START II LESS COSTLY TO RATIFY THAN TO REJECT
Ambassador Linton Brooks
WorldNet - 5 February 1996
(Transcript: Brooks, Bell WorldNet on START II treaty)
Washington -- The costs to Russia of ratifying the
START II treaty will be "a good deal less than
the costs of
not ratifying it," according to a lead U.S. negotiator for the
START I and II treaties.
Speaking on a WorldNet dialogue
with Moscow February 5, Ambassador Linton Brooks noted
that
START II, among its provisions, "reduces the strategic offensive
arms on both sides to 3,500
warheads -- about half of what
START I would have allowed." Thus, "without START II,
the
Russian Federation could maintain equality in nuclear arms
with the United States only at great
expense. So START II
preserves equality while saving money. What it does for the
United
States is eliminate ICBMs with multiple warheads, which
has long been a concern of ours. So
in the most fundamental
sense the treaty is a very equitable one."
When one
questioner said some Russians feel the general provisions of the
treaty could be carried
out without formal ratification,
Brooks pointed out that "the United States Senate has made
it
very clear that we are not allowed as a matter of U.S. law
to implement this treaty without
its
ratification."
Robert Bell, special assistant to
the president for national security affairs, who also
participated
in the WorldNet, said the U.S. Senate resolution
approving the START II treaty January 26
included language
stating that it was "not the intent of the Senate that the
provisions or
obligations of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile)
Treaty be modified or affected."
He noted that President
Clinton vetoed legislation offered by the Republican-dominated
Congress
"that sought to force us to deploy a national missile
defense that we don't need at this time, and
that would have
put us on a collision course with the (ABM) treaty." In a new
defense
authorization bill Congress has sent to the president
"that he will sign this week, the provision
has been deleted,"
Bell said. "So we believe we have underscored our very firm
commitment to
maintaining the integrity of the ABM
Treaty."
Bell said, "We are pleased that the government
of Russia remains firmly committed to the
START II treaty, and
that it intends to work hard over the next weeks and months to
get a
favorable vote of ratification from the Duma.... We
would be delighted if this could be
accomplished in time to
allow the instruments of ratification of the treaty to be
exchanged at the
April nuclear summit in Moscow.... But April
is a goal, a target if you will, and it's certainly not
a
deadline. We recognize the Duma will want to give the treaty the
most careful scrutiny. And
the Duma will pronounce itself on
this important matter when it's comfortable in rendering
that
opinion."
Brooks, a vice president at the Center
for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research
and
development center, served as the U.S. chief negotiator
for the START I treaty and performed
a similar function during
the final preparation of START II. Bell serves as senior
director for
defense policy and arms control at the National
Security Council.
Fifteen high-level Russian guests
attended the WorldNet Interactive. They included
analytical
correspondents from three influential newspapers
(Krasnaya Zvezda, the centrist daily of the
Ministry of
Defense; Isvestia, a reformist daily; and Pravda, a Neo-Communist
daily);
Ambassador Yuriy Nazarkin, who negotiated the START
treaties; Anatoliy Novikov, the chief
of staff of the Duma
Defense Committee; and senior arms control and military policy
analysts
from the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, the
Carnegie Center, the Heritage Foundation,
the Reform Fund, the
Institute for the Defense of Peace, and the USA and Canada
Institute.
Following is a transcript of the WorldNet
program, which was sponsored by the U.S.
Information
Agency:
(Begin
transcript)
MODERATOR: Hello, I'm Victor Morales, and
welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue." Ten days
ago the United
States Senate ratified the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty
with Russia
by a vote of 87 to four. President Clinton
applauded this historic step, saying it will make
every
American, every Russian, and people all over the world
more secure.
On this edition of "Dialogue," we'll be
discussing the significance and details of this treaty,
with
participants in Moscow. Here in Washington are two
gentlemen who have been deeply involved
in the START II
negotiations. Ambassador Linton Brooks is vice president of the
Naval
Analyses, a federally funded research and development
center. He served as the U.S. chief
negotiator for the START
I treaty, performing a similar function during the final
preparation
of START II. Ambassador Brooks is now a
consultant on START II ratification to the
Clinton
administration.
Robert Bell is special
assistant to the president for national security affairs, and
senior director
for defense policy and arms control at the
National Security Council. He is responsible for
advising the
president and the national security adviser on a wide range of
defense and arms
control issues. Gentlemen, welcome to
Worldnet's "Dialogue."
Before we begin our program, I'd
like for each of you to set the scene for us, beginning with
Mr.
Bell. Can you perhaps tell us more about the significance
of this treaty?
BELL: Well, of course, Victor. Let me
just say first that we are delighted to be with you in
Moscow
today. Those of us here in Washington are here on a day that is
actually colder I think
in Washington than it is in Moscow.
But we're trying to get used to that.
I would just like
to make four very brief remarks and points about this treaty
before I introduce
Ambassador Brooks, who negotiated this
treaty, and who is an expert -- our leading expert on
the
provisions in that treaty.
First, as Victor said,
President Clinton is very pleased by the action of the United
States Senate
in giving its advice and consent to this treaty
10 days ago, without amendments to the treaty.
As Victor
said, the president hailed the step as historic, and pointed out
that it will benefit and
improve the security not only of all
Americans, but all Russians and all people around the
world.
Second, our government is very encouraged by the
statements of President Yeltsin and other
Russian officials
in the wake of the Senate's action 10 days ago. We are pleased
that the
government of Russia remains firmly committed to the
START II treaty, and that it intends to
work hard over the
next weeks and months to get a favorable vote of ratification
from the Duma.
The third point I would make is we would
be delighted if this could be accomplished in time to
allow
the instruments of ratification of the treaty to be exchanged at
the April nuclear summit
in Moscow. The treaty was
negotiated, after all, in 1992, and signed in 1993. And over the
last
three years the Duma has had hearings on the treaty, and
I believe come to understand its basic
provisions fairly well.
But April is a goal, a target if you will, and it's certainly not
a deadline.
We recognize the Duma will want to give the
treaty the most careful scrutiny. And the Duma
will pronounce
itself on this important matter when it's comfortable in
rendering that opinion.
That said, we are confident though
that the treaty is balanced and fair and good for Russia
and
good for the United States, and that that judgment will
be reached and will be as true in April
as it might be later
-- August or later.
We noted, and took particular interest
in President Yeltsin's comments after ratification,
pointing
to the importance of the START II treaty for Russia
in terms of cost savings -- money that is
needed in Russia for
domestic programs. And we also noted with interest the statement
that
General Kharchenko made just a few days ago, if I could
just quote him. General Kharchenko
said, "This treaty lowers
the danger of nuclear war, preserves the nuclear parity
between
Moscow and Washington, and guarantees Russia national
security." And that we think is the
judgment that will stand
once the Duma gives its scrutiny to this treaty
Linton,
if I could ask you to talk about some of the basic points of
equity in this treaty.
AMB. BROOKS: Certainly. First,
let me add to what Bob Bell said about how pleased we are
to
be here. I know personally a number of the Moscow participants,
and send them by greetings.
START II is a very simple
treaty. It reduces the strategic offensive arms on both sides
to 3,500
warheads -- about half of what START I would have
allowed. It eliminates ICBMs with multiple
warheads. It puts
limits on the number of warheads that can be on submarines. And
it provides
for some new counting rules on bombers. At the
most fundamental level, what START II does
is it guarantees
equality for the Russian Federation. And without START II, the
Russian
Federation could maintain equality in nuclear arms
with the United States only at great expense.
So START II
preserves equality while saving money. What it does for the
United States is
eliminate ICBMs with multiple warheads, which
has long been a concern of ours. So in the most
fundamental
sense the treaty is a very equitable one.
On the details
there are of course many compromises that go into a treaty like
this. Let me
mention some that favored the Russian side.
First, the United States dropped the bomber
counting rule of
START I, which was quite favorable to the United States because
of its larger
bomber force. Second, the United States agreed
to ban training or exercises involving our B-1
heavy bomber
in a nuclear role. That was a significant concession when Mr.
Bell was a member
of the Senate Armed Services Committee
staff. His committee opposed that concession, but in
the
interest of equity we made it anyway. Third, the United States
agreed to cut the number of
its submarine-launched warheads
in half. We had never previously agreed to any limit,
and
initially we wanted a much higher limit. Fourth, we
agreed to the limit of 3,500 deployed nuclear
warheads. We
initially were comfortable with a somewhat higher limit. And,
finally, we wanted
the reductions completed earlier than 2003,
but we agreed to 2003 in the interest of helping ease
the
burden of reductions on the Russian Federation.
At the
final negotiations, in December of 1992, we made several other
concessions that will help
the Russian implement this treaty
and still save money. First, we allowed downloading
--
reducing the number of warheads on the missile that we call
the SS-18 and the Russian calls the
RS-18. That will make it
less costly for Russia to achieve START II limits. The June
1992
agreement that led to START II would have prevented this
downloading. We agreed to allow
conversion of some of the
silos for the missile we call the SS-18, and Russia calls the
RS-20. We
had previously insisted that all those silos be
destroyed. We agreed to pay for inspections that
we conduct
associated with the SS-18. Under START I, inspections are the
responsibility of the
host country. And finally, for the
first time, we agreed to permit exhibition and inspection of
the
B-2 Stealth heavy bomber. Under START I there was no such
inspection.
So we think both in the details and in the
broad scope this is an equitable treaty. And like Mr.
Bell
I look forward to the day that the Duma will follow the U.S.
Senate in approving it.
MODERATOR: Well, let's begin our
dialogue in Moscow now, where a distinguished group
of
participants is standing by. Please go ahead.
Q:
Hello, my name is Yuriy Nazarkin. I am the director of the
Center of International Studies.
I used to be the head Soviet
negotiator for START. First I'd like to say hello to my
esteemed
American colleagues, Mr. Bell, and my good friend and
former counterpart, Linton Brooks. Hi,
Linton.
After
the American Senate now has ratified START II, the ball as they
say is in the Russian
court. At the same time, there are some
factors which will influence the ratification of START
II by
our Duma. And what I had in mind here are not only our domestic
issues, but factors that
are in the United States. So what
I mean is, first of all, the issue of the ABM Treaty,
national
ABM systems, and also the problem of future
negotiations on further reductions in
strategic
weapons.
The Senate's decision, which chose
to ratify START II, has also touched on these issues.
For
instance, as far as further reductions are concerned, what
we call START III, it was made rather
clear that the Senate
is calling on President Clinton to continue reductions in these
arms. But
on the ABM issue the language is rather unclear.
So could you comment on how you see the
situation on both of
these issues? First, how do you think events are going to
proceed concerning
the issue of the ABM Treaty, first of all;
and, secondly, what are the United States'
intentions
concerning further reductions of strategic arms
under START III? And, if you could also, do
you think it
would be useful to have a high level meeting on these
issues?
BELL: Ambassador Nazarkin, it's a pleasure for
me to be discussing this with you today,
because I well
remember from the trips of United States senators to Geneva to
observe the
negotiations when you were sitting across the
table from Ambassador Brooks -- the good
discussions we had
back then. And I'm delighted to know that you will be very
involved in this,
and in your own capacity advising the Duma
on the importance of this treaty.
Let me address very
quickly both your points -- first, about the ABM Treaty and
second START
III.
With regard to the ABM Treaty, it's
clear, I believe unmistakably clear, that this
administration
is firmly committed to maintaining the
integrity of this treaty. And we mean that not just with
our
words, but we mean it with our deeds. The president of course
has agreed with President
Yeltsin that the ABM Treaty is a
cornerstone of strategic stability between our two countries.
But these past several months, as we have had a discussion
with our Congress on the question
of the ABM Treaty, we have
demonstrated our commitment to the treaty in part by
vetoing
legislation that the Congress had enacted, that sought
to force us to deploy a national missile
defense that we don't
need at this time, and that would have put us on a collision
course with the
treaty. And that veto of that legislation was
sustained by votes in the Congress, and in the new
bill that
the Congress has sent the president, that he will sign this week,
the provision has been
deleted. So we believe we have
underscored our very firm commitment to maintaining
the
integrity of the ABM Treaty.
As you noted,
Ambassador Nazarkin, there is language in the Senate's resolution
of ratification
that touches on the ABM question. I was
involved in negotiating that language with the Senate,
and I
am happy to tell you what it means and what it doesn't mean,
because we sought to be
clear on that point. What the
provision in the resolution says is that in giving its approval
to the
START II treaty it is not the intent of the Senate that
the provisions or obligations of the ABM
Treaty be modified
or affected. And I think that goes without saying. The treaty
that the Senate
has approved is START II. ABM is a treaty
that is in force, and we are committed to maintain
its
integrity. So there is no contradiction here, or no weakening
of the ABM Treaty in any way
by the resolution of ratification
that the Senate has approved.
With regard to START III,
as you noted the resolution of ratification approved by the
Senate
10 days ago does call for further reductions consistent
with the national security interests of the
United States.
And that is the view of the Clinton administration as well.
President Clinton and
President Yeltsin, at each of their
summits, have discussed the question of what comes after
START
II. And both have made clear their commitment -- as soon as
START II enters into
force -- to engage at the very highest
levels to explore the possibility of further reductions
and
other steps that would help us step back from the nuclear
precipice of the Cold War.
Q: This is Dr. Alexander
Konovalov, director for military studies at the U.S.-Canada
Institute.
I'd also like to say hello to our American
colleagues. I am very glad to see Ambassador Brooks,
who is
-- with whom we have ongoing professional contact.
I'd
like to start with a brief comment concerning Mr. Bell's
introductory comments. If I
understood you correctly, you
took note of the fact that the state Duma, following the signing
of
the treaty in 1993, has had enough time to consider it
carefully in its committee and
subcommittees. If I understood
your comment correctly, I would like to take exception to it.
The
Russian Constitution allows the Duma to begin the
ratification process, to study a treaty only
after the
president officially introduces it to the Duma for ratification.
This is a fact which
unfortunately took place only in the
middle of last year. And so the Duma has only had a chance
to
carry -- to conduct two official hearings on this
matter.
And so it seems to me the new Duma will have a lot
of questions about the appropriateness of
this treaty. And
I want to say right away that I am in favor of the treaty myself.
But what
would you suggest that we do -- what would you
suggest that we give as an answer when
discussion turns to
this issue, when people for instance say that the treaty gives
the United States
much more leeway to quickly rearm, or to
quickly reload its missiles? If we're talking
about
downloading, for instance the Trident missiles in
particular, as you know Russia's
submarine-based arsenal is
much smaller than the American. And I think this is an issue
that
will come up, and we will need to be prepared to answer
this. So, for instance, in addition to the
limitations on
deployed warheads, wouldn't it make sense to talk about
verification and perhaps
also destruction of those warheads
that will be taken out of service, and to make the
reduction
process irreversible?
BELL: Let me address
the question about the Duma's timetable, and then I'll ask
Ambassador
Brooks to comment on the downloading issue you
raise -- because I want to be very careful in
emphasizing two
points about the schedule of the Duma.
The first point is,
as I said, the START II treaty was signed three years ago, and
thus I am
confident that the basic provisions of the treaty
are fairly well known to the Duma, even if
technically under
the Constitution the document has not been officially on the
agenda of the
Duma until last fall. But I'm not suggesting
that that's a sufficient foundation to act tomorrow.
Quite
the contrary, I wanted to emphasize that the Duma will give this
treaty very careful
scrutiny over the next several weeks and
months, and that the debate is in one sense really
just
beginning on this treaty in Moscow now that the Senate
has acted. And I think that's evident
by the number of
comments and interviews that have taken place just in the last
10 days.
We also recognize that this is a new Duma, and
there are new members to the Duma, and new
members therefore
to this treaty, and they will need to come to their own judgment.
So the point
I really want to leave you with is that we
recognize, as I said, that the Duma will pronounce itself
on
this important matter when it is comfortable in making that
pronouncement. We are simply
confident that once that degree
of scrutiny is turned to this treaty the Duma will reach
a
judgment that it is a balanced treaty and a treaty that is
in Russia's national security interests,
and that that
judgment would be available and true in April just as it would
be in August.
AMB. BROOKS: Let me make some comments
about the question of uploading. It's true that
there is
slightly greater potential for the United States to replace
warheads on the Trident II
missiles than there is for the
Russian Federation. But this disparity is not as great as it
might
seem. First, Russia too has some ability to upload in
case the treaty collapses through the
provisions I mentioned
earlier, about downloading the SS-19 ICBM.
Secondly, the
United States would have had a good deal more upload potential
had it kept all 18
of its Trident submarines. But in our own
internal review of our forces under START II, we
determined
that we would reduce to 14 submarines. And that significantly
reduces the upload
potential. Now, we have been told by the
Senate that we may only complete that reduction once
START II
is in force.
I understand the interest in destroying
warheads. But as my colleague, Ambassador Nazarkin
remembers,
START II, like START I, is built around things we can verify.
And thus far we have
not been able to come up with a way that
allows us to verify warhead destruction while still
preserving
legitimate security secrets on both sides. And so I think that
this may well be a
subject for the future. But for now I
think that it would not be wise to try to modify START
II to
include such destruction.
Finally, there is one specific
feature included in the treaty at Russian insistence which
further
limits upload potential, and that has to do with the
Minuteman III ICBM. As you may know,
when the warheads are
removed from the Minuteman III, the platform on which they
are
mounted will be destroyed, and replaced with one that only
carries a single warhead. So that
further limits the
theoretical ability that the United States has to
upload.
Q: Hello, this is Sergei Oznobishchev, director
of the Section on International Security Issues,
U.S. Canada
Institute. I'm very glad to see some people in Washington whom
I've actually
known for quite a long time.
I have a
question. You again I think have said something which would sort
of reaffirm my own
concern with something that President
Clinton has said, because apparently we don't have any
reason
to fear that there will be any sudden decisions taken before the
end of the year in the area
of ABM -- or the president's
comments concerning his use of the veto has in fact reassured
me
we have nothing to fear here.
But can we also be
assured that the Republicans' position on this will also --
which, by the way
is very different -- differs significantly
from the Democratic administration's position -- is there
a
mechanism in your government structurewhich would prevent
ambitions on one or the other
side of the aisle from acting
in a way that would cause concern here? For instance, I'm
talking
about non-deployment of ABM systems -- is there any
reason for concern here on our part?
That is, looking ahead
into 1997, is there anything you can tell us on that score?
Thank you.
BELL: Well, the United States, just as is true
with Russia, is a democracy, with split powers
between and
executive and a legislative branch. And that is the design of
our Constitution, just
as it is the design of your
Constitution. There are no ultimate guarantees. The Congress
will
come to an opinion each year as it goes through its
legislative cycle, and the president will
evaluate the
legislation and reach a decision.
We are confident at the
end of the day that the arguments that are present at this time
for not
spending tens of billions of dollars in this country
to deploy a national missile defense, when we
do not see a
threat to our homeland any time in the next decade or so that
would require that,
or particularly to spend the money on an
ABM deployment that would undermine the treaty --
we are
confident that that argument will be persuasive to at least a
sufficient number of members
in our Congress, that the
Congress would not have the power to force that action over
the
objections of our president. And I don't expect that
balance, if you will, between the two
branches of government
to change any time in the near future.
AMB. BROOKS: May
I add a couple of thoughts? The decision to abrogate a treaty
is a
tremendously important decision. Think back to the last
time there was as solid Republican
control of the presidency.
Think back for example to President Reagan's era. The SALT
II
treaty had expired, and had never been ratified. And yet
it took years before the United States
was prepared to decide
that it would no longer be bound by it -- and that only in the
context of
knowing that START was right around the corner.
So while it is easy to make sweeping
statements, it is very
difficult for governments to abandon treaties, and it's very
difficult for this
government in particular. So that is one
thing that should reassure those who, like
this
administration, think that the ABM Treaty is the
cornerstone of stability.
The other thing, as Mr. Bell
alluded to, is money. Those of you who follow American
politics
know that the real issue in this country right now
is not ABM or no ABM, but it is reducing the
budget deficit.
And while thus far defense spending has been relatively immune
from reductions,
no unofficial observer believes that that is
likely to continue.
So for both of those reasons it seems
to me, as one who is not in the administration, that it
is
very, very unlikely that the political circumstances in
this country will allow in the next few years
decisions to be
taken that could undermine the ABM Treaty.
Q: Hello,
Robert, Linton, this is Vasily Krivokhizha. I want to say hi
again from Moscow. I'm
deputy director of the Russian
Institute for Strategic Studies. I wanted to remind everybody
that
there's a certain asymmetry here that is traditional for
U.S.-Russian relations. In part we can
see this in the fact
that we are experts, and Robert and I -- of course we can say
what it is we
feel, whereas Robert by contrast is an official
representative of the government and has to
speak
accordingly.
The issue of START II ratification
is an important one, and I wanted to address my
question
specifically to this -- that is, to the topic of our
discussion today. It's much broader than the
larger question
of balance in U.S.-Russian relations. We all know that
everything is very highly
politicized here. But sticking to
the rules of our discussion, I don't think it makes sense to
raise
very complex and detailed questions. So I am going to
perhaps give a question that is very
simple. I am going to
exaggerate and give a very simple question, and I'd like, if
possible, to get
a very simple response.
On the whole,
if you consider the views of experts -- I don't mean just Russian
experts -- we've
got three different categories here. The
first category of experts feels that START II, just as
many
other treaties which have been prepared, could and should be
ratified. Unfortunately, the
supporters of this particular
view can't answer the question as to where should we find
the
money to implement the treaty, especially since three
years have passed and we are facing even
more serious
constraints now. They understand of course that if we don't
fulfill this treaty then
there will be all sorts of
opportunities for mutual recrimination. I'd like to point out
that this
is a point of view that is fairly widespread in the
Congress, if you look at the hearings that have
been held.
And one of the conditions that is discussed is Russia's ability
to implement the treaty.
Some people refer also to issues of
course to the fact that not all of this is the
financial
responsibility of the United States. That's the
first category of expert opinion.
Of course, all theses
have, as you know, their antithesis, and so there is ia rather
large group of
experts who feel -- and there are many of these
in the Duma -- who feel that no, we don't need
to ratify any
treaty that we are not able to implement. We're fine with the
general provisions.
We feel fine about the general provisions
of the treaty, but we don't need to ratify it formally.
We
will simply carry out the provisions of the treaty without
ratifying the treaty, meanwhile
leaving aside of course those
provisions, those hidden obstacles and so forth that have shown
up
recently, and the various problems that we may have with
the treaty based on our analysis of it
in comparison with
other treaties. And then, as we know, Hegel tells us that every
thesis as an
antithesis, and the two together have a
synthesis.
Other people feel -- this is the other group
-- feel that we need to have new negotiations for
START III,
and we need to take into account Russia's ability to implement
treaties, and remove
the problems in that way.
Now,
there may be other ways to divide up expert opinion, but I think
the real facts of our
financial situation dictate this as
perhaps the most appropriate division of expert opinion.
Which
of these opinions do you feel is the least bad? Bear
in mind that also the United States as a
world power and a
world leader, which is building a new world order, has also --
would like to
see a legal framework established which would
make -- which would allow the entire world
community to
function with it. Thank you.
AMB. BROOKS: Let me try to
answer that. Let me comment on each of the three approaches.
First, the first group of experts should ask themselves,
Where will Russia get the money to
maintain equality with the
United States if this treaty is not ratified? That would be more
money
-- not less -- and it will be money going to the
production of new strategic arms when money
should go to other
areas.
The second group of experts should face a painful
truth: The United States Senate has made it
very clear that
we are not allowed as a matter of U.S. law to implement this
treaty without its
ratification. That means we cannot
eliminate the Peacekeeper ICBM, we cannot reduce the
number
of Trident submarines. So that's simply a fact of American law,
and therefore a fact
of relations between our two
countries.
The third group of experts, who thinks we
should renegotiate, is in my view misguided. There
are things
that I'd like to see different in this treaty; there are things
that you would like to see
different in this treaty; there are
things that I don't much care if they are changed; there
are
things that I care a great deal if they are changed. This
is an election year in the United States.
This is an election
year in Russia. If we start down the path of renegotiating this
treaty, we will
still be at it two or three years from now.
And in that time the Russian strategic forces will come
closer
to the point where economics will drive them to a lower level;
the United States will remain
at START I levels. I do not
believe it is in Russia's interests -- I do not believe it is in
America's
interests -- for there to be marked inequality
between our two nations.
So of your three experts, I would
your first group, that says the treaty should and could
be
ratified, is the closest to correct; but it should modify
its position to say that the costs of ratifying
the treaty are
a good deal less than the costs of not ratifying it.
BELL:
Well, I agree 100 percent with Ambassador Brooks, and I would
vote for group number
one, with the caveat Linton mentioned.
We looked at this very carefully ourselves, and it's
no
question but that there are costs associated with the START
II treaty, as in the case of any arms
reduction treaty. There
is the cost of destroying the silos and eliminating the missiles,
and there
is the cost of the inspection regime that
accompanies the treaty. Now, that cost, measured over
the
lifetime of the treaty, is measured in hundreds of millions of
dollars, and it's easy when
you're looking at a treaty at the
time of ratification just to focus on those upfront
costs.
But what you have to also look at is the forgone
costs that you save through the reductions.
We've looked at
this in our own force planning, and for the United States to stay
at START I
levels, and not to enjoy the benefits of coming
down to the START II ceilings, would require us
to add back
into our defense spending plans billions of dollars. So it's a
choice between spending
hundreds of millions to save billions,
or not ratifying this treaty and having to spend
billions.
So we are confident that if your first group of
experts calculates the costs and the cost
trade-offs
precisely, they will come to a conclusion, as we
hope the entire Duma will, that START II saves
money. That's
what President Yeltsin said the day after the Senate acted in
this country. He
said that he is looking to START II for the
cost savings that Russia needs for social programs.
And we
believe that's the correct analysis.
Q: This is Dr. Anton
Surikov, from the Institute of Defense Studies. I wanted to take
exception
with the assertion that we have heard more than once
now concerning the fact that the START
II treaty is in
Russia's interests in the financial sense -- savings -- and that
Russia is not in a
position to maintain its strategic arsenal
if START I is to remain in effect. I don't want to go
into,
you know, an in-depth analysis of the problems here -- because
that would take too long --
but I did want to just say that
there are certain technical and economic approaches that
would
allow Russia -- maintain its strategic forces within the
START I -- or at the START I levels --
not only that it would
cost less for Russia if it could chose some of its limits on
ICBMs -- that
is, if it could have about a thousand
single-warhead ICBMs -- that's -- a thousand is out of
the
question. But otherwise the notion of quantitative parity
would be violated, you know, if we got
five or six hundred
vehicles -- which is what we're headed toward -- then that would
be a
problem. But this isn't really what I wanted to
ask.
What I wanted to ask is something rather different.
From my point of view right now the timing
isn't very good for
starting an active discussion on START II from the
domestic-political point
of view in Russia. It's new secret
that Russia is about to have its presidential election, and
our
whole political climate in fact is very much permeated by
this upcoming presidential election.
So whether we like it
or not, whether it's good or bad, we are forced to consider the
fact that the
decisions that the Duma might make concerning
ratification of START II, if in fact it comes to
a vote in
April or before, will depend not only on the merits of the
treaty, but the political
circumstances to be quite
frank.
On the other hand, if a vote is held after the
presidential elections, it seems to me that the
chances are
much better that the treaty will be ratified. Of course if the
current president is
reelected, it is clear that with this new
mandate he will look a lot better if he insists to the Duma
if
they ratify the treaty.
However, if someone else is
elected -- for instance, Mr. Zyuganov -- I don't think if such
a person
is to take power that I think he will of course see
a need to proceed on the basis of Russia's real
capacities,
and he may actually call on the Duma to ratify the treaty, based
on Russia's real
ability to implement or not implement the
treaty.
So I think the timing is actually very, very poor.
And I think since we've waited so long we
could certainly wait
another six months, and then go ahead and carry out all of the
activities that
would accompany the Duma's ratification
process. Thank you.
AMB. BROOKS: Let me make a couple
of points. First, of course the Duma is driven by
domestic
politics. I spent most of my life waiting for the day when that
would be true -- waiting
for the day when domestic politics
and the examination of a separate legislative body would
be
part of the Russian political scene. And no one in the
United States would like to go back to the
era when the
Russian government didn't -- or the Soviet government -- didn't
have to pay
attention to domestic politics. So we understand
and we accept that. And, as Mr. Bell said, April
is a goal
-- it's not a deadline. But the longer we wait, the more
disruptive it will be on both
sides, because both sides will
need to make plans both for the situation where the treaty
is
ratified, and for the situation where the treaty is not
ratified. And I think as you have suggested,
and certainly
our Senate has suggested, what we do with strategic forces on
each side will be
different if the treaty is not ratified.
So the sooner we put the question behind us, the better
it
will be.
Finally, let me go back to your opening
comments, where you spoke about the possibility of a
thousand
single-warhead ICBMs. There is nothing in the START II treaty
that would prevent
Russia from doing that. It is often said
erroneously that the START II treaty compels to put
much of
its strategic arsenal on submarines. That's incorrect. The
START II treaty limits what
can be put on submarines -- and
that's a limit for the United States. But it does not
compel
putting anything anywhere. It's an economic decision
about where the strategic arsenal goes.
I didn't mean to
suggest that the Russian Federation is incapable of maintaining
a strategic
arsenal in parity with the United States at START
I levels. In the days of the union, President
Gorbachev had
said publicly that the Soviet Union was not capable of
maintaining that parity,
and had announced that the Soviet
Union, had it not broken up, would settle out at a lower
level,
no matter what happened. But of course the Russian
Federation can maintain parity. Where
I think I disagree, and
I believe other Russian analysts disagree, is whether that would
turn out
to be cheaper than START II. I suspect it would
not.
Q: This is Yuriy Nazarkin again. I apologize for
speaking twice, but I wanted to continue one
of the topics
that my colleague Vasily -- (inaudible) -- brought up. This is
the topic on how
realistic the timetable is for implementing
START II. This is truly a problem which is being
brought up
more and more often as one of the obstacles standing in the way
of ratifying the
treaty as it now stands, in terms of the
timetables that is. And so the treaty of course refers to
two
timetables, the first being on all limitations -- reductions
under the treaty have to be
accomplished by November 1st,
2003. Then there's also an intermediate milestone -- seven
years
after entering into force of START I. So this means
that these limitations have to be carried out
by the beginning
in effect of 2002.
Now, I understand that when START II
was being negotiated nobody expected that START I
would be so
long in entering into force, but nevertheless what we have now
is a situation in which
to reduce arms past the intermediate
levels we've only got one year, even though originally
we
expected there to be at least two and a half years for the
second phase of reductions. Meanwhile,
I am perfectly aware
of the dangers inherent in new negotiations and reopening the
text of the
treaty, and so of course I feel that we have to
do everything that we can to avoid this. My
question is this:
Do you see any other pragmatic way out of this problem that would
not involve
changing the text of the treaty, but which would
allow us to move the timetable down -- move
it back a little
bit for final implementation of the treaty? Thank
you.
AMB. BROOKS: I don't see a way to change the
schedule without changing the treaty itself.
And I think that
the best way to deal with the problem that you mention is for us
to get the
treaty in force so that we can start. Our analysis
shows, for the United States, that we can still
make the
reductions on schedule. We think that is probably true for the
Russian Federation, but
the longer we wait the harder it will
be.
Q: This is Dr. Kanovalov again. I want to call our
American colleagues' attention to the fact
that in the process
of ratifying the treaty in the Duma there are also foreign
political influences
and events that are having their effect.
The old Duma, for instance, had conducted two hearings
on the
treaty -- START II -- and the general staff's opinion was at the
first hearing in favor of
ratification. And in the second
hearing it was already expressing serious doubts concerning
the
appropriateness of ratifying the treaty. And one of the
arguments that they cited were two
factors -- the first being
the bombers in Bosnia that are being used by NATO, and second
the
rather harsh statements concerning plans of expanding NATO
to the east. As far as I am aware,
one of the issues has been
rendered moot by virtue of the Russian participation in the IFOR
in
Bosnia. And so we're not going to run into any of these
problems.
But my question is this: First of all, what's
your own opinion of the fact that -- what's your
attitude to
the fact that the Duma will -- no doubt there will be members of
the Duma who will
use the possible expansion of NATO as a
reason not to ratify the treaty? The other -- I'm not
saying
it's a logical point of view, but I'm saying it is going to come
up -- and the second issue,
if in fact the Duma does ratify
the treaty, but with an amendment that it will remain in
effect
until and only as long as the ABM Treaty remains
unviolated. Thank you.
BELL: We're confident that the
argument for START II rests on the fundamental point
of
strategic parity between the United States and Russia. And
that situation is to be desired
regardless I believe of
political changes in Europe or the discussion we're having with
Russia
with regard to specific issues in Bosnia, or with
regard to NATO expansion. It's just
fundamentally the case
that strategic parity benefits both sides, and provides a
foundation of
confidence and trust and stability from which
you can then have your specific discussions about
specific
issues involving changes in the overall security environment in
Europe.
I would point out, for example, one of the issues
we spend a lot of time discussing with your
government in the
last several months has been the question of the Conventional
Forces in
Europe treaty and the issue of the flanks. And
there I think we've demonstrated that we still
have a way to
go -- our capacity to adapt treaties to reflect changed
circumstances. So I would
hope that we could get START II in
force to provide this foundation, and then allow the
political
discussion on issues like NATO expansion to
continue.
MODERATOR: And with that we'll have to bring
our program to an end. Gentlemen, thank
you very much for
joining us today. We appreciate you coming in. Perhaps once the
treaty is
ratified you can join us again.
BELL: We
look forward to that.
MODERATOR: And we would like to
thank you, our participants in Moscow, for your
questions and
comments, as well as our international viewers. From Washington,
I'm Victor
Morales for Worldnet's "Dialogue."
(End
transcript)