May 13, 1999
ABM Treaty, START II, and Missile Defense
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
partner, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC........................ 171
Prepared statement of........................................ 173
Joseph Hon. Robert G., former Ambassador to the ABM Treaty's
Standing Consultative Commission; Director, Center for Counter
Proliferation Research, National Defense University,
Washington, DC................................................. 193
Prepared statement of........................................ 197
Lee, William T., former analyst for the Defense Intelligence
Agency; adjunct fellow, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 211
Prepared statement of........................................ 212
Annex 1: Questions submitted by the Honorable Curt Weldon
to the CIA and CIA's responses......................... 216
Annex 2: Implications of the ABM Treaty Protocols and
Agreed Statements...................................... 217
Annex 3: Post Soviet Union Russian Missile and Air
Weapons Development.................................... 220
Smith, Hon. David J., former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Defense
and Space Talks; president, Global Horizons Inc., Annandale, VA 178
Prepared statement of........................................ 184
S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
ABM TREATY, START II, AND MISSILE DEFENSE
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:12 a.m., in room SD-562, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel presiding.
Present: Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Good morning. This morning's hearing is the
fifth in a series of hearings the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is holding on the 1972 ABM Treaty. Today's hearing
will focus on the relationship between missile defense,
strategic arms reductions, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the
national missile defense architecture that the administration
is now developing.
Before introducing our witnesses this morning, I would like
to summarize five key judgments that have come out of our last
five ABM hearings to date.
First, the ballistic missile threat to the United States is
present and growing. A number of countries such as Iran and
North Korea could today inflict massive damage on the United
States using a short-range, ship-launched missile with an
unconventional warhead. We are threatened by further
instability in Russia. The Chinese missile threat exists and is
growing.
Second, the committee has heard compelling testimony that a
national missile defense against these threats is
technologically feasible. What is lacking is the political
will. America is kept vulnerable by a commitment to the 1972
ABM Treaty with a country and a government that no longer
exists.
Third, this committee has listened to numerous experts who
advocate deployment of a national missile defense system
despite Russian and Chinese objections. Ideally, we should seek
to engage Russia so that we can deploy missile defenses without
affecting our important bilateral relations. But we should
never let the defense of our citizens be held hostage to
diplomatic relations. The deployment process must move along
its own separate track.
We can undertake confidence building, and that confidence
building addresses Russian concerns. But at no time should
Russia be given the impression that it has a veto over any
aspect of U.S. missile defenses.
Fourth, an overwhelming number of witnesses have urged this
committee to reject the Clinton administration's effort to
expand the ABM Treaty. At a time when we need to move beyond
the ABM Treaty, it would be folly to extend it to new partners
or to place new limits on the capabilities of missile defense
systems.
Several witnesses have noted that the ABM Treaty is legally
dead. Nevertheless, they have pointed out that the treaty
remains a political question in our relationship with Russia
and that it must be addressed in further discussions on missile
defense and strategic arms reductions.
But all decisions relating to U.S. missile defense
capabilities, system architecture, and deployment timeframes
cannot be held captive to these talks. Some of our witnesses
have testified that Russia will ``get on board'' with our
missile defense plans only when they perceive that we are
serious, deadly serious, and that they risk being left behind.
It is time to get serious about missile defense.
Fifth, this committee has heard several recommendations
relating to the subject of today's hearing. The shadow of the
ABM Treaty continues to undermine U.S. missile defense plans.
Several witnesses have noted that missile defense plans
currently under development by this administration are designed
more to tiptoe around the ABM Treaty than they are to actually
intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
For example, the administration has chosen only those
sites, radar configurations, interceptor numbers, and
technologies that would fit most easily within ABM Treaty
constraints. The administration has not selected sites and
capabilities primarily on how well suited they would be for the
task of defending America.
In sum, while there is clear consensus on the nature of the
threat and the need for a national missile defense, the
administration continues to adhere to an outdated treaty. As a
result, we are squandering precious time in developing an
effective system that will protect America's interests from
missile attack.
The committee looks forward this morning to an examination
of these issues by our distinguished witnesses. First allow me
to introduce our two panels. Our lead witness is the Honorable
Stephen Hadley who served from 1989 to 1993 as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under
President Bush. Mr. Hadley was responsible for DOD nuclear
weapons policy, ballistic missile defense, and arms control.
Mr. Hadley is now a partner at Shea & Gardner law firm here in
Washington, DC.
Our second witness is the Honorable David Smith who served
as chief negotiator to the Defense and Space Talks from 1989 to
1991. In this role, he worked to negotiate an agreement with
the Soviets to allow deployment of defenses against ballistic
missiles. And I note that in 1985 and 1986, he served as a
professional staff member on this committee where he advised
Senator Lugar on arms control issues. Ambassador Smith
currently serves as president of Global Horizons, an
international consulting firm.
Our third witness is the Honorable Robert Joseph. Mr.
Joseph served during the Bush administration as U.S.
Commissioner to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative
Commission. Ambassador Joseph has a distinguished background at
the Defense Department where he worked on a wide range of arms
control issues, including missile defense, nuclear testing, and
nonproliferation. Since 1993, Ambassador Joseph has been on
detail from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the
National Defense University.
On our second panel will be Mr. William Lee who served as
senior analyst on nuclear targeting at the Defense Intelligence
Agency from 1981 to 1985. From 1985 to 1992, Mr. Lee was the
Senior Executive Service Officer at DIA charged with military
production, R&D, and collection systems. Mr. Lee is now an
adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
The committee welcomes all four of our distinguished
witnesses and look forward to hearing from each of you.
Gentlemen, thank you and we will ask you, Mr. Hadley, to begin
the presentations.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, PARTNER, SHEA & GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
privilege to have the opportunity to appear before this
committee today.
I want to begin by saying that I strongly support the
effort to provide an effective national missile defense for the
United States. It is true that the current provisions of the
ABM Treaty prevent us from doing so, and hence the questions
raised about the future of the treaty.
In your opening comments, you pointed out that there are
those who believe that the United States should first seek to
negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia so as to permit
a national missile defense system. What is often overlooked is
the fact that the United States made a serious effort in 1991
and 1992 to negotiate changes to the treaty to permit that
deployment, and I thought it might be useful this morning for
me to describe briefly those efforts, to discuss how the United
States might go about renewing a discussion with Russia on ABM
Treaty revision, and to assess the prospects for success.
I have a longer statement on this subject. If it is all
right, Mr. Chairman, I will just go through and hit the
highlights.
Senator Hagel. That is fine. Your complete statement will
be included in the record.
Mr. Hadley. Thank you.
Many do not realize that on November 26, 1991, U.S.
representatives met with representatives from the Soviet Union,
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and tabled an outline
for a new ABM Treaty regime. This new regime would have
permitted ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was
required to protect against small ballistic missile attacks.
The proposal was very concrete. We proposed an upper limit on
the number of ABM interceptors, a limited number of
geographically dispersed sites at which they could be deployed,
a limit on the number of interceptors at each site. We proposed
eliminating the constraints of the treaty on development and
testing of ABM systems, and we proposed a limited duration for
the agreement.
These suggestions were listened to attentively by the
participants and were followed in January 1992 by a public
statement from President Yeltsin in which he called for a
global system for ballistic missile protection of the world
community that could be based on the reorientation of the
United States SDI program, as well as high level technologies
developed by Russia in its defense complex.
This was a real breakthrough. It was a Russian leader
formally acknowledging that ballistic missile defenses have an
important role to play in the post-cold war world.
The Bush administration informed President Yeltsin that it
welcomed his suggestions, and indeed in a summit meeting in
June 1992, President Yeltsin and President Bush formalized
cooperations between their two countries on a global protection
system. They established a high level working group to explore
on a priority basis three issues: potential sharing of early
warning information, potential cooperation in developing
ballistic missile defense capabilities with Russia and our
allies, and a legal basis for cooperation, including necessary
amendments to the ABM Treaty.
Considerable progress was made. A number of working groups
were established. Progress was made in defining a workable
concept for a GPS system, in defining specific areas of
technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early
warning information, and even undertaking the planning for a
joint deployment of the theater missile defense capabilities of
the two sides.
Regrettably, these discussions ground to a halt in October
1992 when it became clear that the outcome of the upcoming
Presidential election would not be the reelection of President
Bush.
Under the Clinton administration, discussions continued
between the United States and Russia on the subject of
ballistic missile defenses, but with a completely different
focus. Instead of trying to lead to a revision of the ABM
Treaty that would have facilitated deployment of ballistic
missile defenses, the administration's discussions instead
focused on the so-called demarcation issue and, as you noted in
your opening statement, resulted in, in fact, extending the
constraints of the ABM Treaty to our ability to deploy theater
ballistic missile defenses.
It is very regrettable that the Clinton administration did
not build on the work that had been done in the Bush
administration on a global protection system and on a U.S./
Russian dialog on how to amend the ABM Treaty to permit
national missile defense. In the intervening 6 years, we have
lost valuable time, and it may simply be too late for
negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty. Obviously, the
political situation, particularly in Russia, is much more
difficult to deal with than it was 6 years ago.
My own view is, however, that it is worth making the effort
but we need to think very concretely about how we restart the
dialog with Russia.
In the balance of my statement, I describe in some detail
the kind of framework we need to pursue in order to have any
chance of successful discussions with Russia. It really has
three parts.
First, we need, I think, to put national missile defense in
a context of a global effort against the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. That
has to involve our allies, but it also has to involve Russia
and, to some extent, China because the reality is they are
potentially the biggest proliferators on the block. And we need
to see ballistic missile defense as one piece and, indeed, a
contribution that we can make to this global initiative against
weapons of mass destruction.
Second, we need to have a new concept of deterrence that is
more appropriate for the post-cold war world. In the cold war,
when we had a single overwhelming Soviet military threat,
deterrence based on threat of retaliation with offensive
nuclear forces made sense. It is not clear that simply relying
on deterrence through threat of retaliation is sufficient any
longer, and I talk in my statement as to why that is the case.
I would argue we need to have a new concept of deterrence that
is based on both offensive nuclear forces to provide
traditional deterrence and the ability to protect against
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
should deterrence fail. And this is a concept that ought to be
attractive both to the Russians as well as to us.
Finally, I would propose, consistent with that concept,
that we go to the Russians with a so-called package deal in
which we would propose to Russia a coupling of significant
reductions in the numerical ceilings in the START II treaty
with a revision of the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of
numerically limited, but still capable ballistic missile
defenses to protect the territory of the two nations. I think
that is something that is both in the United States' and
Russia's national interest, and it is in that context that we
might have an opportunity of some success in those discussions.
I agree with you that the only way to go into those
discussions is making it clear that our NMD program is going to
go forward, and if at the end of the day, those discussions are
not successful, then we are not going to let the ABM Treaty
prevent us from protecting the country against these threats.
But I think the possibility of negotiations is something we
should pursue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen J. Hadley
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to appear before
you today to testify concerning national missile defense and its impact
on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
I strongly support the effort to provide an effective national
missile defense for the United States. The current provisions of the
ABM Treaty prevent the United States from doing so. Hence the serious
questions being raised about the future of the Treaty.
Some experts argue that the United States should act now to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty or that the ABM Treaty effectively lapsed
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other experts argue that
before adopting either of these courses of action, the United States
should first seek to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty that would
permit the deployment of a national missile defense system. What is
often overlooked is that the United States made a serious effort in
1991-1992 to do precisely that--to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty
with the Russian government.
I thought it might be useful this morning to describe briefly these
earlier efforts, to discuss how the United States might go about
renewing a discussion of ABM Treaty relief with the Russians, and to
assess the prospects for success.
the global protection system or ``gps'' concept
The process began on September 27, 1991, when President Bush
publicly called on the leadership of the then-Soviet Union to ``join us
in taking immediate, concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of
non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile
strikes whatever their source.'' On October 5, 1991, then-Soviet
President Gorbachev responded by stating that ``we are ready to discuss
the U.S. proposal on non-nuclear ABM systems'' and suggested that the
two countries examine the possibility of creating joint ballistic
missile warning systems. This statement was a clear recognition by the
Soviets, and confirmed by the Russians, that the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'')
represented as big a threat to them as to the United States.
Encouraged by this response, on November 26, 1991, U.S.
representatives met with representatives of the Soviet Union, Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazahkstan to table an outline for a new ABM
treaty regime. This new regime would have permitted deployment of
ballistic missile defenses but limited to what was required to protect
against small ballistic missile attacks. The proposal envisioned an
upper limit on the number of deployed ABM interceptors; the deployment
of ground based interceptors at a limited number of geographically
dispersed sites; a limit on the number of interceptors at each site;
elimination of the ABM Treaty's constraints on development and testing
of ABM systems; and a limited duration for the agreement so as to
permit deployment in the future of more advanced systems such as space-
based interceptors.
Meanwhile, dramatic events were occurring in Moscow which led
ultimately to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
an independent Russia with its first democratically elected president,
Boris Yeltsin. In speeches on January 29 and January 31, 1992,
President Yeltsin called for ``a global system for protection of the
world community [that could be] based on a reorientation of the U.S.
[Strategic Defense Initiative] to make use of high technologies
developed in Russia's defense complex.''
This was a real breakthrough that stunned even the most committed
U.S. advocates of ballistic missile defense. A Russian leader formally
acknowledged that ballistic missile defense had an important role to
play in the post-Cold War world.
The Bush Administration informed President Yeltsin that it welcomed
his proposal for a ``global protection system'' (or ``GPS'')--that the
United States shared his bold vision and was prepared to work with him
toward that goal. The United States moved quickly to consult with its
friends and allies in Europe and Asia to make clear that they would be
in on the ground floor and included in any such system. The United
States sought specifically to reassure the British and French that such
a system would not undermine the credibility of their own strategic
nuclear deterrents. The United States particularly sought to enlist the
NATO alliance in the cooperative GPS effort.
Everyone understood that to deploy a global protection system would
require changes to the ABM Treaty. It was believed that cooperation in
developing the system would allow Russia to accept its deployment and
the changes in the ABM Treaty that such deployment would require. This
approach would change thinking in the United States as well, for if the
world community in general and Russia in particular were ready to
develop and deploy defenses against limited ballistic missile attacks,
then even the most skeptical critics in the United States would have to
give way. Thus cooperation on a global protection system offered the
hope of breaking the log jam on the ABM Treaty that plagued the U.S.
domestic political system.
u.s. russian discussions on a global protection system
At their summit meeting in June, 1992, President Yeltsin and
President Bush formalized cooperation between their two countries on a
global protection system. In the joint summit statement issued on June
16, 1992, the two Presidents agreed that ``their two nations should
work together with allies and other interested states in developing a
concept for a system [to protect against limited ballistic missile
attacks] as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.'' To this end, they
established a high-level group to explore on a priority basis:
The potential for sharing of early waming information
through the establishment of an early warning center.
The potential for cooperation with participating states in
developing ballistic missiles defense capabilities and
technologies.
The development of a legal basis for cooperation including
new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing
treaties and agreements necessary to implement a global
protection system.
The high-level group established by the two Presidents met twice,
during July and September of 1992, and established working groups to
pursue specific subjects. Considerable progress was made in developing
a workable concept for the GPS system, in defining specific areas for
technical cooperation, in developing means for sharing of early warning
information, and even in undertaking a joint deployment of the two
sides' theater missile defense capabilities. The activity of the high-
level group was suspended in November of 1992, however, with the
outcome of the U.S. Presidential election.
Under the Clinton Administration, discussions continued between the
United States and Russia on the subject of ballistic missile defense.
But the primary object of those discussions changed dramatically.
Instead of leading to the revision of the ABM Treaty to facilitate the
deployment of ballistic missile defenses, these discussions instead
resulted in extending the Treaty's limits and imposing constraints on
the ability of the United States to deploy systems to defend against
theater ballistic missiles. This is ironic because the ABM Treaty does
not by its terms impose any limits on defenses against theater
ballistic missiles systems. The results of these Clinton Administration
discussions are now before this Committee.
restarting the dialogue with russia
It is extremely unfortunate that the Clinton Administration did not
build on the work done during the Bush Administration on a ``global
protection system'' and on the U.S./Russian dialogue on how to amend
the ABM Treaty to permit national missile defense. If it had, we might
be a lot closer today to the consensual deployment of such a system. In
the interim, the political climate for anything positive in the U.S./
Russian relationship has deteriorated badly. We have lost valuable time
and it may simply be too late for negotiated amendments to the ABM
Treaty.
My own view, however, is that it is worth making the effort, for
all the reasons that caused the Bush Administration to undertake the
dialogue in the first place. But how we go about restarting the
dialogue is very important.
what is the right framework for working the problem?
The U.S. national missile defense effort and the issue of revision
of the ABM Treaty have been extremely sensitive issues for Russia. They
have been as divisive within the U.S. domestic political debate. In
truth the U.S. is unlikely to be successful in getting Russian support
for any revision of the Treaty unless it can demonstrate strong
bipartisan political support for the U.S. approach.
What is needed is a framework in which to view national missile
defense that offers the prospect simultaneously of creating a new
consensus within the U.S. political debate, offering an acceptable way
for the Russians to accept our ABM Treaty proposals, and reassuring our
own allies who are in some instances quite skeptical about U.S.
national missile defense efforts. The framework also needs to provide a
basis for dealing constructively with China on this issue.
This framework also needs to reconcile three competing U.S. policy
priorities: discouraging (if not preventing) the proliferation of WMD
and the means to deliver them, reducing the Russian nuclear posture in
ways that are stabilizing, and pursuing the development and deployment
of ballistic missile defenses.
Within the U.S. domestic political debate, these three priorities
have often been at war with one another. The partisans of non-
proliferation have seen the pursuit of national missile defense as
evidence of lack of commitment to and confidence in the non-
proliferation effort. The partisans of reducing the danger posed by
Russian nuclear weapons have seen national missile defense as fatally
undermining the prospects for START II in the Russian Duma and any hope
for a START III. The partisans of national missile defense have felt
stymied by both of the other two groups.
Conflict among these policy priorities has also bedeviled our
approach to these issues in dealing with other governments. The
Russians have made clear they will link any START II ratification to
continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty as written. Even some of our
closest allies are worried that the U.S. national missile defense
program represents either a neoisolationist retreat from the world or a
vehicle for U.S. intervention ``anytime/anywhere.''
Finally, by appearing to be a unilateral initiative providing a
capability available only to the United States, national missile
defense threatens U.S. leadership of the global effort against the
proliferation of WMD.
1. Embed Missile Defense Firmly in a U.S. Strategy Against WMD
The starting point for resolving these conflicts is to treat the
U.S. ballistic missile defense effort as part of a comprehensive U.S.
strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') and the
means to deliver them. That strategy of necessity must be a global
strategy, one in which the U.S. can lead but cannot dictate. Such a
strategy can succeed only if the U.S. can enlist its closest allies
despite increasing economic competition and trade frictions between
these allies and the United States. It can succeed only if the U.S. can
enlist Russia and China, two of the greatest potential sources of both
WMD and the means to deliver them.
But in engaging these parties the U.S. has on its side the fact
that proliferation is a serious challenge that threatens each of these
countries as well as the United States. Europe cannot feel sanguine
about an Iraq with WMD and long-range ballistic missiles any more than
Japan can feel sanguine about North Korea. Russia and China should also
be concerned about North Korea and would certainly be concerned about
the nuclear-armed Japan that could follow if the North Korea problem is
not managed properly.
The United States needs to go to its key allies, to Russia, and
perhaps even to China at the highest levels to propose a revitalized
effort against WMD jointly led by these key nations. Particularly with
respect to Russia, such an undertaking would provide both a positive
element in the U.S./Russian relationship and the best approach for
obtaining Russian cooperation--assuming the Kosovo crisis is resolved
without a total breach between the U.S. and Russia.
Success of a joint effort against WMD will require probably lengthy
strategic consultations between the United States and these governments
to develop a common assessment of the risks posed by countries as Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea and the list of measures that will need to be
pursued. These measures need to include:
Better means of collecting and analyzing intelligence
information about potential proliferators.
Regional strategies to try to resolve underlying tensions
and disputes that provide part of the motivation for WMD
proliferation (such as in the Middle East).
Security strategies that deter the acquisition and use of
WMD and the means to deliver them by states seeking to coerce
their neighbors (such as Iraq).
Enhanced export controls on a multilateral basis with real
sanctions for noncompliance.
Improved capabilities to deal with both the military and
civilian consequences of WMD use (including improved detectors,
vaccines, antidotes, protective clothing, and emergency
response procedures and practices).
Improved technical and operational means to detect and
defeat the various means of delivery of WMD (including
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and
unconventional means).
Improved conventional capabilities (including weapons and
sensors) to locate and destroy production, storage, and support
facilities for WMD and associated delivery systems (though with
obvious limitations on what could be shared with other
countries).
Partisans of ballistic missile defense must recognize that BMD is
only one of several measures that need to be pursued in dealing with
WMD risks, while partisans of nonproliferation (or the risks of WMD
delivery by unconventional means) must acknowledge that ballistic
missile defense needs to be pursued as well.
This framework allows the U.S. to offer to contribute ballistic
missile defense capability to those countries joining in this
comprehensive effort against the proliferation of WMD. The U.S. is
already making such a contribution to some degree in its cooperation
with Israel on the Arrow program, its sale of Patriot missile systems
to close allies, and certain technology sharing with allies under
existing cooperative agreements. But significant technology transfer
restrictions prevent wider sharing.
The foregoing framework also provides a better basis for dealing
with China on the issue of ballistic missile defense. It would allow
the U.S. to offer China a leadership role in this initiative if China
were willing to commit itself to the key elements of the overall
strategy--in particular, tough export control limitations, an end to
transfer of Chinese WMD and missile technology to key countries of
concern, and a halt to its own ballistic missile threat to its
neighbors.
2. Define a new Concept of 21st Century Deterrence
In a Cold War world of a single overwhelming Soviet military
threat, deterrence could be based in large measure on the threat of
retaliation by offensive nuclear forces. With a post-Communist Russia
no longer a global threat to U.S. interests, there is a real question
about the continued requirement for this concept of deterrence as to
Russia. With respect to the rest of the 21st century world, even more
questions can be raised.
A principal U.S. national security concern is to keep countries
like North Korea and Iraq from threatening U.S. regional allies, vital
U.S. interests, or critical resources. To deter or defend against this
challenge, the United States and its allies must be capable of bringing
conventional military power into a region and of using it against a
threatening state if necessary. The principal threat to this ability is
WMD directed against U.S. military forces and allies in the region--and
against the U.S. homeland, in hopes that a U.S. President will be
deterred from putting U.S. forces into the region or using them against
the offending country.
It is an open question whether the threat of even nuclear
retaliation represents a credible deterrent to the use of WMD in this
context. Is a regime as unstable and paranoid as the North Korean
leadership susceptible to ``rational'' deterrence? How credible is the
threat of nuclear retaliation against even states like North Korea and
Iraq--especially if they were to use WMD not against the U.S. but a
U.S. ally? Would we really respond to a chemical weapon attack on a
U.S. ally with U.S. nuclear weapons? To a chemical attack even on U.S.
forward deployed forces?
There is still a role for deterrence by threat of retaliation--even
nuclear retaliation: to help deter a North Korea from using its
overwhelming conventional military capability against South Korean and
U.S. forces; to help dissuade Saddam Hussein from using chemical and
biological weapons such as in the Gulf War. For this purpose, however,
the United States does not need anything like the number of deployed
nuclear weapons that it had during the Cold War. But it increasingly
needs to enhance deterrence by coupling the threat of retaliation with
the ability to deny an opponent the benefit of any WMD capability. This
is the contribution that active defenses (such as ballistic missile
defense) and other measures can make to deterrence.
The United States needs to develop a concept for deterrence in the
21st century based on both offensive and defensive forces, on a balance
between threat of retaliation and ability to deny, on a combination of
dissuasion, defense, and counterforce. A great deal of thinking is
required to develop this concept. But it should already be influencing
U.S. national security strategy and policy. It can help support the
case for ballistic missile defense.
3. Propose to Russia a ``Package Deal'' on Nuclear Forces and Deployed
Defenses
This concept of deterrence based on a mix of offensive and
defensive forces also makes sense as an approach to Russia's own
national security requirements. It would permit Russia to reduce the
number of its nuclear forces to a level that it could sustain
economically while still maintaining parity with the United States. It
would mark a return to the more traditional Russian emphasis on
defensive forces.
To operationalize this concept, the United States should propose to
Russia a ``package deal'' coupling a significant reduction in the
numerical ceilings in the START II Treaty with a revision of the ABM
Treaty to permit the deployment of numerically limited but still
capable ballistic missile defenses protecting the territory of the two
nations. The theater missile defenses of the two sides should remain
unconstrained.
Further analytical work would be required to determine the proper
level for strategic nuclear forces of the two sides. The establishment
of any such level would also have to be contingent upon no significant
increase in the forces of other nuclear weapons states (particularly
chemical) that might threaten either country. But the level might be
expected to be significantly below the 2,500 level set as a target for
START III.
Similar analysis would be required to determine the nature of the
limits to be contained in an amended ABM Treaty. But it is fully
expected that the national missile defense system that could be
deployed by either country under these limits would not undermine the
credibility or effectiveness of either the U.S. or Russian strategic
nuclear deterrents even at reduced levels. The U.S. should insure that
this is also true for the French and U.K. strategic deterrents, which
are likely to represent a much more sophisticated capability than can
be handled by the current U.S. national missile defense system design.
While such a ``package'' approach would reduce the economic burden
of Russia's nuclear forces, it could mean a significant new economic
burden for Russia in the form of ballistic missile defense deployments.
Ironically, however, Russia already maintains the world's only
operating ABM system, still has extensive air defenses, and produces
its own theater missile defense systems.
Still, the United States could consider as part of the ``package
deal'' the possibility of cooperative efforts in the field of ballistic
missile defense--as part of a comprehensive global strategy involving
U.S. allies and other countries in dealing with WMD and the means to
deliver them. Such potential cooperation--again, also involving U.S.
friends and allies--might include:
Expanded ballistic missile launch notification, sharing of
sensor early warning data on ballistic missile launches, and a
joint ballistic missile warning center.
Interoperable theater missile defense systems--the U.S. PAC
III and the Russian S300--that could be offered for sale in
tandem as agreed between the two countries by a U.S./Russian
joint venture to countries threatened by proliferating
neighbors. (This could both provide an important contribution
to a comprehensive global WMD strategy and offer U.S. support
for Russian access to a legitimate export market for its TMD
systems.)
A possible U.S./Russian joint venture to develop a ground-
based national missile defense system that the U.S., its
allies, and Russia could deploy, thereby assisting Russia in
meeting its own needs for ballistic missile defenses.
This latter proposal raises the controversial issue of sharing of
ballistic missile defense technology with the Russians. This is not a
new proposal. President Ronald Reagan offered to share just such
technology with the Soviet Union as part of his SDI initiative, and the
Bush Administration defined several joint development activities to be
pursued by U.S. and Russian scientists in the field of ballistic
missile defense.
Given the number of strategic ballistic missiles that the Russians
would continue to possess, they would not need to be able
technologically to defeat a U.S. national missile defense system but
could simply overwhelm it. Perhaps a greater risk is that the Russians
might provide critical technological information to countries against
which the U.S. system really was directed, such as Iraq or North Korea.
The issue warrants greater study. But such a technology sharing program
with Russia would help to rebut the argument that by pursuing a
national missile defense program the United States was simply seeking
unilateral advantage over Russia.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Hadley, thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. SMITH, FORMER CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR
TO THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS; PRESIDENT, GLOBAL HORIZONS
INC., ANNANDALE, VA
Ambassador Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
inviting me. I would also like to thank you particularly for
recalling my service here at the committee. Unfortunately, we
were dealing with many of the same issues on the ABM Treaty
when I was a staffer here in the mid-1980's, and it is a shame
that we cannot get over that.
Second, I would like to say that I would wholeheartedly
associate myself with your remarks at the outset. I think you
are absolutely right, and I hope that my statement here will
perhaps reinforce some of the points which you have made.
Your staff has asked me to take a look at a rather long and
complicated list of issues, and I have put together a fairly
comprehensive statement. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to submit it for the record and summarize what I
have to say.
Senator Hagel. It will be included in the record.
Ambassador Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My remarks this morning will focus on five areas, and I
would like to take them in turn.
First, while it has been said both by my friend, Mr.
Hadley, and by yourself at the outset, I think it is important
to set the stage. I think it is very important the United
States proceed apace with national missile defense. That is the
first point that I think lays the groundwork for everything
else I have to say.
I would refer to the July 15, 1998 report of the bipartisan
Rumsfeld Commission, and I will not go over all of their
conclusions, but I think two of them bear repeating.
One is that concerted efforts by a number of overtly or
potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with
biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the
United States. It seems to me that that is about all we need to
conclude that we have a problem here and we need to do
something about it.
The second conclusion that I think ought to be
highlighted--and I do not think it has gotten enough attention
since the commission's report was published--is that plausible
scenarios include rebasing or transfer of operational missiles,
sea and air-launch options. The implications of that are clear.
That means that the system that we deploy tomorrow is not going
to be good enough the day after tomorrow. It is like anything
else in human history. I do not know why we should be so
shocked, but the fact is we need to start thinking about what
we are going to do next.
Now, if the Rumsfeld Commission was not enough, recall that
not 6 weeks after the Rumsfeld Commission issued its report,
the North Koreans gave us a practical demonstration with the
launch of their Taepo Dong-1. This overflew Japan on August 31,
1998. And let us remember, it was a three-stage missile. Our
intelligence community was shocked that it was a three-stage
missile, and one of those stages was solid fuel. This is a
broke, hermetic State that has managed to go from a basic Scud
infrastructure to building a three-stage missile, including
solid fuel technology. I think we better watch out out there.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there remains no doubt
that a ballistic missile threat to the United States is
developing rapidly, nor is there any doubt that national
missile defense is the right answer. And I offer you three
reasons.
The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign
danger,'' wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one
of the primitive objects of civil society, an avowed and
essential object of the American Union.'' Every American
citizen should have the defense that our technology and our
wealth can afford.
The second reason for national missile defense is
geopolitical. Now, there are dedicated opponents of national
missile defense who will revel in telling you that why would
anybody go to ballistic missiles when there are 100 other ways
someone could harm the United States. And, of course, there are
100 other ways someone could harm the United States. We have
seen embassy bombings in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. We have had
some homegrown problems here in the United States. Clearly
there are ways to do harm to the United States and to
Americans. That is terrorism. We need to make the distinction
between terrorism and geopolitical tools, and ballistic
missiles are geopolitical tools.
The Rumsfeld Commission makes it very clear that there are
plenty of countries out there who are willing to spend their
scarce resources on developing ballistic missiles. Now, it is
unlikely those countries are doing that just to create some
kind of a space-age car bomb. The fact is they see some other
use, and the use they see is they want to create an
asymmetrical capability with which to threaten the United
States, frankly to keep us from projecting our power into their
regions. They want to affect our calculations. It is a
geopolitical reason.
If somebody wants to throw a suitcase bomb at us, obviously
they can do that, and our Government ought to be working on
that. Do not misunderstand. But let us not confuse the two
issues.
The final reason I think we need to proceed with national
missile defense is to echo what my friend, Mr. Hadley, has
said, to complement our nonproliferation efforts. It seems to
me that if we make clear to countries who are thinking about
getting into this asymmetrical game, that the United States is
going to use its technology and its wealth to thwart their
plans, they might think twice. We might dissuade them. Not all
of them, but it seems to me that it is a necessary ingredient
of a serious nonproliferation effort.
Now, I think those are good, solid reasons why we need to
proceed with national missile defense. But we have a problem.
The fact is that national missile defense is blocked by the ABM
Treaty as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, there will be people
who will come in here and tell you that that is not the case,
that they have found ways to make things treaty compliant. The
three of us know exactly how the United States makes treaty
compliance decisions for its own behavior, and let me assure
you that in the end of the day, there is no such thing as a
treaty compliant national missile defense deployment.
Let me be clear. The only thing that we can deploy is a
second Safeguard system from the 1960's. That is all we can
deploy. We need to understand that even the so-called C-1
architecture, even confined to 20 missiles, even deployed at
Grand Forks, North Dakota is going to involve some kind of a
negotiation with the Russians. There is simply no such thing as
a treaty compliant NMD.
Let me give you three of the issues that will come up in
these kinds of discussions on the ABM Treaty.
The first is territorial defense. It is found in article I.
The root of the problem here is this. Over the years, when it
did not look like we were going to do much, we developed a kind
of shorthand, a common parlance with which we said what the ABM
Treaty permits. It permits 100 interceptors at one site. And
that shorthand grew up as lingua franca. That is what we
decided it meant. Well, we were not really doing much, and so
it was a good textbook description, but there are some
problems.
The notion that there is a treaty compliant defense forgets
that the 100 interceptors at one site was not an object in
itself. It was a tool to implement the treaty's object and
purpose, and the treaty's object and purpose is to prohibit a
territorial defense. Now, that stands in stark contrast with
the stated purpose of our current deployment readiness program
for national missile defense, and it is--I quote--``The NMD
system will provide defense of all territory of all the 50
States.''
Now, anyone who has stood in front of a TV camera or run
for elected office, as you have, Mr. Chairman, would understand
that we might be able to weave other arguments around this, but
it is going to be a real tough sell to stand up and say that
territorial defense is not territorial defense. I can do it but
not in a 15-second sound bite. It is not going to go over well.
Moreover, when you get in the room with the Russians, they
have absolutely no obligation or any interest to make this easy
for us. So, when you hear administration witnesses telling you
we are just going to go over and get the Russians to nod their
heads up and down to something like this, it is not going to be
that easy.
The second issue that is going to arise on any NMD
deployment under the ABM Treaty is the issue of radars. Now,
this may sound elementary, but I think it really does bear
repeating. The world is round. The United States territory is
rather large. From Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu and back
again, it is a large piece of that globe. And electromagnetic
waves travel in straight lines. The reason that the ABM Treaty
requires that the one, single ABM radar be deployed in a 150-
kilometer radius surrounding your launch site was to use those
elementary physical principles to make sure you only had a
territorial defense. It is not a game to see if American
scientists can somehow defend the country from North Dakota.
They cannot, by the way. But that is not the purpose of it. The
purpose is to keep that one radar in North Dakota, knowing that
the electromagnetic waves have to go straight so that you
cannot get out there and defend the whole territory.
It is not that easy just to say, oh, it is a matter of a
radar. Once again, I hear administration witnesses saying
things like that. We will just get the Russians to agree to the
radar. They are going to go right back to the purpose of the
treaty, and the reason for the prohibitions on the radars is
the object and purpose of the treaty: to prevent a territorial
defense.
What I am really getting at here is there is no such thing
as a modest treaty amendment.
Now, the third issue that is going to arise is where do you
put the NMD system. We have a problem even if you want to go to
Grand Forks. The ABM Treaty requires that your ABM system be in
a 150-kilometer radius that contains ballistic missiles. Well,
the idea here was--these are the concepts of mutual assured
destruction and crisis stability--that if you defend just the
missile field, or just the national command authority, you
assure stability because you are assuring some kind of survival
for a second strike capability. If you defend the entire
territory, that becomes destabilizing. That is why the missile
defense is supposed to be in either a missile field or the
national capital. There is a reason for that.
Well, guess what? We have shut down our missile field at
Grand Forks. The BRAC wanted it closed. It is shut down and the
missiles have been moved to Malmstrom, Montana. There are no
missiles at Grand Forks.
Now, what I am hearing now is the Pentagon has come up with
the latest plan that they are going to draw a new circle which
will take in the eastern-most silos that belong to Minot Air
Force Base, draw their 150-kilometer circle, and say that that
is the Grand Forks ABM deployment area. It just seems to me it
is too clever by half, Mr. Chairman. If the Russians did
something like that, we would be raising it with them. I do not
think that is going to float in the American compliance
context.
Finally, let me note that coverage of all 50 States, if you
are going to do that, really requires a deployment from a
single site in Alaska, not in Grand Forks, North Dakota. It is
my understanding that consequently that is what the
administration is currently--and I stress currently--planning
to do. Now, it should go without saying that if you are going
to put your single site in Alaska, everything I said does not
matter. You have to change article III because you cannot now
put your single site in Alaska.
Multiple fixed ground base sites, sea or space-based
national missile defense, the development of sea or space-based
national missile defense, and advanced sensors which could
substitute for what the treaty calls an ABM radar are
altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today.
Mr. Chairman, basically we have an urgent dilemma. What I
have tried to set up before you is this. We have to do national
missile defense. The ABM Treaty, as it stands today, blocks
national missile defense. So, what do we do?
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972
ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the United States. The
ABM Treaty is not a cornerstone of stability for the new
millennium. It is a delicate diplomatic problem for today.
Now, that said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say
that our security relationship with Russia is important, that
Russia is in a crucial transition, and I do not see any reason
needlessly to provoke them into some kind of a diplomatic rift
over the ABM Treaty. I favor trying to negotiate something,
although I recognize, as Mr. Hadley pointed out, today that is
not going to be easy. But the fact is the date at which we are
going to need some ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast
approaching. In fact, it is in about 18 months. That is not me
speaking. That is the schedule of the Clinton administration's
national missile defense program. We have got to have something
done in about 18 months.
There were better times as Mr. Hadley pointed out. There
were times when we had better relations with Russia. There were
times when there was less confusion in Moscow. There were times
when there was no Kosovo crisis. There were times when we had
more time. Unfortunately, the administration abandoned the
Ross-Mamedov talks in 1993, and 6 years during which we could
have been talking have been squandered.
I think it is still worth a shot, but it is going to be
difficult. As a former negotiator, let me offer some points on
how to do it if we do it.
First, the United States should carefully resolve what
national missile defense it needs. And there I mean deployment
of the near-term system, as well as development and testing of
follow-on systems. We should then craft an integral negotiating
position accordingly and then approach the Russians. I will not
go into it in detail here, but I do have some ideas on what it
is we ought to be negotiating if you are interested when we get
to questions.
The one thing I want to say, though, is the worst thing we
could do is to do this piecemeal and run off to Moscow and
negotiate some kind of a deal, pay some kind of a price, just
to get them to nod their heads up and down to the C-1 or C-2
architecture. That is the absolute worst negotiating mistake we
could make.
Second, we need to announce an NMD deployment decision now.
Third, we need to embark upon a vigorous research,
development, and testing program for national missile defense
systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground-based
deployment.
Fourth, in addition to our deployment announcement, we need
to realize that we do have some leverage. The fact is that
Russia's economic plight is sending their strategic forces down
regardless of what we do. They would like an agreement for
future reduction of strategic offensive forces. This is
different from the cold war. They want an agreement for further
reductions. We can get creative, roll this all into one
negotiation. We may actually be able to turn this into a win-
win because there may be some other things the Russians would
like, like real cooperation on early warning or cooperation on
theater missile defense. This does not have to be just the
United States getting its way. There are things the Russians
want. We could come to an agreement.
Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly we have to put a
time limit on negotiations.
And sixth, we should make no commitments on longevity of
the agreement beyond the time during which we think we can live
with what it is we have negotiated.
Now, I cannot tell you what the outcome is going to be, Mr.
Chairman. I think it is worth a try. If the effort comes to
naught, at least we can say we have prepared the way by leaving
no stone unturned. I do not believe the American political
system will do any less than that. I think we have got to give
a try on this negotiation. I cannot guarantee you that in the
end we may not be faced with the stark reality of having to
withdraw from the treaty. We may.
Now, there is a myth here that I would like to explode, and
that is that somehow deploying defenses, negotiating on the ABM
Treaty somehow ipso facto makes agreements for reductions of
strategic offensive weapons go away. It is simply not the case.
As I have stated, the Russians have a greater interest than we
do right now in reducing nuclear weapons and doing that in a
negotiated agreement with the United States. It is not clear
that if we go into a negotiation, we take their security
concerns into account, we offer them something that maybe they
perceive a stake in, and we can have some kind of a negotiation
to go down, which is right now their paramount concern is that
we go down equally, that we cannot have some kind of an
agreement here. I think we need to get over this myth that just
because the Russians scream and say that is the end of START,
that somehow that necessarily needs to be true.
My guess is that if we were really serious, very much like
NATO expansion, they will scream till the moment they realize
we are really serious, and then they will deal with reality and
they will try and negotiate something.
It seems to me that is a pretty good foundation for the
kind of talks that we ought to have here.
Now, since I am suggesting that we have some kind of talks,
I think I have to tie up one other loose end, and that is the
agreements on the ABM Treaty signed at New York on September
26, 1997 on succession and demarcation.
These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for
advice and consent, and in his absence, I would like to commend
the distinguished chairman of this committee for insisting upon
that. Assuming that you are successful, Mr. Chairman, in that
venture, I respectfully suggest that these agreements are not
in the interest of the United States and the Senate should
reject them. I will offer you three main objections. Once
again, I will summarize and if you care to get into it in
questions, I would be glad to do that.
First, the memorandum of understanding adding Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty is a
strategic absurdity. Whatever you think of the ABM Treaty's
merits, you have to agree that the ABM Treaty was designed to
regulate a particular relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the cold war. We have no strategic
relationship with Kazakhstan. I have the utmost respect for the
people of Kazakhstan, but we do not have a strategic
relationship with that country.
My second concern is the New York package not only fails to
achieve so-called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM
systems and unlimited TMD systems. It actually leaves matters
worse than they had been. I will not go into all the details,
but the fact is that we have gotten ourselves into a literal
quagmire and we do not have demarcation. If you are an
interceptor with a velocity between 3 kilometers per second and
5.5 kilometers per second, the fact is you still have to go
through the same old U.S. internal compliance review, now
putting all of this stuff that the New York agreements have
superimposed into the mix. And if you have to go and debate
this with anybody in the SCC, you now not only have to discuss
it with Russia, you also have to discuss it with Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Ukraine.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, my third objection to the seven
documents in the New York package is that they form literally a
new TMD treaty, in all but name. Once again, I will not go into
the details, but if you add up all of the requirements, all of
the declarations, it clearly becomes a whole set of new
obligations, a literal obstacle course for U.S. theater--I
stress theater--missile defense which has nothing to do with
the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone on at some length. My
conclusion is very brief.
Today it is imperative that the United States proceed apace
with national missile defense, and by that I mean deployment of
the near-term system and research, development, and testing of
follow-on systems. These are actions blocked by the 1972 ABM
Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in
accordance with article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we
need--and I emphasize the changes we need--in accordance with
article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David J. Smith
Mr. Chairman: It is indeed an honor to appear before the Committee
on Foreign Relations which I once served with great pride. I thank you
and your colleagues for inviting me to share my views on missile
defense and the ABM Treaty. In accordance with your invitation, my
remarks this morning will address five key points:
--First, it is imperative that the United States proceed apace with
National Missile Defense (NMD) to protect every American citizen,
maintain freedom of action in defense of our worldwide interests, and
complement our non proliferation efforts.
--Second, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the most
modest NMD--there is no such thing as Treaty compliant NMD.
--Third, we face an urgent dilemma. To proceed with NMD, we must
soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty is of no
strategic value to the U.S. That said, however, it is in the interest
of the United States to attempt to negotiate such ABM Treaty changes as
we need. As a former negotiator, I offer six recommendations:
1. Carefully resolve what NMD we need.
2. Announce an NMD deployment decision now.
3. Embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing
program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed,
ground based deployment.
4. Recognize that we have considerable leverage--carrots and
sticks--in a broad strategic negotiation which includes ABM
Treaty issues.
5. Set a time limit on negotiations.
6. Make no commitments beyond the period during which we
think we can live with what we negotiate.
--Continuing with the five points of my testimony, fourth,
substantial modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty need not inexorably
halt agreements to reduce strategic offensive weapons, consistent with
U.S. interests.
--Fifth, the ABM Treaty agreements signed at New York on September
26, 1997--on succession and demarcation--are not in the interest of the
United States. These agreements should have been sent to the Senate for
Advice and Consent and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this
Committee for insisting upon it. Assuming success on that count, I
respectfully urge the Senate to reject them.
I shall address each point in turn.
the u.s. must proceed apace with nmd
On July 15, 1998 the bipartisan Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States chaired by former Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld issued a watershed report. The Commission's
principal findings bear emphasis in the context of this hearing:
--``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile
nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or
nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States . .
. to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five
years of a decision to acquire such a capability.
--``During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that
such a decision had been made.
--``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is
broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been
reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence
Community.
--``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and
accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is
eroding.
--``Plausible scenarios [include] re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea and air-launch options.
--``The U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational
deployment.''
If the Rumsfeld Commission left any doubt about the imminence of
the ballistic missile threat, the final jolt had to be from the roar of
North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) missile as it overflew Japan on
August 31, 1998. Even if we accept Pyongyang's explanation that the
rocket was a space launch vehicle, it is less than a hop, skip and jump
from space launch to ICBM capability. Our attention should not be
diverted from the startling news that the North Korean missile
consisted of three stages: liquid fuel first and second stages, which
the Intelligence Community had thought to be the entire TD-1, plus a
solid fuel third stage. Never mind that the test was not fully
successful--beginning with just a SCUD-based single stage missile
infrastructure, hermetic and destitute North Korea has flight tested a
three stage missile with solid fuel technology! A TD-1 with a small
payload could reach Alaska, and North Korea is known already to be
working on a TD-2.
Mr. Chairman, there remains no doubt that a ballistic missile
threat to the U.S. is developing rapidly, or that NMD is the right
answer for three reasons.
The first is the most basic. ``Security against foreign danger,''
wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 41, ``is one of the primitive
objects of civil society . . . an avowed and essential object of the
American Union.'' Every American citizen, from sea to shining sea,
should have such defense as our technology and wealth can afford.
The second reason for NMD is geopolitical. Dedicated NMD opponents
revel in telling us that there are ways easier than ballistic missiles
to hurt the United States. Why, they ask, would an enemy resort to
ballistic missiles? In light of some of the recent violence which has
gripped our nation, this question deserves particular attention.
Last year, attacks upon U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam
reminded us that simple bombs aboard trucks, cars or vans can be deadly
terror weapons. A home grown kook took the lives of two Capitol Police
officers, reminding us that no security system is risk free. And just a
few weeks ago, our nation was forced to look into its very soul by two
troubled teenagers in Littleton, Colorado. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman,
whether directed by trenchies, Aum Shinrikyo, Osama Bin Laden or some
hostile state, there could also be suitcase bombs, vials of anthrax,
malicious computer hackers, commonplace airplane hijackings, ship
boardings and automatic weapons spraying busy city streets. These are
all perils against which a responsible government should guard its
people. But they are tools of terrorism, not of geopolitical strategy--
and we must not confuse the two.
We must not confuse them because clearly our adversaries do not. As
the Rumsfeld Commission detailed, and as the North Korean TD-1 flight
underscored, there are plenty of countries willing to devote scarce
resources to building ballistic missiles. Since it is unlikely they
plan to use these as space age car bombs, they must calculate some
other benefit. Indeed they do. Regimes which perceive their interests
at odds with ours want ballistic missiles to wield in regional crises
to alter America's calculation of the costs and benefits of
involvement--in other words, to keep us out.
A remark of Chinese General Xiong Guang Kai during the 1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis is instructive in this regard. The United States would
not defend Taiwan, argued Xiong, because China would ``rain nuclear
bombs on Los Angeles.'' No two crises are identical and the outcome of
any future crisis will certainly be situation dependent, but--make no
mistake--a threat to the American homeland would indeed alter our cost-
benefit calculations. Xiong's remark, and others like it by Saddam
Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, reflect not a reckless obsession to hurt
America but, in the words of William R. Graham and Keith B. Payne--both
recent witnesses before this Committee--``a well thought out strategy
to `trump' the West's capability to project overwhelming conventional
power into their regions.''
Anyone who sees the global power projection capability of America
and its allies and friends as stabilizing should see all missile
defense--theater and national--as stabilizing. Just as we do not want
Japan intimidated by North Korean missiles, neither can we tolerate the
same tactics applied directly to the United States by China, North
Korea, Iran or whomever. And best way to thwart such tactics is to
``trump'' them with NMD.
The final reason I shall mention today for the U.S. to proceed now
with a robust NMD program is to complement our non proliferation
efforts. Let us not forget that we are the world's only superpower.
Enemies fear our military might, our training, our experience, our
wealth and, most of all, our technology. They know they cannot take us
on on our terms, so they reach for asymmetrical capabilities such as
long range missiles to alter the playing field. So long as we remain
undefended, the price of entry to the club of countries able to affect
U.S. calculations is but a single long range missile with a nuclear or
biological payload. And as long we appear likely to remain undefended,
a lot of countries will consider joining that club. On the other hand,
if we send an unequivocal signal that we will apply our technology and
wealth to thwarting this particular asymmetrical threat, some countries
will be dissuaded from embarking upon or continuing long range missile
programs. Like any non proliferation effort, this will not be 100%
effective, but it would be a potent dimension of a serious non
proliferation effort.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the Cold War, the U.S. maintained
deterrence with the Soviet Union not only with the force in being, but
also with the so called ``R&D deterrent.'' Moscow's ambitions were
checked by the certainty that America's best and brightest would be a
step ahead at just about every turn. Ultimately, it was the ``R&D
deterrent'' which drove Marshall Akhromeyev and the Soviet military to
despair, a major contributing factor to the implosion of the Soviet
Union. It is time we reclaim our confidence and apply American
strengths to the challenges of the next century.
These are three solid reasons why the U.S. must proceed apace with
NMD. Unfortunately, the ABM Treaty as it stands today blocks even the
most modest NMD.
the abm treaty blocks national missile defense
Mr. Chairman, there are those who assert otherwise, but
understanding the way the U.S. goes about decisions on its own Treaty
compliance, I assure you there is no such thing as an ABM Treaty
compliant National--and I stress National--Missile Defense. About the
only system we can deploy under the ABM Treaty as it stands today would
be a Safeguard II. Let me be clear. Even the so called C-1 architecture
of 20 NMD interceptors, even deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota,
would require negotiation with Russia of some clarifications,
understandings or amendments. Today, I will outline for you the three
biggest ABM Treaty issues which any NMD deployment will raise:
territorial defense, radars and deployment area.
The root of the territorial defense issue is the shorthand
description which developed over the years of what the ABM Treaty
permits: 100 interceptors at one site. As the controversy over SDI
raged, people of good will sought a consensual path forward with a
Treaty compliant system which, applying the shorthand, came to mean up
to 100 interceptors at one site. In 1988, the distinguished past
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, recognized that
a space based version of his Accidental Launch Protection System (ALPS)
would require ABM Treaty amendment, but he also spoke of defensive
deployments that ``might be possible within the terms of the treaty or,
at most, require a modest amendment.'' A few years later, the Missile
Defense Act of 1991 called for a ``. . . cost effective, operationally
effective and ABM Treaty compliant ABM system at a single site . . .''.
President Clinton vetoed the FY-96 Defense Authorization Act and
threatened to veto the 1996 Defend America Act on the grounds that
these bills would have set the United States on a path to violate the
ABM Treaty. At the same time, Administration spokespersons claimed that
their so called ``3 + 3'' NMD program would not violate the ABM Treaty.
More recently, the Administration has realized that while ``3 + 3'', or
now ``3 + 5'', development can probably be carried out in compliance
with the Treaty, deployment would require some amendment.
The fact is that if we ever proceed with the ``plus'' part of ``3 +
5'', significant amendments or understandings to the ABM Treaty will
have to be sought. The notion of Treaty compliant NMD ignores that the
100/1 limitation was not an object in itself, but a tool to implement
the Treaty's object and purpose as set forth in Article I: ``. . . not
to deploy ABM systems for the defense of the territory . . .'' Thus the
objective of our current NMD deployment readiness program--``the NMD
system will provide defense of all territory on the 50 states''--stands
in apparent contrast to the Treaty's object and purpose.
The question, then, is not the technical one of whether the
territory of the United States can be defended with 100 interceptors
from one site in North Dakota (it cannot, by the way). Rather, the
relevant ABM Treaty question is whether limited defense of the entire
territory--even with 100 interceptors at one site--is territorial
defense.
The traditional U.S. view, consistently held across
administrations, is that Article I is hortatory, establishing the
framework for the substantive provisions that follow. Thus, in the U.S.
view, a side would have to violate some provision of Articles Ill, V,
VI or IX in order to violate Article I. In other words, Articles Ill,
V, VI and IX specify what actions would be technologically necessary
for a side to move toward a territorial defense. If this traditional
U.S. view is maintained and sustained with the Russians, the issue of
territorial defense would not arise.
But this is uncharted water. The issue of territorial defense has
never arisen in a major way because, until now, the United States had
not been discussing deployment of an operational ABM system. Although
the Soviets raised Article I a number of times in connection with our
SDI program, we were always able to respond, as we did with the 1984
Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), that the activity in question was a
technology demonstration, not deployment of an operational system. This
time, the U.S. would be deploying an operational system whose stated
purpose is to cover the entire territory.
I do not deny that a sound argument can be made that territorial
defense of the type we are now contemplating would not be a territorial
defense which would impinge upon the object and purpose of the ABM
Treaty. That is, a thin defense against third countries or accidental
or unauthorized launch would not detract from a Russian second strike
capability, even under projected START Ill offensive force levels.
Nevertheless, anyone who has stood in front of TV cameras or run for
elected office will appreciate that arguing that ``territorial defense
is not territorial defense'' is going to be a tough sell. This may be a
hurdle which can be overcome, however, it will require the U.S. at
least to seek some clarification or understanding in the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), the ABM Treaty's joint implementation
body. And the Russians have neither an obligation nor an interest in
making this easy for us.
There is one further liability which NMD raises in the context of
territorial defense. ABM Treaty Article I also commits us ``. . . not
to provide a base for [territorial] defense . . .'' If the thin NMD
system itself would not constitute a territorial defense in violation
of Article I, does it lay a base for such a defense? The U.S. may
establish that an NMD deployment of 20, or even 100, interceptors
cannot possibly be a territorial defense in the meaning of the ABM
Treaty, that is, a defense which could leave us invulnerable to a
Russian retaliatory attack. However, once even a minimal NMD system is
deployed at Grand Forks, long lead items such as radars and BM/C3 will
be in place and interceptor missiles and Kinetic Kill Vehicles (KKVs)
will be under production.
There are no doubt Treaty amendments and confidence building
measures which could address this issue, but these will have to be
negotiated. And this is precisely my point; we are in for a negotiation
which is going to involve the Article I issue of territorial defense.
The second issue, radars, is intertwined with the issue of
territorial defense. This issue is so complex and architecture
dependent that I shall confine my remarks to a general description.The
world is round; U.S. territory--from Calais to Key West to Kure to Attu
and back to Calais--occupies a large bit of it; and high frequency
electromagnetic waves travel in straight lines. By confining ABM radars
to one 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area, the authors of the ABM
Treaty used these elementary physical facts to implement the Treaty's
object and purpose, that is, to prohibit a territorial defense.
With today's technology we can do a lot more from that one site
than we could in 1972 but, still, a single ABM radar in North Dakota
just cannot cover the territory of the United States. Consequently,
every candidate NMD architecture I have seen features some combination
of upgraded Early Warning Radars (EWRs), including EWRs outside U.S.
territory, space based sensors, X-Band radars deployed outside the ABM
deployment area, and a highly capable sensor aboard the NMD
interceptor. Such sensor suites don't fit into the ABM Treaty's
framework.
But the problem is only partly that today's technology does not
match yesterday's Treaty terms. The greater issue is that our objective
for today's technology does not match the object and purpose for which
yesterday's Treaty terms were written. In other words, to proceed with
NMD we will have to seek ABM Treaty adjustments and understandings on
radars and these will be directly related to the issue of territorial
defense. This will involve wrenching the Russians and the American arms
control community from positions with which they have grown quite
comfortable. Consequently, there will be no such thing as a ``modest''
Treaty adjustment or understanding.
Yet a third ABM Treaty issue is the deployment area, and this too
is related to the issue of territorial defense. The ABM Treaty requires
the 150 Km. radius ABM deployment area at Grand Forks to contain ICBM
silo launchers. But the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(BRAC) recommended that the 321st Strategic Missile Group at Grand
Forks AFB be deactivated and its Minuteman III missiles relocated to
Malmstrom AFB, Montana. The missiles have now been moved, but START
Treaty accountable silos will remain at Grand Forks for three more
years. The Department of Defense is apparently taking the view that it
can now locate a Grand Forks ABM deployment area within a 150 Km.
radius circle drawn to include some missiles assigned to Minot AFB, ND.
In a strict legal sense this may be correct. However, deactivating the
missile field in which we have said our ABM system would be located,
and redrawing a circle to encompass a few missiles from a different
base to satisfy Treaty obligations could easily be portrayed as a sham
which is not the way the U.S. complies with its legal obligations. It
is too clever by half and we would surely question an analogous Russian
move. Proceeding in this way would only further underscore the
territorial defense issue.
The idea underlying this ABM Treaty provision was that defense of a
single missile field in order to guarantee survival of at least some
retaliatory capability would be stabilizing, unlike territorial defense
which was seen as destabilizing. Now, if the U.S. deploys an NMD system
in North Dakota which is only perfunctorily related to an ICBM field,
it must be ``up to'' something else--again, we return to the matter of
territorial defense.
Finally, I note that achieving coverage of all fifty states from a
single site, particularly if the fastest emerging threat is in
Northeast Asia, requires that single site to be in Alaska. It is my
understanding that, consequently, the Administration's current plan
would be to deploy our first NMD site in Alaska, if President Clinton
decides to deploy in June, 2000. Clearly, deploying an NMD site in
Alaska would require amendment of the Treaty's Article Ill.
Multiple fixed ground based sites, sea or space based NMD, the
development and testing of sea or space based NMD, and advanced sensors
which could substitute for what the Treaty calls an ``ABM radar'' are
altogether prohibited by the ABM Treaty as it stands today.
we must soon realize at least substantial modifications to the 1972 abm
treaty
We face an urgent dilemma. Frankly, continued U.S. adherence to the
1972 ABM Treaty is of no strategic value to the U.S. Setting aside
discussion of the Treaty's value during the Cold War, we must now
recognize that it is indeed an artifact of the Cold War. It was
conceived to preserve deterrence and crisis stability between two
superpowers locked in an ideological struggle which, from time to time,
erupted into crises. Now, the Soviet Union is gone and with it the
Marxist-Leninist ideology which was the root cause of the Cold War.
Russia, whatever its problems or even faults, is not dominated by a
Marxist-Leninist ideology which impels it into conflict with us across
the globe. It does not keep twenty divisions in East Germany poised to
strangle Berlin. It does not operate a worldwide network to spark
conflict in places like Korea, Vietnam and Angola. Admiral Gorshkov's
blue water navy is rusting, tied up in decaying ports. And the major
issue for Russian strategic forces today is how to manage inevitable
economically driven decline. Quite simply, the potential crisis which
the ABM Treaty purported to stabilize no longer looms. The ABM Treaty
is not a cornerstone of stability for the new millennium; it is a
delicate diplomatic matter for today.
That said, I wholeheartedly agree with those who say that our
security relationship with Russia remains important, that Russia is in
a crucial transition and that we should not needlessly provoke a
diplomatic rift over the ABM Treaty--the Treaty remains important
diplomatically and strategically to them. Therefore, I favor attempting
to negotiate such changes to the ABM Treaty as the U.S. needs, although
I recognize it will not now be easy.
Given even the schedule of the ``3 + 5'' program, the time at which
we will need ABM Treaty modifications in place is fast approaching.
President Clinton has said he will decide whether to deploy in June of
2000. For the reasons outlined above, it would be inconceivable to me
that he would decide otherwise. Then, the kind of construction which
would raise ABM Treaty issues would begin in mid 2001, at the start of
the short Alaskan construction season. Understanding that our only
alternative to negotiated modifications would be withdrawal from the
Treaty in accordance with Article XV, requiring six months notice, we
would have to achieve those negotiated modifications by the Fall of
2000--about eighteen months from today. That would be a tall order in
the best of times and these are not the best of times. The crisis in
Kosovo has created a major rift in U.S.-Russia relations. Moreover,
Russia faces elections to the State Duma this December and presidential
elections in June, 2000. Soon thereafter, the U.S. faces a general
election.
There were once better times when there was more time to negotiate.
Unfortunately, the Administration has squandered six years since 1993
when it abandoned the Ross-Mamedov Talks and discussion of President
Yeltsin's proposal for a Global Protection System.
Still, I think an attempt at negotiation should be made. If it is,
allow me as a former negotiator to suggest a few guidelines.
First, the U.S. should carefully resolve what NMD it needs--
deployment and development and testing--for the next few years, craft
an integral negotiating position accordingly, and then approach the
Russians. Nothing should be excluded from consideration, including
space based defenses. Of course, the more we seek, the tougher the
negotiation will be. On the other hand, there is no sense in seeking or
agreeing to less than is needed. We should not conform our NMD
requirements to the ABM Treaty or to what we expect to be
``negotiable.'' And the worst thing we could do is negotiate piecemeal,
rushing off to negotiate Russian assent to, say, just the C-1 or C-2
architecture. There will be a price to pay and we are likely to have to
live with what we negotiate for a few years.
Second, announce an NMD deployment decision now. Funds to support
the decision should be put into the FYDP and the Congress should
authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to ramp up to a
deployment. Without these, the Russians will not recognize any urgent
need to treat our approach seriously. This is all the more important in
the current political turmoil in Moscow because we will have to work
extra hard to gain their attention which is almost entirely focused on
economics and internal power struggles.
Third, embark upon a vigorous research, development and testing
program for NMD systems which may follow our initial fixed, ground
based deployment. There are no constraints on the evolution of the
ballistic missile threat to the U.S. We should expect MIRVs, MaRVs,
decoys, penetration aids, lower radar cross sections and higher
velocity re entry vehicles. Moreover, a principal finding of the
Rumsfeld Commission is that ``plausible scenarios [include] re-basing
or transfer of operational missiles, sea and air-launch options.''
Fixed, ground based interceptors cannot respond to such threats. We
should not despair and be self deterred from deploying the NMD system
we are developing and getting into the business of missile defense. But
neither should we become complacent and neglect to prepare for the
challenges of tomorrow. Consequently, our foreseeable development and
testing needs must figure into careful resolution of what NMD we need
for the next few years.
Fourth, in addition to the NMD deployment announcement, we must
recognize that we do have other points of leverage. Russia's economic
plight dictates dramatic reductions in strategic forces and their
calculus dictates a negotiated mutual reduction with the United States.
With START II almost certainly dead, we have an opportunity to discuss
force levels and structures appropriate for the new millennium from
START I levels. Moreover, there may be other things Russia would like
to have such as real early warning sharing and cooperation on theater
missile defense. In short, creative strategic negotiations which
include ABM Treaty issues could result in a ``win-win outcome.''
Fifth, politely, reasonably, but firmly put a time limit on
negotiations. The luxury of protracted talks having been squandered, we
must now demand closure in the near term. In a sense, we could turn a
weakness into a strength by using the current NMD schedule as a point
of leverage.
Sixth, while the Russians will demand some longevity for whatever
they negotiate, we should not make any commitments beyond the period
during which we think we can live with the new agreement. One of the
major lessons of the ABM Treaty is that it is absolutely impossible to
predict world events and technology a quarter century down the road.
The ABM Treaty is already of unlimited duration so, to seek further
changes in the future, we would again be faced with renegotiation or
withdrawal from the Treaty. These are guarantees enough. Moreover,
assuming we really negotiate for what we need over the next few years,
I believe there is an excellent chance that by the time we need to face
the issue again, both sides will have moved to a whole new strategic
paradigm in which we no longer base our security on threats of mutual
nuclear annihilation. The ABM Treaty just won't matter any more.
I cannot tell you what the outcome of a negotiation on the ABM
Treaty might be. In the end, if a negotiating effort comes to nought
and we are faced with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, at least we will
have prepared the way by leaving no stone unturned. We will demand no
less of ourselves.
modifications to the 1972 abm treaty need not inexorably halt
agreements to reduce strategic nuclear weapons
One myth which has dogged NMD for years is that U.S. missile
defenses beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty as it stands today will
inexorably bring agreements to reduce strategic offensive arms to a
screeching halt. This need not be the case. The ABM Treaty's Article
XIV provides for amendments--otherwise how could the Treaty's authors
have purported to write a document of ``unlimited duration?'' If the
U.S. has amendments to propose, we should offer them. Russia has an
obligation to engage seriously on our proposals although, of course, no
obligation to agree. However, I would suggest that once it becomes
clear that U.S. NMD is inevitable, Russia--as it did with NATO
expansion--will douse the rhetoric and deal with reality. This is
especially so if we are willing to negotiate, take Russian security
concerns into account and offer benefits in which they perceive a
stake. Today, Russian strategic offensive forces are declining for
economic reasons--some authoritative Russians have even suggested to
the hundreds of warheads. Different from Cold War days, Russia now
wants agreed reductions more than we. Indeed, START II is almost
certainly dead, languishing in the State Duma not over concerns about
American NMD, but over concerns about Russian offensive force
structure. This would appear to be about as promising a foundation for
talks as we are likely to get.
the new york abm treaty agreements are not in the interest of the
united states
Since I have recommended that the U.S. seek needed modifications to
the ABM Treaty in the context of wider strategic negotiations and
suggested that START II is almost certainly dead, it is incumbent upon
me to address one more loose end--the ABM Treaty agreements signed at
New York on September 26, 1997 on succession and demarcation. These
agreements should have been sent to the Senate for Advice and Consent
and I commend the distinguished Chairman of this Committee for
insisting upon that. Assuming success on that count, I respectfully
suggest that these agreements are not in the interest of the United
States and I urge the Senate reject them.
When I refer to the New York package, I am referring to seven ABM
Treaty documents, the first three of which should be submitted for the
Senate's Advice and Consent, signed on September 26, 1997:
--A Memorandum of Understanding adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine as ABM Treaty parties.
--The First Agreed Statement and Second Agreed Statement which
purport to demarcate between ABM Treaty limited ABM and
unlimited TMD.
--An Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
--A Joint Statement on annual updates to information on TMD systems
covered by the CBMs Agreement.
--A unilateral Statement by the United States of America that ``it
has no plans'' to test TMD of a velocity greater than 3 Km/sec.
before April, 1999, to develop TMD with velocity greater than
5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for sea based), or to test TMD against MIRVs
or strategic RVs.
--New Regulations of the Standing Consultative Committee which
reflect the addition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
I offer three main objections to the New York ABM Treaty package.
First, the Memorandum of Understanding adds Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine as parties to the ABM Treaty--a strategic absurdity. Whatever
one's opinion of the merits of the ABM Treaty, we could all agree that
its purpose was to regulate a unique strategic relationship between the
U.S. and the USSR. No such relationship exists or can exist between us
and Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine. These newly independent states had
to be added, the Administration argues, because Treaty limited radars
and an ABM test site now lie in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This
is a specious argument. The Treaty limited Skrunda Radar lies in
Latvia, but Latvia is not being added to the Treaty. The U.S. operates
Treaty limited radars on the territories of Denmark and the United
Kingdom and an ABM test site in the Republic of the Marshall Islands
(which attained sovereignty just a few months before the 1991
dissolution of the USSR). Yet we never felt a post Cold War itch to add
these countries to the ABM Treaty.
It doesn't make sense. But the Administration has persisted so on
this that one cannot escape the thought that its purpose is to consign
negotiations such those proposed here to a pentalateral quagmire.
Moreover, adding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will cloud the issue
of which country to address on future compliance matters.
I would add that because of the way the New York documents are
written, everything turns on the succession Memorandum. Defeat it, and
the entire package falls.
My second concern is that the New York package not only fails to
achieve so called demarcation between ABM Treaty limited ABM and
unlimited TMD systems, it actually leaves matters worse than they had
been.
The First Agreed Statement, that is, the demarcation agreement on
lower velocity TMD, confirms what we could have, and should have,
simply asserted: U.S. TMD with interceptor velocities not exceeding 3
Km/sec. are not subject to the ABM Treaty so long as they are not
tested against targets with a velocity exceeding 5 Km/sec. or of a
range greater than 3,500 Km.
The harder question of higher velocity TMD--interceptor velocities
3 to 5.5 Km/sec. (4.5 for naval systems)--is murkier under the New York
agreements than it was before President Clinton headed to Helsinki in
March, 1997. For higher velocity TMD systems, compliance with the
target velocity and range criteria applied to lower velocity TMD is
necessary, but not sufficient, to determine ABM Treaty compliance.
There is no demarcation! Higher velocity TMD systems would still
undergo an internal U.S. Government compliance review and we would now
be committed to consult not just with Russia, but with four ABM Treaty
parties on any TMD matter. Worse, both internal and pentalateral
deliberations would be clouded by vague new restrictions: TMD may ``not
pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of another
party,'' may not be deployed ``for use against each other'' and may not
be inconsistent ``in number or geographic scope'' with the ballistic
missile threat. We have even agreed to provide our missile threat
assessment to the other parties for discussion!
The Administration emphasizes that the New York agreements would
allow all U.S. TMD programs to go forward. Well, there's ``forward''
and there's ``not exactly.'' One U.S. program, Space Based Laser, would
be preemptively prohibited, as would anything else that can intercept a
theater ballistic missile from space. Aside from that, the New York
package would freeze traditional TMD technology at its 1997 level,
grandfathering five U.S. TMD programs--Navy Area, THAAD, PAC-3, HAWK
and MEADS--in their current state. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) standing
alone would be grandfathered too. But add an improved radar, space
cueing or Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) fire control data,
and NTW would fall into the murky waters of internal compliance review
and bilateral consultation. Airborne Laser would have to traverse the
same murky waters. So would an evolved THAAD if its interceptor
velocity exceeded 3 Km/sec. So would just about anything new--something
as simple as an airship launching a kinetic boost phase interceptor.
Finally, TMD with more capable interceptors--the global missile threat
remaining unconstrained--would be handicapped by a unilateral statement
that the U.S. ``has no plans'' for interceptors faster than 5.5 Km/sec.
(4.5 for naval systems).
Mr. Chairman, I have suggested that we negotiate substantial
modifications to the ABM Treaty. If that effort were successful we
would still have an ABM Treaty, albeit substantially modified. That
means we would still have to have some guidelines to distinguish Treaty
limited ABM from unlimited TMD. Having criticized the Administration's
demarcation agreement I feel I should add just a few more words on
demarcation. Demarcation is a fleeting concept. In the early days of
the ABM Treaty the gap between the ranges of short range or Theater
Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and those of Strategic Ballistic Missiles
(SBMs) was fairly wide. Therefore, the gap between the capabilities of
systems designed to counter each was also fairly wide--it was easy to
``demarcate'' between Treaty limited ABM and unlimited TMD. As TBM
ranges increased, TMD capabilities had to increase. But, for a time,
the gap was preserved because older, less capable SBMs were being
removed from service.
Today, it is still possible to discern a gap between TBMs and SBMs
and hence between TMD and ABM systems. This is reflected in attempts at
demarcation over the quarter century between the ABM Treaty and the
1997 New York agreements. During ABM Treaty ratification hearings,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Foster suggested that
an air defense interceptor of a velocity greater than 2 Km/sec. would
require U.S. Treaty compliance review. Leaving aside the New York
Agreed Statements' many defects, they draw a line calling for U.S.
compliance review at an interceptor velocity of 3 Km/sec. and they
allow that interceptors with velocities between 3 Km/sec. and 5.5 Km/
sec. (4.5 for naval systems) could be found not subject to the ABM
Treaty. This reflects the increased capabilities of TBMs and,
therefore, of TMD.
But there is every indication that TBM ranges will continue to
increase. Just a few weeks ago India tested a 2,000 Km. range Agni-2,
followed by Pakistan's test of an 1,100 Km. range Ghauri-2. India
claims the Agni-2 has a range of 2,000-2,500 Km. and the Ghauri-2 is
credited with a range between 2,000 and 2,300 Km. During 1998, Iran
tested the 1,300 Km. range Shahab-3. Iran is reportedly working on
Shahab-4 and 5 and we should not exclude the possibility that North
Korea could export the TD-1. As the ranges of TBMs increase, the
distinction between TBMs and SBMs will begin to blur. Consequently, the
capabilities of TMD and ABM will blur and demarcation will become
impossible. At that time the concept of a treaty which limits ABM
systems will become untenable. Only interim fixes are possible.
There are two essential ingredients to an effective interim--and I
stress interim--demarcation. First, the U.S. must adopt a true
``demonstrated capability'' standard, that is, we would limit TMD
testing to targets with re entry velocities of 5 Km/sec. or ranges of
3,500 Km. or less. Other considerations, including calculations of
``inherent capability'' would become irrelevant. Second, we must adopt
a realistic ``force-on-force'' approach with which to evaluate ABM
Treaty compliance of U.S. TMD systems. This would eliminate the
altogether theoretical and exaggerated capabilities which our current
``one-on-one'' methodology attributes to U.S. TMD systems. I suggest
that we not repeat the Administration's mistake of trying to negotiate
demarcation criteria, and simply announce that henceforward these are
the criteria the U.S. will use. The Russians can always seek
clarification in the SCC.
Returning to the New York agreements, my third objection is that,
all seven documents added up, the New York package is a new TMD Treaty
in all but name. In addition to the measures I have just sketched,
consider the vast declarations of TMD information that will be
required:
launch notification;
name, designation & basing mode of TMD systems and
components;
concepts of operations;
plans and programs;
launchers per battalion for land based TMD;
class and type of ship & launchers per ship for sea based
TMD;
TMD interceptors per launcher;
aircraft type & interceptors per aircraft for air based TMD;
TMD radar frequency band and potential.
It is an elaborate new obstacle course for American TMD. Consider as
just one example how this sort of thing could afflict the U.S. Navy.
It does not require too vivid an imagination to foresee fishing
expeditions for more and more information on the Aegis system which is,
in reality, a system of systems whose purposes vastly exceed missile
defense. Then, add in commitments to limit ``number and geographic
scope,'' not to ``pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear
force of another party,'' not to deploy TMD ``for use against each
other'' and declarations of interceptors per launcher, launchers per
ship, and class and type of ship, and we are right around the corner
from naval arms control and restrictions on U.S. Navy surface ship
deployments.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, my conclusion is as brief as my presentation has been
long. Today, it is imperative that the U.S. proceed apace with NMD--
deployment of the near term system and research, development and
testing of follow on systems. These actions are blocked by the 1972 ABM
Treaty as it stands today. We have two choices: withdraw in accordance
with Article XV or seek to negotiate the changes we need in accordance
with Article XIV. I recommend that we attempt to negotiate.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Smith, thank you.
Mr. Joseph.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE
ABM TREATY'S STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION; DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR COUNTER PROLIFERATION RESEARCH, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure and an honor to
be here.
It is necessary at the outset for me to say that the views
that I will express are entirely personal. They are not the
views of the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense, or any agency of the U.S. Government.
I have submitted a statement that addresses three highly
dubious propositions or myths that are frequently asserted in
the context of supporting the ABM Treaty and maintaining that
treaty with either no change or minimal change. You touched in
your opening statement on all three of these, a statement that
I, like the previous two witnesses, would like to associate
myself with.
The three propositions that I will, with your permission,
summarize in my opening comments are, first, any attempt to
alter or to withdraw from the treaty will lead to the end of
offensive nuclear reductions and in fact the overall
deterioration in the U.S./Russian strategic relationship.
Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still
years distant, and if it does emerge, it will consist of very
few unsophisticated weapons.
And third, the ABM Treaty does not impede the current
development of a national missile defense and will require only
slight changes to permit the deployment of a limited but
nevertheless effective national missile defense.
In assessing the first proposition, I think looking back
can be very instructive. Following the Gulf War and the
attempted coup in the then Soviet Union, as Mr. Hadley points
out, the Bush administration put forth both a national missile
defense deployment plan, as well as an arms control initiative
to support that deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue
state armed with long-range missiles able to strike the United
States, and an accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from
a breakaway military commander.
To deal with this threat, the United States declared its
intention to deploy GPALS, or global protection against limited
strikes. For the near term, this architecture consisted of up
to six fixed land-based sites with up to 1,200 interceptors, a
very robust space-based sensor capability, as well as robust
theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as the threat
evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key
capability.
On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992,
the United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the
ABM Treaty that were consistent with this architecture. These
changes included the elimination of all restrictions on testing
and development, the elimination of all restrictions on
sensors, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of
systems and components in order to allow cooperative
relationships, including with Russia, and finally, the right to
deploy additional land-based interceptors at additional sites.
These positions were presented to the Russians in a
nonconfrontational and straightforward way. The Russians were
told that we could work together on defenses, but that with or
without them, the United States must protect itself from the
emerging threat. If modifications to the treaty could be
agreed, it could be retained. If not, the United States would
need to consider withdrawal, legally and in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty.
We also made clear to the Russians at that time that the
level of defenses that were to be deployed by the United States
with or without the ABM Treaty, would not threaten the
offensive capability of the Russian force at START levels or
even well below those levels. At the same time, the U.S. team
stressed that with the end of the cold war, the United States
and Russia should base their new relationship on common
interests and on cooperation and not on the cold war suspicions
and distrust that was the foundation for the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction.
I think the Russian reaction was very telling. They did not
threaten and they did not posture. They did not say yes, they
did not say no. They mostly asked questions to explore our
position.
Most important and I think relevant to keep in mind in
terms of today's discussions, while the United States was
insisting on fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty, the Russian
START negotiators in the very next room in the very same
building in Geneva were concluding the long sought after START
agreements that provided for the first time for fundamental
reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the
ABM Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to
offensive reductions was evident in the signing of both START I
and START II in quick succession.
Nevertheless, in 1993, the new administration reversed
course on national missile defenses and the renegotiation of
the ABM Treaty. NMD programs, as you know, were downgraded in
priority and funding was significantly reduced, and the treaty
was proclaimed to be the cornerstone of strategic stability.
For years this policy position has prevailed, often justified
by the assertion that we must choose between offensive
reductions and even limited defenses.
And in particular, we are told that this approach is
necessary to save START II, a treaty that Moscow has held
hostage so many times over so many years for so many different
purposes that few now believe it will ever be ratified, or if
it is to be ratified, that it will have much significance.
Yet, irrespective of START II, how Russia will react to the
deployment of national missile defenses by the United States
does remain an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian
officials have predicted dire consequences if the United States
insists on amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from that
treaty. Such assertions I believe lack supporting evidence and
ignore Russia's own approach to arms control and its own
security policies. Similar predictions were voiced in the
context, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out, of NATO
enlargement. One could give any number of other examples such
as air strikes on Iraq and some of the talk over Kosovo. Yet,
in all of these cases, Russia has acted on the basis of its
interests, not on the basis of its press statements.
The same is true regarding arms control experience, where
the most recent example of Russia pursuing its own interests in
the context of changing strategic realties is also the most
instructive. When the breakup of the Soviet Union led Russia to
conclude that the legal limits on deployed forces in its flank
regions, as established under the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, or CFE Treaty, were no longer in its interest,
Russia's approach was very straightforward: It insisted that
the treaty be changed. And the United States, as well as the
other parties to that treaty, accommodated the Russian demands
in the Flank Agreement. Since then, Russia has again insisted
on additional modifications to the CFE Treaty and the other
parties are certainly going to go along.
The principle I think is very clear. Russia assesses arms
control agreements in the context of its defense requirements.
When security conditions change, it acts with determination to
change those treaties. For us, the parallel to the ABM Treaty
is evident and the principle I believe ought to be the same.
Today the United States faces a long-range ballistic
missile threat that was not envisioned when the ABM Treaty was
negotiated. Although Moscow will certainly seek to delay and
minimize changes to the treaty and will seek a high price for
accommodation, it will understand the U.S. need to defend
against this new threat. And, as we have done with Russian
demands in the CFE context, it will accommodate.
I believe accommodation is possible because Russian
interests and U.S. interests are not mutually exclusive. Even
at the lowest levels of offensive forces speculated for Russia
in the future, a U.S. missile defense deployed to protect
against a limited attack would not undermine its offensive
capability. And this is the critical point: If Russia knows
that U.S. defenses will not call into question the credibility
of their nuclear offensive force, they will have what they
believe they need. And in this context, given the choice
between a modified ABM Treaty and no treaty, Moscow will almost
certainly follow past practice and choose to renegotiate the
treaty because that is in its own best interests.
Finally, the future of offensive nuclear reductions more
generally is less likely to be tied to formalistic arms control
negotiations than to the realities of the post-cold war world.
The Russians, according to almost all assessments, will be
compelled by economics to go to much lower levels of offensive
forces, independent of arms control outcomes.
I think I can be very brief with regard to the second
proposition. As you stated in your opening statement, the
Rumsfeld Commission and the launch of the North Korean Taepo
Dong missile--this multi-stage, long-range missile--underscore
that the threat is here now and that it is likely to become
ever more sophisticated. The national intelligence estimate
that concluded that we would have warning and that we would
likely not face a long-range ballistic threat for 15 years has
been widely repudiated. That we are near consensus on the
missile threat is reflected in the Senate's recent overwhelming
passage of the National Missile Defense Act.
The third proposition that the ABM Treaty does not impede
the development of U.S. defense capabilities and that
deployment of defenses will require only modest changes to the
treaty is in my view more akin to a self-limiting, self-
fulfilling, self-deluding proposition than an objective
assessment of U.S. missile defense requirements in light of the
threat that we face.
It is very difficult for me to conclude that, absent the
treaty, the United States would be considering the contrived
ground-based architectures being contemplated as primary
candidates. If the treaty did not exist, we would most surely
be aggressively exploring sea and space-based options that
offer much greater potential in terms of cost effectiveness and
flexibility for expanding our defense capabilities as the
threat expands. This is not being done because our programs
must be compliant with the treaty.
Moving from development to deployment, one must also
question the proposition that even very limited defenses could
be fielded with only modest changes to the implementing
provisions of the treaty.
The words of article I are very clear and, if one applies
plain and ordinary definitions, the language makes evident the
need to confront the basic contradiction between today's
imperative to deploy defenses, to protect our population
against ballistic missile attack from rogue states, and the
underlying strategic rationale of the treaty.
Designed in the bipolar context of the cold war
confrontation with the then Soviet Union, the express objective
of the treaty was to severely limit defenses so as to preserve
the credibility of strategic offensive forces. Few would
advance this same deterrent concept today for states such as
North Korea or Iran. Yet, the treaty does not provide an
exception for defense against these threats.
This leads to two final observations. The first is on
timing. Given the stated Russian goal of retaining the ABM
Treaty without change, any negotiation, if that is the option
we pursue, can be expected to be long and difficult. Yet, if
the United States acts with determination and avoids mixed
signals, such negotiations could be in my view successful, but
only if we have both, as you say, Senator, a clear deployment
objective and the perceived resolve to move forward, even if
that requires withdrawal from the treaty under the supreme
national interest clause of the treaty. In light of the pace of
missile programs in countries such as North Korea and Iran, we
simply do not have the luxury to devote years to renegotiate
the ABM Treaty.
The second observation is that in attempting to resolve
treaty issues to permit limited defenses, we need to ensure
flexibility for the future to counter missile threats as they
continue to evolve, taking full advantage of new technologies.
Narrow treaty relief to allow for fixed ground-based
interceptors to protect against a very small and crude threat
in the near term must not be purchased at the price of fixing
in concrete a future that does not permit us to adapt our
defenses to meet the threat as it evolves. For example, we must
not compromise now on a defense against a small handful of
missiles from North Korea but leave ourselves totally
defenseless when they add one or two missiles more.
Senator, in conclusion, let me say that my personal view is
that the best option is to exercise our right under the treaty
for withdrawal. I have two primary reasons for this.
First--and I have touched on this--the treaty is currently
inhibiting us from exploring sea and space-based approaches
that in my view offer the greatest potential in terms of cost
effectiveness and flexibility for the future. There is a high
risk that even under a modified treaty, we will foreclose
options that build on new technologies that will be essential
to counter the threat as it develops.
And second, I believe we should discourage the proposition
that mutual assured destruction forms a solid basis for our
strategic relationship with Russia. The ABM Treaty in my view
has a very corrosive effect on how we see each other. It is a
treaty that is unhealthy for both the United States and for
Russia. We simply should not maintain this cold war artifact at
the center of our relations. I believe we can address our
differences with Russia and reconcile those differences outside
of the ABM Treaty.
That said, I believe that the option to renegotiate the
treaty and change it fundamentally, as we attempted to do in
1992, is a viable option and is, in fact, the most likely
option that we will pursue.
As I said in my comment earlier and as you have said in
yours, we must, if we pursue this approach, be serious and be
perceived as serious. In order to do so, we must have a real
deployment program and the willingness to leave the treaty if
in fact that is necessary.
Senator, thank you very much. That concludes my comments. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert G. Joseph
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. It is an honor to be able to present my views on the
ABM Treaty and, specifically, on the central Treaty-related issues that
surround the debate over the deployment of a national missile defense.
It is necessary to emphasize at the outset that the views expressed
in this statement are entirely personal and do not necessarily reflect
those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or
any agency of the U.S. Government.
My statement addresses three highly dubious propositions that are
frequently asserted in support of maintaining the ABM Treaty either
without change or with only minor modifications. These are: First, any
attempt to alter or withdraw from the Treaty, although consistent with
our legal rights, will lead to the end of offensive nuclear reductions
and to an overall deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Second, the rogue state long-range missile threat is still years
distant and that, if it does emerge, it will consist of very few
unsophisticated weapons. And, third, the ABM Treaty does not impede
current development programs and will require only slight changes to
permit deployment of limited but effective national missile defenses.
Experience and evidence stand in stark contrast to all three of these
propositions.
In assessing the first proposition, looking back can be very
instructive. Following the Gulf War and the attempted coup in the then
Soviet Union, the Bush national security team put forth both a
deployment plan and an arms control initiative to support this
deployment. The concern was twofold: a rogue state armed with a small
number of ballistic missiles able to strike American cities, and an
accidental or unauthorized launch, perhaps from a breakaway military
commander.
To deal with this limited threat, the United States declared the
intention to deploy GPALS--Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.
For the near term, this architecture consisted of up to six ground-
based sites with up to 1200 interceptors, a space-based sensor
capability, and robust theater missile defenses. In the longer term, as
the threat evolved, many looked to space-based interceptors as the key
capability.
On the arms control side, in the summer and fall of 1992, the
United States formally proposed fundamental changes to the ABM Treaty
consistent with the GPALS concept. These included:
First, the elimination of restrictions on the development and
testing of ABM systems. These restrictions both directly and indirectly
had impeded our ability to field effective strategic and theater
defenses, just as they do today.
Second, the elimination of restrictions on sensors. Disagreements
in this area had for years dominated the contentious compliance debate.
Moreover, it was recognized that no missile defense architecture that
would permit even a limited territorial defense could be deployed
without Treaty relief on sensors. This also remains the case today.
Third, the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM
systems and components to permit cooperative relationships on missile
defenses with other countries, including Russia. And
Fourth, the right to deploy additional ABM interceptor missiles at
additional ABM deployment sites.
In Washington, Moscow and Geneva, American representatives
presented these positions to the Russians, stating that the emerging
threat of long-range missiles compelled changes to the ABM Treaty. In a
non-confrontational but straightforward way, the Russians were also
told that we could work together on defenses but that, with or without
them, the United States must protect itself from limited attacks. If
modifications to the Treaty could be agreed, it could be retained. If
not--and the implication was direct--the United States would need to
consider withdrawal, legally in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty.
American representatives also made clear that the level of defenses
to be deployed by the United States, with or without the ABM Treaty,
would not threaten the offensive capability of the Russian force at
START levels or even well below those levels. At the same time, the
U.S. team also stressed that, with the end of the Cold War, the United
States and Russia should base their new relationship on common
interests and cooperation, and not on the distrust that was the
foundation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction that had
defined relations as Cold War enemies.
The Russian reaction was telling. They did not threaten or posture.
They did not say yes or no; they mostly listened and asked questions to
explore the U.S. proposals. Indeed, in a speech to the United Nations
in January 1992, President Yeltsin had called for the joint development
of a ``Global Protection System'' to defend against ballistic missile
attack.
Most important, and relevant to keep in mind in today's
discussions, while the United States was insisting on basic changes to
the ABM Treaty, the Russian START negotiators were concluding the long
sought START agreement providing, for the first time, for substantial
reductions in offensive forces. That the U.S. position on the ABM
Treaty did not affect the Russian willingness to agree to offensive
reductions was evident in the signing of both START I and START II in
quick succession.
Nonetheless, in 1993, in one of its most substantial departures
from the Bush Administration security policy, the new Administration
reversed course on national missile defense and the renegotiation of
the ABM Treaty. National missile defense programs were downgraded in
priority and funding was significantly reduced. For years this policy
position has prevailed, often justified by the assertion that we must
choose between offensive reductions and even limited defenses.
Most recently, in the context of the Senate's consideration of the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999, the Administration reaffirmed at
the highest level that the United States has not made a decision to
deploy and continues to uphold the 1972 ABM Treaty as the ``cornerstone
of strategic stability.'' This approach, we are told, is necessary to
save START II--a Treaty that Moscow has held hostage so many times to
so many different objectives over so many years that few now believe it
will ever be ratified by the Duma or, if it is ratified, that it will
have much significance.
Yet, irrespective of the fate of START II, how Russia will react to
the deployment of national missile defenses by the United States
remains an important question. A number of U.S. and Russian officials
have predicted dire consequences if the United States insists on
amending the ABM Treaty or withdraws from the Treaty. Such assertions
lack supporting evidence and ignore Russia's own approach to arms
control and its own security policies. Similar predictions were voiced
in the contexts of NATO enlargement and air strikes on Iraq. Yet, in
both of these examples, Russia acted on the basis of its interests, not
its press statements. Russia's actions spoke louder than its words.
The same is true regarding arms control experience. When NATO
decided to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s,
while simultaneously negotiating for the elimination of this entire
class of nuclear weapon, the Soviet Union made stark threats to test
the Alliance's resolve. Mo