1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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Arms Control and Disarmament 1. Notes of Conversations/1/ Washington, January 7, 1964. /1/Source: Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971, Vol. 7, pp. 187-188. No classification marking. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal. Of the 25 volumes, plus 3 volumes of appendices, Volumes 7-17 cover the Johnson presidency. Copies of the Journal are available through research libraries and institutions, including the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Presidential Libraries of Kennedy and Johnson, and the libraries of the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. [Here follow notes of several conversations and meetings, including an NSC meeting on Indonesia.] At 5 p.m. Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Kermit Gordon and I met with the President in his office to clarify the President's intentions with respect to the fissionable materials production cut; that is, would it apply only to FY 1965, or whether the longer-range aspects of cutting to 2000 megawatts and eliminating six reactors were intended./2/ /2/Reference is to a proposal that President Johnson intended to make in his State of the Union address. At a meeting earlier that afternoon, Seaborg, McGeorge Bundy, Harold Brown, Elmer Staats (Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget), and others discussed the following proposed sentence for this address: "It is in this spirit that we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25%, shutting down four plutonium piles and closing many non-essential military installations." Because the participants disagreed about whether the President's message should mention longer-range cutbacks or only those for FY 1965, they decided to confer with the President and "if the President wanted to refer only to the FY 1965 cutback in production, the sentence should be modified in order to make this clear." (Ibid., pp. 182 and 186) I pointed out that I thought if the longer-range aspects were intended, that it would be difficult to negotiate power cuts without an overall longer-range plan. In this connection, I recalled that this longer-range plan of cutting to 2000 megawatts was geared to the 1968 and 1972 peg points of long-range weapons requirements suggested by McNamara. McNamara and Gordon did not support this point of view and felt that the meeting of December 21st was consistent with the view that the decisions had been made only for FY 1965, with the longer-range plan yet to be finalized./3/ McNamara mentioned his earlier suggestion that the adoption of the AEC figure of a cut to 3700 megawatts might be reasonable in order that there would be less of a minimum before it would be necessary to increase power to meet the requirements for civilian purposes. /3/For Seaborg's notes of the December 21 meeting, see ibid., p. 123. The President decided that, so far as the budget message was concerned, he would refer only to the FY 1965 cuts, and he asked us not to reveal any longer-range plan at this time./4/ He agreed that McNamara, Rusk, and I should hold a "backgrounder" following his budget message tomorrow./5/ Rusk had some doubts that he should properly participate, but the President felt that it would be very worthwhile to have him there to bring out the possible connection to arms limitation. (My own impression is that there is some confusion over the details of the decision taken by the President on December 21, 1963, to cut production, that this decision was clearly to cut electric power for U-235 production to 2000 megawatts over a three- to four-year period, and to shut down six reactors.) The memorandum prepared for the President (copy of my letter to President of December 19, 1963, attached)/6/ as the basis for the December 21, 1963, meeting supports this view. Perhaps there has been some change in this December 21st position in the meantime of which I had not explicitly been told. /4/The sentence in President Johnson's State of the Union message, given at noon on January 8, reads: "It is in this spirit [of not seeking an excess of military power that could be provocative and wasteful] that in this fiscal year we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25 percent." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, p. 117) /5/In an entry for January 8, Seaborg noted: "I participated with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk in a background briefing of several hundred reporters in the State Department Auditorium on the State of the Union Message; we gave out a press release (copy attached) and explained the details of the production cutback." (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 192) For text of the referenced AEC press release, January 8, see ibid., pp. 193-195. For the Department of State transcript of the background briefing, see ibid., Appendix: Press Conferences, pp. 117-140. /6/Ibid., Vol. 7, pp. 103-105. Beginning at 5:50 p.m. I called Senators John Pastore, Clinton Anderson, Henry Jackson, Albert Gore and Congressman Chet Holifield and advised them (with the exception of Jackson--reached on January 8th) that the President has decided to mention in one sentence, in his State of the Union message tomorrow, that he is taking steps to cut back production of fissionable material by 25% (U-235) and closing down four production reactors. I said I had just gotten this word and wanted them to know beforehand. (Note: I mentioned to both Pastore and Holifield that we would like to meet with the JCAE to go over a few things just prior to the budget submission to Congress, and suggested January 17th. I asked them to hold that evening free for dinner, and we would be in touch with them.) At 6:05 p.m. I called Elmer Staats (BOB) and told him that we are going to revise our draft statement on the cutback and that we are now working on the version which I left with him. I said it wasn't clear whether we would issue a statement, but Rusk, McNamara, and I would hold a background press briefing at 3 p.m., tomorrow, at the State Department. Before that time it can be decided whether or not it will be necessary to issue a statement also. Staats said he would appreciate seeing the statement in the morning./7/ /7/This statement was presumably the AEC press release; see footnote 5 above.
