MSG: FROM CHAINES[?] --VAXA TO:NSPMJ --CPUA 12/ 5/86 13:30:26
TO: NSPMJ --CPUA
Subject: BEAZLEY BRIEFING
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
Date: 5-Dec-1986 01:27p EDT
From: Jay R. Watkins
WATKINS
Dept: Decision Support
Tel No: 395-6922
TO: Remote PROFS User ( _PROFS%NSPMJ@CPUA )
TO: Remote PROFS User ( _PROFS%NSPMJ@CPUA )
Subject: BEAZLEY BRIEFING
SECRET
December 3, 1986
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Arms Control Briefing for Australian
Defense Minister Kim Beazley (C)
PARTICIPANTS:
NSC Australia
Peter Rodman Kim Beazley
Robert Linhard Henry John Coates
Adm. William Cockell Ross Dottrill
Sven Kraemer David Reese
James A. Kelly
David N. Laux
Jay R. Watkins
DATE, TIME December 3, 1986
AND PLACE: 11:00-12:00 PM, West Wing, Situation Room
Conference Room
Mr. Kelly introduced the NSC attendees to Defense Minister Beazley.
Mr. Rodman began the substantive briefing by describing Soviet behavior in
arms control negotiations with the United States. The Reykjavik summit did not
go as well as the Soviets had expected. US Congressional reaction has come
more from the right wing. These critics have said to be careful, not to be too
anxious to sign an agreement with the Soviets. Senator Sam Nunn a Democrat, is
taking that line. The Soviets can not be quickly satisfied.
Our Congressional elections had interesting results for the Soviets. They
perceive, in the emergence of a Democratic Congress, a shift toward the
center-left. They do not quite yet know what to make of the Iran arms sale
flap. Will it weaken Reagan? Will he be desperate for success in some area of
foreign policy--such as arms control? The USSR is unable to let its arms
negotiation strategy lay fallow over the next two years, in the expectation of
a better bargaining position folowing Reagan's term. The United States will
not give in to the "wait-and-see" attitude of the Soviets. It is not in
Moscow's interest to delay. If the President recovers from the current
controversy, we'll be in business. There is no certainty that a Democratic
Administration in 1988 would be any easier to deal with in arms control. The
Democrats could run into the same arms control problems Jimmy Carter did. The
reality is that SDI continues to receive Congressional funding. SDI recently
received $3.3 billion. SDI technological advances will continue, providing
another imperative for the Soviets to continue arms control negotiations. The
Soviets can reach closure on arms control in the next two years. Rodman
expressed his optimism. The current pressures on the Administration are,
hopefully, temporary. In the long run, the pressure will be on Moscow.
Mr. Linhard outlined the Administration's position at Reyjavik. He said that,
following the summit, there was considerable confusion in Europe over whether
the United States had tabled a proposal for elimination of all long-range
ballistic missiles or whether it applied only to medium-range missiles.
Following Reykjavik, Linhard traveled to Vienna, then Bonn, London, Rome,
Paris, and Brussels to brief foreign ministries and military staffs on the
talks. At Reykjavik, he said, we had two priorities: first, significant START
reductions of 50%. The USSR would only accept 30% cuts. Second, we sought a
Soviet reduction of the 513 SS-20s in Asia. The Soviets would not budge on
reducing their missiles in Asia. Linhard expressed concern that the Soviets
might try to propagandize the issue by playing our European allies against our
Asian allies, especially the Japanese.
The large overall number of ballistic missiles suggests US negotiating
leverage is rather tenuous. But the Soviets are definitely concerned about US
space weapons. It is our best leverage against them. One of the Soviet
delegates, Chief of General Staff _______ Akhromyev?? , is an amazing asset.
He was very open. The discussed the military problem directly. Linhard felt
Reykjavik was our equivalent of Vladivostok.
At Reykjavik, we tried to reduce the approximately 6,000 nuclear delivery
systems, with an appropriate treatment of bombers. We were looking for a 50%
reduction in Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). We were pleasantly surprised
when the Soviets went to 100 in INF. We'd prefer 0-0. The Soviets asked the
United States for a 10 year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
They were thinking specifically in terms of SDI. Reagan's price for this
concession was "zero-level" offensive ballistic weapons. FROG and SCUD systems
would have to be eliminated. Reagan had in mind the NATO alliance. The
spectrum of systems, from FROGS-7s, with a range of 100 kilometers, though
SS-21s and SCUD-Bs to SS-23s, are a mix of forces. The Soviets have a total
long-range and medium-range force of 18,000-19,000 missiles. By contrast, NATO
has ???? and 170 PIs. The imbalance is obvious. Let's leap from INF to START.
Where do we get the leverage? The answer is in our SDI program. Linhard added
that shorter-range Soviet weapons are also chemically and biologically
capable.
Linhard said that he understands theatre forces and the European concerns. It
used to be his account while at JCS. Theatre forces are just one side of the
nuclear equation. There are two points of view. The NATO alliance is
essentially defensive. A defensive posture surrenders the military initiative.
The Soviets have the advantage of mobilizing out of garrison their tactical
nuclear weapons, putting them out of danger, while the West's arsenal lies
vulnerable in its hardened locations. NATO's airfields, with its tactical
nuclear air delivery mission, as well as fixed garrisons where nuclear
artillery and armor battalions reside, are vulnerable to short-range ballistic
nuclear attack. Our alliance depends on our ability to project a deterrence.
We have a tactical capability. We have the capability to maintain deterrence.
Linhard said that if he were on the Soviet General Staff, his view of his
ballistic missle force structure would be that it is a "technological beast."
These missiles are technologically basic and can be tested in peacetime. The
probability of damage can be accurately assessed. The USSR knows in advance
what an initial nuclear onslaught will do.
Linhard said we in the West have to remove that high degree of certainty. If
the Soviets had to rely instead on Floggers and Fencers to deliver nuclear
weapons, this raises the degree of uncertainty. NATO has an effective tactical
air defense capability. The USSR could not be certain that their planes would
survive a break-through.
Linhard said the European reaction has been interesting. The tabled proposals
have caught military atrategist and observers by surprise. The Soviets were
not caught by surprise. The Soviets do not want "zero-level" in ballistic
missiles. They want "zero-level" strategic forces. They view SDI as ongoing,
making technical progress.
Adm. Cockell reinforced that last point. The conventional defense of Europe
relies on US resupply capability. Fragile as it is already, seven? major
resupply points, known to the Soviets, could be rendered inoperable. Our
defense, then, becomes problematic. There are good arguments for supporting
conventional forces if we can eliminate that threat to our conventional
forces.
Mr. Beazley. The European reaction seems short-sighted. Europeans fear the
"zero-level" ballistic missle idea. They worry that elimination of ballistic
missiles will lead to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons. Where
will it end? The pressures could then build on restructuring conventional
forces.
Mr. Linhard. There were themes in our European talks. The first was confusion,
even at the foreign ministry level. The US side clarified this confusion. In
Italy, after long conversations, we finally made clear that we were talking
only about nuclear ballistic missles, not other nuclear delivery systems. We
stated that it is unlikely that the Soviets will buy this proposal. If the
USSR buys it, and then the United States backs away, do we deploy other
short-range delivery systems (artillery, cruise missiles, tactical air) to
compensate? Do you, as Europeans, want this?
France currently has no major domestic opposition to their nuclear "force de
frappe." The French are fearful that anti-nuclear sentiment will creep into
their country. They wonder where this will put their own independent nuclear
arsenal. The US proposal does not involve French, British, or Chinese
missiles. If the superpowers negotiate limits, however, third country nuclear
arsenals may ultimately be considered.
[Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
Adm Cockell added that since Reykjavik, President Reagan has backed off the
"zero option" on ballistic missiles. The proposal was for a 50% reduction in
ballistic forces. The Soviets wanted concessions on the testing of SDI. For
the first five years of such an agreement this may not be a problem. There was
no revision of tabled offer Reykjavik.
[Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
Mr. Linhard said that the "fear of being duped" view is expressed by European
think tanks, not government officials. Linhard made reference to a cartoon
about the summit from the Atlanta Constitution, in pointing out that our own
citizens are frustrated by the results of Reykjavik. Linhard said we must put
down a marker with the Soviets. We can assume maximum leverage with SDI.
Otherwise, there is just so much leverage the United States can assume.
Linhard said the Soviets respond to out "programmatic" arms development, not
our "jawboning" in Geneva. The US team conveyed to the Soviets why we feel
ICBMs are destabilizing. The US view is that the Soviet Union has
over-invested in ballistic missiles. We need to be more hard-nosed.
Adm. Cockell staed that the post-Reykjavik climate has revealed how many
"nuclear lovers" there actually are in Europe.
[Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
Mr. Linhard. The chief US priority is that SDI should not be treated as a
bargaining chip. The price to restrict SDI would have to be high. We will not
let SDI die. The United States also hopes the Soviets will join us in reducing
START forces by 50%. In short range (SP) INF, a 100-missile deployment package
is acceptable only if there are constraints at the lower levels. The United
States will not accept permanent restriction on the 100 INF-level. We have to
remain flexible to changes by the Chinese not covered in the treaty. For
example, the Chinese may raise their INF levels. Adjustments then can be
resolved through negotiation. Rowny briefed the Australians on this following
the summit.
Linhard moves the discussion to the issue of nuclear testing. There is no
significant difference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United
States and the Soviet Union agree on where to go next. We recognize the need
for further negotiations. The USSR tabled a "package" that looks similar to
our stance on the agenda and objectives. Our only difference is in some
terminology.
The Soviet delegation was not wholly united on the outcome and results of
Reykjavik. Akrimanov??? and Karpov? disagreed over the characterization of the
talks. The international political climate and interpretation do not quite put
us there, in terms of reaching agreement.
The establishment of a nuclear risk reduction center is perking along. This is
being discussed quietly. We are upgrading the "hot line." This area of
cooperation continues, even during the darkest period of USSR-US relations
during this Administration. We need a bit more time to distance ourselves from
current political issues.
On the issue of chemical weapons, we face the challenge of instituting an
adequate inspection system. This is mandatory to prevent the high risk of
cheating. This refers to Article 10 proposals.
[Paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
Mr. Linhard said that a good doctoral thesis would be to examine the sociology
of negotiations.
Linhard then outlined the Soviet initiatives since July. The Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister _______ came in, the day after the delivery of Reagan's SDI
letter in July. He proposed an experts meeting, to which we agreed. Seven US
experts were sent to Moscow. We encountered four Soviets: Arbatov, Gen.
Chervov???, Gen. Turtinov???, and _______??? We went to a dacha. They showed
up in military uniforms, which was highly unusual. The first two days were
fruitless. They started by saying they hoped we had come with concessions.
A month later we met in Washington, DC. The same meeting of seven Americans
and four Soviets took place. Then Shultz and Shevardnadze met and proposed the
Reykjavik meeting. We then encountered a different cast of Soviet delegates.
The new mix was odd: Gen. Akrimanov???, Gen. Karpov???, Gen. Velakov???,
Feline??? and Arbatov. We had long, hard discussions. Karpov stressed the
non-linkage, linkage points. He got off the track. We returned to Vienna after
the Geneva meeting. The Soviets had problems. They did not have a response.
There must not have been a great debriefing in Moscow following the Reykjavik
meeting.
At Geneva, we met new people: Sachabik??? Murtnik??? and Nikulchek??? (an
American desk officer.) The Soviets wanted to know our view on ABM compliance.
The US agenda was post-Reykjavik. Nonetheless, Paul Nitze went point-by-point
through the US position on the ABM Treaty. They were upset at what ended up
being our lecture. The US side then turned toward post-Reykjavik topics. The
Soviets stone walled us. Murtnick??? was uncomfortable. Karpov??? and
Kampelman agreed to an experts meeting in Geneva with a different
format--three Americans and three Soviet experts. The United States has been
consistent with our arms negotiation team. The Soviets have not; they are
running through a variety of fora and players.
Mr. Rodman said the linkage strategy ultimately works against the USSR. The US
bargaining position is remarkably sound. The United States has pocketed Soviet
concessions at Reykjavik and are holding them. We receive some pressure on the
United States from Europe. But the United States is positioned to fend off
anti-US propaganda.
Mr. Linhard. Is the US position being articulated in Australia? Can we do
better?
[Three paragraphs deleted, (b)(1)(c)(s) exemption]
Mr. Linhard said we began SDI in 1983. Military and industrial strategic
planners have met on research and development. If SDI were to go away tomorrow
and the Soviets pursue defensive activity, as we believe they are, SDI will
eventually come back--in reaction to Soviet SDI efforts. Their bunkers,
dispersal sites, government leadership protection, all point to their
strategic defense effort. If I were a Soviet, I would be building be terminal
defenses to protect Moscow.
The United States has been able to sustain substantial funding for three
years. The Delta-180, HCA test, and shorter range projects have been
successful. [One line and a half deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
Mr. Rodman US leverage on SDI has gotten the Soviets to the negotiating table.
Awareness of this may help sustain Congressional funding. We have to fight
every year for it.
[One paragraph deleted, (b)(1)(s) exemption]
SECRET EXDIS
Declassify on: OADR
Beazley2