Index

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R&D Programs (Testimony, 03/22/2000, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-130).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its recent reports on
the coordination of federal nonmedical research and development programs
that address chemical and biological threats, focusing on: (1) the
similarities among nonmedical research and development programs; and (2)
how coordination mechanisms may ineffectively address potential
duplication, research gaps, and opportunities for collaboration.

GAO noted that: (1) each of the federally funded programs conducting
nonmedical research and development on threats from chemical and
biological agents has its own mission objective; (2) GAO found many
similarities among these programs in terms of the research and
development activities they engage in, the threats they intend to
address, the types of capabilities they seek to develop, the
technologies they pursue in developing those capabilities, and the
organizations they use to conduct the work; (3) two of the programs
focus on threats to the military, and the other two focus on threats to
civilians; (4) however, the military and civilian user communities are
concerned about many of the same chemical and biological
substances--such as nerve gas--and possible perpetrators--such as
foreign terrorists; (5) these programs are seeking to develop many of
the same capabilities, such as detection and identification of
biological agents; (6) furthermore, the types of technologies they
pursue to achieve those capabilities may overlap; (7) these programs may
contract with the same groups of laboratories to perform research and
development work; (8) although the four programs GAO examined use both
formal and informal mechanisms for coordination, several problems may
hamper their coordination efforts; (9) participation in formal and
informal coordination mechanisms is inconsistent; (10) program officials
cited a lack of comprehensive information on which chemical and
biological threats to the civilian population are the most important and
on what capabilities for addressing these threats are most needed; (11)
several programs do not formally incorporate existing information on
chemical and biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding what
research and development projects to fund; and (12) having and using
detailed information on civilian chemical and biological threats and the
capabilities needed to respond to those threats would enable
coordination mechanisms to better assess whether inefficient duplication
or critical research gaps exist, and if so, what changes should be made
in federal research and development programs.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-NSIAD-00-130
     TITLE:  Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on
	     Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs
      DATE:  03/22/2000
   SUBJECT:  Military research and development
	     Combat readiness
	     Interagency relations
	     Research program management
	     Chemical warfare
	     Biological warfare
	     Redundancy
	     Hazardous substances
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Terrorism
IDENTIFIER:  DARPA Chemical and Biological Defense Program
	     DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
	     DOE Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
	     DOD Counterterror Technical Support Program

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GAO/T-NSIAD-00-130

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs,
and International [Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:28:00 2000 ]Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives[Author ID0: at ]

[Author ID0: at ]

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m.[Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:29:00 2000 ]
Wednesday,
March 22, 2000[Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:30:00 2000 ][Author ID0: at ]

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE[Author ID0: at ]

Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R&D Programs[Author ID0: at ]

State[Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:31:00 2000 ]ment of Kwai-Cheung Chan,
Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and
International Affairs Division[Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:32:00 2000 ]

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-130[Author ID1: at Tue Mar 21 13:34:00 2000 ][Author ID1: at
Tue Mar 21 13:28:00 2000 ]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the coordination of
federal nonmedical research and development programs that address chemical
and biological threats. In the last decade, concerns about the possible use
of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings
led Congress and federal agencies to implement new or expanded programs to
address these threats. Overall funding in this area has [Author ID2: at Tue
Mar 21 09:07:00 2000 ]increased significantly from 1996 to date[Author ID2:
at Tue Mar 21 09:07:00 2000 ] in recent years[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:01:00 2000 ], and is projected to continue to increase[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:34:00 2000 ]. Today, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:01:00 2000
]Moreover, s[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:34:00 2000 ]s[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:34:00 2000 ]everal civilian and military agencies are now
conducting research and development programs designed to develop equipment
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:01:00 2000 ]to counter these threats. Without
effective coordination, overlapping research and development
activities[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:01:00 2000 ] among the [Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:01:00 2000 ]different agencies, efforts might be
unnecessarily duplicated and[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:02:00 2000 ] could
potentially result in inefficient duplication of effort or [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:02:00 2000 ]important questions being [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:02:00 2000 ]might be [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:02:00 2000
]overlooked. Our testimony today identifies similarities among nonmedical
research and development programs and explains how [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:02:00 2000 ]describes whether [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:02:00 2000
]coordination mechanisms may ineffectively [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:02:00 2000 ]can facilitate actions so that [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:03:00 2000 ]address [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000 ]potential
duplication, research gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are
addressed[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000 ].

Nonmedical research and development focuses on developing techniques for
detecting, identifying, or protecting against chemical and biological agents
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000 ], and [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:03:00 2000 ]as well as [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000
]for[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 17:33:00 2000 ] [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:03:00 2000 ]decontaminating personnel and equipment. The scope of our
work was limited to federal programs that fund unclassified research and
development. We examined 4 [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000 ]four
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:03:00 2000 ]such [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:34:00 2000 ]programs: (1) the Department of Defense's Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, (2) the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program, (3) the Department of Energy's
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, and (4) the Counterterror
Technical Support Program conducted by an interagency working group called
the Technical Support Working Group. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00
2000 ] The programs funded by the Department of Defense and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency support the development of technologies
principally for military applications. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00
2000 ]The intended users of such [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000
]the [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ]technologies developed in
these programs [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ]may be a single
military service (such as the Army),[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000
] or [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ]multiple services. On the
other hand, the programs conducted by the Department of Energy and the
Technical Support Working Group support the development of technologies for
use by [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ], or [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ]organizations that are responsible for addressing
threats to civilians (e.g., [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000 ]. This
civilian user community includes [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:04:00 2000
]federal, state, and local emergency response personnel)[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:05:00 2000 ].

-->Summary[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:07:00 2000 ][Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:05:00 2000 ]SUMMARY[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:07:00 2000
]-->[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:05:00 2000 ]

Each of the federally funded programs conducting nonmedical research and
development on threats from chemical and biological agents has its own
agency-specific [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:34:00 2000 ]mission objective.
However, we found many similarities among these programs in terms of the
research and development activities they engage in, the threats they intend
to address, the types of capabilities they seek to develop, the technologies
they pursue in developing those capabilities, and the organizations they use
to conduct the work. For example, [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:08:00 2000
]T[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:08:00 2000 ]t[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21
10:08:00 2000 ]hese programs conduct a similar range of research and
development activities, such as [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:06:00 2000
]including [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:06:00 2000 ]applied scientific
research [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:05:00 2000 ]evaluat[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:06:00 2000 ]ing[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:05:00 2000 ] the
feasibility [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:06:00 2000 ]or showing the
practical utility [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00 2000 ]of [Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:06:00 2000 ]a technology[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00
2000 ]and developing prototype equipment[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00
2000 ]. With regard to threat, two of the programs (those in the Department
of Defense and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) focus on threats
to the military, and the other two (those in the Department of Energy and
the Technical Support Working Group) focus on threats to civilians. However,
the military and civilian user communities are concerned about many of the
same chemical and biological substances,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00
2000 ] ([Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00 2000 ]such as nerve
agents)[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00 2000 ],[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:07:00 2000 ] and possible perpetrators,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:07:00 2000 ] ([Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00 2000 ]such as foreign
terrorists)[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:07:00 2000 ]. In addition, we found
that these programs are seeking to develop many of the same capabilities,
such as detection and identification of biological agents. Furthermore,
there are overlaps in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ]the types of
technologies,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ] ([Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ]such as mass spectroscopy)[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:08:00 2000 ],[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ] they pursue to
achieve those capabilities may overlap[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00
2000 ]. Finally, these programs may contract with the same groups of
laboratories to perform the [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000
]research and development work.

While potentially overlapping R&D efforts are common and valuable, they
require effective coordination to reduce [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00
2000 ]inefficient [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:33:00 2000 ]duplication of
effort, prevent important questions from being overlooked, and enhance
opportunities for collaboration. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000
]Although the four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ]4[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:08:00 2000 ] programs we examined currently use both formal
and informal mechanisms for coordination, we found several problems that may
hamper their [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:08:00 2000 ]coordination efforts.
First, participation in formal and informal coordination mechanisms is
inconsistent. For instance, several of these mechanisms do not include
representatives of the civilian user community. Second, program officials
cited a lack of comprehensive [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:32:00 2000
]detailed [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:32:00 2000 ]information does not
exist [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:32:00 2000 ]on what are the most
important [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:09:00 2000 ]which [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:09:00 2000 ]chemical and biological threats to the civilian
population are the most important [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:09:00 2000
]and on [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:10:00 2000 ]what capabilities for
addressing these threats are most needed[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:08:00
2000 ]are most needed by [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:10:00 2000
]organizations that are responsible for addressing threats to
civilians[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:08:00 2000 ]. Third, several programs
do not tie funding decisions about research and development projects to
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:31:00 2000 ]formally [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 14:31:00 2000 ]incorporate [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:32:00 2000
]existing information on chemical and biological threats or needed
capabilities in deciding what research and development projects to
fund[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:31:00 2000 ]. Having and using detailed
information on civilian chemical and biological threats and the capabilities
needed to respond to those threats would enable coordination mechanisms to
better assess whether inefficient duplication or critical research gaps
exist, and,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:10:00 2000 ] if so, what changes
should be made in federal research and development programs.

