Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
This chapter describes C4I aspects of the Army TMD mission. It discusses C4I planning and execution of Army TMD operations against a backdrop of force projection operation stages.
4-1. C4I for joint TMD missions must be accomplished effectively using joint and Army C4I systems and resources to ensure integration with other operational functions and to optimize the use of scarce resources. C4I links passive defense, active defense, and attack operations to provide timely assessment of the threat; rapid dissemination of general and specific warning; and mission assignment, targeting data, and BDA to appropriate joint TMD elements. For each operational element, the C4I system must provide rapid communications among intelligence assets, aid data fusion and decision making, and provide early and alert warning. It also provides commanders, staffs, and supporting commanders with the means of rapid coordination. Space assets are critical to joint TMD operations because they provide TBM launch warning, launch point prediction, TM type determination, impact point prediction, weapon systems cueing, communications, and related intelligence (see FM 100-18, Space Operations for details). Joint TMD C4I capabilities support distributed planning at all levels, decentralized execution, and the coordination of assigned forcesí efforts.
4-2. TMD operations are complex. The limited time available for execution of TMD operations places great demands on C4I systems. Commanders and staffs integrate the capabilities of Army TMD operations with joint passive defense, attack operations, active defense, and C4I within the overall operation to obtain the maximum effectiveness in countering enemy TMs, thereby maximizing the flexibility of warfighters to conduct operations.
Command and Control
4-3. C2 for Army TMD operations is the exercise of authority and direction by commanders over their subordinate forces participating in TMD operations. Army TMD C2 involves all functional processes related to the planning and execution of the Army TMD mission. Battle command is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. It includes visualizing the current and future states, then formulating CONOPS to achieve decisive victory. Control is the science of implementing the commanderís guidance and intent by determining requirements, allocating resources, measuring performance, and recommending adjustments and refinements. Army TMD C2 operates within existing C2 structures of units having Army TMD missions at all levels to ensure the seamless and timely flow of Army TMD information.
4-4. Communications involves receiving and distributing Army TMD information required by the C2 functions. Communications includes communications architectures, protocols, data and voice communications, relay devices, input/output data terminals, and data links. The communications aspect of TMD C4I provides the technical capability for Army TMD integration.
4-5. Automation exists throughout Army TMD C4I to enhance performance and promote standardization, commonality, and modularity. TMD C4I maximizes use of existing and planned automation in the form of common reconfigurable workstations and software modules to tailor the information processing software (automated decision aids) for a particular function, application, or situation. Information will be replicated, distributed, and integrated as applicable throughout the joint TMD C4I network. Computers support the rapid fusion of data to meet the short Army TMD execution timelines.
4-6. Intelligence is vital to the joint/Army TMD decision-making cycles and must support friendly TMD assessment, planning, warning, and IPB functions as well as engagement decisions and target prioritization of enemy TM systems. The intelligence function focuses on acquiring and making information available to support joint/Army TMD operations using intelligence systems, capabilities, and organizations within the C4I operational elements.
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
4-7. Theater-level units consist of organizations and activities of large, relatively immobile facilities and require extensive dependable road and communications networks. Organizations and activities at EAC may be more vulnerable to TM attack than mobile, armored, dispersed maneuver forces in the corps area. The ASCC/ARFOR Commander exercises those operational missions assigned by the JFC. If the JFC does not designate a JFLCC, the ASCC may designate an ARFOR Commander to retain OPCON of the ARFOR.
Command and Control
4-8. Army TMD C2 in units at EAC is closely tied to joint and multinational forces. The ARFOR Commander receives all missions and guidance, to include those related to Army TMD operations, from the JFC or JFLCC and staff. Coordination is accomplished with other service components, host nations, and multinational forces.
Army TMD Integration
4-9. The AAMDC commander, as the TAAMDCOORD, integrates all four operational elements of TMD for the ARFOR. As the ARFORís TAMD coordinator, the AAMDC Commander must also coordinate closely with the JFC, AADC, Air Operations Center (AOC), and Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC), when deployed. The AAMDC is equipped with a variety of communications, computer, and intelligence capabilities within its TOC (AMDPCS) to support the TAAMDCOORD and accomplish the TMD mission.
4-10. The JFC establishes theater guidance and objectives for joint/Army TMD and assigns and/or apportions forces and resources. The component commanders jointly conduct operations under the guidance and in support of the objectives of the JFC. Component commanders are responsible for planning and executing combat operations and for jointly coordinating and prioritizing their operations and needs with the JFC and other component commanders. The ARFOR Commander has various means with which to execute Army TMD attack operations. He may employ long-range rockets, missiles, or attack helicopters; or he may coordinate the use of air and sea power with Army resources.
4-11. At the operational level, the focus of the targeting effort is more on planning and coordination than on execution. There will be some critical targets, such as enemy TMs and TM infrastructure, that subordinate Army units are not capable of acquiring or engaging. The nature of these targetsóand the requirement to coordinate and synchronize the employment of several joint acquisitions/attacks as quickly as possibleómay require the ARFOR Commander to establish a DOCC at EAC to support the targeting effort.
4-12. The AAMDC provides target nominations to the DOCC for TM targets. Depending on the target and target location, the DOCC may decide to strike the target, request immediate air support, or insert the target in the air tasking order (ATO).
4-13. The AAMDC commands and controls all EAC ADA brigades assigned in theater. It provides force protection and designated priority asset air defense and active defense for the JFCís DAL. In addition, the AAMDC commander accomplishes the duties and responsibilities of the TAAMDCOORD and, if appointed, the DAADC. The TAAMDCOORD is a member of the ARFOR Commander's special staff for planning, coordinating and executing air defense and missile defense at the numbered Army level. As commander of EAC ADA forces, the AAMDC is responsible for ensuring that these forces are integrated into the AADCís theater-wide air defense plans and priorities.
4-14. TM warning is planned for units conducting operations at the operational or tactical level. The AAMDC develops and provides the ARFOR Commander with a TM warning architecture including detection, communications nodes, warning notification, and dissemination procedures for the ARFOR. Although warning is a component responsibility, the ARFOR Commander may be given the mission to supplement or provide theater warning to the other components, multinational forces, and civil authorities. All unit commanders plan, prepare, train for, and execute TMD passive defense measures to minimize the impact of TM attacks.
4-15. Communications at EAC are established and maintained using all available strategic, operational, tactical, and commercial resources to support TMD operations. (See Appendix C for a description of communication systems.)
4-16. An assigned MI brigade supports intelligence activities at EAC. This brigade is task organized, based on mission requirements to provide C2 for a number of specific MI battalions and provides support for G2 and ACE operations.
4-17. The ACE provides Army TMD intelligence data to the AAMDC, while the AAMDC provides focused TM analysis and intelligence back to the ACE. The ACE requests or tasks intelligence collection missions, intelligence data from other intelligence collection agencies, and ensures existing intelligence data is loaded on the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) and distributed to other C2 nodes that have the capability to receive this data.
4-18. Intelligence support within the AAMDC is composed of an analysis cell with an attack operations team for target nominations and analysis and an operations cell for situation development, terrain analysis, and advice on requests for information and directed collection. Together these cells perform the intelligence functions of indications and warning, IPB, situation development, target development and nominations, and BDA with regard to Army TMD. The AAMDC links with the ACE and the EAC MI brigade for the processes of collection management, general database development, single and all source analysis, and report production and dissemination for all intelligence data and information for any enemy activity.
FORCE PROJECTION PLANNING
4-19. The JFCís operational plan (OPLAN) provides missions, force packages, and a clear description of the CINCís intent and campaign. The ARFOR Commander initiates development of one or more OPLANs supporting the JFCís OPLAN(s). Initial coordination and input to that OPLAN provides indications of expected Army levels of effort to include Army TMD requirements. The intelligence analysts from the ACE initiate the IPB process and request intelligence data and information from the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and other sources on enemy TM systems and capabilities. The ARFOR staff conducts the planning and coordination required to produce the OPLAN(s) to include planning for alerting and mobilizing all active, reserve, and National Guard units authorized in support of ARFOR operations.
4-20. The AAMDC supports ARFOR OPLAN preparation by developing an air and missile defense annex that supports the AADCís air defense plan for the theater. The air and missile defense annex consists of the following:
The air and missile defense annex should also address:
4-21. The AAMDC (using TM intelligence data continuously collected, stored, and analyzed during routine, day-to-day operations) may assist the ARFOR and JFC staffs in preparing contingency plans (CONPLANs). The AAMDC recommends types of Army units that can best support Army TMD in the area of responsibility (AOR) described in the CINCís warning order. If CONPLANs are already written, the AAMDC may assist the ARFOR or JFC staffs in preparing OPLANs by recommending Army units that can best support the Army TMD mission in the AOR.
