1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff and Steven R. Rivkin of the President's Office of Science and Technology to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President's Science Adviser (Hornig)/1/ Washington, June 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the source text reads, "McGB: For your mtg with Butch Fisher this afternoon. DK" The source text is signed only by Rivkin. Mr. Fisher wants to review items for consideration at a possible Principals meeting Friday./2/ He will raise two issues--non-proliferation and inspection for the freeze--in preparation for resumption of the ENDC June 8 at Geneva. /2/The Committee of Deputies to the Principals met on Friday, June 5, but not the Committee of Principals. 1. Non-Proliferation. An ACDA paper (not yet circulated) proposes modifications in our non-proliferation position to circumvent continuing Soviet attacks at Geneva on the MLF./3/ It suggests that we a) settle for a less comprehensive agreement (dropping prohibitions on transfer and concentrating on an agreement not to assist manufacture by potential nuclear powers) and b) undertake publicized preparations "to assure that the MLF charter will contain nuclear weapon non-manufacture and non-transfer provisions." Fisher believes the Soviets have a forceful argument in charging that we are "keeping two sets of books" on proliferation and consequently would like the Principals' agreement on a formula that characterizes the MLF as a definitive step toward non-proliferation. /3/Reference presumably is to May 19 ACDA draft position paper, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement." (Ibid.) The Secretary opposes circulating the current non-dissemination paper (Tab A)/4/ because of its MLF references, and Fisher therefore is thinking about softer language for Geneva to indicate that the U.S. will seek "assurances" from its MLF partners against proliferation. He feels we should emphasize what is now only "implicit" in our existing characterizations of the MLF, i.e., that the weapons involved will not--or even never--be transferred to national control. At the same time, he is clearly aware of possible British and Italian domestic embarrassment (forecast by the disarmament negotiators of both countries at four-power discussions here last week),/5/ should non-dissemination be pushed hard this summer. /4/Not attached, but presumably either the same paper referenced in footnote 3 above, or an unidentified memorandum by Secretary Rusk. /5/A summary of these discussions between U.S., British, Canadian, and Italian officials (with a French observer present) on May 27-28 is in CA-12610, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-2) 2. Verification of Production Freeze of Strategic Delivery Systems. ACDA negotiations with DOD (Barber) for authority to elaborate on our proposal have stalled on the unresolved aerial overflight issue. Mr. McNamara has indicated he is prepared to overrule the JCS if and when the Soviets express interest in the proposal and, preferably, not before. ACDA, on the other hand, believes the Russians may be frightened off and will continue to distort our proposal, unless we give clear assurances that we do not seek to inspect their operational launch forces. To do this, ACDA suggests we now spell out general procedures for a quota of on-site inspections of suspected new construction without mentioning aerial overflights (Tab B)./6/ DOD and the Chiefs, however, believe that this approach would leave the implication that we do not seek comprehensive inspection rights. Fisher acknowledges that semantic foot-work could help somewhat--e.g., if we change our language from "control over the number of launchers" to "verification of limitations on launchers"--but he continues to desire early agreement along the lines of ACDA's proposed quota presentation. /6/Not found. 3. Other issues. Of the other issues considered for inclusion on the agenda, only the cut-off of fissionable material production is likely to be ready; except for second thoughts by AEC on minor details, no particular troublesome problems should arise at this late date. The ACDA paper on prototype testing is not likely to be discussed,/7/ because of DOD and JCS reservations. Barber does not now accept the conclusion of the interagency task force that significant major changes in re-entry bodies--other than the development of multiple warheads--can be monitored with confidence. At the same time, the JCS continues to react strongly in principle against restraints on prototype testing. Also, the Chiefs have yet to review the prototype testing problem from the point of feasibility--as opposed to desirability--and the results of their review are not expected until two weeks hence. /7/Reference is to the report of the Interagency Task Force on Strategic Vehicle Prototype Testing, May 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. II, Box 12) This task force was convened in response to action taken by the Committee of Principals at its meeting on February 28. See Document 14.
31. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, June 5, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. Dear Mr. President: I received your verbal message of May 1/2/ even before my trip to the United Arab Republic./3/ I have thought it over and I wish, in turn, to express a few thoughts. /2/Document 26. /3/Khrushchev visited the United Arab Republic May 9-25. First of all, I should like to assure you that I also am pleased with the measures taken simultaneously by us concerning the cut-back in the production of plutonium and uranium-235 for military purposes. They have met with widespread approval throughout the world. After concluding the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water and reaching the understanding not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons, this new step agreed upon between us constitutes, in effect, a third milestone on the way to ending the nuclear weapons race. It is good that such a course is gradually becoming established in the relations between our countries, and in international relations in general, although, of course, we both know that the progress achieved along this line is still limited, on the whole, especially if it is compared with the vastness of the problem that confronts our countries and all mankind, that is, the elimination of the threat and the very possibility of a nuclear war. As I learned from your message, you agree with our proposal that we now take a step forward in the field of cooperation between our countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, that is, in solving the problem of the desalinization of sea water. That is also a useful undertaking and, after receiving your reply, I immediately gave instructions to our appropriate organizations to start preparing for the forthcoming meeting with the American representatives. You suggested that both sides issue a statement simultaneously concerning our mutual interest in solving the problem of the desalinization of sea water. That is acceptable to us. For our part, we are prepared to publish a statement by the USSR State Committee on the use of atomic energy concerning the understanding reached on the meeting of Soviet and American specialists for the joint study of scientific and technical questions relating to the desalinization of sea water by means of nuclear energy. If you have no objection, such a statement by us and a similar one from the American side could be published about a week after the transmittal of this communication by Ambassador Dobrynin. As for the practical details of the preparations for the forthcoming meeting, including the time and place of the meeting, it will not be difficult to coordinate them through diplomatic channels. We are, of course, pleased with whatever contributions have been made to the improvement of the international situation; this provides further assurance that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in this matter is not an impossibility but quite within the realm of reality. In this connection, I liked your recent statement that you will henceforth try every path to peace, that you intend to keep moving forward and that, after all, the United States is not standing still. I can definitely assure you that we, for our part, will be equally dynamic and equally flexible in searching out ways to promote peace. [Here follows discussion of possible reductions in foreign troops in Germany.] In your message you mention the US proposal submitted at the Geneva conference on disarmament. I am acquainted with these proposals, just as you yourself are of course acquainted with ours. I do not think there is any need at present to enter into details, but if it is a question of the whole gamut of disarmament proposals, then we surely have before us an unlimited field for serious work on the finding of ways to achieve agreements. The Soviet Government has made, and is making, considerable efforts to plow this field and to grow a good crop on it. However, to be perfectly frank, we do not have the feeling that the other party is acting along the same lines. The fact is that there has not yet been any progress in the Geneva negotiations, and the state of the disarmament problem naturally leaves us with a strong feeling of disappointment. Now you are in favor of our representatives, who are dealing with disarmament problems, being instructed to make a really persistent effort to reach agreement in this important area. Why not? Let them work a little longer, and a little harder; we have to explore every possibility to the end, that is my feeling. We shall give our representative in the Committee of 18 the necessary instructions. And to increase the chances of success, to ensure that the disarmament negotiations do not again sink into routine, let us both follow the work of our representatives more closely; let us prod them a little if that is needed. As you will obviously remember, as early as 1962, before the beginning of the work of the Committee of 18, the heads of states and the member governments of the Committee agreed to take a personal interest in the course of the negotiations./4/ That was a sensible decision. /4/Reference is to the exchange of correspondence between Khrushchev and Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy on this question in February and early March 1962. For texts of their messages, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 25-26, 32-38, 49-57, 61-63, and 75-81. I am thinking that sometime soon it might be useful to instruct our ministers of foreign affairs to examine the course of the negotiations. They could do this, for example, during the XIX Session of the General Assembly of the UN. They will of course have other matters to discuss. Let us see what concrete results can be achieved by our ministers. And then, perhaps, the need will arise for us to meet. We understand that similar views are current in Washington also. But this is, of course, a matter for the future. We should not run too far ahead. [Here follows extensive discussion of Cuba, Southeast Asia, and especially the "German question."]/5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy. 32. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)/1/ I-25047/64 Washington, June 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. Dear Butch: I have reviewed the rewritten paper on the cutoff of fissionable material and find that the changes which you and the AEC made are a distinct improvement to the paper./2/ As you know, the Chiefs have not commented on the verification annex in its present form/3/ but I feel they are now in general agreement with the paper with the following exceptions: /2/Entitled "Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production and Transfer to Peaceful Uses as Separable Measures," June 4. (Ibid.) /3/Entitled "Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff," June 4, and attached as Annex A to the above referenced paper. a. They desire overflights and some monitoring of atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. As the Secretary said last week, we believe that the question of overflights need not be decided at this time, and therefore a policy of conscious ambiguity is appropriate on this matter./4/ As for the matter of monitoring atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Secretary made it clear that we believe this is a subject more appropriately discussed in the context of the test ban. /4/McNamara expressed these views in his letter to Foster, June 3. (Ibid.) b. The JCS have also stated that: "Until the IAEA safeguards organization and procedures are strengthened and the concept of IAEA inspection of a US/USSR cutoff agreement can be evaluated, adversary resident inspection of declared facilities is required as one of the safeguards against Soviet cheating."/5/ It is our understanding, based primarily on Section I of the verification annex, that this requirement is adequately recognized in the cutoff paper, and that we are not at this time firmly committed to an IAEA role. /5/The quotation is from the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, May 28, JCSM-449-64. (Ibid.) c. As neither the Chiefs nor the Government as a whole have studied the problem of cutoff and transfer together, I would appreciate it if you would not authorize discussions now of transfer of over 60,000 kilograms for the United States and of a US/USSR ratio greater than 2. The Chiefs' study on this subject should be available some time next month. At that time the Secretary will forward his views on any possible increase in our transfer proposal. If these suggestions are acceptable to you, we have no objection to the use of the revised paper in the Geneva negotiations, or elsewhere, as appropriate. Sincerely, Peter Solbert
33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Scoville) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. SUBJECT Enclosed (at Tab A) is the position paper, "Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production and Transfer to Peaceful Uses as Separable Measures," dated June 4, 1964, together with an annex "Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff" of the same date./2/ The purpose of this memorandum is to request your approval for use of this position paper as guidance for the United States Disarmament Delegation in Geneva, and for use of the Annex as a working paper. /2/Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 32. In accordance with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962,/3/ the United States has discussed these proposals in Geneva; you will also recall that the cutoff proposal was included in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. Thus, the enclosed position paper does not involve new proposals, rather the paper contains elaboration of our existing proposals, particularly with regard to verification. The working paper which the position paper authorizes the Delegation to table at the Conference would constitute the first detailed United States public statement to be made on inspection of the cutoff since the measure was initially suggested by the United States in 1955. /3/In a memorandum to President Kennedy, November 20, 1962, Foster made recommendations regarding U.S. positions at the resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks, and President Kennedy approved them on November 21, 1962. See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 246. The position paper has been developed through extensive interagency consultation and has been approved by the Department of State. In addition, the position paper and annex now presented for approval were redrafted in light of Secretary of Defense McNamara's letter of June 3, 1964, expressing his own views and transmitting those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosed at Tab B. I am enclosing as Tab C a letter of June 9, 1964 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert which states that the drafts are now acceptable to the Department of Defense on certain conditions which are acceptable to ACDA./4/ /4/Neither Tab B nor C is printed; see footnote 4, Document 32. Mr. Solbert's letter indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the inspection provisions, with the exception of two matters: they desire overflights and some monitoring of atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. Secretary McNamara has indicated that the question of overflights need not be decided at this time, and therefore a policy of conscious ambiguity as incorporated in the paper is appropriate on this matter. As for the matter of monitoring atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, Secretary McNamara made it clear that he believes this is a subject more appropriately discussed in the context of the test ban. The JCS have also stated that: "Until the IAEA safeguards organization and procedures are strengthened and the concept of IAEA inspection of a US/USSR cutoff agreement can be evaluated, adversary resident inspection of declared facilities is required as one of the safeguards against Soviet cheating." As indicated by Section I of the verification annex, this requirement is recognized in the cutoff paper, and we are not, at this time, firmly committed to an IAEA role. The Joint Chiefs also believe that the relative advantages and disadvantages of a combination cutoff and transfer proposal have not been thoroughly analyzed. Secretary McNamara has asked the Joint Chiefs to conduct such an analysis, but has noted that the paper is consistent with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962. The Department of Defense, through Mr. Solbert, has asked that we not authorize discussions now of transfer of over 60,000 kilograms for the United States and of a US/USSR ratio greater than 2. The Chiefs' study on this subject should be available some time next month. At that time the Secretary will forward his views on any possible increase in our transfer proposal. This is acceptable to ACDA. The AEC has also concurred in this position paper with a few clarifying comments. On the basis of discussions of these comments with the AEC staff we are in agreement with them. (Tab D)/5/ /5/Letter from Seaborg to Fisher, June 12; not printed. Mr. McCone has concurred in this position with the exception of a point relative to declarations. (Tab E)/6/ All agencies concur with this point and it will be taken care of by subsequent instructions to the delegation. /6/Reference is to McCone's letter to Foster, June 10, in which he wrote in part that "there should be another declaration in Annex A (Section IVA, page 2) on the intended uses of allowed production. Without this, it is doubtful that unilateral intelligence could provide the necessary assurances that declared production requirements were reasonable." Recommendation That you approve the use of the enclosed position paper as guidance for the United States Delegation in Geneva. Herbert Scoville, Jr.
34. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, June 16, 1964. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 565-566. No classification marking. At 12:10 p.m. Commissioners Gerald Tape, John Palfrey, and I attended the meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Those present included President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, Vance, Taylor, Harold Brown, Charles Johnson, Wilson, Gordon, Carter, McDermott, Hornig, McCormack, Crowson, Kelly, Howard, General Donnelly, Keeny, Clifton, Reedy, and Valenti. This meeting was to be devoted to consideration of the FY 1965 underground test series--the Whetstone series. President Johnson called upon me to make the introductory remarks. I gave a description of our FY 1965 underground test program (Whetstone). In particular, I noted that the Commission was caught in the position that it must not violate either the safeguards or the test ban treaty and, thus, it has to walk a rather tenuous middle course. I said that there could be no guarantee against venting, although we think the probability of venting is very small. I described the number of tests planned, in the development category to be carried on by the AEC; in the Plowshare category to be carried on by the AEC; and in the weapons effects and detection category to be carried on by the Department of Defense in collaboration with the AEC. I then called upon General Crowson, who made a presentation of the AEC development tests, with charts. There being no questions on this, I then called upon General Donnelly, who made a presentation covering the weapons effects and weapons detection tests, using charts. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Long Shot device (to be detonated at Amchitka Island in the Aleutians) to give data on the detection of underground nuclear explosions would be an old reliable device or an advanced type. I said that it would be an old reliable device because we needed to be sure of its operation and of its yield. Secretary Rusk asked if we could invite the Russians to be involved in some way in this test, and I said I thought that we could. Bundy mentioned the problem of the effect of this test in Alaska; a problem which is probably psychological but nevertheless very real. I then called upon John Kelly, who described the Plowshare tests, with the help of charts. At the end of this presentation, President Johnson asked me how many tests there had been this last year; and, when I told him, he asked why there are so many planned for this year. I explained that the AEC had refrained from testing during the summer months last year during the sensitive period of test ban negotiations and, thus, due to the fact that the testing last year was for a shorter period, the rate of testing this year will not be much greater. I also indicated that it might not be possible to make as many tests as are being requested, but that it is important to have the flexibility in preparing for the entire number. Then, if some of the tests turn out to be unexpectedly difficult or to yield unexpected results, it might be that it will not be possible or desirable to carry out every test in the series; on the other hand, it might be desirable to add some as yet not foreseen tests to the series. Secretary McNamara added that the DOD program included more tests this year, which adds considerably to the increase; the reason for this is that it took some time to get ready for the complex tests in their series. McNamara went on to say that he thinks it is a good series and that the entire number should be approved. He also mentioned a couple of tests in 1962 in the low kiloton range. He said he feels that we can detect tests down to the low kiloton level. President Johnson commented on the comparison in the numbers between the U.S. and Soviet underground tests and asked why the Soviets had such a small number. Bundy replied that the Soviets used to say that they couldn't afford an underground testing program. He also said that he feels that their program is consistent with the rather restrained rocket program that they apparently are engaged in. Bundy went on to say that he is not persuaded that we should develop high yield weapons just in order to test the effects of such weapons, and he asked Harold Brown to comment on this. Brown said that there is no approved program for high yield tests, but he said that tests in the Whetstone program will help us be ready to test weapons in the 100-megaton range should that become desirable. Secretary McNamara said that this aspect of the program is not very expensive, and he thinks that work along this line should continue. President Johnson then asked me whether this program can be carried out within our budget without asking for an increase. I replied that I think it can. We had approximately $117 million in our budget for this purpose and we will need to augment it by about $13 million, which can be done by transferring funds from production. Bundy suggested that the matter of approval be handled as in the past; thus, it might be proper to authorize only the first quarter of the series, i.e., Whetstone I, at this time. I pointed out that we had been working under rather flexible authorization in the past. Secretary Rusk said that he wouldn't recommend any reduction. He pointed out that we don't know what Soviet plans are, and they might resume testing. Another possibility might be that we would move toward a comprehensive test ban. Thus, he said that all in all, from a foreign policy point of view, he feels we should carry on a vigorous underground program at about the level for which approval is being sought. The implication is that we will hear from the White House soon regarding the approval for Whetstone I. [Here follow notes of an AEC-NASA luncheon, a telephone call about Congressman Holifield, meetings with Potomac Electric Power Company officials and the Committee of Principals.]
35. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 13 memorandum from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy. Keeny expressed reservations about the failure of the agencies to resolve the issue of aerial reconnaissance and the exclusion of certain types of nuclear reactors from inspection but nonetheless concluded, "I am impressed that all the agencies have agreed to the paper and believe that you should recommend that the President approve the paper as it stands." The attached position paper on the cutoff of fissionable material production and the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses/2/ has been submitted by ACDA for your approval as guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva./3/ The paper has been agreed to by all interested agencies: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their comments are attached./4/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 32. /3/Document 33. /4/Reference presumably is to Document 32 and the documents referenced in footnotes 4 and 5 thereto, and Document 33, and the documents referenced in footnotes 5 and 6 thereto. The basic proposals in this paper have already been approved and were included in summary form in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. This paper is essentially an elaboration of our present position particularly with regard to the requirements for verification. In order to achieve agreement, the paper intentionally avoids facing the issue of whether or not aerial reconnaissance should be involved in the verification procedure. Although there is agreement among all other agencies that aerial reconnaissance is not necessary in connection with this agreement, the JCS recommends that a provision for aerial overflight be included. Secretary McNamara has informally advised Mr. Foster that he is prepared to overrule the JCS on this issue but would prefer not to do so unless the Soviets show some interest in the proposal. Mr. Foster agreed to fuzz the language on inspection so that it would not necessarily preclude subsequent consideration of aerial inspection. Although this is a touchy point since even the hint that we are considering aerial inspection as a condition for this proposal would completely discredit it abroad, ACDA believes they can live with this instruction for the time being by avoiding the issue in Geneva. Subject to your approval, the paper will be submitted for information to NAC next Tuesday/5/ and will be presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva next Thursday./6/ /5/June 23. /6/On June 25, the U.S. Delegation submitted the U.S. working paper, "Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff," to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 235-238. This paper was virtually identical to the draft paper, June 4, cited in footnote 3, Document 32. I recommend that you approve the paper. If you approve, I will inform the interested agencies of your action./7/ /7/The approval line of the recommendation is checked. In a memorandum to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Seaborg, McCone, and Hornig, June 16, Bundy indicated that the President had approved the position paper for guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the White House, 1964) McG. B.
36. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. The source text is attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 37, which notes the time of the meeting and that it took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Also attached is a June 30 note from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy (who missed the meeting) that asked him to note the summary of actions and Secretary Rusk's comments "on the problem of nuclear weapons for India when China obtains nuclear weapons." Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 566-567. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS /2/The list of 22 participants is not printed. 1. Verification of Freeze Mr. Fisher briefly outlined the scope of the proposed position and mentioned two areas which warranted further discussion because of differences of opinion or because decisions have been postponed./3/ A major substantive disagreement in the existing paper arose from the Joint Chiefs' views that production of additional subassemblies, such as guidance packages and re-entry vehicles, should be monitored, while DOD and other agencies had not concurred in this proposal. In addition, the present paper postponed resolution on some of the key issues which were still under discussion in the basic position paper agreed upon in March./4/ These included: (a) What type of control should be applied to launchers; (b) What limitations should be placed on research and development and prototype testing; (c) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and (d) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections. /3/Reference is to the position paper, "Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles," June 6, which was transmitted under cover of a June 6 memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) /4/Reference presumably is to the undated draft paper prepared in early March; see footnote 3, Document 19. See also Document 21. With relation to ABMs, Mr. Keeny suggested that there should be a specific reference to them in the paper to avoid giving rise to the misconception that ABMs had been dropped from the freeze or that no inspection was required. Secretary Vance and General Taylor requested information on exactly what was our position on the inclusion of ABMs since they were unclear on agreed linkage of ABMs to the remainder of the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher quoted from the President's 21 January message to the ENDC which included strategic defensive missiles and from a speech by the U.S. representative referring to ABMs in later presentations at Geneva./5/ He pointed out that ABMs were just as much an agreed matter for exploration as were the offensive missiles, although we had consistently indicated that precise definition of such systems had not been arrived at. Secretary Rusk said that he understood ABMs had been included at the request of DOD to provide against a possible loss of deterrence if only offensive vehicles were frozen. /5/For example, Fisher mentioned anti-missile systems in his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 16. (Ibid.) Secretary Rusk asked for information on Soviet interest in the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher indicated that the Soviets had shown no enthusiasm but nevertheless had given evidence of careful study since their statements had emphasized many of the unanswered questions and twisted them to Soviet advantage. In particular, the question of inspection and verification had been misconstrued in order to make it appear very unacceptable. Mr. Fisher felt that the present paper was needed in order to make the record straight on our ideas on inspection which had been designed to minimize intrusion consistent with maintaining U.S. security. Secretary Rusk indicated he felt the present subject needed NATO discussion and questioned how we could avoid the four subjects upon which no decisions had yet been reached. Upon request for a schedule as to when these matters might be completed, Dr. Scoville indicated that the launcher question was basic to the entire MLF problem and it had been agreed that no attempt would be made to reach a decision until after the Soviets had evidenced constructive interest in the freeze proposal. With respect to prototype testing, a paper had been prepared and distributed to the Principals/6/ whose reply was presently being awaited. The problem of ABM systems definition had proven technically very difficult and a task group had just been formed to try and clarify this problem along with our ideas on how such controls on these systems could be verified. However, results could not be expected until August. The question of aerial surveillance would be resolved at any time that the principals chose to make a decision in this area. /6/See footnote 7, Document 30. Mr. Fisher indicated that our proposed schedule for processing the verification paper involved transmittal to NAC at the earliest possible time for discussion which might be somewhat more limited than the NAC discussion on the basic freeze paper. Following this, it would be discussed in a co-chairmen's meeting at Geneva prior to public presentation at the ENDC, probably within three-four weeks (now scheduled for 9 July 1964). This presentation was needed in order to answer the most critical public questions on the nature of the freeze. Mr. Fisher indicated that the other major problem with the position revolved around Mr. McCone's worries on the use of intelligence to support the verification. He believed that the paper had been modified so that intelligence was primarily in a supporting role but that he believed Mr. McCone had wished to discuss this matter./7/ In Mr. McCone's absence, Mr. Marengo indicated that the particular worry concerned the launcher problem which had not yet been defined. The paper proposed no inspection of existing launchers. While intelligence might be adequate for evaluating present declarations on launchers, there would always be a question on adequacy if the deployment made were changed or if mobile launchers were involved. He also worried about the perishability of intelligence and particularly how we could convince Congress and the public that our verification was satisfactory without disclosing intelligence sources. /7/See Document 28. Mr. Fisher agreed that convincing the public and Congress was a problem but one which had been handled satisfactorily in the past. Mr. McCone himself had been very effective in the test ban hearings and with proper briefings and other measures available to the Executive Branch, it is felt that proper support could be obtained for the measure without compromising our intelligence capabilities. Dr. Scoville mentioned that the proposed verification procedures used intelligence only to supply the U.S. the necessary information to make decisions. The basis for these decisions need not be disclosed and, therefore, the intelligence source not compromised. This appeared an appropriate use of intelligence in support of U.S. disarmament policy and Mr. Marengo agreed. General Taylor indicated he would like to receive a copy of Mr. McCone's letter on the proposal and Mr. Fisher read the letter to the group. Secretary Rusk pointed out the significance of CIA's views on the reliance which we could place on intelligence. Mr. Fisher next raised the matter of which subassemblies should be monitored. Gen. Taylor believed that the more subassemblies that could be monitored the better, and he indicated that from his studies both guidance system and re-entry vehicle production should be included. Dr. Scoville indicated that guidance systems had been omitted because of the difficulties in verification. Such systems could be produced in very small facilities, and it would be virtually impossible to detect clandestine production. Including guidance systems would put the U.S. in the position of abiding by a restriction over which they would have no reasonable possibility of confirming Soviet compliance. Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans/8/ concurred in this evaluation. With respect to re-entry vehicles, Dr. Scoville indicated that while these might be verifiable, they presented certain security problems to the U.S. Monitoring the production of re-entry vehicles might disclose sensitive U.S. information on warhead or penetration aid characteristics. Therefore it had been decided that it would not be in the U.S. interest to risk disclosure in these areas by allowing foreign inspection of such production. General Taylor indicated that he did not feel strongly on this subject and that if the others concurred, he would not press this point further. /8/Dr. Robert S. Seamans, Associate Administrator, NASA. Deputy Secretary Vance stated that the DOD was prepared to go ahead with the subject paper as presented. Secretary Rusk indicated that he would like to have the paper revised to define explicitly the status of our existing positions on the unresolved issues: prototype testing; launch site construction; and ABM. He also believed there should be a classified intelligence annex to the paper for discussion with the President which would point out the interaction of intelligence with the proposed verification procedures and the risk to intelligence of disclosure in justifying a measure before Congress and the public. He believed that there should also be a paper which outlined the parliamentary situation, i.e., our schedule and procedures for discussion with NAC, the co-chairman, and the ENDC. Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans indicated they had no problems with the paper as written. 2. Non-Proliferation Secretary Rusk opened the discussion on non-proliferation by asking for views on whether we would be prepared to have a non-proliferation agreement along the lines of previously proposed non-dissemination, non-acquisition measures without the participation of Communist China. How critical could the absence of China be to the usefulness of such agreements? The West Germans had indicated that they would go along if the Chinese would. Would the Senate concur in such measures without Chinese participation? Much of the previous thinking, and particularly the Soviet interest, had probably been directed at providing pressure on the Chinese. The possibilities of other countries obtaining an independent nuclear capability were more remote, although India, Israel, and Sweden were potential candidates. He did not wish for any formal Department positions but rather informal views. Mr. Fisher indicated that he felt that Chinese participation was not essential in order to have a very useful measure. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by China at some time in the not too distant future had already been written off by most of the world since no one at the present time saw any particularly promising way of preventing this. If we continue to insist on the participation of China as a precondition to non-proliferation agreements, this would indicate that the U.S. had written off non-proliferation as a viable measure. Other nations would question our sincerity in this area and this, in turn, might influence their decisions on developing nuclear capabilities. General Taylor asked whether we would propose to treat China as a nuclear power once she detonated her first nuclear weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that we should continue to use pressure, even after the detonation, to get China to adopt a sane nuclear policy. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Government has seriously looked at the problem of giving India nuclear weapons in the event that China had such a weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that he knew of no detailed look, but that he felt rather strongly that it would be more desirable to have U.S. controlled weapons providing defense or a deterrence against nuclear attack on India rather than India's having its own nuclear capability. Secretary Rusk indicated that he did not wish to prejudge this question but that he felt such a look would be useful. He pointed out that no Government position exists as to whether we would oppose other nations having nuclear weapons once China obtains them. Secretary Rusk then stated that he had considered a new U.S. approach to the problem of non-dissemination. This approach might take the form of a draft treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In addition, we would circulate a letter with those statements of our policy relative to MLF which state that this force should not lead to additional new national nuclear capabilities. This approach might replace the agreed minute under which we operate at the present time. Mr. Meeker indicated that he thought this would be a good approach since silence can be considered as meaning consent. The treaty would not be signed initially, but a "letter of intent" would be circulated first to the nuclear powers and then to the non-nuclear powers. This would provide the opportunity for each to indicate his "intent" but not to the point of commitment until it could be ascertained which other countries were going to be included. Secretary Rusk indicated that although the Soviets have always stated that the MLF is their only objection to a non-dissemination agreement, they may indeed have others. However, we had reason to believe that the Soviets had a real interest in non-dissemination and that, therefore, this might be in an area in which we had sufficient community of interest to obtain an agreement. He felt that we should work out a draft agreement and "letter of intent" and then send it around to see how many nations would join us, and then see who was missing. Secretary Vance indicated and others generally concurred that this was a matter worth exploring. Secretary Rusk said he had some questions about Recommendation #1 in Mr. Fisher's letter of 15 June on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the MLF./9/ He felt that it singled out the MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations which would not be required of other nations. Secretary Vance indicated that he had the same worry about this recommendation. /9/This recommendation stated: "That a policy decision be made now that the United States will assure that at the time the MLF Charter comes into being there will be some public commitment by the non-nuclear participants not to acquire a national nuclear capability." (Memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Multilateral Force-General, Box 22) It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on this subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting.
37. Summary of Actions/1/ Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS ACTION TAKEN ON VERIFICATION OF FREEZE PAPER The 6 June 1964 paper outlining procedures for verification of freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles was discussed with particular attention being given to the following points: a. The four unresolved issues; i.e.: (1) Types of controls to be applied to launchers; (2) Limitations to be placed on research and development and prototype testing: (3) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and (4) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections. It was agreed that the status of these unresolved issues should be made clear in the position paper or, in the case of aerial surveillance, in the forwarding letter to the White House. b. The relationship of intelligence to the verification of the freeze and the risks of compromise to intelligence sources. It was agreed that a classified annex discussing this relationship should be prepared for presentation to the White House prior to the use of the verification paper at the ENDC. c. The vehicle sub-assemblies which should be controlled under the freeze. After General Taylor presented the JCS views and general discussion thereon, it was agreed that guidance systems and re-entry vehicles should not be added to the sub-assemblies listed in the subject paper. The proposed paper on the verification of the freeze was then approved subject to the changes and additions discussed above. ACTION TAKEN ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION PAPER Secretary Rusk requested informal views on the importance of the participation of Communist China in any non-dissemination, non-acquisition measure. Mr. Fisher expressed the views that such measures would still have great usefulness without Chinese participation since he felt it still important to prevent additional countries from becoming nuclear powers. Secretary Rusk pointed out that at the moment no Governmental position existed as to whether we would oppose other nations, and particularly India, having nuclear weapons once China obtains them. Secretary Rusk suggested consideration be given to approaching the non-proliferation matter by means of a "letter of intent" in the form of a draft treaty along with a letter restating U.S. policy that the MLF should not lead to additional national nuclear capabilities. Others concurred in this suggestion as a useful approach. Secretary Rusk and Secretary Vance expressed concern about Recommendation No. 1 in Mr. Fisher's letter to Secretary of State Rusk dated June 15, 1964, on non-proliferation which singled out MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations not required of other nations. It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on the subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting.
38. Editorial Note In late June and early July 1964, during meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, Foster and the Soviet Representative Valerian Zorin met privately several times to discuss U.S. and Soviet approaches to arms reductions. At these discussions Foster particularly sought clarification of the Soviet proposal for reduction of military budgets, which Zorin apparently advanced to Foster privately on or before June 24 and formally introduced into the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on June 25. Text is in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 228-235. Memoranda of Foster's conversations with Zorin on June 26, June 30, and July 3, and a memorandum of conversation between Alexander Akalovsky, a member of the U.S. Delegation, and Soviet counterpart L. I. Mendelevich on July 4 are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Current Johnson-Khrushchev Papers. A more detailed memorandum of the last conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Volume III, Box 12.
39. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 11-2-64 Washington, July 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-64, USSR, Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. According to a note on the cover sheet: "This estimate consists of an updating of those subjects in NIE 11-2-63 about which significant new information has become available, and which merit a restatement. It includes topics under the following main headings from NIE 11-2-63, 'The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,' dated 2 July 1963: Nuclear Reactor Program--Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems; Fissionable Materials Production; Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program. The reader should refer to NIE 11-2-63 for information on other details of the Soviet atomic energy program." NIE 11-2-63 is ibid., National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63, USSR, Box 1) THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM The Problem To evaluate significant recent information and developments in the Soviet Atomic Energy Program and to estimate the probable future course of that program to mid-1974. Summary and Conclusions General 1. Since publication of NIE 11-2-63, final evaluations of Soviet nuclear devices tested in 1961 and 1962 and re-evaluations of several earlier devices have led to some changes in the estimate of Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities. While new evidence has led to no changes in the previous estimate of U-235 production, a small upward revision of current and future plutonium-equivalent production has been necessary. The estimate has been extended to cover a ten-year period to mid-1974. Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program/2/ /2/For the estimated number of Soviet submarines, see National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-63, dated 8 January 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-14-63 is ibid.] 2. Three basic classes of nuclear-powered submarines are known to have been constructed in the USSR and identified in an operational status. (See Table IV)./3/ A number of these submarines are probably undergoing modifications. The performance of the Lenin and several of the nuclear submarines during 1963 indicates that the Soviets have probably improved the reliability of their naval nuclear propulsion system. We believe, however, that there is a need for further improvement in their nuclear propulsion technology and operational reliability. (Paras. 17-18) /3/None of the six tables is printed. Fissionable Materials Production
