This document responds to a request from the House National Security Committee to report on specific programmatic, funding, and architecture options for the development and deployment of national missile defenses. As requested, it describes architecture options that contain only ground based elements, those that contain only space-based elements, and those with both. The architectures described in the report build on the current BMDO program, including the legacy from previous years. With adequate funding and streamlined acquisition, initial operational capability of these options ranges from FY2000 to 2007, preliminary cost estimates range from $4,800M to $43,100M (FY 95 $), and relative risks range from low to high. The architectures span a large range in the threat levels against which they can protect, in their estimated cost, and in their support to theater missile defense. None of the architectures has been formally evaluated for compliance with the ABM Treaty.
In response to a request from the House National Security Committee, dated February 21, 1995, this report describes a variety of architectures that could be deployed for National Missile Defense. In keeping with the DOD thrust for acquisition reform, the costs and schedules are predicated on successful acquisition streamlining to reduce acquisition costs and shorten schedules for an operational capability.
Consistent with the specifics of the request, the report describes example alternative architectures that are compatible with technologies and prototypes being developed by BMDO, and that could be made available for deployment. The report provides estimates of their effectiveness, schedules, relative risks, and requirements for acquisition and deployment funding. The architecture options are meant to be representative of general classes of national missile defense systems. The performance levels, which are also meant to be representative, are in fact dependent on many variables, such as threat characteristics and operational procedures. The examples presented are not `tuned' to any particular threat or defense mission, so that modified weapon or sensor inventories could provide different performance and could handle different threats.
BMDO does not advocate any one or another of these architectures or architecture classes as end point systems. Rather, our current program has adopted a strategy of evolutionary defense. This strategy addresses the wide range of threat possibilities existing in the uncertain and unpredictable future. The range of such threats includes events such as a third world nation acquiring and threatening to use a few ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction, China using its ballistic missiles to prevent US action in Korea, an unauthorized limited attack used to instigate a conflict, or a return to a nuclear standoff with a major nuclear power. The BMDO program addresses all of these, consistent with the assessed likelihood of these threats and within its allotted funds.
With adequate annual budgets, all of the architectures presented here can lead to an initial operational capability between 2000 and 2007, but with varying risks. These dates are, in some cases, earlier operational timeframes than have been previously described for NMD options. These later dates were valid because the programs were budget constrained, used more traditional acquisition approaches, and risks were limited to be low to moderate.
Figure EX-1 1
identifies the four architecture classes discussed in the report--each with a range of capabilities and acquisition costs as illustrated. These architectures are classified by where their sensors and weapons would be based. Other concepts that include potentially promising sea-based or Navy systems will be addressed in future reports.
1 Figure EX-1 not reproducible in the Record.
The costs reflected by this report are rough order of magnitude (ROM) projections of the remaining development and acquisition costs in FY95 dollars. They reflect anticipated savings from acquisition streamlining and have been developed using a standard set of assumptions, some of which might not actually be implemented on any given program. The candidate National Missile Defense elements discussed here are not now in an acquisition program and have not been subjected to the rigorous planning and costing reviews usually associated with defense acquisition.
Two measures of capability are reflected in the figure: the threat levels to which the architecture can deny damage to the United States with at least 50 percent probability, which is equivalent to enforcing less than one leaker (on average), and the area protected (i.e., US only or global). The use of damage denial probability was chosen as the appropriate measure of effectiveness for this report because it follows from the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) established for Ballistic Missile Defense and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This requirement specified the confidence level and the probability that no warheads would penetrate a defense system in the face of a ballistic missile attack.
Threat levels considered in this report range from an attack by four unsophisticated warheads, to an attack by 200 MIRV warheads with complex payloads launched nearly simultaneously by 20 boosters. The largest attack used in this report is consistent with the existing JROC-validated operational requirement for National Missile Defense. This requirement was previously shown, in the GPALS COEA and other analyses, to require multilayer defenses with space based elements for high effectiveness. Some degradation in performance could arise due to the responses that threat countries might take to the presence of any specific defense we might deploy, but such responses can be offset by straightforward upgrades to the defenses discussed in this report. Threats containing greater than 200 warheads also remain possible for the foreseeable future.
The damage denial performance of an architecture is an extremely stringent measure of effectiveness, demanding that, on the average, leakage be reduced to one warhead or less. Less perfect defense performance, such as the negation of 190 of 200 attacking warheads, would also be highly valuable both as a defense and as a deterrent to the use of ballistic missiles.
Accordingly, in the body of this report, we also show how well each of the architectural variants could negate the warheads in the spectrum of representative attacks we considered.
Figure EX-2 provides a brief description and summary of the four architecture classes in this report, which are all supported by our NMD architecture strategy and modular approach. Additional design, performance, and programmatic details follow. None of the proposed systems has been formally evaluated for compliance with the ABM Treaty.
`All Ground Based' architectures have BM/C 3 , ground based radars and ground based interceptors. The ground based radars include early warning radars, other existing radars and BMD radars. In common with the other architectures, DSP or SBIRs (High) provide cueing to the BMD system. Entry level defenses with 20 interceptors at Grand Forks could deny damage against a few warheads, with moderate relative risk, by FY 1999 to 2000 for an estimated $3,500M (the BMDO Tiger Team `2+2' solution) or by late FY 2001 with low-moderate relative risk for an estimated $4,800M. Expanding the systems to multiple sites with more radars and interceptors, at costs up to about $12,200M, could increase the defense effectiveness. These expanded architectures could achieve `good' damage denial performance against threats of up to about 50 warheads.
`Ground Based/Space Sensor' architectures contain BM/C 3 , ground based radars, a space based sensor constellation, Space and Missile Tracking System (SBIRs [low]), formerly known as Brilliant Eyes), and ground based interceptors.
The space sensors improve this architecture's performance. It could be operational by FY 2004 with moderate relative risk. This is BMDO's `objective architecture' that is the focus of the current NMD Technology Readiness Program. An initial one-site, 100-GBI option, Case A, costing an estimated $11,000M, could provide `good' performance for threats of about 20 warheads. Expanded inventories and additional interceptor/radar sites could achieve `good' performance against threat levels of 70 warheads or more with costs up to about $20,100M.
`All Space Based' architectures would achieve a higher capability against MIRV systems and provide coverage of assets beyond the United States with costs starting at about $20,000M. Two types of space based systems are considered in this report, chemical lasers and rocket-boosted kinetic kill interceptors. Space based chemical lasers offer the capability to intercept during boost phase against theater threats as well as strategic threats. This capability greatly enhances the performance of theater missile defense architectures, especially against advanced threats. A space based laser (SBL) system and associated BM/C 3 , with costs of $20,000M to $23,000M, could potentially reach IOC by 2007 with relatively high risk. An enhanced laser system, available at IOC two years later and with costs of $26,000M to $29,000M, would provide robustness against certain threats. The space based interceptor (SBI) system, including SMTS and BM/C 3 , and costing $20,000M to $23,000M, could reach IOC in 2004 at moderate to high relative risk.
Combinations of the two types of space based systems provide `good' or better damage denial performance at all threat levels up to 200 warheads, at a cost of $37,100M to $43,100M with IOC and relative risks as noted above.
Finally, combined `Space and Ground Based'
architectures, which include BM/C 3 , weapons, and sensors on the ground and in space, can achieve `good' or better damage denial performance against all threat levels up to 200 warheads, with estimated costs of $30,700M to $35,100M.
The relative risks shown in Figure EX-2 are subjective estimates for the funding and schedules we show and the architecture's maturity. The adoption of more deliberate programs, coupled with the infusion of additional funding could clearly reduce risk in all areas. The time scale at which risk could be reduced, and the cost incurred to achieve the risk reduction, depend on the maturity of the programs and their technical challenges. It is likely, for example, that less time and funding could be required to reduce risks from moderate to low in ground-based systems than would be required to reduce risks for space based lasers from high to moderate. However, definitive risk reduction timelines and costs for all the architectures in this report have not yet been developed.
As shown in Figure EX-1 and EX-2, the architectures in this report span a considerable range in performance and cost. Ground based systems represent lowest-cost defense solutions for denying damage against up to 20 warheads. Space sensors would improve the cost effectiveness when threats approach the performance limits of ground-based systems. For high damage denial effectiveness and cost effectiveness against larger attacks, above about 70 RVs, space based weapons become essential. Finally, layered defense systems become cost effective for denying damage against 200 warheads.
FIGURE EX-2.
[Summary of the architecture options considered in this report including an estimate of dates for operational capabilities. The threat levels given represent an estimate of the maximum representative threat level for which each option could deny damage, with a probability of 50 percent or more (less than one leaker on the average)]
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Architecture classes Deployment Operational date ROM cost FY95 (in dollars) Threat level warheads Relative risk
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All ground based 20 GBI, 1 Site*P100 GBI, 1 SiteP300 GBI, 3 Sites 2001P2003P2004 4,800MP6,500MP12,200M 4P20P50 Low-Mod.PLow.PLow.
Ground based with space sensors 100 GBI, 1 Site, 18 SMTSP300 GBI, 3 Sites, 24 SMTSP630 GBI, 3 Sites, 24 SMTS 2005P2006P2006 11,000MP17,200MP20,100M 20P60P70 Moderate.PModerate.PModerate.
All space based 20 SBL (8 meter)P20 SBL (enhanced) 2008P2010 20,000M-23,000MP26,000M-29,000M 60-100Pã200 High.PHigh.
500 SBI, 18 SMTSP1000 SBI, 18 SMTS 2005P2007 20,000M-23,000MP20,000M-23,000M 60-100Pã200 Mod-High.PMod-High.
20 SBL, 500 SBI 2008 37,100M-43,100M >200 High.
Space and ground based 20 SBL, 100 GBI, 3 SitesP500 SBI, 18 SMTSP300 GBI, 3 Sites 2008P2005 32,100M-35,100MP30,700M-33,700M >200P>200 High.PMod-High.
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