Background

Four federal programs which [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:11:00 2000 ]that
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:11:00 2000 ]currently fund nonmedical research
and development (R&D) on chemical and biological threats are described in
table 1.

Table 1: Federal Programs Funding Nonmedical R&D on CB [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:11:00 2000 ]Chemical and Biological [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:11:00 2000 ]Threats
 Agency           Program           Description
                                    The objective of DOD's Chemical and
                                    Biological Defense Program is to enable
                                    United States [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
 Department of    Chemical and      20 15:11:00 2000 ]U.S. [Author ID2: at
 Defense (DOD)    Biological        Mon Mar 20 15:11:00 2000 ]forces to
                  Defense Program
                                    survive, fight, and win in chemically
                                    and biologically contaminated
                                    environments.

 Defense Advanced Biological        This program funds R&D projects
 Research         Warfare Defense   supporting revolutionary approaches to
 Projects Agency  Program           biological warfare defense, emphasizing
                                    high-risk, high-potential technologies.

                  Chemical and      This program funds R&D to develop
 Department of    Biological        advanced technologies to enable the
 Energy           Nonproliferation  United States to more effectively
                  Program           prepare and respond to the use of
                                    chemical and biological weapons.
                                    The Technical Support Working Group is
                                    an interagency working group whose
                                    mission is to facilitate interagency
                                    R&D for combating terrorism primarily
 Technical        Counterterror     through rapid research, development,
 Support Working  Technical Support and prototyping. Their Subgroup on
 Group            Program           Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
                                    Nuclear Countermeasures oversees, among
                                    other activities, the development of
                                    techniques to detect, protect from, and
                                    mitigate chemical and biological
                                    weapons.

Note: The Technical Support Working Group is funded primarily through the
Counterterror Technical Support Program within DOD[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:11:00 2000 ]

Sources: GAO compilation of information from DOD, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Technical
Support Working Group.

Past and projected f[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:30:00 2000 ]Program
f[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:30:00 2000 ]unding information, as of July
1999,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:28:00 2000 ] is summarized in figure 1.
Recently initiated [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:29:00 2000 ]non[Author ID2:
at Tue Mar 21 09:07:00 2000 ]-D[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:09:00 2000 ]OD
[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:07:00 2000 ]R&D programs have grown rapidly as
compared to DOD's program. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:29:00 2000 ]In
1996, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:13:00 2000 ]R&D funding for [Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:13:00 2000 ]DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program
decreased [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:07:00 2000 ]from $[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:13:00 2000 ]54.6[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:14:00 2000 ]
million in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:13:00 2000 ]fiscal year 1997
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:17:00 2000 ]to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:13:00 2000 ]a projected [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:09:00 2000 ]$50.7
million for fiscal year 2001.[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:13:00 2000 ]
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:14:00 2000 ]In contrast, over [Author ID2: at
Tue Mar 21 09:08:00 2000 ]the same period, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:14:00 2000 ]R&D [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:19:00 2000 ]funding for
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:14:00 2000 ]Energy's program as well as
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:17:00 2000 ]for [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:19:00 2000 ]the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:14:00 2000 ]'s program[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:19:00 2000
] [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:14:00 2000 ]increased[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:15:00 2000 ] to the point of surpassing DOD's program[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:18:00 2000 ].[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:15:00 2000 ] For
instance, Energy's program went from $17 million in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:16:00 2000 ]fiscal year [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:17:00 2000 ]1997
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:16:00 2000 ]to $63 million projected for
fiscal year 2001. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:17:00 2000 ]provided by far
the most funding in nonmedical chemical and biological defense R&D - $60.5
million dollars, as compared to $13.6 million for the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency and $2.4 million for the Technical Support Working
Group. Energy's program began in 1997 at $17 million, and has grown to $31.2
million this fiscal year. For fiscal year 2001, Energy's program (at $63
million), along with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency program
(at $67.1 million) [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:19:00 2000 ]are [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:28:00 2000 ]each [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:28:00
2000 ]projected to have more funding in this area than DOD's Chemical and
Biological Defense Program (at $50.7 million). [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:19:00 2000 ]

Figure 1: Actual and Projected Funding for Nonmedical Basic Research,
Applied Research, and Prototype Development Addressing Chemical and
Biological Threats

-->Note 1[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ][Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:20:00 2000 ]-->a[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ][Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ]:[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ] DOD
and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency budgets include only the
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ]nonmedical R&D categories of
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ]in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:21:00 2000 ]the DOD budget activities of basic research, applied
research, and advanced technology development. The fiscal year 1997 DOD
Chemical and Biological Defense Program budget excludes Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency funds, which were consolidated into the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program for fiscal year 1997 only.

-->Note 2:[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ][Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:20:00 2000 ]-->b[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ][Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:20:00 2000 ] The Technical Support Working Group is funded
primarily through the Counterterror Technical Support Program within DOD.
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:12:00 2000 ]Our figures for Technical Support
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:12:00 2000 ]the [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:12:00 2000 ]Working Group's budget only include funding originating in
DOD for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures
Subgroup. Funding for FY[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ]fiscal
years[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ] 2000-2001 is estimated
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ]assume[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:21:00 2000 ]s[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ]ing[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 15:21:00 2000 ] the same annual percentage change as that of
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ]total Working Group funding from
DOD.

Sources: GAO compilation, as of July 1999,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:28:00 2000 ] of data from DOD, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
and Department of Energy.[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:37:00 2000 ]

According to DOD, three key areas must be addressed [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:22:00 2000 ]issues [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ]in
planning and implementing R&D for [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000
]chemical and biological defense research and development include[Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ]: (1) identifying, validating, and
prioritizing chemical and biological threats;[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:22:00 2000 ],[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ] (2) delineating
the capabilities needed to address those threats;[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:22:00 2000 ],[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:22:00 2000 ] and (3)
allocating program resources to activities that address [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]develop [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000
]those needs[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]capabilities[Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]. Assessing threats [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]Threat assessments [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00
2000 ]may include [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]involve [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]multiple dimensions of a threat[Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ], such as which particular chemical or
biological agents may be used, how they may be delivered, and who might be
the perpetrators. Delineating capabilities [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:23:00 2000 ]needs [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]requires
risk-based assessments to determine what capabilities, such as the ability
to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ]detection of[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:23:00 2000 ] biological agents, are needed to address the threat.
Allocating program resources includes deciding what research, development,
testing, and evaluation projects to fund,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:24:00
2000 ] and making sure that projects address needed capabilities. For
civilian programs to combat terrorism, w[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:24:00
2000 ]W[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:24:00 2000 ]e have previously testified
before this subcommittee that civilian programs to combat terrorism require
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:24:00 2000 ]on [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:24:00 2000 ]the utility of [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:09:00 2000
]threat and risk assessments to help determine program requirements and to
target resources where most needed. By coordinating on [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:27:00 2000 ]analyses of threats and user requirements,[Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:24:00 2000 ] military and civilian programs can [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:27:00 2000 ]could [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:27:00
2000 ]preclude inefficient [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:27:00 2000
]duplication, address research gaps, and identify research projects that may
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:27:00 2000 ]might [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:27:00 2000 ]benefit from consolidation or collaboration.

Similarities Exist Among Federal Nonmedical R&D Programs

We found similarities in terms of the research and development activities
that the four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:25:00 2000 ]4[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:25:00 2000 ] federal R&D programs engage in, the threats they
intend to address, the types of capabilities they seek to develop, the
technologies they pursue in developing those capabilities, and the
organizations they use to conduct the work. For example, all 4[Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ]four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ]
programs engage in applied research and initial prototype development.
Moreover, two [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]- [Author ID2: at
Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]DOD's and Energy's [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21
10:10:00 2000 ]- [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]engage in basic
research.

With regard to threat, two of the programs (those in the Department of
Defense and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) focus principally
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:26:00 2000 ]on threats to the military, and
two (those in the Department of Energy and the Technical Support Working
Group) focus on threats to civilians. However, some threats to the military
and to the civilian population are similar,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:27:00 2000 ] and may involve the same chemical or biological agents or
the same perpetrators. For instance, assessments of both military and
civilian threats include concerns about biological toxins such as ricin,
biological pathogens such as anthrax, toxic industrial chemicals such as
chlorine, and chemical agents such as sarin. The military has traditionally
concentrated on the battlefield use of chemical and biological agents by
enemy nation-states. However, it has recently expanded its assessment of
potential perpetrators to include foreign terrorists [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:27:00 2000 ]- [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ]one of the
primary concerns of civilian programs.

In addition, we found that these programs are seeking to develop many of the
same capabilities,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ] and are pursing
similar technologies to achieve those capabilities. For example, all
four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ]4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
15:27:00 2000 ] programs are pursuing capabilities to detect and identify
biological agents, and three[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000
]3[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ] of the four[Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ]4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:27:00 2000 ] programs
are pursuing the capability to detect and identify chemical agents. A
summary of the capabilities pursued by each program is presented in figure
2. Furthermore, programs sometimes pursue similar technologies in developing
these capabilities. Examples of technologies funded by both DOD and Energy
include mass spectroscopy and flow cytometry, both of which may be used for
detecting and identifying biological agents.

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological-related Capabilities Sought by R&D
Programs

Note: An X indicates that the program covers the specified capability, by
either funding or soliciting for (e.g., through a broad agency announcement)
R&D projects in that area. A blank indicates that the program does not cover
the specified capability.

Sources: DOD, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of
Energy, and Technical Support Working Group.

Finally, these programs may contract with the same groups of laboratories to
perform the research and development work. All four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 15:29:00 2000 ]4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ] programs make
funding available to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]may contract
with [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]Energy's national
laboratories, and these laboratories have been involved in multiple
programs. The [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ] [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]DOD, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and
Technical Support Working Group's[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]
programs also make funding [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]may
contract with [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]available to [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:29:00 2000 ]laboratories in DOD, industry, and
academia.

[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 15:38:00 2000 ]

Current Mechanisms May Not Facilitate Effective Coordination of R&D Programs

While overlapping R&D efforts are common and valuable, they require
effective coordination to reduce inefficient duplication of effort, prevent
important questions from being overlooked, and enhance opportunities for
collaboration. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:25:00 2000 ]Although the
4[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]four[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21
10:10:00 2000 ] programs we examined currently use both formal and informal
mechanisms for coordination, we found several problems that may hamper their
[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]coordination efforts. First, we
found that participation in current coordination mechanisms, whether formal
or informal, is inconsistent. Second, program officials cited a lack of
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:25:00 2000 ]detailed [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 14:25:00 2000 ]comprehensive [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:25:00 2000
]information on [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:08:00 2000 ]does not exist
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:25:00 2000 ]on what are the most important
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:13:00 2000 ]which [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:13:00 2000 ]chemical and biological threats to the civilian population
are the most important [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:13:00 2000 ]and on
[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:10:00 2000 ]what capabilities are most needed
by [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:13:00 2000 ]organizations that are [Author
ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]for [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00
2000 ]responsible for [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]addressing
threats to civilians[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]are most
needed[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]. More detailed information
could help guide and coordinate R&D. Third, several programs do not tie
funding decisions about R&D projects to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:43:00
2000 ]formally incorporate [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:43:00 2000
]existing information on chemical and biological threats or needed
capabilities in deciding [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:44:00 2000 ]which
[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]R&D projects to fund[Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 14:44:00 2000 ]. Because of these problems, these programs may
not be developing the most important capabilities and [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:24:00 2000 ]or [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:24:00 2000
]addressing the highest priority threats. Having and using detailed
information on civilian chemical and biological threats and the capabilities
needed to respond to those threats would enable coordination mechanisms to
better assess whether inefficient duplication or critical research gaps
exist, and, if so, what changes should be made in federal R&D programs.
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:24:00 2000 ]

Participation in Coordination Mechanisms Is Inconsistent

The 4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:14:00 2000 ]four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:14:00 2000 ] R&D programs we examined are coordinated through both
formal and informal mechanisms. For example, the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee-[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:36:00 2000 ], [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:36:00 2000 ]which consists of representatives from
DOD, Energy, and the intelligence agencies, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:37:00 2000 ]-[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:37:00 2000 ]is a formal
mechanism that reviews and makes recommendations to Congress regarding
programs addressing threats from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
According to officials involved in these 4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:14:00 2000 ]four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:14:00 2000 ] programs,
informal coordination also occurs, through such means as informal briefings,
scientific conferences, and participation in each other's planning and
review meetings. We found, however, that participation in coordination
mechanisms is inconsistent. For instance, the Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee's responsibilities include reviewing Energy's program aimed
at chemical and biological threats to civilians. However, the Committee does
not formally [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:24:00 2000 ]include
representatives from the civilian user community. Nor have Energy's project
planning and review processes involved potential [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:23:00 2000 ]civilian users. In addition, although Energy officials are
invited to participate in R&D planning and review meetings of DOD's Chemical
and Biological Defense Program, they have not consistently attended.

Coordination Mechanisms Lack [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:37:00 2000 ]Key
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000 ]Comprehensive [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:22:00 2000 ]Information Is Lacking [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:37:00 2000 ]on Threats to Civilians and on [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:37:00 2000 ]Capabilities Needed to Address Those Threats

Program officials noted that there is a [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:37:00
2000 ]they [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:37:00 2000 ]lack of [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000 ]key [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000
]comprehensive [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000 ]information on
civilian chemical and biological threats and on [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:38:00 2000 ]the capabilities needed to address civilian threats [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000 ]- [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000
]information that could help guide and coordinate R&D. In our previous work
on civilian programs to combat terrorism, we have found that [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000 ]these [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:39:00 2000
]programs lack [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000 ]the need for
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:38:00 2000 ]a comprehensive threat assessment
for terrorist chemical and biological threats. For instance, [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:39:00 2000 ]W[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:39:00 2000
]w[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:39:00 2000 ]e also [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:39:00 2000 ]reported that only the [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:39:00
2000 ]assessments of foreign-origin terrorists, and not those of [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:39:00 2000 ]domestic-origin terrorists [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ], [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ]do not
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ]classify [Author ID2: at Tue Mar
21 09:09:00 2000 ]rank [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:09:00 2000 ]the
specific chemical and biological agents that would more [Author ID2: at Tue
Mar 21 09:09:00 2000 ]most [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:09:00 2000 ]likely
be used. By contrast, more [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000
]detailed military threat assessments exist for chemical and biological
threats from both [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000 ]nation-states as
well as terrorists[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:22:00 2000 ]. In addition,
specific chemical and biological agents are placed in priority categories
that depend on the degree of certainty [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:09:00
2000 ]estimated likelihood [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:09:00 2000 ]of the
threat.

Furthermore, the capabilities needed by [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00
2000 ]civilian requirements [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ]users
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ]are not well coordinated or well
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:40:00 2000 ]defined. We have previously
reported that a standardized equipment list developed for civilian emergency
response personnel is not based on a validated set of requirements n[Author
ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:09:00 2000 ]or on a consensus in the civilian
community on needed equipment. Attempts to identify R&D needs to improve
domestic capabilities to respond to chemical and biological incidents lack
detailed performance specifications and do not incorporate threat analyses.
By contrast, written specifications of military user needs and requirements
are coordinated among the military services and are relatively detailed. For
example, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ]DOD's Chemical and
Biological Defense Program initially identifies [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:41:00 2000 ]coordinates and consolidates information on the war-fighting
capabilities that military users require. These requirements initially take
the form of [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ]broad needs ([Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ], [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000
]such as "individual protection" or "contamination avoidance,[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ]")[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ] from
which they [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]it [Author ID2: at Tue
Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]develops[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:11:00 2000 ]
detailed and coordinated [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:41:00 2000 ]system
performance requirements based on analyses of threats and military missions.

Some Programs Do Not Use [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]Existing
Information on Threats and Needed Capabilities Not Always Used [Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]to
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]Determine[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:42:00 2000 ]ing[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ] Which R&D
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]Projects[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:42:00 2000 ] to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]Funding[Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]

Among the programs we examined, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:21:00 2000
]O[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:21:00 2000 ]o[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:21:00 2000 ]nly DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program integrates
formal threat assessment into its R&D activities. For instance, DOD's
project review process includes a System Threat Assessment Report. This
document describes the most important chemical and biological threats that
military equipment being developed should address. By contrast, the other
three programs do not utilize threat information to the same degree of
detail[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:42:00 2000 ]. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:20:00 2000 ] The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's program uses
threat information for overall program planning, but not for decisions
regarding particular projects. [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:20:00 2000
]According to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:19:00 2000 ]Agency [Author ID2:
at Mon Mar 20 14:19:00 2000 ]program [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:19:00
2000 ]officials, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's
program[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:19:00 2000 ] explain that this is
because their program [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:19:00 2000 ]is meant to
address broad categories of threats,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:43:00 2000
] or threats that are not yet present. As a consequence, their program uses
threat information primarily for overall program planning. [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 14:20:00 2000 ]With regard to civilian programs, although the
Energy and the Technical Support Working Group have utilized [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]incorporated [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00
2000 ]threat assessments in overall program planning, the threat [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:16:00 2000 ]assessments are not project-specific.

Finally, the two larger R&D programs [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00
2000 ]- those [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]in the Department of
Energy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]- [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]do not
formally incorporate existing information on user needs [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 14:15:00 2000 ]tie [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:15:00 2000 ]in
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:15:00 2000 ]deciding[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
14:15:00 2000 ]sions[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:15:00 2000 ] on which
research and development [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:16:00 2000 ]R&D
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:16:00 2000 ]projects to fund to[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 14:16:00 2000 ] existing information on user needs[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 14:15:00 2000 ]. Projects in [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00
2000 ]T[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]t[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:44:00 2000 ]he Energy projects [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000
]program [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:44:00 2000 ]do not incorporate any
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:11:00 2000 ]existing [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 14:11:00 2000 ]requirements developed by the Technical Support Working
Group or the Institute of Medicine [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:11:00 2000
]for civilian programs.[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:12:00 2000 ] Similarly,
each [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]projects [Author ID2: at Mon
Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]of [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]in
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency's program [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]R&D area
does [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]do [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:45:00 2000 ]not necessarily support a documented military need. By
contrast, DOD's program has various mechanisms to tie its R&D projects to
military needs. For example, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000
]Examples of these include [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]DOD's
program uses [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]Defense Technology
Objectives [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ], each of which [Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]to [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00
2000 ]specify[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]ies[Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ] a particular technology to be pursued,[Author
ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ] as well as [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:45:00 2000 ]and [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:45:00 2000 ]the specific
military benefits of that technology. The Technical Support Working Group
develops its own list of civilian [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:10:00 2000
]user needs, which it uses to solicit R&D proposals. However, these
equipment needs are stated without detailed performance specifications, and
they do not incorporate mission and threat analyses.[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 14:10:00 2000 ]

Potential Benefits Exist [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:46:00 2000 ]From
Improving Coordination

The [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:46:00 2000 ]As a [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:46:00 2000 ]result of these problems,[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:46:00 2000 ] is that these [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:46:00 2000 ]R&D
programs may not be developing the most important capabilities and
addressing the highest priority threats. Having and using [Author ID2: at
Mon Mar 20 16:46:00 2000 ]To eliminate duplication, [Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:46:00 2000 ]these [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:47:00 2000 ]programs
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:46:00 2000 ]need [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:47:00 2000 ]detailed information on civilian chemical and biological
threats and the capabilities needed to respond to those threats would enable
coordination mechanisms to better assess whether [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:47:00 2000 ]inefficient [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 14:10:00 2000
]duplication exists and, if so, what areas of research should be
consolidated[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:47:00 2000 ]. For example, after
the 4[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:47:00 2000 ]four[Author ID2: at Mon Mar
20 16:47:00 2000 ] military services-[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:11:00
2000 ]which have such detailed information[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20
16:47:00 2000 ]-[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 09:11:00 2000 ] [Author ID2: at
Tue Mar 21 09:11:00 2000 ]began coordinating their chemical and biological
defense efforts in fiscal year 1994 through DOD's Chemical and Biological
Defense Program, they combined [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:48:00 2000
]were able to consolidate [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:48:00 2000 ]44
service-specific developmental efforts in the program's contamination
avoidance research into 10 joint-service projects. Having comprehensive
information can also help program officials determine whether critical gaps
in research exist which [Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:48:00 2000 ]that
[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:48:00 2000 ]could be filled by refocusing one
or more programs. [Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:12:00 2000 ]

[Author ID2: at Mon Mar 20 16:48:00 2000 ]

[Author ID2: at Tue Mar 21 10:12:00 2000 ]

This concludes our formal statement. If you or other members of the
committee have any questions, we will be pleased to answer them.

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Kwai-Cheung
Chan at (202) 512-3652. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Dr. Sushil K. Sharma, Dr. Weihsueh Chiu, and Dr. Jeffrey
Harris.

(713051)[Author ID0: at ]

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