who don't think that a national missile defense can be done successfully. But as we consider these matters, I hope that the American people will recognize that the fact that the U.S. is defenseless today has nothing to do with technological issues. Instead, it has everything to do with political willpower and adherence to a ludicrous arms control treaty. The NMD program has had notable successes despite dramatic funding cuts by the Clinton administration. Successes also have occurred in theater missile defense programs which demonstrate the feasibility of the same basic principles over 130 launches from 1960-1972. So I must conclude that some who oppose NMD would have concluded at the turn of the century that, given the early failures of Samuel Langley and the Wright brothers, efforts to build an airplane should be shelved. Now, before we turn to our first witness, I want to address the matter of ``countermeasures.'' Some have begun putting forward the argument that any NMD built can be defeated easily by countermeasures. I must caution, however, that countermeasures are not a reality simply because someone draws a picture of one. I am confident that a good many scientists can draw equally as compelling pictures of things to counter the counter-measures. But we need not get into an ``art contest'' at this hearing. I hope we can confine our discussion to the realm of the possible and not allow flights of fancy to lead us to predict either that missile defenses can do nothing to protect our country, or that they will be perfect in affording such protection. STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. SHELBY, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALABAMA Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman. I ask that my complete statement be made part of the record in its entirety. The Chairman. Without objection. Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations as you continue your series of hearings on missile defense. I believe that this Nation needs a national missile defense system, and Mr. Chairman, we need it now. The threat is real and can no longer be ignored. As this Nation formulates a national security strategy for the uncertainty of the post-cold war world, one key assumption which must be considered is that our future adversaries will plan to attack the United States where we are most vulnerable. Today the United States stands vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack. Until recently, this fact was downplayed by this administration. There was a presumption, and perhaps a hope, that no real threat existed. As recently as 1995, intelligence estimates were predicting that no credible ballistic missile threat from other than the major declared nuclear powers would likely appear before the year 2010. However, last year the bipartisan Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, lead by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, reached a very different conclusion. The commission concluded that long-range missile threats to the United States might materialize much earlier than had been predicted. The report stated that within 5 years of a decision to do so, North Korea and Iran might be able to deploy missiles of sufficient range to strike parts of the continental United States, and that Iraq may be able to do so within 10 years. The Rumsfeld Commission also determined that countries may be able to conceal ballistic missile development programs from our intelligence assets until shortly before deployment. This concealment will give the United States little or no warning of an imminent threat, Mr. Chairman. The events of the past year appear to validate the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission and reinforce my belief that the threat is real. This past July, Mr. Chairman, Iran launched a 900-mile range missile capable of striking Israel. In August, North Korea fired a three-stage ballistic missile over Japan that was estimated to have a maximum range of 3,700 miles. If perfected, this missile could reach Hawaii and Alaska, and just 10 days ago India and Pakistan each tested intermediate-range ballistic missiles with ranges of over 1,200 miles. Additionally, Communist China has developed a force of ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States, and as we are learning, China has been persistent in its efforts to acquire advanced missile technology. Mr. Chairman, how do we counter this threat? I recommend two courses of action. The first was completed when the Senate passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. This historic yet simple piece of legislation, along with a similar measure passed in the House, will make it the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as it is technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. The second course of action, Mr. Chairman, is to continue our efforts to develop such a system. I support, as does a recent report by the Kado Institute, the deployment of a limited ground-based national missile system. If we continue our investment in advanced technologies, an effective ground- based system will soon be a reality. Mr. Chairman, some opponents of the national missile defense have argued that treaties and superior intelligence gathering will protect this Nation from a future ballistic missile attack. I do not agree. A treaty must add to a nation's security, not limit it, and as chairman of the Committee on Intelligence I can assure you that although our intelligence gathering is very good, it is not perfect by any means. I believe that the security of the American people should not depend solely on our ability to negotiate treaties or to conduct reconnaissance. We must have the ability, I believe, Mr. Chairman, to defend ourselves from the growing threat. The deployment of a limited ground-based national missile defense system would provide that ability. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what you are doing, and I appreciate your time and your courtesy here today. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Senator Shelby follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Richard Shelby Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations as you continue your series of hearings on missile defense. I believe that this Nation needs a national missile defense system and we need it now. The threat is real and can no longer be ignored. As this Nation formulates a national security strategy for the uncertainty of the post-Cold War world, one key assumption which must be considered is that our future adversaries will plan to attack the United States where we are most vulnerable. Today, the United States stands vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack. Until recently, this fact was downplayed by the Administration. There was a presumption and a hope that no real threat existed. As recently as 1995, intelligence estimates were predicting that no credible ballistic missile threat, from other than the major declared nuclear powers, would likely appear before the year 2010. However, last year the bipartisan Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, led by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, reached a different conclusion. The commission concluded that long-range missile threats to the United States might materialize much earlier than had been predicted. The report stated that within five years of a decision to do so, North Korea and Iran might be able to deploy missiles of sufficient range to strike parts of the continental United States, and that Iraq may be able to do so within ten years. The Rumsfeld Commission also determined that countries may be able to conceal ballistic missile development programs from our intelligence assets until shortly before deployment. This concealment will give the United States little or no warning of an imminent threat. The events of the past year appear to validate the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission and reinforce my belief that the threat is real. This past July, Iran launched the Shahab-3, a 900 mile range missile capable of striking Israel. In August, North Korea fired a three stage ballistic missile over Japan that was estimated to have a maximum range of 3,700 miles. When perfected, this missile could reach Hawaii and Alaska. And just ten days ago, India and Pakistan each tested intermediate range ballistic missiles with ranges of over 1,200 miles. Additionally, Communist China has developed a force of ballistic missiles capable of striking the continental United States. And as we are learning, China has been persistent in its efforts to acquire advanced missile technology. Mr. Chairman, how do we counter this threat? I recommend two courses of action. The first was completed last month when the Senate passed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. This historic yet simple piece of legislation, along with a similar measure passed in the House, will make it the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as is technologically possible, an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. The second course of action is to continue our efforts to develop such a system. I support, as does a recent report by the CATO Institute, the deployment of a limited ground based national missile defense system. If we continue our investment in advanced technologies, an effective ground based system will soon be a reality. Mr. Chairman, some opponents of National Missile Defense have argued that treaties and superior intelligence gathering will protect this Nation from a future ballistic missile attack. I do not agree. A treaty must add to a nation's security, not limit it. And as Chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence, I can assure you that although our intelligence gathering is very good, it is not perfect. I believe that the security of the American people should not depend solely on our ability to negotiate treaties or conduct reconnaissance. We must have the ability to defend ourselves from the growing threat. The deployment of a limited ground based national missile defense system provides that ability. The Chairman. Senator, I thank you and the committee thanks you, and the Senate and the American people ought to be mighty grateful to you for what you are doing. What you have done in your statement today is what badly needs doing, and that is to underscore how little time we have to deploy a missile defense, and if we do not get ready, when a missile comes, it will be too late, will it not? Senator Shelby. It will be. The Chairman. I am not going to question you further, but I am going to ask the staff to circulate your statement very widely, because I think the American people ought to know what you have said. Senator Shelby. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. Thank you for being with us. Now then, I have already identified panel No. 2. Dr. Graham, the former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. We have a lot of brain power here this morning, and I am equally grateful to each of you for coming here. I usually do not start on the left, as policy, but I am going to do it this morning. I call you the father of all this, Dr. Graham, and we will hear from you first. STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY Dr. Graham. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I would particularly like to address briefly the status of technology and some of the history of our experience in providing for the defense of the United States against ballistic missiles, and also the defense of our forces, allies, and friends in the world today. Of course, much has happened in the world since March 23, 1983, when President Reagan first proposed that the United States address the protection of these interests against ballistic missile attack, and I would like to say a few words in my oral statement, and then ask that my written comments be made available for you. The technologies and systems of both offensive ballistic missiles and the defenses against them have undergone much change over the last 30 years. As the threats evolve, the technical challenges and capabilities for defensive systems also have evolved. During each era the challenges were formidable, only to be overcome and replaced by new challenges; however, during this evolution, the balance of the offense/defense capabilities has gradually been moving from the offense having the advantage to the defense having the advantage, and to place the use of ballistic missile defense technology in perspective, my written testimony reviews the challenges that confronted ballistic missile defense in each of the last three decades, and identifies the technologies that played key roles in overcoming those challenges. Nonetheless, the U.S. is today at a substantial disadvantage compared with where we could be had we pursued ballistic missile defense in a more vigorous manner. The U.S. has not built an ABM system since the early 1970's, and, in fact, beginning in the late eighties the U.S. has downsized the defense industrial base very substantially by over half. That downsizing accelerated in the first half of this decade, and in the process of downsizing, the U.S. lost many of the most knowledgeable and experienced technologists that we had in the fields of rocketry, sensing, and other related fields that are key to building viable defense systems. Many of the problems that we have experienced in the THAAD flight test program to date, in fact, are typical of the development of the new technology, only in this case we have many new technologists who are learning to do advanced designs, so we are making the entry-level mistakes and learning from them. We are paying the price of that downsizing and the loss of many of the lead engineers and senior technicians that we have been able to draw on in the past. Second, on the negative side of the ledger, the ABM Treaty has had since 1972 a pervasive chilling effect on the U.S.'s ability to make full use of its technological capability to provide for our defense. Many examples exist, but I will give you one. There is a process and a group in the government, and it has been there for many years, called the Compliance Review Group, that examines systems and design for their compliance with the ABM Treaty. It is composed primarily of lawyers, and they try to make legal interpretations of this diplomatically negotiated ABM Treaty. However, they do not review preliminary design concepts, they refuse to look at those. They insist on having a fully fleshed out design before they take a look at it. That in itself is a multi-year process just to get to the Compliance Review Group, and then the Compliance Review Group takes a substantial part of a year to conduct its review. The fact is that you are down the road a few years before you get the word from the Compliance Review Group as to whether you have a design that you can proceed with or not. Well, the message that sends to the engineers and technologists is stay away from anything that might be viewed as a limitation by the ABM Treaty, and we treat the ABM Treaty as a third rail in technical design processes, and that places a very severe constraint on us using our full technical potential for designing ABM systems. An example of this is the fact that today the ABM system design that is being pursued by the administration suggests that we put our ballistic missile interceptors in Alaska, but among other things, use them to defend Miami, FL. This is a long way, and it takes an enormous amount of technical performance that is unnecessary if we built more interceptors and placed them in more locations either on shore or off shore around the country. One more comment, and that is the lack of the now 24 years of experience since we deactivated the safeguard ABM system means that on both the operational front and on the technical design front there is a big gap in our experience in dealing with ABM systems, in building them, designing them, testing them, and operating them, and we are today trying to recover from that lack, but it will be several years before we make up for the education and the continuous learning that we did not obtain during the last 24 years when we could have been operating at least a rudimentary ABM system and chose not to. Admiral Crowell used to make the case that it was against the U.S. interest to abandon the ABM Treaty, because the Russians, the Soviets, in that case, had gained so much more experience by operating their ABM system continuously since the early seventies, compared to us, that they could break out faster than we could. I think he was right, at least in part, that we did lose a lot of experience during that time and we have to make it up now. On the positive side, the advantage in the perpetual contest between offense and defense has over the last two decades, as I mentioned, been shifting toward the defense, at least in the technologies underlying our ballistic missile defense capability. To mention some of the areas where the advantage is shifted, certainly, the capabilities of our radar systems have improved substantially, both in the transmit-receive function and also in the data processing, which I will come to in a moment. Miniaturized spacecraft and spacecraft optical systems have made great progress in the last two decades, as have spacecraft infrared, visible, and ultraviolet sensors. Lasers, based on aircraft and satellite platforms have made enormous progress, and that progress is being used both in the airborne laser program being pursued by the Air Force today and in the space- based laser that is being pursued by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Small rocket propulsion, which is used, among other things, for maneuvering and diverting kinetic interceptors, or rocket- based interceptors, has improved greatly, and we can now build small thrusters with the thrust-to-weight ratio of over a thousand, but most important, our capability in computing has increased both by the decrease in the size of computers, but also simultaneously in the increase in their capability. In fact, these are related, and we have gone from an era when we had computers weighing several tons in the early 1960's or mid- 1960's, like the Control Data-6600, and able to perform 10 million operations per second, to computers built on a single chip, which weighs a small fraction of an ounce, and are able to perform hundreds of millions of operations per second, and, in fact, when connected properly in groups and operated with the appropriate software, they can now do hundreds of billions and in some cases even thousands of billions of operations per second. Nothing has advanced like the speed and memory capacity of our computers in this last 20 years, and that is one of the key areas that benefits the defense far more than it benefits the offense. So in summary I would say the technology balance, while it will be an eternal challenge, and one can always invent an offense that will overcome a given defense, and one can always conceive of a defense that will overcome a given offense, the technology balance is moving toward the defense, and the U.S. should be taking full advantage of that. Today we are taking advantage of it under the serious constraints of the ABM Treaty. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Graham follows:] Prepared Statement of Dr. William R. Graham the status of technology for defense of the united states, its forces, and its interests against ballistic missile attack Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the status of technology for defense of the United States, its forces, its allies and friends, and its interests throughout the world today, against ballistic missile attack Much has happened in the world since March 23, 1983, when President Reagan first proposed that the United States address the protection of our vital interests against the threat of ballistic missile attack. I would like to address the results of the investment that our country has made in the technology of ballistic missile defense through the Strategic Defense Initiative and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. results of the u.s. investment in ballistic missile defenses The technologies and systems of both offensive ballistic missiles and defenses against them have undergone dynamic change over the last thirty years. As the threats evolved, the technical challenges and capabilities for defense systems also evolved. During its own era, each of the challenges was formidable, only to be overcome and replaced by new challenges. However, during this evolution, the balance of capability has gradually been moving from the offense to the defense. To place the use of ballistic missile defense technology in perspective, this testimony reviews the challenges that confronted missile defense in each of the last three decades, and identifies the technologies that played critical roles in overcoming those challenges. The 1950s In the post-World War II era, the first strategic threat to the continental U.S. arose from Soviet long-range bombers carrying nuclear weapons. Defenses against aircraft--particularly bombers--had undergone extensive development as a matter of necessity in World War II, when allied forces in Europe employed a combination of radar for early warning, aircraft for high-altitude and standoff interception, and barrage balloons and ground-based anti-aircraft guns for local defense, all integrated using point-to-point voice communications over telephone and radio links. As the strategic aircraft threat to the U.S. developed in the 1950s, the need grew for higher performance, more integrated air defenses. Air defense performance was improved through the development of several generations of jet interceptor aircraft of progressively greater speed, better armament for these aircraft including air-to-air missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. These latter missiles were usually tracked along with the target aircraft and command-guided to intercept by ground-based radars that were usually co-located with the missile launchers. The guidance loop went from the radar to the target and the interceptor missile, back to the radar, through an electrical analog computer, and to the interceptor missile with guidance commands. The systems were not sufficiently accurate to rely on a hit-to-kill intercept, so the interceptor missile carried either a proximity-fused high explosive warhead or a small nuclear warhead. The NIKE series of surface-to-air missiles, developed under the leadership of Bell Laboratories and deployed widely in the U.S. during this era, were examples of this technical approach. Countermeasures that had to be overcome included chaff jammers, and both passive and active decoys. The 1960s By the beginning of the 1960s, the progress that the Soviet Union was making in the development of long-range ballistic missiles, along with their ability to make large-yield thermonuclear weapons as demonstrated in their atmospheric tests, stimulated serious consideration in the U.S. of a national missile defense. The point of departure for such a system was the NIKE anti-aircraft system, which by that time had evolved through several generations of design and deployment. Bell Laboratories redirected its anti-aircraft work to the ABM problem, and drew upon its extensive experience to develop what became the NIKE X and then the SAFEGUARD ABM system that was deployed at a single site near Grand Forks, North Dakota, in 1975. The SAFEGUARD ABM system consisted of a long-range surveillance Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), a shorter range but more precise Missile Site Radar (MSR), ground-based digital computers, ground-based SPARTAN missiles for exo-atmospheric intercepts, and Sprint missiles for endo-atmospheric intercepts. Both missiles carried nuclear warheads, although of quite different types, with each optimized to be most effective in its altitude range of operation. The overall interceptor control loop was the same as it had been for earlier air defense missiles, other than the change from analog to large digital computers to solve the fire control equations and guide the interceptor to the vicinity of its target. The SAFEGUARD system was linked to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) of