1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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20. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 171-173. The source text, originally classified, has been sanitized. All deletions are in the source text. Though the source text is undated, Seaborg's Journal confirms that Seaborg wrote the letter on March 25. (Ibid., p. 169) The source text was sent under cover of a March 25 memorandum from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., p. 170) It is an account of his meeting with Penny on March 24, which Bundy asked Seaborg to write after hearing Seaborg's oral report about it. (Ibid., pp. 162-163, 169) Dear Mr. President: I met yesterday with Sir William Penney, Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, as a result of your exchange of correspondence with Prime Minister Home last week in which you agreed, in response to the request of the Prime Minister, to such a meeting of "experts."/2/ Sir William had seen this correspondence exploring the possibility of concurrent announcements between the US, the UK and the Soviet Union concerning planned cutbacks in the rate of production of fissionable material. He wanted, in particular, to discuss for further clarification your response to the Prime Minister's request that the US might immediately deliver all of the U-235, due normally for delivery to the UK between now and 1969, in return for the delivery to the US of plutonium from the UK according to the original schedule contemplated in the barter agreement entered into between the US and the UK in 1959./3/ /2/Home's letter to President Johnson, March 17, is reproduced ibid., pp. 126-131. President Johnson's letter to Home has not been further identified. /3/Terms of this agreement are summarized in Senate Report No. 513, July 14, 1959, p. 6. I explained to Sir William that your position is that such a speedup of delivery is not necessary at this time because what is contemplated is only a concurrent announcement on cutbacks of fissionable materials which had already largely been planned in the three countries. I said that it was the feeling of the US that the Prime Minister's proposal, if appropriate at all, would presumably be better related at some future time to an agreement for the complete cutoff of the production of fissionable material. Sir William seemed to understand this and suggested that if such an event should come to pass, which seemed unlikely for a few years, the UK could again raise the question of immediate delivery of the remaining U-235 at that time; I said that the US would then have to decide at that time as to their response to any such request. Sir William said that, as he saw it, if such a cutoff agreement should be up for consideration at some future time, and if the US didn't feel that they could, at that time, immediately deliver all of the U-235, the UK would have the option of either, (1) not signing the cutoff agreement and restarting their Capenhurst plant for the production of U-235 in order to meet their planned national goals in thermonuclear weapons, or, (2) signing the agreement and meeting their national requirements for thermonuclear weapons by producing some of them, less desirably, entirely from plutonium without the inclusion of any U-235. Sir William went on to explain to me that they have set national goals for the production and acquisition of the fissionable materials, plutonium and U-235, through 1969, at which time their goals will be met. This requires the production of an additional [text deleted] weapons grade plutonium and the acquisition of all of the U-235 to be obtained from the US through the barter agreement by 1969. He said that with respect to the plutonium, he is recommending that their 8 production reactors, 4 at Chapel Cross and 4 at Windscale, now devoted in large part to the production of civilian power grade plutonium, be converted entirely to the production of weapons grade plutonium. Under this program the required additional [text deleted] weapons grade plutonium could be produced by 1966 since their reactors can each produce at the rate of about [text deleted] of weapons grade plutonium per year. Thus, if an agreement to cut off the production of fissionable material was signed by 1966, they would have all of their required plutonium but would still be short that portion of the U-235 to be delivered from the US from 1966 to 1969. Sir William indicated that the maximum UK production rate of U-235 was about [text deleted] per year and that the total cost of their Capenhurst plant was less than some $80 million. This plant, of course, is now no longer producing weapons grade U-235 and is producing only a small amount of civilian power grade U-235. He expressed surprise that the French Pierrelatte plant would only produce, as he understood it, about [text deleted] of U-235 per year despite the billion dollar cost. He also mentioned, interestingly, that he understood the French are having trouble in their plutonium production reactors with the leakage of plutonium through the cladding material which surrounds the uranium fuel elements. An ironic consequence of this is that they cannot run to the desired high exposure levels for the plutonium and, hence, are forced to make more low exposure level, weapons grade plutonium, than they might otherwise do. Sir William also mentioned that it was his opinion that the French would conduct a test of a thermonuclear weapon in the Pacific by the end of next year, which, of course, would imply that it would have to be an all plutonium weapon. I regard this as an exceedingly interesting observation in view of my conversation with you on November 29, 1963, regarding this possibility./4/ Respectfully, Glenn T. Seaborg/5/ /4/An account of this conversation is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 18. /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Seaborg signed the original.
