The Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1995.

Hon. John Warner,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for your letter and strong support of efforts to protect US troops from the theater missile threat. The explanation and clarification of the intent and effect of your amendment are sincerely appreciated.

Since the beginning of the demarcation discussions, the first priority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been protecting US troops. I share the view that the ABM Treaty was never intended to limit theater missile defenses, and agreed to an initial demarcation approach to the Russians based on the standard specified in your amendment. As you note, the Russians appeared to accept the limiting parameters of 3500 km and 5 km/sec for testing against theater ballistic missiles, but pushed for interceptor performance limits as well.

In June 1994, in an effort to each early, acceptable demarcation agreement, some limits on interceptor velocity were proposed by the United States. As negotiations progressed, a subsequent proposal for an interim agreement which would have deferred some unresolved issues--such as deployment of Navy Upper Tier--was also proposed. The Russians rejected both US approaches.

The May 1995 Joint Summit Statement was an effort to move the negotiations away from technical parameters back to a set of principles which would preserve both the ABM Treaty and our ability to test and deploy needed theater missile defenses. The latest US negotiating position was based on that joint statement and was intended as just the sort of `change of course' you suggest.

The Chiefs and I have been fully involved in developing US positions and have never lost sight of our first responsibility to protect US forces. We are unanimous in our commitment to develop and field highly capable theater missile defense systems. While cueing from space-based sensors has yet to be incorporated into those systems, this is currently in our plans.

With regard to broader security issues, the linkage between the ABM Treaty and START II has been stressed repeatedly by the Russians with US military representatives in many fora, including discussions with members of the Duma. While there are, of course, other factors at play in the Duma considerations, one must assume that unilateral US legislation could harm prospects for START II ratification and probably impact our broader security relationship as well.

In closing, the priority goal has been to provide the US Armed Forces with best defenses technical experts are capable of producing. But we also seek to reconcile requirements for protection from theater ballistic missiles with further strengthening of the framework of strategic stability, including strategic arms reduction and the ABM Treaty. We are working to achieve both these goals.

Sincerely,

John M. Shalikashvili,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.