Index FM 100-12 Army Theater Missile Defense Operations

Chapter 2





This chapter outlines the threat to deployed U.S. and multinational forces, LOCs, logistics facilities, and population centers from aerial attack by theater missiles. Under joint doctrine (JP 3-01.5), TMs include BMs, CMs, and ASMs whose targets are within a given theater of operation. Overviews of TM threat systems—what makes them threatening and their future trends—appear first, followed by examinations of selective countries whose current or emerging capabilities could present regional challenges. Information presented in this chapter was obtained from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other open-source documents, such as the Air Defense Artillery School’s Air and Missile Defense Master Plan.


2-1. The evolving threat will take on new, stressing characteristics in the 21st century. Adversaries will closely observe emerging U.S. capabilities in an effort to identify and exploit weaknesses using asymmetric approaches. An asymmetric approach seeks to negate U.S. capabilities by simple counters and avoids a direct match with U.S. strengths. Fundamental capabilities that 21st century adversaries may pursue to counter U.S. strengths include WMDs, unmanned RSTA platforms, precision strike, large numbers of inexpensive rockets, low-observable CMs, and information warfare. Some states will rely on asymmetric capabilities as a substitute for, or complement to, large conventional forces. Regional competition will reinforce the perceived need to acquire unmanned systems that provide high operational effectiveness for nominal cost.

2-2. Ownership of ballistic and aerodynamic systems that can strike well beyond national borders and produce mass destruction is often a source of stature in the international community. These weapons confer strategic status to the countries possessing them. Thus, a country concerned with improving the perception of its military capabilities may be tempted to acquire such systems even if it does not intend to use them.

2-3. The traditional air threat, fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, will still exist in the world of tomorrow. Fixed-wing aircraft will continue to evolve as expensive, but highly capable, multi-role weapon systems. Rotary-wing aircraft (i.e., helicopters) will continue to pose a significant lethal hazard for ground forces with both improved night and standoff capabilities. While these threats are still formidable, the proliferation trend in the 21st century is toward the unmanned threat—TBM, CM, ASM, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), large-caliber rocket (LCR) and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).

2-4. Factors of cost, training, operational need, and strategies to counter enemy capabilities rather than match them drive the trend toward unmanned threats. TMs provide a cost-effective alternative to aircraft. For example, a single SS-1c/Scud system costs a small fraction of a fixed-wing aircraft. Significant numbers of TMs or UAVs can be acquired for the price of one or two highly sophisticated aircraft, without the attendant costs of training, maintaining, basing, and sustaining a manned aircraft fleet. Figure 2-1 illustrates the cost advantage of unmanned systems.

Figure 2-1. Unmanned Systems Cost Advantage

2-5. The advantages of unmanned systems may be worth their economic cost. These systems possess inherent lethal capabilities, and they are increasingly available on the world market. Since most developing nations have virtually no effective defense against a TM threat, TMs provide an excellent deterrent. Investment in substantial numbers of these may have a higher payoff value than an equal value investment in manned systems.

2-6. Sophisticated and rudimentary versions of these unmanned systems pose a danger to deployed U.S. military forces. TBMs and CMs can deliver WMD on deployed forces or geopolitical assets. RSTA UAVs can detect U.S. force operations and provide the basis for near real-time targeting, leading to potential disruption of decisive operations. LCRs and MLRSs pose special hazards and challenges across the spectrum of operations.


2-7. The military and political use of TMs since World War II is listed below.


1973 Egyptian and Syrian attacks FROG/Scud

on Israel

1980-88 Iran-Iraq War FROG/Scud

1986 Libyan attacks on U.S. Coast Scud

Guard base, Lampedusa, Italy

1989-91 Afghan Government use on Scud


1991 Iraqi attacks during the FROG/Scud

Persian Gulf War on Bahrain,

Israel and Saudi Arabia

1991 U.S. attacks during the ATACMS

Persian Gulf War on Iraq

1993 North Korean missile tests Scud/No Dong

1993-95 Yugoslav Civil War FROG/SA-2

1994 Yemeni Civil War Scud/Scarab

1995 Iran-Iraq border clash Scud/SA-2

1995-96 Chinese missile tests M-9

1998 North Korean missile test Taepo Dong

1998 Pakistani missile test Ghauri


2-8. TMs are unique weapon systems. Their capabilities give a country the ability to attack U.S. and multinational forces, LOCs, logistics facilities, and population centers from the beginning to the end of hostilities. During force projection operations, TM targeting requirements will evolve as the political and military situation changes and the availability of threat TM systems change during the conflict.

StageS I and II—Mobilization and Predeployment

2-9. The TM threat is to in-theater U.S. and multinational forces and otherassets. Therefore, the TM threat during mobilization and predeployment operations of U.S. forces is limited. The enemy may conduct a preemptive strike with the intent of preventing or seriously disrupting U.S. deployment operations. This could be achieved by influencing the U.S. will to commit forces, or through the destruction of key deployment infrastructure. Enemy TM targeting requirements will be relatively the same against in-theater U.S. as well as multinational allied forces during this stage.

StageS III and IV—Deployment and Entry Operations

2-10. Initially the operational objective of TM forces may be to slow the flow of forces into the area of operations (AO) and cause enough casualties to influence U.S. public opinion against national involvement. TMs may be used against such high-value targets such as APODs, SPODs, logistic sites, TMD forces, marshaling and staging areas, and political targets.

2-11. TBMs will probably be the enemy weapon system of choice during these operations. Their high survivability, range, penetration, and warhead options make them ideal during most phases of operations. Their lethality allows them to be effective against population centers and to disrupt operations at APODs and SPODs.

2-12. Enemy fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft operations may peak during this stage, especially if enemy forces launch a preemptive strike. Although enemy aircraft may suffer a high attrition rate, the threat of aircraft armed with CMs and ASMs will continue to exist throughout this phase. Air-launched weapons will probably be fired at maximum range, possibly limiting the effectiveness of friendly active defenses against the launching aircraft.

2-13. Land attack CMs (LACMs) will probably be used to target APODs and SPODs, but can be used against virtually any fixed target. Cargo and transport ships may be attacked with CMs while in SPODs. LACMs are most likely to be employed in precision strikes against high-value targets, but may be used to deliver WMD payloads.

Stage V—Decisive Operations

2-14. The enemy weapon systems active during entry operations will be active during the decisive operations stage, and their target lists will be expanded to include troop concentrations and choke points. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons may be used to disrupt and delay operations. It can be assumed that fixed-wing aircraft levels will decrease during this stage, lowering, but not eliminating, the ASM and air-launched CM threat.

StageS VI, VII, and VIII—POST CONFLICT Through Demobilization

2-15. Enemy TM system operations should be limited during these stages, though history has proven that TBMs are highly survivable and mobile ground-launched CMs have a similar potential. Large concentrations of forces throughout these three phases prove to be easy targets for both TMs and CMs. However, further enemy use of TM systems would reinitiate hostilities, so their likelihood of use should be reduced.


2-16. TBMs include short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with ranges up to 1,000 km and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges from 1,000 to 3,000 km. These are surface-launched missiles with ballistic trajectories. TBMs, often launched from highly mobile, difficult-to-detect transporter erector launchers (TELs), have the capability to carry WMD. Most TBMs are single-stage missiles with a circular error probable (CEP) accuracy of one-tenth of one percent of the range. State-of-the-art guidance technologies in some missiles will improve this accuracy too less than 50 m. Figure 2-2 displays a number of TBM threats.

Figure 2-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Threats

2-17. TBMs are inherently difficult to defend against. Characteristics that increase TBM effectiveness include a reduced radar cross section (RCS), high terminal velocity, reduced notification time for defending forces, a variety of difficult-to-kill warheads, and an all-weather capability. Figure 2-3 illustrates the threatening characteristics of TBMs.

Figure 2-3. What Makes Theater Ballistic Missiles Threatening?

2-18. The major TBM trends are increased range and improved accuracy. Currently, many potential adversaries employ inaccurate TBMs targeted at fixed military targets and population centers. However, the TBM lack of accuracy is offset by the use of WMD warheads or submunitions. As potential adversaries acquire TBMs with improved accuracy, range, and payload capacity, TBMs will become more tactically effective. Integration of global positioning system (GPS) and terminal guidance are the current focus of improving accuracy. Solid fuels and multiple staging will increase TBM payloads and ranges. Improved TBMs may target C2 nodes, air defense sites, fire support sites, assembly areas, and logistics concentrations. They can be used to exploit choke points and create obstacles. This will be facilitated through the use of military and commercial satellite support, UAVs, and real-time news reporting.

2-19. For most potential adversaries TBMs are strategic systems, organized in former Soviet-style Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) units. As a result the decision to commit TBMs will be strategic rather than tactical. Orders, including targeting data and launch site location, will be passed via fixed national communications channels rather than mobile tactical channels. Generally, TBM brigades and battalions will serve as communications relays and sources of logistical support. Firing batteries will direct TELs to emerge from protected locations, move to prepared launch sites, fire TBMs, and then return to protected locations for reload operations. These operations will generally occur during periods of darkness and poor weather to reduce the effectiveness of TMD attack operations.

2-20. The organization of TBM forces on strategic lines provides vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Strategic operations reduce the operational flexibility of the adversary TBM force. National authorities will tend to employ TBMs against predictable fixed geopolitical assets and facilities, allowing our active defenses to mass. The exercise of national command authority will slow both the target selection and passing processes, allowing our passive defenses time to regenerate between attacks. The operation from strategic fixed locations provides years of intelligence collection; facilitates our identification of TBM C2, communications, hide sites, launch sites, and logistics facilities; and allows high confidence attack operations.


2-21. While technically not missiles, LCRs and MLRSs appear with TBMs in this document because their size, trajectory, warheads, and battlefield targets are similar to those of SRBMs. LCRs are different from SRBMs in that they do not have onboard guidance and, thus, are unguided throughout their flight. Typical LCR systems are the Russian Luna M or free rocket over ground (FROG) series and the U.S. Honest John. MLRSs also lack onboard guidance, overcoming this shortfall by being employed in volleys of a hundred or more rockets on a single target. Typical MLRSs are the Brazilian Astros, Russian Smerch, and U.S. MLRS.

2-22. The ability of these systems to deliver high volumes of fire and a variety of warheads makes them ideal weapon systems for fire support missions. Highly mobile launchers effectively support forward artillery missions. This mobility and the rocket’s short burn time result in little warning for maneuver forces, and their short range precludes engagement by current missile defense systems. Figure 2-4 illustrates the MLRS characteristics.

Figure 2-4. What Makes Large-Caliber and Multiple Launch Rockets Threatening?

2-23. MLRSs are widely proliferated, and their production and sale is increasing. The high volume of fire and multiple warhead capabilities of MLRSs make them a very appealing weapon system for threat nations. In the future, threat nations may incorporate simple guidance schemes, and deploy passive infrared (IR) or radio frequency (RF) warheads with these missile systems, improving their use against armor systems, C2 nodes, and battlefield radars.


2-24. CMs are unmanned, powered, self-guided vehicles that exhibit sustained flight through aerodynamic lift at one or more predetermined, constant (cruise) altitudes and carry a warhead or other lethal payload. There are two primary missions and, thus, two types of CMs—anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and LACM. The Army is most concerned with the LACMs.

2-25. CMs are reliable, accurate, survivable, and lethal. They can be launched from the land, air, or sea. In flight, they are difficult to detect, can fly indirect routes (low or high) to avoid heavily defended areas, and can attack from any direction. Today’s CMs can hit a target with remarkable accuracy; tomorrow’s smarter and more accurate CMs will pose a far greater threat.

2-26. Although only a limited number of LACMs are currently deployed, numerous countries (e.g., China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Russia, and South Africa) have ongoing development programs. These CMs should become operational around 2000.

2-27. Emerging CMs pose serious threats because of their unique operational characteristics (Figure 2-5). The incorporation of new technologies in airframe and warhead design, propulsion systems, and guidance systems has contributed to vastly improved systems. The increased use of composite materials in airframe construction has created stronger and lighter airframes. A range of low observable and stealth technologies has reduced the RCS. The increased use of air-breathing turbojet and turbofan engines permits subsonic speeds, providing longer ranges and flight altitudes as low as 20 m above ground level (AGL). Sophisticated guidance systems, such as GPS, the inertial navigation system (INS), and terrain contour matching (TERCOM) contribute to overall accuracy and allow programming of unpredictable flight paths to optimize surprise. A terminal guidance seeker increases accuracy to less than 10 m. A wide array of conventional warheads, to include submunitions, allows targeting of both soft and hard targets. NBC weapons pose the most serious threat, but currently only Russia, France, and the U.S. have CMs with nuclear warheads. However, the development of a chemical or biological warhead is not difficult. The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report noted that the use of NBC weapons is a likely condition of future warfare and that these weapons could be delivered by several means, including CMs.

Figure 2-5. What Makes Cruise Missiles Threatening?

2-28. The success of U.S. CM operations in the Gulf War has led to increased interest in these systems and spurred current worldwide developments. Threat experts foresee an increase in the number of LACMs within the next ten years, as well as extended ranges, improved accuracy, reduced RCSs, and increased lethality. The development of systems such as the Russian AS-18/KAZOO (Kh-59M Ovod-M), Israeli AGM-142 Popeye, and U.S. AGM-84E Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) blur the distinctions between CMs and ASMs, and their proliferation presents a grave threat to tactical operations. The addition of smart submunitions will allow the engagement of armored units on the move in the near future. CM countermeasures and evasive maneuvers are also potential future capabilities.


2-29. ASMs are air-launched, precision-guided munitions designed to strike ground targets. They are ideal against targets, such as bridges, that are difficult to destroy with "dumb" bombs. They are similar to air-launched CMs, but are smaller, have shorter ranges, lack the wings and aerodynamic lift associated with CM flights, and are launched by fighter-bomber aircraft. Russia and Free World countries widely export ASMs, and they are operational in numerous air forces around the world.

2-30. ASMs are an extremely lethal threat because of their versatility and pinpoint accuracy (Figure 2-6). Most threat ASMs are of Russian origin and employ radio command, laser, anti-radiation homing, or electro-optical (EO) guidance systems. Missiles that employ anti-radiation homing systems are referred to as anti-radiation missiles (ARMs); they represent the greatest threat to air defense, artillery (counter-battery), aviation, and intelligence radars. Most ARMs have ranges of over 100 km. An aircraft firing an ARM will usually launch from outside the lethal envelope of the air defense system being attacked. Laser-guided systems place the attacking aircraft in harm’s way because of their short range, generally less than 10 km. EO or video-guided systems and ARMs offer the greatest standoff range and aircraft survivability. Some EO systems have ranges in excess of 100 km.

Figure 2-6. What Makes Air-To-Surface Missiles Threatening?

2-31. ASMs, like CMs, are becoming smarter and more versatile, reliable, accurate, and lethal. New capabilities may include a lock-on-after-launch capability or a loitering capability to attack enemy radars (for ARM variants) and may use dual mode seekers for increased reliability and combat capability.


2-32. UAVs include drones, characterized by preprogrammed flight paths and patterns, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), controlled by ground-based operators. Each can perform a variety of missions, ranging from reconnaissance and battlefield surveillance to attack and electronic warfare.

2-33. UAVs serve as RSTA information platforms for target detection, identification, and location; weapon targeting; target designation; and battle damage assessment (BDA) (Figure 2-7). State-of-the-art sensors and data links provide real-time targeting for fire support systems, maneuver forces, and aircraft. UAVs, equipped with laser designators, provide immediate targeting of assets for attack by smart munitions.

Figure 2-7. What Makes Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Threatening?

2-34. The low RCS, low speed, and small thermal signature of UAVs make them difficult to detect and engage. Mission-dictated flight profiles take full advantage of terrain, increasing system survivability, and optimizing coverage. Flight altitudes are normally between 1,000 to 3,000 m AGL. UAVs conducting RSTA missions fly at altitudes safe from small arms fire.

2-35. UAV payloads consist of daylight television, IR video, and film cameras (for reconnaissance missions). Other major payload categories include electronic warfare (EW), electronic intelligence, radar, and attack warheads.

2-36. Several nations are developing and fielding anti-radiation homing UAVs with the primary mission of attacking battlefield RF emitters (radars, communications). These platforms have a variety of launch options and are usually fire-and-forget systems. Other attack UAV systems employ terminal guidance to kill tanks or fighting vehicles.

2-37. Threat experts project more than 50 UAV developer countries and 75 UAV user countries by 2005. In addition to information gathering (still the dominant function), UAV roles will include electronic combat, decoy, ground attack, and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD). A significant new capability involves the direct linkage of a reconnaissance UAV to an artillery unit’s fire direction center. This linkage provides near real-time information to ground commanders, followed by immediate fire and damage assessment. UAVs are also good candidates for stealth technology and spinoff technologies from CM developmental programs.


2-38. With the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. interests have now broadened, and the number of potential conflict areas around the world has increased dramatically. In accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the military may now deploy forces to many regions of the world where potential adversaries possess significant air and missile threats, including those with WMD payloads. These potential adversaries are also seeking to develop nuclear weapons.


2-39. Belarus inherited an extensive inventory of TM systems from the former Soviet Union (FSU), to include SS-1c/Scud B and SS-21/Scarab SRBMs, and has no known chemical or biological warfare programs. While Belarus’ national policy supports U.S. and United Nations (UN) sponsored nonproliferation initiatives, serious concerns remain regarding their export policies and security measures. Belarus exports weapon systems, but it has a poor record of safeguarding weapons and nuclear material. Continued economic difficulties require massive infusions of hard currency that could be obtained through the sale of TM or WMD systems or associated technologies.


2-40. China is deeply involved in the development of BMs with capabilities that span ranges and payloads from theater to intercontinental. China has developed the following types of BMs: SRBMs (CSS-6/M-9, CSS-7/M-11, and CSS-8); MRBMs (CSS-2 and DF-21); intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) (CSS-3); intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (CSS-4); and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (JL-1). It is aggressively seeking markets for its weapons industry (e.g., China has exported the CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia, the CSS-8 to Iraq, and M-11 to Pakistan). The transfer of Chinese missile and nuclear technology to potential threat countries adds to the threat facing the U.S. and its allies. The range capabilities of Chinese BM systems are shown in Figure 2-8.

Figure 2-8. Ranges of Chinese Ballistic Missile Systems

2-41. China maintains a robust inventory of MLRSs, with at least 18 different systems with ranges to 40 km. China’s eagerness to export these weapons to other potential threat nations makes their use likely against U.S. forces.

2-42. The Chinese are also active in CM development, basing this development primarily on the SS-N-2/Styx provided by the Soviets in the late 1950s. The HY-1/Silkworm and the HY-2 are the Chinese versions of the Russian Styx; they are limited in range and not considered high-tech systems. In the mid-1980s, China appeared to have reverse-engineered the French Exocet into the C-801 and has exported this system. Although China lacks an LACM capability, it may be developing a long-range spinoff of its ASCM programs.