21. Editorial Note During the early months of 1964, U.S. Government agencies concerned with arms control policy continued to develop a proposal for a strategic nuclear delivery vehicles freeze. Regarding some of these discussions, see Documents 2, 14, and 19. Additional documentation on formal papers and comments on them can be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. I, Boxes 10-11. Finally, in an April 14 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Spurgeon Keeny reported that the principals had cleared instructions for presentation of the U.S. initiative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. A typed copy of the instructions is attached to Keeny's memorandum. (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. I, Cables, Box 11) These instructions were transmitted in Todis 1399, April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3) On April 16, Acting Representative Adrian Fisher introduced this initiative in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. For text of his statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 157-162.
22. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/ Washington, April 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have decided to announce our plan for an additional cutback in the production of Uranium 235 in an address on foreign policy on April 20. I had hoped to make this announcement in conjunction with parallel announcements by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. I still hope that this will be possible. We are under considerable pressure, however, to proceed promptly with this announcement since major long-term electric power contracts must be renegotiated immediately if the action is to be accomplished in an orderly and expeditious fashion. I have not heard from you on this matter since my oral message of March 9,/2/ and I do not think I should delay further the public actions necessary to initiate this cutback in the production of Uranium 235. /2/Document 18. In my speech, I will announce that I have ordered a further reduction of our production of Uranium 235 by an additional 25 percent--which will result in a total reduction of some 45 percent below present levels. This reduction will take place in an orderly fashion over the next four years. I was very gratified to learn in your message of March 2/3/ that the Soviet Government was prepared to announce the ending of construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. At the same time, I urged you in my message of March 9 to consider seriously the possibility of some action on your Uranium 235 program since it is our understanding that this program is continuing to expand. I hope that you have decided that such reductions will be possible and that your announcement can more closely parallel those of the United Kingdom and ourselves. /3/Document 15. The March 2 date is the day Dobrynin delivered the message to Llewellyn Thompson. Unless I hear from you before April 20, I do not plan to refer in my speech to the possibility of parallel actions by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom since I am not certain how you will wish to proceed in this matter. Sincerely,/4/ /4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
23. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, April 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. Dear Mr. President: Your reply to my verbal message of February 28, 1964,/2/ which expressed our point of view on the question of reducing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, was transmitted to me. /2/Document 15. You express satisfaction at our consent to try to search for agreement on this question. I can confirm that we are actually ready for this. At the same time, it appears to me to be necessary, at this stage of our exchange of opinions, to say once more quite definitely that we consider some reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes to be a measure which is most limited in its significance. The reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials will not only fail to signify liquidation of nuclear weapons, but will not even arrest the process of their further accumulation in the arsenals of states. Accordingly, reaching agreement on this question, if one regards matters in their true perspective, will simply bear witness to the fact that neither side has any intention to compete with the other, without restraint, in an effort to determine who will have the large reserves of raw material for nuclear weapons. However, for the present situation of international affairs this, too, may turn out to be useful, in as much as any step which in some degree contributes to the strengthening of mutual trust between our two countries, which reflects mutual understanding with respect to the necessity of avoiding nuclear war, may contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for the solution of those questions upon which in the final analysis the preservation of peace depends. It is for this very reason that we are, in addition to that which has already been accomplished--the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the agreement on not launching into orbit objects with nuclear weapons, some measure of reduction of military expenditures of the USSR and the USA--in favor of now also adding agreement on reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I consider it necessary to tell you about all this because it is useful for both of us to have a clear understanding of each other's views with respect to the realistic significance of this measure; otherwise a situation may arise when that limited success which has already been achieved will overshadow those important and urgent tasks which are still far from being solved--the tasks of reaching agreement on measures toward reducing the arms race, on measures of actual disarmament. If I have correctly understood the meaning of your message of March 9, 1964/3/ there are a number of points of contact as regards a practical solution of the problem of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. This pertains, first of all, to the recognition by both sides of the possibility of proceeding to some measure