radars and communications that had been established in the 1960s to monitor Soviet ballistic missile and space launches. It was interconnected by commercial long-line telephone carriers and military surface-to-surface microwave links, and was interconnected and controlled from the NORAD facilities inside Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The SAFEGUARD system faced three major technical challenges. The first of these was traffic capacity. In the 1960s, digital computers were built from discrete components: individual transistors, resistors, etc. This form of electronics technology produced several inherent limitations on the speed of computation, and also imposed what by today's computer standards are severe practical limitations on the memory and processor size of the computer. These limitations in 1960s computer technology translated mid limitations in the ability of the SAFEGUARD system to handle multiple ballistic missiles and other objects such as chaff, jammers, or decoys simultaneously, which in turn gave rise to the possibility of defeating its defensive capabilities by saturating its processors with a barrage or countermeasure attack. However, such an attack had drawbacks for the attacker. To produce a high-traffic attack, the offense would have to coordinate its launches so that the offensive missiles would arrive in the battle space of the radar and its associated computers nearly simultaneously. This degree of synchronization of the attack not only would place an additional requirement on the offense, but would also subject the offensive missiles to various forms of fratricide--the destruction or disabling of one offensive missile warhead by another. To avoid multiple intercepts from a single defensive missile, the attacking warheads would have to be spaced sufficiently far apart so that one interceptor could not destroy more than one offensive warhead, and if the offensive warheads were fused to detonate when attacked, sometimes referred to as salvage fusing, the spacing would have to be sufficiently large that the salvage explosion of one offensive warhead would not kill another in the attack. Even if a following warhead were not killed, the anomalous aerodynamic conditions within the fireball created by either an offensive or defensive nuclear explosion could induce a substantial error in the targeting accuracy of a latter warhead--a particularly significant effect when the attack was directed against hardencd targets such as missile silos that required considerable offensive warhead accuracy to kill. Finally, crater ejecta from earlier warheads would still be airborne when later warheads arrived and that debris could be struck by rapidly moving incoming warheads, causing them to pre-detonate or even to be destroyed. Countermeasures had always been a problem for radar-guided anti- aircraft. As Soviet missile defenses came into operation, U.S. strategic missiles began to incorporate similar countermeasures, and there was a concern that Soviet missiles might do the same. Some countermeasures, such as lightweight chaff, would only be effective outside the atmosphere, but others, such as replica decoys, could be designed to look somewhat like offensive warheads from deployment until they began penetrating the upper atmosphere and could quickly add still more traffic to the defended battlespace. To overcome such countermeasures, the performance of both the radar and the computers had to be sufficiently accurate to distinguish between the signatures and the trajectories and other dynamics of the decoys and the actual warheads. This, in turn, put additional requirements on the defensive hardware and software capabilities. Blackout and other nuclear explosion-induced radar propagation problems were another technical challenge. Blackout is caused by the ionization created by an atmospheric or exo-atmospheric nuclear explosion. That ionization can absorb or distort the radar signal as it passes through the region around the explosion, and result in either no return signal or a signal improperly directed back to the radar. Blackout and related effects would be caused by the explosion of a nuclear interceptor warhead, and could be caused by the offensive warhead as well if it were salvage-fused. To overcome these problems, the defensive system had to maintain a good model of the battlespace and the events occurring in it, and had to be able to correct for problems less than a total blackout of the radar signal. These phenomena imposed additional loads on the radar and its computers. Finally, while not solely a technology problem, the siting issues associated with SAFEGUARD became a major impediment to its deployment in some areas. Missile and radar range limitations of the SAFEGUARD system necessitated the deployment of several radar/computer/missile installations around the country to protect the entire continental U.S. The most stressful threats in terms of battlespace available were not the Soviet ICBMs, but rather their sub-launched ballistic missiles-- SLBMs. SLBMs could be fired from only a few hundred kilometers off the U. S. coastline, and could have flight times of ten minutes or less to the population centers along the coasts, and to the bomber bases and other military facilities inland. However, deploying any systems armed with nuclear warheads close to coastal population centers met with public and political resistance in some areas. The 1970s In February 1976, after ten months of operation at the Grand Forks site, the SAFEGUARD system was deactivated by Act of Congress. For the next seven years, ballistic missile defense activities were focused on R&D carried out primarily by the Army's Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama; the organization that had directed the development of the SAFEGUARD system. During that time, substantial progress was made in the development of high-powered laser systems suitable for weapons applications and multi-spectral space-based sensors by the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and by the Air Force. During this era, great progress was also made first by the military and then by commercial initiatives in computer hardware technology. ARPA and other organizations carried out initiatives to develop large- scale, high-speed integrated digital circuits, which took the technology from a few tens of transistors on a single semiconductor chip in 1970 to tens of thousands in 1980 to numbers approaching ten million today. Equally impressive were the gains made in computer speeds. In the early 1960s, the world's foremost supercomputer--the Control Data Corporation's 6600--had a clock speed of ten million operations per second. By the late 1980s, personal computer microprocessors had reached this speed, and have continued to advance to today's speeds of 500 million operations per second, with good prospects for still higher speeds in the near future. Special purpose computers have recently been built that operate at speeds of hundreds of billions to trillions of operations per second. Integrated circuit semiconductor memories have experienced similar advances in capacity and speed. The enormous progress made in computers during this era resolved several of the challenges encountered in the 1970s in the design and development of ballistic missile defense systems, including traffic handling capacity, nuclear effects modeling, and more countermeasure discrimination. The 1980s The establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan in 1983 was a seminal event in the development of ballistic missile defense technology. Diverse activities that could contribute to missile defense were brought together from many Defense Department organizations, and focused in the Strategic Defense Initiative Office. With a new infusion of national interest and funding, rapid progress began to be made in the development of lightweight, high-powered laser systems and neutral particle beam devices. Early successes included the destruction of a TITAN booster structure in a static test stand by the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser in 1985 and the first test in space of a neutral particle beam accelerator--the Beam Experiment Aboard Rocket (BEAR) in 1989. In the 1960s and '70s, the limitations of ground-based radar tracking, relatively slow ground-based computing, and ground-based command guidance of the interceptors made it technically impractical for the interceptors to be maneuvered with sufficient accuracy to actually hit high speed offensive ballistic missile warheads. This situation was overcome in the SAFEGUARD system by using nuclear explosives on the interceptors to extend their lethal range by at least a factor of a thousand over non-nuclear interceptors. In June, 1984, the Army demonstrated the feasibility of a hit-to- kill ballistic missile interceptor with its Homing Overlay Experiment. This experiment used pre-SDI technology, resulting in a kill vehicle mass on the order of 1000 kg. The first formative reductions in component miniaturization gave rise to the highly successful Delta series (Delta 180-183). This sequence of experiments established the feasibility of the fundamental operations necessary to enable the space-based operation of a ballistic missile defense system. Operations ranging from target detection and acquisition to space based intercept were conducted. The mass of the kill vehicle used in the Delta series was of the order of a few hundred kilograms. The combination of miniaturized high-performance components, the large amount of computer power that could now be placed on a small interceptor, and the ability to integrate advanced components into a semiautonomous hit-to-kill interceptor made it possible for the first time to consider deploying a ballistic missile defense system composed of interceptors that could function with sufficient autonomy and precision so that each could intercept a warhead using only its on-board sensors, thrusters, and computers once it had been given the battlespace it was to defend and the authority to act. The miniaturization of sensors, propulsion systems, and computers also progressed rapidly; for example, small rocket engines well suited for maneuvering either ground-based interceptors or satellites into hit-to-kill trajectories were developed that had thrust-to-weight ratios of one thousand. Advances in these technologies represented major progress, and opened significant new opportunities in the design of interceptors and space systems. This progress has been so profound that it is revolutionizing the design of both military and non-military space systems, and has already strongly influenced the plans, designs, and hardware of commercial, NASA, and military satellites. The drastic reduction in the size and weight of the components which make up hit-to-kill interceptors has enabled new families of endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric kinetic kill vehicles. Taken together, this family of vehicles is known as LEAP (Lightweight ExoAtmospheric Projectile). The mass of these vehicles is as low as 10 kg in a package roughly the size of a coffee can. These vehicles are fully self-contained units which include the seeker, processor, guidance, and divert propulsion system--in short, a fully integrated projectile with enough computational capability to perform intercepts autonomously. Under other technology programs, liquid and solid axial engines have been developed which are specifically designed to propel the kill vehicles into the target. The emergence of the LEAP capability has created the opportunity to leverage the AEGIS air defense weapon system currently deployed aboard dozens of Navy ships. This approach uses existing investments in hardware, infrastructure and training to provide a range of potentially near-term ballistic missile defense options. A notable example of the ingenious use of SDI technologies was the design of the Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptor in 1987. Brilliant Pebbles had been preceded by Project BAMBI, an Air Force concept of the early 1960s using space-based ABM kill vehicles that would guide themselves to intercept boosting ballistic missiles. But it would take another twenty-five years of technical development to make BAMBI feasible as Brilliant Pebbles. The BAMBI concept was reborn as Brilliant Pebbles of necessity in response to the projected cost of the first phase of deployment of a strategic defense system. The cost of this system was dominated by the space segment and was driven by survivability considerations and the use of technology proven in the Delta series. Brilliant Pebbles enabled a drastic reduction in the cost of the space segment while meeting all requirements. Brilliant Pebbles achieved survivability through proliferation, thereby distributing the intercept function across a number of elements. This approach obviated the need for expensive measures designed to ensure that every individual space-based asset be capable of surviving a direct attack. The proliferated nature of the Brilliant Pebbles concept enabled a production line approach, allowing dramatic cost reductions through economies-of-scale. The difference between the earlier space-based interceptor and Brilliant Pebbles is akin to the difference between the MILSTAR and IRIDIUM communications systems. The Brilliant Pebbles interceptor was designed to weigh about 50 kilograms, and be deployed in a constellation of a few thousand satellites that, when commanded, could conduct autonomous hit-to-kill intercepts of offensive missiles and warheads. While the Brilliant Pebbles system was designed to operate exo-atmospherically as a defense against longer range missiles, it could also intercept missiles with ranges as short as 1000 kilometers. Unfortunately, the development of the system was terminated in 1993, at the direction of the Administration that took office that year. While the production and deployment of Brilliant Pebbles was never undertaken, the technology continued to be developed, and was ultimately proven with a space system called Clementine. The Clementine satellite was composed of all the components of a Brilliant Pebble and assembled into a configuration designed to demonstrate surveillance and interception for missile defense applications as well as a variety of civil space applications. The Clementine satellite was the first satellite to orbit the moon since the Apollo program over 25 years ago. Using SDI-developed sensors, Clementine produced the first complete photographic map of the surface of the moon, and it did so at a variety of visible and infrared wavebands. It also found the first indications of ice at the south pole of the moon. Beginning concurrently with the Brilliant Pebbles development and continuing through the present, the Army has pursued development of miniature ground-based hit-to-kill interceptors and associated ground- based radars, designed to use cueing from space-based sensors for both theater ballistic missile defense and national missile defense. These interceptors would have a range of from tens to hundreds of kilometers depending on their booster velocity at burnout and--most importantly-- the external sensor and command and control capabilities of the system. The Navy also began development of miniaturized ship-based interceptors that could be integrated into the AEGIS air defense system and used in conjunction with its shipborne SPY-1 radars, their advanced battle management system, and space-based sensors. To a much greater degree than the space-based interceptor systems, the ground and sea-based systems have radar range and horizon limitations that in turn limit the performance of interceptors to ranges substantially less than the kinematic range of the interceptor itself. However, this limitation can be offset to a limited extent by using forward based early warning radars and to a large extent by using space-based sensors. Drawing from the technological advantages exploited by Brilliant Pebbles, the MSTI satellite series (MSTI I--MSTI III) demonstrated the feasibility and practicality of such an approach, gathered key background data, and demonstrated all the key sensor functions--such as target detection, acquisition and tracking. The ``footprint'' or defended area of surface-based systems depends very strongly on the availability and use of external sensing and tracking of offensive missiles. Following the conceptual development of the Brilliant Pebbles interceptors, and in view of the rapid progress being made in the development of small, lightweight sensors and satellites, Dr. Gregory Canavan proposed the development and deployment of a constellation of about twenty to forty surveillance, tracking, and attack assessment satellites, communicating through satellite-to-satellite links with downlinks to ground stations from any satellite within line of site, in orbits about 1000 kilometers in altitude. The system was called Brilliant Eyes, since it used much of the same technology as the Brilliant Pebbles interceptor satellites. The Brilliant Eyes system is currently being addressed in an Air Force program called the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS). Unfortunately, that program has recently been started for the third time and is proceeding slowly if at all. The importance of Brilliant Eyes, or SMTS, can hardly be overestimated. For example, Figure 1 shows the ratio of the areas that could potentially be defended by the THAAD ground-based theater defense missile limited only by the kinematics of the missile compared with the area defended using only the planned ground-based radar located with the missile launcher. For offensive missiles of over about 1,500 kilometers range, the ratio of defended areas is more than a factor of 10. <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> The significance of space-based sensing such as Brilliant Eyes becomes even clearer when the benefits are characterized in terms of relative dollar costs to obtain an equal capability. In the case mentioned above, the area that a surface-based interceptor system can defend using only its co-located radar is one-tenth the area that the same interceptor can defend using space-based sensing. Therefore, to defend the same area without space-based sensing, ten times as many missile/radar systems would have to be deployed, at a cost that would be approximately ten times as much as the same capability using space- based sensing to its fullest potential. The shift in emphasis from the multi-thousand warhead threat that could be deployed by the Soviet Union (or its successor, Russia) to a much smaller threat that could be deployed today by China, and in the near future by other states, has shifted the ballistic missile defense focus to smaller scale deployments. A change begun with the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) in January 1992, and continued through May 1993. With the increase in computer power and the absence of nuclear explosives on the interceptors, together with the advances in multi-spectral infra-red, optical, and ultraviolet sensors, problems of traffic management, discrimination, and blackout have been substantially reduced and in some cases eliminated. Recent Technical Challenges Soon after the Strategic Defense Initiative was begun, a new problem was put forward as a potential fundamental limitation to the capability of strategic missile defenses. Since the time available for operator intervention during an attack would be minimal, the potential problem was software--the underlying logical instructions that govern the operation of the system's computers, and therefore the system itself. Some asserted that it would be infeasible to construct software of tens of millions of instructions without introducing errors that would only appear during attack and would render the missile defense ineffective. However, over the last decade, computer software technology has also advanced at a rapid rate, and the ability to test software has kept pace, so that today it is routine for people not expert in software to install and operate reliable programs of tens of millions of instructions on personal computers. The cost of missile defenses is periodically raised as another barrier to the deployment of effective systems. Fortunately, the use of the SDI's miniaturization technologies had a very significant effect on reducing systems cost. At the same time that the Brilliant Pebbles system was proposed, another military organization proposed a space- based system using earlier technologies. Cost estimates of the latter system indicated that it would be prohibitively expensive, and raised the prospect of terminating space-based interceptor systems. However, initial cost estimates of the Brilliant Pebbles system indicated that it would have a much lower cost than the system using more conventional technology. For chemical and biological offensive warheads, submunitions remain a concern. They can be dealt with most directly by intercepting the offensive missile while it is still in boosted flight, before it can deploy the submunitions. Such defensive systems are referred to as boost phase interceptors. Since powered flight of an offensive missile usually extends through the first one to five minutes of its trajectory, only that amount of time is available for performing a boost phase intercept. Intercepting an offensive missile in such a short time after launch requires both a close proximity and rapid response for a rocket-propelled kinetic interceptor. While such a capability is technically feasible, for many situations of interest to the U.S., kinetic boost-phase interceptors are not being pursued as a system development program. The Air Force is pursuing another approach to boost phase intercept. Building on the progress that has been made in high power laser systems, it is developing a system that can be carried in a large aircraft and uses a laser beam to destroy missiles in boost phase at distances greater than can be achieved with kinetic interceptors. Rapid progress has been made in compensating for beam imperfections and atmospheric propagation effects, both of which can limit the effective range of such a system. The U.S. missile defense program has successfully overcome a series of formidable technological and systemic challenges. Major hardware and software obstacles have been resolved, and miniaturization of sensor, propulsion system, and computer technologies have greatly reduced cost issues. The diminished size of the anticipated missile threat also has significantly facilitated the resolution of technological and operational problems. The principal challenge today is not in the technology, which has made great progress and continues to advance, but in the national commitment to proceed with deploying effective missile defenses, and to do so in an efficient and expeditious manner. The substantial accomplishments of the Strategic Defense Initiative and its successor Ballistic Missile Defense Organization have brought about revolutionary advances in other areas of military space capabilities and in scientific and commercial space enterprises as well. For example, in the military area, the development of small, inexpensive, highly capable satellites has given the U.S. the opportunity to move away from dependence upon the infrequent coverage of specific ground areas by a few large satellites for weather observation, reconnaissance, and other functions, and toward nearly continuous coverage of all ground areas by constellations of small satellites. In the scientific exploration and exploitation of space, SDI technology has changed the paradigm for spacecraft systems. Before SDI, scientific spacecraft built by NASA and other organizations typically weighed thousands to tens of thousands of pounds and cost in the range of a billion dollars. Today, both deep space and earth-orbiting scientific satellites typically weigh in the hundreds of pounds and cost about 10% of their predecessors. Clementine, the first U.S. spacecraft to orbit the moon in 25 years, and made the initial discovery that ice might be present at the lunar southern pole, could not have been built without SDI technology. Future scientific spacecraft will be even smaller, less expensive, and deployed in greater numbers than Clementine and its peers. The recent progress in commercial spacecraft and their applications is also the result of SDI technology. The constellations of small, low- orbit communications satellites such as the Iridium and Teledesic systems depend upon highly capable, inexpensive, miniaturized, autonomous spacecraft for their commercial feasibility. Today, billions of dollars are being invested in these systems, and many billions of dollars will be earned over their lifetimes. The Chairman. Thank you very much. General, is it ``Piotrowski''---- General Piotrowski. Sir, you pronounced it exactly correct. The Chairman. Did I? General Piotrowski. Yes, sir. The Chairman. General, it is a pleasure to have you. Thank you very much for coming. You may proceed. STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN PIOTROWSKI, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SPACE COMMAND, COLORADO SPRINGS, CO General Piotrowski. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for asking me. I would like to draw a historical perspective. My background is operational and programmatic, and as you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, program success is often largely dependent on the goals established, the motivation behind the program, and where it sits in the national priorities. For example, if President Kennedy in the decade of the sixties had said, ``It may be necessary to go to the moon, I am not sure, but what I would like to do is develop the technology, and by the end of the decade I will review it, and if I find the need, then I will make a decision to go to the moon.'' The greatest technological achievement, certainly in my lifetime, was the Apollo program. It was not structured that way. It was a top national priority. There was an instate, put a man on the moon by the end of the decade and bring him back to earth, and it was properly funded. I have something the NASA administrator used about a month ago in a presentation, and it shows that in year 2000 dollars the Saturn rocket alone was $48 billion. At the same time, the lunar escape module cost the Nation about $16 billion in current year dollars. As the Senators will remember, that was a time when we were building the Great Society, we were fighting a major war in Vietnam with a million or so people on the ground, and modernizing our weapon systems at a rapid rate. This Nation can do daunting technological programs and do them well if they are prioritized, if there is an instate, and if we are motivated. The motivation is there. As panel one and Senator Shelby stated, there is a threat. From an operational perspective, I am absolutely convinced as an operator that our senior military leaders today, if given the tools, can defend America. There is another operational advantage to having a ballistic missile defense, whether it is national, theater, or global. It devalues ballistic missiles. Today they are immutable. They are very attractive, because they cannot be stopped, but if we could stop them, it would, first, devalue ballistic missiles at all levels, and second, open up other operational avenues to pursue. For example, if North Korea decided to blackmail the United States by threatening Oahu or Los Angeles, if we had a ballistic missile defense, the Nation's leaders could take a decision to preempt, knowing that if some escaped or if some were launched out from under attack, they could be defeated, and we could eliminate that scourge permanently. Now, again, I would like to end by saying I am convinced that our military leaders of today can do this job, do it right, make the right decisions and defend America, if given the tools. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. Before Dr. Garwin proceeds, I would like to ask the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden, if he has an opening statement, and I hope he does. Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do, and I appreciate your graciousness, I apologize for being late, I was still on the floor in the aftermath of the last vote, and I will wait with your permission until the rest of the panel---- The Chairman. Very well. Senator Biden [continuing]. Goes and then make my statement. The Chairman. You may proceed. Senator Biden. Thank you. STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD L. GARWIN, PHILIP D. REED SENIOR FELLOW FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY Dr. Garwin. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I request that my written testimony be included in the record, and I'll summarize it. The Chairman. Without objection. Dr. Garwin. Thank you. Senator Shelby indicated that an enemy would attack the United States where it is most vulnerable, and presumably where they can achieve such an attack, but unlike Russia, these countries that we are talking about today, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, have no capability to destroy the United States as a whole. They can nibble around the edges, where it is easiest for them, and most difficult for us to defend. So given a will to damage the United States and our geography, Hawaii would be struck by North Korea with short- range cruise missiles or ballistic missiles from ships, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Washington, Seattle, San Diego, are all vulnerable, and we have absolutely no defense, and no proposal to defend against these cruise missiles or short-range ballistic missiles, or nuclear weapons detonated in harbors. So my problem with the national missile defense is that it defends against a threat which is most difficult for the other side to prepare, and as I will indicate, does not do that at all either. Now, with Dr. Graham, I was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, and with the other eight members, we unanimously endorsed the threat that could appear within 5 years by these three stated countries, joining the thousands of ballistic missile nuclear warheads present in Russia and the ten or twenty in China, and, of course, the hundreds available to the French and the British. A few other countries could do the same, but they are not classed as enemies. Rather than give my view of the history of the national missile defense program, I want to render a judgment. In the early stages of the program it is contemplated that 75 ground- based interceptors would be built, and about 25 deployed to counter a relatively few warheads. The system specifications require an extremely high confidence that not a single warhead penetrate to U.S. soil. In my opinion, no system thus far proposed could achieve such confidence even against cooperating warheads. Senator Biden. I am sorry. What kind of warheads? Dr. Garwin. Cooperating warheads. Senator Biden. Cooperating warheads. Dr. Garwin. Warheads that would be launched like puppy dogs---- Senator Biden. I got it. Dr. Garwin [continuing]. Wagging their tails, and wanting to be slapped with hit-to-kill interceptors. But the problem with the national missile defense is not simply that it would not fulfill the stated requirement, but that it would have essentially no capability against a long-range missile system that would be deployed by North Korea, Iraq, or Iran to strike the United States with biological weapons or with nuclear weapons. The problem is really simple. Consider the use of biological weapons, a country could put a payload of a hundred kilograms or a ton of anthrax or other germs into a reentry vehicle, have it come down in the middle of Washington, (or upwind would be better), strike the ground, and deliver all of these germs. The result would be a very narrow plume carried by the breeze, which would kill most of the people in its path, but would leave those outside the plume untouched, except in the case of extremely contagious germs, such as small pox, where one carrier could cause an epidemic. But a country would make much better use of their payload capacity by packaging the biological weapon in the form of individual bomblets that would be released just after boost, when the ICBM would reach its full velocity, and these would fall through space and reenter individually with a limited amount of heat shield protection against the reentry heat, and after the heat of reentry the shield would be shed, as was the case with the reentry of the film capsule in the first U.S. strategic reconnaissance system, CORONA; the bomblets would fall to earth, where a thoroughly tested device would expel the biological agents. Given this approach to increased military effectiveness, the planned national missile defense system has no possibility of making its intercept so early in the trajectory. Now, let us look at nuclear warheads. You cannot break up nuclear warheads into one-kilogram bomblets, but there is something else that could be done against these hit-to-kill interceptors which would be equally effective. That is for the offense to arrange for the nuclear warhead to be enclosed in a balloon, a large balloon made of plastic Mylar, coated with aluminum foil, a balloon that could be almost the size of this room, and a warhead somewhat bigger than me would be hidden in there someplace. Everything would work according to plan, the launch would be seen by the defense support program, DSP satellites; an alert would be sent to the upgraded early warning radars; they would see eventually this big balloon containing the warhead or not; the interceptors would be launched; an interceptor would strike the balloon, it would not strike the warhead, because the balloon is so much bigger. It might even, we do not know, because of the shock of the collision of the thin balloon against the interceptor, it might create enough gas really to blow the whole balloon away, but another balloon could have been shrunk down on the reentry vehicle and now deployed within a second or so, and once again, hide the warhead from further intercept. If they did not like that particular approach--and people often do not use my ideas until 20 or 30 years later, but eventually they often do, as with the global positioning system, or the cruise missiles, or the laser-guided bomb that we pushed so hard in the 1960's--if they do not like that particular approach, they could do another countermeasure which would be different, using smaller balloons, not much bigger than the warhead, so striking the balloon might strike the warhead, if the balloon contained a warhead. But in this case they could have perhaps ten or twenty balloons made of the same plastic, coated with aluminum. The purpose of the aluminum is to keep the radar from looking in the interior and to keep the infrared or the visible from seeing through the balloon. But the reentry vehicle has a lot of heat, because it is an object at room temperature, and it would be radiating to the balloon, so this balloon would be warmer than the other balloons, the decoys, that would have no reentry vehicles. No problem. You go to your local store, you buy a one-pound lithium battery, it might cost you $50, and you put it in these other balloons so that they are being warmed just as the reentry vehicle warms its balloons. Now, we have always from the very beginning ``spun up'' our warheads so that they reenter more accurately, but other countries have not done that. If you are going to discriminate a warhead which is spinning from decoys that are not, well, that is an easy thing to do; but if you do not spin your warhead, if you have anti-simulation, that is, you make the warhead easier to simulate, because it is coated with a lumpy aluminum-covered balloon rather than showing its beautiful machined surface, then these decoys become much more feasible. So the national missile defense would have no capability against bomblets carrying biological agents dispersed on ascent, or against a nuclear weapon in a large enclosing balloon; nor would it discriminate a warhead in a small balloon, properly done, from perhaps ten empty decoy small balloons; it would neither see nor be able to intercept short- range ballistic missiles launched from ships near U.S. shores; and it would neither see nor be able to intercept short-range cruise missiles launched from ships. Nevertheless, it is still possible to protect the United States against attack by long- range ballistic missiles. Now, first, we have to really believe and attend to our deterrent, that is, to ensure that people who strike the United States realize that they will be struck back. They may even be struck preemptively, as General Piotrowski says, and that is something that I would favor under many circumstances. Even so, they might build a limited ICBM capability for political reasons, despite the insecurity that it would pose to them. In addition to devaluing ballistic missiles, building a defense against them actually values them, it shows you take them seriously. So it is not clear to me which of these arguments outweighs the other. But if you want to intercept an ICBM, you can do it in boost phase. That will handle this nuclear weapon inside its enclosing balloon; That would handle the biological weapons before they are disseminated, and the task of a homing interceptor is a lot easier in boost phase, because it sees the rocket plume rather than having to see the---- Senator Biden. Dr. Garwin, may I ask a question. How long is boost phase? When you say boost phase, most people are not technically proficient. I assume it means just at the moment it is lifting off the pad. Is that all it is, or to what height is---- Dr. Garwin. Thank you. The boost phase typically extends for 4 or 5 minutes for an ICBM, because there are three stages or so, and the ICBM cannot go too fast in the lower portions of the atmosphere, so that is a pretty good number. It is possible--we have considered making ICBM's that would reach their full speed in 100 seconds. They go quite a ways down range, maybe several hundred miles, before they reach their full speed, and that is the key to the intercept, because the interceptor can launch more rapidly, get up to its full speed--the same speed as an ICBM-- in 100 seconds; and that means that it has this extra 150 seconds or so to catch up with it if it is launched from behind, but if it is launched from the side, then it can be launched down range a thousand miles or so, and intercept from any region, which might be a thousand miles or more in diameter. So there is a vast area from which interceptors could be deployed, and still make an intercept of a North Korean- launched ICBM, launched north, as they must be, against the United States, in boost phase. We could even, if the Russians cooperate, make a joint ABM test range south of Vladivostok, really close. We could use, in fact, much simpler interceptors from there, but we could also do it from ships or other places in a vast range of neighborhoods there. VC-based capabilities might be useful for defense of Japan, against boost phase, against theater-range missiles launched from North Korea. We already have an agreement with Russia and three other countries, of September 26, 1997, which I hope will be ratified soon, a provision by which the parties to the ABM Treaty of 1972 accept the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that do not, quote, ``Pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another party.'' That is ``another party'' to the 1972 ABM Treaty; but North Korea is not a party, there is no reason why we should not have a defense against North Korea. China is not a party, but China raises different questions. So in conclusion, we should not deploy the proposed national missile defense unless it is proved capable of handling the countermeasures that can realistically be employed by the potential adversary, and I really do mean these countermeasures of enclosing balloons, and anti-simulation, and biological weapons dispersed on ascent. Furthermore, the evaluation of national missile defense should start from scratch, not to prove that the thing that we have proposed will work, because it will not; to start with scratch with the use of ground-based or ship-based interceptors that will destroy the offensive missiles in boost phase before they can release bomblets or separate a warhead that could then provide itself with an enclosing balloon. Finally, there is no reason to abandon the protection of the ABM Treaty that constrains Russian defenses and thus allows the United States to deter Russia with modest numbers of nuclear weapons, thus facilitating great reductions in the only nuclear threat to the survival of the United States. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Garwin follows:] Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard L. Garwin introduction This Committee knows well the characteristics of the threat facing the United States, which were reviewed in part by the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998. As one of the nine members of that Commission, I concurred in the unanimous report published July 15, 1998, which assessed the ballistic missile threat to the United States. In brief, we considered both nuclear weapons and biological weapon payloads as strategic threats. We noted the thousands of warheads still available and deliverable by long-range missile from Russia; the 10 to 20 ICBMs available to China, armed with nuclear weapons; and the possibility that any of three additional nations with which the United States is not on friendly terms--North Korea, Iran, or Iraq--could within five years of a decision to do so have an ICBM that could strike some of the 50 United States. This judgment was based on the assumption of a concerted program, well funded and given priority, with due attention to denial and deception, as it has been increasingly practiced by countries that wish to hide the scope of their activities from U.S. intelligence. Of course, other nations have much greater capabilities than these three; for instance, Britain or France could deliver hundreds of nuclear warheads against the United States, but we have no fear that they would do so. With its space launch vehicle, India could also deliver a nuclear weapon, and Israel has apparently quite a few nuclear or thermonuclear weapons, but they are also not classed as threats to the United States. The Rumsfeld Commission further noted that short-range ballistic missiles based on ships and armed with nuclear or biological payloads would constitute a threat more readily available than ICBMs to North Korea, Iran, or Iraq; and that ship-launched cruise missiles available commercially would add to that threat. The Rumsfeld Commission did not consider as a group the vulnerability of the U.S. to BW attack from ships off shore, from cars or trucks disseminating BW, from unmanned helicopter crop dusters, or from smuggled nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons detonated in a U.S. harbor while still in a shipping container on a cargo ship; but these capabilities are more easily acquired and more reliable than are ICBMs. In January 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that a decision to deploy a National Missile Defense would be considered in summer of the year 2000, based on the existence of the threat and the technological readiness of an NMD system to counter it. He modified the Administration's ``3 + 3'' program which had promised that within three years (by the year 2000) an NMD would be developed capable of deployment within the following three years (2003), so that deployment would now take place in 2005 in case of a favorable decision in summer, 2000. The ``3 + 3'' program had intended that development would continue in the case that deployment was not authorized, so that year by year what could be deployed within three years of a decision to do so would be increasingly capable. A decision to deploy would need to freeze the technology in order to build a system within three (or five years). national missile defense Rather than recount my view of the history of the NMD program, let me just give a judgment on the program as it is now defined. It is contemplated that to counter a relatively few warheads, 75 ground-based interceptors (GBI) would be built, and some 20 deployed. The system specifications require extremely high confidence that not a single warhead penetrate to U.S. soil. In my opinion, no system thus far proposed could achieve such confidence, even against cooperating warheads. Nevertheless, the problem with the NMD system is not simply that it could not fulfill its stated requirement, but that it would have essentially no capability against a long-range missile system deployed by North Korea, Iraq, or Iran to strike the United States with biological weapons or with nuclear weapons. I make this judgment on the basis of a substantial knowledge of the NMD system as it is proposed, of previous efforts to develop a system of missile defense of the nation (and of Theater Missile Defense), and of a close look over the decades at countermeasures that are feasible to defeat missile defenses. The problem is a simple one. Begin, for instance, with North Korea. If North Korea wished to maximize its capability to cause death or damage in the United States by the launch of a first-generation ICBM, it would not use a so-called unitary payload of BW, which would perhaps deliver tens or hundreds of kilograms of anthrax or other infectious or even contagious microbe on some city. The result would be a very narrow plume carried by the breeze, which would kill most of the people in its path, but would leave those outside the plume untouched, except in the case of extremely contagious germs such as smallpox. Rather, a country could make much better use of a limited payload capacity by packaging the BW agent in the form of individual bomblets that would weigh a kilogram or so, and that would be released by the missile just as soon as it had reached its full velocity on ascent. That is, just after boost phase. The bomblets would fall separately through the arc of the trajectory to their target, and would reenter the atmosphere without incident, having been provided with a thin ablative reentry shield. After the heat of reentry, the shield could be shed, as was the case with the reentry of the film buckets of the first U.S. strategic reconnaissance system--CORONA, and the bomblets would fall to Earth, where a thoroughly tested device would expel the BW agent. This could be a mild explosive burster charge or some other mechanism. Given this approach to increased military effectiveness, the planned National Missile Defense system has no possibility of making an intercept so early in the trajectory. If the adversary has a nuclear weapon that can be delivered by ICBM, it can evidently not break it up into 1-kg bomblets. A first- generation nuclear weapon would probably have a yield of 10 to 20 kilotons (like those U.S. nuclear weapons that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945). So the NMD system would have a chance to observe the flight--first the DSP satellites would see the booster flame (as in the case of BW as well); then the upgraded early warning radars would see the warhead in mid-course, together with whatever simple countermeasures might have been used (and the spent final-stage fuel tank); and X-band radars would perhaps help to discriminate the real warhead from decoys or junk. A sufficient number of ground-based interceptors would be launched to obtain (in principle) the desired damage expectancy by their hit-to-kill intercept against the incoming nuclear warhead. If the interceptors were based at Grand Forks, ND, there would in general not be time to observe the success of an intercept before launching a second GBI. If the interceptors were based in Alaska, a launch from North Korea would provide some time for such shoot-look-shoot. To my mind, there is no significant difference between the protection of the country offered by interceptors based in Alaska compared with those based in North Dakota. Protection would be negligible in either case. The reason is that a simple countermeasure would defeat the system as planned. Depending on the preferences of the adversary, this countermeasure could take the form of a large enclosing balloon around the reentry vehicle that contains the nuclear warhead. Immediately after achieving full velocity, the warhead would separate from the final stage of the missile, and a simple gas generator containing a few grams of material (like that in every airbag in modern automobiles) would gently inflate a metallized plastic balloon that had been crumpled down onto the warhead by a simple vacuum cleaner exhausting most of the air. Or inflation could be done simply by compressed gas. A warhead that might be five feet long could be enclosed in a balloon 30 ft. in diameter, so that it would be perfectly well visible to the radars and to the hit- to-kill homing vehicle of the ground-based interceptor. But the homing vehicle which would strike the balloon (if all goes according to plan) would have very little probability of striking the warhead contained within. A thin aluminum coat on the plastic is opaque to radar and also to infrared invisible light, which are the means by which the homing kill vehicle (HKV) is expected to strike its target. Depending upon the characteristics of an isolated target, such intercept might take place in principle with an accuracy of one foot or less, providing high probability of kill (if the equipment and software is reliable--which it is not yet). But with the aimpoint hidden, the chance of striking the warhead would be tiny, considering its small size compared with the enclosing balloon. One might imagine that the collision of the warhead with the balloon would generate sufficient gas from the very high velocity impact of the thin balloon on the interceptor as it is going by, to blow away most of the remainder of the balloon and thus to expose the warhead, bare, to the other interceptors that may follow. This is a possibility, and the United States would no doubt wish to test this prospect (following the best analysis we can do), but unfortunately for the effectiveness of the defense, this approach is readily defeated by the offense, without testing in space. The offense could have several such balloons shrunk down one over the other, and independently expanded when the outermost balloon is blown away. It is not necessary to define the countermeasures that an adversary nation might use, but only to understand those that might work. They could choose among several others. Another simple countermeasure that might have greater appeal to some, would be to use not a large balloon but a small one, not much bigger than the warhead itself. Then additional small balloons would serve as decoys, if the HKV could not tell them apart by means of its multi-spectral sensor. More than 30 years ago, the Strategic Military Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, of which I was a member, observed that an adversary would no doubt use ``anti- simulation'' rather than rely strictly on a decoy's simulating the characteristics of the warhead. Thus, if the warhead were to be coasting bare through space, perhaps spinning in a stable fashion, decoys in order to be credible would need to be pretty much the same size and have the same spin. However, with anti-simulation, the idea is that the warhead would be modified or clothed, so as to make it easier to simulate. The warhead would simulate a cheap decoy, rather than the decoys being required to simulate an expensive and precise warhead. An easy way to begin anti-simulation is to put the warhead in a small lumpy balloon. This would take care of the radar simulation quite well. It might be better also to have a warhead that is not spun up, as was the case with warheads of other countries for a long time. Spinning the warhead improves the reentry accuracy, because a displacement of the external reentry vehicle from the center of mass of the warhead otherwise leads to substantial error. But the first-generation ICBMs are so inaccurate that this will not be a significant impairment of their accuracy. In any case, it is entirely possible for a warhead to be spun up just as it begins to reenter and after all possibility of intercept by the NMD system has passed. When to spin is simply a design choice, and if spinup before reentry helps to penetrate an NMD system, it can readily be done. The warhead itself has substantial mass (perhaps 500-1000 lbs.) and so does not cool appreciably in its passage through space. Thin empty balloons, on the other hand, have no such heat capacity. Nevertheless, it takes less than a pound of lithium battery within such a balloon to supply as much heat radiation to the interior of the balloon as the warhead itself would provide, if the warhead were shrouded in commercially available multi-layer insulation, widely used in refrigerators, transport of liquid nitrogen, and in space applications. While the NMD
  • would have no capability against bomblets carrying BW dispersed on ascent, or against a nuclear weapon in a large enclosing balloon,
  • nor could it discriminate a warhead in a small balloon, properly done, from perhaps 10 empty small balloons,
  • would neither see nor be able to intercept short-range ballistic missiles launched from ships near U.S. shores,
  • would neither see nor be able to intercept short-range cruise missiles launched from ships near U.S. shores, it is possible to protect the United States against the attack by long- range ballistic missiles. The beginning of protection lies with deterrence of such attack, and even deterrence of building such a capability. Deterrence against use comes from the certainty of nuclear response to nuclear attack against the United States, and such a response would be overwhelming. Deterrence against building such a capability derives from its lack of utility, since its use is likely to be deterred by the threat of retaliation. Furthermore, a nation deploying an ICBM system to threaten the United States would surely feel vulnerable to preemptive attack, if the United States learned where the missiles were based. Nevertheless, a limited ICBM capability might be built for political reasons, despite the insecurity that it would pose. It is possible to intercept the ICBM in boost-phase--while the main rocket engines are still burning, so that the task of a homing interceptor is far simpler than that posed to the ground-based interceptor that must see a cool warhead at great distances in space. But such a system has essentially nothing in common with the National Missile Defense that is proposed. It would use the existing DSP satellites to determine the time and rough direction for launch of a ground or sea-based interceptor. But the fundamental characteristic of that interceptor is that it should reach ICBM velocity of 7 km/s and should do it in about 100 s rather than the 250 s of a typical ICBM. Under these circumstances, there is a vast area in which the interceptor could be deployed and still make the intercept in boost phase. Specifically, against North Korea, such interceptors could be deployed at a joint U.S.-Russian test range south of Vladivostok (if Russia wished to cooperate with the United States in this regard) or, in principle, from military cargo ships in a vast range of ocean area. Because such sea-based capabilities might be useful for defense of Japan, for instance, against theater-range missiles launched from North Korea, and because there is already in the September 26, 1997, ``Agreement on Confidence-building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles'' (signed but unratified) a provision by which the Parties to the ABM Treaty of 1972 accept the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that do not ``pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another Party,'' it is possible that Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would agree specifically to a few large interceptors based on ships to carry out boost-phase intercept of missiles launched from North Korea--which is, after all, not a Party to the ABM Treaty. conclusion
  • We should not deploy the proposed National Missile Defense unless it is proved capable of handling the countermeasures that can realistically be employed by the potential adversary.
  • The evaluation of NMD should start from scratch with the use of ground-based or ship-based interceptors that will destroy the offensive missiles in boost phase--before they can release bomblets or separate a warhead that could then provide itself with an enclosing balloon.
  • There is no reason to abandon the protection of the ABM Treaty, that constrains Russian defenses and thus allows the United States to deter Russia with modest numbers of nuclear weapons, thus facilitating further great reductions in the only nuclear threat to the survival of the United States. The Chairman. Thank you very much. Dr. Wright. STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID WRIGHT, RESEARCH FELLOW, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE, MA Dr. Wright. It is a pleasure today to appear before the committee. I will summarize my written remarks, which I would ask would be put in the record. Both the administration and the Senate have singled out technical readiness as the key criteria that will affect next year's decision on whether or not to begin deployment of the national missile defense system. Is the technology ready to deploy? I will argue the answer is no. Will it be ready to deploy by next summer, when the Deployment Readiness Review is schedule? Again, I will argue the answer is no. I will then discuss what the United States needs to do to find out if the technology is ready to deploy at some point in the future. When you develop a technology and want to know if it is ready for production, you need to do three things. First, you need to build a prototype and test it on the test range or in the lab under controlled conditions to determine if the basic technology is in hand and whether it will work in a benign environment. Second, once you have demonstrated that the technology works under controlled conditions, you need to test it under conditions that approximate as closely as possible those you would expect to find in the real world, and to assess its operational effectiveness in the real world. Three, you need to do enough testing to assess the reliability of the technology. Satisfying the first criteria is clearly important and necessary, but it does not demonstrate technical readiness to deploy. The other two criteria must be satisfied as well. In fact, satisfying the first condition and demonstrating the basic technology may tell you essentially nothing about whether the second criteria will be met and how well the technology will do in the real world. It is obviously important to test for operational effectiveness when developing a military technology which an adversary will be trying to defeat. Thus, for an NMD system, satisfying the second criteria would in part require making a best guess about the types of warheads that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would be likely to use in their ballistic missiles, and then conducting tests against those types of targets. Since the NMD system is in intended to counter ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction, satisfying the third criteria and demonstrating reliability is extremely important. If the United States is going to count on its NMD system, it has to know how reliable the system is. Some argue it is important to employ an NMD system as soon as possible, and the United States should, therefore, be willing to take high risks by developing subsystems concurrently and using surrogate components and tests, but experience shows that this rarely works. In fact, by taking such risks, you are more likely to delay deployment than speed it up. As the Welch report stated, ``The virtually universal experience of the study group members has been that high technical risk is not likely to accelerate fielded capability. It is far more likely to cause program slips, increased costs, and even program failure.'' No matter what development strategy is adopted, it is essential that the United States not cut corners on testing, because testing is the only way to find out if the technology is ready. The more urgent one believes NMD deployment is, the more one should support and insist on an adequate and complete test program that satisfies the three criteria outlined I have listed above. Now, what is the current situation? Well, let us look first at whether the United States has satisfied my first criteria. There have been no intercept tests of the NMD system, but since 1982, the United States has conducted 16 intercept tests of exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors, which operate in a similar manner to the planned NMD interceptor. To date only 2 of those 16 intercept tests have scored hits, a 13 percent success rate, and the test record is not getting better with time. The most recent successful high- altitude test occurred in January, 1991, and the last 11 such intercept tests have failed. What this test record shows is that learning to do high- speed hit-to-kill, commonly called hitting a bullet with a bullet, is very hard. General Lyles testified in January that one thing that had changed in the previous year was an appreciation of ``The reality of how difficult this job is, the reality of how tough it is to try and do missile defense, and how tough it is to try to get hit-to-kill technology.'' Thus, as of today, the technology does not justify making a decision to begin deployment. Indeed, a year ago the Welch report stated, ``After more than a dozen flight tests, we are still on step one in demonstrating and validating the hit-to- kill system.'' Mr. Welch's report appeared, two more flight tests of exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill intercepts have taken place, and both failed to hit their targets. Thus, the more recent tests only strengthen the Welch panel's conclusion. What is the program status likely to be next summer when the Deployment Readiness Review is scheduled? The United States is planning to conduct four NMD intercept tests between now and then. Even if all four of these intercept tests take place between now and next June, and are successful, would that satisfy the first criteria? It would certainly demonstrate the principle of hit-to-kill under test conditions, and would be a necessary first step for the testing program; however, it would still not indicate that the technology had fully satisfied the first criteria, because these tests will be performed using surrogate boosters and kill vehicles, and not prototypes of the components that would actually be deployed. A full prototype of the interceptor technology that is intended for deployment will not be flight tested until fiscal year 2003. Thus, the tests planned for the next year will not assess the performance of two of the most important and least mature components of the system. More importantly, the second criteria will not have been met, since apparently none of these tests will simulate real- world conditions. As the fiscal year 1998 DOT&E report states, ``The NMD test and evaluation program is building a target suite that, while an adequate representation of one or two reentry vehicles, may not be representative of threat penetration aids, booster or post-boost vehicles. Test targets of the current program do not represent the complete design-to threat space and are not representative of the full sensor requirements spectrum,'' that is, discrimination requirements. It is quite possible for a technology to work well in tests and fail in the real world. For example, the Patriot system used in the Gulf war did phenomenally well in tests, it had a perfect 17 for 17 record in intercept tests prior to the Gulf war, yet the Army claims only a 61 percent success rate for the Patriot during the Gulf war, and independent assessments of its performance as well as statements by the Israeli officials indicate that the success rate was actually much lower. One reason for the failure of the Patriot to destroy the Iraqi al Huseyn missiles is that the Iraqi missiles broke up on reentry, creating multiple targets that maneuvered as they fell to the ground. These proved to be very effective countermeasures, albeit inadvertent ones. Future missiles must be expected to incorporate intentional countermeasures to confuse or overwhelm the defense. Let me make a couple of short points about countermeasures. Ultimately, the U.S. NMD system will succeed or fail, based on its ability to deal with countermeasures, so before deciding to deploy, the U.S. must understand whether the NMD system it is developing is likely to work against plausible real-world threats. Members of the Rumsfeld Commission have stressed that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence when considering ballistic missile development. This advice must also be heeded relative to countermeasure development for these missiles. While some see the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the 1991 Gulf war as a wake-up call to the United States about the future ballistic missile threat, it was also no doubt a wake-up call to other countries about the future deployment of U.S. missile defenses. Those countermeasures should not be thought of as an optional add-on that the country might or might not decide to put in its long-range missiles at the last minute. A country that is developing or trying to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles would no doubt see the parallel development or the purchase of countermeasures as an integral part of its missile program. The bottom line is that none of the three criteria outlined above will have been fully satisfied by next summer. At best, the first criteria may be partially satisfied, and I think it is clear then that by next summer the technology will not justify making a decision to begin deployment, but in the longer term, what kind of test program would the United States need to deploy to determine whether its NMD system is technically ready to deploy? First, the United States should not set an unrealistic time scale for its testing program. The testing schedules should not be predetermined, but should be set by the outcome of previous tests. There must be sufficient time between tests to assimilate the results of one test before conducting the next test. Second, the United States should set up a red team, whose job it is to devise countermeasures using the kind of information and technology that is available to developing countries. Some of this is already being done, but it must become a top priority of the program. Third, the NMD testing program should include flight tests of the interceptor against the best countermeasures potentially available to a threat nation, as devised by the red team, and the United States should not deploy an NMD system before it is proved effective against the countermeasures devised by the red team. Fourth, the United States should conduct enough tests to assess the reliability of a system. The number of tests required will depend on both the system reliability requirements and the test record. Finally, there should be an independent oversight of the overall NMD testing program, and in particular, there must be careful oversight to ensure that the red team is independent and adequately supported, and that its ideas are incorporated in tests. Let me conclude by noting that national missile defense is a highly politicized issue, and there is great political pressure on decisionmakers to do something, but the political response must not get too far ahead of what the technology can deliver. In January, 1999, General Lyles stated, when talking about the newly revised NMD program and test schedule, he said, ``You will find no programs at all in the Department of Defense that have the limited amount of testing and the aggressive schedule that we have embarked upon here, even with this revised schedule.'' If the United States is serious about deploying a defense against ballistic missiles launched to its territory, then it should be serious about finding out if the technology is ready. The only way to find that out is by a rigorous and realistic testing program. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Wright follows:] Prepared Statement of Dr. David C. Wright Mr Chairman, distinguished Senators, it is a pleasure to appear before the Committee today. Both the Administration and the Senate have singled out technical readiness as a key criteria that will affect the decision next year on whether or not to begin deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system. Is the technology ready to deploy? In this testimony, I will argue the answer is no. Will it be ready to deploy by next summer, when the Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) is scheduled? Again, I will argue the answer is no. I will then discuss what the United States needs to do to find out if the technology is ready to deploy at some point in the future. Thus, I will consider three questions in turn. First, does the United States now know enough about the capability of the technology to make a commitment to deploy a national missile defense? Second, will the United States know enough by next summer? And finally, what will it take for the United States to know at any point beyond next summer? That is, what does the United States have to do to understand enough about the capability of the technology to be able to make a commitment to deploy an NMD system that it can expect to be effective? ``Fly before you buy'' is an oft-heard dictum regarding the Pentagon's acquisition policy. It is important to be clear about what kind of flying the United States needs to do before buying NMD. When you develop a technology--any technology--and want to know if it is ready for production, you need to do three things: 1. You need to build a prototype and test it on the test range or in the lab under controlled conditions to determine if the basic technology is in hand and whether it will work in a benign environment. 2. Once you have demonstrated that the technology works under controlled conditions, you need to test it under conditions that approximate as closely as possible those you expect to find in the real world. This is necessary to assess the operational effectiveness of the technology in the real world, which will not be a benign environment, 3. You need to do enough testing to assess the reliability of the technology. Satisfying the first of these criteria is clearly important and necessary, but does not demonstrate technical readiness to deploy. It is necessary but not sufficient; the other two criteria must be satisfied as well. In fact, satisfying the first condition and demonstrating the basic technology may tell you essentially nothing about whether the second criteria will be met and how well the technology will do in the real world. It should go without saying that it is especially important to test for operational effectiveness if the technology you are developing is a military technology, which an adversary will be trying to defeat. Thus, for an NMD system, satisfying the second criterion would in part require making a best guess about the types of warheads that North Korea, Iran and Iraq would be likely to use on their ballistic missiles, and then conducting tests against targets of those types. After all, one of the key things an NMD system is supposed to do is to defend the United States from long-range missiles launched by one of these countries. Since the NMD system is intended to counter ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction, satisfying the third condition and demonstrating reliability is extremely important. If the United States is going to--in any sense of the word--count on its NMD system, it has to know that the system is reliable. Some have argued that it is important that the United States deploy an NMD system as soon as possible, and that the United States should therefore be willing to take high risks by developing subsystems concurrently and using surrogate components in tests. But experience shows that this rarely works. In fact, by taking such risks, you are more likely to delay deployment than speed it up. As the Welch Report \1\ stated ``The virtually universal experience of the study group members has been that high technical risk is not likely to accelerate fielded capability. It is far more likely to cause program slips, increased costs, and even program failure.'' Similarly, in discussing the sense of urgency behind the THAAD program, the FY 1998 Report of the Director, Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E) \2\ stated that ``The ultimate result, ironically, is a schedule slip of seven years.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk In Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, 27 February 1998. \2\ FY98 Annual Report of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, submitted to Congress February 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- No matter what development strategy is adopted, it is essential that the United States not cut corners on testing, because testing is the only way to find out if the technology is ready. The more urgent one believes NMD deployment is, the more one should support and insist on an adequate and complete test program that satisfies the three criteria outlined above. where is the program now? What is the current situation? First, let's look at whether the United States has satisfied the first criteria. There have been no intercept tests of the NMD system, but since 1982 the United States has conducted 16 intercept tests of exo- atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors, which operate in a similar manner to the planned NMD interceptor. To date, the test record of such interceptors has been abysmal. Only 2 of these 16 intercept tests scored hits, for a 13 percent success rate. And the test record is not getting better with time; the most recent successful high-altitude test occurred in January 1991 and the last 11 such intercept tests have been failures. What can we learn from this test record? What it shows is that learning to do high-speed hit-to-kill commonly dubbed ``hitting a bullet with a bullet''--is very hard. Indeed, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, General Lyles, stated in his Senate testimony \3\ in January 1999 that one thing that had changed in the previous year was an appreciation of ``the reality of how difficult this job is . . . The reality of how tough it is to try to do missile defense and how tough it is to try to get hit-to-kill technology . . .'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Lt. General Lester Lyles, testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 24, 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is clear that the technology has not satisfied even the first criteria listed above--demonstrating a capability against cooperative targets. Thus, as of today the technology does not exist to justify making a decision to begin deployment. Anyone asserting otherwise is basing their assertion on something other than the demonstrated facts. Indeed, a year ago, the Welch Report \4\ stated that ``After more than a dozen flight tests . . . we are still on `step one' in demonstrating and validating HTK [hit-to-kill] systems. . . . And even when this first step is achieved, these programs will have to go through steps two and three: demonstrating reliable HTK at a weapon system level and demonstrating reliable HTK against likely real-world targets.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk In Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since the Welch Report appeared, two more flight tests of exo- atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors have taken place,\5\ and both failed to hit their target. Thus, the more recent tests only strengthen the Welch Panel's conclusion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Both of these tests were of THAAD interceptors. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- where will the program be next summer? What is the program status likely to be next summer, when the Deployment Readiness Review is scheduled? The United States is planning to conduct four NMD intercept tests between now and then. However, the date of the first intercept test has recently slipped by several months, and it is not clear how many of these tests will actually take place by June 2000. Even if all four of these intercept tests take place between now and next June, and are successful, would that satisfy the first criteria? It would certainly help demonstrate the principle of hit-to- kill under test conditions, which would be a necessary first step for the testing program. However, it would still not indicate that the technology had satisfied the first criteria because these tests will be performed using surrogate boosters and kill vehicles and not prototypes of the components that would actually be deployed. Prototypes of the interceptor technology that is intended for deployment will not be tested until FY2003. (The first tests of the prototype interceptor booster and kill vehicle are planned for FY2001 and FY2003, respectively.) Thus, the tests planned for the next year will not assess the performance of two of the most important components of the system. Yet, as General Lyles testified in February of this year, ``The ground-based interceptor (GBI) weapon is the least mature element of the system and entails the highest technological development risks.'' \6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Lt. General Lester Lyles, testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 24, 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More importantly, the second criteria will not have been met since apparently none of these four planned tests will simulate real-world conditions. According to the FY 1998 DOT&E Report. ``The NMD T&E [testing and evaluation] program is building a target suite that, while an adequate representation of one or two reentry vehicles, may not be representative of threat penetration aids, booster, or post-boost vehicles. Test targets of the current program do not represent the complete `design-to' threat space and are not representative of the full sensor requirements spectrum.'' \7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ FY98 Annual Report of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, submitted to Congress February 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- And it is quite possible for a technology to work well in tests and fail in the real world. For example, recall that the Patriot system used in the Gulf War did phenomenally well in tests against ballistic missiles--it had a perfect 17 for 17 record in intercept tests prior to the Gulf War. Yet the Army claims only a 61% success rate for Patriot during the Gulf War, and independent assessments of its performance \8\ (as well as statements by Israeli officials \9\) indicate that the success rate was actually much lower--and perhaps close to zero. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, ``Video Evidence on the Effectiveness of Patriot during the 1991 Gulf War.'' Science and Global Security, Vol. 4, pp.1-63, 1993. The Panel on Public Affairs of the American Physical Society appointed a panel to review the Lewis-Postol analysis and criticisms of it; the panel found that the Lewis-Postol methodology was sound and that none of the criticisms stood up to scrutiny. These findings are reported in Jeremiah D. Sullivan, Dan Fenstermacher, Daniel Fisher, Ruth Howes, O'Dean Judd, Roger Speed, ``Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War,'' Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, pp.1-55, 1998. \9\ Moshe Arens, former Israeli Minister of Defense, and General Dan Shomron, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Force during the 1991 Gulf War, stated in interviews conducted by Reuven Pedatzur on an Israeli TV documentary (21 November 1993) that the Patriot successfully intercepted at most one Scud over Israel. Highlights of these interviews are reported in Tim Weiner, New York Times, 21 November 1993, and Newsweek, November 1993. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- One reason for the failure of the Patriot to destroy the Iraqi al Huseyn missiles is that the Iraqi missiles broke up on reentry, creating multiple targets that maneuvered as they fell to the ground. These proved to be very effective countermeasures, albeit inadvertent ones. Future missiles must be expected to incorporate intentional countermeasures to confuse or overwhelm the defense. Indeed, the U.S. NMD system will succeed or fail based on its ability to deal with countermeasures. So before deciding to deploy, the U.S. must understand whether the NMD system it is developing is likely to be able to work against plausible real-world threats. Members of the Rumsfeld Commission have stressed that ``absence of evidence is not evidence of absence'' for ballistic missile development; this advice must also be heeded relative to countermeasure development for those missiles. Dr. William Graham and others have emphasized the importance of using ``Try Intelligence'' or ``TRYINT'' to assess potential ballistic missile threats. This would involve trying to build ballistic missiles using only the kind of information and technology assumed to be available to potential adversaries to see what is possible. The United States must also use TRYINT in assessing potential countermeasures and must test the NMD system against such countermeasures. While a countermeasure TRYINT program--the Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP)--exists, the level of effort devoted to it is likely inadequate.\10\ Moreover, it is not clear at what level its results will be incorporated into intercept tests. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ According to Michael C. Sirak, `` `Chop'' shop helps create robust missile defenses,'' Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 5. No. 8, April 21, 1999, pp. 1, 8-12, CHOP brings together teams of four engineers to work on developing countermeasures for nine to twelve months. Yet a country serious about developing countermeasures could work for many years on the problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It turns out that the type of interceptor the U.S. NMD system will use--a hit-to-kill interceptor that is designed to intercept outside the atmosphere in the vacuum of space--is particularly vulnerable to certain kinds of simple countermeasures. I will not go into detail here, but countermeasures that are technically simple (such as lightweight balloon decoys with the warhead also enclosed in a balloon) can make the system fail catastrophically. Will these types of simple countermeasures be available to developing countries such as North Korea? Yes. It is logically inconsistent to assert that developing countries will be able to build or otherwise acquire the technology for intercontinental ballistic missiles, and at the same time will not have access to the far simpler technology to equip these missiles with effective countermeasures. (If one assumes these countries are receiving technology and/or assistance for ballistic missiles from more advanced missile states, such as Russia, one must also assume they would receive assistance on countermeasures.) Are ballistic missiles equipped with countermeasures merely a theoretical threat? Some people argue that developing countries may not bother to use countermeasures. But it is also logically inconsistent to assert that countries like North Korea or Iran will go to all the trouble to build or acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles-- largely to be able to target the United States--and at the same time will not be motivated to use simple countermeasures to defeat a U.S. NMD system deployed to counter their ballistic missiles. While some see the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the 1991 Gulf War as a wake-up call to the United States about the future ballistic missile threat, it was also no doubt a wake-up call to other countries about the future deployment of U.S. missile defenses. Thus, countermeasures should not be thought of as an optional add-on that a country might or might not decide to put on its long-range missile at the last minute. A country that is developing or trying to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles would no doubt see the parallel development or purchase of countermeasures as an integral part of its missile program. Thus, asserting that countries deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles either will not be able to or will not bother to use effective countermeasures amounts to wishful thinking and should not be the basis for military planning. Two sensor fly-by tests have been done that have reportedly distinguished decoys from a mock warhead. What does this mean? From a technical point of view, there is no doubt that sensors can detect temperature differences between objects in space, or differences in wobbling motions. But this capability is only useful in discriminating between warhead and decoys if the attacker does not manipulate the heat or motion signals in a way to confuse the defense. Rather than using decoys that look and behave differently from the warhead, the attacker would disguise the warhead to make it look like a decoy, or make all the objects dissimilar in appearance. The bottom line is that none of the three criteria outlined above will have been satisfied by next summer. At best, the first criteria may be partially satisfied. Thus, it is clear that by next summer the technology will not justify making a decision to begin deployment of an NMD system. recommendations for the future What should the United States do to find out if the technology is ready in the longer term? In particular, what kind of a test program would the United States need to determine whether its NMD system is technically ready to deploy?
  • First, the United States should not set an unrealistic time scale for its testing program. The testing schedule should not be predetermined, but should be set by the outcome of previous tests. There must be sufficient time between tests to assimilate the results of one test before conducting the next test.
  • Second, the United States should set up a Red Team whose job it is to devise countermeasures using the kind of information and technology available to developing countries.
  • Third, the NMD testing program should include flight tests of the interceptor against the best countermeasures potentially available to a threat nation, as devised by the Red Team. The United States should not decide to deploy an NMD system before it is proved effective against the Red Team countermeasures.
  • Fourth, the United States should conduct enough tests to assess the reliability of the system. The number of tests required will depend both on the system reliability requirements and the test record.
  • Finally, there should be independent oversight of the overall NMD testing program. In particular, there must be careful oversight to ensure that the Red Team is independent and adequately supported, and that its ideas are incorporated in tests. conclusion National Missile Defense is a highly politicized issue and there is great political pressure on decision-makers to do something. But the political response must not get too far ahead of what the technology can deliver. General Lyles stated in January 1999 \11\ about the newly revised NMD program, ``You will find no programs at all [in the Department of Defense] that have the limited amount of testing and the aggressive schedule that we've embarked upon here even with this revised program. . . .'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director, BMDO, DOD News Briefing, January 20, 1999. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the United States is serious about deploying a defense against ballistic missiles launched at its territory then it should be serious about finding out if the technology is ready. The only way to find out is by a rigorous and realistic testing program. Appendix A Following are excerpts from the section on NMD of the FY 1998 Annual Report by the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E), available at http://www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY98/98JTETOC1.html#jte test & evaluation assessment The aggressive schedule established for the NMD Deployment Readiness Program presents a major challenge. For instance, if a deployment is required by 2003, the NMD program will have to compress the work of 10 to 12 years into 6 years. As a result, many of the design and T&E activities will be done concurrcntly. Program delays have already caused IFT-3 to move to June 1999. This represents almost an 18-month slip over the last year and a half. This clearly demonstrates an extremely high-risk schedule and DOT&E considers the probability of meeting the DRR on time with the currently planned T&E program as highly unlikely. The complex operating characteristics and environments of the NMD T&E Program make it necessary to plan and conduct IFTs that are limited in scope. DRR information based on a few flight tests with immature elements will be limited. As a result, the T&E program will rely heavily on ground testing and the execution of simulations for assessing the maturity and performance of the NMD system concept. For example, the decision to downselect the EKV contract early eliminates the benefit of intercept flight data to support that decision. This warrants a rigorous ground hardware-in-the-loop simulator test program to assess competing seeker design. It does not appear, however, that the LSI will increase the scope of that grown testing in the absence of the flight test. The following risks can potentially impact the NMD T&E program's ability to test, analyze, and evaluate system performance: Limited system-level testing: Only two flight tests and one system- level flight test (IFT-5) are planned before the DRR. Should IFT-5 fail, the DRR would be left with limited IFT and IGT data on which to basc a decision. Furthermore, the IFT-5 configuration differs from the Capability-1 system in that it uses prototype and surrogate sensors and a surrogate GBI booster stack. Limited engagement conditions: Flight test launches from California and interceptors from Kwajalein Missile Range, along with safety constraints, place significant limitations on achieving realistic geometry and closing velocities. GBI booster testing: The NMD T&E program makes use of a surrogate launch vehicle, the Payload Launch Vehicle, for all flight tests prior to the DRR. The objective booster contract was just awarded in July 1998 and first delivery will not occur until after the FY00 DRR. Lack of IFT data without the objective GBI capability (e.g., larger burnout velocity than the Payload Launch Vehicle) before the DRR will limit the GBI evaluation. Limitations of ground testing: The Integrated System Test Capability will be the major source of data generated from ground testing. However, test articles used to represent NMD elements in the testbed may not be verified or validated in time for the DRR. In addition, early tests like IGT-1A were very rudimentary and only tested the message exchange between the BMC3 and prototype X-Band Radar; a simulated interceptor was not even launched. Substantial upgrades must be performed on the Integrated System Test Capability before overall system performance can be thoroughly assessed. Target suite: The NMD T&E program is building a target suite that, while an adequate representation of one or two reentry vehicles, may not be representative of threat penetration aids, booster, or post- boost vehicles. Test targets of the current program do not represent the complete ``design-to'' threat space and are not representative of the full sensor requirements spectrum (e.g., discrimination requirements). Much of this limitation is attributable to the lack of information about the real threat. Multiple target testing; NMD system performance against multiple targets is not currently planned for demonstration in the flight test program. Validated simulations will be used to evaluate multiple simultaneous target engagement. BMC3 interoperability testing: The BMC3 to Commander-In-Chief interface inside Cheyenne Mountain will not be tested prior to the DRR. Spare test articles: The current TEMP identifies a lack of spare test articles due to a resource allocation trade-off. This may have a significant impact on schedule and data availability for the FY00 DRR, and ultimately an FY03 deployment if there are any flight test failures. Limitations of ground lethality testing: There is no ground test facility capable of propelling EKVs or their full-scale replicas against targets at the closing velocities expected for NMD intercepts. These closing velocities will exceed 7 kilometers per second. Existing full-scale facilities cannot yet achieve 3 kilometers per second. The lethality test data to support DRR will be collected from light-gas-gun tests of reduced-scale replicas of EKV surrogates and targets at the lower-end (six kilometers per second or less) of the intercept velocity spectrum. Programmatic changes: The advent of the LSI contractor has resulted in the repeat of extensive planning and analysis already performed by the JPO. The System Evaluation Plan is being replaced by a LSI generated System Verification Plan; and there does not appear to be a strong desire on the part of the JPO to have any independent developmental evaluation. The High Fidelity System Simulation, which was to be the fast running, system performance, digital simulation for assessing many scenarios throughout the threat space, has been largely abandoned in favor of developing Boeing's LSI Integrated Distributed Simulation. lessons learned The NMD system shares an important functional attribute with theater missile defense systems like THAAD, Navy Theater Wide, and PAC- 3--all are hit-to-kill systems. Recent THAAD flight test failures have provided us with the following important lessons: (1) hit-to-kill technology is extremely difficult; (2) pre-flight checkouts of reliability and performance need to be emphasized; and (3) strict quality control activities need to be implemented in the manufacturing of the GBI. In addition, the failure of IFT-1 underscored the need for a more robust program for targets and system spares, which will support the development of ballistic missile defense systems. This failure and its resultant impact on the test program highlights the very high level of schedule risk associated with the NMD program. All of the above points were reemphasized in the findings of the Institute for Defense Analyses study, chaired by Retired General Larry Welch, on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs. This study was co-sponsored by DOT&E, the Director, Systems, Engineering and Evaluation, and the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. The Chairman. Thank you very much. As I indicated earlier, Senator Biden was unavoidably detained because of his interest in a vote that occurred on the Senate floor, which was delayed itself by 30 or 35 minutes, causing everybody to be behind time. I want Joe to do his opening statement in just a moment, and I would also like, if he pleases, Senator Lugar to have his statement, but before I turn to Senator Biden, I think we should address the matter of countermeasures. Some have begun putting forward an argument that any NMD built can be defeated easily by countermeasures. Of course, countermeasures are not a reality simply because somebody draws a picture of one. I would be willing to wager that a good many scientists could draw equally compelling pictures of things to counter the countermeasures, but we need not, I think, get into an art contest at this hearing, and I hope we will confine our discussion to the realm of the possible, and not allow flights of fancy either to lead us to predict that missile defenses can do nothing to protect our country, or that they may be perfect in affording such protection. Having said that, I invite Senator Biden to make his opening statement. Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that my entire statement be placed in the record, if I may. The Chairman. Certainly. Without objection. Senator Biden. Let me just state at the outset that testing aside, and I speak to this in my opening statement, I am concerned that our currently envisioned system may be the wrong tool for the job. I am skeptical that our national missile defense currently under development is the best means of defense against the threat of missile attack. I know you do not want to talk about them, but missile defense systems have to be able to defeat countermeasures. I do not know enough to know whether or not the countermeasures envisioned by Dr. Garwin are art projects or realistically within the grasp and reach of the Koreans, or the Iraqis, or anyone else we are immediately concerned about. I just do now know, and I am going to ask about that at some point, and ask Dr. Graham, who is a very knowledgeable fellow, whether they are within their grasp and whether it is something we should be concerned about. But the missile defense system, it seems to me, needs to be able to defend against the most likely ICBM payloads, including chemical or biological bomblets. Now, I assume that that was within the competence of the very nations that we are most concerned about, I assume that was part of the threat, but I may be mistaken, so I would like to talk about that as well, and whether or not the proposed system that we are talking about, and Dr. Wright was critiquing, is ineffective or effective against such attacks. The most likely missile attacks against the United States territory, at least I have been schooled to believe over the last couple of years, are from cruise missiles or short-range ship-borne missiles, and yet the proposed system, I am under the impression, cannot even begin to deal with those. I, by the way, truly appreciate all four of you being here. You are an incredibly competent panel, with differing views, which is the most helpful to us, quite frankly, at least to me. Mr. Chairman, I will cease my statement at this time, but one of the things I would like to do when it comes my time to question is ask each of them to respond to the other's comments, because I, at least, am more likely to learn a little more that way than with my prepared questions. But let me close by saying that the thing that I have yet to fully understand, and maybe we can flush out in this question and answer period, is what each of you believe to be the threat, not generically, but specifically, what do you believe the threat is that warrants or would warrant our building a missile defense system. It seems to rest upon the notion that there is some madman in Iraq or a madman in Korea who, not withstanding the fact that he knows his country will be obliterated, will nonetheless feel he has the capacity to threaten us by saying, ``I will strike Hawaii unless you do the following.'' Now, I assume that is the premise upon which most of this is based, because if we assume people are rational, as Russian dictatorial bad guy leaders were for 50 years, the threat of use of nuclear weapons against us, which was fully within their capacity, was always viewed as not likely. That was because of deterrence: they knew that we would be able to visit an equally monstrous reign of firepower upon them in response to that which they could us. My core question is: Does this current threat assume, General Piotrowski and others, that there is an irrational leader in the countries we are concerned about, or is it premised upon the notion that there is a rational leader who cares about whether or not his country is obliterated. Have we changed the equation? I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to speak. [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also for giving me the lead-time to invite two of our five witnesses today--Drs. Richard Garwin and David Wright. I look forward to hearing from all of today's witnesses, of course. I am very interested in their views regarding our technological progress toward the goal of a national missile defense, as well as their thoughts on what technical challenges remain to be overcome. The status of our ABM capabilities will be a crucial factor in our decision whether to deploy a national missile defense by the year 2005. To put this hearing into context, the administration has repeatedly said they will base their deployment decision on four criteria: (1) whether a threat exists to the United States; (2) the cost-effectiveness of missile defenses; (3) whether the necessary technology exists to build a defensive system; and (4) whether the benefits of deploying that system outweigh any possible negative effects it might have on U.S.-Russian relations. On the first point, the administration granted that a missile threat exists during the lead-up to the March vote on the Cochran bill. By including missile defense procurement money in the Future Years Defense Plan, the administration also seems to have decided that the proposed, very limited, National Missile Defense system will be worth the money if it works. But the jury is still out when it comes to the administration's final two criteria, both of which were supported by the Senate in the amended Cochran bill. It will not surprise my colleagues to hear that I strongly doubt that those criteria can be met in the near term. On the topic of today's hearing, let me be blunt. Nothing I have heard so far has convinced me that we are ready to field an effective missile defense by 2005, which is the administration's earliest target date for deployment. I am concerned, moreover, that we may deploy a national missile defense for political reasons, without adequate testing. The 1998 Welch Report--the product of an independent commission charged by the Defense Department with assessing the missile defense testing program--warned that: To succeed, the national missile defense program must meet a series of formidable challenges. [It] should be restructured now to provide for adequate, sequential development and testing. Without a rigorous development and testing program, the Welch panel warned of a ``rush to failure.'' Events since then are not reassuring. The first intercept test of the national system has been delayed until August because of fuel leaks in the kill vehicle. Because of that delay, the administration may be forced to decide on deployment after only three intercept attempts. That is far too few tests on which to base such a major decision, at least in my view. Testing issues aside, I am concerned that our currently envisioned system may be the wrong tool for the job. I remain skeptical that national missile defenses currently under development are the best means to decrease the threat of missile attack. A missile defense system must be able to defeat countermeasures. But the proposed system may be vulnerable to very simple countermeasures. A missile defense system needs to defend against the most likely rogue-state ICBM payload--namely, chemical or biological bomblets. But the proposed system may be ineffective against such attacks. The most likely missile attack against United States territory may be from cruise missiles or short-range, ship-borne missiles, yet the proposed system cannot even begin to defend against those attacks. I wonder, therefore, whether early deployment of a national missile defense system is a wise response to the emerging missile threat to the United States. I wonder whether we should not consider alternative means of decreasing the missile threat, rather than spending billions of dollars to deploy a ballistic missile defense that will only provide modest benefits and may well fail the technology test--as well as the test of maintaining U.S.-Russian strategic security, which we will discuss in tomorrow's hearing. Again Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the views of the witnesses on these important technical issues. Today's hearing should provide us a much clearer picture regarding some of the implications of deploying missile defenses. The Chairman. Senator Shelby was very good, I wish you could have heard his statement---- Senator Biden. I do apologize. The Chairman. Maybe you should read it, because he responded to some of the very things that you had mentioned. Senator Lugar, the distinguished Senator from Indiana, is the former chairman of this committee, and a great Senator, a great American, and I would like for him to make a statement, if you wish. Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will not ask a question, but I will in due course try to flush out the threat. Senator Biden has talked about this a little bit. From time to time we have been discussing the so-called rogue nations, single shots, or fledgling programs of countries that might gain some strategic advantage by having these weapons, and General Piotrowski addressed this in a way. I was curious as to the perception of the threat and what program is being developed to counter it. Is the threat strictly rogue nations or is it a more sizable threat? And with that in mind, what effect is the ABM Treaty having on any of the developments that you gentlemen are describing? To what extent is it a hindrance? Clearly, if, in fact, one of our objectives was to counter the ICBM's of Russia, Russians would legitimately say that our missile defense system came into force simply to try to take away these potential threats and to change the strategic posture. so I am eager to hear much more about the ABM Treaty as a hindrance, whether it should be modified, appealed or does it not make any difference, and is part of the difference, perception of the threat to begin with, who we are after with this program. The Chairman. Now we will begin the questions; I suggest that we take about 6 or 7 minutes each. I am no Henny Penny talking about the sky dropping myself, and neither is or has been the Rumsfeld Commission, which consists of some pretty great Americans who do not imagine things falling from the skies. They are pretty realistic, and they have served this country well in various connections. Dr. Graham and Dr. Garwin, you were both members, I believe, of the Rumsfeld Commission, or still are, and you both agreed with the judgment that North Korea and Iran, and I quote, ``Would be able to inflict major destruction on the United States within about 5 years of a decision to acquire such a capability,'' is that correct? Just 2 months after your report, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong-I missile. The United States intelligence community has warned that this missile could be used, ``To deliver small payloads to ICBM ranges.'' Now, my question is: Do you agree that this demonstrates an intent or even a possible intent by North Korea to acquire a missile capability to threaten the United States? Dr. Graham, you first, and then Dr. Garwin. Dr. Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me respond to that, and also to Senator Biden's question about the rationality of the leadership. I think there is an argument that can be made over the irrationality of the North Korean leadership, and what we are really dealing with there is a hostage population with a despotic government, but even on an irrational basis, they realize, the North Koreans realize that the greatest threat to their regional aspirations is the presence of the United States in South Korea, and Japan, and elsewhere in Asia, and our ability to move into those areas rapidly. They also realize that we put great weight on our ability to build alliances and work cooperatively with other countries in a given region, such as Asia, and a rational use for ballistic missile and other military capability, but particularly long-range ballistic missile forces that can strike Japan, South Korea, and the United States, is to dissuade the U.S. from taking an active role militarily in conflicts in the region, and particularly in thwarting our ability to build alliances in the region. I happened to live in Japan in 1948 through 1950, and was there during the start of the Korean War, and I remember hearing threats by the North Koreans that they were going to bomb Japan, because we were basing our military operations out of Japan at the time. They were not able to do it then. There is absolutely no question that they can do it with ballistic missiles, and I am sure that would give the Japanese and other allies great pause in thinking of letting the United States use those areas and in joining in alliances with the United States should the North Koreans try military action on their peninsula. I think the threat in the nearest term form and easiest one to deploy is the one that the Rumsfeld Commission and Dr. Garwin described, which is ship-based ballistic missiles that could be shot from off our shores into our population and industrial centers, Scud missiles work just fine for that, and we have no defense against those today, and no defense against them planned under the ABM system. The ABM system that we are seeing being developed today is a very stylized system designed to conform to the very limiting constraints of the ABM Treaty, and among other things, that treaty prohibits sea-based defenses, it prohibits air-based defenses, base-based defenses, it prevents multiple defensive sites on the land, and, therefore, we are treaty constrained not to protect ourselves through the shorter range threats that Dr. Garwin was describing, and also can arguably be said to protect us or to prohibit us from deploying launch-phased, boost-phased defenses, which are very effective against virtually all countermeasures, and in particular, the early release submunitions that he described. So our ABM system design that the United States is currently pursuing is, in my view, a step in the right direction, but one with substantial deficiencies that need to be filled out before we have a comprehensive missile defense capability, and the limitations on it are primarily driven by the ABM Treaty today. The Chairman. Thank you very much. I want the timekeeper to be sure that Dr. Garwin gets equal time. Dr. Garwin. Certainly, the Taepo Dong-I launch of August 31, 1998 shows progress and intent on the part of the North Koreans. When the United States expressed its displeasure, North Korea responded that they need the money, and they do sell their ballistic missiles. They are a big proliferator, they are not a member of any regime that keeps them from doing it, they make money out of it, and they are very short of money. Now, we do not have a lot of money, but we have a lot more than the North Koreans, and I think that we ought to see what kind of international or bilateral agreement could be formulated that would prevent the development in North Korea of longer-range ballistic missiles, and might even tone down or eliminate the development of shorter-range missiles. But the ABM Treaty does not stand in the way of defending coastal cities against short-range ballistic or cruise missiles. That would be done locally. It would be done with within-the-atmosphere interceptors. Patriot might do that quite well. What stands in the way is the demand that we protect every square inch of the 50 United States, and that is a big problem, because they could always find a place that was undefended and attack it, although that would not make sense from their point of view, and would not cause much damage, from our point of view. So I think that if we look at the threats that exist, the threats that are easiest to pose, we ought to start working on the cruise missiles against coastal cities, including Hawaii, and the short-range ballistic missiles. The national missile defense is going to stand in the way of doing the right thing, because it takes so much of our attention and of our effort, and it will invariably evoke arguments that ``we are spending so much money on it, it must be effective.'' Economists always say that everything has its price, and its price determines its value. Apologies to economists who may be watching. The Chairman. Very well. I think we ought to try to finish, at least on my time, and I will not take a next round, would you like to respond to the gentleman, Dr. Graham? Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like you to take more liberty. There are only three of us here, and I think if you can get an interchange going---- The Chairman. That is exactly what I want to do. Senator Biden [continuing]. I do not think you should be constrained by the time, with all due respect. The Chairman. Well, I think that is a good idea. General, proceed. General Piotrowski. Well, I would like to make a few comments. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say what I do agree with. I do agree that countermeasures can evolve. I do agree that testing is important, and certainly that should be foremost in the development of this program, adequate testing to ensure an understanding of the reliability, but let me comment to some other points that were made. Senator, you asked about rational versus irrational. Senator Biden. I am serious about it. I am not trying to be argumentative. General Piotrowski. No, no, I want to respond to that in a serious fashion. I never believed that the Soviets would act irrationally during the time that I was CINCSPACE, CINCNORAD, and had to worry about an attack on North America and my advice to the President. I do not believe that that situation exists any more, and I have perhaps a different understanding of irrational versus rational behavior. We tend to analyze behavior based on our Western moors and our Western values. I have come to historically look at what was perceived to be irrational behavior historically in war, and when you look at it from the part of the actor who was believed to be irrational, you can find that they chose to die rather than live under the conditions that were forced upon them. A very good historical exam, sir, are our Forefathers, who chose to take on the British empire when we barely had a toe- hold or maybe a finger-hold on this continent and declared war on the British empire. I am sure that most civilized nations in Europe felt that that was totally irrational, but it was our Forefathers' choice. Do systems evolve? Yes, they do. I do not recall in my 38 years of historical military activity that we ever feel that a system that was capable of defeating or even taking on an equal footing, threats that could be imagined. The F-15, for example, when it was fielded, it is not the aircraft that exists today, which is far more capable. The F-16, when it was fielded, did not have a night capability, did not have a good precision bonding capability. That has evolved over time. None of our systems had adequate electronics countermeasures to take on the threats that would evolve, the SA-4 or the SA-6, and on, and on, and on. Our systems have evolved to meet the threats that have evolved. I believe that there is a threat today. I believe that whether there is intent or not, that can change in an instant. It can change with a leader. It can change with an event. We have always dealt in military capability against other military system capabilities, not so much with their intent, but their capability. Senator Biden. Well, General, if I could interrupt just a second, I can recall that years ago there was a national forum put together, a series of debates with Admiral Zumwalt, Paul Warnke, Dr. Teller, and myself, and they set up these debates around the country, and 3,000 or 4,000 people showed up for these discussions, and it was about arms control, generically and specifically the SALT treaties. One of the things that always fascinated me--and I knew he said it with every ounce of earnestness, he believed it--was that Dr. Teller, whom I certainly could not match in terms of knowledge of any of the systems that we were talking about, used to say the reason why we have to assume that the threat of a counterattack by the United States and the devastation it would bring upon the Soviet Union was not credible--he argued it was not credible that deterrence was working--was that the Soviets had demonstrated they were prepared to lose 20 million people during World War II and, therefore, they were ready to do it again. Yet, 50 years of history demonstrated that the Soviet leadership, although they imprisoned the people, were fairly conservative in how they acted. I am not trying to be argumentative. I truly find myself at a loss when I hear Dr. Graham's arguments that the Japanese would not likely form an alliance with us, knowing that they could be more likely to be struck if they were cooperating with us. Everything in history demonstrates the exact opposite: that the Japanese, or the Koreans, knowing that they are vulnerable with or without us now, as a consequence, would find it very much in their interest to have an alliance with us. It seems that the assertions, although theoretically rational, fly in the face of historical analysis and human behavior. Our Founding Fathers were not worried that all Americans, their sons and daughters, would be obliterated if, in fact, they declared war. What they were most concerned about, from historical analysis, as you know, General, is that they, those who signed the Declaration of Independence, would, in fact, be hung on the gallows, since over 50 percent of the people who lived here then did not share their view. The idea of mutually-assured destruction is something that I understand is now sort of out of vogue.The premise upon which some of this current concern is based, at least, is that there will be a North Korean leader who would threaten to hit Hawaii unless all American troops leave South Korea, for example, he threatens Hawaii unless we agree to send food aid, or threatens Hawaii unless we do the things he wants us to do, even though he would possibly put his entire country, himself, and all his people--whom he does not care about, theoretically, or at least apparently--in jeopardy of being literally obliterated. I have trouble with that equation. But I am speaking more about what I think than listening to what you have to say. I just do not see how they equate, our Founding Fathers and the obliteration of an entire nation. The idea is that somebody is going to come along and say, ``Hawaii goes unless you give us the following,'' or some variation of that, or that Japan will say, ``Look, United States, they now have this missile capacity, they can strike every city in Japan now. We want you out of here, because we are going to capitulate. We want to cut a deal right now with North Korea.'' It seems to me to fly in the face of modern Eastern history as well as European history, of all history. I have seen nothing to indicate that people would react that way, whether it was in 1897, in 1917 or in 1948, I do not see anything that suggests otherwise, and I am searching for it, because I truly believe if we could put a shield up that protects against the threat that we are now talking about, I would be all for it, but I do not see how we get from here to there. I am talking too much. I yield to the Chairman. I would like your response. Dr. Graham. Well, you raised a question on the motives of the leader of North Korea, and I do not claim to be an expert on that, I am not sure if anybody understands him, but one thing we have taught him to this point is, at least, that even with the poorest, most isolated country in the world, if he just goes to the trouble of attempting to develop a small number of nuclear weapons, we will engage him as a serious power, provide him with large quantities of fuel oil, provide him with a promise to build two very large nuclear reactors in his country, which he has got the infrastructure to use, and provide all the funding for that in the course of that process. So it is clear that the North Korean militant acts in ballistic missiles, in warheads for ballistic missiles, and other military areas, are benefiting North Korea today. Senator Biden. I think that is true, Doctor, but how does that translate into the assumption that he would use them? I think part of the reason we do that is because guys like you come along and tell us we may lose San Francisco if we do not either build a system or stop him. Dr. Graham. Absolutely. I would certainly not try to sit up here and show you that the leader of North Korea would not use nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles if he had those for any of a range of purposes. More importantly, though, the threat of those and having that capability is enough to get him a lot in the world, nuclear reactors, food, heat, oil today, and undoubtedly other things in the future, and that in some ways is even more valuable to him than the prospect of losing much of his country to an all-out war. So it is not an irrational act on his part to build those. It is an irrational act on our part not to build defenses against them. Dr. Garwin. Well, much of the support for the nuclear reactors in North Korea I think stems from the vulnerability of South Korea to North Korea, and the desire to hold the peninsula together while North Korea evolves into a more conventional country. Whether that will work or not, I do not know. I hope it does. There is a big difference between using nuclear weapons in retaliation, in case you are destroyed as a country; that is not desirable, but it is rationale. The United States and the Soviet Union, when we had no defense against one another, practiced that intensively for 50 years. There is a big difference in between that and the first use of nuclear weapons when you have only one or two, because the first use is surely going to be the last use. Once you have done that, the game is up. First of all, it may not work. We have lost three modern Air Force boosters in the last months, something that we thought we knew how to do. Who believes that a North Korean ICBM is going to work perfectly every time they light the torch; and if they try to send it and it does not work, they will lose the rest of their weapons as well; and if it does work, they will lose the rest, even if that one comes over and explodes, and we lose 100,000 people, or whatever the number, depending on the accuracy. So even if a country has nuclear weapons, even if it is not the most rational in the world, it can still be deterred with high probability. But my problem with the subject of this hearing on the national missile defense is that it does not really address this problem. I understand General Piotrowski's statement about countermeasures, and I have been in this business for a very long time, but this is a countermeasure that is really easy. The bomblets would be done independent, in my opinion, of the presence of a defense. They are to increase military effectiveness, and the question of the enclosing balloon, well, at a later hearing I think we could bring one in and seam it up on the floor, and shrink it down on a mock reentry vehicle, and see whether it works. Now, the one difference is that here we have an atmosphere, every cubic yard of air weighs 2 pounds, and so we would have to bring in enormous tanks to fill a balloon the size of this room, but in space there is not any atmosphere, and it takes only a few grams of gas. So that is why these things are so much easier to do. Our enclosing balloons that we have developed, but not necessarily deployed, are not the simple ones that I proposed. For various reasons, they are more complicated, but in this case, the simple one would really work, and I think I could ask General Piotrowski and Dr. Graham about that. General Piotrowski. There is no argument that countermeasures can be developed. I, again, like to use historical examples. When the AWAC's was fielded I played a large role in fielding at the E3A, back in 1976. Many scientists of notable reputation at that time argued that it was foolish to deploy the system, because radars are easily jammed, and it would be jammed and useless. Well, we have been through a number of wars since then, the AWAC's are still flying, it is 23 years later, and it has never been effectively jammed, even though we could go to Radio Shack and buy a few components and show how easily it is jammed. It has not been done. The question is, should we field a defense against what exists today and be able to evolve it over what will exist tomorrow? My background tells me yes, and that it would be difficult to explain to the American people, I am sorry we lost Los Angeles, but we were waiting to develop against countermeasures that we can envision in the future. I think that is unacceptable, based on my background. I have never known a weapons system that was fielded that was able to counter the threats that could be perceived that would exist in the next couple of years, and I do not see it happening. Senator Lugar [presiding]. Do you have any comment? Dr. Graham. Yes. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Countermeasures are serious issues that should be considered in the design of any ballistic missile defense system, there is no question about that. Most, if not all, of the countermeasures that are discussed today, in fact, have been on the books for decades, and are reasonably well understood. In fact, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization supports a small group called the Countermeasures Hands-on Project, which is a third-world-like operation populated by intelligent but relatively inexperienced young officers and enlisted men, in which they try to develop these countermeasures and test them to see how hard it is to make them and what can be said about them. This is something that we discussed in the Rumsfeld Commission that I call ``Try Int,'' that is, if you want to know you can do something or how your enemy might do something, try it under the circumstances that he would do it under and see how it works. In fact, even the balloon that Dr. Garwin described was one of the ideas that the Countermeasures Hands- on Project has tried. In detail, of course, it is not as easy as it sounds, both from the mechanization, but even more from the dynamics of the balloon. While you might have a balloon shell encompassing a heavier object like a reentry vehicle, you cannot change the mass distribution substantially, and our radars are now able to get very precise data on the dynamics of objects that they see. So even if they cannot see inside the balloon, they can get information on where the center of mass is, which is, in fact, going to be the heavy warhead. So you go down into the subtleties of this action, reaction, and that will continue forever. Our uniform experience in this is that countermeasures have proven harder to make work well in our own efforts to build them, both in the Countermeasures Hands-on Project, but more generally with our ballistic missle force, than we anticipated, and discrimination has proved to be less difficult than we had anticipated. Remember, what you are doing as a developing-world country is you are betting your ability to deceive U.S. ballistic missile defense systems in the radar bands, in the optical bands, infrared, possibly ultraviolet, eventually from our space platforms as well as our ground-based radars, against their ability to fool these. We have so much more experience in these areas and so much more technical capability in these areas that that is an extremely risky bet for them, and one which today I would bet on the side of the U.S. winning, and that has certainly been our experience in recent ballistic missile defense tests. Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much. It has been very helpful in flushing out the countermeasure issue. Let me try a broader question, and I would like each of you to comment. This may stretch analogies too far, but so be it. We have been having a debate last evening and this morning about Kosovo. Essentially, in the conference with Senator Biden, Senator Helms, and I participated with the President, he has stated objectives for our country, and that is very important. This would also be true of what we are talking about today, that we try to define what it is we are attempting to do, and you gentlemen have been helpful in that respect. But nevertheless, in trying to meet the objectives, the President has indicated that that planning for the use of ground forces is not to be done, quite apart from deployment of ground forces; that bombing missions will be conducted at 15,000 feet or higher to meet the problems of anti-aircraft that cannot be suppressed sufficiently; only on clear days will bombs be dropped where there is visual sight of the situation, which rules out a good number of missions; the Kosovo Liberation Army, or other such elements, would not be armed for a variety of reasons; the independence of Kosovo is not our objective but an autonomous province of Serbia, a country that is certainly at war with people that are living in the country now. So there are a number of constraints. Now, they all have some rationale in terms of our foreign policy, our alliances, our relationships with other countries, and the amount of money we want to spend on the war, plus the casualties we want to sustain, but they do lead one, at least, Senator Biden and I, in our votes today, to wonder whether you can get there from where we are. In other words, would it now be a better idea to say to the President, ``Mr. President, you are authorized to do what you need to do, in order to be successful in this situation.'' Now, I have a feeling in this conversation about missile defense, we have a similar predicament, in which we have had constraints of money, the national will has never been exactly clear, although it is being clarified by votes as they come along, and maybe we have not quite defined the objectives altogether. There are rogue states, and the possibility of ICBM's that are still out there from Russia, and we have the ABM Treaty, which has very considerable constraints. Now, I just ask you, to what extent our program, whether we are in the national missile defense or in subsidiary programs dealing with countermeasures or developing, as Senator Biden suggested, defenses against cruise missiles from the coast quite apart from ICBM's, to what extent does the ABM situation constrain what we need to do, or is it the other problem that I sensed from General Piotrowski's testimony, that there often is the case that if there is a national will to do something that it is more likely to get done. I think counter-testimony, maybe Dr. Wright, or maybe Dr. Garwin saying, fair enough, but even if you want to do it very badly, if technically you keep missing the bullets, and do not do the proper testing, do not do enough of it, you cannot get it done anyway, that there is sort of an American can-do spirit that says ``That is just not so, we are Americans.'' If we want to do this sort of thing, take off the constraints, spend the money, get the objectives broad enough so that we sort of encompass all the threat, why we are going to get it done. That is what I would like to believe. On the other hand it appears that our policy now is constrained in many ways by the ABM Treaty and our relationship with Russia, and second, by the money problem. And probably third, by a lack of confidence that has come maybe from lots of test failures, that somehow this is not working out very well, that the technical genius in this country, great as it may be, is not all quite here to do that kind of thing, and, therefore, it is convenient, in a way, to sort of approach this incrementally. So I hope we can make a little headway on it with the thought that maybe you will stumble into it, and given the timeframe of history, maybe no one will really develop much more in that process anyway, that we have that kind of time. I just want to get some feel from you, if you were President of the United States and know what you know about this threat, the timeframe, the problems we have in terms of money, whether we have the technical skills, what should we be doing, and should we be constrained by the ABM Treaty? Is the Russian relationship that important in this, and if it is, does this really mean that we are always going to be working around the edges of a problem, trying to stay in conformity, as we try to edge up to the rogue nation problem and state that as our objective? Do you have any overall comment about this sort of series of questions and thoughts? Dr. Graham, can you give an answer to that? Dr. Graham. Yes, Senator Lugar. I think there is no question that we have the technical and industrial capability to develop a much more substantial ballistic missile defense, in some ways along the lines that Dr. Garwin has suggested, for example. Senator Lugar. By more substantial, do you mean not only the national missile defense, but also you picked up some of these variations---- Dr. Graham. Yes. Senator Lugar [continuing]. The small nation's response, the whole comprehensive bit? Dr. Graham. Yes. You would include a greater emphasis on countermeasure defense. Even there is some in the program today, it could certainly be strengthened. It would include defense against shorter range missiles, targeted at U.S. territories, for example, Aegis-ship based defenses against shorter and mid-range ballistic missiles, and without the ABM Treaty we would certainly deploy more than one site against long-range ballistic missile threats, and we would also, I believe, should make a substantial attempt to add to the Aegis and possibly other locations, such as the heart of Russia, very close to North Korea, if the Russians will cooperate, the boost phase defense, which is an extremely effective technique against countermeasures, as Dr. Garwin described. Senator Lugar. Would you pick up also whatever obligation we have with Japan, in terms of missile defense of that country? Dr. Graham. Yes, indeed. In fact, we are cooperating with Japan. They have bought, I believe, Patriots already, are considering the Aegis-based systems, and could acquire THAAD, as could other countries in that region. But if the President is going to make a sound decision on this, it seems to me to be useful for him to go back to history and look at the great successes we have had in major technical developments. For example, the Minuteman system was technically more challenging in many ways than this. We decided to build an unattended intercontinental ballistic missile. That was unprecedented. It would have solid propellant from missiles at all stages, so it would be ready at very short notice; hence, its name Minuteman. That was new. It would be based in holes in the ground, silos, which is the most difficult sort of structure to fire a ballistic missile from, because you cup the missile as it comes out of the silo with the heat of the first stage engine, and it would have nuclear weapons on it, so it would be an unattended nuclear weapons system. All of those were new characteristics, and yet, General Shriever had a clear mandate that went from him to the Secretary of the Air Force, to the Secretary of Defense, to the President, that said, do it, take what national resources you need to build a viable system, and build it as rapidly as you can, and in a little over 4 years, he went from start to a full-scale engineering development, to the initial operating capability, which was, I believe, ten or twenty missiles deployed in their silos. He built all the infrastructure for that, the bases, the training facilities, the logistics, and so on, and had the whole system deployed in very few years. That, I think, is a good example for a national missile defense system, but if he had constraints such as those that the ABM Treaty imposed on national missile defense, I believe there is no way that he could have developed that system at all, much less in the timeframe that he did. I liked Dr. Garwin's interpretation of the ABM Treaty much better than the interpretation I have seen by the State Department, the compliance review group, and everybody else, but unfortunately, they are the government and he is not. There would be very strong arguments made against, for example, defense against the shorter range missiles, and you can see it in article 1, section 2, which is the Russian's favorite part of the ABM Treaty, which says, ``Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of the territory of its own country and not to provide a base,'' whatever that is, ``for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region, except as provided for in article three of this Treaty,'' which at the time of the treaty was the capital or ballistic missile field. So that essentially imposes a constraint against any kind of a territorial defense, and that is what we are living with today. Senator Lugar. General, do you have a comment? General Piotrowski. Yes. I will make them brief, sir. I believe that as long as we have no defense against ballistic missiles, it makes them very attractive to people who either want to blackmail us or wish us ill. Certainly, they are immutable today, and they will remain immutable until we field a system that changes that chemistry. With regard to retaliation, I think people who believe strongly their feelings about retaliation, it is my conviction that, and I think you illustrated it, sir, in your comments about how carefully we are working in Kosovo to prevent the loss of innocent lives, I believe strongly that if a nuclear weapon was detonated in Los Angeles that we would retaliate, and if it came from Pyong Yang, we would retaliate against Pyong Yang, but I am not sure we would use a nuclear weapon and kill 8 million or 9 million people who are believed innocent, because it is the dictator, Kim Il Sung, who would push the button, not 8 million people who live in Pyong Yang, and do not believe the retaliation would take that form. We would retaliate. We would go in and I think we would root out the evil, but I am not convinced in my mind, in my lifetime, that we would retaliate with nuclear weapons. Senator Lugar. You may be right, but the whole idea with the Soviet Union for 50 years was they were certain they would. In other words, there would not be some humane thought about Moscow at that point. General Piotrowski. Yes, sir, and I would agree that historically that seemed to work, but I do not believe that either side was every pushed to the point where that might have even been considered. I think we robusted each other. If we had been in an all- out tactical nuclear war in Central Europe, and perhaps one side was on the brink of loss, that might have been a thought, but I do not think we ever came to the point where that was even considered, but that is an opinion, not a fact. I believe that we have the ability to develop a system capable of defeating the threat that we see today that will evolve into the capability to defeat threats in the future. That would require severe changes to the ABM Treaty as it exists today, as Dr. Graham has pointed out. I think that we could do useful things if we wanted to start deployment and said, as President Kennedy said, we would put a man on the moon by the end of the decade and return him to earth, we would do things differently and more meaningfully than are being done today. For example, we know how to build an X-band radar that can track and discriminate. That radar, if fielded today, at a site that we believed that we were going to deploy, could do useful work in space, in monitoring our own test RV's, and on, and on, and on. I would field the command and control element in Cheyenne Mountain so that the operators could gain confidence as they used the radar, and then use simulators or emulators to fly out what we thought a ballistic missile interceptor would look like to gain confidence in the system, and to evolve that system to meet the threats that were extant when we were ready to deploy interceptors, and I believe that eventually we would evolve to a space-based system probably using lasers, where we had speed of light, and we could defeat systems early in the boost phase so they would not go far beyond their launch sites, and could defeat all of the countermeasures and all of the heinous weapons that one could think of, because they would be encapsulated in the ballistic missile when it was destroyed in boost. Sir, that ends my comments. Senator Lugar. Dr. Garwin. Dr. Garwin. Well, to go back to the 1972 ABM Treaty, we did not enter into that lightly. We did it because, although we could see that we could defend against the existing Soviet threat, if we fielded a defense, we saw that threat expanding without bound. We knew what we were doing in order to counter the ballistic missile defense system that the Soviet Union had deployed around Moscow, and Moscow, in case nuclear war came, would have been destroyed much more thoroughly than if there had been no defense against it. So that is the problem with trying to build a defense against hundreds of nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles from Russia. The problem is that there would not be hundreds, there would be thousands, and if we look at space-based lasers, for instance, we discussed this 15 years ago, and it is very easy to destroy these space components. In fact, even if there are thousands of space-based interceptors, it is a lot easier to destroy them from the ground one at a time, soon after they are put in orbit, than it is to maintain them in orbit ready to be used at a moment's notice. So the ABM Treaty, as I have explained, does not in any way inhibit our protection right now of U.S. cities against short- range, ship-launched cruise or ballistic missiles. It has nothing to do with that. It was against strategic ballistic missiles, which are either of ICBM range or long-range missiles launched from submarines. I think that the ABM Treaty could use some updating, but rather than go in and say we want to be freed from the constraints of the ABM Treaty, we ought to have a specific proposal for Russia and now the other partners to the ABM Treaty. This proposal, in the case of boost-phase intercept, would use not cruisers, but military cargo ships, because we need to put large interceptors, much larger than the ones that fit into the vertical launch systems of ordinary military ships. We do not need very many of these. I think that a lot of the support for national missile defense comes from a feeling that we could, in fact, deploy an effective defense against the Chinese ballistic missiles, because there are fewer than 20 of them, and as I indicated, we plan to build 75 ground-based interceptors even with this preliminary C-1 system. So China would see that we are serious about a system which they would have to believe would eliminate their deterrent, and that is a sure way to get them to build more, and to get them, in addition, to work on the countermeasures, which there would be no reason to work on now, so presumably they have not deployed very many of them, since we have no defensive system at all. Senator Lugar. Dr. Wright. Dr. Wright. Let me make a couple of comments. One, I think it is fair to say that the kind of technology that is being developed for the system really is remarkable, so I do not think that the implication is that somehow U.S. technological efforts are not really first rate. I think they are. The problem is that you do not have a clear technical objective of the program, and I think that that is the key difference with the Apollo program. It was clear that you had a well-defined technical problem there. As people used to like to say, the Moon did not fight back when you were trying to land a person on the Moon, and I would say to a large extent the same is true of the analogy with the Minuteman missile. Again, I think that was a remarkable bit of technology, but it had clearly stated goals that were not changing as you went through, and that is a very big difference in this case. You are not exactly clear what you are going to be shooting at. The parameters of the defense of the threat are going to be changing. Second, I would like to say just a couple of words about the blackmail scenario that has been talked about here a couple of times. The concern is that if there were a threat of a use of one of these weapons that blackmail would tend to limit U.S. freedom of action, and the question is, well, what happens to that scenario if the defense that you have put up is less than perfect? Would U.S. political leaders have enough confidence in the effectiveness of the missile they would put up, especially against weapons armed with weapons of mass destruction, to be able to ignore the threat that was made, and completely restore U.S. freedom of action, and I think the answer to that is simply no, that missile defenses in the end do not significantly change the blackmail scenario that has been laid out here. Finally, I think it is worth keeping in mind that in any policy decision you are forced to make difficult tradeoffs, and I think that is a real lesson of Kosovo, that the U.S. is trying to balance a lot of different issues here. Two points there: One is I think that that means it is very crucial to understand how well a national defense system would work, what its effectiveness in the real world would be expected to be, because that is the thing that ultimately you are going to have to decide whether that is worth the tradeoff, in terms of dollars, in terms of reaction by the countries, in terms of other things that you would like to do. But also it seems to me that, from my point of view, the biggest threat the United States faces today is