1. Purpose. This chapter provides a discussion of the potential threat and threat doctrine that should be considered for the planning and conduct of joint nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense operations. This chapter also recaps the US national policy guidance and objectives for NBC defense that form the basis for NBC doctrinal precepts.

2. Overview. The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) occurs across the full range of military operations. NBC-capable nations, including developing nations, may use these weapons to achieve political or military objectives. WMD may be used in isolation or as an adjunct to conventional combat power. If used, they pose the problem to US forces of creating an asymmetrical battlefield.

3. Worldwide Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The number of nations capable of developing and possessing WMD is steadily increasing. Developing nations are receiving these weapons or means to develop them through technological transfer, overt or covert direct transfer, or support to belligerent groups or governments. The potential for their use can range from blackmail or acts of terrorism during peace to escalation during conflict or war.

a. NBC Capable-Nations. An NBC-capable nation is defined as one that has the capability to produce or acquire and employ one or more types of WMD to achieve political and military objectives. Inherent in this capability are varying degrees of abilities to conduct research and development, improve technology, stockpile, and effectively prosecute a war in an NBC environment.

b. Planning Considerations. The implications of proliferation of WMD on planning are significant. The proliferation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs has been stimulated by perceptions of the political-military utility of CBW weapons. Chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) are perceived as excellent force multipliers. Both are perceived as deterrents to regional aggression. It is projected that there will be an increase in the number of CBW capable countries, albeit at a slower rate than over the past 20 years, as well as an increase in the number and effectiveness of agents and improved delivery systems available.

a. Nuclear: Premise of First Use

(1) Threat doctrine postulates that limited nuclear operations may occur within a given theater of war and that such limited nuclear conditions could proceed without the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. Regardless of changing political conditions, two consequences are possible. First, this premise provides rationale for an enemy to use nuclear weapons. Second, focusing on the potential results of a limited nuclear war that could bring either victory or, at a minimum, result in a stalemate, may provide the enemy with an incentive to use nuclear weapons first.

(2) The operational and tactical use of nuclear weapons would be directed against friendly strong points, air and naval power, and critical centers of gravity. Subsequently, enemy doctrine envisions that large-scale conventional armored and mechanized forces in "nuclear dispersed" formations would strike deep into friendly defenses and pass through nuclear- created gaps to destroy friendly command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) facilities and other critical targets. Once within the friendly operational area, the threat objective would be to split, isolate, and destroy friendly forces.

(1) Threat doctrine considers biological agents as WMD. Such agents, including infectious microorganisms and toxins, are capable of widespread, mass infection or intoxication. These agents, depending on intended use, can cause lethal, disabling, contagious, or noncontagious type casualties. These agents could be effectively employed against large rear area objectives or against C4I or other critical targets.

(2) Certain factors may significantly increase the probability of use. Should a potential threat consider that initiating BW was worth the risk, the employment of biological agents may provide a way of causing asymmetry on the battlefield. Further, genetic engineering can selectively improve toxicity, lifespans, or dissemination efficiencies; defeat detection and warning systems; or make verification of use virtually impossible.

(1) It is possible that threat employment doctrine may consider chemical munitions, including riot control agents (RCA), to be conventional weapons.

(2) Primary uses of chemical warfare are to achieve surprise and cause mass casualties, particularly against an unprepared adversary. Chemical weapons can be used to hinder the momentum of an opposing force, disrupting C4I, and degrading combat potential, to include the use of CW agents to restrict the use of terrain, facilities, and equipment.

6. National Military Strategic NBC Considerations. The national military strategy for NBC operations is based on defense and deterrence. Accordingly, this strategy demands an effective orchestration of US strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces and conventional resources in providing direction, intelligence, and employment of US forces in countering enemy NBC war making capabilities. This strategy supplements the combatant commander's theater strategy in attaining campaign objectives.

a. Strategic Direction and Integration. This guidance is expressed through revised national (and alliance) military strategy, derived from national security strategy, relative to the attainment of strategic objectives. Within the context of an NBC environment, it is derived from the national policy of non use of biological and chemical weapons and close control of nuclear weapons in warfare. This guidance may account for the potential of an asymmetrical battlefield, which may be imposed on the combatant commander. The threat potential of using or the actual use of NBC weapons may change the strategic direction and integration. It focuses on the following: acquiring and communicating worldwide and regional national military strategic NBC information, reassessing the worldwide and regional NBC strategic environment as required, revising and providing national military strategic direction, and providing appropriate command and control warfare (C2W) as required.

b. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligence on the NBC threat is required to enhance or modify policy and military planning at the national, international, and theater levels. This includes planning and coordinating strategic intelligence activities for assessing NBC threats; assessing enemy NBC capabilities and vulnerabilities; proliferation, intentions, and indications; and warning measures.

c. Employment of Military Forces. At the national military strategic level, the employment of military forces primarily connotes the forces' ability to conduct both strategic operations and protection of the strategic forces and delivery means against NBC attack. Strategic operations (firepower and forces) will be utilized against one or more of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction and disintegration of their strategic NBC force, national command and control (C2) facilities, strategic centers of gravity, NBC war making capacity, and the will to conduct NBC war. Protection for friendly strategic forces and means involves safeguarding US strategic centers of gravity and our strategic force potential. Measures include active security and defense, operations security (OPSEC) considerations, and the conduct of deception operations.

d. Other Strategic NBC Considerations

(1) Interagency Coordination. Combatant commanders should establish close coordination relationships with US departments and agencies both within and without their sphere of command and control. In particular, networks should be established with diplomatic missions and supporting country teams within the theater. These sources may provide valuable intelligence and information on the likelihood of enemy intent to use NBC weapons. They may also produce data on the political and psychological implications, as well as military aspects of effectively countering NBC weapons beyond that provided by intelligence sources subordinate to the theater combatant commander.

(2) Dissemination of Information. NBC defense, RCA, and herbicide operations are of significant national, international, and public interest.

(a) The special nature of NBC warfare mandates that combatant commanders prepare thorough and detailed plans for the immediate and accurate dissemination of information concerning the use and effects of NBC weapons. These plans should provide for the dissemination of information concerning an enemy NBC first strike, the appropriate warning of US forces in the event of a US and/or allied nuclear strike, and contingencies for defensive NBC operations by US forces.

(b) Planning should consider multilevel target groups. These range from the political level of both involved and noninvolved nations, to the affected civil populace, and to US forces engaged in the theater.

(c) Combatant commanders should ensure that an integrated effort is undertaken in the information gathering and dissemination process to provide an accurate and complete depiction of the NBC warfare situation. Such effort would include intelligence, public affairs, legal, medical, civil affairs, and psychological operations resources.

(d) Annex F to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) prescribes procedures for the release of all NBC defense, RCA, and herbicide information to the public. This policy does not apply to requests for information made under the Freedom of Information Act. Release of information may be subject to OPSEC considerations and specified conditions as stipulated by the NCA.

a. Immediately alert the NCA, through the CJCS, of indications that a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack may be imminent or has occurred.

b. Request authority to use nuclear weapons, RCAs, and herbicides as appropriate.

c. Route requests and authentication procedures for the use of nuclear weapons, RCAs, and herbicides as described in the JSCP.

07-09-1996; 16:35:54