of reducing production of plutonium, as well as uranium-235, for military purposes. /3/Document 18. As concerns plutonium, here, apparently, there is agreement between us to the effect that we are to discontinue the construction of two new large reactors, while you will shut down four old reactors which have a considerable smaller capacity than the ones we are now building. But with respect to reducing the production of uranium-235, we shall be able to determine our decision after it has become definitely known what steps for reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials will be undertaken by your NATO partners--England and France. For now, I will only say that we have planned to reduce the manufacture of uranium-235 for military purposes and to increase its consumption for peaceful needs. In this connection I would like to remark that we have noted your expressed consideration as to the fact that the reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials by our two countries need not necessarily be carried out in equal dimensions. I think that this is a realistic approach to the problem if only because in NATO fissionable materials are being produced by three powers--not only by the United States of America but also by your allies--England and France, while among the Socialist countries they are being produced solely by the Soviet Union, which fact, of course, one cannot fail to take into account. Therefore, we shall determine the extent of the reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials by taking into account their total production by NATO countries. You have informed me of the fact that you are discussing the question of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials in England with the English Prime Minister and that you are sure that the English Government would be ready at the proper time to undertake appropriate steps in this direction as its contribution to the simultaneous action of our three countries. It would be desirable, however, to have a specific understanding as to the steps which England would be ready to undertake. And France? You do not say anything about whether there is any prospect that on her part, too, measures will be undertaken towards reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I hope that you will agree that it is important for us to know how matters will stand in this respect with France. In speaking of this I cannot refrain from remarking in passing that our specialists continue to insist on the evaluation of the capacity of the French Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant which I cited in my preceding message. In doing so, by the way, they cite American publications as well. Also, they confirm their appraisal of the capacity of the new American reactor in Hanford and the four reactors to be shut down, to which capacities I have also referred. It is necessary to clarify one more question as well. As I understand it, we agree with respect to having the actions for reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials carried out by our two countries in a parallel manner--by way of mutual example, i.e., on the basis of faith in each other's intentions. Otherwise in this case it is simply impossible to approach a solution of this problem, since it is a question of such steps as do not provide for actual disarmament and, consequently, their implementation cannot be subjected to control without being detrimental to the legitimate interests of the security of states. At the same time, in your message you speak of the desirability of working out some kind of provisions providing for the verification of the reduction by our two countries in the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I will tell you frankly: we will not agree to the establishment of control over the enterprises of our atomic industry if at the same time no agreement is reached on disarmament, on the liquidation of nuclear weapons. As to the factor of mutual trust in the implementation by both sides of reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials, it seems to me that due significance should be given to this factor. We already have certain experience in this regard: it was on this very mutual trust that we based our agreement not to launch into orbit objects with nuclear weapons. And it seems that this does not disturb either side, because each side relies on the word given by the other side. The same may also be said concerning the steps which we took toward mutual understanding with regard to a certain reduction in military budgets. These are the thoughts, Mr. President, which occur to me in connection with our exchange of opinions on the question of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. The impression is created that on this problem, apparently, agreement may be reached, it being important merely to know what steps will be taken in this direction also by other powers producing fissionable materials for military purposes. As to the form of such an understanding, your proposal to prepare and exchange separate statements concerning our proposed action toward reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials and to publish these statements simultaneously is acceptable to us. It seems advisable to us that the statements should likewise reflect the intention of our governments to expand in the future the delivery for peaceful uses fissionable materials from current production or from accumulated reserves. In this connection I should like to note with satisfaction your positive attitude toward our idea of cooperation in the implementation of such big projects as the desalting of sea water, which, as I have already pointed out in a preceding message,/4/ is so badly needed by a large number of states. If Soviet and American scientists and engineers would combine their efforts in the interests of a more effective solution of the problem of desalting sea water and utilize atomic energy for such purposes, this would be a great and very useful operation. It would also be possible to consider other potential fields of cooperation between our two countries in the utilization of nuclear energy for the good of mankind. /4/Khrushchev mentioned desalinization of sea water in his February 28 message to President Johnson. With respect./5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
24. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, April 20, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President: I have received your oral message of April 17/2/ on the question of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes which you sent through our Ambassador in Washington A. Dobrynin and which as it turned out you prepared before you could familiarize yourself with the answering message which I sent you earlier on this question./3/ /2/Document 22. /3/Document 23. You state that you intend to make a statement April 20 concerning the plans of the Government of the U.S.A. in connection with a fixed reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and would like to know whether you could refer in some form or other to the possibility of parallel actions on the part of the Soviet Union in this area. I think the answer, although possibly not complete, to this question of yours is already contained in my last message to you of April 17: we regard the achievement of agreement between our countries on the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes useful, although naturally we for our part will determine the amount of the reduction of such production of active materials proceeding from a calculation of the total production of them by the NATO countries. As for England, in addition to your communications, I have only just received a message from Prime Minister Douglas-Home/4/ in which he informs me of his intention to associate himself with your forthcoming statement of April 20 although he is doing this in general form not giving concrete expression to his intention. Concerning the plans of France, nothing as formerly is known to us in this connection, although as I have already noted it is important for us to know this. /4/This message has not been further identified. Nevertheless, since as a result of the exchange of opinions, agreement in principle between us concerning the desirability of parallel actions in this question has been achieved and, as you point out, it is important for you to make a statement on this question April 20, we also on that day will make a declaration concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union in the matter of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Our declaration naturally will take into account the above mentioned circumstances complicating for us a determination at the present moment of the specific amount of reduction of the production of uranium-235. As for plutonium, as I have already informed you we shall make a declaration concerning the discontinuance of the construction of two new big atomic reactors for the production of plutonium. And so, we have nothing against your referring in your statement to the receipt from me of a communication concerning the intention of the Soviet Government to carry out some reduction of fissionable materials for military purposes. For my part, I have in mind to refer in my statement to the receipt of analogous communications from you and from Prime Minister Douglas-Home. I am sure that our parallel statements on the question of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes will be interpreted positively by international public opinion as a step in the development of that course which our governments have taken through the conclusion of the treaty on the banning of the testing of atomic weapons in three spheres. Of course, as I have already said, this new measure which it is now possible to consider agreed, is although useful limited in its significance. This is not a disarmament measure. However the very fact that we have succeeded in undertaking certain practical steps as a matter of mutual example--I have in mind both the present agreement and mutual reduction of military budgets--shows that this approach can also be applied beneficially in a number of other instances. Why, for example, do we not attempt to agree in the same manner on the reduction of foreign troops on others' territories? I am familiar with the declarations to the effect that the U.S.A. intends to withdraw from Western Germany 7,500 soldiers and officers transferred there additionally in 1961./5/ We welcome this step of yours. If you would be prepared to go farther and proceed to the reduction of those American troops which are permanently stationed on the territory of the FRG, then I can say right now: we in that case will also be prepared to reduce our troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic with the provision, naturally, that the reduction of your troops would not be compensated by the further increase in the number of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany itself. It is no secret that recently the West German Bundeswehr is swelling quickly. Your Minister of Defense declared recently that the number of NATO troops in Europe already exceeds the number of troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact/6/ and we understand that this on the whole is directly connected with the rapid growth of the West German Army. All this we must naturally take into consideration. /5/No announcement of these specific numbers of troop withdrawals has been found. /6/In a speech to the New York Economic Club on November 18, 1963, McNamara stated that "the Warsaw Pact total [of armed troops] including the Soviets is only about 4,500,000. Against that, it is today the members of NATO whose active armed forces number over 5,000,000." (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964, p. 19920) I would be happy to know your views on this score. In conclusion, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the warm congratulations in connection with my 70th birthday sent me through Ambassador A. Dobrynin. I am grateful for the token of remembrance which you sent through our Ambassador for me on my birthday./7/ /7/Neither the President's message nor his "token of remembrance" has been further identified. I have also received your official congratulations for which I thank you and to which I shall reply. Respectfully,/8/ /8/Printed from an unsigned copy.