2-43. The Chinese aerospace industry is actively developing new UAVs. In 1996 China displayed the ASN-206, designed to perform a variety of missions ranging from day and night aerial reconnaissance to battlefield surveillance. The ASN-206 is reportedly available for export.


2-44. India will probably become self-sufficient in all areas of missile production in the near future. India has two missile programs: the Prithvi SRBM, with a range of 250 km and the Agni MRBM, with an approximate range of 2000 km, both of which could be used to deliver WMD. India also has an ambitious space-launch vehicle program that could easily lead to ICBMs. The range capabilities of Indian BM systems are shown in Figure 2-9.

Figure 2-9. Ranges of Indian Ballistic Missile Systems

2-45. India has a variety of MLRS, CM, and UAV development programs. India has developed a 45-km range, 214-mm MLRS designed to "shoot and scoot," each launcher has its own computerized fire control system. Its ASCM inventory includes the French Exocet and the Russian Styx and Starbright. It also developed the Lakshya, a LACM reportedly derived from a target drone. India currently has at least two indigenous UAV programs underway. It is also experimenting with a mini-UAV, similar to the Israeli Mazlat Pioneer system.


2-46. Iran has placed a high priority on rebuilding its armed forces since its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War of 1988. Iran has emphasized the acquisition of power-projection capabilities, TMs, aircraft, and submarines to oppose intervention. This effort includes the development or acquisition of WMD. Iran is attempting to build an indigenous capability to produce nuclear weapons, has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s, and has produced large quantities of chemical agents since 1984.

2-47. Iran first acquired Scud B missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq War. Later, it received Scud B and C missiles from North Korea and CSS-8 missiles and components from China. It has launched a two-track missile program, acquiring Scud missiles and missile equipment from North Korea and establishing its own production capability. The range capabilities of Iranian BM systems are shown in Figure 2-10.

Figure 2-10. Ranges of Current and Future Iranian Ballistic Missile Systems

2-48. Iranian forces field a variety of LCRs and MLRSs to support the Iranian Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The LCRs, ranging in size up to 355.6 mm, are capable of delivering high explosives or, possibly, chemical weapons.

2-49. Iran has Chinese land-based and shipborne ASCMs and Russian ASMs. Iran is expected to continue to rely on China for ASCMs and, when available, LACMs.

2-50. Iran currently operates a limited UAV capability using the Sahahin, a radio-controlled battlefield reconnaissance drone, and the Baz, a radio-controlled reconnaissance drone with a reported attack capability. Iran operates several squadrons of UAVs, and there is concern that it may be developing the UAVs as a means of delivering chemical and biological agents.


2-51. Despite Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s goal is to establish Iraq as the leading Arab political and military power in the Middle East and to dominate the Persian Gulf. Iraq continues to seek the capability to employ WMD. It has an extensive biological warfare program, has produced several thousand tons of chemical agents since the 1980s, and it continues to pursue a nuclear weapons production capability.

2-52. Iraq is believed to be hiding some quantity of TBMs, TELs, and other ground support equipment (GSE) and maintains some equipment needed to produce TBMs and rockets. Today, Iraq focuses its efforts on developing the Ababel 50, a Yugoslav-designed, 50-km range MLRS, and the Ababel 100 SRBM. Iraq’s artillery force includes rockets having a range of up to 100 km with submunitions dispensers, and the Layth-90 LCR, an Iraqi 90-km variant of the Russian FROG-7. The range capabilities of Iraqi BM systems are shown in Figure 2-11.

Figure 2-11. Ranges of Current and Future Iraqi Ballistic Missile Systems

2-53. Iraq effectively used an ASCM, the French Exocet missile, to damage the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqis have a limited number of C-601, C-801, Exocet, and HY-2 ASCMs in their inventory and are expected to acquire an LACM capability. Indigenous development programs have resulted in the Faw family of ASCMs, derived from the Russian Styx.

2-54. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had several developmental UAV programs. Today, there is no evidence of full-scale production, and it is assessed that only a few UAVs exist.


2-55. Kazakstan inherited an extensive inventory of TM systems from the FSU, but has no known chemical or biological warfare programs. While Kazakhstan’s national policy supports U.S. and UN-sponsored nonproliferation initiatives, serious concerns remain regarding their export policies and security measures. Kazakstan exports weapon systems, but it has a poor record of safeguarding weapons and nuclear material. Continued economic difficulties require massive infusions of hard currency that could be obtained through the sale of TM or WMD systems or technologies.


2-56. Libya’s TBM inventory is currently limited to the Scud B, but they have LCR, MLRS, ASCM, and UAV capabilities. Libya is conducting both TBM and WMD research and development (R&D). The development of an indigenous MRBM, or the acquisition of a foreign one such as the North Korean No Dong, would give Libya the capability to reach regional adversaries. They could target all of Egypt, much of Algeria, most of Israel, and portions of Europe including Athens and Rome. The Libyans have weapon stocks of chemical agents and are conducting low-level research on biological and nuclear weapons.

North Korea

2-57. North Korea has conducted extensive research, development, and production of TBM and WMD systems over the last 10 years. They have developed, produced, fielded, and exported two Scud missile variants, the North Korean Scud B and Scud C, both capable of carrying WMD. The fielding has provided North Korea with an extensive TBM infrastructure capable of launching hundreds of missiles deep into South Korea. The exports have included complete TBM systems consisting of missiles, TELs, and other GSE; disassembled electronic components for assembly by the receiving country; and production equipment. Countries in the Middle East, such as Iran and Syria, have received hundreds of these missiles.

2-58. North Korea is in the late stages of developing and fielding a new MRBM, the No Dong. Two additional new missile systems are in design and test, the Taepo Dong 1 MRBM and Taepo Dong 2 IRBM. Most recently, they have begun testing longer range multistage systems. The range capabilities of North Korean BM systems are shown in Figure 2-12.

Figure 2-12. Ranges of Current and Future North Korean Ballistic Missile Systems

2-59. In addition, North Korea has produced more than 4,000 MLRSs. These MLRSs, based on Chinese systems, have ranges from 20 to 43 km. They produce two types of ASCMs based on the Russian Styx technology and the Chinese HY-1 and HY-2 missiles. However, it currently lacks a LACM capability. North Korea maintains a limited number of target drones, which might be used as decoys or attack systems.


2-60. Pakistan, like India, has both nuclear weapons and the TBMs capable of delivering them. Pakistan has purchased the M-11 SRBM from China and is developing its own family of SRBMs, the Hatf I, II, and III. The Hatf I and II are based on French technology and are operational. Intelligence analysts believe the Hatf III, still in development, is based on the Chinese M-9 and M-11 technology.

2-61. Pakistan has a limited ASCM capability consisting primarily of Chinese Silkworm ASCMs. China is expected to remain Pakistan’s most important supplier of missile-related technology.


2-62. Russia is the primary recipient of the weapons inventories, production facilities, and technologies of the FSU. These resources include the largest stocks of TMs in the world. Russia’s TBM inventory is limited to thousands of SS-1c/Scud B and SS-21/Scarab SRBMs as a result of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, which required the elimination of the FSU’s extensive stocks of MRBMs. Russia possesses the bulk of the FSU’s BM industrial base and remains capable of developing and producing the full range of solid and liquid propellant BMs and associated technologies. The SS-X-26 SRBM is in development, and is expected to be both a replacement for the SS-1c/Scud B and an export.

2-63. Russia maintains a large number of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. It has the world’s largest and most advanced chemical warfare program and has a considerable stockpile of nerve, blister, and choking agents. Russia may also be retaining its biological warfare production capability.

2-64. Russia’s use of LCRs and MLRSs can be traced to the Russian Katyusha system in World War II. Since then, the Russians have increased the range, caliber, accuracy, and variety of warheads for their rocket systems.

2-65. Russia began developing UAVs as early as 1950. The early systems were adaptations of obsolete full-size aircraft and large missiles. Newer systems, such as the Schmal, have been developed based on the successes of smaller, dedicated tactical UAVs in Chechnya.

2-66. Russia’s national policy supports U.S. and UN-sponsored nonproliferation initiatives. Nevertheless, serious concerns remain regarding Russian export policies and security measures. Russia continues to exhibit a vast array of weapons systems at international air shows, and it has exported an assortment of weapons to numerous countries. Continued economic difficulties require massive infusions of hard currency that could be obtained through the sale of TM or WMD systems or technologies.

2-67. Russia has a poor record of safeguarding weapons and nuclear material. To date, thefts have focused primarily on small arms and military goods that are readily convertible to cash. Recent events have shown that nuclear material is available on the black market and within reach of potential terrorist countries. In addition, the emigration of Russian scientists, engineers, and technicians with experience in development of TM and WMD technologies could provide other countries with access to critical research and production know-how, thereby accelerating their capabilities.


2-68. Syria acquired SS-1c/Scud B and SS-21/Scarab SRBMs from the FSU in the mid-1970s and the 1980s. Syria has received supplies of Scud-related equipment and materials from both North Korea and Iran. In parallel with the production program for the liquid propellant Scud, Syria (with foreign support) has devoted significant resources to establishing a solid propellant rocket motor development and production capability. Syria is laying the groundwork for a future option to develop a modern, solid propellant SRBM.

2-69. Syria may have chemical warheads available for a portion of its TBM force, enhancing this force’s value as either a strategic deterrent or an actual weapon. In addition, Syria has a variety of Russian land and sea-launched short-range ASCMs and ASMs.


2-70. Ukraine inherited an extensive inventory of TM systems from the FSU including SS-1c/Scud B and SS-21/Scarab SRBMs, but it has no known chemical or biological warfare programs. While Ukraine’s national policy supports U.S. and UN-sponsored nonproliferation initiatives, serious concerns remain regarding their export policies and security measures. Ukraine exports weapon systems, but it has a poor record of safeguarding weapons and nuclear material. Continued economic difficulties require massive infusions of hard currency that could be obtained through the sale of TM or WMD systems or technologies.


2-71. Transnational groups—including terrorists, insurgents, opposing factions in civil war, and members of organized criminal groups—are proliferating. Such groups are not generally bound by the same constraints or motivated by the same factors as nation states, and they pose significant threats to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

2-72. With numerous ongoing insurgencies and civil wars worldwide, there are additional dangers of escalation if NBC weapons or missiles are introduced. Opposing factions in civil wars, gaining access to TMs and WMD, might threaten or actually use TMs with WMD against civilian targets for either psychological or strategic effect; or they could use these weapons against conventional forces to disrupt staging or resupply efforts.


2-73. The number of countries with the potential to present regional challenges to the U.S. and its allies will increase as the capabilities of these countries increase. While traditional air threats such as fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters will continue to improve, the acquisition of new, lower-cost, unmanned threats—TBMs, CMs, ASMs, UAVs, and LCRs—adds greater lethality. TBMs, in addition to being effective terror weapons, will have a more significant military role as their range and accuracy improve. LCRs and MLRSs with multiple warhead options and long-range, high rates of fire are another deadly threat. CMs and ASMs are difficult to detect, highly accurate, and can attack from any direction. UAVs will add new attack, decoy, and targeting missions though still emphasizing the traditional reconnaissance mission. The use of WMD is a likely condition of future warfare, and many of the unmanned threat platforms are capable of delivering such weapons. These emerging threats present a serious challenge to TMD.

2-74. Rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria continue to threaten global security and the stability of their respective regions. The tension between India and Pakistan exacerbated by recent nuclear testing by both countries is of serious concern. Belarus, China, Kazakstan, Russia, and the Ukraine have extensive inventories of TMs and access to either WMD or WMD technologies. They also have national needs that can be facilitated through weapon exports.