1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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10. Editorial Note Because of budgetary constraints, the AEC developed possible schedules for power reductions at its gaseous diffusion plants, which in turn would result in further reductions in the production of U-235 beyond the 25 percent cut President Johnson announced on January 8, 1964. Seaborg outlined the alternatives in a February 11 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, which is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 7, pages 363-365. At a meeting among Bundy, Charles Johnson, Keeny, Ambassador Thompson, Seaborg, and AEC Commissioners Gerald F. Tape and John G. Palfrey on February 12, the conferees agreed to a schedule for reducing power and U-235 production. They further agreed to announce these reductions by February 15 because "a long delay on this matter would cost on the order of $16 million in penalty payments" to the utilities, which required long advance notice of power cutbacks. When Bundy asked Thompson whether there would be any value in delaying this decision in order to use this possibility of a cutback in the current disarmament negotiations with the Russians, Thompson said that "it wouldn't be worth the cost of delay on the basis of the slight hopes that the Russians would go along with mutual reductions in production." It was further decided that Seaborg would write a letter to the President recommending these actions. (Ibid., pages 373 and 382) Seaborg's February 13 letter, which did not mention the possible disarmament implications, is reproduced ibid., page 383. McNamara cleared this letter on the telephone subject to Secretary Rusk's concurrence, but the disarmament people at State and ACDA apparently demurred. (Ibid., pages 386 and 392) In his memorandum to Bundy, February 14, ACDA Acting Director Fisher argued that a premature announcement of the pending additional reduction in U.S. production of U-235 would undercut the President's earlier call for the Soviets to respond to the earlier U.S. cutback and to accept some inspection, and he proposed first "that an effort be made to elicit a favorable Soviet response." Fisher's memorandum is reproduced ibid., pages 393-394. Bundy agreed to go ahead with a message to the Soviet leadership and to defer the announcement of the cutback until April 20. (Ibid., page 400)
11. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/ Washington, February 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Regarding the decision to send this message, see Document 10. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 18, Fisher attached an undated draft of the proposed message to Khrushchev. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8) Fisher's draft is similar to the source text but more directly proposed "appropriate inspection of some of the closed facilities," such as President Johnson had already offered for one of the U.S. reactors that was being shut down. A similar draft to Fisher's, dated February 18, is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, p. 23. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Handed to Dobrynin, Sat. 2/22/64. WRTyler." In a memorandum to Llewellyn Thompson, February 22, Tyler recounted that he handed the oral message to Dobrynin at 11:30 a.m. He noted that Dobrynin read it carefully but made no substantive comment. Tyler stressed to the Soviet Ambassador that this was one in a series of private messages between the two leaders and that the U.S. approach was to be helpful and had "no propaganda objective." In reply to Dobrynin's question, Tyler said he was not aware of any specific date for the announcement of the U.S. reduction, "but I thought we would not wish to delay it too long." (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (1), Box 8) Dear Mr. Chairman: With further reference to my announcement of January eighth of the reduction by twenty-five percent in the United States output of enriched uranium (U-235) and the closing of some plutonium-producing reactors,/2/ I have again reviewed our requirements and have concluded that it will soon be possible to reduce United States production of U-235 by an additional substantial amount. /2/See Document 1. I am furnishing you this advance notice in the renewed hope that the Soviet Government would find it in its interest to take a parallel step. It seems to me that this is an area in which our two Governments could put into practice the concept of "mutual example" which you have suggested./3/ The reductions need not be by an equal amount. I am sure that another substantial reduction in United States output will naturally lead the world to hope that the Soviet Union will follow suit. I would hope that your Government would also be prepared to join the United States in taking such action as would confirm to the world that we were in fact taking these steps; I have already offered to take action of this type with respect to one of the reactors we are shutting down. /3/The quoted phrase has not been further identified. Should my suggestion meet your approval, I am prepared to delay my announcement of a further United States reduction for the time it would require to concert our views on the matter. We could then consider how best to make this public, whether by a joint announcement or other appropriate means. You will have noticed that the UK has announced the cessation of production of U-235 for military purposes,/4/ and I would hope that the UK would want to join in any discussions we have. /4/Included in the British Defense White Paper, issued February 13, was a statement that sufficient supplies of fissile material were already available and that therefore production of U-235 for military purposes had ceased at Capenhurst in 1963 and military plutonium production was gradually being terminated. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, p. 19978) I sincerely believe that both our Governments would stand to gain by such joint action. It would hearten world public opinion and give new impetus to the disarmament talks. Sincerely,/5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
12. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-148-64 Washington, February 22, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 (January-February 1964). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached is a February 24 covering memorandum from Barber to Fisher enclosing copies of this memorandum and JCSM-147-64, entitled "Basic Elements of a Freeze." JCSM-147-64 has not been found. SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Acting Assist-ant Secretary of Defense (ISA) I-21210/64, dated 11 February 1964,/2/ which requested comments on an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) paper, subject as above. /2/Not found.
2. By JCSM-128-64, dated 15 February 1964,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a preliminary analysis of the national security implications inherent in a "verified freeze" of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. That study served to focus attention on the many complex problems involved in defining and subsequently negotiating the basic elements of an acceptable freeze agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded from the preliminary analysis that there was real doubt whether practical solutions could be found to some of the problems. One of the principal areas of doubt was the negotiability of the type of verification system that would be adequate to provide necessary assurance of compliance with the provisions of an agreement. Certainly such a system would be intrusive to a greater extent than the USSR has been willing to consider in the past. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that many benefits would accrue if a breakthrough could be made in opening up the Soviet Union to the level of inspection deemed necessary. On the other hand, they also note that if, through the negotiation process, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on adequate verification were substantially eroded, national security could be adversely affected. /3/Entitled "President's Proposal To Explore a 'Freeze' on Strategic Nuclear Offensive and Defensive Vehicles." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 (March-August 1964)) 3. The ACDA paper would apparently place major reliance on US intelligence to verify a freeze agreement. In particular, no provisions are made for aerial surveillance and unscheduled on-site inspections, other than of production facilities, at the option of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification system negotiated should be completely sufficient within itself to assure compliance with an agreement. US intelligence, on the other hand, should only be relied upon to validate any list of installations, to cross check information and data obtained from the inspection system, and to establish priority for the type and area of inspection. Any other role could result in either a compromise of US intelligence sources with degradation of US intelligence capability or in an inability positively to confirm suspected violations. The latter case would tend to negate the tension-reducing objectives of the agreement by creating situations whereby legitimate suspicions could not be definitely allayed. Thus, before a US position paper on verification can be formulated, the foregoing role of US intelligence in the verification process must be accepted. 4. In addition to the freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, the preliminary analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that consideration should also be given to including other items under the freeze, such as launchers and fissionable material production. Accordingly, the attached Appendix/4/ has been prepared consistent with the inclusion of these items and compatible with the view expressed above on the role of US intelligence. /4/Not printed. 5. In view of the fundamental nature of the comments provided in the Appendix, a detailed review of the verification portion of the ACDA paper is not appropriate until basic differences are resolved and the paper has been redrafted. It is recommended that the views expressed in the Appendix be incorporated in the redraft and that such redraft be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.
13. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 27, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Henry (EUR/SOV) on February 28 and approved in S on March 9. The source text is labeled "Part I of VII." The conversation was held in the Secretary's office. In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, February 26, Fisher provided talking points for this meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary, 1964) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Dobrynin came in this afternoon to discuss disarmament matters. The Secretary opened the conversation by explaining that he had mentioned Dobrynin's visit at his just-concluded press conference/2/ because not to have done so would have created an undesirable air of mystery. /2/Text in Department of State Bulletin, March 16, 1964, pp. 403-409. The Secretary mentioned that Mr. Foster's return from Geneva did not indicate any lessened American interest in disarmament and stressed that we must keep trying to reach agreement. The Secretary also mentioned seeing today for the first time an indication that the Soviet Government is supporting the Polish proposal for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe./3/ Dobrynin indicated that his Government would support the Polish plan but, in response to the Secretary's question, said he did not know when full details of the plan would be available. The Secretary said that we will take a good look at the plan when the details are available. /3/Reference presumably is to a February 24 memorandum from the Government of Poland on freezing nuclear weapons in Central Europe, which was transmitted to interested governments through diplomatic channels. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 53-55. The first indication of Soviet support for the Polish proposal has not been further identified. MLF AND NON-DISSEMINATION The Secretary then turned to the subject of the Multilateral Force (MLF) and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, saying that this was an informal conversation and not a government-to-government representation. The Secretary stated that he wished clarification of one aspect of this subject. He desired to know whether the Soviet objection to MLF is that the Soviet Government believes MLF would mean dissemination of nuclear weapons or whether the Soviet Government has additional or different objections. He said that if the Soviet objection is merely the former, we believe that we can eventually reassure the Soviet Government on this point. After Dobrynin had said that the U.S.S.R. is opposed primarily to dissemination, the Secretary asked further whether the Soviet Government was concerned primarily about the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany or whether it was more generally concerned about dissemination to any country. Without answering the question in specific terms, Dobrynin indicated that the U.S.S.R. is concerned about the dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany but was also concerned about dissemination of these weapons to any country. At this point the Secretary mentioned that the primary U.S. concern in this field is Communist China and asked whether the Soviet Government had any indication whatsoever whether Peiping would be interested in a non-dissemination treaty. Dobrynin said he had no information and would not guess but stressed that we (the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) should not lose interest in non-dissemination in any case. The Secretary agreed and stated that he hopes we can keep the issue of non-dissemination open, adding that we know the MLF will not give nuclear weapons to Germany; that the safeguards are not merely legal but also apply to the physical arrangements; that the MLF safeguards will be even stronger than those currently in force among NATO partners. He asked Dobrynin whether, if the U.S. can satisfy the U.S.S.R. on this point, the Soviet Government had other objections to MLF. He mentioned as an example that the U.S.S.R. might be concerned that MLF would add the financial and economic resources of other countries to the production and deployment of nuclear weapons capability. Dobrynin responded that the Soviet side believes that MLF means dissemination, that the Soviet Government understands the U.S. position but does not agree with it, that the Soviet Government is concerned that Germany, and also other countries, will get nuclear weapons through MLF. The Secretary said that if this is the specific point of Soviet objection, it is important to keep the discussion of non-dissemination open because the Soviet Government will discover that the Germans will not get nuclear weapons through MLF. Dobrynin asked if he could summarize the Secretary's position as follows: The U.S. believes in the desirability of non-dissemination but is going ahead on the MLF and will later try to convince the Soviet Government by the actual MLF arrangements that the MLF will not mean dissemination. The Secretary said there was one more point--that he had asked whether the Soviet objections to MLF were concentrated on dissemination or on other questions. Dobrynin replied that the question of other objections had not arisen because the Soviet Government was concerned about dissemination. The Secretary repeated that in this event it is important to keep the discussion of non-dissemination open because the U.S. will eventually be able to show the U.S.S.R. that the MLF will not mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany and others. MILITARY BUDGETS The Secretary said that the Soviet Government had made proposals for a mutual reduction of defense budgets and that the U.S. had responded by suggesting technical talks on this subject. He indicated that the U.S. is concerned that the Soviet and American military budgets are so different that it would be impossible to make percentage reductions which would be meaningful. He pointed out that the U.S. defense budget contains more items than the Soviet defense budget and suggested that the U.S. defense budget expert, Mr. Charles Hitch,/4/ talk to his Soviet counterpart to obtain a proper comparison in military budgets. He added that when he had discussed this subject with Gromyko the latter had neither agreed nor disagreed and the Secretary asked Dobrynin to sound out his Government as to whether we could have such a discussion of experts. /4/Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Dobrynin said the Soviet side and he personally felt that such a discussion would do no good, that if the U.S. doesn't trust the U.S.S.R. now, no details would ever satisfy the U.S. The discussion passed back and forth on this question, the Secretary reiterating the need for further information and Dobrynin arguing in favor of an immediate percentage cut in budgets. When Dobrynin asked why, since the U.S. favored cuts by mutual example, it could not accept cuts by agreement, the Secretary replied that by an agreement the U.S. would be giving up its freedom of movement. He also said that, since the Soviet defense budget is more narrow than ours, a percentage reduction would mean less of a reduction for the U.S.S.R. than for the U.S. Dobrynin said that when the U.S. announced a reduction in its defense budget, it did not say exactly what it was reducing. He added that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to do this same sort of thing. He continued that another committee to study defense budgets would get nowhere. It would take years of discussion and the U.S. would want to look at the defense budgets of all the Soviet ministries. The Secretary replied that he thought a policy of mutual example was best, but the U.S.S.R. was pressing for a percentage reduction at Geneva. Dobrynin claimed the U.S.S.R. had set a good example but said he felt an agreement was better than mutual example. He added that the U.S. had intelligence means to discover whether the U.S.S.R. carried out its agreement. He concluded by saying that without some such technical discussion of military budgets he did not see how the U.S. could agree to a percentage reduction of military budgets, since it would be giving up its freedom of action for something unknown. The Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin agreed that Dobrynin would tell the press that they had discussed a number of disarmament matters.
14. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, February 28, 1964. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 424, 429-430. No classification marking. Here and elsewhere, Seaborg has inserted reproduced documents in the Journal, which account for the interrupted pagination. [Here follow notes of a telephone conversation on the Argonne Laboratory and a Regulatory Information Meeting.] At 11 a.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Present were Rusk, Foster, Fisher, Palfrey, Taylor, McCone, Webb, Bundy, Barber, McNamara, Hornig, Keeny, Alexis Johnson, plus Tyler, Labowitz, et al. Rusk opened the meeting by asking Foster to give a summary of the negotiations at Geneva. Foster said that these had been conducted in the best atmosphere yet. There had been no agreement, not even on the agenda. The Soviets are insisting on reductions in the military budgets, but we are resisting this since there is no way of verifying such reductions. The Soviets emphasize the election year aspects of the U.S. reductions. The Soviets are proposing a 20% reduction in military budgets, with the savings to be contributed to the welfare of developing countries. The Soviets have given no answer to our proposal for the destruction of bombers./2/ Tsarapkin often refers to the strategic superiority of the U.S. in missiles and bombers. With respect to the cutoff of the production of fissionable materials, he says privately that the U.S. already has too much and has a five-year lead on the USSR. /2/The U.S. and Soviet Governments had earlier discussed the destruction of bombers informally, but the U.S. position was not formally presented until Fisher introduced it in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 19. Text of Fisher's statement is in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 101-105. Rusk said he talked to Dobrynin yesterday, not about observation posts, as the newspapers reported, but about the possibility of the Soviets letting Charlie Hitch talk to their "Hitch," but they refused./3/ They say that the policy of mutual example is best, but Rusk said that the U.S. couldn't agree to this without a lot of verification. It was suggested that Fisher go into this further. Rusk said that Dobrynin hinted at some Soviet withdrawals from Germany. /3/Regarding this conversation, see Document 13. Rusk continued that today's issue is the freeze on delivery vehicles and that we should get our position in line. We needn't disclose any details in the early negotiations. The Soviets haven't disclosed any position on this as yet. He said he appreciated the fine work done by the JCS on this question. Issue I. (Degree of linkage of a fissionable material cutoff to the freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.) Rusk said he tended to agree with the Chiefs on this linkage,/4/ and that we could discuss the separability later. Foster, however, demurred and said that President Johnson's message indicated that they are separable./5/ /4/For a statement of the JCS position, see Document 12. /5/Reference is to the President's statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 21. See footnote 3, Document 4. McNamara felt that the language in this message was sufficiently finessed to make either point of view possible. Rusk said he thought we should proceed with what he called Option (5) [added to the four options listed in the agenda document (not attached)/6/ for this meeting] which would be to proceed with both missile freeze and production cutoff in parallel. McNamara said he would like to see them definitely linked, but Bundy said that linking them would weaken the proposal. Rusk spoke again for Option (5), whereas Bundy said he would prefer Option (4). Rusk suggested that a try be made to draft something to clarify this, which might be used to talk to our allies concerning our position. /6/Brackets in the source text. The paper has not been found, but is identified elsewhere as a paper forwarded under cover of a memorandum from ACDA to the Committee of Principals, February 25. (Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary McNamara (JCSM-223-64), March 18; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10) Issue II. (Basis for production replacement.) Rusk then suggested that we go on to Issue II, for which Fisher suggested Option (2) modified toward Option (1). There seemed to be general agreement on this. Issue III. (The extent of limitations to be applied concerning the dispersal and hardening of launchers, in view of the interaction with the MLF and the Nassau Agreement.) Rusk then suggested we go on to Issue III. McNamara suggested that Option (3) be agreed to, with specific provision for the MLF. Rusk, McNamara and Bundy spoke to the necessity of protecting the MLF and the Nassau Agreement. Rusk pointed out that the exact method of this could be left flexible and would depend on the effective date of the treaty in any case. Issue IV. (Limitations to be applied on construction and testing of prototypes.) Rusk then went on to Issue IV. Fisher said that the missile and firing systems apparently can be improved, and thus a freeze on testing is important; Hornig confirmed this. Rusk reiterated that we can't depend on limitations that depend on good faith; we must have verification. The consensus seemed to be that this arrangement needs much more exploration, and it was decided that a task force would be set up by Foster to explore this. McNamara said that we will need a specific statement on research and development limitations for use before the North Atlantic Council. [Here follow notes of a meeting on AEC research support and a long meeting of the AEC Commissioners.]
15. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, February 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Attached is a March 2 memorandum from Thompson to Secretary Rusk, indicating that Dobrynin gave Thompson the oral message at 10 a.m. that morning. After reading the message, Thompson remarked that "the reply did not refer to the President's suggestion that we might accept inspection of closed plants. The Ambassador said he had no further instructions, but remarked that traditional Soviet policy was 'no inspection without actual disarmament.'" Dear Mr. President: I have studied your oral message delivered on February twenty-sec-ond through our Ambassador Dobrynin./2/ In that message you raise the question that our two countries should agree on and put forward a joint declaration of, or make public in some other appropriate way, their intention to cut production of fissionable materials for military purposes. You express the view that this would have an encouraging effect on world public opinion and that it would give new impetus to the talks on disarmament. /2/Document 11. I want to tell you at once in this connection that we, naturally, are ready to explore jointly all ways, to use all opportunities that might lead to an improvement of the international situation and to the strengthening of trust among states and that might facilitate progress in the disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Government firmly holds the view that to this end now certain preconditions have developed in the world. The conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater and after it the understanding that has been reached on not putting into orbit objects with nuclear weapons aboard,/3/ as is now being widely recognized, have helped clear somewhat the international horizon. We were also able to reach mutual understanding on the question of some reduction of military budgets./4/ Now it is necessary to proceed further and to try to reach an understanding on further steps directed at reducing the arms race and at creating increasingly favorable conditions for solving the cardinal problem--that of general and complete disarmament. /3/Reference apparently is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), adopted by acclamation on October 18, 1963, in which all nations were called upon to refrain from stationing in outer space or placing in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 538. /4/An apparent reference to parallel reductions of military budgets in the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Government has expressed in the Eighteen Nation Committee among other places, its considerations with regard to those measures which we believe desirable to undertake in this direction. You know, of course, our position--we propose to agree on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of others or, by way of beginning, on the reduction of the numerical strength of such forces, on the further reduction of military budgets, on the signing of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty states, on preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and so on. We are convinced that these are both the most effective, from the standpoint of reducing international tension, and the most realistic measures in present conditions. However, we gave our full attention to the suggestion set forth in your message, that an understanding be reached on a certain reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. After thinking it over and consulting our specialists I come to the conclusion that it may be worthwhile to try to seek a mutual understanding in this area also. Of course, as I understand it, you yourself proceed from the assumption that a reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes does not represent any step forward in terms of actual disarmament. Indeed, in this case neither nuclear weapons stockpiled by the states are to be destroyed nor is even further stockpiling to be stopped. I shall confide that our specialists have also drawn my attention to the numerous remarks in the American press as well as to the statements of some of your officials to the effect that for two decades the United States has accumulated a quantity of fissionable materials, which in general exceeds all thinkable and even unthinkable requirements for the production of nuclear weapons. If this is really true, it means that a kind of a crisis of overproduction is about to happen in the field of fissionable materials in the United States. But no matter what the situation is, I admit that the very fact of agreement between our countries about the reduction of production of fissionable materials for military purposes can have positive significance as evidence of our intention to take the way not of further increasing the nuclear weapons race but to go along the way of its gradual slowdown. It is precisely on this basis that we are saying that we are ready to search for such agreement. You express the opinion that in this field we could take practical steps in accordance with the concept of "mutual example." I agree with you in this respect. Reducing production of fissionable materials for military purposes is the very field where apparently it is easier to act on the basis of "mutual example." But then it is necessary of course to seek sincerely an actual reduction of production of fissionable materials since this involves national security and each side takes a certain risk. What good could come out, for example, if one of the sides took the path of closing some enterprises producing fissionable materials while at the same time put into operation others and more powerful at that? If we have mutual understanding concerning the necessity of a wholly sincere approach by both sides to the question of reducing production of fissionable materials for military purposes and taking into consideration all actually existing circumstances, then I think we could come to agreement. I, for example, even now could inform you that the Soviet Government would be prepared to announce the ending of the construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. However, our specialists have informed me that the United States, having adopted a decision to stop four old plutonium reactors of low power, at the same time is starting a new reactor NPR in Hanford, which has more than twice as much power as all four reactors to be stopped taken together. Now as for a reduction of the production of uranium-235. Here, too, certain circumstances should be taken into account. For instance, you refer to the announcement of the British Government concerning the ending of the production of uranium-235 for military purposes. It is no secret however that at the same time new large plutonium plants are being put into operation in England. And in France after the forthcoming starting of a large gas-diffusion plant in Pierrelatte, the production of uranium-235 as reported will reach one-fourth of the American level. All this will more than compensate for the stopping of the production of uranium-235 for military purposes at a small plant in England. I consider it necessary to draw your attention to all this because it is already important to avoid now any reservations which in the future could lead to misunderstandings and to complications that would damage mutual confidence. Your words that the reductions of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes need not be by an equal amount I interpret as an indication that you too take this into account. So, let us try. If it turns out that a possibility really exists to take agreed steps in the field of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes then there might also become more practicable such prospects as the extension of the transfer for peaceful use of such materials out of current production or of accumulated stockpiles. And this would give a considerable impetus to the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful application of the energy of the atomic nucleus including the implementation of large projects for instance in the field of desalinization of sea water which a number of states need so badly. But let us not forestall events. You suggest that the British Government should also be drawn in our discussions. We have no objection to this. Here, Mr. President, are considerations which came to my mind with regard to your oral message of February twenty-second. In transmitting this message to our Ambassador a wish was expressed that the exchange of views on this question as before be of a confidential nature. I agree with this. Sincerely,/5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 28, 1964, midnight. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and Geneva. 2691. Gromyko on Disarmament and NAP. After discussion on bilateral issues (reported separately),/2/ Gromyko commented that he had impression from recent speech in New York/3/ that Secretary was now considerably less sanguine as to prospects of reducing world tensions than he had been last summer in Moscow after signature Test Ban Treaty and even last fall in talks with Gromyko during the General Assembly. I pointed out that obviously Secretary in major speech on foreign policy must inevitably react to world developments and Soviets own behavior in giving his assessment of detente prospects. Thus the Secretary was obliged to take into account recent TASS statement with regard to Vietnam,/4/ certain unfounded Soviet press allegations with regard to use of chemical warfare by US forces, and failure of Sovs play more vigorous co-chairman role on Laos problem. Nonetheless, it was clear from Secretary's speech that he intended to continue search for avenues to agreement in order reduce world tensions. The Secretary obviously had not forsaken his belief that the Test Ban Treaty was a good start on which to build, but he felt the world should not be deluded into thinking that