25. Editorial Note In luncheon remarks to the Associated Press in New York on April 20, 1964, President Johnson declared: "I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium to be carried out over a 4-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an overall decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 percent, and of enriched uranium by 40 percent." He also mentioned that in reaching this decision, he had been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home and Chairman Khrushchev, and the latter was releasing a simultaneous announcement in Moscow of Soviet reductions in U-235 production. Text of the President's speech is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, pages 493-500. For text of Khrushchev's statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 166-168. Regarding concerns by Seaborg, Foster, and McGeorge Bundy on the failure of Khrushchev to respond in a timely manner to the President's March 9 message, which proposed a joint announcement of cutbacks (Document 18), and discussions about the timing and content of the President's April 20 announcement, see Seaborg, Journal, Volume 8, pages 247-248, and 307. On April 20, the Atomic Energy Commission issued a press release providing further details on the cutback. On the same day the White House issued Seaborg's February 13 letter to the President, initially recommending the cutback, and a letter from Seaborg and McNamara to the President, April 16, reviewing the status of their joint progress on the implementation of the limited test ban treaty safeguards earlier recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy. The AEC press release, Seaborg's February 13 letter, and the Seaborg-McNamara April 16 letter are reproduced ibid., pages 291-293, and 308-310. The text of the Seaborg-McNamara letter, with an additional White House explanatory statement, is also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 162-164. At the 528th meeting of the National Security Council on April 22, President Johnson asked about congressional and foreign reactions to his announcement of the cutback, and Seaborg and McNamara reported that it had been generally well received in Congress, and Carl Rowan reported that the world reaction "had been generally good, and that the overall tendency was to reflect credit on President Johnson. He said that the Indians liked the action; the Chinese stated that the Soviet Union had been taken in by the United States and that the action indicated that the United States was siding with Khrushchev in the Sino-Soviet dispute; the French indicated that the action was rather unsatisfactory." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 8, pages 329-330) Another account of the NSC meeting is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 9, Box 1. NSC Action No. 2484, April 22, noted this NSC discussion. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting--April 22, 1964)
26. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/ Washington, May 1, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have read with great interest your two recent letters/2/ and I think we can agree that the separate decisions which we announced on April 20/3/ have already had a useful effect. Such responsible actions on each side are helpful in moving us forward on the hard road to peace. It was particularly good to have our announcements come out at the same time, and I send my thanks for your understanding of the need which I faced to make a statement, and for your willingness to make your own statement at the same moment. Throughout the world these actions have been warmly approved, and I have already told your Ambassador how strongly I believe that we should continue the search for further steps along this road. /2/Documents 23 and 24. /3/Document 25. In this spirit I am happy to express my agreement to your suggestion that our scientific and technical experts should cooperate on the problem of desalting sea water, including the possibility that nuclear energy may be an effective force for this purpose. This is a problem which is of great interest not only to our two countries but to many others throughout the world, and we believe that there is every reason for hearty cooperation among the interested nations. I have designated my own Scientific Adviser, Dr. Donald F. Hornig, to prepare concrete proposals for cooperative efforts, working with Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission. They or their chosen representatives will be ready shortly to begin discussions with those whom you designate. As I understand this problem, it appears to be one which requires a great deal of careful scientific and technical study before we will be ready to undertake large-scale projects, but that is all the more reason for moving ahead urgently, and we on our side are ready. As soon as your representatives are designated, I suggest that we should make a simultaneous announcement of our interest in this problem. I also continue to believe that our representatives in the field of arms control and disarmament should continue to press forward to seek agreement in their great field of work. I will not take your time in this message to repeat the arguments which we have put forward both in my public statements and at Geneva on this subject, but I mention the matter so that you may know that the positions taken by the American Government on this subject have my strong personal support and have been designed, at my direction, to provide real hope for additional useful agreements. We continue to hope that as these proposals are further studied by the Soviet Government the prospects for agreement may improve. In two of your messages, and especially in the most recent one, you refer to the problem of the reduction of troop levels, especially in Germany. I am sorry to have to tell you that I do not think this subject is one on which we can expect to make progress by private discussion between us at this time. The American forces in Germany are there for entirely defensive purposes, and their presence is a matter of great importance for the people and government of West Germany. For there to be any substantial additional reduction in the level of the U.S. forces in Germany there would have to be changes in the situation which would make it possible for the Germans and others in Western Europe to feel secure in other ways. In the meanwhile, I hope we can continue to cooperate in reducing the level of tension in Central Europe. The problem of the future of Germany is a most important one, and nothing could be better for the peace of the world than a real settlement. We on our side remain ready for such a settlement, which could serve the legitimate interest of the German people as well as the other peoples involved, including your own. I think we should go forward with projects like the desalting of sea water, in which no one can misunderstand the purpose of our cooperation. Meanwhile, of course, we should also work hard to find ways which will reconcile our differences in all fields, with due regard to the interests of others. This is the central purpose of my policy in international affairs. There are differences between us, Mr. Chairman, in important areas, but it should be our purpose to reduce them and to find sensible agreements wherever we can. Let me state again, in closing, my great satisfaction with our success in reaching parallel positions on the cutback of production for nuclear weapons, and my hope that we shall continue to make more progress of this kind. Sincerely,/4/ /4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
27. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 7, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--General, Vol. 1, Box 27. Secret. SUBJECT National Security Action memorandum No. 282/2/ requested a first report by the end of March on "the probabilities and problems involved in obtaining from the nations signatory to the Test Ban Treaty approval for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful explosions under adequate international controls." This is a response to that request. The problem posed is one which necessarily must be reviewed periodically in the light both of the international situation and the state of our technical development. /2/Document 7. There are two ways that international agreement to the conduct of Plowshare excavation projects might be obtained. One would be the amendment of the Test Ban Treaty to exclude peaceful uses applications of nuclear explosives from the restraints of the Treaty. The other method would be the approval of specific described projects through the voting procedures prescribed for amendment of the Treaty. Our view, at the present time, is that the second method would be the more likely of success. There appears to be little likelihood, however, that the Soviets would be receptive at this time to any proposal to exempt Plowshare excavation experiments or applications from the Treaty restraints. We have very little evidence of active Soviet interest in the application of nuclear excavation techniques (See Tabs A and B),/3/ although the USSR leads the world in large-scale excavation with conventional explosives. Clearly, at the time of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, Khrushchev did not envisage early amendment of the Treaty, and his statements about the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes were set in a vague and indefinite future. Perhaps encouraging is Khrushchev's April 20 statement about allocating ". . . more fissionable materials for peaceful uses--in atomic power stations, in industry, agriculture, in medicine, in the implementation of major scientific, technical projects, including the distillation of sea water."/4/ We note, however, that nuclear excavation was not included specifically in the enumerated activities. /3/None of the tabs has been found. /4/Reference is to Khrushchev's April 20 statement. See Document 25. We understand that four or five years will be required to develop the devices and cratering technology which would be required in large-scale excavation projects, such as a new trans-Isthmian canal. During this period it would seem important to stimulate international interest and cooperation in the nuclear excavation program to the maximum extent possible. By international participation in Plowshare symposia, observation of cratering shots or experiments and perhaps exchange of test data, it should be possible to demonstrate the economic development potential of nuclear excavation, the absence of hazard to human life and the safeguards that could be provided to prevent evasion of the Treaty for weapons development purposes. Development of international accept-ance or even of cooperative effort by Treaty signatories would obviously provide the most favorable atmosphere in which to seek and gain support for international agreement, under the voting procedures of the Treaty, for approval of specific excavation projects. ACDA has suggested that the most likely opportunity for raising the question of a treaty amendment for the conduct of nuclear excavation projects probably will be in the context of future international discussion of a comprehensive test ban. In the context of such discussions it might be possible to obtain some easing of the restraints on the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is difficult to predict, however, when such discussions might be reopened and it is possible that discussions in this context might lead to more rather than less restrictive conditions on Plowshare. (See Tab C) While development of the nuclear devices can proceed within the Treaty limits, there are some uncertainties as to the limitations placed on the development of the necessary cratering technology by the Treaty language. The committee established by NSAM 269/5/ is charged with reviewing the facts relating to any prospective nuclear test "which might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." The discussions to date by that committee seem to indicate that the Treaty restraints may well inhibit the development of cratering technology and become a limiting factor earlier than the estimated first large-scale excavation project some four or five years hence. (In presenting the Treaty to the Senate, Administration witnesses, while acknowledging that large-scale applications such as a trans-Isthmian canal could not be carried out under the Treaty, clearly expressed the view that properly devised experiments for developing the excavation technology could be conducted, see Tab D. Similar testimony was given as recently as 4 March 1964 before the Senate Committee on Commerce.)/6/ Certain of the tests designed to develop the necessary cratering technology raise concerns of Treaty violations with some of the committee members. The concern is with the definition of "radioactive debris . . . present outside the territorial limits" of the United States. While it seems useful to identify the conflicting views on this problem (as is done below), it is not our purpose here to address ourselves to its solution, which is the proper concern of the NSAM 269 committee. The concerns expressed in that forum, however, underline the urgency of establishing an atmosphere of international acceptance of and cooperation on peaceful excavation activities. /5/Regarding NSAM 269, see Document 3. /6/The testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee has not been further identified. The AEC believes that the review committee established by NSAM 269 can adopt policies of appraisal which would allow many of the cratering experiments to be carried out. If so, the need for a Treaty amendment would be obviated for some years. Furthermore, if cratering experiments are carried out with international observation, an atmosphere can be created in which an amendment could be obtained more easily. In AEC's opinion a particularly appropriate consideration in appraising cratering experiments, in view of the Treaty limitation on causing debris "to be present" beyond territorial boundaries, is the internationally accepted technical definition of when radionuclides are considered "not present." Such a definition is found in the health protection guides of both USSR and the US (10 CFR 20) as well as in the guides of the International Commission on Radiation Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition a precedent for the use of this definition in interpreting an international treaty is found in the operation of the McMurdo nuclear reactor and the very slight attendant release of radioactivity within the limits of 10 CFR 20. This procedure is considered by the US to be consistent with the prohibition in the Antarctica Treaty of 1961, to which the USSR is a party, against "disposal there of radioactive waste material."