Index


Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R&D Programs (Letter Report, 08/16/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-160).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the coordination of
federal research and development (R&D) efforts to develop nonmedical
technology related to chemical and biological (CB) defense, focusing on:
(1) federal programs that conduct nonmedical CB defense-related R&D; and
(2) the existing mechanisms for coordinating these programs.

GAO noted that: (1) four federal programs that fund R&D of nonmedical CB
defense technologies are: (a) Department of Defense's (DOD) Chemical and
Biological Defense Program; (b) Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency's (DARPA) Biological Warfare Defense Program; (c) Department of
Energy's (DOE) Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program; and (d)
Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by the Technical
Support Working Group; (2) all of these programs pursue R&D ranging from
applied research to prototype development; (3) two of these programs,
the Chemical and Biological Defense Program and Biological Warfare
Defense Program, develop technologies primarily for military warfighting
applications; (4) the other two programs develop CB defense technologies
primarily to assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents; (5) the
formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may not ensure that
potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are
addressed; (6) coordinating mechanisms lack information on prioritized
user needs, validated CB defense equipment requirements, and how
programs relate R&D projects to these needs; (7) in particular, domestic
preparedness needs are specified with significantly less detail than
military needs; (8) furthermore, two programs--those in DARPA and
DOE--do not formally utilize user requirements in planning their R&D
goals; (9) more detailed information about user needs, validated CB
defense equipment requirements, and how user needs relate to R&D
projects may allow coordination mechanisms to better assess whether
overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration exist; (10) agency
officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination
mechanisms and some have initiated additional informal contacts in
response; and (11) informal coordination between DOD and DOE has been
particularly active.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-160
     TITLE:  Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of
	     Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs
      DATE:  08/16/1999
   SUBJECT:  Military research and development
	     Biological warfare
	     Combat readiness
	     Chemical warfare
	     Redundancy
	     Interagency relations
	     Terrorism
	     Defense capabilities
	     Emergency preparedness
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
	     DARPA Biological Warfare Defense Program
	     DOE Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
	     Counterterror Technical Support Program

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ns99160 GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 1999 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R& D Programs

GAO/NSIAD-99-160

  GAO/NSIAD-99-160

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense United
States General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 National Security and International
Affairs Division

B-282700 Letter August 16, 1999 The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Appropriations United States
Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Armed Services United States Senate

Since the Persian Gulf War, Members of Congress have raised
concerns regarding the adequacy of technology used by the
Department of Defense (DOD) to detect, identify, prepare for, and
protect troops against chemical and biological (CB) weapons. 1 In
1993, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(P. L. 103- 160) directed the Secretary of Defense to take actions
designed to improve the Department's CB defense capabilities,
including coordination and integration of all CB defense programs
into

what is now the CB Defense Program. More recently, concerns that
terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to CB
devices led Congress to authorize the federal government to
improve domestic capabilities to respond to such incidents. With
the initiation of these

domestic preparedness programs in fiscal year 1997, federal
research and development (R& D) efforts to develop nonmedical CB
defense technology expanded considerably, and they continue to
grow. 2 According to the White House, the President's fiscal year
2000 budget request includes over

$10 billion to combat terrorism. Almost $1.4 billion is for
programs specifically aimed at terrorist threats from chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, an amount that
exceeds the funding of less than $1 billion for military programs
to counter CB threats.

1 See Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems (GAO/NSIAD-96-103,
Mar. 29 1996) and Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy
to Address Low- Level Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23,
1998). 2 Nonmedical technologies refer to technologies for
detecting, identifying, protecting against, or decontaminating
personnel and equipment of CB agents. By contrast, examples of
medical R& D include the development of prophylactics such as
vaccines, medical diagnostics for determining exposure to

chemical or biological agents, and therapeutic drugs or procedures
for countering the effects of exposure.

B-282700 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

In response to your request, we examined the coordination of
federal R& D efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to
CB defense. Specifically, we (1) identified federal programs that
conduct nonmedical CB defense- related R& D and (2) described the
existing mechanisms for

coordinating these programs. A companion report, Chemical and
Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow
Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, Aug. 16, 1999), examines
the extent of DOD's application of the Government Performance and
Results Act's outcome- oriented principles to the CB Defense
Program.

Results in Brief Four federal programs that currently fund R& D of
nonmedical CB defense technologies are:

 Department of Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense Program,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare

Defense Program,  Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation

Program, and  Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by
the Technical Support Working Group. All these programs pursue R&
D ranging from applied research to prototype

development. Two of these programs, the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program and Biological Warfare Defense Program, develop
technologies primarily for military warfighting applications. The
other two programs develop CB defense technologies primarily to
assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents.

The current formal and informal program coordination mechanisms
may not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities
for collaboration are addressed. Coordinating mechanisms lack
information on prioritized user needs, validated CB defense
equipment requirements, and how programs relate R& D projects to
these needs. In particular, domestic preparedness needs are
specified with significantly less detail

B-282700 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

than military needs. 3 Furthermore, two programs those in the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of
Energy do not formally utilize user requirements in planning their
R& D goals. More detailed information about user needs, validated
CB defense equipment requirements, and how user needs relate to R&
D projects may allow coordination mechanisms to better assess
whether overlaps, gaps, and

opportunities for collaboration exist. Agency officials are aware
of the deficiencies in the existing coordination mechanisms and
some have initiated additional informal contacts in response.
Informal coordination between the Department of Defense and

the Department of Energy has been particularly active. We are
making no recommendations at this time.

Background In the last decade, concerns about the possible use of
CB weapons led both Congress and the executive agencies to
implement new or expanded

programs to address these threats. In 1993, Congress established
DOD's CB Defense Program in an effort to coordinate and integrate
across the military all CB defense programs from R& D through
procurement. 4 DOD initiated a stand alone R& D program in
biological defense within the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) in fiscal year 1997, and in October 1998 it
established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to administer the
CB Defense Program as well as to address other emerging military
threats. Following the use of a chemical agent by terrorists in
Japan, civilian- oriented programs emerged through Congress's
passage of

3 In Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999),
we found that there is no assessment that would provide a basis
for clearly defined and prioritized equipment requirements based
on threat and risk, and there is little consensus among federal,
state and local officials on the types of equipment needed for
civilians to prepare for a CB terrorist incident. Moreover, in
1998 we reported that some local jurisdictions were deciding on
equipment purchases without the benefit of formal threat and risk
assessments based on valid threat data. See Combating Terrorism:
Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,
1998); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9,
1998); Combating Terrorism:

Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic Preparedness
Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998); and Combating
Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

4 P. L. 103- 160, sec. 1701, Nov. 3, 1993.

B-282700 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. 5
This act initiated a set of domestic preparedness programs,
including R& D programs, for improving domestic capabilities to
respond to terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons.

Four Federal Programs Fund Nonmedical R& D Addressing CB Threats

Four federal programs that currently fund nonmedical R& D
addressing CB threats are:  DOD's CB Defense Program,  DARPA's
Biological Warfare Defense Program,  Department of Energy's (DOE)
CB Nonproliferation Program, and  Counterterror Technical Support
Program conducted by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).
The objective of DOD's CB Defense Program is to enable U. S.
forces to survive, fight, and win in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments. DARPA's program funds R& D projects
supporting revolutionary approaches to biological warfare defense,
emphasizing high- risk, high- potential technologies. DOE's
program funds R& D to develop advanced technologies to enable the
United States to more effectively prepare and respond to the use
of CB weapons. Finally, TSWG is an interagency working group whose
mission is to facilitate interagency R& D for combating terrorism
primarily through rapid research, development, and prototyping. 6
The TSWG's subgroup on Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures oversees,
among other activities, the development of techniques to detect,
protect from, and mitigate CB weapons.

These programs conduct R& D in similar areas as well as in support
of similar user communities. In all four programs, R& D activities
include applied research and initial prototype development; two
programs, DOD's CB Defense Program and DOE's CB Nonproliferation
Program, also engage

5 This act was contained in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (title XIV of P. L. 104- 201, Sept. 23, 1996)
and is commonly referred to by its sponsors' names: Senators Nunn,
Lugar, and Domenici.

6 TSWG is funded primarily through the Counterterror Technical
Support Program within DOD.

B-282700 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

in basic research. 7 The R& D funded by DOD's and DARPA's programs
support the development of technologies principally for military
warfighting applications. The end users of such technologies may
be a single military service, such as the Army, or multiple
services. The R& D conducted by DOE's program and by the TSWG's
Subgroup on Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures support the
development of technologies for civilian end users, which include
federal, state, and local emergency response personnel.

The funding for nonmedical R& D in the DARPA and DOE programs has
been increasing, and combined are projected to be greater than
nonmedical R& D funding for DOD's CB Defense Program for fiscal
years 2000- 2001. The funding levels of basic research, applied
research, and prototype development for these programs are shown
in figure 1 for fiscal years 1996- 2001.

7 Basic research involves the investigation of fundamental
scientific knowledge, such as the basic physical properties of CB
agents. Applied research refers to scientific investigation
directed toward a technical goal, such as developing and
evaluating the feasibility of proposed detection technologies.
Applied research generally tests such technologies within a
controlled laboratory environment. Prototype development involves
developing a piece of equipment in order to show the practical
utility

and feasibility of a technology. In general, the initial prototype
must be able to perform in an environment similar to that in which
it will ultimately be used, though it may not be able to withstand
all the stresses of operational use. Two other types of R& D
activities, conducted primarily by DOD, are Demonstration/
Validation and Engineering and Manufacturing Development. These
two activities are part of DOD's acquisition cycle, and include
the testing and evaluation of technologies.

B-282700 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 1: Actual and Projected Funding for Nonmedical Basic
Research, Applied Research, and Prototype Development Addressing
Chemical and Biological Threats a

a All funding amounts are in then- year dollars. b DOD and DARPA
budgets include only nonmedical R& D in the DOD budget activities
of basic research, applied research, and advanced technology
development. The fiscal year 1997 DOD CB Defense Program budget
excludes DARPA funds, which were consolidated into the CB Defense
Program for fiscal year 1997 only. c Our figures for TSWG's budget
only include funding originating in DOD for the Chemical,
Biological,

Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Subgroup. Funding for
fiscal years 2000- 2001 is estimated assuming the same annual
percentage change as total TSWG funding from DOD.

Sources: DOD, DARPA, and DOE.

Current Mechanisms May Not Ensure Effective Coordination of R& D
Programs

These four programs need to coordinate their R& D efforts because
they pursue many of the same capabilities and may contract with
many of the same laboratories to perform R& D work. The current
formal and informal mechanisms to coordinate among these programs
may not ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities
for collaboration are addressed.

In particular, participation in some current coordination
mechanisms is Dollars in millions

DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program b DARPA Biological
Warfare Defense Program DOE Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation Program TSWG Counterterror Technical Support
Program

b c

0 20

40 60

80 100

120 140

160 180

200 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Fiscal Year

B-282700 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

inconsistent, and information on user needs, validated CB defense
equipment requirements, and on how programs relate R& D projects
to those needs is incomplete.

Programs Pursue Similar Capabilities and May Employ Many of the
Same Laboratories As emphasized in a recent National Academy of
Sciences study, 8 overlapping R& D activities among different
agencies, while common and

valuable, would be enhanced by effective coordination to reduce
potential inefficient duplication of effort, prevent important
questions from being overlooked, and enhance opportunities for
collaboration. The National Academy of Sciences study advocated a
formal process to coordinate areas of research that are supported
by multiple agencies. In the case of R& D to address CB threats,
every R& D area is addressed by at least two of the four programs
we examined. For example, all four programs address the capability
for biological agent detection and identification, and three of
the four programs address the capability for chemical detection
and identification. Furthermore, programs sometimes develop
similar technologies in pursuing these capabilities, such as mass
spectroscopy for identifying biological agents. A summary of the
R& D

areas pursued by each program is presented in figure 2. 8
Evaluating Federal Research Programs: Research and the Government
Performance and Results Act, National Research Council, National
Academy Press, 1999.

B-282700 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 2: CB- related Subject Areas Covered by R& D Programs

Note: An X indicates that the program covers the specified R& D
subject area, by either funding or soliciting for (e. g., through
a broad agency announcement) R& D projects in that area. A blank
indicates that the program does not cover the specified R& D
subject area.

Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.

In addition, programs may contract with the same groups of
laboratories to perform R& D. Laboratories in DOD, industry, and
academia may perform R& D work for three of the four programs, and
DOE laboratories may perform work for any of the programs. A
summary of the relationships among the agencies, programs, and
potential R& D performers is presented in figure 3.

R& D area DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program

DARPA's Biological Warfare Defense Program

DOE's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program

TSWG's Counterterror Technical Support Program

Biological detection and identification

Chemical detection and identification

Individual protection Collective protection

Other basic research (e. g., aerosol science, genomic sequencing)
Other applied research

(e. g., threat assessment, aerosol technology) Modeling and
simulation

Decontamination, restoration, and mitigation

X X X X X X X X

X X X

X X X X X X X

X X X

B-282700 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 3: Summary of Organizational Relationships Among Agencies,
Programs, and Potential R& D Performers for Nonmedical R& D
Addressing CB Threats

Sources: DOD, DARPA, DOE, and TSWG.

Participation in Coordination Mechanisms Is Inconsistent

Both formal and informal mechanisms are used to coordinate R& D
among these four programs. One formal coordinating body involved
with both military and domestic preparedness programs is the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. This Committee,
which consists of representatives from DOD, DOE, and the
intelligence community, is responsible for annually reviewing and
making recommendations to

Congress regarding programs related to military as well as
terrorist threats from non- conventional weapons, including CB
threats. In addition, the National Security Council has
established a coordinating group for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Preparedness, under which there is a

subgroup for R& D. Other formal coordinating bodies, such as the
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group and the

CB Defense Program

CB Nonproliferation Program Biological

Warfare Defense Program

Counterterror Technical

Support Program Department of

Energy DARPA Department of

Defense DOD labs Industry labs

DOE labs Academic labs

DOD labs Industry labs

DOE labs Academic labs

DOD labs DOE labs

Industry labs

Programs Agencies

Potential Performers of R& D

TSWG (interagency)

DOE labs Academic labs

B-282700 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

National Security Council- sponsored TSWG, oversee narrower ranges
of activities related to CB threats. 9 Many officials cited the
importance of informal coordination mechanisms, such as informal
briefings, scientific conferences, and participation in each
other's planning and review meetings. 10 Participation in some
informal coordination mechanisms, however, is incomplete. For
example, although

DOE's program is aimed at domestic preparedness needs, planning
and review of DOE projects have not involved potential users from
the domestic preparedness community. And, moreover, no valid
requirements have been defined for this community. In the case of
DOD's CB Defense

Program, although DOE is invited to participate in the R& D
planning and review meetings, they have not consistently attended.
DARPA officials cite insufficient staff to attend all potential
planning and review meetings. Thus,

informal coordination mechanisms have not ensured input from end
users and agencies involved in addressing threats from CB weapons.
Current Coordination Mechanisms Lack Complete Information on User
Needs and Requirements

The current coordination mechanisms utilize only limited
information on civilian user needs, validated CB defense equipment
requirements, and how programs relate R& D projects to user needs.
Information on user needs and defined requirements may allow
coordination mechanisms to compare the specific goals and
objectives of R& D projects to better assess whether overlaps,
gaps, and opportunities for collaboration exist. DOD's CB Defense
Program coordinates and consolidates information on

the warfighting capabilities that military users require. These
requirements initially take the form of broad needs, such as
individual protection or contamination avoidance. From these broad
needs, users develop detailed system and coordinated performance
requirements based on analyses of threats and military missions.
With information on user needs, equipment requirements, and
ongoing R& D, consolidation is possible. For

instance, after the CB defense efforts of each of the four
services were coordinated through the CB Defense Program, 44
service- specific

9 The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group
addresses preventing and detecting the use of CB threats, but not
responding to their use. The TSWG's scope only includes terrorist,
not military, CB threats. 10 As an example of the results of
informal coordination, program officials repeatedly noted a
project for

detecting CB agents based on parallel micro separations that is
funded jointly by DOD and DOE at the Sandia National Laboratory.

B-282700 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

developmental efforts in the program's contamination avoidance
research area were consolidated into 10 joint- service projects.
Programs have significantly less information on domestic
preparedness needs than on military needs. While military user
needs and requirements are coordinated among the military services
and are relatively detailed,

domestic preparedness needs are uncoordinated and scantly defined.
For example, the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization
and InterOperability advising the National Domestic Preparedness
Office at the Federal Bureau of Investigation has developed a
Standardized Equipment List for first responders. Use of the list
is voluntary, however, as there is neither a validated set of
requirements nor a consensus in the domestic

preparedness community on needed equipment. 11 Two lists of R& D
needs to improve domestic capabilities to respond to CB incidents
have been developed, but these lists are short statements of
equipment needs without detailed performance specifications, and
they do not incorporate mission and threat analyses. 12 The
coordinating mechanisms also lack sufficient information on how
two

of the four programs relate user needs to their program R& D
goals. Only R& D projects conducted by DOD's CB Defense Program
and the TSWG's Subgroup on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Countermeasures are formally tied to user needs. One
example of how DOD's R& D efforts are tied to user needs is the
use of Defense Technology Objectives. Each Defense Technology
Objective identifies a specific technology advancement that will
be developed or demonstrated as well as the specific benefits to
military operational capabilities from the

technology advance. In other cases, R& D efforts are tied directly
to performance specifications as part of the equipment acquisition
cycle. In the case of TSWG, all R& D projects directly support the
user needs developed within TSWG; though, as noted above,
equipment needs are stated without detailed performance
specifications, and they do not incorporate mission and threat
analyses.

11 Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response
Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).
12 A prioritized list of R& D needs to detect, protect from, and
mitigate CB weapons is developed by TSWG annually; and, in a
recent Institute of Medicine study, Chemical and Biological
Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical
Response, the nonmedical R& D needs of civilian health providers
were delineated (e. g., personal protective equipment, detection
and measurement of chemical agents).

B-282700 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

The DARPA and DOE programs, by contrast, do not formally
incorporate user needs in planning their R& D efforts. Each DARPA
R& D area is internally developed by DARPA and does not
necessarily support a documented military requirement. Proposals
in each area are evaluated by a peer review panel consisting
primarily of nongovernment experts, and the final decision for
funding a proposal is made by the DARPA program manager for that
R& D area. Similarly, the planning and review of DOE

projects do not utilize any requirements developed for domestic
preparedness programs. Project reviews are primarily concerned
with technical merit, although potential user benefits are
considered. Review panels consisted primarily of DOE personnel in
1997- 98, and are planned to consist of non- DOE technical experts
in 1999.

Agency officials are aware of the deficiencies in the existing
coordination mechanisms, and some have initiated additional
informal contacts in response. Informal coordination between DOD
and DOE has been particularly active.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of our report to DOD and DOE. DOD provided
technical comments, which we incorporated into our report, where
appropriate. In a written response, DOE stated that they had no
comments with our report as written. DOE's response is reprinted
in appendix I.

Scope and Methodology

The scope of our study was limited to federally funded R& D of
nonmedical technologies to address CB threats. We did not evaluate
any classified R& D. To address objective (1), to identify federal
programs funding R& D in this area, we conducted interviews,
literature searches, and collected program documents. We queried
officials from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy,
the Technical Support Working Group, and the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy. We also conducted searches of
Department of Defense databases, governmentwide databases, and the
Commerce Business Daily. In addition, we reviewed recent
legislation addressing the threat from chemical and biological
weapons to

both the military and civilians, including legislation
establishing new programs in this area. Program documents we
examined included program budgets, strategic and performance
plans, annual reports, internal program

B-282700 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

planning documents, program briefings, and proceedings to program
review meetings.

For objective (2), to describe the mechanisms for coordinating
these programs, we interviewed program officials, examined
legislation and program documents, observed program review
meetings, and attended scientific conferences. Our interviews
included discussions of formal coordination mechanisms as well as
informal mechanisms. We also reviewed legislation establishing
formal coordinating bodies and documents produced by these bodies.
This documentation included annual reports, briefing slides, and
documentation made available on the world

wide web. Our assessment of informal coordination included our
observation of interagency participation in program meetings and
scientific conferences. We observed a 1999 TSWG requirements
determination meeting as well as the 1999 DOD Technology Area
Review and Assessment of CB defense. Scientific conferences we
attended included the 1998 Joint Workshop on Standoff Detection
for Chemical and Biological Defense and the 1998 Scientific
Conference on Chemical and Biological Defense Research. We also
obtained proceedings from these and other scientific conferences
from previous years.

We contacted the following organizations:  Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia;  Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Dulles, Virginia;  Department of Energy,
Washington, D. C.;  Office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, Washington,

D. C.;  Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving
Ground,

Maryland;  Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Falls
Church, Virginia;  National Domestic Preparedness Office,
Washington, D. C.;  National Ground Intelligence Center,
Charlottesville, Virginia;  Nonproliferation and National Security
Office, Department of Energy,

Washington, D. C.;  Office of Science and Technology Policy, White
House, Washington,

D. C.;  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.;
Technical Support Working Group, Fort Washington, Maryland;  U. S.
Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Maryland; and  U. S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

B-282700 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

We conducted our evaluation from November 1998 to April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 7 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send
copies to other congressional committees and the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Energy. We will also make copies
available to others on request.

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me
or Sushil K. Sharma at (202) 512- 3092. Key contributors to this
report were Weihsueh Chiu and Jeffrey Harris.

Kwai- Cheung Chan Director, Special Studies and Evaluations

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-160 Chemical and Biological Defense

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(713040) Let t er

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Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00

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