2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, January 14, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 388.3, January 11-16, 1964. Secret. Attached to another copy of Bundy's memorandum is a January 15 memorandum from ACDA Director William C. Foster to the Committee of Principals, recommending that Bundy's memorandum serve as the agenda for their meeting on January 16 and transmitting a list of working papers for use as reference material. The list covers three areas: nuclear containment, immediate reductions or limitations of arms, and observation posts. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament--ACDA Publications, Vol. I, Box 11) The January 16 meeting of the Committee of Principals was cancelled, and Foster and others instead worked on a paper that attempted to incorporate the President's general thoughts. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 228) Regarding this paper, see footnote 3, Document 4. Butch Fisher, Spurgeon Keeny and I have been working on the possible set of "new proposals" for the United States in Geneva, and from our point of view the following are desirable and practicable, subject to your advice. We have broken them down into two major fields--A. Nuclear Containment, and B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms (formerly called separable first stage). The organizing principle of these proposals is that each separate numbered item should be something which we are prepared to negotiate on its own terms. The posture we seek to present is that of a nation which believes that the way to begin is to begin. We are offering a dozen or more ways to begin and are ready to start whenever others will meet us half way. While many of these proposals are not altogether new, the approach has some novelty and appears to us to match the President's temper and his general purpose. A. Nuclear Containment 1. Non-dissemination. This is a familiar field and we would follow the general guidelines in the ACDA paper./2/ /2/Reference presumably is to the January 14 ACDA paper, "Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," which is cited in the list above under nuclear containment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament--ACDA Publications, Vol., I, Box 11) 2. Non-reception of nuclear weapons. This is a partial element of non-dissemination and one which is worth encouragement, although probably not front-page leadership by the United States. 3. Non-dissemination to individual nations of strategic nuclear delivery systems. This is a separable element which might be accomplished by unilateral or bilateral agreement. This could be accomplished by the reciprocal destruction of B-47/Badger bombers so that they would not be available for possible dissemination to other countries. We also believe the United States could easily make a self-denying statement that its obsolete bombers, for example, will not be sold to those who might seek a nuclear capability of their own. 4. Reciprocal inspection of large peaceful nuclear reactors both here and abroad. 5. An agreed nuclear production cut-off with minimum inspection. 6. An offer to allow inspection to confirm our own projected close down of plutonium production reactors. 7. Improved proposals for the transfer of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes. These transfers need not be in the same amounts and will be under improved IAEA supervision. 8. Basic principles for nuclear-free zones. 9. Assertion of the possibility of nuclear-limited zones (such as a possible nuclear freeze in Europe). 10. Reassertion of the comprehensive test ban (in a low key with emphasis on seismic study if the subject is posed)./3/ /3/A handwritten question mark appears in the right margin next to this sentence. B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms 11. An agreed reduction across the board. 12. An agreed reduction in strategic forces. 13. An agreed reduction in tactical forces. 14. A separate agreement on nondeployment of AICBMs (comparable to the nuclear weapons in space agreement). 15. An agreed freeze on the production of strategic delivery systems./4/ /4/The word "emphasis" has been inserted by hand in the left margin next to this sentence. 16. An agreed across-the-board stoppage of arms production./5/ /5/The word "No" is handwritten in the margin next to this sentence. All of these separable measures are designed to be consistent with existing approaches to inspection with the possible exceptions of the reduction in strategic weapons and AICBM non-deployment, where our own means of surveillance may be satisfactory. The President's set of proposals should also include: --A general reaffirmation of our basic position. --An assertion of our great interest in a plan for control posts, coupled with a statement that this is a matter which so closely engages the interest of some of our major allies that we will not make specific proposals until we have consulted further with them. --A reaffirmation and resume of the proposed agreements on preventing the use of force set forth in the President's letter to Khrushchev, of which I attach the latest draft./6/ /6/Not printed. Text is identical to a letter President Johnson sent to Chairman Khru-shchev on January 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 153-155. Butch Fisher still wants to say something about budgets and will reluctantly settle for whatever small bone you wish to throw in his direction. He points out that this is a field of real promise and that in the fitness of things it should not be wholly neglected in a Presidential declaration at Geneva. We recognize that not all of this may be negotiable in your terms in the few days that remain, but my own belief is that we ought to be able to get enough agreement on most of them to have them put forward as examples of the sort of things for which the Johnson Administration is ready, while detailed work proceeds, on specific ways and means. McG. B.
3. Editorial Note On January 16, 1964, President Johnson sent a letter to AEC Chairman Seaborg approving Niblick III, an AEC proposal for a total of 13 underground nuclear tests to be conducted in the third quarter of FY 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series--FY 1964, Box 27) Seaborg proposed this series in a December 21, 1963, letter to President Johnson. (Ibid.) In a January 16 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Charles E. Johnson noted that the proposed test program had been circulated to all members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests on January 6 for comments and no negative comments or objections had been made. Thus, he and Spurgeon Keeny recommended that the President's previously signed letter of approval be dated and sent to Seaborg under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Bundy. (Ibid.) The Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests was established by President Kennedy in NSAM No. 269, October 31, 1963. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, Document 372. Bundy's January 16 memorandum to Seaborg reads in part: "In making his approval, the President noted that your submittal was based on the understanding that there must be no untoward risk of violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty limitations concerning delivery of radioactive debris beyond national boundaries, and your assurance to him that the test program proposed is consistent with such understanding." (Ibid.) The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 10, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963. (14 UST 1313) In a March 26 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg said that 10 shots were carried out under Niblick III, which had been completed, and he requested 14 weapons development tests and 2 Plowshare events for the Niblick IV series in the fourth quarter of FY 1964. "The Plowshare events," Seaborg wrote, "are directed toward the development of clean explosives and techniques for their employment in the excavation program." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series--FY 1964, Box 27) In a memorandum to President Johnson, April 9, McGeorge Bundy wrote that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and his office had reviewed the AEC request for the President's approval. The President initialed his approval of the Niblick IV program on this memorandum. (Ibid.) Bundy conveyed the President's approval in an April 10 memorandum to Seaborg. (Ibid.) Ultimately, the U.S. Government conducted 10 tests, including 1 Plowshare event, during the third quarter of FY 1964 and 13 shots, including 2 Plowshare events, in the fourth quarter. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, pages 20-22)
4. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 18, 1964. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 251-252. No classification marking. [Here follow notes of a meeting on the impact of the impending reactor shutdowns.] At 3:30 p.m. until about 4:30 p.m. I met with the President in the Oval Room of the White House, along with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, William Bundy, General Marshall Carter,/2/ Fisher, Moyers, and Valenti. The President called on Rusk, who said that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain clearance on the statement to be made, in President Johnson's name, to the Geneva Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A draft statement was given out./3/ It was decided to add the word "now" at the end of the first sentence of paragraph (2) on page 2. The President asked about the sentence concerning appropriate international verification of the reactor shutdowns already scheduled in our country, and I explained the situation with respect to the three reactors at Hanford and the one reactor at Savannah River, namely, that two of the reactors at Hanford were old and there is no problem of international inspection, but the reactor at Savannah River is essentially the same as the four reactors that would continue to operate, and therefore, there would be problems in revealing the internal construction of this reactor. Rusk and McNamara asked whether there would be problems concerning the inspection of the shutdown reactor at Savannah River if the inspection entailed no more than standing in the door to watch whether operating personnel were working at the reactor, or monitoring the electrical power that was going into the reactor. I said that, with that interpretation, there would be no problem with the language of the last sentence of paragraph (3) on page 3, namely, ". . . we are prepared to accept international verification of some or all of the reactor shutdowns already scheduled in our country." I also pointed out that we might want to start the reactors up again either for the production of electrical power or for production purposes, and it was agreed that this was consistent with the President's statement. The other issue in the statement was whether the paragraph (5) (c), on page 3, should be deleted as the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested, and the President decided that it should be deleted./4/ /2/Deputy Director, CIA. /3/A January 17 draft is reproduced in the Seaborg Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 229-231. For the text of the final version of President Johnson's message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 21, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 171-172. /4/Paragraph (5) (c) in the January 17 draft cited above states: "on the principles which could lead to the establishment of nuclear-free zones." The President asked Fisher to give him a 1,000-word statement that he could make to the American people Tuesday morning concerning this matter (attached on January 16)./5/ The President said that he would take care of the consultations with the congressional leadership at the breakfast on Tuesday morning (January 21)/6/ and asked McNamara to take care of consultations with the foreign relations people in Congress. It was also agreed that Fisher would take care of informing Senators Pastore and Anderson of the JCAE. Carter said that the Director of the CIA (McCone) is opposed to several points in the memorandum; but, upon further discussion, it appeared that the memorandum, as changed, is now satisfactory from his point of view. It was also agreed that the President's letter to Khrushchev would be released on Monday morning (January 20)./7/ /5/Reference should be to the President's statement on Tuesday, January 21, not January 16. Fisher's statement has not been found, but the White House press release derived from it is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 261-262, and printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pp. 174-175. /6/No record of this meeting has been found. /7/See footnote 6, Document 2. [Here follows discussion of a possible appointment of an AEC Commissioner, the President's concerns about leaks at the Department of State, and other meetings and conversations.]
5. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. SUBJECT I have prepared for your information the following summary of the principal activities of White House interest in the arms control field during your absence from 17 January-3 February./2/ /2/Bundy was on vacation during this period. On Friday, 17 January, shortly after your departure, Fisher and I agreed on an amended version of Sorensen's draft of the Presidential statement for Geneva. Fisher then circulated the draft, which to the best of my knowledge reflected the agreements reached by Rusk, McNamara, Fisher and yourself the previous day, to all interested agencies for clearance by close of business on the 17th./3/ There were immediate objections from all sides and it looked for awhile as though it would be impossible to clear a paper with anything new in it at all. The JCS objected to the production freeze and the nuclear free zones./4/ There was also strong opposition within the State Department to the nuclear free zones. Finally, the AEC managed to find some alleged security reasons to object to our offer to permit inspection of all four reactors involved in the present U.S. cut-back of plutonium production (i.e., one reactor scheduled for shut down at Hanford is immediately adjacent to a reactor that will continue operations and consideration is now being given to operating the closed down Savannah River pile as a commercial power reactor). /3/Sorensen's draft has not been found; but regarding the draft submitted to the interested agencies, January 17, and the President's message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, January 21, see footnote 3, Document 4. /4/See footnote 4, Document 4. On Saturday, 18 January, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and Fisher held a private meeting in which it was concluded that the JCS and State Department would only go along with the statement if the reference to nuclear free zones was eliminated and production freeze was presented in terms of "agree to explore" rather than as an actual proposal./5/ Separately, AEC support was obtained by fuzzing the language a bit so that it did not necessarily offer to permit international inspection of all closed down U.S. reactors. Later Saturday afternoon, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and Fisher were joined by Seaborg and Carter and they met with the President who approved the attached statement for Geneva (see attachment 1)./6/ Actually, in the eyes of the world, I doubt that the final statement was very much weakened over the original draft since the full significance of the semantics was not apparent to anyone who was not acquainted with the internal debate. /5/No record of this private meeting has been found. /6/No attachments are filed with the source text and have not been further identified except as indicated in footnotes below. Regarding the Saturday afternoon meeting, see Document 4. On Sunday, 19 January, Rusk, McNamara and members of their staffs held a series of meetings to develop a program to reassure NATO that the Presidential proposal would not affect any U.S. NATO commitments. The attached cable of instructions (see attachment 2) forwarded copies of the Presidential statement for Geneva to all NATO capitals./7/ This cable, which makes quite a few policy decisions that to my knowledge had not previously been agreed to, was not cleared by anyone in the White House. I complained about neither having been included in the preparation of these instructions nor informed of the results and to my knowledge all subsequent substantive cables have been cleared with either Bromley or myself. Fisher has actually been very good about keeping me informed on day to day developments. /7/The President's statement was sent to all NATO capitals and USRO in circular telegram 1300, January 19 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) and the instructions in circular telegram 1301, January 19. (Ibid.) On Tuesday, 21 January, the President delivered the attached television statement to coincide with Foster's delivery of the Presidential message at Geneva/8/ (see attachment 3). The draft was prepared by Sorensen and cleared with interested agencies just prior to delivery. At the last moment (30 minutes before the President went on the air), the AEC formally took the position that the statement in the speech that, "This country and the Soviet Union already have produced enough explosive force to equal 10 tons of T.N.T. for every man, woman and child on the face of the earth." was Restricted Data and wanted it removed from the speech. They persisted in this ridiculous position up until the moment before the President went on the air./9/ It is also interesting to note that the President himself, at the last moment, added the "excellent" next to last paragraph referring to the importance of individuals interesting themselves in the problems of arms control. /8/Regarding the President's televised statement at 11:30 a.m., January 21, see footnote 5, Document 4. /9/Item 4 in the minutes of the AEC's Information Meeting 243, which began on January 21 at 10:50 a.m., notes approval of the declassification of the President's statement, with Howard Brown, AEC Assistant General Manager for Administration, informing Bromley Smith "telephonically of the Commission's decision regarding language." The meeting was held in the absence of Seaborg who was giving a speech in Denver, but the minutes are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 258. In the week following the Presidential statement, there were a series of meetings and cables aimed at further reassuring our allies./10/ There appears to be a major effort in some quarters to use this opportunity to establish as large a "safeguards" program with NATO as possible and tie up possible negotiations with commitments to make future proposals only on a joint NATO basis. I objected to a number of cables on the grounds that they implied positions and commitments that had not been agreed to and managed to tone things down a little. /10/Examples of this exchange of cables are Disto 1496 from Geneva, January 24 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) and Todis 1208 to Geneva, January 25. (Ibid.) At the same time, the control post proposal ran into anticipated troubles in NAC. Finletter and the Germans and French objected to both the schedule and the proposed method of procedure. The Timberlake mission appears to have accomplished little and he has returned to Washington. Finletter asked that the control post proposals be advanced as formal NAC proposals and that all deadlines be removed. I objected to an EUR cable which would have authorized Finletter to agree to handle the control post proposal only as joint NAC proposal since it should be much easier to get the key members of NATO to go along with a U.S. initiative in this field than to create a formal joint NATO control post proposal. The final instructions, which although weak are acceptable, are attached (see attachment 4). As I understand it, formal discussion of the control post proposal will begin in Paris today but there is no longer any official date by which a decision will be reached. At the end of last week, ACDA circulated for staff consideration the attached paper setting forth in more detail the basic elements of a production freeze proposal (see attachment 5). This will be considered at a Principals meeting next Monday, 10 February./11/ ACDA also circulated the attached position paper on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to formalize the changes involved in clearing the Geneva statement (see attachment 6)./12/ This has now been agreed upon. /11/No record of a February 10 meeting of the Committee of Principals has been found. /12/The ACDA position paper has not been found. The "Geneva statement" apparently refers to Foster's remarks on dissemination, which he made to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on February 6; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 32-36. Meanwhile in Geneva, the Presidential statement appears to have been well received although Foster has not been able to elaborate on it in much detail. Most of the initial concern has been with what the proposal would not do rather than with what it would do and this does not make very good text for Geneva. The most interesting development in Geneva was probably the discussion of the much anticipated Polish proposal. The Poles are clearly going out of their way to indicate that they are very flexible and I believe that it may eventually be possible to build something on it. The U.S. response has been non-committal and a series of questions are being posed to clarify the proposal (see attachment 7)./13/ The Soviet Union has also tabled a proposal which appears to have been rather hastily put together in response to the U.S. initiative (see attachment 8)./14/ /13/On December 28, 1963, Polish First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka proposed a nuclear freeze in Central Europe. For extracts from his statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 651-652. /14/Reference is presumably to the Soviet memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 28. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 12-17. When the U.S. jet was shot down over Germany last week,/15/ Foster, lacking instructions, did not make his planned presentation to the ENDC. He has now been instructed to continue his participation as previously planned without further comment on the incident. /15/Reference is to a USAF jet trainer that was shot down by Soviet aircraft on January 28 after it strayed across the East German border near Erfurt. On Friday, 31 January, at the request of the President, Fisher prepared the attached useful summary of actions in the field of disarmament (see attachment 9). Looking into the immediate future, a Deputy Principals meeting is scheduled for 6 February and a Principals meeting for 10 February to consider the ACDA paper on the basic elements of the freeze on nuclear vehicles. A second item for consideration is the ACDA proposal to set up a Verification Advisory Committee (VERAC), which you will recall we have discussed with Foster and Fisher in the past. As I anticipated, this has run into some AEC-CIA opposition. With all of the unfinished business before us, I do not really believe the Principals should occupy themselves with this VERAC question at this time if there is strong opposition. Looking back over the past two weeks, I conclude