/7/ Soviet representatives have visited this facility. /7/Signed on December 1, 1959, and entered into force on June 23, 1961. (12 UST 794) AEC points out that the legal basis for such policies of appraisal is the principle of "de minimis" or the application of a "rule of reason" to interpret otherwise imprecise provisions of law. Since the Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria, it becomes necessary for the NSAM 269 committee to decide when debris might be considered "present." Among other relevant material to be considered in deciding this question is the understanding of the Senate in advising and consenting to the Treaty. In this connection, the Foreign Relations Committee reported, after hearing all the testimony on this and other questions, its understanding that "the Plowshare program will not be seriously inhibited by the Treaty."/8/ /8/For text of the entire report, September 3, 1963, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 450-483. It should also be noted that, since the technical definition of when radionuclides are "not present" is when their concentration is small compared to maximum permissible concentrations under health protection guides, the levels of radiation involved in this definition are internationally accepted as being far below the point where there might begin to be a health hazard. Thus, this definition would be consistent with a stated objective of the Treaty "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances." ACDA is concerned about the international repercussions if debris attributable to U.S. underground nuclear explosions should be picked up outside our territorial limits (Tab E). The Tass press release and related cable from Moscow commenting on the accidental venting of one of our recent Nevada tests/9/ (Tab F) show that the Soviets are fully alert to this possibility. In these circumstances, ACDA is concerned that the good faith of the United States in seeking arms control agreements could be thrown into doubt by possible charges of violation, and that our reputation as a country which takes its treaty obligations seriously could be prejudiced. As to the consideration suggested by the AEC for appraising what is acceptable under the Test Ban Treaty, ACDA believes that its application would result in a substantial risk of incurring the international consequences described above. The Treaty speaks simply of causing "radioactive debris" to be "present" outside territorial limits and there is nothing in the text itself to indicate that the presence of small amounts of debris should be accepted. Finally ACDA calls attention to arguments that could be made against the suggested policy of appraisal on the basis of official U.S. records published in connection with the Treaty. (Tab E) /9/Though the Tass press release and related cable from Moscow have not been further identified, the reference presumably is to an AEC test of a small nuclear device (called Pike) in Nevada on March 13. In a March 25 information memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy noted in part that the device "partially vented" and produced "measurable quantities of radioactive debris at considerable distances from the test site. Although there is no evidence that the debris was detected outside the United States or that the Mexican authorities were in a position to measure it, the possibility cannot be excluded that measurable quantities of debris did, in fact, cross into Mexico. There remains, therefore, a remote possibility that charges may be made subsequently that this event constituted a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Vol. II, Niblick Series--FY 1964, Box 27) Whether or not the AEC interpretation is accepted by the review committee as a standard of appraisal, it can be borne in mind as possible rebuttal should any nuclear test accident, either weapons or Plowshare, bring forth Soviet charges of Treaty violations. In summary, we urge a) the question of amending the Treaty be kept under continuing surveillance, b) a program of Soviet and international participation and cooperation in the U.S. nuclear excavation development program be devised and carried out, and c) the acquisition of intelligence on Soviet interest and planning in this area be intensified. U. Alexis Johnson/10/ /10/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
28. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 18 memorandum from Fisher to members of the Committee of Principals. Dear Bill: This is in reply to your memorandum of 8 May to the Committee of Principals, requesting comments on the paper "Verification of Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles."/2/ /2/The memorandum and the draft paper have not been further identified. Regarding other drafts of this paper, see Document 21 and footnotes 3 and 4, Document 36. I am glad to note certain changes in the present paper which I believe are steps in the right direction. Specifically, paragraph 8 on page 14 no longer says that only a "small" number of undeclared facilities would be eligible for inspection and it makes explicit that no disclosures of unilateral information would be necessary to justify on-site inspection. These changes bear on problems of the perishability and possible compromise of unilateral intelligence which have concerned me for some time. Nonetheless, I remain concerned about the reliance placed on unilateral means to verify declarations and to help police controls over production and launcher construction. As the paper itself notes, our present means are inadequate in some areas. Moreover, if we go ahead with this proposal, there can be no assurance that we will not in the future be deprived of some of the intelligence we now possess. I hope that further thought can be given to ways in which the negotiated inspection arrangements can be expanded. In particular, I continue to think it important that the number of on-site inspections to check undeclared facilities be large enough to protect against the perishability of intelligence and the danger of its compromise. Sincerely, John/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original.
29. Editorial Note In a May 30, 1964, letter to President Johnson, Seaborg formally requested approval in principle of the Whetstone series for FY 1965, which included 50 tests for weapons development, about 8 for the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes (Plowshare Program), another 12 tests for the Department of Defense, and 1 or 2 tests by the United Kingdom. He also requested specific approval for 17 AEC tests, including 1 Plowshare event, 1 Department of Defense test, and 1 possible U.K. test for the first quarter of FY 1965 (Whetstone I). (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Volume 2, Tab 7, June 16, 1964, FY 1965, Underground Nuclear Test Program, Box 1) Copies of this letter, along with its four enclosures and a paper entitled "Briefing for the President: Underground Test Program, FY 1965, Parts I and II, June 1964,"were transmitted to NSC members under cover of a June 15 memorandum from Bromley Smith. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting--June 16, 1964) In a June 13 memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy summarized these papers and gave his own recommendations on possible decisions the President might make. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Volume 2, Tab 7, June 16, 1964, FY 1965, Underground Nuclear Test Program, Box 1) For an account of the June 16 NSC meeting, at which the Whetstone series was discussed, see Document 34. In a memorandum to Seaborg, June 22, Bundy reported that the President had approved in principle the FY 1965 testing program with a few exceptions, including one Plowshare event, tests above or near one megaton yield, and the Long Shot event at Amchitka Island, Alaska, for all of which specific Presidential approval was required. Bundy added that the President also approved all the tests proposed for the first quarter of FY 1965. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In an August 27 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of 18 tests, 16 by the Atomic Energy Commission and 2 by the Department of Defense, and also of Sulky, a Plowshare cratering experiment, for the second quarter (Whetstone II) of FY 1965. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume III, Whetstone Series--FY 1965, Box 28) Bundy informed Seaborg in a memorandum, September 25, that except for Sulky the President had approved his request. (Ibid.) Adjustments to the schedule for Whetstone II are contained in a letter from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, October 20. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Regarding Sulky, see Document 58. In a letter to President Johnson, December 14, 1964, Seaborg requested approval of Whetstone III for the third quarter of FY 1965, which was to consist of 12 tests by the Atomic Energy Commission and one or two by the Department of Defense. One of the AEC events was to be a Plowshare experiment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume III, Whetstone Series--FY 1965, Box 28) Bundy informed Seaborg in a memorandum, January 8, 1965, that the President had approved his request. (Ibid.) In a letter to President Johnson, March 17, 1965, Seaborg requested authority to conduct Whetstone IV for the fourth quarter of FY 1965. The request consisted of 13 new and 3 deferred third quarter AEC weapons development tests, 1 AEC Plowshare test (Palanquin), and 3 Department of Defense tests. The test program was described in some detail in an undated enclosure to Seaborg's letter. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a memorandum to Seaborg, April 2, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had approved all these tests. (Ibid.) The United States conducted 48 tests in the Whetstone series for FY 1965. Breakdown by quarters was 11 (July-September 1964); 13 (October-December 1964); 10 (January-March 1965); and 14 (April-June 1965). (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992, pages 22-25) A history of the Whetstone series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Nougat and Whetstone: Events--Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshmallow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Water, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965 (DNA 6320F, 1984). [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |