Tuesday, May 21, 1996, 2 p.m.
Q: Yes, referring to the SS-18 Russian missiles and/or technology transfers to China. Can you be definitive, Ken, about whether China has tried to acquire whole entire SS-18 missiles and if that acquisition then would be for offensive or defensive intercontinental missile deployment. And secondly, it was mentioned that other countries had tried to buy SS-18 technology from Russia. Could you identify that? These are statements made I believe by Secretary Perry in the Washington Times yesterday.
A: First, I can't get into a lot of detail because this is all based on intelligence reporting obviously. Secondly, one of our biggest fears with the breakup of the Soviet Union is that weapons or know how, or weapons components would be sold by Russia and other former Soviet Union republics to willing buyers of which there are several around the world. We have worked very hard to prevent proliferation through this method.
We know that a number of..., China already, of course, has a strategic military force. It's not a huge force compared to the Russian force or the American force. Before the end of the Cold War, China was the third largest military power behind the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, broke into separate countries, the third, fourth, and fifth largest military powers suddenly became the Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. And as you know, we worked very aggressively with those three countries to get them to eliminate their nuclear forces, dismantle their rockets. Kazakstan has succeeded under the so-called Nunn/Lugar program. Now, it no longer has a strategic nuclear force. Ukraine will eliminate its strategic nuclear force this June and the Secretary will be there to witness that. And Belarus is close to eliminating its strategic nuclear force. That's one part of our effort to control proliferation, to dismantle these rockets. We have also been working to prevent through persuasion and other ways Russia and Ukraine and others from responding to invitations they're getting to sell rocket technology to other countries. As you know, China already has a small strategic rocket force. There are other countries that would like to build a strategic rocket force. It's not a easy thing to do. It would be much easier for them to build ICBMs if they got help from countries like Russia and Ukraine. So, we've been working to stop that.
Q: Ken, can you name which of those countries are? Is Iran one of those countries that's trying to get this technology?
A: I don't want to go into details about that. The Secretary has said in response to the Washington Times report that China has talked to Russian and Ukrainian officials about SS-18 technology. I want to point out that Russia in particular, but Ukraine also, has a real interest in controlling proliferation. They are surrounded by many more countries than we are and these countries are much closer to them than they are to us. So, they're surrounded not only by countries in Europe, but of course countries in the Middle East and in Asia. We believe that Russia shares our commitment to non-proliferation and it's something that we've discussed with them directly and will continue to discuss with them.
Q: Ken, can you be any more specific about what steps the United States is taking to ensure that this technology does not fall into the hands of the Chinese?
A: Well, the first step we've taken and the most tangible step we've taken is purchasing the 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakstan [through] Project SAPPHIRE a year, 18 months ago. We've also working through the Nunn/Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to set up a number of programs to help employ scientists who were involved in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. We've helped convert former defense businesses into civilian manufacturers. You may have visited some of those. The Secretary has visited some in Ukraine and Russia. We've been working very hard to make sure that the scientists and engineers who helped build these weapons can remain employed in non-military businesses, but remain employed so that, out of desperation, they don't sell their services and their knowledge to other countries. We've also spoken explicitly and directly to the Russians about sales of nuclear hardware and know how to the Iranians and that's been public for some time. We've spoken to them about sales of rocket technology to China and we've made it very clear to all these countries that we all share an intense interest to non-proliferation.
Q: Did the United States issue a demarche?
A: Yes, in this particular case, the SS-18s we've issued a demarche to the governments of Russia and Ukraine.
Q: Can you tell us when the overtures were made by China to get this technology? And --
A: There have been a serious of discussions about this over time. I don't want to -- countries have discussions about technology all the time. We've had discussions with the Russians and the Ukrainians about technology. So, these discussions, I think some of them would probably be more properly called preliminary overtures, feelers, rather than hard offers.
Q: This year?
A: Within the last 12, six to 12 months.
Q: Has the United States been given assurances Moscow and Kiev that kind of stuff will not be done?
A: Well, we're in continual dialogue with them about non-proliferation. They've told us that they understand our concerns.
Q: Are the Chinese looking for components or scientists or actual missiles or all the above or what are they looking for?
A: I don't want to get into a lot of detail. Basically, they're looking for ways to help them advance their program.
Q: It's their ICBM program from the technology from Russia, isn't that right, to be the manufacturer of rockets? Is that right?
A: That's what the Secretary spoke about yesterday.