ARMS CONTROL/NON-PROLIFERATION
Allegation of China Missile/Technology/Chemical Weapons
Sales to Iran ........................................ 3-6,11
Secretary Christopher's Discussions on
Non-Proliferation in Beijing ......................... 6,12
Peru's Acquisition of MiG-29 Aircraft .................. 8-9
Alleged Czech Arms in Zaire ............................ 10
U.S.-Syrian Discussions on Non-proliferation ........... 12
NORTH KOREA
Congressman Richardson/Dept. Official Travel to Region . 9-11
QUESTION: I'm sure you have seen the latest story about the Chinese missile technology sales --
MR. DAVIES: Who could miss it. It was on the front page of a major American newspaper. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Well, do you have anything to say about it?
MR. DAVIES: Well, you know the basic mantra here, George, which is that when we see reporting based on alleged intelligence reports, we decline to comment on the reporting. We decline to comment or to confirm any such alleged intelligence reports. So I'm not going to get into talking about the information that is contained in the article specifically because it is all based on intelligence, alleged intelligence reporting, that has been allegedly leaked.
But what I can do, of course, is very briefly reiterate to you our position on the subject of leaks, and this is not meant in any way to confirm in fact the article is based on a real U.S. Government document. We don't know that and we don't comment on alleged leaked documents.
But there is in the government always at some level, there are leaks that occur. What we have now, though, is a situation that is perhaps qualitatively and quantitatively a little bit different from situations that have existed in the past.
So what I have to say, I guess, would be addressed to those who would allege to have government documents and hand them over to members of the press. It is quite simply that this kind of systematic activity is very damaging to the national interest, and those who are leaking documents that they purport to be government documents may well be committing crimes. It is a crime to hand over classified information to those not cleared to read the information, and I think that is an important point to make.
Now, in terms of setting aside the article in specifics, but to talk just a little bit about the general subject matter, which is this question of shipping military materials to Iran from China, our views opposing any cooperation with Iran, not just on the part of China but any other country, are well-known.
As Secretary Christopher noted in his public remarks yesterday in Beijing, he again made clear our strong concerns about Iran's efforts to acquire dangerous weapons of various kinds.
We have repeatedly said that we have serious concerns regarding Chinese missile cooperation with Pakistan and Iran, cooperation which could contribute to Pakistan and Iran's acquiring delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. We have concerns about the reports of transfers by Chinese entities of dual use chemicals and equipment that could be used in Iran's chemical weapons program, and concerns about China's transfers of sophisticated conventional weapons to Iran.
Now we have raised those objections, our objections, to such activities at the highest levels of the Chinese Government, and, as Secretary Christopher indicated at the conclusion of his meetings, and I quote, he said, "Our discussion generally on nonproliferation has advanced our cooperation in this area of vital interest, but we agreed we must do more to achieve our goals."
QUESTION: Would these arms transfers that you mentioned, not the newspaper, be in violation of the MTCR or the D'Amato Act?
MR. DAVIES: I don't have any information to relate to you today about arms transfers that would violate either act. The United States Government in its dialogue with the Government of China sets a high standard against which we measure Chinese activities in this regard.
We have had a long-running intensive dialogue with the Chinese about their arms transfer activities, but of course everything we do, Jim, we do obviously mindful of the law, within the law, and we pay strict attention to what the law dictates in terms of what transfers do or don't violate the law.
So, I mean, you know, because you followed this all the way back to the Ring-Magnets issue and back into the past beyond that, that certainly in this building and around town, an awful lot of effort is spent evaluating these reports. A great deal of diplomatic effort is spent by Under Secretary Lynn Davis, by Bob Einhorn, who works for her, by members of the National Security Council, by the Secretary, and others, raising these issues with the Chinese and clarifying with them precisely what the nature of these reports are and what the facts are, and we follow up on every report that we receive.
QUESTION: Well, in your evaluation, are you looking at the information with a view of possibly imposing sanctions on China?
MR. DAVIES: I'm not going to get into any steps we might prospectively take. You know that with the Chinese, as a result of our intensive dialogue with them, we have received certain assurances from them.
We believe at this stage that, in fact, the Chinese are operating within the assurances they have given us. But we will continue to be very vigilant on this subject and to raise with the Chinese at every opportunity every report we receive that we believe is credible of such arms transfers.
QUESTION: The Iranian arms buildup in the area and also those Syrian and Iranian corporations on upgrading the Syrian some SCUD missiles was well over defensive purposes. They are changing the military balance, on the whole, in this area.
Do you have any concern? Do you urge these two countries? For example, in both countries some missiles are arranged; most of the NATO countries of which you are allies with.
MR. DAVIES: Clearly, we're concerned and have been for some time about the capabilities being developed by certain countries in the region. We pay particular attention to Iran and their efforts to obtain not just these missile technologies and conventional capabilities but also weapons of mass destruction. We believe that they do have a policy of seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
So this is part of our dialogue with all potential supplier nations around the world. We believe it's very important not to supply such materials to the Iranian Government, and we make that point quite clear in our dialogue with other nations.
QUESTION: You said you believe the Chinese are operating within the commitments that they made to us. By that, do you mean that they are living up to the letter of the MTCR and the D'Amato Act?
MR. DAVIES: By that, I mean that in our view we've not seen any reason to question their behavior. If the Chinese were not living up to the MTCR, there's a mechanism for dealing with that. The United States Government would be the very first to raise concerns with the Chinese if we thought there were legitimate concerns to raise with them.
I don't right now have anything to announce by way of specific concerns that we've got vis-a-vis China.
The Secretary, yesterday, held discussions in Beijing with Chinese officials. He went over this at great length. He works on this issue not just when he's in China but when he's back here in Washington.
We've hammered out with the Chinese, in essence, an understanding about what it is precisely they will be doing, what it is precisely our understandings are. At this stage, I don't have anything to report to you that would indicate that they've gone beyond those understandings.
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QUESTION: Could you comment something about the acquisition of MIG-29 airplanes for Peru?
MR. DAVIES: Yes. The United States is disappointed by Peru's acquisition of MIG-29 aircraft. As a guarantor of the 1942 Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro, we strong urge both countries -- Peru and Ecuador -- to maintain their pledge of October 6, 1995, which is, "It is essential to avoid the risks of an arms race so as not to undermine the end of hostilities or otherwise damage the peace."
We applaud the Peruvian-Ecuadoran dialogue on security matters and urge the countries to develop further confidence and security-building measures. On October 29, the two countries signed an accord in Santiago which committed them to begin next month continuous talks on the substantive issues underlining the dispute.
The United States believes that finding a solution to the border dispute will allow both countries to focus their scarce financial resources on economic development and programs which support social well-being rather than on building up their militaries.
QUESTION: Couldn't this break the military agreement in the region?
MR. DAVIES: I'm sorry?
QUESTION: Could this break the military agreement in the region, the potential --
MR. DAVIES: Between the two countries?
QUESTION: Yes. And another in the region?
MR. DAVIES: We have a concern about the sale. I don't have for you now an estimate that would indicate that this is somehow, in a fundamental way, going to change the military balance in the region. It's a sale -- it's an acquisition by Peru of aircraft that does give us a degree of concern.
QUESTION: The U.S. does not sell high-performance jet fighters to South America, but there are some elements in the government which think that policy should be revised. Does this sale, or purchase by the Peruvians impinge in any way on the internal debate going on on that subject?
MR. DAVIES: If I answered that question straight, I'd have to acknowledge that there is, in fact, some kind of an internal debate going on.
What I can say on the question of sales of military equipment to Latin America is that we've had a policy of restraint in our arm sales to Latin America. That policy of restraint has served us well. It's a policy that's been on the books, so to speak, for sometime; for decades, really.
Right now, George, I don't have any plans to report to you that we're going to change it.
QUESTION: Do you have anything on a possible trip to North Korea by Congressman Bill Richardson?
MR. DAVIES: I do. Our understanding is that Congressman Richardson intends on traveling to North Korea next week. Obviously, for details on what he plans to do, you would want to get in touch with Congressman Richardson or his office.
His plan, specifically, as we understand it, is to seek the release of the detained American citizen, Evan Carl Hunziker. Details of the trip and of this plan to obtain Mr. Hunziker's release have yet to fully finalized, so I don't want to get out in front of the Congressman.
But I can say, though this is a trip that he is taking on his own hook, the Administration fully supports it. We view it as an important humanitarian mission. As I say, if you would like more details, you might want to talk to him.
One additional detail I can give you is that he will be accompanied by a working-level State Department official.
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QUESTION: North Korea. This working-level official will have contact with the North Korean Government? The State Department --
MR. DAVIES: The working-level official traveling with him?
QUESTION: Right.
MR. DAVIES: I assume so, since he'll be with Mr. Richardson.
QUESTION: Which kind of subjects he or she will talk with North Korea?
MR. DAVIES: The focus of this trip is to talk to the North Koreans and to seek the release of Evan Carl Hunziker who has been held now for some time and who ought to be released by the North Koreans. We've called for him to be released. Beyond that, I don't have any further information.
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QUESTION: On the Iran-Chinese relationship.
MR. DAVIES: Sure.
QUESTION: We've been framing these questions in relation to missiles or radar technology. Does the United States know of any large sale of chemical warfare components from China to Iran?
MR. DAVIES: I don't have anything on that. I really don't. The issue of the sale of chemical weapons, precursors, falls squarely in the same category as some of these other allegations that have been made.
As the Secretary discussed at length in his press statement of yesterday, we have, on non-proliferation issues -- on missile non-proliferation and on chemicals -- worked intensively with the Chinese Government discussing these areas. The Secretary went into this in some detail. He talked, for instance, about missile non-proliferation and said, in his meetings with the Chinese, both countries reiterated their October 1994 joint statement commitment on missile proliferation that, of course, the Secretary signed with Vice Premier Qian Qichen on chemical weapons.
The Secretary pointed out that the United States and China agreed to seek ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the end of April 1997, so that both nations can be original parties to the Convention. We think that's significant.
In addition, on the issue of advanced conventional arms, the U.S. stressed the risk that it posed for the stability of the Persian Gulf to sell any such arms to Iran.
So they had a long discussion on non-proliferation issues, generally.
The Secretary described the result of the meeting as having advanced our cooperation in this area of very vital interest to both countries.
QUESTION: Before, when I asked a question, you said that you have a concern about Iran -- Iranian sales. However, to Syria, we know that a couple of weeks ago we heard some press report that the Russians are building some chemical factory in the Syrian territory. Also now, they're upgrading their SCUD missiles to extend their ranges.
You have diplomatic relations with Syria. Did you raise the subject? Did you raise this as your concern? What's going on?
MR. DAVIES: I can't confirm for you specifically that we raised that report or that concern.
I can tell you, in general, that we do raise with the Syrian Government these same non-proliferation issues. The Secretary of State has had many opportunities, in fact, to do so and he's done so many times. But I don't have anything specifically or in particular on that report of a chemical weapons factory.
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