Index

                              May 13, 1999
               ABM Treaty, START II, and Missile Defense

Hadley, Hon. Stephen, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
  partner, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC........................   171
    Prepared statement of........................................   173
Joseph Hon. Robert G., former Ambassador to the ABM Treaty's 
  Standing Consultative Commission; Director, Center for Counter 
  Proliferation Research, National Defense University, 
  Washington, DC.................................................   193
    Prepared statement of........................................   197
Lee, William T., former analyst for the Defense Intelligence 
  Agency; adjunct fellow, Center for Strategic and International 
  Studies, Washington, DC........................................   211
    Prepared statement of........................................   212
        Annex 1: Questions submitted by the Honorable Curt Weldon 
          to the CIA and CIA's responses.........................   216
        Annex 2: Implications of the ABM Treaty Protocols and 
          Agreed Statements......................................   217
        Annex 3: Post Soviet Union Russian Missile and Air 
          Weapons Development....................................   220
Smith, Hon. David J., former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Defense 
  and Space Talks; president, Global Horizons Inc., Annandale, VA   178
    Prepared statement of........................................   184

 

S. Hrg. 106-339 BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE ======================================================================= HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations <snowflake> Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director (ii)
ABM TREATY, START II, AND MISSILE DEFENSE ---------- THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1999 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. The committee met at 10:12 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel presiding. Present: Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel. Good morning. This morning's hearing is the fifth in a series of hearings the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is holding on the 1972 ABM Treaty. Today's hearing will focus on the relationship between missile defense, strategic arms reductions, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the national missile defense architecture that the administration is now developing. Before introducing our witnesses this morning, I would like to summarize five key judgments that have come out of our last five ABM hearings to date. First, the ballistic missile threat to the United States is present and growing. A number of countries such as Iran and North Korea could today inflict massive damage on the United States using a short-range, ship-launched missile with an unconventional warhead. We are threatened by further instability in Russia. The Chinese missile threat exists and is growing. Second, the committee has heard compelling testimony that a national missile defense against these threats is technologically feasible. What is lacking is the political will. America is kept vulnerable by a commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty with a country and a government that no longer exists. Third, this committee has listened to numerous experts who advocate deployment of a national missile defense system despite Russian and Chinese objections. Ideally, we should seek to engage Russia so that we can deploy missile defenses without affecting our important bilateral relations. But we should never let the defense of our citizens be held hostage to diplomatic relations. The deployment process must move along its own separate track. We can undertake confidence building, and that confidence building addresses Russian concerns. But at no time should Russia be given the impression that it has a veto over any aspect of U.S. missile defenses. Fourth, an overwhelming number of witnesses have urged this committee to reject the Clinton administration's effort to expand the ABM Treaty. At a time when we need to move beyond the ABM Treaty, it would be folly to extend it to new partners or to place new limits on the capabilities of missile defense systems. Several witnesses have noted that the ABM Treaty is legally dead. Nevertheless, they have pointed out that the treaty remains a political question in our relationship with Russia and that it must be addressed in further discussions on missile defense and strategic arms reductions. But all decisions relating to U.S. missile defense capabilities, system architecture, and deployment timeframes cannot be held captive to these talks. Some of our witnesses have testified that Russia will ``get on board'' with our missile defense plans only when they perceive that we are serious, deadly serious, and that they risk being left behind. It is time to get serious about missile defense. Fifth, this committee has heard several recommendations relating to the subject of today's hearing. The shadow of the ABM Treaty continues to undermine U.S. missile defense plans. Several witnesses have noted that missile defense plans currently under development by this administration are designed more to tiptoe around the ABM Treaty than they are to actually intercept incoming ballistic missiles. For example, the administration has chosen only those sites, radar configurations, interceptor numbers, and technologies that would fit most easily within ABM Treaty constraints. The administration has not selected sites and capabilities primarily on how well suited they would be for the task of defending America. In sum, while there is clear consensus on the nature of the threat and the need for a national missile defense, the administration continues to adhere to an outdated treaty. As a result, we are squandering precious time in developing an effective system that will protect America's interests from missile attack. The committee looks forward this morning to an examination of these issues by our distinguished witnesses. First allow me to introduce our two panels. Our lead witness is the Honorable Stephen Hadley who served from 1989 to 1993 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under President Bush. Mr. Hadley was responsible for DOD nuclear weapons policy, ballistic missile defense, and arms control. Mr. Hadley is now a partner at Shea & Gardner law firm here in Washington, DC. Our second witness is the Honorable David Smith who served as chief negotiator to the Defense and Space Talks from 1989 to 1991. In this role, he worked to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets to allow deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles. And I note that in 1985 and 1986, he served as a professional staff member on this committee where he advised Senator Lugar on arms control issues. Ambassador Smith currently serves as president of Global Horizons, an international consulting firm. Our third witness is the Honorable Robert Joseph. Mr. Joseph served during the Bush administration as U.S. Commissioner to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission. Ambassador Joseph has a distinguished background at the Defense Department where he worked on a wide range of arms control issues, including missile defense, nuclear testing, and nonproliferation. Since 1993, Ambassador Joseph has been on detail from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the National Defense University. On our second panel will be Mr. William Lee who served as senior analyst on nuclear targeting at the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1981 to 1985. From 1985 to 1992, Mr. Lee was the Senior Executive Service Officer at DIA charged with military production, R&D, and collection systems. Mr. Lee is now an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The committee welcomes all four of our distinguished witnesses and look forward to hearing from each of you. Gentlemen, thank you and we will ask you, Mr. Hadley, to begin the presentations. STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PARTNER, SHEA & GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to appear before this committee today. I want to begin by saying that I strongly support the effort to provide an effective national missile defense for the United States. It is true that the current provisions of the ABM Treaty prevent us from doing so, and hence the questions raised about the future of the treaty. In your opening comments, you pointed out that there are those who believe that the United States should first seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia so as to permit a national missile defense system. What is often overlooked is the fact that the United States made a serious effort in 1991 and 1992 to negotiate changes to the treaty to permit that deployment, and I thought it might be useful this morning for me to describe briefly those efforts, to discuss how the United States might go about renewing a discussion with Russia on ABM Treaty revision, and to assess the prospects for success. I have a longer statement on this subject. If it is all right, Mr. Chairman, I will just go through and hit the highlights. Senator Hagel. That is fine. Your complete statement will be included in the record. Mr. Hadley. Thank you. Many do not realize that on November 26, 1991, U.S. representatives met with representatives from the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and tabled an outline for a new ABM Treaty regime. This new regime would have permitted ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was required to protect against small ballistic missile attacks. The proposal was very concrete. We proposed an upper limit on the number of ABM interceptors, a limited number of geographically dispersed sites at which they could be deployed, a limit on the number of interceptors at each site. We proposed eliminating the constraints of the treaty on development and testing of ABM systems, and we proposed a limited duration for the agreement. These suggestions were listened to attentively by the participants and were followed in January 1992 by a public statement from President Yeltsin in which he called for a global system for ballistic missile protection of the world community that could be based on the reorientation of the United States SDI program, as well as high level technologies developed by Russia in its defense complex. This was a real breakthrough. It was a Russian leader formally acknowledging that ballistic missile defenses have an important role to play in the post-cold war world. The Bush administration informed President Yeltsin that it welcomed his suggestions, and indeed in a summit meeting in June 1992, President Yeltsin and President Bush formalized cooperations between their two countries on a global protection system. They established a high level working group to explore on a priority basis three issues: potential sharing of early warning information, potential cooperation in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities with Russia and our allies, and a legal basis for cooperation, including necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty. Considerable progress was made. A number of working groups were established. Progress was made in defining a workable concept for a GPS system, in defining specific areas of technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early warning information, and even undertaking the planning for a joint deployment of the theater missile defense capabilities of the two sides. Regrettably, these discussions ground to a halt in October 1992 when it became clear that the outcome of the upcoming Presidential election would not be the reelection of President Bush. Under the Clinton administration, discussions continued between the United States and Russia on the subject of ballistic missile defenses, but with a completely different focus. Instead of trying to lead to a revision of the ABM Treaty that would have facilitated deployment of ballistic missile defenses, the administration's discussions instead focused on the so-called demarcation issue and, as you noted in your opening statement, resulted in, in fact, extending the constraints of the ABM Treaty to our ability to deploy theater ballistic missile defenses. It is very regrettable that the Clinton administration did not build on the work that had been done in the Bush administration on a global protection system and on a U.S./ Russian dialog on how to amend the ABM Treaty to permit national missile defense. In the intervening 6 years, we have lost valuable time, and it may simply be too late for negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty. Obviously, the political situation, particularly in Russia, is much more difficult to deal with than it was 6 years ago. My own view is, however, that it is worth making the effort but we need to think very concretely about how we restart the dialog with Russia. In the balance of my statement, I describe in some detail the kind of framework we need to pursue in order to have any chance of successful discussions with Russia. It really has three parts. First, we need, I think, to put national missile defense in a context of a global effort against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. That has to involve our allies, but it also has to involve Russia and, to some extent, China because the reality is they are potentially the biggest proliferators on the block. And we need to see ballistic missile defense as one piece and, indeed, a contribution that we can make to this global initiative against weapons of mass destruction. Second, we need to have a new concept of deterrence that is more appropriate for the post-cold war world. In the cold war, when we had a single overwhelming Soviet military threat, deterrence based on threat of retaliation with offensive nuclear forces made sense. It is not clear that simply relying on deterrence through threat of retaliation is sufficient any longer, and I talk in my statement as to why that is the case. I would argue we need to have a new concept of deterrence that is based on both offensive nuclear forces to provide traditional deterrence and the ability to protect against weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them should deterrence fail. And this is a concept that ought to be attractive both to the Russians as well as to us. Finally, I would propose, consistent with that concept, that we go to the Russians with a so-called package deal in which we would propose to Russia a coupling of significant reductions in the numerical ceilings in the START II treaty with a revision of the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of numerically limited, but still capable ballistic missile defenses to protect the territory of the two nations. I think that is something that is both in the United States' and Russia's national interest, and it is in that context that we might have an opportunity of some success in those discussions. I agree with you that the only way to go into those discussions is making it clear that our NMD program is going to go forward, and if at the end of the day, those discussions are not successful, then we are not going to let the ABM Treaty prevent us from protecting the country against these threats. But I think the possibility of negotiations is something we should pursue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen J. Hadley Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to appear before you today to testify concerning national missile defense and its impact on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. I strongly support the effort to provide an effective national missile defense for the United States. The current provisions of the ABM Treaty prevent the United States from doing so. Hence the serious questions being raised about the future of the Treaty. Some experts argue that the United States should act now to withdraw from the ABM Treaty or that the ABM Treaty effectively lapsed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other experts argue that before adopting either of these courses of action, the United States should first seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty that would permit the deployment of a national missile defense system. What is often overlooked is that the United States made a serious effort in 1991-1992 to do precisely that--to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty with the Russian government. I thought it might be useful this morning to describe briefly these earlier efforts, to discuss how the United States might go about renewing a discussion of ABM Treaty relief with the Russians, and to assess the prospects for success. the global protection system or ``gps'' concept The process began on September 27, 1991, when President Bush publicly called on the leadership of the then-Soviet Union to ``join us in taking immediate, concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes whatever their source.'' On October 5, 1991, then-Soviet President Gorbachev responded by stating that ``we are ready to discuss the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear ABM systems'' and suggested that the two countries examine the possibility of creating joint ballistic missile warning systems. This statement was a clear recognition by the Soviets, and confirmed by the Russians, that the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') represented as big a threat to them as to the United States. Encouraged by this response, on November 26, 1991, U.S. representatives met with representatives of the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazahkstan to table an outline for a new ABM treaty regime. This new regime would have permitted deployment of ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was required to protect against small ballistic missile attacks. The proposal envisioned an upper limit on the number of deployed ABM interceptors; the deployment of ground based interceptors at a limited number of geographically dispersed sites; a limit on the number of interceptors at each site; elimination of the ABM Treaty's constraints on development and testing of ABM systems; and a limited duration for the agreement so as to permit deployment in the future of more advanced systems such as space- based interceptors. Meanwhile, dramatic events were occurring in Moscow which led ultimately to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Russia with its first democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin. In speeches on January 29 and January 31, 1992, President Yeltsin called for ``a global system for protection of the world community [that could be] based on a reorientation of the U.S. [Strategic Defense Initiative] to make use of high technologies developed in Russia's defense complex.'' This was a real breakthrough that stunned even the most committed U.S. advocates of ballistic missile defense. A Russian leader formally acknowledged that ballistic missile defense had an important role to play in the post-Cold War world. The Bush Administration informed President Yeltsin that it welcomed his proposal for a ``global protection system'' (or ``GPS'')--that the United States shared his bold vision and was prepared to work with him toward that goal. The United States moved quickly to consult with its friends and allies in Europe and Asia to make clear that they would be in on the ground floor and included in any such system. The United States sought specifically to reassure the British and French that such a system would not undermine the credibility of their own strategic nuclear deterrents. The United States particularly sought to enlist the NATO alliance in the cooperative GPS effort. Everyone understood that to deploy a global protection system would require changes to the ABM Treaty. It was believed that cooperation in developing the system would allow Russia to accept its deployment and the changes in the ABM Treaty that such deployment would require. This approach would change thinking in the United States as well, for if the world community in general and Russia in particular were ready to develop and deploy defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks, then even the most skeptical critics in the United States would have to give way. Thus cooperation on a global protection system offered the hope of breaking the log jam on the ABM Treaty that plagued the U.S. domestic political system. u.s. russian discussions on a global protection system At their summit meeting in June, 1992, President Yeltsin and President Bush formalized cooperation between their two countries on a global protection system. In the joint summit statement issued on June 16, 1992, the two Presidents agreed that ``their two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for a system [to protect against limited ballistic missile attacks] as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.'' To this end, they established a high-level group to explore on a priority basis:
  • The potential for sharing of early waming information through the establishment of an early warning center.
  • The potential for cooperation with participating states in developing ballistic missiles defense capabilities and technologies.
  • The development of a legal basis for cooperation including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement a global protection system. The high-level group established by the two Presidents met twice, during July and September of 1992, and established working groups to pursue specific subjects. Considerable progress was made in developing a workable concept for the GPS system, in defining specific areas for technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early warning information, and even in undertaking a joint deployment of the two sides' theater missile defense capabilities. The activity of the high- level group was suspended in November of 1992, however, with the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election. Under the Clinton Administration, discussions continued between the United States and Russia on the subject of ballistic missile defense. But the primary object of those discussions changed dramatically. Instead of leading to the revision of the ABM Treaty to facilitate the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, these discussions instead resulted in extending the Treaty's limits and imposing constraints on the ability of the United States to deploy systems to defend against theater ballistic missiles. This is ironic because the ABM Treaty does not by its terms impose any limits on defenses against theater ballistic missiles systems. The results of these Clinton Administration discussions are now before this Committee. restarting the dialogue with russia It is extremely unfortunate that the Clinton Administration did not build on the work done during the Bush Administration on a ``global protection system'' and on the U.S./Russian dialogue on how to amend the ABM Treaty to permit national missile defense. If it had, we might be a lot closer today to the consensual deployment of such a system. In the interim, the political climate for anything positive in the U.S./ Russian relationship has deteriorated badly. We have lost valuable time and it may simply be too late for negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty. My own view, however, is that it is worth making the effort, for all the reasons that caused the Bush Administration to undertake the dialogue in the first place. But how we go about restarting the dialogue is very important. what is the right framework for working the problem? The U.S. national missile defense effort and the issue of revision of the ABM Treaty have been extremely sensitive issues for Russia. They have been as divisive within the U.S. domestic political debate. In truth the U.S. is unlikely to be successful in getting Russian support for any revision of the Treaty unless it can demonstrate strong bipartisan political support for the U.S. approach. What is needed is a framework in which to view national missile defense that offers the prospect simultaneously of creating a new consensus within the U.S. political debate, offering an acceptable way for the Russians to accept our ABM Treaty proposals, and reassuring our own allies who are in some instances quite skeptical about U.S. national missile defense efforts. The framework also needs to provide a basis for dealing constructively with China on this issue. This framework also needs to reconcile three competing U.S. policy priorities: discouraging (if not preventing) the proliferation of WMD and the means to deliver them, reducing the Russian nuclear posture in ways that are stabilizing, and pursuing the development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Within the U.S. domestic political debate, these three priorities have often been at war with one another. The partisans of non- proliferation have seen the pursuit of national missile defense as evidence of lack of commitment to and confidence in the non- proliferation effort. The partisans of reducing the danger posed by Russian nuclear weapons have seen national missile defense as fatally undermining the prospects for START II in the Russian Duma and any hope for a START III. The partisans of national missile defense have felt stymied by both of the other two groups. Conflict among these policy priorities has also bedeviled our approach to these issues in dealing with other governments. The Russians have made clear they will link any START II ratification to continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty as written. Even some of our closest allies are worried that the U.S. national missile defense program represents either a neoisolationist retreat from the world or a vehicle for U.S. intervention ``anytime/anywhere.'' Finally, by appearing to be a unilateral initiative providing a capability available only to the United States, national missile defense threatens U.S. leadership of the global effort against the proliferation of WMD. 1. Embed Missile Defense Firmly in a U.S. Strategy Against WMD The starting point for resolving these conflicts is to treat the U.S. ballistic missile defense effort as part of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') and the means to deliver them. That strategy of necessity must be a global strategy, one in which the U.S. can lead but cannot dictate. Such a strategy can succeed only if the U.S. can enlist its closest allies despite increasing economic competition and trade frictions between these allies and the United States. It can succeed only if the U.S. can enlist Russia and China, two of the greatest potential sources of both WMD and the means to deliver them. But in engaging these parties the U.S. has on its side the fact that proliferation is a serious challenge that threatens each of these countries as well as the United States. Europe cannot feel sanguine about an Iraq with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles any more than Japan can feel sanguine about North Korea. Russia and China should also be concerned about North Korea and would certainly be concerned about the nuclear-armed Japan that could follow if the North Korea problem is not managed properly. The United States needs to go to its key allies, to Russia, and perhaps even to China at the highest levels to propose a revitalized effort against WMD jointly led by these key nations. Particularly with respect to Russia, such an undertaking would provide both a positive element in the U.S./Russian relationship and the best approach for obtaining Russian cooperation--assuming the Kosovo crisis is resolved without a total breach between the U.S. and Russia. Success of a joint effort against WMD will require probably lengthy strategic consultations between the United States and these governments to develop a common assessment of the risks posed by countries as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea and the list of measures that will need to be pursued. These measures need to include:
  • Better means of collecting and analyzing intelligence information about potential proliferators.
  • Regional strategies to try to resolve underlying tensions and disputes that provide part of the motivation for WMD proliferation (such as in the Middle East).
  • Security strategies that deter the acquisition and use of WMD and the means to deliver them by states seeking to coerce their neighbors (such as Iraq).
  • Enhanced export controls on a multilateral basis with real sanctions for noncompliance.
  • Improved capabilities to deal with both the military and civilian consequences of WMD use (including improved detectors, vaccines, antidotes, protective clothing, and emergency response procedures and practices).
  • Improved technical and operational means to detect and defeat the various means of delivery of WMD (including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and unconventional means).
  • Improved conventional capabilities (including weapons and sensors) to locate and destroy production, storage, and support facilities for WMD and associated delivery systems (though with obvious limitations on what could be shared with other countries). Partisans of ballistic missile defense must recognize that BMD is only one of several measures that need to be pursued in dealing with WMD risks, while partisans of nonproliferation (or the risks of WMD delivery by unconventional means) must acknowledge that ballistic missile defense needs to be pursued as well. This framework allows the U.S. to offer to contribute ballistic missile defense capability to those countries joining in this comprehensive effort against the proliferation of WMD. The U.S. is already making such a contribution to some degree in its cooperation with Israel on the Arrow program, its sale of Patriot missile systems to close allies, and certain technology sharing with allies under existing cooperative agreements. But significant technology transfer restrictions prevent wider sharing. The foregoing framework also provides a better basis for dealing with China on the issue of ballistic missile defense. It would allow the U.S. to offer China a leadership role in this initiative if China were willing to commit itself to the key elements of the overall strategy--in particular, tough export control limitations, an end to transfer of Chinese WMD and missile technology to key countries of concern, and a halt to its own ballistic missile threat to its neighbors. 2. Define a new Concept of 21st Century Deterrence In a Cold War world of a single overwhelming Soviet military threat, deterrence could be based in large measure on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear forces. With a post-Communist Russia no longer a global threat to U.S. interests, there is a real question about the continued requirement for this concept of deterrence as to Russia. With respect to the rest of the 21st century world, even more questions can be raised. A principal U.S. national security concern is to keep countries like North Korea and Iraq from threatening U.S. regional allies, vital U.S. interests, or critical resources. To deter or defend against this challenge, the United States and its allies must be capable of bringing conventional military power into a region and of using it against a threatening state if necessary. The principal threat to this ability is WMD directed against U.S. military forces and allies in the region--and against the U.S. homeland, in hopes that a U.S. President will be deterred from putting U.S. forces into the region or using them against the offending country. It is an open question whether the threat of even nuclear retaliation represents a credible deterrent to the use of WMD in this context. Is a regime as unstable and paranoid as the North Korean leadership susceptible to ``rational'' deterrence? How credible is the threat of nuclear retaliation against even states like North Korea and Iraq--especially if they were to use WMD not against the U.S. but a U.S. ally? Would we really respond to a chemical weapon attack on a U.S. ally with U.S. nuclear weapons? To a chemical attack even on U.S. forward deployed forces? There is still a role for deterrence by threat of retaliation--even nuclear retaliation: to help deter a North Korea from using its overwhelming conventional military capability against South Korean and U.S. forces; to help dissuade Saddam Hussein from using chemical and biological weapons such as in the Gulf War. For this purpose, however, the United States does not need anything like the number of deployed nuclear weapons that it had during the Cold War. But it increasingly needs to enhance deterrence by coupling the threat of retaliation with the ability to deny an opponent the benefit of any WMD capability. This is the contribution that active defenses (such as ballistic missile defense) and other measures can make to deterrence. The United States needs to develop a concept for deterrence in the 21st century based on both offensive and defensive forces, on a balance between threat of retaliation and ability to deny, on a combination of dissuasion, defense, and counterforce. A great deal of thinking is required to develop this concept. But it should already be influencing U.S. national security strategy and policy. It can help support the case for ballistic missile defense. 3. Propose to Russia a ``Package Deal'' on Nuclear Forces and Deployed Defenses This concept of deterrence based on a mix of offensive and defensive forces also makes sense as an approach to Russia's own national security requirements. It would permit Russia to reduce the number of its nuclear forces to a level that it could sustain economically while still maintaining parity with the United States. It would mark a return to the more traditional Russian emphasis on defensive forces. To operationalize this concept, the United States should propose to Russia a ``package deal'' coupling a significant reduction in the numerical ceilings in the START II Treaty with a revision of the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of numerically limited but still capable ballistic missile defenses protecting the territory of the two nations. The theater missile defenses of the two sides should remain unconstrained. Further analytical work would be required to determine the proper level for strategic nuclear forces of the two sides. The establishment of any such level would also have to be contingent upon no significant increase in the forces of other nuclear weapons states (particularly chemical) that might threaten either country. But the level might be expected to be significantly below the 2,500 level set as a target for START III. Similar analysis would be required to determine the nature of the limits to be contained in an amended ABM Treaty. But it is fully expected that the national missile defense system that could be deployed by either country under these limits would not undermine the credibility or effectiveness of either the U.S. or Russian strategic nuclear deterrents even at reduced levels. The U.S. should insure that this is also true for the French and U.K. strategic deterrents, which are likely to represent a much more sophisticated capability than can be handled by the current U.S. national missile defense system design. While such a ``package'' approach would reduce the economic burden of Russia's nuclear forces, it could mean a significant new economic burden for Russia in the form of ballistic missile defense deployments. Ironically, however, Russia already maintains the world's only operating ABM system, still has extensive air defenses, and produces its own theater missile defense systems. Still, the United States could consider as part of the ``package deal'' the possibility of cooperative efforts in the field of ballistic missile defense--as part of a comprehensive global strategy involving U.S. allies and other countries in dealing with WMD and the means to deliver them. Such potential cooperation--again, also involving U.S. friends and allies--might include:
  • Expanded ballistic missile launch notification, sharing of sensor early warning data on ballistic missile launches, and a joint ballistic missile warning center.
  • Interoperable theater missile defense systems--the U.S. PAC III and the Russian S300--that could be offered for sale in tandem as agreed between the two countries by a U.S./Russian joint venture to countries threatened by proliferating neighbors. (This could both provide an important contribution to a comprehensive global WMD strategy and offer U.S. support for Russian access to a legitimate export market for its TMD systems.)
  • A possible U.S./Russian joint venture to develop a ground- based national missile defense system that the U.S., its allies, and Russia could deploy, thereby assisting Russia in meeting its own needs for ballistic missile defenses. This latter proposal raises the controversial issue of sharing of ballistic missile defense technology with the Russians. This is not a new proposal. President Ronald Reagan offered to share just such technology with the Soviet Union as part of his SDI initiative, and the Bush Administration defined several joint development activities to be pursued by U.S. and Russian scientists in the field of ballistic missile defense. Given the number of strategic ballistic missiles that the Russians would continue to possess, they would not need to be able technologically to defeat a U.S. national missile defense system but could simply overwhelm it. Perhaps a greater risk is that the Russians might provide critical technological information to countries against which the U.S. system really was directed, such as Iraq or North Korea. The issue warrants greater study. But such a technology sharing program with Russia would help to rebut the argument that by pursuing a national missile defense program the United States was simply seeking unilateral advantage over Russia. Thank you for your time and attention. Senator Hagel. Mr. Hadley, thank you very much. Mr. Smith. STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. SMITH, FORMER CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR TO THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS; PRESIDENT, GLOBAL HORIZONS INC., ANNANDALE, VA Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me. I would also like to thank you particularly for recalling my service here at the committee. Unfortunately, we were dealing with many of the same issues on the ABM Treaty when I was a staffer here in the mid-1980's, and it is a shame that we cannot get over that. Second, I would like to say that I would wholeheartedly associate myself with your remarks at the outset. I think you are absolutely right, and I hope that my statement here will perhaps reinforce some of the points which you have made. Your staff has asked me to take a look at a rather long and complicated list of issues, and I have put together a fairly comprehensive statement. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit it for the record and summarize what I have to say. Senator Hagel. It will be included in the record. Ambassador Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My remarks this morning will focus on five areas, and I would like to take them in turn. First, while it has been said both by my friend, Mr. Hadley, and by yourself at the outset, I think it is important to set the stage. I think it is very important the United States proceed apace with national missile defense. That is the first point that I think lays the groundwork for everything else I have to say. I would refer to the July 15, 1998 report of the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission, and I will not go over all of their conclusions, but I think two of them bear repeating. One is that concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States. It seems to me that that is about all we need to conclude that we have a problem here and we need to do something about it. The second conclusion that I think ought to be highlighted--and I do not think it has gotten enough attention since the commission's report was published--is that plausible scenarios include rebasing or transfer of operational missiles, sea and air-launch options. The implications of that are clear. That means that the system that we deploy tomorrow is not going to be good enough the day after tomorrow. It is like anything else in human history. I do not know why we should be so shocked, but the fact is we need to start thinking about what we are going to do next. Now, if the Rumsfeld Commission was not enough, recall that not 6 weeks after the Rumsfeld Commission issued its report, the North Koreans gave us a practical demonstration with the launch of their Taepo Dong-1. This overflew Japan on August 31, 1998. And let us remember, it was a three-stage missile. Our intelligence community was shocked that it was a three-stage missile, and one of those stages was solid fuel. This is a broke, hermetic State that has managed to go from a basic Scud infrastructure to building a three-stage missile, including solid fuel technology. I think we better watch out out there. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there remains no doubt that a ballistic missile threat to the United States is developing rapidly, nor is there any doubt that national missile defense is the right answer. And I offer you three reasons. The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign danger,'' wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one of the primitive objects of civil society, an avowed and essential object of the American Union.'' Every American citizen should have the defense that our technology and our wealth can afford. The second reason for national missile defense is geopolitical. Now, there are dedicated opponents of national missile defense who will revel in telling you that why would anybody go to ballistic missiles when there are 100 other ways someone could harm the United States. And, of course, there are 100 other ways someone could harm the United States. We have seen embassy bombings in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. We have had some homegrown problems here in the United States. Clearly there are ways to do harm to the United States and to Americans. That is terrorism. We need to make the distinction between terrorism and geopolitical tools, and ballistic missiles are geopolitical tools. The Rumsfeld Commission makes it very clear that there are plenty of countries out there who are willing to spend their scarce resources on developing ballistic missiles. Now, it is unlikely those countries are doing that just to create some kind of a space-age car bomb. The fact is they see some other use, and the use they see is they want to create an asymmetrical capability with which to threaten the United States, frankly to keep us from projecting our power into their regions. They want to affect our calculations. It is a geopolitical reason. If somebody wants to throw a suitcase bomb at us, obviously they can do that, and our Government ought to be working on that. Do not misunderstand. But let us not confuse the two issues. The final reason I think we need to proceed with national missile defense is to echo what my friend, Mr. Hadley, has said, to complement our nonproliferation efforts. It seems to me that if we make clear to countries who are thinking about getting into this asymmetrical game, that the United States is going to use its technology and its wealth to thwart their plans, they might think twice. We might dissuade them. Not all of them, but it seems to me that it is a necessary ingredient of a serious nonproliferation effort. Now, I think those are good, solid reasons why we need to proceed with national missile defense. But we have a problem. The fact is that national missile defense is blocked by the ABM Treaty as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, there will be people who will come in here and tell you that that is not the case, that they have found ways to make things treaty compliant. The three of us know exactly how the United States makes treaty compliance decisions for its own behavior, and let me assure you that in the end of the day, there is no such thing as a treaty compliant national missile defense deployment. Let me be clear. The only thing that we can deploy is a second Safeguard system from the 1960's. That is all we can deploy. We need to understand that even the so-called C-1 architecture, even confined to 20 missiles, even deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota is going to involve some kind of a negotiation with the Russians. There is simply no such thing as a treaty compliant NMD. Let me give you three of the issues that will come up in these kinds of discussions on the ABM Treaty. The first is territorial defense. It is found in article I. The root of the problem here is this. Over the years, when it did not look like we were going to do much, we developed a kind of shorthand, a common parlance with which we said what the ABM Treaty permits. It permits 100 interceptors at one site. And that shorthand grew up as lingua franca. That is what we decided it meant. Well, we were not really doing much, and so it was a good textbook description, but there are some problems. The notion that there is a treaty compliant defense forgets that the 100 interceptors at one site was not an object in itself. It was a tool to implement the treaty's object and purpose, and the treaty's object and purpose is to prohibit a territorial defense. Now, that stands in stark contrast with the stated purpose of our current deployment readiness program for national missile defense, and it is--I quote--``The NMD system will provide defense of all territory of all the 50 States.'' Now, anyone who has stood in front of a TV camera or run for elected office, as you have, Mr. Chairman, would understand that we might be able to weave other arguments around this, but it is going to be a real tough sell to stand up and say that territorial defense is not territorial defense. I can do it but not in a 15-second sound bite. It is not going to go over well. Moreover, when you get in the room with the Russians, they have absolutely no obligation or any interest to make this easy for us. So, when you hear administration witnesses telling you we are just going to go over and get the Russians to nod their heads up and down to something like this, it is not going to be that easy. The second issue that is going to arise on any NMD deployment under the ABM Treaty is the issue of radars. Now, this may sound elementary, but I think it really does bear repeating. The world is round. The United States territory is rather large. From Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu and back again, it is a large piece of that globe. And electromagnetic waves travel in straight lines. The reason that the ABM Treaty requires that the one, single ABM radar be deployed in a 150- kilometer radius surrounding your launch site was to use those elementary physical principles to make sure you only had a territorial defense. It is not a game to see if American scientists can somehow defend the country from North Dakota. They cannot, by the way. But that is not the purpose of it. The purpose is to keep that one radar in North Dakota, knowing that the electromagnetic waves have to go straight so that you cannot get out there and defend the whole territory. It is not that easy just to say, oh, it is a matter of a radar. Once again, I hear administration witnesses saying things like that. We will just get the Russians to agree to the radar. They are going to go right back to the purpose of the treaty, and the reason for the prohibitions on the radars is the object and purpose of the treaty: to prevent a territorial defense. What I am really getting at here is there is no such thing as a modest treaty amendment. Now, the third issue that is going to arise is where do you put the NMD system. We have a problem even if you want to go to Grand Forks. The ABM Treaty requires that your ABM system be in a 150-kilometer radius that contains ballistic missiles. Well, the idea here was--these are the concepts of mutual assured destruction and crisis stability--that if you defend just the missile field, or just the national command authority, you assure stability because you are assuring some kind of survival for a second strike capability. If you defend the entire territory, that becomes destabilizing. That is why the missile defense is supposed to be in either a missile field or the national capital. There is a reason for that. Well, guess what? We have shut down our missile field at Grand Forks. The BRAC wanted it closed. It is shut down and the missiles have been moved to Malmstrom, Montana. There are no missiles at Grand Forks. Now, what I am hearing now is the Pentagon has come up with the latest plan that they are going to draw a new circle which will take in the eastern-most silos that belong to Minot Air Force Base, draw their 150-kilometer circle, and say that that is the Grand Forks ABM deployment area. It just seems to me it is too clever by half, Mr. Chairman. If the Russians did something like that, we would be raising it with them. I do not think that is going to float in the American compliance context. Finally, let me note that coverage of all 50 States, if you are going to do that, really requires a deployment from a single site in Alaska, not in Grand Forks, North Dakota. It is my understanding that consequently that is what the administration is currently--and I stress currently--planning to do. Now, it should go without saying that if you are going to put your single site in Alaska, everything I said does not matter. You have to change article III because you cannot now put your single site in Alaska. Multiple fixed ground base sites, sea or space-based national missile defense, the development of sea or space-based national missile defense, and advanced sensors which could substitute for what the treaty calls an ABM radar are altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, basically we have an urgent dilemma. What I have tried to set up before you is this. We have to do national missile defense. The ABM Treaty, as it stands today, blocks national missile defense. So, what do we do? Frankly, Mr. Chairman, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the United States. The ABM Treaty is not a cornerstone of stability for the new millennium. It is a delicate diplomatic problem for today. Now, that said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say that our security relationship with Russia is important, that Russia is in a crucial transition, and I do not see any reason needlessly to provoke them into some kind of a diplomatic rift over the ABM Treaty. I favor trying to negotiate something, although I recognize, as Mr. Hadley pointed out, today that is not going to be easy. But the fact is the date at which we are going to need some ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast approaching. In fact, it is in about 18 months. That is not me speaking. That is the schedule of the Clinton administration's national missile defense program. We have got to have something done in about 18 months. There were better times as Mr. Hadley pointed out. There were times when we had better relations with Russia. There were times when there was less confusion in Moscow. There were times when there was no Kosovo crisis. There were times when we had more time. Unfortunately, the administration abandoned the Ross-Mamedov talks in 1993, and 6 years during which we could have been talking have been squandered. I think it is still worth a shot, but it is going to be difficult. As a former negotiator, let me offer some points on how to do it if we do it. First, the United States should carefully resolve what national missile defense it needs. And there I mean deployment of the near-term system, as well as development and testing of follow-on systems. We should then craft an integral negotiating position accordingly and then approach the Russians. I will not go into it in detail here, but I do have some ideas on what it is we ought to be negotiating if you are interested when we get to questions. The one thing I want to say, though, is the worst thing we could do is to do this piecemeal and run off to Moscow and negotiate some kind of a deal, pay some kind of a price, just to get them to nod their heads up and down to the C-1 or C-2 architecture. That is the absolute worst negotiating mistake we could make. Second, we need to announce an NMD deployment decision now. Third, we need to embark upon a vigorous research, development, and testing program for national missile defense systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground-based deployment. Fourth, in addition to our deployment announcement, we need to realize that we do have some leverage. The fact is that Russia's economic plight is sending their strategic forces down regardless of what we do. They would like an agreement for future reduction of strategic offensive forces. This is different from the cold war. They want an agreement for further reductions. We can get creative, roll this all into one negotiation. We may actually be able to turn this into a win- win because there may be some other things the Russians would like, like real cooperation on early warning or cooperation on theater missile defense. This does not have to be just the United States getting its way. There are things the Russians want. We could come to an agreement. Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly we have to put a time limit on negotiations. And sixth, we should make no commitments on longevity of the agreement beyond the time during which we think we can live with what it is we have negotiated. Now, I cannot tell you what the outcome is going to be, Mr. Chairman. I think it is worth a try. If the effort comes to naught, at least we can say we have prepared the way by leaving no stone unturned. I do not believe the American political system will do any less than that. I think we have got to give a try on this negotiation. I cannot guarantee you that in the end we may not be faced with the stark reality of having to withdraw from the treaty. We may. Now, there is a myth here that I would like to explode, and that is that somehow deploying defenses, negotiating on the ABM Treaty somehow ipso facto makes agreements for reductions of strategic offensive weapons go away. It is simply not the case. As I have stated, the Russians have a greater interest than we do right now in reducing nuclear weapons and doing that in a negotiated agreement with the United States. It is not clear that if we go into a negotiation, we take their security concerns into account, we offer them something that maybe they perceive a stake in, and we can have some kind of a negotiation to go down, which is right now their paramount concern is that we go down equally, that we cannot have some kind of an agreement here. I think we need to get over this myth that just because the Russians scream and say that is the end of START, that somehow that necessarily needs to be true. My guess is that if we were really serious, very much like NATO expansion, they will scream till the moment they realize we are really serious, and then they will deal with reality and they will try and negotiate something. It seems to me that is a pretty good foundation for the kind of talks that we ought to have here. Now, since I am suggesting that we have some kind of talks, I think I have to tie up one other loose end, and that is the agreements on the ABM Treaty signed at New York on September 26, 1997 on succession and demarcation. These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for advice and consent, and in his absence, I would like to commend the distinguished chairman of this committee for insisting upon that. Assuming that you are successful, Mr. Chairman, in that venture, I respectfully suggest that these agreements are not in the interest of the United States and the Senate should reject them. I will offer you three main objections. Once again, I will summarize and if you care to get into it in questions, I would be glad to do that. First, the memorandum of understanding adding Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty is a strategic absurdity. Whatever you think of the ABM Treaty's merits, you have to agree that the ABM Treaty was designed to regulate a particular relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. We have no strategic relationship with Kazakhstan. I have the utmost respect for the people of Kazakhstan, but we do not have a strategic relationship with that country. My second concern is the New York package not only fails to achieve so-called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM systems and unlimited TMD systems. It actually leaves matters worse than they had been. I will not go into all the details, but the fact is that we have gotten ourselves into a literal quagmire and we do not have demarcation. If you are an interceptor with a velocity between 3 kilometers per second and 5.5 kilometers per second, the fact is you still have to go through the same old U.S. internal compliance review, now putting all of this stuff that the New York agreements have superimposed into the mix. And if you have to go and debate this with anybody in the SCC, you now not only have to discuss it with Russia, you also have to discuss it with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. Finally, Mr. Chairman, my third objection to the seven documents in the New York package is that they form literally a new TMD treaty, in all but name. Once again, I will not go into the details, but if you add up all of the requirements, all of the declarations, it clearly becomes a whole set of new obligations, a literal obstacle course for U.S. theater--I stress theater--missile defense which has nothing to do with the ABM Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone on at some length. My conclusion is very brief. Today it is imperative that the United States proceed apace with national missile defense, and by that I mean deployment of the near-term system and research, development, and testing of follow-on systems. These are actions blocked by the 1972 ABM Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in accordance with article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we need--and I emphasize the changes we need--in accordance with article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Smith follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. David J. Smith Mr. Chairman: It is indeed an honor to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations which I once served with great pride. I thank you and your colleagues for inviting me to share my views on missile defense and the ABM Treaty. In accordance with your invitation, my remarks this morning will address five key points: --First, it is imperative that the United States proceed apace with National Missile Defense (NMD) to protect every American citizen, maintain freedom of action in defense of our worldwide interests, and complement our non proliferation efforts. --Second, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the most modest NMD--there is no such thing as Treaty compliant NMD. --Third, we face an urgent dilemma. To proceed with NMD, we must soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the U.S. That said, however, it is in the interest of the United States to attempt to negotiate such ABM Treaty changes as we need. As a former negotiator, I offer six recommendations: 1. Carefully resolve what NMD we need. 2. Announce an NMD deployment decision now. 3. Embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground based deployment. 4. Recognize that we have considerable leverage--carrots and sticks--in a broad strategic negotiation which includes ABM Treaty issues. 5. Set a time limit on negotiations. 6. Make no commitments beyond the period during which we think we can live with what we negotiate. --Continuing with the five points of my testimony, fourth, substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty need not inexorably halt agreements to reduce strategic offensive weapons, consistent with U.S. interests. --Fifth, the ABM Treaty agreements signed at New York on September 26, 1997--on succession and demarcation--are not in the interest of the United States. These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for Advice and Consent and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this Committee for insisting upon it. Assuming success on that count, I respectfully urge the Senate to reject them. I shall address each point in turn. the u.s. must proceed apace with nmd On July 15, 1998 the bipartisan Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld issued a watershed report. The Commission's principal findings bear emphasis in the context of this hearing: --``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States . . . to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability. --``During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made. --``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community. --``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding. --``Plausible scenarios [include] re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea and air-launch options. --``The U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment.'' If the Rumsfeld Commission left any doubt about the imminence of the ballistic missile threat, the final jolt had to be from the roar of North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) missile as it overflew Japan on August 31, 1998. Even if we accept Pyongyang's explanation that the rocket was a space launch vehicle, it is less than a hop, skip and jump from space launch to ICBM capability. Our attention should not be diverted from the startling news that the North Korean missile consisted of three stages: liquid fuel first and second stages, which the Intelligence Community had thought to be the entire TD-1, plus a solid fuel third stage. Never mind that the test was not fully successful--beginning with just a SCUD-based single stage missile infrastructure, hermetic and destitute North Korea has flight tested a three stage missile with solid fuel technology! A TD-1 with a small payload could reach Alaska, and North Korea is known already to be working on a TD-2. Mr. Chairman, there remains no doubt that a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. is developing rapidly, or that NMD is the right answer for three reasons. The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign danger,'' wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one of the primitive objects of civil society . . . an avowed and essential object of the American Union.'' Every American citizen, from sea to shining sea, should have such defense as our technology and wealth can afford. The second reason for NMD is geopolitical. Dedicated NMD opponents revel in telling us that there are ways easier than ballistic missiles to hurt the United States. Why, they ask, would an enemy resort to ballistic missiles? In light of some of the recent violence which has gripped our nation, this question deserves particular attention. Last year, attacks upon U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam reminded us that simple bombs aboard trucks, cars or vans can be deadly terror weapons. A home grown kook took the lives of two Capitol Police officers, reminding us that no security system is risk free. And just a few weeks ago, our nation was forced to look into its very soul by two troubled teenagers in Littleton, Colorado. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, whether directed by trenchies, Aum Shinrikyo, Osama Bin Laden or some hostile state, there could also be suitcase bombs, vials of anthrax, malicious computer hackers, commonplace airplane hijackings, ship boardings and automatic weapons spraying busy city streets. These are all perils against which a responsible government should guard its people. But they are tools of terrorism, not of geopolitical strategy-- and we must not confuse the two. We must not confuse them because clearly our adversaries do not. As the Rumsfeld Commission detailed, and as the North Korean TD-1 flight underscored, there are plenty of countries willing to devote scarce resources to building ballistic missiles. Since it is unlikely they plan to use these as space age car bombs, they must calculate some other benefit. Indeed they do. Regimes which perceive their interests at odds with ours want ballistic missiles to wield in regional crises to alter America's calculation of the costs and benefits of involvement--in other words, to keep us out. A remark of Chinese General Xiong Guang Kai during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is instructive in this regard. The United States would not defend Taiwan, argued Xiong, because China would ``rain nuclear bombs on Los Angeles.'' No two crises are identical and the outcome of any future crisis will certainly be situation dependent, but--make no mistake--a threat to the American homeland would indeed alter our cost- benefit calculations. Xiong's remark, and others like it by Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, reflect not a reckless obsession to hurt America but, in the words of William R. Graham and Keith B. Payne--both recent witnesses before this Committee--``a well thought out strategy to `trump' the West's capability to project overwhelming conventional power into their regions.'' Anyone who sees the global power projection capability of America and its allies and friends as stabilizing should see all missile defense--theater and national--as stabilizing. Just as we do not want Japan intimidated by North Korean missiles, neither can we tolerate the same tactics applied directly to the United States by China, North Korea, Iran or whomever. And best way to thwart such tactics is to ``trump'' them with NMD. The final reason I shall mention today for the U.S. to proceed now with a robust NMD program is to complement our non proliferation efforts. Let us not forget that we are the world's only superpower. Enemies fear our military might, our training, our experience, our wealth and, most of all, our technology. They know they cannot take us on on our terms, so they reach for asymmetrical capabilities such as long range missiles to alter the playing field. So long as we remain undefended, the price of entry to the club of countries able to affect U.S. calculations is but a single long range missile with a nuclear or biological payload. And as long we appear likely to remain undefended, a lot of countries will consider joining that club. On the other hand, if we send an unequivocal signal that we will apply our technology and wealth to thwarting this particular asymmetrical threat, some countries will be dissuaded from embarking upon or continuing long range missile programs. Like any non proliferation effort, this will not be 100% effective, but it would be a potent dimension of a serious non proliferation effort. Mr. Chairman, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. maintained deterrence with the Soviet Union not only with the force in being, but also with the so called ``R&D deterrent.'' Moscow's ambitions were checked by the certainty that America's best and brightest would be a step ahead at just about every turn. Ultimately, it was the ``R&D deterrent'' which drove Marshall Akhromeyev and the Soviet military to despair, a major contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet Union. It is time we reclaim our confidence and apply American strengths to the challenges of the next century. These are three solid reasons why the U.S. must proceed apace with NMD. Unfortunately, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the most modest NMD. the abm treaty blocks national missile defense Mr. Chairman, there are those who assert otherwise, but understanding the way the U.S. goes about decisions on its own Treaty compliance, I assure you there is no such thing as an ABM Treaty compliant National--and I stress National--Missile Defense. About the only system we can deploy under the ABM Treaty as it stands today would be a Safeguard II. Let me be clear. Even the so called C-1 architecture of 20 NMD interceptors, even deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, would require negotiation with Russia of some clarifications, understandings or amendments. Today, I will outline for you the three biggest ABM Treaty issues which any NMD deployment will raise: territorial defense, radars and deployment area. The root of the territorial defense issue is the shorthand description which developed over the years of what the ABM Treaty permits: 100 interceptors at one site. As the controversy over SDI raged, people of good will sought a consensual path forward with a Treaty compliant system which, applying the shorthand, came to mean up to 100 interceptors at one site. In 1988, the distinguished past Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, recognized that a space based version of his Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS) would require ABM Treaty amendment, but he also spoke of defensive deployments that ``might be possible within the terms of the treaty or, at most, require a modest amendment.'' A few years later, the Missile Defense Act of 1991 called for a ``. . . cost effective, operationally effective and ABM Treaty compliant ABM system at a single site . . .''. President Clinton vetoed the FY-96 Defense Authorization Act and threatened to veto the 1996 Defend America Act on the grounds that these bills would have set the United States on a path to violate the ABM Treaty. At the same time, Administration spokespersons claimed that their so called ``3 + 3'' NMD program would not violate the ABM Treaty. More recently, the Administration has realized that while ``3 + 3'', or now ``3 + 5'', development can probably be carried out in compliance with the Treaty, deployment would require some amendment. The fact is that if we ever proceed with the ``plus'' part of ``3 + 5'', significant amendments or understandings to the ABM Treaty will have to be sought. The notion of Treaty compliant NMD ignores that the 100/1 limitation was not an object in itself, but a tool to implement the Treaty's object and purpose as set forth in Article I: ``. . . not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of the territory . . .'' Thus the objective of our current NMD deployment readiness program--``the NMD system will provide defense of all territory on the 50 states''--stands in apparent contrast to the Treaty's object and purpose. The question, then, is not the technical one of whether the territory of the United States can be defended with 100 interceptors from one site in North Dakota (it cannot, by the way). Rather, the relevant ABM Treaty question is whether limited defense of the entire territory--even with 100 interceptors at one site--is territorial defense. The traditional U.S. view, consistently held across administrations, is that Article I is hortatory, establishing the framework for the substantive provisions that follow. Thus, in the U.S. view, a side would have to violate some provision of Articles Ill, V, VI or IX in order to violate Article I. In other words, Articles Ill, V, VI and IX specify what actions would be technologically necessary for a side to move toward a territorial defense. If this traditional U.S. view is maintained and sustained with the Russians, the issue of territorial defense would not arise. But this is uncharted water. The issue of territorial defense has never arisen in a major way because, until now, the United States had not been discussing deployment of an operational ABM system. Although the Soviets raised Article I a number of times in connection with our SDI program, we were always able to respond, as we did with the 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), that the activity in question was a technology demonstration, not deployment of an operational system. This time, the U.S. would be deploying an operational system whose stated purpose is to cover the entire territory. I do not deny that a sound argument can be made that territorial defense of the type we are now contemplating would not be a territorial defense which would impinge upon the object and purpose of the ABM Treaty. That is, a thin defense against third countries or accidental or unauthorized launch would not detract from a Russian second strike capability, even under projected START Ill offensive force levels. Nevertheless, anyone who has stood in front of TV cameras or run for elected office will appreciate that arguing that ``territorial defense is not territorial defense'' is going to be a tough sell. This may be a hurdle which can be overcome, however, it will require the U.S. at least to seek some clarification or understanding in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the ABM Treaty's joint implementation body. And the Russians have neither an obligation nor an interest in making this easy for us. There is one further liability which NMD raises in the context of territorial defense. ABM Treaty Article I also commits us ``. . . not to provide a base for [territorial] defense . . .'' If the thin NMD system itself would not constitute a territorial defense in violation of Article I, does it lay a base for such a defense? The U.S. may establish that an NMD deployment of 20, or even 100, interceptors cannot possibly be a territorial defense in the meaning of the ABM Treaty, that is, a defense which could leave us invulnerable to a Russian retaliatory attack. However, once even a minimal NMD system is deployed at Grand Forks, long lead items such as radars and BM/C3 will be in place and interceptor missiles and Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs) will be under production. There are no doubt Treaty amendments and confidence building measures which could address this issue, but these will have to be negotiated. And this is precisely my point; we are in for a negotiation which is going to involve the Article I issue of territorial defense. The second issue, radars, is intertwined with the issue of territorial defense. This issue is so complex and architecture dependent that I shall confine my remarks to a general description.The world is round; U.S. territory--from Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu and back to Calais--occupies a large bit of it; and high frequency electromagnetic waves travel in straight lines. By confining ABM radars to one 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area, the authors of the ABM Treaty used these elementary physical facts to implement the Treaty's object and purpose, that is, to prohibit a territorial defense. With today's technology we can do a lot more from that one site than we could in 1972 but, still, a single ABM radar in North Dakota just cannot cover the territory of the United States. Consequently, every candidate NMD architecture I have seen features some combination of upgraded Early Warning Radars (EWRs), including EWRs outside U.S. territory, space based sensors, X-Band radars deployed outside the ABM deployment area, and a highly capable sensor aboard the NMD interceptor. Such sensor suites don't fit into the ABM Treaty's framework. But the problem is only partly that today's technology does not match yesterday's Treaty terms. The greater issue is that our objective for today's technology does not match the object and purpose for which yesterday's Treaty terms were written. In other words, to proceed with NMD we will have to seek ABM Treaty adjustments and understandings on radars and these will be directly related to the issue of territorial defense. This will involve wrenching the Russians and the American arms control community from positions with which they have grown quite comfortable. Consequently, there will be no such thing as a ``modest'' Treaty adjustment or understanding. Yet a third ABM Treaty issue is the deployment area, and this too is related to the issue of territorial defense. The ABM Treaty requires the 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area at Grand Forks to contain ICBM silo launchers. But the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) recommended that the 321st Strategic Missile Group at Grand Forks AFB be deactivated and its Minuteman III missiles relocated to Malmstrom AFB, Montana. The missiles have now been moved, but START Treaty accountable silos will remain at Grand Forks for three more years. The Department of Defense is apparently taking the view that it can now locate a Grand Forks ABM deployment area within a 150 Km. radius circle drawn to include some missiles assigned to Minot AFB, ND. In a strict legal sense this may be correct. However, deactivating the missile field in which we have said our ABM system would be located, and redrawing a circle to encompass a few missiles from a different base to satisfy Treaty obligations could easily be portrayed as a sham which is not the way the U.S. complies with its legal obligations. It is too clever by half and we would surely question an analogous Russian move. Proceeding in this way would only further underscore the territorial defense issue. The idea underlying this ABM Treaty provision was that defense of a single missile field in order to guarantee survival of at least some retaliatory capability would be stabilizing, unlike territorial defense which was seen as destabilizing. Now, if the U.S. deploys an NMD system in North Dakota which is only perfunctorily related to an ICBM field, it must be ``up to'' something else--again, we return to the matter of territorial defense. Finally, I note that achieving coverage of all fifty states from a single site, particularly if the fastest emerging threat is in Northeast Asia, requires that single site to be in Alaska. It is my understanding that, consequently, the Administration's current plan would be to deploy our first NMD site in Alaska, if President Clinton decides to deploy in June, 2000. Clearly, deploying an NMD site in Alaska would require amendment of the Treaty's Article Ill. Multiple fixed ground based sites, sea or space based NMD, the development and testing of sea or space based NMD, and advanced sensors which could substitute for what the Treaty calls an ``ABM radar'' are altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today. we must soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 abm treaty We face an urgent dilemma. Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the U.S. Setting aside discussion of the Treaty's value during the Cold War, we must now recognize that it is indeed an artifact of the Cold War. It was conceived to preserve deterrence and crisis stability between two superpowers locked in an ideological struggle which, from time to time, erupted into crises. Now, the Soviet Union is gone and with it the Marxist-Leninist ideology which was the root cause of the Cold War. Russia, whatever its problems or even faults, is not dominated by a Marxist-Leninist ideology which impels it into conflict with us across the globe. It does not keep twenty divisions in East Germany poised to strangle Berlin. It does not operate a worldwide network to spark conflict in places like Korea, Vietnam and Angola. Admiral Gorshkov's blue water navy is rusting, tied up in decaying ports. And the major issue for Russian strategic forces today is how to manage inevitable economically driven decline. Quite simply, the potential crisis which the ABM Treaty purported to stabilize no longer looms. The ABM Treaty is not a cornerstone of stability for the new millennium; it is a delicate diplomatic matter for today. That said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say that our security relationship with Russia remains important, that Russia is in a crucial transition and that we should not needlessly provoke a diplomatic rift over the ABM Treaty--the Treaty remains important diplomatically and strategically to them. Therefore, I favor attempting to negotiate such changes to the ABM Treaty as the U.S. needs, although I recognize it will not now be easy. Given even the schedule of the ``3 + 5'' program, the time at which we will need ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast approaching. President Clinton has said he will decide whether to deploy in June of 2000. For the reasons outlined above, it would be inconceivable to me that he would decide otherwise. Then, the kind of construction which would raise ABM Treaty issues would begin in mid 2001, at the start of the short Alaskan construction season. Understanding that our only alternative to negotiated modifications would be withdrawal from the Treaty in accordance with Article XV, requiring six months notice, we would have to achieve those negotiated modifications by the Fall of 2000--about eighteen months from today. That would be a tall order in the best of times and these are not the best of times. The crisis in Kosovo has created a major rift in U.S.-Russia relations. Moreover, Russia faces elections to the State Duma this December and presidential elections in June, 2000. Soon thereafter, the U.S. faces a general election. There were once better times when there was more time to negotiate. Unfortunately, the Administration has squandered six years since 1993 when it abandoned the Ross-Mamedov Talks and discussion of President Yeltsin's proposal for a Global Protection System. Still, I think an attempt at negotiation should be made. If it is, allow me as a former negotiator to suggest a few guidelines. First, the U.S. should carefully resolve what NMD it needs-- deployment and development and testing--for the next few years, craft an integral negotiating position accordingly, and then approach the Russians. Nothing should be excluded from consideration, including space based defenses. Of course, the more we seek, the tougher the negotiation will be. On the other hand, there is no sense in seeking or agreeing to less than is needed. We should not conform our NMD requirements to the ABM Treaty or to what we expect to be ``negotiable.'' And the worst thing we could do is negotiate piecemeal, rushing off to negotiate Russian assent to, say, just the C-1 or C-2 architecture. There will be a price to pay and we are likely to have to live with what we negotiate for a few years. Second, announce an NMD deployment decision now. Funds to support the decision should be put into the FYDP and the Congress should authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to ramp up to a deployment. Without these, the Russians will not recognize any urgent need to treat our approach seriously. This is all the more important in the current political turmoil in Moscow because we will have to work extra hard to gain their attention which is almost entirely focused on economics and internal power struggles. Third, embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground based deployment. There are no constraints on the evolution of the ballistic missile threat to the U.S. We should expect MIRVs, MaRVs, decoys, penetration aids, lower radar cross sections and higher velocity re entry vehicles. Moreover, a principal finding of the Rumsfeld Commission is that ``plausible scenarios [include] re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea and air-launch options.'' Fixed, ground based interceptors cannot respond to such threats. We should not despair and be self deterred from deploying the NMD system we are developing and getting into the business of missile defense. But neither should we become complacent and neglect to prepare for the challenges of tomorrow. Consequently, our foreseeable development and testing needs must figure into careful resolution of what NMD we need for the next few years. Fourth, in addition to the NMD deployment announcement, we must recognize that we do have other points of leverage. Russia's economic plight dictates dramatic reductions in strategic forces and their calculus dictates a negotiated mutual reduction with the United States. With START II almost certainly dead, we have an opportunity to discuss force levels and structures appropriate for the new millennium from START I levels. Moreover, there may be other things Russia would like to have such as real early warning sharing and cooperation on theater missile defense. In short, creative strategic negotiations which include ABM Treaty issues could result in a ``win-win outcome.'' Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly put a time limit on negotiations. The luxury of protracted talks having been squandered, we must now demand closure in the near term. In a sense, we could turn a weakness into a strength by using the current NMD schedule as a point of leverage. Sixth, while the Russians will demand some longevity for whatever they negotiate, we should not make any commitments beyond the period during which we think we can live with the new agreement. One of the major lessons of the ABM Treaty is that it is absolutely impossible to predict world events and technology a quarter century down the road. The ABM Treaty is already of unlimited duration so, to seek further changes in the future, we would again be faced with renegotiation or withdrawal from the Treaty. These are guarantees enough. Moreover, assuming we really negotiate for what we need over the next few years, I believe there is an excellent chance that by the time we need to face the issue again, both sides will have moved to a whole new strategic paradigm in which we no longer base our security on threats of mutual nuclear annihilation. The ABM Treaty just won't matter any more. I cannot tell you what the outcome of a negotiation on the ABM Treaty might be. In the end, if a negotiating effort comes to nought and we are faced with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, at least we will have prepared the way by leaving no stone unturned. We will demand no less of ourselves. modifications to the 1972 abm treaty need not inexorably halt agreements to reduce strategic nuclear weapons One myth which has dogged NMD for years is that U.S. missile defenses beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty as it stands today will inexorably bring agreements to reduce strategic offensive arms to a screeching halt. This need not be the case. The ABM Treaty's Article XIV provides for amendments--otherwise how could the Treaty's authors have purported to write a document of ``unlimited duration?'' If the U.S. has amendments to propose, we should offer them. Russia has an obligation to engage seriously on our proposals although, of course, no obligation to agree. However, I would suggest that once it becomes clear that U.S. NMD is inevitable, Russia--as it did with NATO expansion--will douse the rhetoric and deal with reality. This is especially so if we are willing to negotiate, take Russian security concerns into account and offer benefits in which they perceive a stake. Today, Russian strategic offensive forces are declining for economic reasons--some authoritative Russians have even suggested to the hundreds of warheads. Different from Cold War days, Russia now wants agreed reductions more than we. Indeed, START II is almost certainly dead, languishing in the State Duma not over concerns about American NMD, but over concerns about Russian offensive force structure. This would appear to be about as promising a foundation for talks as we are likely to get. the new york abm treaty agreements are not in the interest of the united states Since I have recommended that the U.S. seek needed modifications to the ABM Treaty in the context of wider strategic negotiations and suggested that START II is almost certainly dead, it is incumbent upon me to address one more loose end--the ABM Treaty agreements signed at New York on September 26, 1997 on succession and demarcation. These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for Advice and Consent and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this Committee for insisting upon that. Assuming success on that count, I respectfully suggest that these agreements are not in the interest of the United States and I urge the Senate reject them. When I refer to the New York package, I am referring to seven ABM Treaty documents, the first three of which should be submitted for the Senate's Advice and Consent, signed on September 26, 1997: --A Memorandum of Understanding adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as ABM Treaty parties. --The First Agreed Statement and Second Agreed Statement which purport to demarcate between ABM Treaty limited ABM and unlimited TMD. --An Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). --A Joint Statement on annual updates to information on TMD systems covered by the CBMs Agreement. --A unilateral Statement by the United States of America that ``it has no plans'' to test TMD of a velocity greater than 3 Km/sec. before April, 1999, to develop TMD with velocity greater than 5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for sea based), or to test TMD against MIRVs or strategic RVs. --New Regulations of the Standing Consultative Committee which reflect the addition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. I offer three main objections to the New York ABM Treaty package. First, the Memorandum of Understanding adds Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty--a strategic absurdity. Whatever one's opinion of the merits of the ABM Treaty, we could all agree that its purpose was to regulate a unique strategic relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. No such relationship exists or can exist between us and Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine. These newly independent states had to be added, the Administration argues, because Treaty limited radars and an ABM test site now lie in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This is a specious argument. The Treaty limited Skrunda Radar lies in Latvia, but Latvia is not being added to the Treaty. The U.S. operates Treaty limited radars on the territories of Denmark and the United Kingdom and an ABM test site in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (which attained sovereignty just a few months before the 1991 dissolution of the USSR). Yet we never felt a post Cold War itch to add these countries to the ABM Treaty. It doesn't make sense. But the Administration has persisted so on this that one cannot escape the thought that its purpose is to consign negotiations such those proposed here to a pentalateral quagmire. Moreover, adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will cloud the issue of which country to address on future compliance matters. I would add that because of the way the New York documents are written, everything turns on the succession Memorandum. Defeat it, and the entire package falls. My second concern is that the New York package not only fails to achieve so called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM and unlimited TMD systems, it actually leaves matters worse than they had been. The First Agreed Statement, that is, the demarcation agreement on lower velocity TMD, confirms what we could have, and should have, simply asserted: U.S. TMD with interceptor velocities not exceeding 3 Km/sec. are not subject to the ABM Treaty so long as they are not tested against targets with a velocity exceeding 5 Km/sec. or of a range greater than 3,500 Km. The harder question of higher velocity TMD--interceptor velocities 3 to 5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for naval systems)--is murkier under the New York agreements than it was before President Clinton headed to Helsinki in March, 1997. For higher velocity TMD systems, compliance with the target velocity and range criteria applied to lower velocity TMD is necessary, but not sufficient, to determine ABM Treaty compliance. There is no demarcation! Higher velocity TMD systems would still undergo an internal U.S. Government compliance review and we would now be committed to consult not just with Russia, but with four ABM Treaty parties on any TMD matter. Worse, both internal and pentalateral deliberations would be clouded by vague new restrictions: TMD may ``not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another party,'' may not be deployed ``for use against each other'' and may not be inconsistent ``in number or geographic scope'' with the ballistic missile threat. We have even agreed to provide our missile threat assessment to the other parties for discussion! The Administration emphasizes that the New York agreements would allow all U.S. TMD programs to go forward. Well, there's ``forward'' and there's ``not exactly.'' One U.S. program, Space Based Laser, would be preemptively prohibited, as would anything else that can intercept a theater ballistic missile from space. Aside from that, the New York package would freeze traditional TMD technology at its 1997 level, grandfathering five U.S. TMD programs--Navy Area, THAAD, PAC-3, HAWK and MEADS--in their current state. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) standing alone would be grandfathered too. But add an improved radar, space cueing or Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) fire control data, and NTW would fall into the murky waters of internal compliance review and bilateral consultation. Airborne Laser would have to traverse the same murky waters. So would an evolved THAAD if its interceptor velocity exceeded 3 Km/sec. So would just about anything new--something as simple as an airship launching a kinetic boost phase interceptor. Finally, TMD with more capable interceptors--the global missile threat remaining unconstrained--would be handicapped by a unilateral statement that the U.S. ``has no plans'' for interceptors faster than 5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for naval systems). Mr. Chairman, I have suggested that we negotiate substantial modifications to the ABM Treaty. If that effort were successful we would still have an ABM Treaty, albeit substantially modified. That means we would still have to have some guidelines to distinguish Treaty limited ABM from unlimited TMD. Having criticized the Administration's demarcation agreement I feel I should add just a few more words on demarcation. Demarcation is a fleeting concept. In the early days of the ABM Treaty the gap between the ranges of short range or Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and those of Strategic Ballistic Missiles (SBMs) was fairly wide. Therefore, the gap between the capabilities of systems designed to counter each was also fairly wide--it was easy to ``demarcate'' between Treaty limited ABM and unlimited TMD. As TBM ranges increased, TMD capabilities had to increase. But, for a time, the gap was preserved because older, less capable SBMs were being removed from service. Today, it is still possible to discern a gap between TBMs and SBMs and hence between TMD and ABM systems. This is reflected in attempts at demarcation over the quarter century between the ABM Treaty and the 1997 New York agreements. During ABM Treaty ratification hearings, Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Foster suggested that an air defense interceptor of a velocity greater than 2 Km/sec. would require U.S. Treaty compliance review. Leaving aside the New York Agreed Statements' many defects, they draw a line calling for U.S. compliance review at an interceptor velocity of 3 Km/sec. and they allow that interceptors with velocities between 3 Km/sec. and 5.5 Km/ sec. (4.5 for naval systems) could be found not subject to the ABM Treaty. This reflects the increased capabilities of TBMs and, therefore, of TMD. But there is every indication that TBM ranges will continue to increase. Just a few weeks ago India tested a 2,000 Km. range Agni-2, followed by Pakistan's test of an 1,100 Km. range Ghauri-2. India claims the Agni-2 has a range of 2,000-2,500 Km. and the Ghauri-2 is credited with a range between 2,000 and 2,300 Km. During 1998, Iran tested the 1,300 Km. range Shahab-3. Iran is reportedly working on Shahab-4 and 5 and we should not exclude the possibility that North Korea could export the TD-1. As the ranges of TBMs increase, the distinction between TBMs and SBMs will begin to blur. Consequently, the capabilities of TMD and ABM will blur and demarcation will become impossible. At that time the concept of a treaty which limits ABM systems will become untenable. Only interim fixes are possible. There are two essential ingredients to an effective interim--and I stress interim--demarcation. First, the U.S. must adopt a true ``demonstrated capability'' standard, that is, we would limit TMD testing to targets with re entry velocities of 5 Km/sec. or ranges of 3,500 Km. or less. Other considerations, including calculations of ``inherent capability'' would become irrelevant. Second, we must adopt a realistic ``force-on-force'' approach with which to evaluate ABM Treaty compliance of U.S. TMD systems. This would eliminate the altogether theoretical and exaggerated capabilities which our current ``one-on-one'' methodology attributes to U.S. TMD systems. I suggest that we not repeat the Administration's mistake of trying to negotiate demarcation criteria, and simply announce that henceforward these are the criteria the U.S. will use. The Russians can always seek clarification in the SCC. Returning to the New York agreements, my third objection is that, all seven documents added up, the New York package is a new TMD Treaty in all but name. In addition to the measures I have just sketched, consider the vast declarations of TMD information that will be required:
  • launch notification;
  • name, designation & basing mode of TMD systems and components;
  • concepts of operations;
  • plans and programs;
  • launchers per battalion for land based TMD;
  • class and type of ship & launchers per ship for sea based TMD;
  • TMD interceptors per launcher;
  • aircraft type & interceptors per aircraft for air based TMD;
  • TMD radar frequency band and potential. It is an elaborate new obstacle course for American TMD. Consider as just one example how this sort of thing could afflict the U.S. Navy. It does not require too vivid an imagination to foresee fishing expeditions for more and more information on the Aegis system which is, in reality, a system of systems whose purposes vastly exceed missile defense. Then, add in commitments to limit ``number and geographic scope,'' not to ``pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another party,'' not to deploy TMD ``for use against each other'' and declarations of interceptors per launcher, launchers per ship, and class and type of ship, and we are right around the corner from naval arms control and restrictions on U.S. Navy surface ship deployments. conclusion Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is as brief as my presentation has been long. Today, it is imperative that the U.S. proceed apace with NMD-- deployment of the near term system and research, development and testing of follow on systems. These actions are blocked by the 1972 ABM Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in accordance with Article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we need in accordance with Article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate. Senator Hagel. Mr. Smith, thank you. Mr. Joseph. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE ABM TREATY'S STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION; DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR COUNTER PROLIFERATION RESEARCH, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC Ambassador Joseph. Senator, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure and an honor to be here. It is necessary at the outset for me to say that the views that I will express are entirely personal. They are not the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the U.S. Government. I have submitted a statement that addresses three highly dubious propositions or myths that are frequently asserted in the context of supporting the ABM Treaty and maintaining that treaty with either no change or minimal change. You touched in your opening statement on all three of these, a statement that I, like the previous two witnesses, would like to associate myself with. The three propositions that I will, with your permission, summarize in my opening comments are, first, any attempt to alter or to withdraw from the treaty will lead to the end of offensive nuclear reductions and in fact the overall deterioration in the U.S./Russian strategic relationship. Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still years distant, and if it does emerge, it will consist of very few unsophisticated weapons. And third, the ABM Treaty does not impede the current development of a national missile defense and will require only slight changes to permit the deployment of a limited but nevertheless effective national missile defense. In assessing the first proposition, I think looking back can be very instructive. Following the Gulf War and the attempted coup in the then Soviet Union, as Mr. Hadley points out, the Bush administration put forth both a national missile defense deployment plan, as well as an arms control initiative to support that deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue state armed with long-range missiles able to strike the United States, and an accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from a breakaway military commander. To deal with this threat, the United States declared its intention to deploy GPALS, or global protection against limited strikes. For the near term, this architecture consisted of up to six fixed land-based sites with up to 1,200 interceptors, a very robust space-based sensor capability, as well as robust theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as the threat evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key capability. On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992, the United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty that were consistent with this architecture. These changes included the elimination of all restrictions on testing and development, the elimination of all restrictions on sensors, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of systems and components in order to allow cooperative relationships, including with Russia, and finally, the right to deploy additional land-based interceptors at additional sites. These positions were presented to the Russians in a nonconfrontational and straightforward way. The Russians were told that we could work together on defenses, but that with or without them, the United States must protect itself from the emerging threat. If modifications to the treaty could be agreed, it could be retained. If not, the United States would need to consider withdrawal, legally and in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. We also made clear to the Russians at that time that the level of defenses that were to be deployed by the United States with or without the ABM Treaty, would not threaten the offensive capability of the Russian force at START levels or even well below those levels. At the same time, the U.S. team stressed that with the end of the cold war, the United States and Russia should base their new relationship on common interests and on cooperation and not on the cold war suspicions and distrust that was the foundation for the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. I think the Russian reaction was very telling. They did not threaten and they did not posture. They did not say yes, they did not say no. They mostly asked questions to explore our position. Most important and I think relevant to keep in mind in terms of today's discussions, while the United States was insisting on fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty, the Russian START negotiators in the very next room in the very same building in Geneva were concluding the long sought after START agreements that provided for the first time for fundamental reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the ABM Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to offensive reductions was evident in the signing of both START I and START II in quick succession. Nevertheless, in 1993, the new administration reversed course on national missile defenses and the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty. NMD programs, as you know, were downgraded in priority and funding was significantly reduced, and the treaty was proclaimed to be the cornerstone of strategic stability. For years this policy position has prevailed, often justified by the assertion that we must choose between offensive reductions and even limited defenses. And in particular, we are told that this approach is necessary to save START II, a treaty that Moscow has held hostage so many times over so many years for so many different purposes that few now believe it will ever be ratified, or if it is to be ratified, that it will have much significance. Yet, irrespective of START II, how Russia will react to the deployment of national missile defenses by the United States does remain an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian officials have predicted dire consequences if the United States insists on amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from that treaty. Such assertions I believe lack supporting evidence and ignore Russia's own approach to arms control and its own security policies. Similar predictions were voiced in the context, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out, of NATO enlargement. One could give any number of other examples such as air strikes on Iraq and some of the talk over Kosovo. Yet, in all of these cases, Russia has acted on the basis of its interests, not on the basis of its press statements. The same is true regarding arms control experience, where the most recent example of Russia pursuing its own interests in the context of changing strategic realties is also the most instructive. When the breakup of the Soviet Union led Russia to conclude that the legal limits on deployed forces in its flank regions, as established under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, or CFE Treaty, were no longer in its interest, Russia's approach was very straightforward: It insisted that the treaty be changed. And the United States, as well as the other parties to that treaty, accommodated the Russian demands in the Flank Agreement. Since then, Russia has again insisted on additional modifications to the CFE Treaty and the other parties are certainly going to go along. The principle I think is very clear. Russia assesses arms control agreements in the context of its defense requirements. When security conditions change, it acts with determination to change those treaties. For us, the parallel to the ABM Treaty is evident and the principle I believe ought to be the same. Today the United States faces a long-range ballistic missile threat that was not envisioned when the ABM Treaty was negotiated. Although Moscow will certainly seek to delay and minimize changes to the treaty and will seek a high price for accommodation, it will understand the U.S. need to defend against this new threat. And, as we have done with Russian demands in the CFE context, it will accommodate. I believe accommodation is possible because Russian interests and U.S. interests are not mutually exclusive. Even at the lowest levels of offensive forces speculated for Russia in the future, a U.S. missile defense deployed to protect against a limited attack would not undermine its offensive capability. And this is the critical point: If Russia knows that U.S. defenses will not call into question the credibility of their nuclear offensive force, they will have what they believe they need. And in this context, given the choice between a modified ABM Treaty and no treaty, Moscow will almost certainly follow past practice and choose to renegotiate the treaty because that is in its own best interests. Finally, the future of offensive nuclear reductions more generally is less likely to be tied to formalistic arms control negotiations than to the realities of the post-cold war world. The Russians, according to almost all assessments, will be compelled by economics to go to much lower levels of offensive forces, independent of arms control outcomes. I think I can be very brief with regard to the second proposition. As you stated in your opening statement, the Rumsfeld Commission and the launch of the North Korean Taepo Dong missile--this multi-stage, long-range missile--underscore that the threat is here now and that it is likely to become ever more sophisticated. The national intelligence estimate that concluded that we would have warning and that we would likely not face a long-range ballistic threat for 15 years has been widely repudiated. That we are near consensus on the missile threat is reflected in the Senate's recent overwhelming passage of the National Missile Defense Act. The third proposition that the ABM Treaty does not impede the development of U.S. defense capabilities and that deployment of defenses will require only modest changes to the treaty is in my view more akin to a self-limiting, self- fulfilling, self-deluding proposition than an objective assessment of U.S. missile defense requirements in light of the threat that we face. It is very difficult for me to conclude that, absent the treaty, the United States would be considering the contrived ground-based architectures being contemplated as primary candidates. If the treaty did not exist, we would most surely be aggressively exploring sea and space-based options that offer much greater potential in terms of cost effectiveness and flexibility for expanding our defense capabilities as the threat expands. This is not being done because our programs must be compliant with the treaty. Moving from development to deployment, one must also question the proposition that even very limited defenses could be fielded with only modest changes to the implementing provisions of the treaty. The words of article I are very clear and, if one applies plain and ordinary definitions, the language makes evident the need to confront the basic contradiction between today's imperative to deploy defenses, to protect our population against ballistic missile attack from rogue states, and the underlying strategic rationale of the treaty. Designed in the bipolar context of the cold war confrontation with the then Soviet Union, the express objective of the treaty was to severely limit defenses so as to preserve the credibility of strategic offensive forces. Few would advance this same deterrent concept today for states such as North Korea or Iran. Yet, the treaty does not provide an exception for defense against these threats. This leads to two final observations. The first is on timing. Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM Treaty without change, any negotiation, if that is the option we pursue, can be expected to be long and difficult. Yet, if the United States acts with determination and avoids mixed signals, such negotiations could be in my view successful, but only if we have both, as you say, Senator, a clear deployment objective and the perceived resolve to move forward, even if that requires withdrawal from the treaty under the supreme national interest clause of the treaty. In light of the pace of missile programs in countries such as North Korea and Iran, we simply do not have the luxury to devote years to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. The second observation is that in attempting to resolve treaty issues to permit limited defenses, we need to ensure flexibility for the future to counter missile threats as they continue to evolve, taking full advantage of new technologies. Narrow treaty relief to allow for fixed ground-based interceptors to protect against a very small and crude threat in the near term must not be purchased at the price of fixing in concrete a future that does not permit us to adapt our defenses to meet the threat as it evolves. For example, we must not compromise now on a defense against a small handful of missiles from North Korea but leave ourselves totally defenseless when they add one or two missiles more. Senator, in conclusion, let me say that my personal view is that the best option is to exercise our right under the treaty for withdrawal. I have two primary reasons for this. First--and I have touched on this--the treaty is currently inhibiting us from exploring sea and space-based approaches that in my view offer the greatest potential in terms of cost effectiveness and flexibility for the future. There is a high risk that even under a modified treaty, we will foreclose options that build on new technologies that will be essential to counter the threat as it develops. And second, I believe we should discourage the proposition that mutual assured destruction forms a solid basis for our strategic relationship with Russia. The ABM Treaty in my view has a very corrosive effect on how we see each other. It is a treaty that is unhealthy for both the United States and for Russia. We simply should not maintain this cold war artifact at the center of our relations. I believe we can address our differences with Russia and reconcile those differences outside of the ABM Treaty. That said, I believe that the option to renegotiate the treaty and change it fundamentally, as we attempted to do in 1992, is a viable option and is, in fact, the most likely option that we will pursue. As I said in my comment earlier and as you have said in yours, we must, if we pursue this approach, be serious and be perceived as serious. In order to do so, we must have a real deployment program and the willingness to leave the treaty if in fact that is necessary. Senator, thank you very much. That concludes my comments. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert G. Joseph Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is an honor to be able to present my views on the ABM Treaty and, specifically, on the central Treaty-related issues that surround the debate over the deployment of a national missile defense. It is necessary to emphasize at the outset that the views expressed in this statement are entirely personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any agency of the U.S. Government. My statement addresses three highly dubious propositions that are frequently asserted in support of maintaining the ABM Treaty either without change or with only minor modifications. These are: First, any attempt to alter or withdraw from the Treaty, although consistent with our legal rights, will lead to the end of offensive nuclear reductions and to an overall deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still years distant and that, if it does emerge, it will consist of very few unsophisticated weapons. And, third, the ABM Treaty does not impede current development programs and will require only slight changes to permit deployment of limited but effective national missile defenses. Experience and evidence stand in stark contrast to all three of these propositions. In assessing the first proposition, looking back can be very instructive. Following the Gulf War and the attempted coup in the then Soviet Union, the Bush national security team put forth both a deployment plan and an arms control initiative to support this deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue state armed with a small number of ballistic missiles able to strike American cities, and an accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from a breakaway military commander. To deal with this limited threat, the United States declared the intention to deploy GPALS--Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. For the near term, this architecture consisted of up to six ground- based sites with up to 1200 interceptors, a space-based sensor capability, and robust theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as the threat evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key capability. On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992, the United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty consistent with the GPALS concept. These included: First, the elimination of restrictions on the development and testing of ABM systems. These restrictions both directly and indirectly had impeded our ability to field effective strategic and theater defenses, just as they do today. Second, the elimination of restrictions on sensors. Disagreements in this area had for years dominated the contentious compliance debate. Moreover, it was recognized that no missile defense architecture that would permit even a limited territorial defense could be deployed without Treaty relief on sensors. This also remains the case today. Third, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems and components to permit cooperative relationships on missile defenses with other countries, including Russia. And Fourth, the right to deploy additional ABM interceptor missiles at additional ABM deployment sites. In Washington, Moscow and Geneva, American representatives presented these positions to the Russians, stating that the emerging threat of long-range missiles compelled changes to the ABM Treaty. In a non-confrontational but straightforward way, the Russians were also told that we could work together on defenses but that, with or without them, the United States must protect itself from limited attacks. If modifications to the Treaty could be agreed, it could be retained. If not--and the implication was direct--the United States would need to consider withdrawal, legally in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. American representatives also made clear that the level of defenses to be deployed by the United States, with or without the ABM Treaty, would not threaten the offensive capability of the Russian force at START levels or even well below those levels. At the same time, the U.S. team also stressed that, with the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia should base their new relationship on common interests and cooperation, and not on the distrust that was the foundation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction that had defined relations as Cold War enemies. The Russian reaction was telling. They did not threaten or posture. They did not say yes or no; they mostly listened and asked questions to explore the U.S. proposals. Indeed, in a speech to the United Nations in January 1992, President Yeltsin had called for the joint development of a ``Global Protection System'' to defend against ballistic missile attack. Most important, and relevant to keep in mind in today's discussions, while the United States was insisting on basic changes to the ABM Treaty, the Russian START negotiators were concluding the long sought START agreement providing, for the first time, for substantial reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the ABM Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to offensive reductions was evident in the signing of both START I and START II in quick succession. Nonetheless, in 1993, in one of its most substantial departures from the Bush Administration security policy, the new Administration reversed course on national missile defense and the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty. National missile defense programs were downgraded in priority and funding was significantly reduced. For years this policy position has prevailed, often justified by the assertion that we must choose between offensive reductions and even limited defenses. Most recently, in the context of the Senate's consideration of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, the Administration reaffirmed at the highest level that the United States has not made a decision to deploy and continues to uphold the 1972 ABM Treaty as the ``cornerstone of strategic stability.'' This approach, we are told, is necessary to save START II--a Treaty that Moscow has held hostage so many times to so many different objectives over so many years that few now believe it will ever be ratified by the Duma or, if it is ratified, that it will have much significance. Yet, irrespective of the fate of START II, how Russia will react to the deployment of national missile defenses by the United States remains an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian officials have predicted dire consequences if the United States insists on amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from the Treaty. Such assertions lack supporting evidence and ignore Russia's own approach to arms control and its own security policies. Similar predictions were voiced in the contexts of NATO enlargement and air strikes on Iraq. Yet, in both of these examples, Russia acted on the basis of its interests, not its press statements. Russia's actions spoke louder than its words. The same is true regarding arms control experience. When NATO decided to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s, while simultaneously negotiating for the elimination of this entire class of nuclear weapon, the Soviet Union made stark threats to test the Alliance's resolve. Moscow promised to walk out of the negotiations when the first NATO missiles were fielded, and did so in November 1983. But when it became clear that the determination of the Allies would not be shaken, the Soviet negotiators returned to the table and the result was a total ban on these weapons. The most recent arms control example of Russia pursuing its own interests in the context of changing strategic realities is also perhaps the most instructive. When the breakup of the Soviet Union led Russia to conclude that the legal limits on deployed forces in its flank regions--as established in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty--were no longer in its interest, its approach was straightforward: it insisted that the Treaty be changed. The United States and the other parties accommodated the Russian demand in the Flank Agreement. Since then, Russia has again insisted on additional modifications to the CFE Treaty. That the other parties will again go along is apparent in the recent Washington NATO Summit Communique that reads: ``The CFE Treaty is the cornerstone of European security. We reaffirm our commitment to the successful adaptation of the Treaty reflecting the new security environment . . .''. The principle is clear. Russia assesses the value of arms control agreements in the context of its defense requirements. When the security conditions change for Russia, it acts with determination to change the treaties. For us, the parallel to the ABM Treaty is evident and the principle should be the same. Today the United States faces a long-range ballistic missile threat that was not envisioned when the ABM Treaty was negotiated. Although Moscow will certainly seek to delay and minimize any changes to the Treaty, and as always will seek a high price for accommodation, it will understand the U.S. need to defend against this new threat and, as we have done with Russian demands in the CFE context, it will accommodate. Accommodation is possible because Russian interests and U.S. interests are not mutually exclusive. Even at the lowest levels of offensive nuclear forces speculated for Russia in the future, a U.S. missile defense deployed to protect against a limited attack would not undermine its offensive capability. And this is the critical point: at the end of the day, if Russia knows that U.S. defenses will not call into question the credibility of their nuclear offensive force, they will have what they believe they need. In this context, given the choice between a modified ABM Treaty and no Treaty, Moscow will almost certainly follow past practice and choose to renegotiate the Treaty consistent with its own best interests. Finally, the future of offensive nuclear reductions is less likely to be tied to formalistic arms control negotiations than to the realities of post-Cold War world. The Russians, according to almost all assessments, will be compelled by economics to go to much lower levels of offensive forces, independent of arms control outcomes. If this forecast is accurate and Russia does go to lower numbers, perhaps even well below those being discussed for START III, the United States could make appropriate adjustments in our own posture--a posture that must be structured to meet our global interests, which are much different from those of Russia. With regard to the second proposition--that the rogue state missile threat to the United States is still years away--the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission and the North Korean launch last August of the multi-stage, long-range Taepo Dong missile underscore that the threat is here now and will become increasingly sophisticated. There is an apparent consensus within the defense community that the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons represents a major security challenge to the United States. We are also near consensus on the missile threat, as reflected in the Senate's overwhelming passage of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. The National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that we would have warning and that we likely would not face a long-range missile threat for fifteen years has been widely repudiated. Here, two points should be made. First, in the area of proliferation shocks and surprises, we have a long record of intelligence failures. From Sputnik and missiles in Cuba to the recent Taepo Dong launch, there is every reason to believe that we will be surprised in the future about the size, scope and speed of adversaries' missile programs. The same applies to their programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Second, it seems to me that the North Korean launch settles the debate. We now have a desperate, totalitarian regime, that could we are told have a couple nuclear bombs, in the possession of long range missiles. The third proposition--that the ABM Treaty does not impede the development of U.S. defense capabilities and that deployment of defenses will require only modest changes to the Treaty--is more akin to a self-limiting, self-fulfilling proposition than an objective assessment of U.S. missile defense requirements in light of the threat we face. One can argue technically that the fixed, ground-based national missile defense architectures being contemplated can be developed consistent with the Treaty. Yet, it is very difficult to conclude that, absent the Treaty, the United States would be considering these architectures as the primary candidates. If the Treaty did not exist, we would likely be aggressively exploring sea- and space-based options that offer much greater potential in terms of cost effectiveness and flexibility for expanding our defenses as the threat expands. This is not being done because our programs must be compliant with the Treaty. Moving from development to deployment, one must also question the proposition that even very limited defenses could be fielded with only modest changes to the implementing provisions of the Treaty. Article One embodies the purpose of the Treaty by committing each party ``not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense.'' Coupled with the 1974 Protocol that reduces the number of permitted sites from two to one, Article One limits a compliant defense to the sole purpose of protecting the former ICBM field near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The words of Article One and their meaning are very clear and, if one applies plain and ordinary definitions, the language makes evident the need to confront the contradiction between today's imperative to defend our population against ballistic missile attacks from rogue nations and the underlying strategic rationale of the Treaty. Designed in the bipolar context of the Cold War confrontation with the then Soviet Union, the express objective of the Treaty was to severely restrict defenses so as to preserve the credibility of offensive deterrent forces. Few would advance this same deterrent concept today for states such as North Korea or Iran. Yet, the Treaty does not provide an exception for what is often referred to as a light territorial defense against these and other ballistic missile threats. This leads to two further observations. The first is on timing. Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM Treaty without change, and given their fears that any U.S. deployment program will provide the base for a robust national missile defense that could threaten the viability of their nuclear arsenal, any negotiation can be expected to be long and difficult. Yet, if the United States acts with determination and avoids mixed signals, such negotiations could be successful if we have both a clear deployment objective and the perceived resolve to move forward to meet the threat from rogue states, even if that requires withdrawal from the Treaty under the supreme interest clause. In light of the pace of missile programs in countries such as North Korea and Iran, there simply is not time to devote years to the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty. The second observation is that in attempting to resolve Treaty issues to permit limited defenses, we need to ensure flexibility for the future to counter missile threats as they continue to evolve, taking full advantage of developments in technology. Narrow Treaty relief to allow for fixed ground-based interceptors to protect against a very small and crude missile threat in the near term must not be purchased at the price of fixing in concrete a future that does not permit us to adapt our defenses to meet the threat as it evolves. For example, we must not compromise now on a defense against a small handful of missiles from North Korea but leave ourselves totally defenseless when they add one or two more. In conclusion, I will end by describing three alternative futures for the ABM Treaty. The first, advocated by Russia and China, would have the United States abide by the Treaty without change. At the core of this approach--although often disguised by such noble sounding phrases as ``the cornerstone of strategic stability'' or ``the cornerstone of world stability''--is the perpetuation of the Cold War concept of mutual assured destruction that bases national security policy on the vulnerability of our society to nuclear destruction. That the United States would remain vulnerable to the rogue nation missile threat is either discounted or prized. For Russia, the status quo best protects the nuclear force that it increasingly relies on in both defense planning and declaratory policy. Moscow gives little indication of concern about U.S. vulnerability to rogue state attacks, such as from North Korea. For China, the ABM Treaty is considered critical to its national interest because, without U.S. defenses, Beijing can credibly threaten the United States with unacceptable destruction of our cities. While not a party to the Treaty, China certainly sees itself as an interested beneficiary, especially in the context of its designs on Taiwan. The second ABM Treaty future rejects the three propositions assessed in this statement and calls for the United States to withdraw from the Treaty consistent with our legal rights. Here, the clear imperative is to deploy an effective national missile defense against the rogue threat in a manner that permits our defenses to evolve as the threat evolves. Under this approach, the ABM Treaty is acknowledged to be strategically obsolete and counterproductive to long-term relations with Russia. Differences with Russia--and specifically assurances to Moscow that U.S. missile defense deployments would not undermine the Russian offensive force--could be reconciled outside of the Treaty, through informal confidence building measures or perhaps even in a more formal way. The third ABM Treaty future accepts as a national security imperative the need to defend against the rogue threat. It also sees the ABM Treaty as obsolete and counterproductive. Yet, under this approach, there is a willingness to attempt to renegotiate the Treaty if Moscow believes it essential and is willing to accept fundamental changes that permit the United States to pursue defenses that are sufficiently robust and flexible to protect against the threat. If this attempt is unsuccessful, the United States would be forced to withdraw from the Treaty, legally and consistent with our security requirements. This was the approach taken in 1992. It may well provide a way ahead today. Senator Hagel. Mr. Joseph, thank you. Thanks again to each of the three of you. I would like to take each of you through a series of questions, realizing that there is a significant technical aspect to all of this which the three of you are far more prepared to deal with than I am, but seeing if I can keep this in the jargon that most of us understand. But nonetheless, all three of you have touched on important dynamics of the ABM Treaty as we currently understand it and interpret it. And I want to match that up a little bit in a series of questions with what you all have laid out as to where you think we need to go, how you suggest we get there, and what the consequences are for not dealing with this, especially as we have to deal with the reality of this over the next 18 months. So, with that, I will suggest some questions, and take as much latitude as you wish in embroidering around the question as well. If there are some things that you want to add, please feel free to do so. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you? We have heard from both Ambassador Smith and Ambassador Joseph this morning some references to the Rumsfeld Commission, which all three of you are thoroughly familiar with. I would like to begin by asking each of you whether you believe that the timeframe that the Rumsfeld Commission came up with, the 5-year timeframe, before a serious North Korean or Iranian missile threat would emerge is correct. Are they understating it? I would be interested in getting your evaluation of that dynamic of the Rumsfeld report. Mr. Hadley. I have not gone into the intelligence behind that report. I have read the report, talked to some of the people who participated in it. All I can say without that kind of technical review is it sounds right to me. I spent some time looking at the 1995 CIA estimate which seemed to me really did not hold up particularly well, and I think that the Rumsfeld Commission has really done a remarkable service by what it has done. And I would point out that my understanding is that the CIA analysts really are pretty much in accord with where the Rumsfeld Commission comes out. I have talked to those analysts and heard briefings from them. I have concluded that Rumsfeld had it about right. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Smith. Ambassador Smith. Well, Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of serving as a consultant and reviewer of the Rumsfeld Commission report, and I think I can assure you that they are basically correct. Obviously what they are saying is, to a certain extent, things cannot be predicted. So whether it is 4 years or it is 6 years, or maybe it is wrong in one case it is 10, but in another case it could be 3, they have got it just about right. And our official intelligence community has gotten it wrong pretty consistently. Let me just give you a few examples. Look how quickly North Korea went from a No Dong to a Taepo Dong with not two stages, with not liquid fuel, but a three-stage Taepo Dong with a solid fuel stage. That is an important advance in a couple of years. Just 2 years ago, the intelligence community told us that the Iranians were a long way away from the Shahab 3. Not 9 months later, the Director of Central Intelligence was here in the Senate testifying that actually they had been wrong, and now we are looking at a Shahab 4 and a Shahab 5. I would also point out that the Indians and the Pakistanis went very quickly from their first missiles to their second missiles and we saw I think just last month both tests of the Indian Agni and the Pakistani Ghauri. It seems to me that 5 years is about right. And remember what they said. It is 5 years from the time a country makes that decision. They did not say there was going to be an onslaught in 5 years from today. They said that given technology transfer, given that these countries do not have to reinvent the wheel, given that they can beg, borrow, and steal technology in bits and pieces all over the world, if and when a country makes a decision, it would take it about 5 years. And there are plenty of countries doing just that, Mr. Chairman. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph. Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I do not know what I can add. Let me say that I, like many other people, was very impressed with the individuals that formed the Rumsfeld Commission--very competent, very experienced individuals with a wide variety of views. They had access to a great deal of intelligence, and I think the findings--in this case, the findings in terms of the 5 years--does reflect the best assessment that can be made. I would point out that, in that finding, the report says we may not know when that 5-year clock begins. We may not have indicators and warning. So, it is not necessarily 5 years from now or 5 years from a time in the future in which a decision is made by a State to acquire this capability. We may be well along that path already. And I would also emphasize what Ambassador Smith just said about the history of being surprised, of intelligence failures, as some would call them. We have often been surprised by the speed and the scope of adversaries' missile programs, as well as their nuclear, biological, and chemical programs. One can go back to Sputnik or to missiles in Cuba. The Taepo Dong and the Iranian program are just more recent examples. In terms of nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, we were surprised with the Indian test last year. We were also shocked at the scope and size of the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons program. This uncertainty is something that we need to take into account in terms of our own sense of timing for moving forward. I believe it is urgent that we move forward with the national missile defense, and that is supported by this history of surprises. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Let me ask each of you. You all touched on this in some way. The ship-based threat, the sea-based threat. Recently we became aware of the fact that the Iranians towed a barge out in the middle of the Caspian Sea and on that barge was a Scud missile, and they test fired a Scud off the barge. What our intelligence shows is that the result of that test was rather accurate where they placed the missile. In response to the three of your analyses of what not only our limitations are presently under the ABM Treaty constraints, but more importantly, as we are looking out into the future, how do we prepare ourselves--and can we--to deal with this kind of a threat? Obviously, the Iranians, a terrorist group, anyone can get a hold of a cargo ship and put a Scud type of missile in the hold and run it around out in the bay somewhere and get it close to our shore where we have very little time to respond and fire it. What is your response to that specific threat, Mr. Secretary? Mr. Hadley. Mr. Chairman, I have not gone through or reviewed military analysis or technical analysis about how you deal with that threat, but let me give you a couple suggestions. I think one of the things that is unfortunate about this debate about ballistic missile defense is that in some sense the partisans of ballistic missile defense have had to focus all their efforts on this one instrument because the resistance to it has been so great. While the critics of ballistic missile defense are prepared to do a lot of things to deal with weapons of mass destruction--almost anything but ballistic missile defense. I think we have got to try and bridge that gap and recognize that ballistic missile defense is an active element, but only one element of what has to be a broader strategy. In my testimony and elsewhere, you can find a long list of the things we need to do to deal with the challenge of weapons of mass destruction. And I think the Iranian case is an example of that. We may have a role for active ballistic missile defense in that case, but it is also a situation where we are going to need good intelligence about what kinds of ships are approaching our shores and what they contain. We are going to need capability based on that intelligence to preempt, if necessary, and take out some of those threats. So, I think what we need to do is look for a comprehensive strategy which has a variety of elements, and of course, in those instances where appropriate, ballistic missile defense will be one. But that is why I mentioned this need for a really comprehensive approach to the weapons of mass destruction threat. We have got a lot of tools in our arsenal. It is a serious threat and we have got to use them all. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Smith. Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, let me try and respond to that. First of all, with regard to the possibility, the likelihood of this, I think we should not scare ourselves to the point where we think we are going to be overwhelmed with this tomorrow. But the fact is there are countries working on this, as we have just stated. They are making breakthroughs and I think we should expect this. They know what kind of defenses we are thinking about. They clearly go and look for something else, for the same reason people built submarines years ago. You noted the Iranian barge incident. There are some other things in the Rumsfeld report. I would just note a couple things that I think are common knowledge. One, the Israelis launch the targets for their Arrow missile from a barge at sea. It is clearly done and that is a fairly accurate trajectory that they are following. Two, the Boeing Corporation has just launched a Ukrainian booster from something called Sea Launch quite successfully for commercial purposes. The technology is basically there. The problem that used to lead people to say it cannot be done is a problem basically of navigation. It was the challenge that our SLBM program had to face at the outset. To know where you are going, you need to know where you are. That is why it makes it very hard to launch a missile at sea. Well, guess what? If you have GPS or you have GLONASS or you have both--and these countries do--you can go to any sport shop and buy a GPS device for $1,000, $2,000. If you are willing to spend a little more, you get a real sophisticated one. The missile knows where it is, sir. The other problem is the roll and yaw of a ship. As you launch something, obviously the ship is on the sea. It is not a completely stable platform. But once again, if you know where you are, the missile can correct for its position. And remember there is a big difference with these kind of countries. They are not going for high accuracy, hard target kill the way the United States and the Soviet Union were. What if they are 5 miles off? What we are talking about is a missile on some kind of a ship, 500 miles at sea in the Atlantic Ocean. They are aiming for Charleston, South Carolina, sir, and if the roll and yaw gets it at the wrong moment, they hit Hanahan instead of Charleston. They still achieve their objective. So, it is very possible and we need to think about that. Now, what do you do? I have to underscore what Mr. Hadley suggested. We need a comprehensive program. We need better intelligence. We need to double nonproliferation efforts. We need to think about interdiction or preemption, and we need to think about defense. Now, when you think about defense, the fact is that if the ships can be out there, you can track them. And the Coast Guard, by the way, has a very interesting program that has just been reinvigorated to keep track of significant ships out there for various reasons. But the fact is ships move. That is why countries want them. Well, you cannot fix that with a fixed, land-based system in Grand Forks, North Dakota or in the middle of Alaska. If it is 500 miles off the coast of South Carolina and it launches at Charleston, believe you me, you will not get a missile that is leaving North Dakota there in time. The fact is if we are worried about this--and I think we should be--we need to start looking at space-based defenses. That is the answer, Mr. Chairman. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph. Ambassador Joseph. Senator, just very briefly. There are, as you point out, many different avenues for missile attack, both ballistic and cruise. All are technologically challenging. Some, in fact, may be countered only by future capabilities such as boost-phase interceptors or the space-based interceptors, as Ambassador Smith just said. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The intercept of a missile carrying a biological warhead, for example, is obviously risky for many reasons. If that intercept is not done during the missile's boost phase, the intercept occurs over a friendly nation, fallout, casualties. Does, in your opinion, the current administration proposal for intercept deal with this, deal with it in a way that addresses this possibility, calling for a boost phase, for example, of the intercept capability in the three-tier C-1, C-2, C-3? Would you each comment on that? Mr. Hadley. I am not aware that the C-1, C-2, or C-3 architecture for national missile defense has any boost phase capability to it. My colleagues can correct me on that. That is obviously for a lot of reasons the intercept moment of choice. I think one of the things that we should do from a deterrence standpoint is to be working on and try and demonstrate that kind of capability for deterrence purposes. I am not fully briefed in the airborne laser program. That is one which would provide that capability, and there an advantage to moving it along even if it is fairly primitive and demonstrating it because it makes it clear to countries of concern that we are working that problem much the same way that we dumped an MX missile out the back of a 747 in the 1980's simply to show there were technical fixes out there available to us for MX vulnerability so that countries that did not wish us well had to take them into account. I think that is the kind of thing we need to be doing--the kind of robust research and development program we need to support national missile defense, and that is one of the reasons all three of us have argued that part of the ABM Treaty relief we need is to get out from under the restrictions on research and development. Senator Hagel. Would you like to add anything? Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I agree with Mr. Hadley. The current administration, the 3 + 3 or what I guess has now become 3 + 5--we are not talking about boost phase. We are talking about fixed, ground-based interceptors in the United States. Obviously, the people engineering that system are trying to build it such that the interceptor can get to something high enough, fast enough so that they can vaporize that kind of warhead. Depending on the distance they have to travel and the angle of attack, that could be problematic or not. They are working the problem as best they can with that stricture. If you want to be sure about it, you are quite correct. You need to go to boost phase. The United States does not now have any programs--does not now have any programs--for strategic defense in boost phase. We have an airborne laser program, but I need to underscore airborne laser is theater missile defense. The ABC concept of operation does not permit that to be in the right time and the right place to carry out a strategic mission. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph. Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I would add that I have had a number of discussions with Israeli colleagues. Israel as a nation is very concerned about the problem, the threat that you just raised. The Israeli approach is a comprehensive approach. It is an approach that emphasizes active defenses against ballistic missiles. It emphasizes a whole range of passive defense capabilities to protect not only forces, but the population should active defense fail. And it emphasizes counter force capabilities and options in that category. That sort of comprehensive approach is the type that I believe we should be looking at. Senator Hagel. Thank you. As the three of you look at the administration's concept for national missile defense, as you understand it, what are your concerns about the elements of that concept that might make the time table slip even more than what we have discussed this morning? You all three have identified some of those areas. But if you would like to add to that part of your testimony, the committee would be interested in hearing anything further on this. Mr. Hadley. I do not have anything to add. Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, the only thing at this point, having stretched out from 3 + 3 to 3 + 5, I think the program manager probably has the latitude that he needed. It is a high risk program. Obviously something could go wrong. But frankly the biggest risk to our NMD program right now is it gets delayed for political reasons, not technical reasons. Ambassador Joseph. I have nothing to add, sir. Senator Hagel. Some have criticized the administration's missile defense concept because they say it seems to concentrate more in keeping within the ABM Treaty, as you have all noted, I have noted, others, rather than focusing on providing the essential effective defense that this debate should be about, the purpose of all this should be about. And setting aside for a moment the question, which we continue to deal with and will, whether the ABM Treaty is legally in force and all the dynamics and consequences of that, would each of you comment on whether you believe that even the limited defense contemplated under the administration's C-1 concept would be a violation of article I of the ABM Treaty which bans any defense of the territory or regions of the United States? Mr. Secretary. Mr. Hadley. I think for the reasons that Ambassador Smith laid out, I would associate myself with the statement that even C-1 presents an ABM Treaty problem. Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador Smith. Well, I can only repeat what I have said. I think there are arguments one could make, but the fact is we are getting at the object and purpose of the treaty. It seems to me that you are going to have to negotiate something, otherwise it will at least be construed by a lot of significant people in both countries to be a violation of the ABM Treaty, particularly of article I. Ambassador Joseph. Senator, as I said--and I certainly would agree with Ambassador Smith--article I is very clear. It is a very short article. If you use plain and ordinary definitions of terms, then I think the language makes very clear that a national missile defense, even a very limited national missile defense, is not permitted and, in fact, expressly prohibited by article I. Senator Hagel. A follow-on to this question. The administration's C-1 concept--and this again has been touched upon here this morning by each of you--calls for a missile defense site in central Alaska. Would this, again in your opinions, violate the protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as article III? Mr. Secretary. Mr. Hadley. Yes, sir. Ambassador Smith. Unequivocally. Ambassador Joseph. Yes, sir. Senator Hagel. The central Alaskan site that I am referring to being considered now by the administration would rely upon the Shemya X-band radar, with which I think all three of you are very familiar. Is this again legal under the ABM Treaty given the distances involved? Mr. Secretary. Mr. Hadley. I am going to defer to my two colleagues on that issue. They have struggled with that issue much more than I. Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hadley defers for a good reason. That is a very complex question, and it hinges on whether that Shemya radar is an ABM radar. Now, the way it parses out is basically this. The ABM Treaty imagined a world in which there would be one, big, giant radar like we had at Cavalier, North Dakota, and that was an ABM radar. And the treaty specifies where it can be. Now, if it is an early warning radar, it can be out on the periphery of the territory, but if it is an ABM radar, it needs to be in a 150-kilometer radius that contains the launch site. And clearly Shemya to central Alaska is more than 150 kilometers. There is absolutely no doubt about that. The question is, is that X-band radar an ABM radar? Now, it seems to me that if you argue that it is not, you then fall into the quagmire of answering the question, all right, then what is? Is some other early warning radar out there an ABM radar? Is something on board the system an ABM radar? Something has to be an ABM radar or a substitute for an ABM radar. I think the most likely conclusion that people will reach is that the X-band radar that is being built expressly for the purpose of national missile defense at Shemya is the ABM radar, and if that is the ABM radar, it cannot be at Shemya as the ABM Treaty stands today. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph. Ambassador Joseph. I agree with Ambassador Smith. I think article III would have to be addressed and changed in order to permit an ABM radar to be at Shemya. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Smith, I wanted to get back to a point you raised in your testimony, inviting me essentially to followup with you on some additional thoughts you might want to share with the committee on negotiating points. I would like to avail you of that opportunity at the present time, and with your colleagues on either side of you, as they listen to your insightful commentary on this, if they would like to add anything, we would welcome their thoughts as well. Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I suggested that what we need to do before we run off and talk to the Russians is consider exactly what we need and go and try and get no more or no less than that. As I look at what we are going to do over the next few years, over what we should do over the next few years, on the one hand, you do not want to err on the side of caution and go and ask for less than you need. That is ridiculous because you are back in the same situation--you have jumped from the pot to the frying pan. On the other hand, if this is a negotiation, there is no point of overplaying your hand and seeking things that you really do not need for maybe another 10, 15 years. The way I parse it out is this. First of all, we are moving along on the fixed, ground-based system. If we could go back a few years and I could do it differently, I might not do it that way. But the fact is that is where we are. I think it would be a real shame to derail that system. We have got to get in the business of missile defense. It will give us a minimal capability. It will get us into the production business. It will get us into the operational side of operational concepts, training, et cetera, et cetera. And most importantly, we will demonstrate to ourselves and the rest of the world that when you deploy a missile defense interceptor, the sun will actually come up the next day, and a lot of these bugaboos will go away. So, I think we need to do that. Can we get by with one site? No, sir, we cannot. I think we need to start thinking about multiple sites. It seems to me that the option would be three or six. When we were talking about a ground-based component of the GPALS architecture, we were talking about six, but there was a sort of GPALS light for three sites. When you think about it, it makes sense. You put something in Alaska, something in the north central United States, and something in New England. If someone is going to launch a missile at the United States from, let us say, Iran or from Libya, the great circle route from that part of the Middle East really brings you to Boston. That is the logical target. So, if you are worried about that, not just North Korea, logically you are somewhere in Maine. So, you need to get multiple sites. So, that would be my first point. We need to get multiple sites. Second, we need to get sensors go free for several reasons. One, that is what glues the whole system together. Two, you just touched upon it with the Shemya radar. Sensors are a source of never-ending argument. I do not know what an ABM radar is, Mr. Chairman. We do not really know what 1972 terms mean anymore as we hit the new millennium. What is an ABM radar? What if we can make something on the interceptor itself to do the whole job? Is that an ABM radar? We are just going to go on and on. We are going to have endless compliance problems, not just for ourselves, but look at the compliance problems we have had with the Russians. Sensors go free is the way we not only can go forward now but we can start laying the groundwork for what we are going to need to do in another decade. We need to get out of the business of limitations on sensors. The third thing we need to do you raised with the idea of the ship-borne missiles. If we need to have follow-ons--and I cannot imagine a situation in human defense for 10,000 years in which there has not been a follow-on to something--then we need to start looking at things like space and sea based NMD. We do not even know if we can do those things yet. We have not even got a proof of concept. We do not need to deploy them. We do not need deployment rights for that. We do need development and testing to go free. Those would be my three basic elements. I would go for multiple sites, sensors go free, and development and testing go free. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Secretary. Mr. Hadley. I would agree with that. I would put two cautions down, and they are political cautions actually. The first explains why I mentioned in my testimony that we need to put ballistic missile defense in the context of a global effort against weapons of mass destruction in which we would invite our friends and allies and even countries like Russia and maybe even China to participate. It is not just an issue of the ABM Treaty. There is a political aspect that even our allies are concerned about, and that is whether a national missile defense is a vehicle for one of two things, both of which give even our friends pause. One is a sort of fortress America--that we can withdraw behind a national missile defense and be safe from all the threats that some of our friends and allies have to face. Or two is it in some sense a protection that is going to allow us to deploy forces anywhere, anytime. I think one of the consequences of Kosovo is going to be some real questions about what the United States is doing in the world. I think if we are going to move forward on national missile defense in a way that is not going to be disruptive of relations not just with Russia but also with some of our friends and allies, we have to put it in the broader context of a global effort against weapons of mass destruction. Second, I think we have got to make sure that we'd not let the best be the enemy of the good. If we were going to throw out the ABM Treaty, we would probably have a different NMD architecture. But the architecture of national missile defense has been changed too many times. We need to stabilize an architecture, get something deployed and get in the business, as Dave Smith said, of defending the country. So, I would urge us to have a political context as we go forward, ask for what we need in ABM Treaty relief, but not let the best be the enemy of the good because the objective here has to be to get into the business of defending the country. We are already late. That is the message of the Rumsfeld Commission. We have got threats and no capability to deal with them. We are already late. If we start changing baseline architectures and the like, we are going to be even later. We have got a defenses gap not a missile gap, and we do not want to make that gap any bigger. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph. Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I think that if we do choose to renegotiate the ABM Treaty, then the experience of 1992 provides a very good model. In fact, the components that Ambassador Smith has just mentioned were the very components of our negotiating position back then. These included: Elimination of all restrictions on sensors. Very straightforward and very simple. Elimination of all restrictions on development and testing. Again, very straightforward and very simple. This would allow for flexibility for the future whether it be space-based approaches or sea-based approaches or any other approach, including mobile land-based. Elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems and components to allow for the type of cooperative relationships that underly Mr. Hadley's last point on the context in which we conduct these negotiations and move forward with defenses. This is particularly the case given the concerns of our allies, which, in fact, may pose obstacles equal to those are that posed by Russia. And finally, relief on the number of fixed land-based sites and interceptors that are permitted. Our position then was six sites, and up to 1,200 interceptors. I think in fact we do know the basic components of what our negotiating position should be and we do not need to take a whole lot of time doing the inevitable. In my experience it is inevitable in arms control that we will negotiate among ourselves before we take our position to Russia. This is a luxury that we cannot afford. We need to move forward now and we need to move forward recognizing that whatever agreement we make with Russia must provide flexibility for the future, given that the threat is going to continue to change and become more challenging. We cannot fix now on a compromise that permits us to defend only against the threat of today. We need to look beyond that. Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, you have all been very helpful, and the committee appreciates your individual contributions. I might also add thank you for what you have done for this country over the years, and hopefully at some point you will have renewed opportunities to bring new leadership in this area. Thank you very much. Mr. Lee, welcome. You have been patient. I know that you will probably add on to what some of your colleagues have said, and I know you have some very specific points that you wish to make. On behalf of the committee, thank you very much for coming this morning, and please proceed with your testimony. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. LEE, FORMER ANALYST FOR THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ADJUNCT FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Lee. Well, thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate the opportunity and I want to thank you personally and all members of the committee for this opportunity. I am going to concentrate on the new evidence, the bottom line of which is the ABM Treaty is not and was not from the beginning a valid contract. Since the publication of my book on this subject a year ago, we have had a lot of additional evidence that has confirmed the conclusions of that book. The Soviets violated article I prohibiting national ABM defenses by deploying more than 10,000 dual purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile, SAM/ ABM, missiles supported by 17 huge radars on the Soviet periphery. Moreover, Russia is now developing yet another new SAM/ABM. Based on what they had been told by the Secretary of Defense and other senior U.S. officials, the Soviets most likely entered the SALT negotiations expecting two things: they could negotiate a treaty banning national ABM defenses in both superpowers while continuing to develop and deploy their dual purpose SAM/ABM systems; and second, U.S. satellites would not detect the violation. The treaty certainly confirmed such expectations. The key to this whole thing, one of the keys to their whole approach to it, was these large radars, which I can talk to in some detail, but they provide what is called battle management, target tracking data. That mode of operation was dictated by the technology constraints on the Soviet Union at the time and continued through the cold war. With the exception of one late model, the maximum velocities of Soviet ABM missiles were a fraction of that of the targets. Thus an ABM interceptor with a velocity of 2 kilometers a second had to be launched with an ICBM warhead with some 1,200 kilometers from its target. The big radars on the periphery and those at Moscow provided the long-range tracking data so that the ABM's could launch in time. This applied to all Soviet ABM systems, both the legal systems at Moscow that we call a Galosh and ABM-3, as well as to the SAM/ABM's that we call SA-5 and SA-10. The general staff wrote the script for the Soviet treaty negotiators, five of whom belonged to the military-industry cabal that had secured Politburo approval of national ABM defenses by mid-1962. To keep it short, the Soviet Union was in violation of article I of the ABM Treaty when they signed it. They had been in violation at that point 10 years. The new evidence that I submit is now conclusive fills in the intelligence gaps that we had from our national collection systems. The sources for this are very credible. They include the former Premier of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin; General Colonel Vitintsev, who was the former commander of Soviet ABM and space defense forces for 20-odd years; a gentleman named Kisun'ko who was the chief designer of the Moscow system and general designer of ABM systems for the Soviet Union; a number of other very credible sources. The essential part here is that all of these Russian sources agree on three critical issues in the intelligence record. The SA-5 and the SA-10 were designed from the beginning as dual purpose SAM/ABM's from relatively low cost air defense components. The big radars that we call the Hen House and LPAR, the first and second generation respectively, were designed to provide target tracking data to make these systems work. They were not initially designed just as early warning radars. As far as the record from Russian sources is concerned, the early warning function was recognized only later, some years later, after they had designed these for the battle management target tracking function. Furthermore, these sources provide the information, though in less detail than on other things, that by the mid-1970's the Soviet Union had a national ABM and space defense command- control system to make it all work. We ourselves by the early 1970's verified that the dual purpose missiles, the SAM/ABM's had the nuclear warheads they required. Russia is now developing and is about to deploy a major update to this system, their national defenses, called the S- 400. It represents a major improvement in all respects--I can go into details some other time--on the capabilities of the ABM defenses that they inherited from the Soviet Union. I want to say something briefly about the implications of this, that modernizing the Russian national ABM systems with the S-400 will challenge the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially if our arsenal is reduced from the 6,000 warhead level permitted under SALT I to 3,500 under SALT II that the Senate already has ratified. Existing Russian ABM defenses probably nullified the small British and French nuclear deterrents and would be able to exact some significant attrition on our forces. Even before Kosovo, Russia was committed to maintaining its strategic advantage in this respect. They understand very well that the side that has both offenses and defenses has an advantage over the side that only has offenses. It is like we have two boxers, one with one hand tied behind his back. The guy with both hands free has an advantage. In sum, the 1972 ABM Treaty was neither a valid contract nor the cornerstone of strategic stability. Amended by these 1997 protocols, the treaty would be a monument to strategic instability by legalizing major improvements in Russia's ABM defenses while the U.S. and our allies remain totally vulnerable. There simply is no excuse for failing to protect the United States population, our military forces, and our allies in the name of a treaty that never was a valid contract with a State that no longer exists. Now, I can use these graphs here and so forth to illustrate some of these points, if you wish, or I understand you are under considerable time pressure. Do you want to go directly to questions? [The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:] Prepared Statement of William T. Lee Thank you Senator Hagel. I wish to thank you and all Committee members for the opportunity to testify on this issue. My testimony represents the findings of my own research and should not be construed as the position of any organization with which I am associated. Since the publication of my book, ``The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion,'' in May 1997 additional evidence has confirmed the conclusions in my 1997 book: the Soviets violated Article 1 prohibiting national ABM defenses by deploying more than 10,000 dual purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile (SAM/ABM) missiles supported by 17 huge radars on the Soviet periphery. Moreover, Russia is developing yet another SAM/ABM. Based on what they had been told by Secretary of Defense McNamara and other senior U.S. officials, the Soviets most likely entered the SALT negotiations expecting: a) they could negotiate a Treaty banning national ABM defenses in both superpowers while continuing to develop and deploy their SAM/ABM systems; and b) U.S. satellites would not detect the violation. The Treaty certainly was consistent with such expectations by permitting, among other things, deployment of 18 large phased array radars--Hen House and LPAR (Krasnoyarsk type)--that delivered target tracking data to the SAM/ABMs under the guise of providing only early warning of ballistic missile attack. The battle management mode of operation was dictated by technology constraints. With the exception of one late model, the maximum velocities Soviet ABM missiles were a fraction of that of the targets. Thus an ABM interceptor with a velocity of 2 km./sec. had to be launched when an ICBM warhead was some 1,200 km. from its target. The big radars--on the periphery and at Moscow--provided the long range target tracking data so that the ABMs could launch in time. This applied to all Soviet ABM systems--Galosh and ABM-3 as well as to the SAM/ABMs. The General Staff and KGB wrote the script for Soviet Treaty negotiators, five of whom belonged to the military-industrial cabal that had secured Politburo approval of national SAM/ABMs defenses by mid-1962. When the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty banning such defenses in 1972, much of their first generation national SAM/ABM defense system--the SA-5 and Hen House radars--was in place, and construction was about to begin on the first LPARs for the second generation SA-10 SAM/ABM system. The Soviets were in violation of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty when they signed it. In the U.S. national intelligence estimates (NIEs) the issue of whether the Soviets were deploying national SAM/ABM defenses turned primarily on four questions. First, were the SA-5 and SA-10 designed to be only (anti-aircraft) SAMs, or dual purpose SAM/ABMs? Second, were the Hen House and LPAR radars passing only early warning data, or battle management target tracking data as well? Third, was there a central ABM command authority with an adequate command-control system? Fourth, did the SAM/ABM missiles have nuclear warheads? All NIE participants agreed that if the answers to these questions were ``yes'', then the Soviets were deploying national SAM/ABM defenses. Until 1967 CIA and other NIE players agreed that the SA-5 could be a SAM/ABM. Similarly, in the 1960s the NIEs stated that Hen House radars were providing ``early tracking and prediction data for use by ABM launch units'' and ``initial (target) track data'' for the Moscow ABM, which is tantamount to saying that the Hen Houses were battle management radars. Then CIA switched its position--the SA-5 was only a SAM, the radars were only for early warning--and the majority soon followed. Neither of these changes in CIA assessments was the result of evidence on either SA-5 and Hen House design, or actual radar operations. In rare moments of candor, CIA acknowledged that there simply were too many ``intelligence gaps'' in the evidence from U.S. technical collection systems to resolve these issues. The CIA and the NIE majority simply systematically violated the rule that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, e.g. if satellites did not detect the Soviet radars passing battle management target tracking data, therefore, only early warning data were being passed. When the U.S. identified nuclear warhead storage at the SA-5 complexes in the early 1970s NIE positions remained the same. Conclusive evidence filling in the ``intelligence gaps'' began to surface publicly from U.S. and Russian sources only in 1992. The principal Russian sources for that evidence are: --A.N. Kosygin, former Premier and Politburo member for over three decades; --Gen. Col. Yu.V. Votintsev, Commander ABM (PRO) and Space Defense (PKO) Troops, 1967-85; --G.V. Kisun'ko, Chief Designer of the Moscow ABM system 1954-75, General Designer of the Soviet Empire's ABM systems from 1956 until the mid-1970s, and two of his colleagues; --two Soviet Military Attaches--one a military intelligence (GRU) general officer; and --various books and articles from the Russian press. The top three Russian sources--Kosygin, Votintsev, Kisun'ko--had unique access to all Soviet ABM programs. All the Russian sources are consistent on three critical points refuting CIA's position: --the SA-5 and SA-10 were designed as dual purpose SAM/ABMs from relatively low cost air defense components; --the Hen House and LPAR radars were designed to provide target tracking (battle management) data to the SAM/ABMs; and --a national ABM and space defense command-control system was installed by the mid-1970s. In 1991 a U.S. inspection team independently confirmed the LPAR battle management role. The de-classified NIEs and the Russian sources confirm the same function for the Hen House radars. There are no factual contradictions between the NIEs and the Russian sources. For the most part, the Russian sources simply fill in the intelligence gaps. Tables 1 and 2 list the major milestones for the Moscow ABM and national SAM/ABM programs. Table 3 gives the sequence of flight tests for all Soviet ABM programs (excluding directed energy systems). In sum, the evidence now is conclusive: the ABM Treaty was DOA. Russia inherited most of the illegal Soviet national ABM defenses and is trying to maintain and modernize them. The Russian military understands that the side with both strategic offensive and defensive forces has a great advantage over the side that relies only on offensive weapons, and that the advantage multiplies as offensive arsenals are reduced by START agreements. Meanwhile, Russia's national ABM defenses can protect them from the nuclear and missile proliferation to which they are contributing so much. To this end, over the past decade Russia has developed a new SAM/ ABM, the ``S-400'', which is scheduled for deployment next year. Both the S-400 SAM/ABM and its predecessor, the SA-10, can operate with the same interceptor missiles. The new long range S-400 missile can engage ballistic missiles with ranges of (at least) 3,500 km., as compared to about 2,000 km. for the latest model SA-10 missile, even without target tracking data from battle management radars. The new ``super-maneuverable'' short range S- 400 missile provides two layers of ABM defense instead of one layer for previous SAM/ABMs (SA-5 and SA-10), and has the potential for non- nuclear kill of strategic ballistic missiles. Given long range target tracking data from Russia's battle management radars and nuclear warheads, the S-400 should be highly effective against all types of strategic ballistic missiles--medium range through ICBMs. Furthermore, production of three new radars of various ranges is underway. Inasmuch as S-400 missile characteristics correspond to the limits set in the 1997 protocols to the ABM Treaty, Russia obviously negotiated those protocols to legalize modernization of its illegal national ABM defenses. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration persists in the illusion that the protocols only defined the technical boundaries between ``theater'' and ``strategic'' ABM systems. Modernizing Russian national ABM defenses with the S-400 will challenge the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially if our arsenal is reduced from the 6,000 warhead level permitted by SALT I to 3,500 under the SALT II Treaty that the Senate already has ratified. Existing Russian ABM defenses probably nullify the small British and French nuclear deterrents. Even before Kosovo Russia was committed to maintaining its strategic military advantage in this respect. In sum, the 1972 ABM Treaty was neither a valid contract nor the ``cornerstone of strategic stability.'' Amended by these protocols the Treaty would be a monument to strategic instability by legalizing major improvements in Russia's ABM defenses while the U.S. and our Allies remain totally vulnerable. There simply is no excuse for failing to protect the U.S. population, our military forces, and our Allies in the name of a Treaty that never was a valid contract with a State that no longer exists. TABLE 1_MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM MILESTONES 1953 Seven Marshals: need ABM Politburo charges KB-1 with proposal 1954 ``System A''--competing battle management radar designs, non-nuclear ``V-1000'' interceptor, 25km altitude 1956 Begin construction Sary Shagan ABM polygon Test nuke air blast ABM warhead 1959 V-1000 interceptor flight tests Moscow defended area requirements specified 1960 V-1000 simulated SS-3/4 intercepts Neutron & x-ray kill mechanisms understood ABM at Moscow by October 1967 1961 V-1000 direct hit SS-4 RV, battle management mode 11 intercepts SS-4 RVs Simulated nuke warheads test on V-1000 missile ECM decoy & terminal guidance tests of system A ``Operation K-1/2'' nuclear tests System ``A-35'' with Galosh interceptor instead of system A 1962 Deploy Galosh system (A-35) at Moscow by October 1967 Operation ``K-3/4/5'' nuke tests Develop x-ray nuke warhead 1963 Project ``Battering Ram''--SS-11 as ABM with 10 MT 1964 Reduce Galosh (A-35) radars and launchers Cancel ``Battering Ram'' 1966-67 Galosh flight tests begin at Sary Shagan 1967 Develop ABM X-3 (``A-135'') (copy U.S. 1966 Nike-X) 1972 ``Experimental Exploitation'' Galosh system 1973 Modernize Galosh, some anti-MIRV capability 1975 Engineering development ABM-3 (derivative of X-3) 1978 Modernized Galosh ABM system Aaccepted into Service 1982 Extraordinary Strategic Force Exercise 1987 ABM-3 accepted into services TABLE 2_SA-5/l0 NATIONAL SAM/ABM PROGRAM MILESTONES 1953 Split in KB-1 on ABM feasibility 1954 ``Zonal ABM'' alternative to system A Design Hen House and Dog House battle management prototypes Military set on semi-mobile systems for the future PVO Strany Mission = Aerospace Defense 1956 Begin construction Sary Shagan ABM test range Reject SAM/ABM to replace system A at Moscow 1957 Project ``Saturn'' (SA-5) SAM/ABM 1960 Developing ``Universal SAM/ABM'' (SA-5) 1961 Politburo approved SA-5/Hen House deployment 1962 Program entrenched in Politburo, VPK, MOD, MIL industry Cancel Leningrad SAM/ABM, Replace with SA-5 Project ``Battering Ram'' (SS-11 ABM with 10 MT warhead) SA-5 SAM/ABM flight tests begin 1963 Three ABM systems for Moscow: Galosh, SA-5, & SS-11 1964 Canceled project ``Battering Ram'' 1967 SA-5 accepted into service at least as SAM (anti-aircraft) Reconfirmed SA-5/Hen House program, modernize SA-5 Develop: SA-10 (``S-300'') SAM/ABM and LPAR radars Rejected project ``Aurora'' national ABM (ABM-X-2) Formed ABM/Space Defense Command 1973 SA-5 Modernization flight tests in ABM mode 1974 Nuke storage appears at SA-5 complexes 1975 Acceptance SA-5 into service as ABM (SAM/ABM) 1977 Deployment SA-5/Hen House national ABM virtually complete 1980 First LPARs operating but unreliable SA-10 (SAM/ABM) deployment begins 1982 Extraordinary Strategic Forces exercise with ABM 1985 1st SA-10 modernization (``S-300PMU''), LPARs reliable 1992 SA-10 modification (``S-300PMU-1'') 1995 SA-10 modification (``S-300PMU-2'') TABLE 3_APPROXIMATE SEQUENCE OF ABM SYSTEM TESTING AT SARY SHAGAN RANGE 1958-60 System A (original Moscow ABM), Griffon (Leningrad SAM/ ABM), SA-2 as tactical ABM ? 1961-62 System A, Griffon (SAM/ABM), SA-5 (SAM/ABM) 1963-65 SA-5 (SAM/ABM)* 1966-67 SA-5, Galosh 1967-70 Galosh, SA-5 (1st modernization) 1971-75 Galosh, SA-5 (2nd modernization), probably ABM X-3 1976-80 Galosh, SA-5, ABM X-3 * A few Griffon tests--the Leningrad system--could have continued into early 1963. ______ Annex 1: Questions Submitted by the Honorable Curt Weldon to the CIA and CIA's Responses subject: responses to the honorable curt weldon's questions QUESTION 1. The ABM Treaty was based on acceptance of Russian declarations that the large phased array radars located on the periphery of the former Soviet Union are only early warning radars. How confident are we of that assessment? ANSWER 1. We are confident in our assesment that Russia's large phased array radars (LPARs), as well as the older Hen House radars, perform a ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) function against strategic and shorter-range missiles from potentially hostile countries. NOTE: The ABM Treaty was signed before the first LPAR was constructed, although the Hen House radar network was aready in operation. QUESTION 2a. I would like to know the current operational and maintenance status of the Hen House and LPAR radars in Russia and the CIS states. ANSWER 2a. General Sokolov, Russia's commander of the missile attack early warning system group, has recently claimed that his deployed forces continue to function ``with the utmost reliability and operational efficiency.'' The press has touched on the same theme with coverage of the Pechora, Russia, and Lyaki, Azerbaijan, LPARs, specifically singling out the Pechora facility for the role it played in correctly identifying the Norwegian sounding rocket as non- threatening in the January 1995 incident. At the same time, the Russian press has noted the difficulties introduced by having many of these radars now located outside Russia's borders. In particular, the press has covered extensively Azerbaijan's continuing efforts to pressure Russia into large annual payments for operating the Lyaki LPAR, and has also commented on the serious loss of the Skrunda LPAR in Latvia, razed in 1995 before completion as a result of negotiations with the newly independent Latvian government. QUESTION 2b. In light of the Administration's official [policy] on Russian nuclear targeting, changes in U.S. strategic forces, and Russian military budgets, why does Russia want to continue to operate those radars? ANSWER 2b. Russia continues to rely on its ballistic missile early warning network, in conjunction with its launch detection satellites, to assure the viability of its strategic nuclear deterrent forces. These radars and satellites provide Moscow with its warning capability against strategic ballistic missile attack from the United States, the UK, France and China, as well as warning of tactical ballistic missile attack from other neighboring nations. Despite public statements that recognize significantly reduced tensions and the greatly reduced likelihood of a future nuclear confrontation, Russian military planners appear unwilling to accept the risk to Moscow's nuclear deterrent that the absence of an eary warning capability could pose. QUESTION 3. Since only the SA-12 is identified as a theater missile defense (TMD) system, how confident are we that the SA-10 is not a TMD? ANSWER 3. The SA-12 is the only Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian system subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement; however, this does not imply that the SA-12 is the only TMD system possessed by former Soviet states. The SA-10 has in fact been advertised by the Russians as a TMD system. QUESTION 4. I would like to know how many of the SA-10 complexes in Russia and the CIS states have been retrofitted with the later models of that system? ANSWER 4. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this guestion. QUESTION 5. There have been recurring concerns that SA-5 and SA-10 systems were ABMs as well as SAMs. Has any new evidence of this issue appeared over the last decade? If so, what is the assessment of such evidence? ANSWER 5. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this guestion. QUESTION 6a. What was the velocity and range of the target missiles employed to test the Galosh and ABM X-3 systems prior to IOC? ANSWER 6a. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this question. NOTE: The ABM-X-3 system never attained IOC. QUESTION 6b. What are the maximum velocities [of] the Galosh, Gorgon, and Gazelle missiles? ANSWER 6b. We are unable to supply an unclassified response to this guestion. QUESTION 6c. How do these numbers compare with the definition of low and high velocity TMD systems in the amendments and agreed statements? ANSWER 6c. As ABM interceptor missiles, none of these missiles is subject to either the First or Second Agreed Statement of 26 September 1997. The First Agreed Statement addresses, inter alia, interceptor missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles, whose demonstrated velocity does not exceed 3.0 km./sec. The Second Agreed Statement addresses, inter alia, interceptor missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles whose demonstrated velocity exceeds 3.0 km./sec. QUESTION 7a. When was the last NIE on Soviet or Russian/CIS strategic defense published? ANSWER 7a. The last NIE on strategic air defenses in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union was published in May 1994. The last NIE to address the ABM system was NIE 11-3/8 in 1991. QUESTION 7b. When is the next NIE on this subject scheduled to be completed? ANSWER 7b. In May 1997, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation sponsored a two-day conference to assess the status of Russian ballistic missile defenses. The review of current activity did not appear to indicate the need for a new NIE at this time. ______ Annex 2: Implications of the ABM Treaty Protocols and Agreed Statements The ABM Treaty Protocols and agreed statements that the U.S. signed with Russia and three successor States in 1997, and which are to be submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification, have a number of implications that may not be apparent at first glance. The demarcation between strategic anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs) and theater missile defense systems (TMDs) is the most complex issue, hence is treated first in some detail. Other implications may be treated in a summary fashion. Essentially, the Protocols and agreed statements border on the absurd. tmd definitions In 1972 Dr. John Foster told Congress that a TMD is any interceptor with a maximum velocity of about 2 km./sec., tested against a target with 40 km. maximum altitude, which is typical of a Scud missile-- flight range 150-300 km. However, the 1972 ABM Treaty did not address this issue. In the ABM Treaty Protocols TMD parameters are defined as: Low velocity TMD --``demonstrated'' interceptor velocity not to exceed 3 km./sec.; --target velocity not to exceed 5 km./sec.; --target flight range not to exceed 3,500 km. High Velocity TMD --interceptor velocity greater than 3 km./sec. --target velocity and flight range limits same as for low velocity TMD. According to conventional wisdom, and the U.S. interpretation of both Soviet and Russian compliance with the ABM Treaty, the only ``strategic'' ABM systems were those deployed at Moscow, Galosh and ABM-3, and the only ``TMD'' system was the SA-12 deployed in limited numbers in the 1980s. The SA-5 and SA-10 were only ``SAMs,'' i.e. anti- aircraft systems. The U.S. ``intelligence community'' and the Clinton administration have simply ignored all evidence from both Russian and U.S. sources that the SA-5 and SA-10 really were dual purpose anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems (SAM/ABMs) deployed nation-wide in violation of Article 1 of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russian plans to modernize its illegal ABM defenses with the new ``S-400'' SAM/ABM also are being ignored. The following discussion focuses on the implications of Dr. Foster's and the 1977 Protocol criteria for ``strategic ABM'' and TMD systems. background on soviet abm test practices and system characteristics In the mid 1950s the Soviets concluded that they could develop ABM systems using only medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) as targets. The Galosh and ABM-3 systems, which were deployed only at Moscow, and the dual purpose anti-aircraft/missile (SAM/ABM) SA-5 and SA-10/12 systems, which were deployed nationwide, were all developed at the Sary Shagan range (on the Western shore of Lake Balkhash). Target missiles were SS-3 and (mostly) SS-4 MRBMs launched from Kapustin Yar (across the river from Stalingrad, now Volgograd): maximum target velocity 3- 3,5 km./sec.; range <difference>2,000 km.; and maximum altitude <difference>1,000 km. With the exception of one interceptor (Gazelle) deployed at Moscow in 1987, all Soviet ABM systems had maximum velocities that were a fraction of that of ICBMs. Although the maximum velocity of the Galosh missile has not been reported, it most probably was around 2 km./sec. This also applies to the Gordon, a modernized Galosh, currently deployed with the ABM-3 at Moscow. Moreover, these interceptors had low initial launch acceleration rates. The interceptor missiles of the first generation SAM/ABM, the SA-5, had maximum velocities around 1.5 km./sec. Both the original SA-10 (Russian S-300P) interceptor and the anti-aircraft interceptor for the SA-12 (Russian S-300V) had maximum velocities of <difference>1.7 km./ sec. Subsequent modernizations of the SA-10 (Russian S-300 PMU-1 & PMU- 2) raised the maximum velocity to over 2 km./sec., approaching the 2.4 km./sec. maximum velocity of the SA-12 TMD interceptor. (The SA-12 was a variant (S-300V) of the SA-10 designed to protect Soviet Ground Forces from both tactical aircraft and missiles). In order to intercept ICBM RVs with velocities of 6-7 km./sec., all of these interceptors, both for the ABM systems deployed only at Moscow and the SAM/ABM systems nation wide, had to be launched when the target RVs were on the order of 1,200 km., or more, from the intended targets. Consequently, all of these systems depended upon long range target tracking data from large phased array radars located on the Soviet periphery and in the Moscow area. All of the large phased array radars--Hen House, LPARs, Dog House and Cat house--were designed initially as ``battle management'' target tracking radars because, given the available interceptor missile technology, there was no other practical ABM architecture, either for defense of Moscow or of the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. When Soviet designers began working on ABM systems in 1954-55, they had no choice but to adopt ``battle management'' architecture. Early warning of a missile attack was a bonus mission for those radars, not the initial design objective. It is hardly possible to overemphasize these points, or of the consequences of U.S. failure to grasp them. Table 4 summarizes these data and various U.S. attempts to define the differences between ``strategic'' and theatre (TMD) ABM systems. TABLE 4--SOVIET ABM & TMD SYSTEM AND TARGET PARAMETERS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ R&D targets SS-4 Operational MRBM targets ICBMs ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Range............................. <difference>2,000 10,000 km.+ km. Velocity (Max.)................... 3.5 km./sec. 6-7 km./sec. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ INTERCEPTOR VELOCITIES_KM./SEC. Moscow ABM Systems Galosh..............................................\1\<difference>2 Gordon.................................................<difference>2 Gazelle................................................... very high National SAM/ABMs SA-5...................................................... 1.4-1.6 SA-10 1980.................................................. 1.7 1985.............................................<difference>1.7 1992.................................................. >2.0 \1\ Not available but likely approximation. DR. JOHN FOSTER'S 1972 TMD PARAMETERS Target range.........................................<difference>300 km. Target velocity...............................................2 km./sec. 1997 ABM TREATY PROTOCOLS' TMD PARAMETERS Low Velocity TMD: S-400 Target range: 3,500 km.............................. 3,500 km. Target velocity: 5 km./sec.......................... 4.8 km./sec. Interceptor velocity: 3 km./sec............\2\<difference>3 km./sec. High Velocity TMD: Same target range and velocity as low velocity Interceptor velocity: >5 km./sec. \2\ Specifics not available, but probably about 3 km./sec. The new ``S-400'' from the same design school that produced the SA- 2, SA-5, and SA-10 pushes even the Protocol criteria to the limits, if not beyond. The S-400 is designed to intercept missiles with velocities up to 4.8 km./sec. and a range of 3,500 km. While maximum velocities of either of the two new S-400 interceptors were not available at this writing, expect them to be at or near the Protocol limit of 3 km./sec. for both the long range and short range models. Trying to delineate between ``strategic'' and ``theater'' ABM systems by interceptor velocity and target parameters only results in confusion and contradictions when the U.S. does not comprehend the implications of the Soviet ABM architecture, and persists in the erroneous notion that Soviet/Russian SAM/ABMs are only SAMs, i.e. not even TMD systems much less strategic ABMs as well. Thus systems that are strategic ABMs by one definition are only TMDs by others. Components of the same system are equally contradictory. By Dr. Foster's target altitude and range criteria--40 and up to 300 km. respectively--all these systems, whether officially recognized ``ABMs'' deployed at Moscow, or the SAM/ABMs deployed nationwide that the U.S. insists are only ``SAMs'', are strategic ABMs. The same applies to the new S-400 SAM/ABM. On the other hand, by Foster's interceptor velocity criteria, the SA-5 and the original SA-10 are only TMDs, but the modernized SA-10 and one of the SA-12 interceptors are strategic ABMs. Galosh and its successor Gordon deployed with ABM-3, which the U.S. considers are the only strategic ABMs the Soviets developed and deployed, are somewhere on the borderline between strategic ABMs and TMDs. By the 1997 Protocol target and interceptor velocity criteria, only the Gazelle interceptor of the ABM-3 qualifies as a strategic ABM component. All other systems and components are only TMD systems with the S-400 falling on the border line between ``Low'' and ``High'' velocity TMD interceptors. Some qualification of the Soviet practice of using mostly SS-4 MRBMs as targets for all ABM systems is in order. During the extraordinary 1982 Soviet strategic forces exercise, SS-11 and SS-20 missiles were fired into Sary Shagan from an unspecified range. SA-5s and SA-10 SAM/ABMs, of course, were present. However, only the ``rapidly deployable'' version of the ABM X-3 with the small phased array radar was present at Sary Shagan in 1972. While ABM-3 is a derivative of ABM X-3, its ``Pillbox'' radar is unique to Moscow. While the ABM X-3 reportedly was active against the SS-11 and SS-20 targets in 1982, no intercepts--attempt, failure, success--have been reported. Was SA-5/10 activity also detected at the time? One recent Russian source hints that some targets on the Sary Shagan may have been boosted to ICBM velocities, i.e. 6-7 km./sec., but such activity has not been reported publicly by Western sources. Despite billions of dollars of satellite collection effort the U.S. Intelligence Community cannot certify with much confidence which specific systems were, or were not, tested against which targets during more than three decades of operations on the Sary Shagan range. All technical intelligence can provide is a circumstantial case indicating a high probability of intercept activity in some time periods with many information gaps remaining. In sum, U.S. attempts to define the difference between strategic ABMs and TMD systems have resulted in hopeless contradictions and confusion. U.S. technical intelligence cannot answer a lot of key questions with any confidence. Nor can U.S. intelligence negate reports from highly credible Russian sources that the SA-5 and SA-10, in conjunction with the Hen House and LPAR battle management radars, were SAM/ABMs. CIA's assessments on these issues are fatally flawed. other implications and conundrums Despite all the evidence to the contrary, the 1997 Protocols declare that all of the large phased array ABM battle management radars deployed on the periphery of the former Soviet Empire are only ``early warning'' radars that Russia may continue to operate. Russia still controls at least nine, possibly as many as 13, of these radars. Thus this provision of the protocols legalizes Soviet violation of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty by deploying these radars with some 10-12,000 SAM/ABM interceptors, and Russia's continued violation with its inherited portion of Soviet ABM defenses. Indeed the protocols explicitly permit passing battle management tracking data from these radars, and from space based sensors, provided such data are not used to intercept strategic ballistic missiles! The only way the U.S. could verify that the data were not being used in the ABM mode would be to launch a missile strike on Russia, and accept the consequences. Despite the fact that Russia is marketing the SA-10 as the world's best TMD, with characteristics equal to or considerably superior to the SA-12, only the latter is declared to be a TMD prohibited from being tested in the ABM mode. The same applies to modernization of Russia's massive violation of the Treaty with the S-400, which also has an export version. Inasmuch as all TMD deployments by the U.S. and Russia must be proportionate to the threat, Russia evidently may veto any U.S. global TMD deployment simply by declaring it disproportionate to the local threat. Each side is to notify the other if it has plans to test a ``high velocity'' interceptor but deployment is not prohibited, and ``Treaty compliance . . . will remain the national responsibility of each Party.'' Verification of land based ABM programs depends entirely on Russia informing the U.S. of its plans! ______ ANNEX 3_POST SOVIET UNION RUSSIAN MISSILE & AIR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT SS-X-26 SRBM Operational SS-27 ICBM Operational 1997-98 SS-N-X-28 SLBM ? ``Borey'' Class SSBN 2005-07 New Long Range Bomber ..................... MOD Specs submitted TU-95 & 175 ..................... Maintain, modernize with new ASM AS-X Long range ? ASM ..................... AS-X Medium range ASM ..................... S-400 SAM/ABM: ..................... ..................... New missile 400 km. range Deployment 2000 New missile 160 km. range ..................... New target tracking radars Long range ..................... Medium range Deployment 2000-03 OTH, range 5-600 km. ..................... Modernized SU-27 ..................... Schedule ? New MIG model ..................... Flight testing New Fighter ..................... Schedule ? AS-X Short range ASM* Schedule ? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Derivative of short range S-400 missile. Senator Hagel. Well, Mr. Lee, thank you. We are looking at a vote probably around noon. So, I am going to shoot to try to have this wound up by then. But in the time we have, which is valuable because you have so much to contribute, and I do not want to interfere with that. Why do we not take a couple of minutes at your instruction to take the committee through what you think are the most important points related to the charts in connection to your testimony. Mr. Lee. Thank you, sir. If you look at that first chart, the Hen House radars, that is the first generation of the system. What we never were able to determine from technical intelligence collection was whether those radars were designed for this long-range tracking mode so they could look out, see the targets coming far enough in advance so that the missile could fire and the interceptor could fire, intercept, and make up for that difference in the velocity. We simply did not know whether they were just for early warning or for both purposes. The majority in the intelligence community concluded they were only for early warning. There was never any basis in the technical evidence to prove that. It was simply which way you chose to interpret ambiguous data that could be interpreted either way. We now have the evidence from the Russian sources that these systems were designed that way from the very beginning, and as I said, indeed the realization that they were good for early warning seems to have come after they had originally designed them for the target tracking function. The second chart simply--and I could not find one that is complete with all the radars from both generations. The second chart shows one of the radars at Moscow. There is another one that complements the coverage of that that is not shown--I did not have that available--and some of those in the second generation. At the end they had 17 of these deployed. They negotiated the ABM Treaty to permit 18 of them, and we did not realize that was what we were doing, that we were legalizing the first generation and the second generation deployment. The Krasnoyarsk radar would have been the 18th, but the Politburo, from the record available, made the decision to put that at Krasnoyarsk rather than Aral'sk and so they lost that radar before the Soviet Union collapsed. Russia controls something like six or eight of these. I can give you the list of them still. The important part is they have what is necessary still for a viable national ABM defense and the upgrade even with what they have lost in Latvia and incomplete radar in the Ukraine. The other charts. From putting together the declassified national intelligence estimates and the data from the Russian sources, let me emphasize all this new data from the Russian sources does not conflict with any of the facts we had from our national collection systems. They are complementary. I could not a find a single case where there is a factual contradiction. The information from the Russian sources fills in the gaps that we did not and could not have collected from our national collection systems. The important points on that first one, it is sort of the history of the Moscow ABM system. The critical things are we did not realize that the Russians started out with a non- nuclear ABM system for Moscow. Indeed, they achieved the first non-nuclear hit-to-kill back in March 1961 on a strategic missile, what they used as a target, an intermediate range system, the SS-4, a medium range system. Not realizing that, we never understood the sequence of the development of that system and the Moscow system. We did not realize that that original system had been canceled and replaced with quite a different version of it in the Moscow system that we call the Galosh. So, there was a 5-year gap there, which I will come back to, in which we were just misinterpreting the evidence we had because we did not understand what the Russians had started out with and what they had changed over to. That was simply a limit of the national intelligence collection. We could not have expected them to do any better as long as they limited it to that. The other important thing is that I already mentioned but will reiterate that the Russian sources are very clear that all of these systems, all these radars that were on the previous two graphs, all of them were designed to provide the long-range target tracking data so that the low velocity interceptors, including those at Moscow, as well as these dual purpose SAM's could be fired in time to get up there and meet the warhead before it was too late. The second table shows the points in their national ABM system, dual purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-missile designed from the beginning which we suspected for a long time, but then refused to believe from fairly standard anti-aircraft components that they could be adapted with the big radars to make them dual purpose. All that really does is confirm that is really what went on, and gave us a key date that the Politburo had approved this national deployment of the first generation no later than mid-1962. That is the basis of my statement that they were in violation of the treaty, article I of the treaty for 10 years before they signed it. Now, because of various problems of providing the nuclear weapons and the command-control system, that original national ABM dual purpose system probably was not operational until about 1975. It may have been partially operational just in the Moscow area because they had the big Moscow radar there 1969- 70. But otherwise, it was probably not. I think those are the most important points I wish to make. Table 3 simply shows that sequence of test firing, what went on at Sary Shagan, the development center. And the critical thing that was missed in the national intelligence was that from sometime around mid-1962 and until 1966, all of the test firings we saw going on there that we could not interpret very well as to what was going on--and this is very clear from the estimates--all of that, those 4 to 5 years, was the initial test firing of the dual purpose SA-5 system. And we simply did not recognize that that was what was going on. That is the essence of it, sir. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Lee, thank you very much. Let me ask a couple of questions which tie into specifically your timeframe here and some of the testimony. You have claimed that there is new evidence from Russian sources relating to that country's violations of the ABM Treaty. You have also claimed in your book and testimony this morning that this evidence has been known to the U.S. Government for some time. What happened? Did the CIA not pass it on or DIA failed to act on it. Did our political leaders know it and did not respond? Would you take us through what your interpretation of that failure was about, why and what it has meant to our defense capabilities? Mr. Lee. To the best of my knowledge, sir, they simply have not been reading it. Senator Hagel. They meaning who? Mr. Lee. The CIA and DIA simply have not been reading this evidence, not been looking at it at all. In fact, a little over a year ago, CIA replied to seven questions from Congressman Weldon clearly stating that they had not read any of this evidence whatsoever, much less reexamined the entire past history and told anybody about it. I sure would like to see your colleagues in the Intelligence Committee ask some questions on precisely that point. It would be kind of nice to have the Rumsfeld Commission look into this or a new version of the Rumsfeld Commission look into this whole issue. Senator Hagel. When was that testimony given to Congressman Weldon? Mr. Lee. The questions were submitted by Congressman Weldon in late 1997. I have the questions and the replies that were returned to him in early 1998. There was not a specific date on that. Those are appended as annexes to my testimony. Senator Hagel. I will, of course, include all your testimony and your accompanying materials, charts, and the questions and answers for the record. That is rather serious, what you have said about our intelligence community. Is that an ongoing, long-term problem do you believe in our intelligence community, that they have not paid attention to these things? Mr. Lee. Sir, how much time do you have to listen to past records of not paying attention to what was in the open press? I have often made kind of a harsh remark that the Soviet Union could always hide some of its deepest and darkest secrets very effectively by putting them in books and on the newsstands. Senator Hagel. If Russian public sources on this matter complement the evidence from the U.S. collection systems, then what are the key intelligence gaps that are filled in by this information? Mr. Lee. The key gaps are the radars were designed from the beginning as battle management radars for target tracking data, and at some point--I can only date it 6 years later--they realized they could use them for early warning too and went ahead and used them for both purposes. Second, the SAM/ABM's were designed from the beginning as dual purpose systems, recognizing they were not terribly effective by U.S. standards, not terribly effective at all perhaps--we do not know and maybe we really do not want to know because the only way you could really test it was to have a little nuclear exchange, which is not exactly desirable. But they went ahead and did the best they could, and they have a long record of doing that in many areas and that was simply overlooked, that they would do the best they could with what they had and they were determined to defend the USSR and now Russia no matter what. And that is the story from the new S-400 also. The third point is clear. They did put together the command and control system to make it all work, although it probably was not very effective or really satisfactory until about the mid-1970's as best as I can reconstruct it. Senator Hagel. As you laid out rather clearly in your testimony and the accompanying charts, in view of the evidence that you have brought to light over the years, including what you have shared with us this morning and what we do know that is available on Soviet violations of the ABM and biological weapons treaties, in your opinion were there ever any cold war arms control agreements that the Soviets adhered to? Mr. Lee. Well, they adhered to the agreement not to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, although there was always some question about bending in some cases. The issue of whether they observed the threshold test ban treaty was always very controversial. It is generally accepted that they did, but there was a significant minority of highly qualified people who repeatedly--and you could get some of those to testify in detail on this--repeatedly that they did violate that one. The critical thing about the interim agreement on the offensive weapons, the SALT agreements on the offensive weapons, was that they negotiated those so they did not have to violate them in any significant degree except to encode the telemetry, which they proceeded to do. They simply negotiated those to their level of sufficiency which was defined by their military doctrine and strategy, their nuclear targeting strategy, and therefore they did not have to violate them. The biological treaty was totally violated. The chemical treaty, we really do not know, but probably also violated. It is hard to find anything except the hot line and a few things like that that they really strictly adhered to. But the SALT agreements and so forth, they only violated them when they really believed it was in their interest to do so. They did not violate them capriciously. Senator Hagel. Mr. Lee, unfortunately, the bewitching hour has arrived and I am going to have to go do my duty here. I first want to thank you for your contributions. They are very important and we are grateful for what you have shared with us this morning in addition to the information that you have brought with you. I suspect we will want to do a little followup work here. We have really not had adequate time to cover as much as we need to cover. If it is acceptable with you, we may have followup questions that we would like to ask you to respond to, and we would give those to you and we would insert those answers for the record. Again, thank you. Mr. Lee. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity, and anytime day or night I am at your service. Senator Hagel. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 2:15 p.m., May 25, 1999.]