[Index]

Approval Date:

12 Jun 92

Document:


MISSION NEED STATEMENT (MNS)

                              FOR

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE

                          (NO. AAS 42)


1. Defense Planning Guidance Element

a. This mission need statement (MNS) provides requirements for a theater missile defense (TMD) capability.  A theater missile (TM) is a ballistic missile (BM), cruise missile (CM) or air-to-surface guided missile (ASM) whose target is within a theater or which is capable of attacking targets in a theater.

b. This need responds to the Tactical Warfare major program planning objective and supports the enduring national objective (reference:  FY 1992-1997 Defense Planning Guidance, dated 24 January 1990) "to deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries; and to ensure the defeat of such attack should deterrence fail."

c. This MNS should be used, when applicable, to guide Service and joint doctrine, training, force design, and material developments to counter the TM threat.  It should also guide cooperative efforts with U.S. allies.

2. Mission and Threat Analyses

a. Mission

(1) This MNS addresses the Department of Defense (DoD) mission areas of Land Warfare (210), Air Warfare (220), Naval Warfare (230), and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) Programs (300); specifically the missions of Ground Based Antiair and Tactical Missile Defense (214), Counter Air (221), Antiair Warfare (231), Tactical Command and Control (344), and Tactical Communications (345).

(2) The mission of TMD is to protect U.S. Forces, U.S. allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest to the U.S. from TM attacks.

b. Objectives.  The objectives of TMD are:

(1) To prevent launch of TMs against U.S. forces, U.S. allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest.

(2) To protect U.S. forces, U.S. allies, other important countries and areas of vital interest from TMs launched against them.

(3) To reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by a TM attack.

(4) To detect and target TM platforms, to detect, warn and report of TM launch, and to coordinate a multifaceted response to a TM attack and to integrate it with other combat operations.

c. General Capabilities.  The required general capabilities of TMD are grouped into four areas:  attack operations, active defense, passive defense, and C3I.

(1) Capabilities for attack operations (counterforce) are required to prevent launch of TMs by attacking elements of the overall system including such actions as destroying launch platforms, support facilities, reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition platforms, command & control (C2) nodes, and missile stocks.  They would also be used to deny or disrupt employment of additional TMs that may be available to the attacker.  Attack operations can be executed by all offensive forces, including space, air, ground, and maritime.

(2) Capabilities for active defense are required to protect against TMs by destroying missiles inflight.  Boost, post boost, midcourse, long range or high altitude interception on inflight TMs is necessary to prevent saturation of a forward combat commander's TM point defenses, to negate potential warhead effects, and to ensure minimal leakage in defense of critical assets.  Therefore, active defenses must consist of defense in depth.  A defense in depth provides multiple opportunities to negate the TMs with differing technology, increases the probability of a kill, and prohibits the enemy from being able to counter the defensive system with a single technique.  Active defenses could consist of space, air, ground, and sea-based systems.  If a strategic BM defense is deployed, the active TMD should be supported by, but not limited by, those systems to increase the defense in the theater of operations.

(3) Capabilities for passive defense are required to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage caused by a TM attack by reducing an enemy's target acquisition capability, lessening the vulnerability of critical forces and supporting infrastructure, and improving the potential to survive an attack thus providing a force reconstitution capability.  Passive measures to accomplish these tasks might include one or more of the following:  counter surveillance, deception, camouflage and concealment, hardening, electronic warfare, mobility, dispersal, and redundancy.

(4) An architecture which integrates C3I capabilities is required to coordinate attack, active defense, and passive defense operations, and to integrate the entire TMD system into overall combat operations.  C3I must include:  the ability to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (to define the most likely areas of operations of TM forces and to focus collection assets into those areas of operations); wide area surveillance, composed of space, air, ground, and sea-based assets, that provides timely warning and assessment of the threat, including accurate target discrimination, and provides for cuing and cross cuing of various sensors; wide area rapid dissemination of surveillance and warning data for targeting attack operations and active defense capabilities, and for implementing passive defense measures; capability to provide a rapid response for counterattacks; tasking to the appropriate U.S. and allied attack forces including TMD specific forces; and the ability to accurately conduct battlefield damage assessment.

d. Threat

(1) TMD must counter an expanding array of increasingly accurate TMs that could contribute significantly to the achievement of an enemy's war aims.  This target set might include hundreds of missiles on dispersed, highly mobile launch platforms with few distinctive characteristics.  In addition to conventional capabilities, associated missiles could be armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads.  Target characteristics will range from technologically sophisticated former Soviet based and exported Western weapons to comparatively crude systems produced indigenously by developing nations.

(2) The projected threat environment reflects a growing potential for major regional threats to U.S. interests, despite uncertainty about the ultimate results of developments in the former Soviet Union.  This uncertain political environment is accompanied by continuing efforts to modernize offensive and defensive arsenals throughout the world.  In addition to the traditional threats, recent events have illustrated that conflicts can arise suddenly, unpredictably, and from unexpected quarters.  Future conflicts could include major regional contingencies, often very far from the continental U.S., against foes well armed with high technology weapons.  Emerging high technology weapons like TBMs and CMs stress the effectiveness of ground based air defense weapon systems.  Not only will more countries acquire TM capabilities, but the technology of these missile systems will improve.  A trend toward longer range missiles with increased accuracy and more lethal warhead is already apparent.  These warheads will be able to deliver
conventional high explosive, nuclear, chemical and biological munitions.  Additionally, air defense systems must survive in
diverse operational environments utilizing integrated antiradiation missiles and intense electronic warfare.

        (3)  The current and projected foreign missile threats summarized above are documented in numerous classified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) general military and scientific and technical intelligence studies and handbooks.  They include the Surface-to-Surface Missile Handbook - Free World; Cruise Missiles and Tactics ASMs - Free World (series); Ballistic Missile Systems Handbook - USSR and China; etc. The system itself will be vulnerable to the electronic warfare (EW) jamming, and will encounter the full range of battlefield threats such as artillery and rockets, air delivered ordnance, including antiradition missiles.  This threat is also well documented by the DIA.  For example, the worldwide EW technical threat is provided in ECM/ESM Capabilities - ECC, and Free World Electronic Warfare Capabilities among other classified publications.  In addition, the current Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate addresses global threat projection and the technical threat for the next decade, and will provide future flashpoints assessed to have potential for Marine Corps involvement.

e. Shortfalls of Existing Capabilities.  Existing and programmed systems have limited capability to protect the full range of theater critical fixed and mobile assets from TM attack.  Comments below are key to subparagraphs (1) through (4) in paragraph 2c above.

(1) The U.S. and allies currently have limited capabilities for attacking most TM systems successfully (including launch platforms, C2, and logistics structures).  These capabilities include combinations of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, CMs, C2 countermeasures systems, electronic warfare systems and Army and Marine Corps fire support systems.  Attack operations are generally difficult because TM system elements are hard to detect and target.  Although U.S. and allied attack weapons are highly capable, some shortfalls have been identified.  The major attack operational shortfall is in C3I.  A much improved and integrated C3I capability is essential to support real-time detection, targeting, and attack.  The key to TMD attack operations is a wide area surveillance system.  

(2) Current air defense systems have limited asset and point defense capabilities.  Planned and improved air defense systems (e.g., Patriot, Corps SAM, ERINT, HATMD, and AEGIS/Standard Missile Block IV) will be capable of self-defense against some theater BMs and will have some capability for
limited area defense systems (e.g., E-3 AWACS, F-15, and F/A-18 aircraft) have some capabilities for defense against CMs.  However, without an increase in the number of air defense
systems, this limited TM defensive capability would be at the expense of defenses against aircraft.  Future strategic BM defenses (e.g., Brilliant Pebbles (BP)) could have some theater BM defense capability, if deployed.  However, the short flight time and low flight trajectory of many theater BMs will prevent BP intercepts.

(3) A variety of passive measures are available to provide a limited degree of protection against TM attack for
both fixed and mobile assets.  The Air Force Air Base Operability Program and the Army's Survivability programs (such as Strategic Defense Command's survivability studies and emission control programs) are examples of programs applicable to the TM threat.  There are identified shortfalls in passive defense capabilities.

(4) Current C3I systems are deficient in the capability to detect/target TM systems, to coordinate attack operations and active defense responses within enemy missile operating
timelines.  Limitations currently exist in the U.S. ability to perform rapid and accurate TM launch platform and launch detection, definition of operating areas of hostile land mobile TM systems, identification, and location.  Limitations also exist in communicating that information to attack operations and active defense forces for targeting.  Tactical support by space and ground-based systems are subject to limitation if they have a primary strategic mission.

f. Timing.  The capability is required to counter existing threats, which are expanding at an alarming rate.  The required initial operational capability is FY96 and the desired full operational capability is FY98.

3. Nonmateriel Alternatives.  Passive measures can induce targeting errors in some systems and decrease the effectiveness of a TM attack.  However, the increased numbers, lethality, improved accuracy, effectiveness, and chemical, biological, or nuclear TM warheads would overcome these passive measures.  This would permit an aggressor to suppress, disrupt, or significantly damage U.S. combat capability or political interests, and hold the theater forces at undesirable risk.  Therefore, passive measures alone will not completely protect critical forces and supporting infrastructure against TM attack.  Changes in U.S. and Allied doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, organization, and training were considered and such changes, though helpful, were judged to be inadequate in meeting the need.

4. Potential Material Alternatives

    a.  General.  The TM threat cannot yet be countered by any single technical solution (e.g., Patriot, Corps SAM, ERINT, HATMD, and AEGIS/Standard Missile Block IV).  It most likely will require a mix of land, air, sea, and space capabilities.  Solutions will require closely coordinated, joint and combined efforts, building on existing systems and doctrine, and, when appropriate, incorporating the newest technologies and concepts.  TMD will require a balance of integrated attack operations, extensive passive measures, and a robust C3I and surveillance capability responsive to unique TM characteristics.  Such a TMD would protect vital assets within a theater of operations against TM attack.  Decisions regarding acquisition of TMD unique systems must be weighed carefully against resource constraints and mission needs.  The existing and planned intelligence, air defense and communications systems should be modified to support countering the TM threat.  There is potential for joint and allied cooperation in TMD.

    b.  Product Improvements.  The MAGTF currently provides medium range/medium altitude air defense ultitizing air
surveillance radars (i.e., AN/TPS-59) and the HAWK surface-to-air missile system.  These systems have demonstrated TBMD capability during proof of concept demonstrations.  The integration of product improvements to the surveillance radar(s) and HAWK missile system may produce near term TBMD capabilities.

    c.  Existing Systems.  The U.S. Army currently employs the Patriot surface-to-air missile system to provide limited TBMD capability.  The Patriot missile system is developing enhanged TBMD capability with subsequent product improvements (PACII & PACIII).  The U.S. Navy is currently testing the concept of modifying the Standard Missile Block IV and the AEGIS system to provided TMBD capability.

    d.  Developmental.  The development of a new weapon system may be necessary to meet TBMD requirements.  Currently the U.S. Army (lead)/U.S. Marine Corps are in concept development for the medium range/low-medium surface-to-air missile system (Corps SAM).  The initial operational capability for Corps SAM is set for FY04.
    
5. Constraints

a.  Logistics.  TMD must use the existing DoD logistics support infrastructure.

b.  Transportation.  Transportable TMD elements should be compatible with the provisions specified in DoD 4500.32-R, Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures.  In addition, they should be sized to allow rapid tactical airlift (C-130 deployable).

c.  Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy.  TMD must be compatible with a common navigational reference grid currently used by the Navstar Global Positioning System based common reference grid.

d.  Manpower, Personnel, and Training.  Training must be integrated into the existing DoD training infrastructure and conform to Hardware/Manpower Integration analysis.  New manpower and training requirements must make the greatest possible use of existing resources.  TMD systems should be capable of performing multiple functions, including doctrinal air defense, in order to minimize the impact on current manpower and equipment.  

e. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.  TMD C3I should be fully interoperable with current and projected service, joint, and combined air defense and C4I2 systems.

f.  Security.  TMD will be compatible and take maximum advantage of the existing DoD Physical Security program.  It willuse standard DoD cryptographic equipment rather than requiring unique designs.  TMD should emphasize the use of nonsensitive compartmented information in its attack, active defense and passive defense areas.

g.  Standardization/Interoperability.  TMD should be based on and integrated with current planned forces but dedicated assets may be required to meet the mission as specified.  All future theater air defense systems and sensors should consider the inclusion of TMD capability.  Upgrades to existing weapon systems must not reduce detection, surveillance, responsiveness, nor lethality against air breathing threats.  Tactical weapons and C3I systems will require high capacity, high speed, interoperable, joint standard data exchange networks with existing/planned digital interfaces at both force and tactical level, and provide flexibility to interface with allied systems.  All systems elements will be compatible with current protocols and formats.

    h.  Energy.  System(s) will be compatible with available energy sources (especially in the case of tactical equipment) and will minimize energy consumption.

    i.  Survivability.  Survivability features must be consistent with the survivability of the interfacing, supporting, and supported systems.

    j.  Arms Control.  This need must be met in a manner that is fully compliant with arms control agreements and policies which apply during development and deployment of TMD systems.

k. Operational Environments.  TMD must provide full service during the full range of operational environments including: conventional, initial nuclear weapon effects, nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination, electronic and natural (arctic, tropical, and desert.)
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