the very large nuclear arsenal that remains in Russia. You had mentioned that. At current force levels that the Russians deploy, I do not think the kind of defenses that the U.S. are talking about would be a major concern, but that is not where I would like to end up. I would like to leave the opportunity open and make real progress toward getting the Russian nuclear arsenal down to as small a number as possible. My concern is that Russia has shown that it is concerned about U.S. missile defenses, and if that turns out to be U.S. deployment of missile defenses, it turns out to be a barrier to getting to low levels of Russian nuclear forces, than I would say that that is not a good tradeoff, and I would hope that at some point in the future, we would be holding a hearing like this, at which point Russia would say that they are not concerned about U.S. missile defenses, and the kind of tradeoffs you would have to make in the policy world would be very different, but I do not believe that is where we are today. Senator Lugar. I would agree that we are not there. I would think, however, that Dr. Garwin makes an interesting point, and you cannot draft this proposal today, but a specific proposal to the Russians, with regard to this, seems to me to be in the realm of the doable, not immediately, maybe not in this period when we are dealing with Kosovo, but at some stage. The question I think maybe Senator Biden and I would have is, what is the proposal. This hearing is very helpful in sort of flushing out all the questions that ought to be asked, but in due course we need to have some more thoughts, with each of you as experts, as to what it is that we want to do, and then to what extent is the Minuteman analogy applicable? In other words, to what extent is this a question of priority, in terms of our own national will? I gather for the moment it is one of the things we are concerned about. From time to time we think about the potential for Hawaii, or Alaska, or someplace to be attacked, or we sort of know out there that the North Koreans are difficult, and maybe others, but it sort of filters in with a lot of other things we are thinking about. Maybe there is never any way that you have a prioritization of 1 to 10, but on the other hand, each of us have to make judgments on appropriations. Maybe the two of us are not the instrumental persons in ranking them, but we can speak up and we all do. To the extent that we really do not understand the nature of the threats or which ones we ought to prioritize---- Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, on that point, if we could followup--and I hope you are willing to keep this going a little bit longer, because at least I find it enlightening--I truly appreciate the four of you being here. I mean, you are the experts. Several of you are among the most renowned scientists in the world. You guys know what you are doing. I try to distill this after 27 years of dealing with what one of our deceased colleagues used to call the nuclear theologians. We used to go through this logic about strike, counterstrike, what would happen, how many losses, et cetera. I would sit there in these hearings and meetings with some of you and your predecessors, and feel like I was reading Suma Theologica again and arguing about how many angels fit on the head of a pin, and motivations, and it gets very complicated. But if I can stand back for a second and distill it this way, I think it gets at what Senator Lugar has been flushing out: Were Senator Lugar President and I Secretary of State, what if I came to you guys and said, ``Look, I need you now to prioritize for us. Do not tell me the politics; let me do the politics. Do not tell me whether it can or cannot be done. Do not consider the limitations that are imposed by the ABM Treaty. Tell me, in the following list of priorities, what are the greatest threats we have?'' For example, Dr. Garwin, I believe that if, within the near term, the scientific community came and the defense community came to us and said, ``Look, the single, best immediate way to deal with one of the rogue states, North Korea, is to put in the Vladivostok area a system that could eliminate the threat in the boost phase,'' I believe with every fiber in my being, after 27 years of being a part of negotiating teams, or witnessing the aftermath of negotiation with the former Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the present leadership, that with serious and hard negotiation it could be made clear to them that it was in their interest as well as our interest that that missile defense be done on Russian soil. Now, if, in fact, you were to say to me that, that is the cleanest--do not give me your politics, let me do the politics; I stand for reelection, you all do not--if you were to tell me that is the cleanest scientific way to eliminate that threat, then President Lugar would have something to work on. We have to understand what is underlying this debate. There are those like Senator Helms who truly believe that, and he quotes it and he means it, ``We have never lost a war and never won a treaty,'' so we are divided in this body, as we have been for the last 30 years or more, 27 years I have between those who think even arms control, notion of arms control is a bad idea, and those who think arms control is a means by which we can help maintain our security. But when we sit and listen to all of you, what we do not say to you is, a lot of people in this debate do not trust the motivation of those advising us. That is because some would listen to what was said today and say what this is really about, is not the rogue states. This is really about Russia. This is really about moving on to a position in which we have a missile defense system that can render harmless Russia's nuclear arsenal, because we believe the Russian bear is going to reassert himself as an imperialistic aggressor in the world community, and we should stamp it out now. There are others who believe that the reason for the underlying debate about the missile defense system is really China, that China is the place where my grandchildren are going to face a problem and a threat, and so what this really is about is getting a jump on the ability of China ever to be able to threaten the United States in any way with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Then there are others who believe you mean what you say, that what you are really talking about is dealing with the immediate concern of the rogue nations. So I do not think we ever honestly say that out loud, but in a debate on the floor, in our caucuses, at least in the Democratic Caucus, that is the kind of interplay you get. So it gets very hard not only to determine the objectives, Dr. Wright, because the truth is, politically, at least, that there are different objectives behind the support for an ABM system of any kind. So back to my question. Given the technological shortfalls that we all acknowledge thus far--notwithstanding, General, your point that if you set a goal and we have no constraints on it, we are more likely to achieve it than not--but given the technological shortfall, do any of you believe that the proposed national defense should be deployed? Or is the real argument whether to build a sea-based or a spaced-based ballistic missile defense? I listen to you, Dr. Graham, and it seems to me that in effect you are arguing for a wholesale rejection of ABM. I respect that, but if I listen to you, you seem to be arguing that ABM should be rejected wholesale. Others of you are saying, well, no, it may need to be amended. So my question again is, to repeat it, do you believe the proposed system should be deployed, or should the real argument, the honest argument, be whether or not to build a sea- or a space-based ballistic missile system and sort of leapfrog this? Dr. Graham. Senator, when you say I think I reject the ABM, I presume you mean the ABM Treaty. Senator Biden. Yes. I am sorry. I meant to say the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty. I may be wrong, but it seems that you would prefer that it be abrogated, period. If you were advising President Lugar, my guess is you would say, ``Mr. President, abrogate the treaty, period. Get out of it.'' Dr. Graham. That is absolutely right, Senator Biden. I would say, get out of that treaty. You can always conceive of some other treaty you might want to be in, but in this area, I believe the U.S. would be far better off without that treaty in any of its current manifestations. Senator Biden. Should we be going to sea-based and space- based missile defense? Dr. Graham. I believe we should, Senator Biden, and I do not believe it is an either/or question. I think there is merit to building a land-based component to the national missile defense; although, I would not constrain it to one site. Senator Biden. But if you did what General Piotrowski is saying, and that is, set a goal, an objective, listening to you, I doubt whether you would say that the present land-based system being contemplated, if that were the only thing that was going to be done, is worth it. It seems to me what you are saying is that it is worth it as a component of a larger goal. I am trying to understand the goal, because General, you have impressed me with your point about setting a goal, making a judgment, and if we do that then pursue it. I am getting mixed signals here, because it does not seem as though any of you are saying that this system in and of itself--assuming we can negotiate with the Russians and the successor states an agreement that what is contemplated here is within the ABM Treaty--would you do it if that was all you were going to do, Dr. Graham? Dr. Graham. Having the experience of--even the current ABM system I believe would benefit the United States. One of our greatest shortfalls is that we have not developed, constructed, and deployed any ABM system for 25 years, so on that basis, on a technical basis, I would say, keep going, do it, but I would also argue extremely strongly that this is a component and not a particularly well-designed component of a territorial defense capability, and our goal should be to provide for the defense of U.S. territories against ballistic missiles and, by the way, as Dr. Garwin mentioned, against cruise missiles and a lot of other threats that we have to worry about, but I would say, do this, but do not make this the only thing you do. If it is the only thing you are going to do, consider it an exercise in bringing up our technology, our industrial base, and so on, but do not imagine for a minute that it is going to protect you against the full range of ballistic missile threats that, for example, we identified on the Rumsfeld Commission. Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, this is the last iteration of this question I will try. If the Lord Almighty came down and sat here in the chairman's seat and said, ``Gentlemen, I can assure you that if we do this, this is all we are ever going to do in the near term,'' I doubt whether any one of you would say, go ahead and spend the money to do this. I understand the argument, and if the Lord came down and said it is an open-ended deal, you would do this, you got the old nose-under-the-tent, you would be able then to ramp up the technology, you would be able to attract people back into the program, the people we have lost, you would be able to get things moving, you would get dollars spent, and that would lead to the next thing, and then maybe more. But I guess what I am saying is, it seems like an expensive gamble for something that on its face technologically does not work, and in the near term, even if it worked to specifications, could not do the bulk of what you are most worried about, the most likely scenarios. I understand that dilemma for some of you: you have to start somewhere. But if this is where you start and this is where you end, it seems to me we have wasted a whole hell of a lot of money when we could have been doing other things, and if in the process the Russians overreact to this and conclude that they should now end any discussion on a START II or START III saying ``we are not destroying anything else''--at the end of the day we spent a whole hell of a lot of money for something that has actually increased the threat. That is because now, the only outfit in the world at this moment that can, in fact, destroy us, if they just launched them all,--although we would get them, too--if they became irrational, the only outfit that can truly destroy us--would, in fact, be more dangerous to us than they are at the moment. If anybody wants to respond to that, fine; if you do not, I understand. But that is the dilemma I find myself in, in wanting to support a system, as opposed to coming to President Lugar and saying, ``Look, Mr. President, we can take care of these several things that are immediate threats, and here is how I propose it. If you can get the Russians to sign onto this ABM Treaty of putting a defense system in Vladivostok, then you will be able to take care of this piece now, and if you can get them to do this, you can take care of that piece.'' Senator Lugar. Let us have Dr. Garwin's response here. Dr. Garwin. I think we should separate the political from the technical. My understanding of the political situation is exactly yours, although I could not put it that well. The most immediate result of abandoning the ABM Treaty would be to abandon any hope of bringing Russian nuclear weapon holdings down to a thousand or maybe even to one hundred, and that would not be a good result. On the technical side, I do believe that we ought to dis- aggregate these things, but everybody is so used to decisions taking decades or more that they do not have time to respond. If you say North Korea is the problem, let us fix North Korea. Then we will fix something else tomorrow, or next month, or the next year. Now, we did once deploy a ballistic missile defense system, Safeguard, in Grand Forks, ND. It cost I guess about $21 billion in 1998 dollars. It was operational for a few months. Even though one of the arguments for deploying it was learning by doing, we did not want to learn any more after we had deployed it, so we shut it down. Very often these programs come to you prepackaged. Some good things, some bad things. We are all familiar with that, even on amendments to appropriations bills. But here there is particular evidence, because whenever the national missile defense is discussed, it is in these precise words, ``It would have as its primary mission the defense of all 50 States against a small number of intercontinental range ballistic missiles launched by a rogue nation,'' and then General Lyles, or whoever is proposing, goes on, ``such a system would also provide some residual capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from China or Russia. It would not be capable of defending against a large-scale deliberate attack.'' Well, that subsidiary ``residual capability'' is a requirement masquerading as an observation. Somebody has decided that this is what is absolutely necessary, and to my mind, this is the primary purpose of the national missile defense; and by the way, since China can only launch its ICBM's as a small launch and not a large-scale deliberate attack, then China has every reason to believe that this system is oriented against them. Now, if that is what we want to do, then we ought to say that is our purpose in building the system, and we ought to consider what kind of countermeasures the Chinese can build to such a system; and then I certainly agree, we do not want to build this specific proposed system. I think we should have a task force to look at the North Korea problem and to see what we can do, maybe a U.S.-Russian task force would even help, but we would go it alone, and look at military cargo ships, and see which approach we want there, and then move on. Senator Lugar. Let me just ask for one more comment just to complete the record. Obviously, this is a strong answer to Senator Biden's question as to whether this particular discussion today should proceed. Do either you, Dr. Graham or General, have a comment in defense of proceeding with this system? General Piotrowski. Let me answer a slightly different question, it is one that I think Senator Biden asked. I believe an at-sea ballistic missile defense, if the focus was North Korea, is a very sound approach. You would have to solve many of the same technical problems, but you have a large thrusting booster that is going to burn for 300 seconds, or 250 seconds. You can put in a barge or surface ship, the capability to defeat that, think such that I would have confidence in it. It is a point solution, and one that could then go on from that point solution as other things evolve. So I am not at all against an at-sea solution for a specific capability. I accept the fact that this is a very daunting and difficult political issue as well as technical issue, but that is a useful solution against a point problem. Senator Lugar. But how about this NMD, should we proceed with this, that is one of the basic questions of the hearing. Do you have a final comment, sir? Dr. Graham. Yes, Senator Lugar. Notwithstanding Dr. Garwin's generous interpretation of the ABM Treaty with regard to defense of our coastal cities, I believe that what we are seeing now is about the best ballistic missile defense system for the U.S. territory that we can build under the constraints of the ABM Treaty and, in fact, even this system will violate common interpretations of the ABM Treaty in several areas. I believe we should build a more effective system. If this is where we have to start under this administration and its constraints, I believe it is worth starting. We will learn a lot. We will make up for a lot of the damage done to our technical infrastructure in this area over the last 25 years of particularly not deploying ballistic missile defense systems. But this is not an end-point issue. There is no silver bullet in ballistic missile defense, or offense, for that matter, and we are never going to get to the point where we say OK, that is it, that is the ultimate system, we never have to think about it again. Like all other offense and defense interactions, it will be a continual process of assessing the defense and see what needs to be done to bring it into balance. I hope that someday we will get to the point where we decide that the Soviet Union or now Russia really does not have some kind of an innate privilege to kill as many Americans as it wishes, whenever they wish to, and that we do not have a built-in privilege of killing as many Russians as we want to whenever the occasion might arise. That was forced upon us by the invention of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads 50 years ago, and I think it is something today that we can get out of with a determined effort. The trouble is that we have gotten so accustomed to that in mutual-assured destruction and other related philosophies, that we forget that the problem is trying to survive as a country and as nations, and not accommodating ourselves to a threat and absorbing it, when, in fact, we can defend ourselves against it, but the defense will be a continuing process, it will have many components, and it will have to evolve over time. Senator Biden. I know you said the last thing, Mr. Chairman, but can I just followup on one point that Dr. Graham just made? If you could get the ABM Treaty amended to accommodate the defense system that Dr. Garwin talked about, and that is a sure defense, or a defense against cruise---- Dr. Garwin. We do not need amendments. Senator Biden. Pardon me? Dr. Garwin. We do not need amendments for that. Senator Biden. No, but Dr. Graham thinks you do. If, in fact, there was no question that that was allowed, either because they agree it is allowed or we amended the treaty, would that not be a preferable way to go than this, assuming there was no question that the ABM Treaty permitted it? Which would you prefer then? Rather than assessing that you cannot do it, assume that President Lugar gets it amended, or it is already permissible. Which is preferable, in terms of the threat we are talking about, at least the immediate short-term threat? Dr. Graham. You would need to change more than that in the treaty so that it did not interfere with our ability to provide for a territorial defense. For example, you would have to remove the clause in the treaty that says we cannot provide for a territorial defense. You would also have to change the part about where we can locate interceptors and where we can locate radar sets to guide and the fire control solutions for the interceptors. Eventually, if you get to the point of the argument where you say the ABM Treaty is not interfering with our ability to build at least a light, that is, tens to hundreds, but not thousands of warheads, ABM system, then I would say, OK, it is a matter of indifference, because it is not blocking our ability to do what we should do, at least at the level of the Third-World threat, the level of the China threat, and the level of the accidental or inadvertent Russia threat. That would be a big step forward, in my view. If you can arrange to amend the treaty so we are not constrained in that direction, more power to you. Senator Biden. But my point is, if you could, would you then not go this route, but go the route that Dr. Garwin is talking about? That is the point I am trying to get at. In other words, every time I talk to people like you, Doctor, who know so much more about the technology than I do, you give me the political or the treaty constraints. Assume you did not have that constraint, which of the two approaches would you take? Dr. Graham. It is not an either/or situation. You would certainly want to have a high priority on defending against short-range ballistic missiles launched, for example, by ships. That should be a high priority. It is clear that North Korea, Iran, and other countries are also developing longer- and longer-range ballistic missiles, and you want to have at least a modest defense against long- range ballistic missiles, so that does not become their attack of choice. You also want to have a cruise missile defense. So when you cast it as an either/or situation, it is not the real-world problem. It is any more than having a, whether you have a police department or a fire department in a town, it is an either/or situation. You want to have them both. Here, we should have the defenses that Dr. Garwin described, we should have long-range defenses, and someday we should have space- based defenses to help against some of the threats he described earlier. You have to take all of those into account, and the treaty blocks you in virtually all of those. Senator Biden. Would you share this with the Russians? Dr. Graham. What is the this in that statement? Senator Biden. Everything. Everything that you are talking about. Any system you built that dealt with missile defense. The implication of your earlier statement was, we should end the era where the Russians feel that they can at will destroy Americans and we feel that at will we can destroy them. Would you share the system with them, whatever anti- ballistic missile system is developed? Dr. Graham. I would share it with them in this way. Early on, while they still have nuclear weapons, I would be glad to share the functionality of the system, its capabilty to intercept missiles. Later, when they did not have any nuclear weapons, or any significant number, and we did not have any significant number, then I would be willing to consider the details of the system as well, but the more they know about the details, the more they would know about how to overcome the system, and I would reserve that to a later era. Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Dr. Graham. Let me thank each one of you on behalf of the chairman and the distinguished ranking member for the extraordinary testimony and your willingness to work hypothetically through each of our questions. I think the hearing has been a very important one, and we are glad that so many other Americans are sharing with us, those in the audience in this hearing today, and those who have watched the televised portion of this. We thank you for coming. [Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., May 5, 1999.]