Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, February 7, 1995.

Memorandum for: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Director, Ballistic Missile Defense; Senior Deputy General Counsel, International Affairs and Intelligence.

Subject: BMD program logic.

Here is a revised outline based on your inputs and pulled together by Ash Carter. As always, your suggestions have been helpful.

Attachment.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

I. BMD Program is determined by:

II. The Threat

A. Present threat against CONUS (AK and HI slightly different)

  1. Russian ICBM and SLBM threat.

  2. China--CSS4.

  3. No Rest of World (ROW) BM threat to CONUS expected before 2005 at the earliest. (Clapper testimony)

  4. Vulnerability to surreptitiously delivered or air-delivered nuclear device.

B. Future threat against CONUS

  1. Russia and China.

  2. ROW Proliferator indigenous development, e.g., North Korea, Iran, Libya.

  3. Delivery by BM or air breathers, e.g., cruise missile.

C. Effective CONUS defense against determined Russian attack (several thousand RVs) problematic. Responses to this threat are vigorous deterrent (NPR) plus priority on preventing reemergence of threat (CTR).[[CONUS Defense ]] against accidental or small attack (50 RVs without sophisticated penaids) possible.

D. Theater Ballistic Missile Threat

  1. Here today--for US and Allies; SCUDs NO DONG, CSS-2, etc.

  2. TBM can carry nuclear or unitary/submission CW/BW warheads.

  3. If unchecked, significant problem for U.S. forward operations, esp. SWA, ROK.

  4. ROW by purchase or SLV conversion.

  5. Urgent defense requirements for US and Allies.

III. TBM Defense first priority ($2 billion/year)

A. Core Program (deployment planned):

  1. PAC-3 First Unit Equipped (FUE) 1998

  2. THAAD FUE 2002

  3. Navy Lower Tier FUE 2000

B. Enhanced Program (technology development):

  1. Navy Upper Tier

  2. Boost Phase Intercept

  3. Corps SAM (MEADS)

C. International cooperation emphasized.

D. Depending upon performance, any effective TBM system (especially with the over-the-horizon threat cueing) will have some marginal capabilities against faster strategic incoming BM targets in one-on-one engagement.

E. U.S. will not accept limitations on TMD capabilities that pose no threat to the basic principles of the ABM Treaty.

IV. Technical and Program Options for National Missile Defense (NMD)

A. System components include:

  1. Early warning/Surveillance

  2. Target acquisition and track--mix of ground based multifunction radars, early-warning radars, space based EO/IR sensors.

  3. Interceptors--number, location, and performance.

  4. Battle Management C3

B. An NMD system requires significant RDT&E before deployment and the system may be either compliant or not compliant with the ABM (and other) treaties.

C. The DoD NMD program consists of two elements

  1. BMD Technology. R&D on BMD components that could eventually be part of an advanced NMD or TMD system and growth of TMD system for limited NMD capabilities.

  2. The Baseline Program. A treaty compliant three year R&D program that will provide the option for deployment over an additional three years, of an initial NMD system which might or might not be treaty compliant. There is room for further growth in system capabilities.

D. The DoD budget does not fund an emergency response NMD program that could be more rapidly deployed in case an unanticipated threat emerges or capability was desired, against accidental or inadvertent launch.

  1. Such a system consists of 20-50 exo-kill vehicles (EKVs) on MINUTEMAN II or III boosters with DSP, early warning radar, and multifunction radar cueing.

  2. This Emergency Response System would take two years to develop (at a cost of $1 billion to the baseline) and two years to deploy (at an additional cost of $2-4 billion to the baseline)

  3. The Emergency Response System would not be compliant with either the ABM or START treaty.

  4. ERS would be more effective to degree we know what threat it would meet; therefore not wise to commit to deployment until threat is clearer.

E. Summary Chart

NMD PROGRAM OPTIONS 1 1 Treaty issues subject to review by Compliance Review Group.

R&D phase

Deployment phase

F. Choices include:

1. Adding funds for NMD technology, to create more choices for the future, such as strategic application of Navy uppertier technology.

2. Adding funds for baseline system--risk reduction and, schedule acceleration.

3. Adding funds for R&D phase of Emergency Response System.

V. Treaty Compliance

A. Purpose of ABM Treaty was to assure strategie stability by prohibiting ABM deployment that had significant capabilities against a retaliatory strategic missile attack. The US stands by this purpose.

B. The 1972 ABM Treaty does not reflect either the changed geopolitical circumstances or the new technological opportunities of today. We should not be reluctant to negotiate treaty modifications that acknowledge the new realities provided we retain the essential stabilizing purpose of the treaty.

  1. The ABM Treaty permits one particular `thin' system--100 interceptors at Grand Forks ND with GBR and space based sensor adjuncts. May be possible to deploy a satisfactory NMD within these limits.

  2. Other NMD configurations or TMD systems that do not meet specific prohibitions of the treaty but are comparable to the permitted `thin' system, e.g., the Emergency Response system, would not undermine, the Treaty and should be permitted.

C. TMD Demarcation--TMD is an essential defense capability and we should pursue these programs diligently: we cannot let Russian foot dragging on TMD demarcation issue slow TMD programs.

  1. Present US position proposes limits on demonstrated capability of components (no testing against targets with velocity 5 KM/sec or range 3500 km) and interceptor velocity. This approach aimed at negotiability and prompt Russian acceptance.

  2. If Russians do not accept essential elements of US TMD demarcation proposal soon, we should consider shifting our proposal to a more technically straight forward position based on the actual capability of a deployed TMD system to defend against a substantial Russian retaliatory missile strike