that although our present Geneva position is much less impressive than we had hoped, it is a substantial improvement over the one we would have had if you had not given things a strong push the week before you left. I think that the initiatives that have been started, if not allowed to die on the vine, could evolve into some rather interesting and conceivably negotiable proposals. The action or lack of action of the past two weeks present the following immediate problems: (1) Need for agreement within U.S. Government on the basic elements of our proposal for a production freeze so that the Geneva delegation can expound on these ideas at an early date. (2) Prevention of proliferation of "safeguards" for NATO prior to any indication of Soviet interest in our present proposals. (3) Prevention of any commitments to NATO limiting our arms control initiatives to formal joint NATO proposals. (4) Need for continued consideration within Government of both strategic and conventional reductions that might be coupled with the production freeze. (5) Need for follow-up action to assure that the control post proposal does not bog down indefinitely in NAC debate. (6) Need for careful consideration of the Polish proposals to see if new counter-proposals can be built upon them. Spurgeon
6. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, February 7, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Thomas Ehrlich (L). The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For another account of this meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 348. Seaborg's version gives the time and place of the meeting. SUBJECT /2/Seaborg earlier explained the rationale for Project Sulky, which was a proposed Plowshare excavation nuclear test the AEC wanted to conduct at the Nevada Test Site in late February 1964, in a letter to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. Seaborg requested that the proposed test be considered by the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and submitted to the President for his decision. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) As you know, a meeting was held today at the White House to discuss Project Sulky. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Hornig, in Mr. Bundy's absence, and representatives from the Defense Department, the Army, AEC, and ACDA were present./3/ /3/The following attended the meeting: Donald Hornig (Chairman), Seaborg, Chayes, Pete Scoville, McCone (for first 15 minutes), Charles Johnson, Howard, Harold Brown, Keeny, Jackson, Fred Schuldt, AEC Commissioners Palfrey and Tape, Thomas, John Kelly, and other military representatives. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 348) The AEC, represented by Commissioners Seaborg and Palfrey, first presented its basic justification for the project: It will provide necessary information concerning cratering and dispersion of radioactive debris. In the view of the AEC the project is not objectionable under the Treaty on the ground that the risk of detection outside the territorial limits of the United States is minimum. Mr. McCone questioned the compatibility of the project with the Treaty and indicated that in his view only an event which was intended to be fully contained was permitted under the Treaty. The Defense Department was represented by Dr. Harold Brown who supported the AEC position. I pointed out that there were two aspects involved in the question whether the project violated the Treaty. First, the actual amount of radioactive debris that would travel beyond our borders and, second, the probability that such amount could be detected. There may be a Treaty violation even though no radioactive debris is detected beyond our borders, just as there can be a violation of a speeding limit even though no policeman sees it. On the other hand, we recognize that every underground nuclear explosion, no matter how fully contained, will produce some radioactive debris and that some of that debris will inevitably travel beyond our borders. The Treaty was obviously not intended to preclude all underground explosions. The question of detection is, therefore, a relevant, though not the only, consideration. Dr. Scoville, the ACDA representative, questioned the project both on the ground of the Treaty and also because of the lack of a detailed analysis of future projects. In response to Dr. Hornig's question, Dr. Seaborg stated that the project could be delayed until the fall without impairing the Plowshare program if the AEC received some indication that the project would probably be actually carried out in the fall. I was asked what the reaction abroad would be if the test turned out to be detectable. In essence I responded that there might well be adverse propaganda but that I doubted whether any nation, including the USSR, would denounce the Treaty as a result. I also commented upon the domestic-political factors involved in rejecting the project. Dr. Hornig concluded the meeting by stating that he would discuss the matter with Mr. Bundy. There may be a further meeting on the subject. I will be in Europe for the next two weeks but have asked Leonard Meeker to keep in touch with the White House concerning this matter. He will inform you of any further developments.
7. National Security Action Memorandum No. 282/1/ Washington, February 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, General, Vol. I, Box 27. Secret. In a telephone call to President Johnson on February 11 at 12:20 p.m., McGeorge Bundy reported on "three small matters," the first of which had to do with "a project Plowshare peaceful uses experiment which will vent and may be detected in Canada." Bundy continued, "The recommendation of State and of myself and I'm pretty sure of Bob McNamara is that we ought to put this off til after the election. You don't want the Russians accusing you of breaking a treaty. There'll be some fuss in the Commission, but they themselves are not prepared to do it in the grazing season because of the fear of American farmers complaining, which seems to make it clear that we're not quite ready to run these risks. I would prefer to sign the instruction myself and to sign you on it directly, unless you are deeply interested." President Johnson: "No, it's all right, if all of you follow the agreement." Bundy: "Well, as I say, Seaborg would love to do it, but he's a special interested party, and I think I can cool him off. If I get a tough reaction, I'll come back." (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, February 11, 1964, 12:20 p.m., Tape F64.13, Side A) Bundy then called Seaborg at 3:45 p.m. and said that unless Seaborg objected, he was planning to issue the NSAM that day. Seaborg replied that he had no objection "so long as this is only a postponement and that this does not actually preclude the shot. (In my opinion this decision may be a mistake in view of the very small risk and the history of the Senate Test Ban hearings, need for Plowshare, etc.)." (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 366) MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT In view of the delicacy of the balance of US-USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducting Sulky at this time, the President has decided to defer further consideration of Sulky without prejudice until next winter in the expectation that the intervening time could be profitably used for a review of possibilities for improving nondetection and to give a longer period in which to select the most favorable wind and weather conditions. In addition, the President requests the Secretary of State, in consultation with other responsible officers of the Government as appropriate, to give immediate consideration to the probabilities and problems involved in obtaining from the nations signatory to the Test Ban Treaty approval for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful explosions under adequate international controls. The President requests that a first report on this matter be available to him by the end of March. McGeorge Bundy/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 13, 1964, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by M. Gordon Knox (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on February 26. The source text is labeled "Part II of V." The meeting was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS British US Secretary Rusk introduced Secretary McNamara, who made the following remarks: the US current efforts in the field of disarmament are to find some next steps toward disarmament which do not require rigorous inspection. The West now has a balanced force of nuclear missiles, land and sea, which is considerably larger than the Soviets. However, the West cannot completely destroy the Soviet missiles in a first strike, so the Soviets have the power to inflict unacceptable damage on the West. Hence, they have the essence of a deterrent. It appears the Soviets believe they have this power. Therefore, a freeze would be to their advantage even as it would be to ours. The verification procedures would be less complicated than with more extensive disarmament measures. They would be applied only at declared testing sites and at production facilities; verification would also involve some checking for clandestine facilities. The categories of delivery systems affected by the freeze would be: a) Intercontinental missiles It would be possible to maintain and replace missiles on a one-for-one basis and keep confidence in the missiles by some number of firings. There would be no testing of new models. The tactical weapons systems, for instance the Pershing, would not be affected because they lacked the range to reach to the heart of Russia and they were needed in West Germany. The inspection would be simple and agreed. In addition the West would have unilateral monitoring of launch facilities by its own facilities. There would be a withdrawal clause. Other states would join the agreement as their development of nuclear weapons caused them to affect the balance of power. Initially France and Communist China would not need to be included. The Multilateral Force concept would be protected because the MLF does not contemplate the national dissemination of control of nuclear weapons. The anti-missile missile would have to be controlled; otherwise there might be a big shift in the balance of power. Mr. Rusk added that the US felt quite sure the USSR would not agree soon to such a program if it were proposed. It would be a miracle if agreement were reached in 1964. This meant that the nuclear production of 1964 would be maintained. Our first step, of course, was to consult our allies regarding this general idea. Mr. Butler asked whether Polaris were covered. Mr. McNamara said yes, that one could not build one after the agreement. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that Britain, for example, could declare 5 Polaris submarines with 16 nuclear missiles apiece and replacements, and this would be the British limit under such an agreement. Mr. Butler thought the idea might be an infringement of Nassau./2/ /2/Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. agreement, concluded at Nassau on December 21, 1962, on nuclear defense systems. For a joint U.S.-U.K. statement issued on that occasion, see Department of State Bulletin, January 14, 1963, pp. 43-45. Mr. McNamara said no because the British program would be provided for under the agreement. Mr. Butler asked what was the Soviet reaction. Mr. Fisher said it was too early to say. He thought such a program was too big a bite for the Soviets to take now; they probably want to make haste slowly. Mr. McNamara pointed out that the British did not have production in several of the five categories that would be frozen. The program was devised to exclude from control the British TSR-2 and the US TFX. Mr. Butler, turning to a new subject, said he was thinking of advocating publicly asymmetrical reductions in armaments, including a balancing in some way conventional and nuclear forces. He also wondered about the details of the proposed destruction of out-moded nuclear delivery systems. Mr. McNamara thought that the effort to work out a reasonable relationship between conventional and nuclear forces was too complicated to be realistic or helpful. Mr. Rusk said, for example, what is one million civilians; are they potential soldiers? Mr. Butler surmised that the US would prefer that he not raise the idea of asymmetry in disarmament. Mr. Rusk said he would prefer to have Mr. Butler emphasize the prime importance of making sure that arms production curve does not soar upwards. Mr. Butler asked whether it was still fashionable to have a Badger-B-47 bonfire. Mr. McNamara said, yes, if they do not have much value and Mr. Rusk pointed out the value of keeping such obsolescent weapons from falling into the hands of, for example, the Egyptians or the Indians. He agreed with Ambassador Ormsby Gore that other kinds of weapons might be proposed for the bonfire. He said that Gromyko had asked him whether other weapons than the B-47-Badger could be destroyed and that the reply had been that the US would be glad to consider further suggestions. In point of fact, the first important step was the freeze on manufacture of new weapons, but, Mr. Rusk concluded, it might prove possible later on to throw into the bonfire more than merely out-moded weapons. Mr. Rusk asked whether Mr. Butler at Geneva might not also consider saying something publicly about arms races other than that of the US and UK versus the USSR. For instance, the Arab-Israeli arms race, the Indian-Pakistan, the arms acquisition of African states all served to jeopardize the peace and to impoverish nations already very poor. Mr. Butler thought that the expose of this subject had been most helpful and thanked Mr. McNamara. He said that the British had been making the right noises in their public statements in Geneva and that they would continue doing so. He recognized that the major responsibility was that of the US since the US had so much larger and more varied an arms production.
9. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is labeled "Part II of II." On February 12-13 in Washington, Prime Minister Douglas-Home and President Johnson had their first working meetings since assuming the leadership of their respective governments. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS British US Secretary Rusk reviewed current US thinking on disarmament for the Prime Minister. He referred to the categories of missiles and delivery systems which the US thought could be banned from further production under a carefully devised formula with a minimum of inspection. These included intercontinental missiles, heaviest bombers, medium bombers of 25,000 kilograms, anti-missile missiles. In the meantime, the Secretary thought that it might be helpful if the British wished to contribute something to the "bonfire" of Badgers and B-47's. He suggested that the British could discuss aspects of disarmament privately with the French. The French government was interested in non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, he said, though it was not interested in a Multilateral Force. It might be possible for the French to tell the Russians that in the French opinion MLF does not constitute dissemination of nuclear weapons. Sir Alex asked whether the categories of weapons and delivery systems where production might be halted excluded all tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. Rusk said they would not be included; that the US was now in the process of re-equipping its allies with smaller but more effective weapons of this sort. Mr. Bundy pointed out that thousands of them are in existence and are hard to inspect. Sir Alec wanted to know why the Russians would want to agree on a strategical hold-down. Mr. Rusk referred to these advantages: a) the expense, which the Russians could spare themselves (developing an anti-missile missile might cost $14 billion); b) the Russians have a deterrent now. The British Ambassador remarked that in fact the Russians to date have not shown much interest in the idea of limiting production of various categories. Sir Alec inquired whether if the bomber production were stopped, it would be stated that the Polaris production continues as a replacement of the bomber. Mr. Bundy thought that the rationale would be different. The US would agree to a freeze on terms which would allow it to honor its agreement at Nassau and with regard to MLF. Furthermore, the freeze would permit confidence firings and this would mean a one-for-one replacement of such missiles. Secretary Rusk indicated that some specifications might be made which would allow, for example, Polaris submarines on the way but not built to be completed. He felt sure that such a plan, in any case, would not become a reality for a considerable period of time, almost certainly not in 1964. Sir Alec asked whether the Soviets were interested in comprehensive and general disarmament. Secretary Rusk thought they had no interest at the present time. Mr. Bundy said that the immediate problem is to make use of and yet control underground testing in the light of the partial test ban. There is also the problem of the peace time use of nuclear power. These issues would not be acute, he thought, this year, but they would be in 1965 and the years to come. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |