Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA,

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your June 28 letter to Senator Levin concerning the impact of the `Warner Amendment,' which prohibits the application of the ABM Treaty to U.S. theater missile defense systems.

I introduced this amendment in April with only one goal in mind--to rapidly provide the brave men and women of the Armed Forces with the most technically advanced, cost-effective theater missile defense systems which the United States is capable of producing. As you well know, over 30 nations currently possess short-range ballistic missiles. The Gulf War demonstrated that such missiles pose a threat to our troops which is real, immediate and growing.

In my view, work on defenses against these missiles should not in any way be constrained by restrictive and erroneous interpretations of the ABM Treaty--a Treaty which was never intended to limit or restrict theater missile defenses.

I was there, General, in Moscow in May 1972 when this Treaty was signed. Further, as Secretary of the Navy, I knew and had access to the people conducting the negotiations and preparing the working papers for those negotiations. I have since--recently--spoken with some of thee people to confirm that short-range systems were not the subject of their work. The ABM Treaty was intended only to apply to strategic, long-range systems. It should not now be stretched to cover the short-range, or theater, systems.

Unfortunately, that is exactly what is happening. Our on-going TMD efforts--in particular THAAD and Navy Upper Tier--have been artificially limited by ABM Treaty considerations. For example, neither system has been allowed to incorporate space-based sensors because of concerns that the use of such sensors would not be Treaty-compliant. This despite the fact that all of the military experts with whom I have consulted have assured me that we could develop and deploy more cost-effective and technically capable TMD systems if such systems incorporated space-based elements. And I might add that this is not a new problem. This course was followed by previous administrations as well as the current one.

My amendment establishes a clear demarcation line between anti-ballistic missile defenses which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and theater missile defenses which are not. The demarcation standard which I selected for my amendment is the one used by the Clinton Administration at the beginning of the demarcation talks in November 1993, and one that was accepted by the Russians at that time. It is a standard which, to my knowledge, has not been disputed by either party to the negotiations.

Contrary to the assertion in your letter, my amendment does not prohibit the Administration from conducting demarcation negotiations with the Russians. Instead, the amendment would, in effect, prohibit the implementation of any agreement which might result from those negotiations which would have the effect of making the ABM Treaty a TMD Treaty. To remain on solid Constitutional grounds, I carefully chose the Congress' power of the purse as the vehicle to ensure that Congressional views on this issue are taken into consideration.

I, and many of my colleagues, have grave reservations about the direction the Administration has been pursuing in the demarcation talks with Russia. It appears that the Administration is intent on concluding an agreement with the Russians that would severely limit the technological development and deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense system. For example, reportedly over the objections of senior military officers, the Administration earlier this year tabled a proposal which would impose performance limitations on our theater missile defense systems, and accepted a Russian proposal to prohibit the deployment of the Navy Upper Tier system--a system that was subsequently deemed to be Treaty-compliant by the DoD. The negotiations are clearly headed in the wrong direction. A change of course is in order.

Your letter mentioned the potential impact my amendment might have on Russian ratification of START II. I might point out that START II Treaty ratification by the Russian Duma is in doubt for reasons having nothing to do with the ABM Treaty or U.S. theater missile defense efforts. Put simply, many Russians do not want to give up their multiple warhead ICBMs, as called for under START II. We must not hold our TMD efforts hostage to Russian threats concerning START II ratification, or any other issue.

While I share your desire to maintain a good security relationship with the Russians, I am not willing to sacrifice vital and legitimate U.S. defense efforts in the interest of that security relationship.

I think you would agree with me that our goal should be to provide our troops with the best defenses that our technical experts are capable of producing. I believe that my amendment advances that goal.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

John Warner.