MISSIONS
FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 03/05/86 23:12:48
To: NSJMP --CPUA
*** Reply to note of 03/04/86 16:51
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
Subject: MISSIONS
Roger on the Iranian issue.
With regard to the Geneva talks, let me get something off my chest. I have
worried for some time--going back to last summer--that the delayed pace of
serious analytical work to define just what we are after on the mix between
offense and defense and the derivative questions such as how to conduct the
transition, how to respond to critics (and Russian) charges that SDI is
intended for offensive purposes etc. will put us in an impossible position
vis-a-vis both the Russians in Geneva and the Congress. Those fears are
proving out. They are exacerbated by the deficit problem to the extent that it
makes it all that easier for people to cut SDI. But I see a future (six months
from now) when the Russians will conclude that we have lost control of the
appropriation process. By that time they will have seen-absent an initiative
from the President--the congress move several domestic bills at higher levels
than requested. Over time (even with vetos) the climate will sour even more on
the Hill as the election nears and vetos will become harder. Defense will come
last and because at least some domestic bills will have already been enacted
over budget, the pressure to take more out of defense will be even greater.
The Russians will watch all this with some amusement and pleasure and probably
slow down the Geneva talks or become more unyielding given our propensity to
cut our own programs--including SDI (which will be the case if, by that time,
we don't have answers to the central questions on the future of the program
and how it relates to arms control.)
The only way I see to avoid this is to take the initiative now to get the best
deal you can on defense. It seems to me that the Packard Commission provides a
good foundation for launching such an effort. The President could call
together the leading bipartisan players on national security issues from the
congress (Nunn, Goldwater, Aspin, Dickenson etc) and say he has reviewed the
report and endorses it. The specific changes he would recommend would include:
-A reinvigorated PPBS (as Packard recommends).
-Congressional reform (less micromanagement) and a commitment to a five
year (two years as a fallback)appropriation.
-Agreement to the first two years being at a level of 2% real growth each
year.
-He would concurrently appoint a Bipartisan Board to serve with staggered
terms in perpetuity to advise on national security issues. They wold be asked
to report on an interim basis within two months and then annually forever. It
might include, as part of the first effort "Congressional Advisors" who would
take part in forging the first report.
-Then the Board would be named (HAK might be a good Chairman)_ to include
Harold Brown and half a dozen other heavies.
A variant would be not to propose the compromise until the Board recommends it
two months from now with the Congress asked to suspend work on the defense
budget until the reports comes in.
Unless this concept or something like it which gets the initiative back in
the White House is tried, by September we will be watching the investment of
the past five years go down the tubes, the victim of congressional
preoccupation with the deficit (thanks to Don Regan and Gramm Rudman). With it
goes arms control and before long, we will be seeing a more ambitious Soviet
Union a la the late 70's.
One reason I believe that the scheme might work is that there are several
politically ambitious Democrats (Nunn and Aspin) who understand that it will
not be smart to be the party that cut defense in 88 even though it may look
like the politically smart thing to do now. But they need something--some new
event or commission or compromise to point to as their "contribution to
wisdom."
All this is pretty far afield from your original point concerning John Tower's
departure. I suppose this has been a long way of saying that it seems to me
that the hardest work is here in Washington and you will need all the horses
you can find to overcome the congresional tide running in favor of cutting the
feet out of from under the guys in Geneva. I guess I think I could be more
help here--or stated anopther way; if the job isn't done here, it won't make
much difference who is in Geneva.
I am flattered that you would think of me John. But I suppose in my heart
believe that assuming we get the initiative back from the congress (and I
honestly believe it is feasible to do so) that you might want to try something
differennt on arms control anyway. And that would be to establish the private
channel with Paul Nitze or someone else tasked to do the negotiating.
It is kind of you to think of me but I honestly believe there are solid people
who would do it and would keep up the image of a prestigious delegation who
are probably better than I am.
A different approach would be just to have Ron Lehman move up to fill Tower's
shoes. You would take some knocks from those who wouldn't think his tickets
are good enough--even though intellectually they are. Other candidates might
include Sy Weiss, Johnny Foster, Johnny Vogt, Tom Hayward, John Lehman or Rick
Burt or even Richard Perle.
As a final footnote, it looks from the outside as if Regan is charting some
very dangerous courses in congresional relations. Today's throwing down of the
gauntlet on the Contra issue seems to me very shortsighted. I may be
wrong--maybe it is Pat Buchanan--he likes to go over the cliff with flags
flying--but it doesn't matter who is doing it. It will alienate the few
friends we have among Democrats who are going to be key on the issue in the
House.
Sorry to be so verbose. The record of accomplishment is terrific. My
kibbitzing is only out of concern for what I see Don doing to lay a groundwork
for disaster in the future. If I can help, please just holler.