this was any more than an initial step. There was still a long way to go before we could be sure the world had ceased to be a dangerous place in which to live. I knew from personal knowledge that the Secretary hopes that among the many items now on ENDC agenda, we would find it possible to agree on further partial measures which would constitute useful sequel to Test Ban Treaty in our mutual efforts to reduce tensions. I understood Secretary had discussed problem with Dobrynin yesterday, although I was not yet informed of details./5/ /2/Reported in telegram 2690, February 28 (ibid., POL 27 LAOS), telegram 2692, February 28 (ibid., POL 7 US-USSR), telegram 2693, February 28 (ibid., POL 28-8 CYP), and telegram 2694, February 28 (ibid., POL 3 UN). /3/Reference apparently is to Secretary Rusk's address at Barnard College in New York on January 22; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1964, pp. 190-195. /4/Not further identified. /5/See Document 13. Despite my remarks Gromyko said he could not avoid feeling the Secretary was less positive now in his approach than last year. He agreed, of course, that proper approach was to single out partial measures on which we could agree and in this connection he felt the Soviet proposal for destruction of all bombers was ideally suited. Proposal, in Gromyko's view, sufficiently limited to avoid impairing present balance of forces and at same time radical enough to impress world. I said that we had hoped to find common interest in measure of this type, but we feared that radical extension of proposal by Sovs to cover all bombers might in fact result in killing off chances for agreement. Best approach, in our view, was to agree now on limited step of B-47-Badger destruction in order not to upset balance of forces--UK for example relies exclusively on bomber force--and perhaps ultimately reach understanding on destruction of all bombers. Gromyko said that perhaps compromise could be reached under which we might agree on general policy of destroying all bombers and in implementing this policy decide on one or two particular types for initial destruction. In his view, it would be difficult to convince world that this genuine disarmament measure if agreement confined only to destruction obsolete weapons. Important thing was to agree in principle; question of timing, he was sure, could be worked out to satisfaction both sides. [Here follows discussion of a non-aggression pact.] Kohler
17. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, March 3, 1964. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 8 and 30. No classification marking. At 11 a.m. I met in the Situation Room of the White House with Bundy, Foster, Thompson, Scoville, McNaughton, Keeny, McCone and Chamberlain. Bundy opened the meeting, which was called to discuss Chairman Khrushchev's oral answer (copy attached) of February 28, 1964,/2/ to President Johnson's message (copy attached) of February 18, 1964,/3/ by asking Ambassador Thompson for his reaction to this response. /2/See Document 15. In a March 3 memorandum to the President, Foster offered his optimistic assessment of Khrushchev's "encouraging response" and proposed an approach "to obtain the maximum benefits from the initiative of your original letter." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (1), Box 8) /3/Reference is to the President's draft message of February 18 (see footnote 1, Document 11), not the final version of February 22, Document 11. Thompson said he felt that it might have some significance in regard to Khrushchev's desire for an agreement in this area. Bundy asked me whether a further delay in announcing the further cutback in power for U-235 production was possible, and I indicated that another month or two could certainly be arranged. Thompson suggested that a copy of the Khrushchev message be given to the U.K. Bundy and Foster thought we should decide our own course of action before we do this./4/ Bundy raised the question of whether the NPR produces weapons grade plutonium, or whether it could be said that this production was all for peaceful uses. /4/In a March 4 meeting with British Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Foster and Scoville shared the exchange of letters and the March 3 draft response and asked for more details on the British cutback for possible inclusion in President Johnson's reply to Khrushchev. The Ambassador, taking the three documents with him, agreed to get his government's answers to them as quickly as possible. (Memorandum for the Record by Scoville, March 4; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Current Johnson-Khrushchev Papers) No early British response has been found, but President Johnson's oral message of March 9 (Document 18) eliminates the following sentence from the March 3 draft: "I have been assured by Her Majesty's Government that no expansion of plutonium production capacity for weapons is in fact being undertaken." For further U.S.-U.K. discussions of this question, see Document 20. I said that it is contemplated that a substantial fraction of its output would be used for weapons grade plutonium. Bundy mentioned that the President had some doubts as to the future value of the NPR. There was further discussion as to the possibility of the NPR's being devoted exclusively to the production of plutonium for use as fuel for civilian power, with the implication that this might be explored further. McCone pointed out that, with respect to possible cuts by the Soviets on the production of enriched U-235, this could be monitored by the power input in the gaseous diffusion plants. Bundy said he thought that we should think about the possibility of coupling the announcement of the cutback in Soviet plutonium production, mentioned by Khrushchev, with the announcement of a further cutback of U.S. production of enriched U-235. There ensued discussion of the type of reply that should be prepared for the Khrushchev message, and it was agreed that Scoville, Chamberlain and Keeny should draft such a message. This message would include an explanation that the cut in plutonium production through the shutdown of four reactors would much more than counter-balance the increase in production due to the start up of the NPR; in fact, it was felt that it might be best to say that the NPR production is only about one-half that corresponding to the shutdown of the four reactors. McCone felt that this might be included in the letter to Khrushchev because they already very likely know our production rates. It was agreed that the letter should reiterate the value of inspection in connection with cutbacks. It was agreed that when a draft of the letter was available, it would be checked with me. I identified the dilemma of whether any joint announcement with the USSR would be based, from the standpoint of the U.S., on the rationale that the U.S. was cutting back production because it had more fissionable material than it needed, or on the rationale that we were cutting back production in concert with the Soviets (which presents the difficulty of appearing that we are entering into an arrangement without provisions for inspection). (Attached is a copy of the draft reply to Khrushchev.)/5/ /5/Dated March 3. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 25-29) At a White House meeting on March 7, Foster, Scoville, Keeny, Thompson, and Seaborg further discussed the wording of President Johnson's proposed message to Khrushchev. The participants "focused especially on the question of the comparison between the production rate of the oncoming NPR reactor and the four old reactors that are being shut down." (Ibid., p. 50) [Here follow notes of a meeting with private industry executives, a meeting on congressional legislation, and a telephone conversation relating to the University of Chicago.]
18. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/ Washington, March 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. When Thompson gave the message to Dobrynin on March 9, the Soviet Ambassador read it carefully and inquired on what basis the 25 percent reduction was made, and Thompson replied that he "understood this was on the remainder after the earlier cut had been made." Dobrynin also asked whether the suggestion of verification was an absolute condition. Thompson said he "did not think it was an absolute condition, but that we felt strongly that this would be advisable and would greatly add to the significance of the announcement of cutbacks." (Memorandum of Conversation, March 9; ibid.) Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your oral message of February 28/2/ in answer to a similar message of mine of February 22/3/ and I am pleased that you agree with me on the desirability of concurrent action in the area of the reduction of production of fissionable materials. I am particularly gratified to learn of your decision that the Soviet Government is prepared to announce the ending of the construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. /2/Document 15. /3/Document 11. In your letter you raise some question on the announced U.S. reduction in plutonium production since your specialists have informed you that the new NPR reactor at Hanford would have twice as much power as all four of the reactors which are being shut down. On the contrary, our cutback in plutonium production is actually very much greater than your specialists have stated. The new NPR will have very much less power than the total power of the four reactors in question. Perhaps this misunderstanding on the part of your specialists arose from the fact that the power levels of the four reactors being shut down have been increased several-fold over their original design levels. Moreover, it is our plan to operate the NPR reactor, which will be used to produce civilian electric power, in such a manner that a substantial portion of the plutonium produced will not be used for weapons but for the development of breeder piles for the peaceful civilian power program. Nevertheless, as I previously stated, I do not believe that the reductions in production of fissionable materials by our two countries need be by an equal amount. Therefore, I believe that your proposed halting the construction of two new reactors would serve as an appropriate step on your part to parallel the closing down of the four U.S. reactors. As I informed you in my oral message of February 22, the U.S. also proposes to undertake additional substantial reductions in the production of Uranium 235. Specifically, we plan to cut back the production of Uranium 235 by another twenty-five percent in addition to the reduction of twenty-five percent that I announced in January of this year. This additional cutback will be implemented in an orderly fashion over the next few years. In your reply no specific reference is made to parallel Soviet reductions in the production of Uranium 235, but your message implies that you have such actions under consideration. I think that this would be particularly appropriate since it is our understanding that you are continuing to expand your already substantial Uranium 235 production capacity. I am therefore looking forward to learning of any reductions or curtailment that you might have planned in this area which might be considered as a counterpart of the U.S. reductions. You have called attention to the starting up of the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte and indicate that it has been reported to have a capacity of one-fourth the American level. We are convinced that this report is incorrect and that the proposed production of the French Uranium 235 plant is a much smaller fraction of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. capacity. Therefore, I do not believe that this activity on the part of the French should preclude a decision on your part to reduce Uranium 235 production or plant expansion. The United Kingdom has also announced that it has stopped the output of Uranium 235 for weapons purposes and is gradually bringing to an end the production of plutonium for weapons use. This is in contrast with your concern that new plutonium plants were being put into operation in England. I am taking this up with the British Prime Minister and I feel sure that he would be prepared at the right time to amplify the recent announcement about United Kingdom reductions as a part of a concurrent action by our three countries. In your message you raise serious questions about the accuracy and nature of the proposed reductions in fissionable materials production programs. I can appreciate these misunderstandings since all of these programs have been conducted in a highly secure manner. Precisely for this reason, I should like to reaffirm my previous suggestion on the desirability of some type of verification to confirm the nature of the cutbacks being carried out by our countries. I am sure that mutually satisfactory arrangements could be devised so as not to involve unreasonable intrusion. For example, simple observation of some facilities could confirm they were shut down. If such verification could be arranged, I feel that it would add measurable to the confidence of all peoples in the reality of our reductions. Moreover, this verification would provide invaluable experience for the development of verification procedures that must accompany any agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material production for use in weapons. In any case, I believe that we should try to make our announcements on plutonium and Uranium 235 reductions as soon as possible. I also note with pleasure your suggestion that we move on from these initial steps to other measures which would involve actual transfers to peaceful uses of substantial quantities of fissionable materials out of current production or accumulated stockpiles. The U.S. has made numerous offers to transfer large quantities of fissionable material to peaceful uses, and I look forward to further exchanges of view on this subject in the near future. I also share your interest in the possibilities of increased applications of nuclear energy to the welfare of the peoples of the world and would welcome further discussions on possible cooperative projects such as the desalinization of sea water. I shall look forward to hearing from you in the near future on your overall program of reductions or curtailments which would parallel the planned U.S.-U.K. reductions. I propose that we prepare and exchange independent announcements of our intended actions for concurrent release. I believe that the proposed parallel actions will provide a good illustration of what you have called a policy of mutual example. Sincerely,/4/ /4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
19. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, March 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. II, Box 12. Secret. Dear Bob, I have received comments from members of the Committee of Principals on the 29 February draft policy paper pertinent to the "Basic Elements of a Verified Freeze of Strategic Delivery Vehicles."/2/ I have attempted to incorporate these comments into another draft/3/ to the extent they conform to my understanding of the agreements reached by the Committee of Principals last February 28./4/ This latest draft has been circulated to each of the members. /2/The draft policy paper was transmitted under cover of a February 29 memorandum from Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals. (Ibid., Vol. 1, Box 10) Comments on this draft have not been found. /3/A copy of this undated draft, with JCS proposed amendments, is attached as Appendix A to a March 18 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara (JCSM-223-64). (Ibid.) /4/For notes of the February 28 meeting, see Document 14. From the comments made by you and the JCS on the earlier draft, there are three areas where negotiating tactics seem to be unnecessarily entwined with basic policy. 1. With regard to the question of linking a possible "freeze" proposal with a possible "cut-off" proposal, I have studied the extensive treatment of this subject by the JCS (JCSMs 128-64/5/ and 187-64)./6/ I have noted your views and theirs as to the essentiality of linking any such proposals which might be made to the USSR. Leaving the need for this link to future government decision, as decided at the Principals' meeting, I feel that I must have leeway as to the tactics in exploring possible proposals in these two fields, as well as the remainder of the items in the President's five-point message. As Secretary Rusk observed at the Principals' meeting, if we were to state initially that the U.S. insists on linking the two measures, we would pay a political price during the initial exploration that we may never need to pay. However, we do not want to state at this time that they are not linked. I believe that the wording suggested by the Chiefs and agreed to by you would, in effect, require us to insist on clear linkage from the start and would thus not be fully responsive to the intent of the Principals' meeting. In view of what appeared to be your judgment as to the essentiality of linkage, however, my own explorations for the present should not preclude our insisting upon such linkage if and when the Soviets indicate a real interest in the freeze--presuming, of course, that the need for the linkage is ultimately determined to be the U.S. Governmental position. /5/See footnote 3, Document 12. /6/Dated March 5; not found. 2. With regard to the limitations to be placed on construction and improvement of launchers, we agreed at the last Principals' meeting that the preparation of a detailed position was not desirable at this time. We also agreed on the need for indicating that we would protect the MLF even though we could not state at this time just how this would be done. The proposed wording of the JCS comments on this matter appears to make it virtually impossible to explain, even to our Allies, that there do exist ways and means to protect the MLF. 3. With regard to prototype testing, we agreed at the last meeting of the Committee of Principals not to restrict R&D efforts in any way which could not be adequately verified, and would therefore place the U.S. at a disadvantage because of its more open society. We also agreed to establish a task force (which is now at work) to study the technical questions involved in controlling various forms of prototype testing, and to await their report before determining the specifics of our position on prototype testing. In the interim, it appears to me that we would fare far better in exploratory discussions if we at least imply a willingness to impose suitable limitations on prototype testing, within the limitations imposed by verification considerations. This appears to be in consonance with the spirit of the basic measure. If the USSR does not show any detailed interest we would thus avoid giving the USSR an important new propaganda angle from which to attack our proposal. If they do show some active interest, we can use the results of the technical study as a basis for insisting on the continuation of whatever prototype construction and testing activities we ultimately decide are necessary. In setting forth the above, I have attempted to leave open Governmental decisions on the items referred to above--decisions which the Committee of Principals agreed do not have to be made at this time. However, by means of this policy paper, I am trying to arrive at a basis on which we can prepare a presentation to NAC to elaborate on one item of the President's brief message to the ENDC last January 21./7/ I hope, therefore, that you can concur in my latest draft of the subject policy paper which differs from your wording on the three items cited above. /7/See footnote 3, Document 4. Sincerely, William C. Foster/8/ /8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |