APPENDIX A: TAMD OPERATIONS
This section discusses future operations with emerging TAMD capabilities. Three representative scenarios highlight how naval forces may conduct TAMD operations circa 2010. The scenarios include:
The mission, the environment, the enemy, and other factors shape joint and naval operations. The outcome reflects the commanderís ability to understand and out-think the enemy. This chapter uses three scenarios to highlight how naval TAMD operations might be conducted in different circumstances circa 2010. The scenarios reflect different types of operations, varying levels of warning and preparedness, the impact of the environment, and the military match-up of the contending forces.
Scenario One: Forward Presence/Crisis
Forward presence operations will continue to be the major assignment for naval forces in the future. Forward presence operations by naval forces demonstrate US interest in an area, provide forces ready to defend or represent US interests, and support rapid response to provocation, threats, and attacks. Forward deployed naval forces will include: individual units; battle groups or amphibious ready groups; a Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF); a MAGTF; or combinations of these units. These are, and will remain, the naval forces typically involved in crisis response.
As a hypothetical example of a future forward presence operation, presume that a political dispute between two nations flares into open threats and warnings. Neither participant desires combat, but the aggressor is willing to undertake combat operations as a matter of national pride and regional standing. A heavily-used, 100 nautical mile wide strait separates the mountainous shores of the two sides. There are no nearby US bases, but fleet units pass regularly on their way to and from other commitments. Two battlegroups are diverted to the area - the nearest detaches two Aegis cruisers to sprint ahead to patrol stations off the coast of the defended island nation.
Mission and Main Effort
The US wishes to quell the crisis and return both sides to negotiations. Deterrence of the aggressor is the CINCís foremost objective, backed up by a solid defensive capability to protect the friendly nation. The US needs forward presence forces able to protect the defended people, their government, and critical assets from attack. The US plan emphasizes active defense, exploiting fighters, NTW, and NAD capabilities as the first layers of defense against aircraft and theater missiles. TAMD operations are integrated with defensive preparations against submarines, mines, and special operations forces. Surveillance of the surface and submarine environments ensures the air defense forces are not compromised or endangered by sea combat operations. Electronic warfare measures are taken as precautions against jamming and deception. Early warning networks are established to alert the friendly nation and support civil defense.
The unified commander creates a Joint Operations Area (JOA) to define the battlespace. The JOA includes the strait, the airspace of the defended nation, the coastal territory of the aggressor, and the territorial waters of the defended nation. An area of interest (AOI) over the aggressorís inland territory and airspace borders the JOA. US assets maintain surveillance over the AOI. The battlespace is spatially compressed, and is heavily traveled by shipping and local air traffic. Several clusters of small islands dot the strait, with shoal areas and several reefs close to shore. Low, rolling mountains slope up from the seashore on either side of the strait, complicating the conditions for radar surveillance and placing a premium on sensor netting and the JCTN-enhanced JDN.
Chain of Command
The unified commander designates the commander of one of the battlegroups as the JFC. The unified commander assigns the naval battleforce and three Airborne Laser aircraft ordered into theater from the US to the joint force. The captain of one of the Aegis cruisers is designated as the AADC, responsible for planning the use of combined TAMD capabilities, and for the conduct of TAMD operations. The AADC also is designated as the ACA. The unified commanderís staff, the staff of the numbered fleet commander, and other geographically dispersed experts provide collaborative planning support to the on-scene commanderís in a distributed, "virtual staff." Liaison officers assigned by the unified commander fly to the defended nation with communications and planning tools for coordinating TAMD operations between the two nations. The on-scene experts design, test, and complete an ADP reflecting the available forces, the unified commanderís guidance, and the unified commanderís DAL. They use JMCIS-hosted applications to develop and test the ADP, accessing non-organic resources to keep it up to date and optimize its effectiveness. The ADP is forwarded to the unified commander via the JPN for approval. After review, the plan is confirmed, with recommendations for minor modifications based on detailed testing and analysis. Principal concerns include optimizing the C4I network design for the mission and available forces, developing doctrinal rules sets for JCTN operations, and optimizing doctrinal rules sets for Aegis C&D, SSDS, and ACDS units. The RADCs use JMCIS-hosted applications to fine-tune AADC guidance and plans to local circumstances, and to access intelligence products.
Figure A-1. Scenario One Battlespace for TAMD
The Air Defense Plan creates two air defense regions. The AADC retains the duties of the RADC for the battlespace between the AOI and the landward shoreline of the defended nation, retaining tactical control of all TAMD ships and aircraft in this battlespace. A second, shore-based RADC controls the battlespace over the defended nation and in its far shore territorial waters. The ADP reserves several sectors around critical military facilities on the DAL as MEZs for host nation missile systems, commanded by SADCs reporting to the shore-based RADC. Engagement and identification doctrine for the JCTN and automated combat systems is tightly controlled, minimizing the likelihood and impact of mistakes and uncontrolled force action. Likewise, engagement authority and identification authority are tightly controlled due to the political sensitivity of the situation, the high level of publicity, and the desire to avoid escalation.
The arrival of the body of the two battlegroups, builds US strength to four cruisers, six destroyers, and two aircraft carriers. The US cruisers pair off into two air defense task units, augmented by defensive CAP aircraft from the carrier. They take stations in the strait which support NTW mid-course interception as the first line of defense against TBMs, and NAD or air-to-air interception as the first line of defense against cruise missiles and piloted aircraft emerging from aggressor airspace. (In the right conditions, NAD also can engage endoatmospheric TBMs during mid-course and terminal flight.) The remainder of the US battleforce moves to a station on the seaward side of the defended nation, from which the carriers can freely conduct flight operations in support of the ADP. Defensive CAP and alert aircraft from the carrier air wings fly in support of the afloat RADC.
Three ABL aircraft deploy to a protected airfield in the defended nation, providing a 24-hour ABL capability from a station protected by the cruisers and the battleforce CAP. The ABL patrol station optimizes aircraft stationing for infrared detection of TBM launch, infrared tracking and cueing to the cruisers, and laser engagement of TBMs. The ABL sensors complement the Aegis radar surveillance information, shore-based radar systems, and US national assets. Defended nation naval units take up stations for defense in depth against land attack cruise missiles and aircraft. These ships augment the cruisers, increasing the number of firing units and weapons available for a second layer of defense, while preserving the cruiserís NAD missiles for engaging TBMs which leak past NTW and ABL. Alert interceptors from the defended nationís air force and shore-based surface-to-air missile systems form the final layer of active defense, under the tactical control of the shore-based RADC.
Execution authority for attack operations is deliberately retained by the JFC, awaiting authorization by the NCA. Attack operations capability is a deterrent, not to be used unless the aggressor initiates large-scale hostilities. The combined land attack capability of the battleforce includes land attack missiles carried aboard surface combatants and submarines, and the naval strike fighter aircraft of the two carrier air wings. The battleforce land attack capability is ready for large-scale precision strikes against critical elements of the aggressorís command and control infrastructure, and the air wings are ready for interdiction operations against airfields and theater missile forces field operations. The JFCís emphasis, however, remains with active and passive defense.
Information warfare, operational deception, camouflage, and concealment are used to deny effective targeting information to the aggressor. Threatened assets are dispersed where possible and appropriate. Assets are shielded or hardened against explosive and kinetic effects. Military and civil defense authorities set up shelters and warning networks to get the population to shelters in time to protect themselves from conventional or NBC warheads. Decontamination stations and procedures are instituted to speed recovery from NBC attacks. Passive defense plans incorporate measures for redundancy, robustness, graceful degradation, and speedy reconstitution of operations following air and missile attacks. US ships follow similar principles, ready to exploit countermeasure washdown systems, speed, mobility, and damage control measures to prevent, minimize, or recover from attack.
The JPN is the primary means for exchanging force level plans and supporting information between commanders on scene and geographically dispersed resources. Long-haul communications provide access to non-tactical information from sources outside the theater. Theater communications channel the exchange of information, imagery, IPB products, and intelligence through integration of user-pull and intelligent-push access. JMCIS terminals aboard battleforce units, and with the liaison officers ashore, provide access to non-real time data from tactical and non-tactical databases, intelligence, imagery, and IPB products. The JFC battle watch and the principal commanders of the force use the JMCIS for situational awareness at the operational level, supplementing the JDN picture.
US forces rely on the JCTN-enhanced JDN for track data, and to disseminate TBM early warning data from the Tactical Event System (TES). The battleforce E-2Cs provide airborne surveillance information, but the altitude of their airborne patrol stations greatly increases the LOS range of the JCTN and JDN, keeping the two pairs of Aegis cruisers working in a common link. The ABL aircraft also provide LOS relays and add infrared track data and surveillance information to the JDN. Dedicated communications relays connect the carrier operating area with the afloat RADC, extending the LOS range of Link-16 across the defended nation. Link-11 connects the forces of the defended nation and the US battleforce in a common air defense link useable by both RADCs. Link-11 also provides a backup capability to Link-16, whether by HF operations or through satellite relay. CEC capability links the US ships in the air defense task units and their cooperating E-2Cs in a JCTN. The E-2Cís altitude extends the LOS range for the CEC network, enabling sensor cooperation, cooperative engagement decision, and cooperative engagement execution between units in the JCTN. CEC data is incorporated into Link-16 track data for the operators and combat decision systems aboard the ships of the battleforce.
Scenario Two: Enabling Operations
Naval forces can seize and secure airfields, port facilities, or beachheads for follow-on joint forces. These "enabling operations" establish a base for joint operations, the first step towards the objective of the joint operation. Naval enabling operations are one type of "operational maneuver from the sea" (OMFTS) - the naval approach to warfighting at the operational level. In OMFTS naval forces exploit a significant enemy vulnerability in order to deal a decisive blow to the enemy. Extensive use of the sea to gain and maintain advantage over the enemy distinguishes OMFTS from other forms of operational maneuver. Landing forces move directly from their ships to their objectives, whether those objectives are on the coast or far inland. Ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) maximizes the ability of naval commanders to seize and maintain the tactical and operational initiative against the enemy. This scenario uses a hypothetical conflict between an aggressor and a democratic nation traditionally friendly to the U.S., aggravated by small scale naval clashes involving submarines, firings on tactical aircraft, and incursions by special operations forces. Internal divisions in the democratic nation create an opportunity for the aggressor to launch an invasion. Mobile forces quickly overrun most of the defending nation before a U.S. response can be mounted against them. The attackers drive deeply through the valleys, leaving small, scattered pockets of resistance, and pushing the defenders back into remote, forested mountains. The NCA orders the unified commander to plan and execute operations to drive out the invading force.
Mission and Main Effort
A Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) comprised of Navy battle force units, amphibious force units, and a MAGTF is organized to seize and secure a bridgehead for landing and building up a joint force. The MAGTF enabling operation, complemented by Army airborne units conducting an air assault, will seize port facilities, an airfield, and the heights overlooking them. Naval TAMD operations provide layered defense in depth for the MAGTF and the supporting NEF units. Sea-based TAMD capabilities cover ground maneuver forces, protect coastal installations seized by MAGTF and airborne troops, protect the NEF staging area, inshore operating areas, and transit routes.
The TAMD battlespace includes the objective area, the offshore staging area for the NEF, and a defensive zone around both of them. The NEF commander designates the area beyond the objective area as an AOI because of the threat from long-range air and missile attack. The objective area is the mouth of a broad valley flanked by low, rocky mountains overlooking an industrial port and a large airfield. The NEF staging area lies in deep water over the horizon from the objective area and enemy surveillance, providing the amphibious ships and their escorts more warning time against air and missile raids, and additional insurance against the minimal submarine threat. In this season the weather is given to frequent light to moderate precipitation, low cloud ceilings, and moderate visibility. The climate is temperate, and sea conditions are well within the range needed for amphibious operations.
Figure A-2. Scenario Two Battlespace for TAMD
Chain of Command
The unified commanderís designated JFC embarks in the NEF. In addition to the NEF, the JFC controls several US Army airborne units staged into a regional base for a supporting air assault in the objective area. Long-range bombers of the USAF will fire air-launched cruise missiles on the first day of the operation, in coordination with naval strikes. The JFC retains the duties for planning and coordinating air operations, TAMD, and airspace control. An Aegis cruiser is designated as the RADC, responsible for tactical execution of active and passive defense operations. The TACC (Navy) on the command ship is assigned to exercise airspace control in the operating area, and the duties for tactical execution of attack operations are assigned to one of the carrier air wing commanders. An SADC will be activated as the assault force consolidates its hold on the landing area. The SADC will control a distinct air defense sector within the objective area. The Aegis destroyer is designated as SADC will coordinate active and passive defense operations with the RADC and the JFC. The MAGTF TAOC will exercise airspace control authority within the sector, in coordination with the Navy TACC in the staging area, and also direct tactical air operations in the objective area. As the Marine TACC is established ashore, it will assume the SADC role from the Aegis destroyer, retaining the TAOC as the airspace control authority within the sector.
Exploiting network-based capabilities, identification and engagement authority is granted to the firing unit level. The RADC controls the battle through command by negation, monitored by the JFCís staff. Reporting requirements are minimized, emphasizing the situational awareness and cooperative engagement decision capabilities of the JCTN-enhanced JDN, as well as the commanderís confidence in the planned responses modeled and tested prior to (and during) the operation. System engagement doctrine is selected to ensure speedy detection, identification, and appropriate response to all contacts in the battlespace. Sea-based air defenses from the Aegis ships and carrier-based CAP aircraft are reinforced as the MAGTF lands its organic surface-to-air missile systems for defense against the full spectrum of air and missile threats. The Aegis destroyers remain close inshore, supporting the MAGTF and airborne troops ashore, integrating their capabilities with MAGTF TAMD systems. The Aegis cruiserís NTW capability caps the layered defense of the objective area, providing the first engagement opportunity against the longer-range TBMs used by the aggressor.
The cruisers themselves patrol out to sea in the NEF staging area, participating in the layered defense of the NEF. They integrate their TAMD capabilities with self-defense systems aboard the other ships of the NEF, as well as with the air wingís TAMD capabilities. The integrated air defense system accommodates periodic movements of NEF ships close inshore to off-load supplies and equipment. The amphibious shipís SSDS capabilities seamlessly adapt their responses to CEC system doctrine as they move to new stations inshore for transfer operations, and when they return to the staging area. The RADCís ship controls CEC net setup and CEC doctrine distribution with each cooperating unit responsible for local operation and response. E-2C Hawkeyes from the carriers provide airborne radar surveillance data and extend the LOS range for Link-16 and the JCTN, unifying the NEF staging area and the objective area. The Marines seize the mountains overlooking the objective area, expanding their surveillance volume and backing up the E-2Cs with additional high elevation surveillance sites.
The commanderís estimate for the first day of the operation posits a minimal threat from enemy theater missile systems and a delayed response from tactical aircraft due to surprise. Accordingly, direct air support of the MAGTF and Army airborne units is the first priority for most naval tactical aircraft, supplementing the MAGTFís attack helicopters and Harriers. Initial attack operations direct tactical aircraft to detect, identify, and engage TCTs encountered in the objective area. Land attack missiles execute coordinated strikes against high leverage targets such as C2 nodes, early warning sites, the electrical power system, and communications facilities, disrupting crucial processes in the enemy capability. As the operation develops, air support requirements in the objective area decrease, freeing aircraft for operations outside the objective area. Deep strikes destroy or disrupt enemy air and missile command and control, preventing some attacks. Attack operations CAP seek to disrupt or break up coordinated missile launches. DCA CAP intercept and destroy attack by enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. The bulk of the tactical aircraft, however, are assigned to strike and interdiction operations which shape the battlespace and tactical situation and safeguard the buildup of the joint force.
Passive defense begins with operational deception and information warfare, creating operational and tactical surprise and indirectly contributing to passive defense by delaying prompt response by enemy forces. Poor weather conceals the NEFís approach and independent diversions elsewhere distract hostile reconnaissance assets. The NEF staging area is over the horizon in deep water, increasing opportunities to detect and engage any attacks on the MAGTFís sea based support. Once ashore, units protect themselves through dispersion, where possible, to minimize the effects of attacks. Shelters are built to protect personnel and vital functions against explosive and kinetic weapons effects. Camouflage and concealment measures hinder enemy targeting, aided by adroit use of terrain features in the objective area. Decontamination stations augment the shelters protecting the force from NBC attacks - a more serious threat to the ground forces than to the NEF ships, which have organic countermeasure washdown systems and decontamination stations. All units take measures to ensure prompt recovery from attack. Passive defense operations provide for robustness, redundancy, and graceful degradation of forces and functions. The C4I networkís integrated warning system is the linchpin of passive defense. Surveillance and warning systems provide the greatest possible warning time for each attack. What makes it truly effective, however, is the ability to specify the areas which are the target of attacks - particularly NBC attacks - preventing unnecessary adoption of passive defense measures in areas not under attack.
JPN connectivity links shipboard JMCIS terminals and GCCS-compliant MAGTF terminals in the NEF, and also links the NEF to theater and national resources. Staff planners rely on the JPN to connect their workstationís planning tools and TDAs to evaluated, timely, and accurate data, coordinating the principal force commanderís efforts and improving coherence in command, planning, and execution. The JCTN-enhanced JDN is the backbone of the C4I architecture. A single JCTN-enhanced JDN covers the entire area of operations, but stands in instant readiness to split into two JCTN-enhanced JDNs working with a single JPN. The accuracy and precision of the JDN makes integrated use of the battlespace possible. The JDN expedites timely broadcast of attack warnings, improving the effectiveness of passive defense and buying additional time for engagement by hard kill and soft kill systems. The principal weakness of the JDN - its limitation to LOS ranges - is overcome by incorporating airborne participants (the E-2Cs) and elevated sites atop the mountains overlooking the objective area. Link-11 provides a back up for air defense operations, but cannot support maximum use of all force capabilities (the maximum range of the SM-2 Block IV-A against aircraft, for example).
The JCTN makes full use of CEC sensor cooperation, cooperative engagement decision, and cooperative engagement execution, providing data to the Link-16 net which dramatically improves track data timeliness and quality. CEC enables force sensor cooperation, overcoming blind spots in individual unitís surveillance coverage (due to terrain masking, jamming, etc.), decreasing track latency, and optimizing use of force surveillance assets. The E-2Cs and mountain top sites extend the LOS range of the CEC net, just as for the Link-16 net. The integration of CID data with the JCTN further improves the quality of JDN track data and increases the reliability of cooperative engagement decision and execution capabilities. The system doctrinal statements distributed to the cooperating units make full use of cooperative engagement execution in and between each of the layers of active defense.
Scenario Three: Sustained Combat Operations by a Joint Task Force
Naval forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct prompt, sustained combat operations in defense of the US and its interests. Naval forces execute and contribute to a broad range of missions during sustained combat operations, including force sustainment, battlespace dominance, and power projection. They function as integrated elements of a combined arms team in naval battle groups, MAGTFs, and NEFs, as well as in joint force operations. Naval forces are the first on scene and the last to leave, providing continuity and stability throughout a campaign. This scenario postulates US forces reinforcing a nation defending itself against a stalled invasion by an aggressor. The defended area contains several large capacity ports and airfields, providing a bridgehead for reinforcements from the US. American forces lead a coalition of several nations. Substantial US forces have been committed to the operation by each of the Services, and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) is planning a ground offensive to oust the invaders.
Mission and Main Effort
The main effort in the campaign is the ground attack on the occupying forces, capturing or destroying the mobile forces and their supporting arms which led the invasion. Naval forces and their operations fully support the preparations for the coming ground offensive. Naval TAMD forces protect several critical assets on the DAL, as well as protecting naval power projection and battlespace dominance operations shaping the battlefield for the ground attack.
The battlespace includes the territories of the two belligerents: the large, peninsular nation under attack, and its aggressive northern neighbor, an inland country whose coastline is less than 300 kilometers in length. The continental shelf extends to 50 kilometers beyond the shore, hosting large fishing grounds and numerous oil and gas platforms. The two warring nationís common border ends several hundred kilometers inland to the west, where they are separated by the wedge-shaped territory of a heavily-armed neutral nation. The invasion is stalled in the approaches to the mountain range rising over the western and southern coast of the peninsula. Frequent heavy overcasts hamper imagery and intelligence gathering systems, increasing demand for UAVs and aerial reconnaissance during periods of poor visibility.
Figure A-3. Scenario Three and TAMD Battlespace
Chain of Command
The JFACC coordinates all aircraft operations, particularly offensive action deep inside enemy territory. The JFACC is headquartered with an Air Force Air Operations Center (AOC) sited at a southern host nation air base. The AADC plans and coordinates air defense, and also is the ACA. The combined AADC/RADC of the original on-scene force, an Aegis cruiser, is relieved by the JFACC as the AADC. The AADC designates two RADCs to oversee the joint AO. A cruiser is designated as the RADC for the southern littoral of the peninsula, while an Air Force CRC is designated as RADC for the western littoral and the inland areas still under friendly control. A cruiser serves as an SADC for a naval battle force raiding the enemy positions and lines of communications from across the eastern coast, as well as protecting an embarked Marine raiding force during its landings and operations ashore.
The ADP ensures rapid, decisive action at all levels of the chain of command, granting engagement authority at the firing unit level. The RADCs control the battle through command by negation. Reporting requirements are minimized, emphasizing the situational awareness and cooperative engagement decision capabilities of the JCTN-enhanced JDN, and the high level of confidence in the planned responses modeled and tested prior to - and throughout - the operation. System engagement doctrine supports speedy detection, identification, and appropriate response to all contacts in the battlespace. The JPN connectivity smoothes the coordination of air operations and air defense operations between the geographically separated naval raiding force and the main coalition forces.
The ADP incorporates US and coalition reinforcements in a developing air defense system. Since the enemyís TBM launch sites are too far inland for ascent phase interception, naval forces initially patrol near the center of the western littoral, protecting a cluster of port and airfield facilities around the capital of the host nation with NTW and NAD. They complement the defenderís air defenses, which are limited to engaging aircraft and shorter-ranged, slower TBMs. The Marines promptly land several SAM units along the southern littoral for area defense against aircraft and TBMs. Army THAAD units deploy along the western littoral to complement NTW coverage in an upper tier/lower tier defense in depth. As Army maneuver units move into the host nation their organic air defense units are built into the ADP, particularly for terminal defense against cruise missiles emerging from cross-mountain attack routes. ABL aircraft, guarded by CAP interceptors, deploy as additional defenses to fight off large-scale TBM raids on the northern and central parts of the defended area. The air defense systems are supported by a modest number of coalition tactical aircraft reserved for use as alert interceptors and airborne CAP for defense of ground forces attacked by enemy interdiction missions. Missile systems organic to coalition forces coordinate with the rest of the coalition air defenses through Link-11, and they operate in local missile engagement zones against cruise missiles and tactical aircraft.
The raiding naval battleforce has a self-contained, layered air defense. Outer layers include the NTW capability (particularly during operations ashore by embarked Marines) and outer area CAP stations maintained by the carrier air wing. NAD netted through E-2Cs provides the most powerful defensive layer, offering a thick, robust belt of protection against all threat types. SSDS capabilities integrated through the JCTN-enhanced JDN are the final layer, incorporating coordinated employment of hard kill and soft kill systems for protection of the force by each unitís self-defense systems.
Attack operations by tactical aircraft focus on forward airfields and operating bases for enemy tactical aircraft and reconnaissance systems. Naval aircraft attack coastal missile defense systems on the eastern coast and keep the enemy alert to the possibility of an amphibious assault on their rear. Cruise missiles launched by Navy combatants and Air Force long-range bombers attack enemy C2, intelligence, and TBM assembly sites to cripple long-term air and missile threat capabilities.
The JFACC plans attacks by coalition aircraft against targets and target systems identified as priorities by the JFLCC based on their importance to the main effort, the coming ground offensive. Attack operations by the naval battleforce to the east are planned by the battleforce commander, in coordination with the JFACC, but they also engage objectives related to support for the ground offensive and the air defense of the coalition force and the host nation. On the southern coast, attack operations by the MAGTF are planned and conducted by the ACE in coordination with the JFACC, while Army corps commanders plan and conduct attack operations by Army attack aviation and deep fires.
Extensive information warfare and operational deception measures undergird force passive defense. They are key factors preventing attacks by denying the enemy effective targeting information and hindering collection of battle damage indications information. The naval raiding force uses mobility to deny effective targeting information. Forces ashore are dispersed so they don't present concentrated, inviting targets to the enemy. They also exploit the terrain to enhance passive defense. Each unit takes dispersal and hardening measures to protect itself from explosive and kinetic effects. Camouflage and concealment measures hinder enemy attack pilots in the target area, and expand on adroit use of the terrain features in the objective area. Decontamination stations augment the shelters protecting the force from NBC attack.
Measures are taken throughout the force to ensure prompt recovery from enemy attack. Passive defense operations provide robustness and redundancy, and support graceful degradation of forces and functions which are attacked. All measures are integrated to prevent attacks, minimize their effects, and speed the recovery of operations. The C4I network includes the integrated warning system to maximize warning time for attack. The ability to pinpoint areas which are the target of attacks - NBC attacks, in particular - is critical for preventing unnecessary adoption of passive defense measures in areas not under attack.
One JPN works with three mutually supportive JCTN-enhanced JDNs. The JPN is a principal tool improving coherence in command, planning, and execution. JPN connectivity links JMCIS and other GCCS-compatible terminals throughout the joint force with theater and national resources. Staff planners rely on the JPN to connect their workstationís planning tools and TDAs to timely, evaluated, accurate data.
AWACS/EAGLE aircraft are the AADCís critical links in the JDN, linking the air defenses along the two coasts and inland. The Navy E-2Cs are used along the southern coast, and by the raiding battlegroup for its own air defense. Link-16 is the backbone of the force JDN, integrated with the data from the CEC and CID capabilities. The accuracy and timely precision of the JDN makes the integrated battlespace possible. The JDN expedites timely broadcast of attack warnings, improving the effectiveness of passive defense and buying additional time for hard kill and soft kill engagements. LOS extension for the JDN is overcome by the airborne capabilities of the AWACS/EAGLE and the E-2Cs, plus elevated sites atop the mountains within the joint forceís positions. Link-11 provides a back up for air defense operations, but cannot support full capabilities in the force (the maximum range of the SM-2 Block IV-A against aircraft, for example) but Link-11 is crucial to working with coalition forces.
The JCTN makes full use of sensor cooperation, cooperative engagement decision, and cooperative engagement execution, providing CEC and CEC-like data to the Link-16 net which dramatically improves track data timeliness and quality. Force sensor cooperation coordinates sensors to overcome blind spots in individual unitís surveillance coverage (due to terrain masking, jamming, etc.), decreases track latency, and optimizes use of force surveillance assets. The aircraft and mountain top sites extend the LOS range of the JCTN, just as they did for the JDN. CID data integrated with the JCTN further improves data quality and increases the reliability of cooperative engagement decision and execution capabilities. The doctrinal statements distributed to the cooperating units make full use of CEC, including cooperative engagement execution in and between each of the layers of active defense.
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