3. There are three plutonium production sites in the USSR; these are located at Kyshtym in the Urals, and near Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Para. 21) 4. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Paras. 25-26) 5. Future production estimates have taken into consideration Khrushchev's statement in April 1964 that the Soviet Government had decided "to discontinue now the construction of two new, big, atomic reactors for the production of plutonium."/4/ We have no basis, at present, for ascertaining whether or not such construction has been discontinued. The spread shown in Table VI for the years 1967-74 represents estimates with and without continuing construction of new reactor facilities. It is estimated that even if reactor construction is discontinued, improvements in reactor operation will lead to increases in future annual plutonium-equivalent production rates. (Paras. 27-28) /4/Quoted from Khrushchev's statement, April 20, 1964. (Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 168)
6. There are four gaseous diffusion isotope separation complexes in the USSR: one at Verkh-Neyvinsk in the Urals, one north of Tomsk in Central Siberia, a third at Angarsk in the Lake Baykal region, and a fourth which started operation recently, north of Zaozerniy near Krasnoyarsk. Consideration of all available information leads to a U-235 production estimate (see Table VI) which is essentially the same as that shown in NIE 11-2-63. (Paras. 29-32) 7. We estimate that the probable Soviet cumulative U-235 production for mid-1964 is 170,000 kilograms and that it is unlikely that actual cumulative U-235 production is less than 100,000 or more than 220,000 kilograms./5/ There is no valid means, short of on-site inspection of determining whether or not or by how much the USSR will carry out the announcement by Khrushchev that the USSR has decided " . . . in the next several years to reduce substantially the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons . . .," therefore, a cut-back has not been assumed in the projected estimate. We estimate that by 1967 the [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] will increase the Soviet U-235 production capacity 60 percent over their mid-1964 production rate. (Paras. 30-32) /5/See page 21 for the view of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy. [Footnote in the source text.] Nuclear Weapons
8. The Soviets significantly improved their fission and thermonuclear weapon capabilities as a result of the 1961-62 test series. However, the status of Soviet nuclear weapon technology, while highly sophisticated and apparently adequate for their present needs, is such that substantial advances can still be made through further development and testing. We believe that the Soviets are continuing an active weapon development program. They will certainly have a continuing requirement to test at a greater rate/6/ than has been evident since the Test Ban Treaty was initialed in July 1963. (Paras. 42-48, 50-57 and 64) /6/As of 1 July 1964 three tests had been detected. [Footnote in the source text.] 9. Fission Weapons. By 1958, the Soviets had developed implosion devices encompassing a variety of yields and physical dimensions and employing boosting techniques in some cases. The 1961-62 test series provided the Soviets with improved fission weapon capabilities. [2 lines of source text not declassified] However, a large number of new devices were tested without employment of boosting. This perhaps indicates that the Soviets will limit their employment of boosting, thus, in their unboosted weapons gaining simplicity and a reduced requirement for tritium at the cost of some increases in vulnerability, fissionable materials, and size, and perhaps decreased yield. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] However, possible undetected tests and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] might have provided the Soviets with still smaller low-yield weapons. (Paras. 41-45) 10. Thermonuclear Developments. By 1958 the Soviets had tested a variety of thermonuclear devices [2 lines of source text not declassified]. In 1961 and 1962, the Soviets greatly improved the performance of their thermonuclear weapons and extended their yield experience. [10 lines of source text not declassified] 11. [10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Future Weapon Development and Testing 12. We have detected only three Soviet tests in the twelve months since the initialing of the Test Ban Treaty in July 1963. There are undoubtedly a variety of useful tests the Soviets could now conduct underground both for research and development and for military purposes. We have no evidence that they have conducted tests banned by the Treaty and do not believe they will resort to such tests so long as the options of underground testing and formal treaty withdrawal are open to them. (Para. 65) 13. It is certain that the Soviet weapons laboratories have remained active and are creating new test requirements. The potential improvements obtainable through underground testing together with the high rate of US underground testing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] between 1 August 1963 and 1 July 1964--must be generating considerable pressure on the Soviet leadership for a more vigorous test program than has been conducted to date. We do not believe, however, that research, development and military requirements alone are now so pressing as to necessitate withdrawal from the Treaty or are likely to become so in the near term. Hence, we believe that political factors will be the major consideration in reaching a decision whether or not to withdraw. If such a decision is made by the Soviets, atmospheric testing by the French or Chinese Communists might provide the pretext. (Para. 66) 14. If the Soviets embark on a reasonably extensive underground testing program involving yields up to about 200 KT, they could achieve, during the period of this estimate, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. Improvements in Soviet low-yield devices which could occur during the period of this estimate are more likely to emphasize the development of small-diameter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads rather than [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. 15. Underground testing and simulation techniques would permit the acquisition of a limited amount of weapon effects data, including the effect of ground shock upon hardened underground structure, the effects of nuclear radiation upon materials or systems components, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Other effects data related to high-altitude effects and the full effects of electromagnetic pulse could not be obtained through underground testing. (Paras. 72-74) [Here follow Part I. Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program; Part II. Fissionable Materials Production; Part III. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program; and Annex A. Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests (29 August 1949-6 June 1964.] [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |