Defense For A New Era
Lessons of the Gulf War
House Committee on Armed Services
March 30,1992
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMIITEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, D.C., March 30,1992
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
This material is the product of an effort by the Ranking Republican
member, Mr. Dickinson, and myself to make an assessment of the lessons
of the Persia Gulf war. It is intended to serve as a precursor to a
subsequent committee print that will reflect the views of other
committee members.
Les Aspin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Enclosure
Approved for printing
LES ASPIN
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
FINDINGS
ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The New Battlefield Balance xii
Mix of Forces xii
Communications That Work xii
Tactical Missile Defenses (TMD) xiii
Makeup of the post-Cold War Navy xiii
OPERATION DESERT STORM EXAMINED:
CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHWEST ASIA
Introduction 3
Historical Legacy 4
Prelude to War: No Rotation Policy Limits Choices 6
Air Power: The Most Significant Factor in Winning War 7
Air Power as an Instrment of War 8
The Air Tasking Order 9
Tank Plinklng and Other Operation Desert
Storm Innovation 10
Interservice Fights Avoided 11
Ground Campaign Ultimately Forced Iraqi Military Out of Kuwait 12
Deception Works 12
Plans to Fight in Europe Created Problems
in Southwest Asia 13
Using Ground Contingency Units 15
What the War Reveals About Our Military 16
High Tech Works 16
Benefits of High Tech in the Air Campaign 17
Benefits of High Tech on the Ground 19
U.S. Troops Most Qualified Ever 21
Communications Hampered by Old, Incompatible Equipment 22
Tactical Missile Defenses Succeed
Politically, Raise Technical Questions 24
Minehunting on Land and at Sea 25
Counting the Iraqi Army 29
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Table I : Accounting for the Iraqi Army 32
Table II: Accounting for the Iraqi Troops:
A Rough Estimate of Enemy Strength 33
The New Battlefield Balace 34
New Thinking About Tooth to Tail 34
Complexity of Warfare Requires Sophisticated Support 36
Striving for a Balanced Military 38
Balace in the Force Structure 39
Balance Within Weapon Systems 39
Goldwater-Nichols Played a Crucial Role 41
Goldwater-Nichols Fosters Jointness 41
Unity of Commad Was Key 42
Jointness Problems Still Remain 42
PROVIDING THE FORCES:
U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
The All Volunteer Force (AVF) 45
Background 45
How Would the AVF Fight 46
But is it Fair? 47
Women in the Services 48
The Guard & Reserve 49
Background 49
Planing for World War III 49
Mobilization -- In Pieces by Improvisation 50
The Shift to an Offensive Option 51
Army 52
The Mobilization 52
Evolution of the Call-Up 53
Making Units Ready and Measuring Them 53
What Happened? 58
Large Combat Units A Special Case 59
Overall Impact of Army Guard and Reserve 60
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Marine Corps 61
The Mobilization 61
How the Marine Mobilization Evolved 62
Caught in Midst of Revitalization 62
Making Units Ready for Deployment 63
In-Theater Training 64
Into Combat as Smaller Units 66
Combat Support and Service Support: A Special Case 66
Overall Impact of Marine Reserve 67
Air Force 68
The Mobilization 68
Tailored to Meet Requirements 69
Reserve After Active 70
Overall Impact of Air Force Guard and Reserve 70
Navy 70
The Mobilization 71
Tailored to Meet Needs 72
Overall Impact of Navy Reserve 72
NAVAL QUARANTINE IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
Introduction 75
The Naval Quarantine 76
Typical Interdiction Operations 77
Importance of Training 77
Command and Control of MIF Operations 77
MIF Stopped Flow of Prohibited Items 78
MIF Effect on Iraqi Warfighting Uncertain 78
PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
Introduction 83
CENTCOM' s New Pl:ning Focus 83
Planning the Air Campaign 84
Planned Air Campaign Had Four Phases 86
Planing for the Ground Offensive 87
Low Casualties the Highest Goal 88
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PREFACE
In August 1990, Iraqi forces directed by Saddam Hussein poured
over the border into Kuwait. The ensuing crisis led to war -- the
first major military clash of the post-Cold War era.
For 43 days in early 1991, the armed forces of the United States
and a multi-national coalition fought a successful military campaign
to expel Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait.
It is vital that we fully understand the lessons of the war in
Southwest Asia and what they mean for our future. In the months after
hostilities ceased, the House Armed Services Committee conducted
hundreds of interviews with nearly 1,000 individuals who experienced
the war first hand.
The committee is grateful to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
for making the military personnel who planned and implemented
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm available for interview. Without
his assistance and that of the staff within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, our effort would not have been possible.
One of the most important lessons to be learned is that this war
was unique in many ways. Many of its most salient features -- not
least the foolhardiness of our adversary -- are not likely to be
repeated in future conflicts. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm has given us, as we say in our
report, "an unprecedented and invaluable opportunity to measure,
challenge and adjust the policies and assumptions that will drive U.S.
defense budgeting and strategy in the years ahead."
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The publication of these Findings -- Defense For A New
Era/Lessons of the Gulf War -- is part of a continuing effort by the
House Armed Services Committee to understand the momentous changes
taking place in the world and to contribute to the debate on how we
should respond to these changes.
Les Aspin William L. Dickinson
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FINDINGS
... ... ... ...
(3) The war with Iraq also demonstrated technology-related problems.
--U.S. forces, particularly in the air campaign, could have been
more effective had there been a greater ability to process and
disseminate target and other information, especially the assessment of
damage done by allied air strikes.
--One-target, one-round precision, coupled with long ranges and
inadequate ability to distinguish between friend and foe, produced one
of the most distressing problems of the war: casualties of friendly
fire. U.S. forces lack effective means to distinguish between enemy
targets and friendly forces in the midst of battle.
--In many instances, the readiness rates and operating tempos of
primary platforms such as aircraft, tanks and fighting vehicles
outpaced the ability of support structures and equipment. For
instance, aerial tankers became a limiting factor in air operations.
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--Communications are still plagued by incompatibilities between
services, inadequacies between levels of command, as well as by
technical limitations.
--The military effectiveness of our existing defense against
tactical ballistic missiles has been questioned. The Patriot
antimissile system performed well in its intended role of point
defense of installations such as ports and airfields. Most of the
questions focus on the issue of how well the Patriot system defended
population centers -- a job for which it was not designed.
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ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
... ... ...
Tactical Missile Defenses (TMD). Independent of the debate over
the degree of success that the Patriot missiles had in their TMD role
against Iraqi Scuds, the political and military utility of mobile
theater defenses was demonstrated unequivocally during Operation
Desert Storm. Although some critics contend that the lessons leamed
from the employment of the Patriot missile in a TMD role are
negligible due to the low-tech nature of 20 year-old Scud technology,
it should not be forgotten that the Patriot is, itself, based on 20
year-old technology.
The global proliferation of ballistic missile technology and
weapons of mass destruction has become one of the most immediate and
dangerous threats to U.S. national security in the post Cold War era.
Over time, this threat will most likely evolve from today's
shorter-range, inaccurate missiles in the direction of more
sophisticated, longer-range and increasingly accurate systems.
Therefore, the question of how the U.S. can modernize its TMD
capabilities to best ensure that its forward deployed and power
projection forces possess effective defenses against future tactical
ballistic missile threats is paramount.
Operation Desert Storm Examined:
Conduct of the War in Southwest Asia
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INTRODUCTION
In exploring the lessons of the Persian Gulf war, it is essential
first to establish the applicable caveats and limit the usefulness of
lessons learned to future contingencies. As a senior U.S. commander,
not without hyperbole, said:
Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. The
enemy leader was universally despised and his troops offered very
little resistance. We had the perfect coalition, the perfect
infrastructure and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful
about the lessons we draw from the war.
While this may overstate the point, it highlights the need for
caution in drawing the right lands of conclusions about this war and
then applying them universally to the conduct of future conflicts.
On the other hand, it is equally important to acknowledge that
certain aspects of this war are directly applicable to the type of
conflicts U.S. forces might face in the future. For instance, the
strategic air campaign against the Iraqi network of fixed, heavily
defended targets provides a strategy that will likely apply to a
variety of scenarios the U.S. military may face. Similarly, Iraq's
centrally controlled military offers a potential model of the threat
posed by previous Soviet clients.
A final factor to consider is that others are analyzing the
stunning U.S. military success as well. Many adjustments are likely to
be made in the equipment and tactics of military forces around the
world in the hope that they do not meet Iraq's fate.
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WHAT THE WAR REVEALS ABOUT OUR MILITARY
High Tech Works
Technology gave U.S. forces and their equipment the mobility,
precision and battlefield awareness to bridge the historical gap
between planning objectives and battlefield results. U.S. forces
accomplished what they set out to do. Virtually every frontline weapon
system used in the war had come under criticism at least once during
its history for being overly complex, too dependent on temperamentai
technology or not dependable enough to perform reliably under the
rigors of combat. Unlike our experience in previous military
conflicts, the performance of U.S. equipment and forces in Operation
Desert Storm exceeded even the most optimistic expectations.
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Tactical Missile Defenses Succeed Politically, Raise Technical
Questions
Long before the air campaign began on January 17, the United
States was concerned about the threat posed by Sadaam `s Scuds. By the
time the air campaign commenced, the United States already had
deployed several Patriot batteries to Saudi Arabia to defend various
high-value civilian and military targets.
In an effort to draw Israel into the war and destroy the
international coalition arrayed against him, Saddam launched nightly
Scud attacks against undefended Israeli population centers beginning
on January 18. While some Scuds missed their intended targets, others
landed in Tel Aviv and Haifa, causing substantial damage. Iraq's
capacity to use Scuds to deliver chemical warheads added to the
psychological impact of the Scud attacks.
On January 19, the Israeli Government accepted the U.S. offer to
deploy Patriots to various positions in Israel to defend against the
Scud attacks. The Frrst Patriot batteries, manned by U.S. troops
pending training of Israeli technicians, arrived from Europe and were
declared operational on January 20,1991.
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Since the war ended, controversy has erupted surrounding the
question of Patriot's effectiveness intercepting and destroying Iraqi
Scuds aimed at military facilities in Saudi Arabia and civilian
targets in both Saudi Arabia and Israel. In fact, Patriot successfully
defended critical military facilities in Saudi Arabia such as ports
and airfields, and ensured that the Scuds had a minimal impact on
coalition military operations. In Israel, Patriot took on the more
demanding job of defending population centers a job for which it was
not designed. While its technical success in this role has been
questioned, its political impact was decisive in reassuring Israeli
leaders of the U.S. committnent to their security, which in turn
helped keep the coalition intact by keeping Israel out of the war.