4-22. Major headquarters and staffs, subordinate to the ARFOR Commander receive their mission statements and probable force packages for their planning from the ARFOR Commander OPLAN(s). Upon receipt of the ARFOR Commanderís warning order, intelligence analysts initiate their IPB process by requesting intelligence data and information from the ACE and other threat databases.
4-23. The DOCC initiates specific planning and coordination to ensure deep operations and attack operations considerations are included in the OPLAN(s) development. The AAMDC assists in providing a TM focus to the DOCC considerations. Key attack operations considerations, depending on METT-TC, include but are not limited to:
STAGES I AND IIóMOBILIZATION AND PREDEPLOYMENT
4-24. Mobilization begins with a presidential decision and after the combatant commander receives and distributes an alert order. Predeployment planning and preparations follow mobilization, provided the situation causing the alert has not changed for the better.
4-25. In an undeveloped theater, the principal challenges are shortening the time required to deploy Army TMD-capable forces and ensuring the availability of Army TMD resources, when required, in theater. In an undeveloped theater, entry operations and the introduction of personnel and equipment by air or sea may limit the opportunity to establish an immediate, robust Army TMD capability. However, forces are flowed into a theater based on the threat and the mission. The JFC may decide to deploy a robust TMD capability into theater first through priority of transportation assets to TMD forces. The limitations of entry operations may preclude availability of some communications normally found in a developed theater. However, Army TMD communications must ensure the timely and seamless delivery of critical information.
4-26. The ARFOR Commander and major subordinate commanders refine their OPLANs as required to execute the OPLANs as OPORDs as soon as possible after the JFC has begun his update. The IPB is updated with emphasis on developing friendly and enemy land component courses of action (COAs) and:
4-27. COA development takes into account the integration of C4I with joint and multinational forces by making maximum use of existing communications and communications infrastructure (Army, joint, and multinational) to collect and disseminate enemy TM information. COA development also begins identification of TM HPTs and begins the Decide phase of the D3A process.
4-28. The AAMDC Commander plans Army TMD operations in support of the JFC CONOPS and intent. The AAMDC conducts a mission area analysis; develops COAs; recommends priorities; determines passive defense requirements; refines IPB; coordinates with the JFACC, AADC, and ACA; provides in-theater TAMD expertise; monitors ADA unit status; and task organizes EAC ADA units as required. The AAMDC produces the air and missile defense annex for the ARFOR OPORD. The AAMDC provides target nominations for TMD attack operations to the DOCC, coordinates intelligence updates with the ACE and AAMDC LNOs, and coordinates active defense ROE with the AADC. The AAMDC recommends and coordinates an Army TMD design supporting ARFOR and joint planning. Also, the AAMDC recommends a force warning criteria and methodology for ARFOR Commander approval.
4-29. As OPORDs are completed, the AAMDC conducts vulnerability analyses of unit locations and operational areas. This is accomplished for the ARFOR Commander situational awareness and to assist in coordinating the Army TMD design. Lastly, during these stages, all headquarters and support units continue to conduct focused training on expected mission requirements and procedures to support all expected missions.
STAGES III and IVóDEPLOYMENT AND ENTRY OPERATIONS
4-30. Deployment includes the continuous movement of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies, using all available transportation means, throughout a campaign. Deployed forces conduct entry operations to establish a lodgment, build up, and expand the entry by moving into tactical assembly areas. Early entry operations requirements following deployment will vary, but forces may have to move immediately to combat operations. They may need to take advantage of an opportunity, protect the force from RSTA operations and TM attacks, or even conduct retrograde operations to gain time for additional force build up. Forces are most vulnerable and the success of the campaign is at greatest risk during initial entry operations. This vulnerability is acute when the enemy possesses TMs with WMD payloads.
4-31. Based on JFCís guidance and objectives, component commanders plan Army TMD operations to include establishment of C4I networks and a TM attack warning net. Commanders and staffs have a broad array of communication resources available such as Army Common User System (ACUS), combat net radios (CNR), and broadcast nets. These are configured into networks that satisfy the information exchange requirements of Army TMD C2 structures.
4-32. The ARFOR Commander must evaluate the potential TM threat faced in the theater and ensure that the proper Army TMD resources are allocated to meet the threat. Units supporting the Army TMD plan should also be sequenced in the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) so that Army TMD capability can be established with the overall JFC priorities and risk assessment. Generally, the AAMDC and EAC ADA brigades remain OPCON to the ARFOR, who employs them in accordance with JFC-approved ROE and weapons control procedures developed by the AADC.
4-33. ARFOR Commanders with attack resources coordinate and conduct their operations according to Army and joint doctrine and procedures. Effective attack operations require real-time coordination between all component commanders as well as continuous wide-area surveillance of the entire AOR, with emphasis on enemy TM systems and support, fabrication, assembly, and launch areas. Coordination of attack operations initiated in the Decide phase of the D3A process involves the detection, acquisition, and identification of enemy TM systems and the dissemination of targeting information to the designated attack asset for execution. These tasks are directed to subordinate elements as missions for execution. BDA is an integral part of the attack operations concept.
4-34. Planning for passive defense is conducted at all levels. One of the principal C4I imperatives to passive defense is "warn the force." Commanders and staffs should carefully plan appropriate tactics and techniques for warning the force. All units must have the ability to receive force warnings. Warnings may be general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) or specific (areas that may be affected by missile impact, fall out, or the downwind hazards from NBC payloads). Technology is critical in effectively warning the force of TM attack or of possible NBC hazard. Commanders and staffs should consider a variety of aspects in planning force warning, including warning method (cascading, broadcast, or pinpoint warning protocols and architectures) and, probably most importantly, the force impact of warning. BDA reports are submitted to the various command posts (CPs). They are part of the basis for refining the IPB products and operational guidance and priorities.
4-35. Forced entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition and may include using airborne, amphibious, or air assault forces. Air and space-based systems and special operations provide a supporting role in forced entry operations. The TM threat should be assessed, and an appropriate defense should be provided to counter the expected threat. The AAMDC may control all Army TMD operations, with the exception of attack operations in support of the ARFOR during early entry operations. The AAMDC will support TMD attack operations through a detailed TM IPB. AAMDC LNOs will deploy to the JFACC/AADC and JFMCC to facilitate TMD unity of effort and integration.
4-36. Army TMD execution during deployment and entry includes early establishment of an integrated C4I capability to support the JFCís concept and priorities for joint TMD. It provides force and critical asset protection from TM attack through the conduct of attack operations, active defense, and employment of passive defense measures to include a robust, early warning capability.
Integrated C4I Capability
4-37. ARFOR intelligence activities update and use the intelligence synchronization matrix and other factors to provide timely and relevant intelligence from national and in-theater resources. TMD targets and TMD decision points are included in the intelligence synchronization matrix and correlated to available intelligence sources and information requirements. Special Operations Forces (SOF) units and standoff sensor identify known or suspected TMD attack operations targets. In addition to assigning and monitoring intelligence collection missions and collecting information, intelligence staff at the AAMDC process information and information requests. The ASAS and ACUS systems are used to collect, store, and disseminate information within and between organizations. For TMD operations, this includes planning for direct sensor/processor to shooter communication links to ensure quick responses to validated attack operations targets. Data from ground and space-based intelligence sensor systems, including national, theater, Air Force, Navy, and SOF, are processed in the ACE to provide all source intelligence for the corps and subordinate units.
4-38. Selected high priority messages from sensor systems will be sent via TIBS/TDDS to those elements with receivers. TMD-related intelligence data is received and processed in the AAMDC, ACE, G2, and S2 TOC cells in battalion size units and larger for all battlefield operating systems involved in Army TMD operations. Intelligence cells continuously process information to update TOC operations and assist in TOC planning for future Army TMD attack operations, active defense, and passive defense. During these stages, sensors may identify movement of a TBM launcher or TBM infrastructure activity that may indicate a TBM launch is imminent. If identified, targeting analysts within the AAMDC and ACE recognize the movement or activity as a potential attack operations target. Depending on how the movement was identified, the AAMDC coordinates with the ACE to task sensors to confirm the movement or activity, track the vehicles, or confirm the identification of the vehicles. This may involve tasking Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the Common Ground Station (CGS) for more information, tasking for initiation of a specific UAV mission, or requesting information through the JSOTF or Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) (if assigned). At the point where target identification is confirmed and an accurate location is available, the AAMDC or the ACE will nominate the target as an attack operations target to the DOCC. The DOCC may pair the target with aviation or artillery attack assets. This will be accomplished digitally from the DOCC to the fire support element (FSE).
4-39. A confirmed launch triggers reactions by a preplanned selection of appropriate TMD systems, in accordance with established ROE. Short missile flight times require that available air, land, sea, and space-based sensor and surveillance asset report will be integrated to provide a current air and space picture. Near real-time communications enable this critical integration process. Space-based systems should be responsive to the JFC or multinational force commander. The C4I systems supporting TMD provide for centralized coordination and decentralized execution of TMD operations.
4-40. During the decision process, a determination of the need for BDA was made. BDA requires the commander to determine damage after attack. Intelligence collection managers are notified when targets are being attacked and execute the plan for appropriate sensors to observe the target and gather data leading to an ability to assess the extent of damage to that specific target. Accumulation of this intelligence with other data being collected permits the development of BDAs against functional areas of the remaining threat capability.
Force and Critical Asset Protection
4-41. The AAMDC, BCD, and DOCC will deploy early providing the JFC and ARFOR Commander the ability to exercise control of Army attack operations, active defense, and passive defense assets. Initial communications support must ensure the AAMDC has linkage to all operational elements. The AAMDC nominates known enemy TM assets to the DOCC. Targets, which cannot be attacked by Army assets, are passed by the DOCC to the BCD. The BCD nominates them for enclosure in the draft Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) developed by the JFACC, BCD and other component LNOs at the JAOC (Guidance Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) Cell) and then submitted to the JFC staff for the JTCB (if established). Key activities for the AAMDC during entry operations are:
4-42. If a mission is determined to fit a SOF profile, the AAMDC will request the mission through the DOCC and notify the AAMDC JSOTF LNO. The ARFOR staff will submit the request to the JFCís Joint Operations Center (JOC). The SOCCE, if available, can forward the request to the JSOTF and alert the JSOTF staff of a possible SOF mission.
4-43. Attack Operations. Concurrent with defensive actions, TM system targets identified in the IPB database are included in the JFCís plan for preemptive strikes or operations at the onset of hostilities. Observed enemy activity, TM signatures, or characteristic pre-attack conditions trigger timely execution that has been anticipated through the D3A targeting process. If the JFC policy is that TMs will be attacked when moved from hide sites, storage sites, or reload locations to potential firing locations without waiting for first attack, then sensor systems begin tracking of all TELs as priority targets. Trigger event reporting will become the primary portion of intelligence support to rapid reaction targeting.
4-44. If aviation assets are requested to search for and destroy TM targets, MI analysts are alerted to the planned aviation mission and the requirements to support it. Selected sensors and analysts are instructed to observe the critical elements for the tip-off activity that is needed to trigger the aviation launch to search and destroy. The report is passed directly to the aviation brigade. At the same time, a continuous update of all enemy activity, with specific emphasis on anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and weather predictions are provided to the aviation brigade S2 for forwarding to the battalion C2 element. Watch is maintained on the movement of enemy elements along ingress and egress routes and in the vicinity of the target through the JSTARS CGS. Updates are forwarded directly to the aviation brigade. Updates will be provided until the attack units have completed the mission and returned. Attack helicopter units routinely perform BDA as an integral part of the mission.
4-45. Opportunities are normally available for use of various sensors working together in a cross-cueing mode to obtain details on specific enemy elements. The purpose of cross-cueing is to obtain different types of intelligence such as current activity; location; use of radio or radar emitters; or movement, direction, and speed on a given enemy element. Three factors affect the sensor selection process: sensor availability, current knowledge, and type of additional knowledge required to support the desired action.
4-46. Intelligence collection and management should include tasking analysts to rapidly cross-cue supporting intelligence assets to confirm targeting data and ensure timely attack. For example, a JSTARS CGS operator detecting a possible TEL may be required to cross-cue and confirm the target with the CGS supporting the unit tasked to attack the target. The AAMDC intelligence analysts continually update their database and provide NAIs, target areas of interest (TAIs), and target nominations to the DOCC.
4-47. Once hostilities are initiated, all targets acquired are attacked based on the commanderís guidance. Attacking TM capabilities as early as possible after commencement of hostilities may prevent the launch of a substantial number of TMs.
4-48. C2W is employed against an enemyís C3 surveillance and target acquisition assets to disrupt TM operations. This aspect of attack operations will influence, degrade, or destroy enemy C3 capabilities and may be closely linked to a deception measure. The primary goal is to destroy enemy acquisition and detection capabilities and thereby enhance overall protection of the force.
4-49. BDA will be based on information collected by a variety of sensors. Specific BDA data is best collected by imagery intelligence (IMINT) or human intelligence (HUMINT) assets with line of sight to the target just after the weapons delivery. This assessment provides information on target destruction. Sensors from the attack platform may be available to conduct an initial assessment, but subsequent collection may also be required. Sensor selection will be based on system resolution, availability, and other priorities.
4-50. Active Defense. Units identified to conduct active defense may deploy early during operations to defend the force and critical assets. Defense planning is a distributed process occurring at all echelons. The JFC normally issues planning guidance by phase. The JFC or, if delegated, the JFACC/AADC tasks components to develop detailed priorities. The components conduct COA analyses to prioritize their defended assets based on phases. The AAMDC is involved in this process by assisting the ARFOR and AADC in planning and coordination of the DAL. The JFC or JFACC/AADC with the components, go through an arbitration process to coalesce all priorities into a single list. Once the DAL is published, ADA brigades conduct their defense planning which includes, but is not limited to: weapon; sensor; and communications locations, relays, logistics, etc. ADA battalions and task forces continue to refine these plans to execute active defense for TMD. Active defense during these stages is essential due to the vulnerability of deploying forces. Active defense provides a measure of security during deployment and entry stages of force projection operations.
4-51. Units at EAC capable of conducting active defense normally consist of at least one ADA brigade that provides C2 for one or more PATRIOT battalions or air and missile defense task forces (AMDTF) and battalions. These task forces may consist of Avenger, PATRIOT, and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire units. ADA units at EAC receive missions from the AAMDC to defend the force and critical assets from the CINCís DAL (at the joint level there are DALs; however, at the Army and lower levels there are air and missile defense priorities).
4-52. Corps active defense units normally consist of an ADA brigade that provides C2 over ADA battalions. The corps ADA brigade task organizes ADA resources to protect the corps and division commanderís air and missile defense priorities. Corps/division ADA units receive missions from the corps commander to protect forces and critical assets. The TAAMDCOORD will ensure the corps active defense requirements are integrated into TMD planning.
4-53. Intelligence information resulting from enemy TM activity is distributed from the AAMDC, ARFOR staff, task force TOCs, and other sources to the ADA brigade and battalion TOCs through ACUS. Units conducting active defense receive early warning of a TBM launch from the following Army or joint systems.
4-54. Passive Defense Warning Capability. Tactical warning is provided to the force over the JFC warning net. Observed pre-launch indications or activity will be forwarded to Army elements to provide early warning of possible incoming missiles. The warning is also used to update the local readiness posture. The JFC warning net obtains data from space, air, and surface-based sensors (both national and theater) that detect missile launches or track missiles in flight. Warning data should be transmitted immediately to appropriate commands and, if known, to targeted units and civilian authorities. Passive defense measures should be activated.
4-55. A force warning capability is necessary from the deployment stage throughout all force projection operations. Early in a force projection operation, the AAMDC may assume a primary role in warning the force. The AAMDC may retain this responsibility in a developed theater. When the DSP or other sensors detect a TM launch, the information is directly down-linked and processed by JTAGS and other intelligence information processing stations. These processing stations process the raw IR data and disseminate a warning message over CINCSPACE-specified networks. Event release criteria for JTAGS (and TES overall) is governed by USSPACECOM Unified Instruction (UI) 10-30. Dissemination of the in-theater voice warning is dictated by the theater CINC. The AAMDC monitors the warning dissemination procedures established by the ARFOR Commander for the operational area and will, per commanderís guidance, selectively transmit a warning to units and population centers within any hazard area. JTAGS disseminates the predicted ground impact point/time (PGIP/T) and can provide a refined PGIP/T at regular intervals. As more accurate PGIP/T information becomes available (e.g., if applicable, from the THAAD radar), a refined warning may be disseminated by the AAMDC. The AAMDC should also provide an intelligence assessment on possible TM effects (e.g., high, low, or no NBC threat) along with the warning. This transmission should be sent from the AAMDC over automated and manual communications systems. The AAMDC may also establish a Pager Alert Warning System (PAWS) in theater to warn the force. Effective communications are essential to provide the information required at each level to support the execution of passive defense plans. Subordinate headquarters are responsible for disseminating the warning down to each soldier. Units must rely on organic equipment and systems to pass warnings down to soldiers. Units also use organic communications to forward BDA reports.
STAGE VóDECISIVE OPERATIONS
4-56. Operations involve commitment of forces in combat against an enemy force to achieve decisive victory with minimum casualties. TMD is vital when the enemy possesses a robust TM force, WMD capability, and a history of their employment. TMD protects the force, allowing freedom of maneuver to accomplish the mission. The decision to initiate operations may be predetermined, or it may be tied to specific enemy actions.
4-57. The ACE continues to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence supporting the close battle and Army TMD operations. The AAMDC recommends adjustments to the ARFOR Commanderís Army TMD design based on joint and Army TMD decisive operations requirements. The TAAMDCOORD continues to provide the ARFOR Commander with active defense expertise, making recommendations for improving protection and better supporting the operational concept and ensuring communications networks support Army TMD design adjustments. As in all stages, the DAL is continually reassessed and recommendations are forwarded to the JFC. The DOCC conducts target management optimizing both Army TMD and non-Army TMD deep operations. Additionally, ARFOR staff and AAMDC plan for post conflict Army TMD operations.
4-58. Reconnaissance and force protection against TM operations remain crucial to the JFC and ARFOR plans as they engage the enemy in combat operations. Actions to counter the enemyís RSTA efforts help maintain the conditions created earlier for decisive operations. Whereas overall Army TMD operations may vary depending upon threat TM activities, joint and Army Army TMD C4I execution during decisive operations remains essentially as previously described.
STAGEs VI AND VIIóREDEPLOYMENT AND POST CONFLICT
4-59. Deployed forces transition to a period of post conflict operations upon cessation of hostilities. This transition can occur even if residual combat operations are still underway in parts of the theater of operations. Post conflict focuses on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operations, reestablishing host nation or area infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing to provide a presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims.
4-60. The IPB process continues; the ACE continues to execute intelligence collection activities related to remaining TM targets. Any intelligence on new threat capabilities based on data derived from impact analysis or from post-launch activity is used to update known threat capabilities, doctrine and procedures, and is passed to all operational elements.
4-61. Typically, Army TMD forces are required to continue providing force protection so long as there is a TM threat. TMs, due to their long range and short delivery time, make excellent retaliatory weapons and can be employed solely for political and propaganda reasons.
4-62. The AAMDC oversees Army TMD design adjustments and continues to provide fused situational awareness to the ARFOR and AMDCOORDs. The AAMDC also recommends priorities to supported commanders just as in the operations stage. The DOCC continues to conduct target management and plan attack operations should decisive operations resume. Communications networks are established or reestablished as required and continue to support Army TMD communications requirements. Army TMD-related ROE are revised as required. Lastly, headquarters and support units review operations, document Army TMD lessons learned, and plan for redeployment and reconstitution.
4-63. Reconstitution and recovery activities do not normally contribute to intelligence processes. Disruption of friendly capabilities may cause a revisit of anticipated threat activities in a limited wargaming of potential COAs. As in early entry, Army TMD forces remain vigilant as long as there is a TM threat. Headquarters and support units redeploy and reconstitute to achieve readiness status as required, submit Army TMD lessons learned to higher headquarters, and resume training. C4I units and active defense forces may be among the last units to redeploy. Active defense forces may remain in theater in a MOOTW demonstration of support and resolve to preclude further enemy aggression.
4-64. Demobilization is the process by which units, individuals, and materiel transfer from an active to a premobilization posture or to some other approved posture. Although the overall focus of demobilization is generally on units and individuals, the demobilization of logistics also requires significant resources such as supplies, materiel, and support activities. It also involves returning the mobilized portion of the industrial base to peacetime conditions.
4-65. Demobilization ensures rapid reconstitution of units and prepares for future mobilization to meet other contingencies. Demobilization is conducted in the following phases: