REMARKS OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY TO THE DUMA PARLIAMENT MEMBERS THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1996 AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY (Urges ratification of START II) (3470) Moscow -- Secretary of State William Perry urged Russia's Duma October 17 to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), stressing that "it is in the supreme interest of Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, to lead the world in controlling these terrible weapons and the deadly plutonium from which they are made." Perry noted in his speech that the two countries are "well ahead of schedule in making the reductions called for in START I, but that "even after the START I reductions are completed, the United States and Russia will each have about 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads." Furthermore, "there are thousands of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium in storage, with nuclear reactors making still more." This poses a temptation to rogue nations and criminal terrorists, the secretary noted. "Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have made clear their intention to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he said. "By reducing our arsenals, we reduce the risk that nuclear weapons or nuclear material will fall into the wrong hands." Perry pointed out that "there is another way START II seizes the opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat: by reducing the numbers of weapons on both sides it reduces the chance of a launch by accident or miscalculation." He stressed that START II "allows us not only to make a landmark difference ourselves, but also to set an example for the world. And there is no more concrete way for our two nations to advance security relations than to work together to reduce our nuclear arsenals. "START II would be a crowning achievement for our pragmatic partnership -- a vivid example of how our countries can work together where our interests overlap." Following is the official text as prepared for delivery: REMARKS OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY TO THE DUMA PARLIAMENT MEMBERS THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1996 AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY SEC. PERRY: I am honored to be here today, and I want to thank each of you, and especially General Rohklin and Ambassador Lukin for inviting me to speak to the Duma. I have met many times with Duma members in Moscow and Washington, but I believe it is the first time an American Defense Secretary has ever addressed such a large assemblage of Duma members. This meeting manifests the growing spirit of cooperation between our two countries. This cooperation is in marked contrast to the four decades of confrontation during which each country built more and more deadly arms. By the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each had more than 10,000 nuclear warheads aimed at each other, ready to launch in minutes. We were like two men standing 5 meters apart, each with a gun aimed at the other's head. The guns were loaded and cocked, their fingers were on the trigger. And each was shouting insults at the other. During this period, the Russian physicist, Andrei Sakharov, wrote, "Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations." Indeed, both of our governments made nuclear control an "absolute priority," and somehow we got through that period without "annihilating humanity" -- without a nuclear holocaust. Today, the two great nuclear powers, Russia and the United States, no longer stand in confrontation. They no longer aim their missiles at each other. But there is still a large nuclear infrastructure remaining -- a legacy of the Cold War -- and our two governments must deal with it responsibly, not pass this dangerous legacy on to our children. Even after the START I reductions are completed, the United States and Russia will each have about 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. Additionally, there are thousands of nuclear warheads in our tactical forces, with thousands more in secure storage areas. And there are thousands of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium in storage, with nuclear reactors making still more. This huge infrastructure requires a considerable expense to maintain, and it requires stringent safety and security measures. The security features are particularly important, since a handful of rogue nations are trying to get their hands on our nuclear weapons, or the plutonium which would allow them to make their own. These countries, if they possessed nuclear weapons, could pose a terrible threat to their neighbors, including Russia. Additionally, terrorist groups are seeking to obtain nuclear weapons or assorted radioactive material. Therefore, it is in the supreme interest of Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, to lead the world in controlling these terrible weapons and the deadly plutonium from which they are made. Key to this control is making dramatic reductions in the deadly legacy of the Cold War -- the nuclear infrastructure: warheads, missiles, weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, launch facilities, and manufacturing facilities. Together we initiated these reductions in 1991 with the START I treaty which reduces nuclear warheads by half -- Russia and the United States are both well ahead of schedule in making the reductions called for in START I. We followed that in 1994 with the trilateral agreement to transfer nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia. Today, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are nuclear-weapons free. The next major step is START II, which will result in another reduction in nuclear warheads by half. Both Russia and the United States have far too many nuclear weapons and we can both improve our security and our safety by making dramatic reductions in them. I urge you to ratify the START II treaty so that both of our nations can proceed to make those reductions. The United States Senate has comparable responsibility to your own -- to provide legislative oversight of our defense programs and to ratify the solemn treaty commitments made by the president. Two of the members of the U.S. Senate are here with me today -- Senator Lugar and Senator Lieberman. Last year I appeared before them and other U.S. senators to explain why the START II treaty should be ratified and implemented. They had some very important questions which they expected me to answer. Let me share with you the questions they asked and my answers to them in the hopes that this may be useful as you deliberate START II. First: Will the reduction in weapons result in a reduction of danger? Second: Will the remaining weapons provide adequately for our security? Third: Is the treaty fair? Fourth: Will the reduction of weapons lead to a reduction of cost? Fifth: Will the United States continue to abide by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? And Sixth: Does the treaty contribute to the overall security environment and enhance the United States-Russia relationship? The first question goes to the heart of most of our concerns: "Will the reduction in nuclear weapons result in a reduction of danger to our nations?" I believe that the answer is "yes," but let me explain why. I have already talked about the nuclear danger we do not face any longer -- the danger of a nuclear holocaust. That danger has passed because Russia and the U.S. have a new relationship that involves cooperation, not confrontation. And because we have taken dramatic and historic steps to reduce nuclear arsenals. START I has reduced the danger by cutting our strategic warheads almost in half. NATO has reduced its nuclear arsenals by almost 90 percent. But as we have reduced the threat to each other, a new threat has arisen -- a threat we must address together. This threat is posed by rogue nations and criminal terrorists who would use a nuclear weapon to threaten nations, their citizens, and their legitimate interests. Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have made clear their intention to get weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups have shown that they are willing to use weapons of mass destruction, as the sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway. By reducing our arsenals, we reduce the risk that nuclear weapons or nuclear material will fall into the wrong hands. START II seizes the opportunity to reduce this threat in a very big way. And there is another way START II seizes the opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat: by reducing the numbers of weapons on both sides it reduces the chance of a launch by accident or miscalculation. This is particularly true of MIRV ICBMs -- the ICBMs with up to 10 warheads on each missile. MIRV ICBMs are at the same time valuable and vulnerable: valuable, and therefore, an inviting target, because they have 10 warheads; vulnerable because it takes only one or two attacking warheads to destroy all 10 of the warheads. Because they are both valuable and vulnerable, they tend to be kept on a "hair trigger," which protects them, but increases the danger of a launch by miscalculation. The only way to get rid of this danger is to get rid of MIRVed ICBM weapons. START II gives Russia and the United States the opportunity to do this together. The second question asked by the Senate was: will the remaining weapons provide adequately for our security? I believe the answer to this question is also "yes." After START II is fully implemented, both nations will still have about 3,000 nuclear warheads. This much firepower is more than needed to destroy any plausible target set. Indeed it is enough to destroy the world. That is more that enough for deterrence. And U.S. and Russian nuclear forces under START II will be structured in such a way that they can survive any plausible attack. Without MIRVed ICBMs, both our forces under START II will be both stable and survivable -- threatening any potential attacker with overwhelming retaliation, but not threatening a first-strike. Put very simply, lower numbers plus survivability from attack equals improved security for both our countries. The third question was whether the START II treaty is fair, or does it give one side or the other a military advantge. I believe that START II is fair, that it gives neither side a strategic military advantage. Each side is allowed the same numbers of warheads -- 3,000 to 3,500. On the other hand, under START I, the United States can have more warheads than Russia because of a complex rule by which bomber warheads are discounted. We gave up that advantage in START II -- all warheads count as one, whether on bombers, SLBMs, or ICBMs. We will also eliminate under START II our most modern ICBM -- the Peacekeeper -- which otherwise has decades of useful service left. And our submarine force will be constrained, for the first time, by a sub-limit on SLBM warheads. Some critics of START II believe the Treaty might still result in a numerical disparity in warheads between our countries. They argue that Russia would have to build more missiles to reach the 3,000 level and would not want to undertake that cost. This takes me directly to the fourth question: "Will reducing weapons also reduce cost?" I believe the answer is "yes" both for Russia and for the United States. I know that many of you do not believe that, so let me explain my answer. There are three factors involved in the costs/savings associated with START II: 1. Cost of dismantling the missiles and launch facilities no longer needed. 2. Savings from not having to operate and maintain facilities reduced by the treaty. 3. Costs associated with building new missiles and facilities compatible with the treaty. Let me discuss each of these in turn. In the United States, we estimate the cost of dismantling the weapons under START II would be $600 million. I do not know what the Russian costs of dismantlement would be, but I expect they would be comparable. The United States is prepared to assist Russia in defraying these coses under the Nunn-Lugar program. The United States has already provided more than $750 million to Russia under Nunn-Lugar, a third of which was specifically dedicated to START I implementation. Our Congress continues to appropriate funds to the Nunn-Lugar program (about $350 million per year) so we can offer substantial support for START II implementation. Let me turn to the second factor -- the year-to-year savings that would result from START II reductions. In the United States we estimate that we will save almost $5 billion ($5,000 million) over the next seven years by avoiding the costs of maintaining and operating systems that would be dismantled under START II. Again, I do not know what the Russian savings will be, but costs avoided by not having to operate, maintain readiness, and provide safety and security for the 3,000 warheads and associated launch facilities that would be reduced by START II is quite significant. The third factor is the cost associated with building new missiles and facilities compatible with START II. I know there is a concern that Russia, after eliminating MIRVed missiles, would need to build more land missiles -- presumably SS-27s -- to reach the 3,000 to 3,500 level. That would be costly. But it is not necessary. We can and should ratify START II now, and move promptly to negotiate START III, with lower levels. Long before all these new missiles people talk about could be constructed, we would have agreement on lower numbers. Then each country could get the advantage of timely planning in sizing missile programs. In any event, whatever temporary disparity in numbers might result, it would certainly be smaller than if we both stayed with START I. In the absence of ratification of START II, United States law requires me to maintain the START I limits. This would result in the United States missing the opportunity to cut our missile force in half, and thereby missing the opportunity to save more than $4 billion ($4,000 million). It would result in Russia either accepting a significant disparity in missile forces or undertaking an expensive missile-building program, or maintaining aging and dangerous MIRV ICBMs in the force a few more years and then undertaking an expensive building program. So my conclusion is that START II makes sense from a cost standpoint both to Russia and the United States. The fifth question was whether the United States will continue to abide by the ABM treaty. President Clinton has made clear that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability between the United States and Russia. The United States has no plans for an ABM system that does not comply with the treaty, or that would undermine the stability it ensures. At the same time, both of our countries must be concerned about the possibility that a rogue nation could launch a few nuclear missiles at our cities and our citizens. That is the value of the ABM system deployed around Moscow -- a system that complies with the ABM treaty. And that is why the United States is moving forward with research and development on a limited National Missile Defense system over the next three years -- a system that would also comply with the ABM treaty. If the possibility of a rogue state acquiring nuclear missiles becomes real, we then would be in a position to deploy that system over the following three years. This potential deployment would be directed against the actual threat -- not against Russia. The United States does not consider Russia a threat, just as the United States is not a threat to Russia. Our top priority in ballistic missile defense -- and I believe Russia's top priority as well -- is development of a theater missile defense system. Theater missiles are a real and present threat to our deployed forces and allies. Both Russia and the United States have agreed that theater missile defense systems are allowed under the ABM treaty as long as they do not pose a realistic threat to each other's strategic forces. In fact, Russia and the United States have been cooperating on theater missile defense exercises, and we are prepared to cooperate in the development of theater missile defense systems. Since we both face a common threat, we should work together to find common solutions. The sixth and final question of our Senate was whether the START II treaty will contribute to the overall security environment and enhanced United States-Russia security relations. My answer to this question is an emphatic "yes." Both of us know that fewer nuclear weapons in the world make us all safer. START II allows us not only to make a landmark difference ourselves, but also to set an example for the world. And there is no more concrete way for our two nations to advance security relations than to work together to reduce our nuclear arsenals. START II would be a crowning achievement for our pragmatic partnership -- a vivid example of how our countries can work together where our interests overlap. I call our partnership "pragmatic" because it is rooted in self-interest. When I met with Minister Rodionov yesterday, I found that he and I deal with the same set of complex security problems. Each of us bears important responsibility for the defense and security of our countries. Both of us believe that our missile arsenals are too large, and that reductions in nuclear missiles can increase our security. So while we seek to foster cooperation between Russia and the United States, we seek cooperation that is pragmatic and protects the interests of each of our countries. I also call the United States-Russia partnership "pragmatic" because we recognize it will not happen overnight. It will take time to overcome our shared history of confrontation and turn it to a shared future of cooperation. But even as we sit here today, that future is being created as the United States and Russia undertake more and more history-making cooperative security ventures. Nuclear reductions play a big part in our partnership. And START II plays a big part in our nuclear reductions. But our partnership is based on more than just nuclear reductions. Every day the United States and Russia continue to break new ground -- whether it is conducting major bilateral exercises in the United States and in Russia, or joining together in the Partnership for Peace, or cooperating with 30 other nations in bringing peace to Bosnia. Bosnia is truly a model for the future where all nations of Europe are working within a single circle of security and stability -- including Russia. The United States wants Russia inside the security circle, and we want Russia to take a leading role in European security commensurate with its status as a great power. Fifty-one years ago, the United States and Russia shared a moment of triumph and glory when our forces joined at the River Elbe. I have met some of the veterans of that campaign, both Russian and American, and was struck by their common qualities and enduring esteem for each other. Indeed, one of the most moving memories of my tenure as Secretary of Defense will be that moment during my visit to the magnificent new monument to World War II in Moscow, when Russian veterans of that war raised their glasses in a toast to their American counterparts. Today our troops are sharing another bright moment on the "Little Elbe," a stream that runs through their camp in Bosnia. I have met the Russian troops in Bosnia, and I can tell you how proud you should be of their professional qualities and dedication. If you want to understand just how much the United States-Russian relationship has changed, and the warmth, trust, and cooperation that is possible between our nations, I recommend you talk to the Russian troops who are serving with the American forces in Bosnia, and living that warmth, trust, and cooperation every day. Their everyday partnership in the cause of peace is like a stone tossed into a pond. It is creating ripples of trust and goodwill that are spreading throughout Europe and into the consciousness of our nations. By ratifying START II, you will be creating not just ripples, but giant waves of trust and goodwill that will spread throughout the world and into the consciousness of all mankind. Let us conclude by observing that there are moments in history when a door opens and lets the future in. For Russia and the United States this is such a moment in history. The ending of the Cold War has opened a door -- the future is out there waiting to come in. Russia and the United States should join together to shape that future -- and make a safer world for our children and our grandchildren. (End text) NNNN .