1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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40. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Scoville, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. The source text is also attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 41, which provides the time and place of the meeting. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by commenting that he thought the subject paper/3/ was quite complicated and questioned whether this would be understandable to the political representatives at the ENDC. Mr. Foster pointed out that most of the representatives at the ENDC had been intimately involved in the disarmament problem for two or more years and were therefore quite used to handling papers of this sort. He added that many of the items here had been previously handled in briefer form in the ENDC and the objective was to present this more detailed material on verification in order to answer and clarify certain Soviet objections. Certain areas of the freeze were not covered, such as ABMs, prototype testing and elaboration on the launcher problem. He felt that it was very desirable, however, to present this material on either the 6th or the 20th of August since these were the two dates during the present session at which the U.S. would be in a position to select the topics. /3/Reference is to the position papers, "Draft U.S. Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles," July 9, which was sent to the Committee of Principals under cover of a memorandum from Foster, July 9. A prefatory note to this paper states that it was based "on the U.S. statement in NAC together with the substance of the amendments transmitted in Todis 1508 of July 7." (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) Todis 1508 is ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-3. Secretary Rusk believed the paper was suitable for presentation but suggested two additional paragraphs; one at the beginning and one at the end. The initial introduction would point out that the freeze was a serious U.S. proposal but that the present paper was illustrative in nature and not a complete or definitive U.S. position. These and other subjects would have to be negotiated out in detail. A final paragraph would be added which would point out that this paper did not cover all subjects and would list the various items which would have to be considered at a future time. Mr. Foster concurred in the concept of an introductory paragraph which would put the present statement in an illustrative context. He doubted, however, the desirability of mentioning the specific items in a final paragraph since this might open these for detailed discussion at a time when the U.S. had not yet achieved agreed upon positions. In this connection he indicated that the insertion (Page 11) on launch site inspection proposed by Mr. McCone would raise some problems since we did not have a position on the desired type of controls on launch sites./4/ Secretary McNamara indicated that he, too, felt some kind of an introduction was needed to point out that this was only a partial discussion of the problem but agreed that specific issues need not be detailed. /4/Reference presumably is to a later paper, "Proposed Modifications in Draft U.S. Statement to the ENDC on Verfication of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles." July 17, which has not been found. Mr. Bundy suggested that in view of the importance of ABMs this could be used as an example in order to avoid possible implications that ABMs were no longer a part of the freeze. Secretary Rusk asked whether the inspections were not so arduous that the Soviets would never accept them. Mr. Foster explained that while inspection was quite detailed, it was very much less than that which existed for GCD. Mr. McCone explained his reasons for recommending the inclusion of the sentence on launcher inspection (Page 11). He felt that without it the right to inspect existing launchers for unauthorized improvements would be foreclosed. He also suggested the deletion of the clause, "yet at the same time unnecessarily intrusive," at the end of the last paragraph on Page 14./5/ He felt it would be difficult to justify or misleading to indicate that the type of inspection required would not be intrusive to the Soviets. He further observed that there had been in the past considerable criticism of inspection systems which observed the removal of things, but did not inspect the remainders. He further agreed with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the need for an introductory paragraph. Mr. Foster observed that the purpose of the "intrusive" phrase was to try to bring the Soviets along on this inspection and that indeed the inspection was very much less intrusive than that required for GCD. Secretary Rusk suggested that perhaps the language might be changed to draw the comparison with GCD, and this was agreed upon. /5/The full text of this paragraph is as follows: "The U.S. believes that an inspection arrangement of the type I have just described, together with such additional procedures as might be required, would afford adequate assurance of compliance with the proposed freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and yet at the same time not be unnecessarily intrusive." Secretary Rusk also wondered whether the language was adequate to provide protection against inspection of sensitive installations. Mr. Foster read the sections on Pages 13 and 14, and indicated that he believed this adequately covered the problem which would be admittedly difficult. He felt that the situation would be adequate to guard against significant violations. Some discussion ensued on what violations would be significant, but it was agreed that this was a very complicated problem and could not be resolved at this time. Secretary McNamara expressed a desire not to foreclose at this time on this subject or on the numbers and types of inspections required. Mr. Bundy agreed that the paper should remain loose and said he felt that it was just about right at the present time. He felt that it was important to present it at this time at Geneva since this had been one of the key points in the President's position. General Wheeler requested clarification on why it was proposed to change the phrasing on additional procedures in Paragraph 1, Page 14./6/ He preferred the original wording. Although State had proposed this change, Secretary Rusk said he had no objection to going back to the old wording and all concurred. With these changes it was agreed that the paper would be suitable for presentation at Geneva at an early date. /6/This paragraph related to procedures for withdrawal from a treaty covering a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles. Other Business Secretary Rusk observed that he was worried about the procedures involved in handling the collateral or partial measures. The negotiation of large numbers of treaties with all the complications of developing precise and agreed language and the clearing of these treaties through the Government and the Senate were very cumbersome and time-consuming. He thought we should look at other alternatives such as a possible Arms Commission under the Security Council which would keep a roster of information on the armed forces of all countries. This Commission could keep everyone informed and might make it easier to achieve arms reductions by unilateral decisions. Such decisions would be less binding and, therefore, perhaps not require elaborate control mechanisms. Mr. Foster observed that this was the general direction in which we were presently going and quoted the examples of the bombs in orbit resolution, budget reduction, and the fissionable material cutback. He felt that the ENDC still served a very useful purpose even in these types of arrangements and he would not like to see this abandoned. Secretary Rusk felt that it was desirable to develop some machinery which would get the smaller nations involved in arms control since almost all the arms control activity involved only the U.S. and the USSR. Mr. Foster indicated that this had resulted from the criticality of the nuclear forces in the present age, but agreed that other areas were important. He agreed that we should explore this other approach. Mr. McCone agreed that the small nation problem was extremely worrisome and could precipitate all of us into war. Mr. Foster informed the group that he had prepared a paper on non-dissemination/7/ as a follow-up to the discussion at the 16 June 1964 Principals' meeting./8/ He stated that this paper should have a limited distribution to the Principals in view of its sensitivity and would go out shortly for comment. /7/Entitled, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," this draft position paper was sent under cover of a memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, July 23. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) /8/See Documents 36 and 37. Secretary Rusk informed the group that Mr. Butler had requested permission to tell Khrushchev on his forthcoming visit that we would never give up the veto on the MLF./9/ Secretary Rusk had told Mr. Butler that this would not be appropriate since it would have to be considered by all eight countries./10/ Secretary McNamara agreed, but he felt very strongly that we should avoid giving the reverse impression. He felt that a number of Government people were encouraging the idea of giving up the veto either by leaks or in private conversations. He thought this was very bad and would be a great disservice to the success of many of our programs and our policies, and even to the MLF itself. Secretary Rusk agreed and said he would pass these instructions on to his staff. Mr. Foster indicated that in the ACDA paper it was attempted to develop a language which would "waffle" the situation, by referring to no increase in the number of independent entities having control over nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara had some doubts on the desirability of any language at this time. He stated that he had made it clear to various European leaders, and believed Secretary Rusk had done likewise, that when the day came that European nations could have an independent nuclear force it would be the day that the U.S. would remove its five divisions from Europe. He had discussed this with Von Hassel and he did not feel there was any great pressure from the German side for this control./11/ Secretary Rusk agreed and stated that a Europe with an independent nuclear force also meant an independent U.S. /9/British Foreign Minister Butler had several talks with Khrushchev and Gromyko during his visit to Moscow July 27-August 1. Using reports not yet approved by Butler, Richard Faber, British First Secretary, summarized these talks in a conversation with Richard Freund, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR. In his talk with Gromyko on July 29, Butler said that his government would not take part in the MLF without a veto on the use of weapons nor if it thought the MLF would be provocative to the Soviets. After Gromyko replied with a tirade against Germany, Butler "reiterated that Britain would retain a veto on the use of nuclear weapons and that the control arrangements could not be changed without British consent." (Memorandum of conversation, August 7; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) /10/This conversation or communication has not been further identified. /11/Reference is apparently to McNamara's trip to Bonn from May 9-11, during which he held several conversations with German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. Documentation on this visit is scheduled for publication in volume XV. Upon a request from Mr. Bundy for the Geneva schedule, Mr. Foster pointed out that we had two days, 6 and 20 August, on which the U.S. could select topics for discussion. One of these would be covered by the freeze paper which had been agreed upon today./12/ The other subjects which had been agreed for discussion as a part of the collateral measures were non-dissemination, fissionable materials cutoff, budget and bomber destruction. He had suggested termination for the present session early in September to permit smaller countries to prepare for the UN meeting in the fall and to avoid unprofitable discussions during the pre-election period. Secretary Rusk wondered whether we could not raise the topic of arms control in other countries than the U.S. and the USSR, perhaps initially in private discussions with the Soviets. Mr. Bundy indicated that this should be handled with great care since it was potentially explosive. It was agreed that the matter would be studied. /12/The draft paper was revised to incorporate the decisions of the meeting, and the approved paper was forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, July 24. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) Acting Representative Timberlake read the approved paper at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on August 27. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 367-373. Timberlake's statement was identical to the text of the July 9 paper cited in footnote 3 above except for a few sentences and an added opening and final paragraph. The meeting was adjourned at 9 a.m.
41. Summary of Actions/1/ Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS 1. Verification of the Freeze
(a) July 9, 1964, Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Draft US Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles/2/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 40. (b) July 17, 1964, Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Proposed Modifications in Draft US Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles/3/ /3/See footnote 4, Document 40. Reference (a) with amendments included in Reference (b) was approved for presentation at Geneva with the following modifications:/4/ /4/Regarding presentation of the approved paper at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee conference, see footnote 12, Document 40. a. An introductory paragraph would be added which placed the speech in an illustrative context rather than as fixed complete U.S. position. The incompleteness of the subjects covered should be described using the ABM problem as an example. b. Paragraph 1, Page 14, was approved without the amendment in Reference (b), and with the final clause to be modified to describe the intrusiveness in comparison to GCD inspection. 2. Other Business a. It was agreed, on Secretary Rusk's suggestion, that studies be made of other modes of handling arms control negotiations which might facilitate unilateral measures not requiring treaties and which might increase attention toward arms control by nations other than the U.S. and the USSR. Any international discussions of this should be handled with great care. b. Announcement was made by Mr. Foster that a new non-dissemination paper, based on the discussions at the 16 June meeting, would be shortly distributed on a limited basis to the Principals. It was also agreed that it would have been inappropriate for Mr. Butler to have given Khrushchev assurances that the veto would never be removed from the MLF. However, statements should not be made on any basis which would imply that the veto would be given up. A radical change in U.S.-European relationships would occur if the Europeans had an independent nuclear force.
42. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Jacob D. Beam, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. The source text is also attached to the summary of action taken at the meeting, Document 43, which provides the time and place of the meeting. SUBJECT /2/A draft position paper, transmitted under cover of an August 11 memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals; not printed. In his memorandum Foster explained that a statement of this kind, if approved, might be issued at the time of the recess by Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee or in the Committee's report to the United Nations. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) PARTICIPANTS /3/Not printed. Secretary Rusk asked two preliminary questions: first, whether, barring unforeseen developments such as possibly might occur in the Far East could one foresee the shape of next year's military budget? (Secretary McNamara replied the DOD budget would be about the same as this year's and Mr. Palfrey said the same applied with respect to AEC); secondly, what are the Soviets doing about expenditures, are they reducing? (Mr. McCone replied they were not.) Mr. McCone continued that he had a summary to read from which shows that Soviet public statements and actions in this field are contradictory. It appears that the Soviets are engaging in a dynamic expansion of their weapons program by steps such as the following: testing of the new ICBM types and launch systems; continued expansion of fissionable materials capacity, including new reactors; construction of fourteen large reactors; increase up to thirty, of the number of nuclear submarines, and conversion of old submarines; expansion of aircraft plants. In summary, this was not a crash program but a consistently expanding one, despite public statements designed to mislead world opinion. In reply to a question, Mr. McCone said his statement was based on a study which had just been prepared by a special group and general distribution had not been made./4/ /4/This study has not been further identified. Secretary McNamara generally agreed with the substance of Mr. McCone's report but said its significance depended to some extent on interpretation. The facts are not new; the Soviets are building new missiles, including Polaris types, are engaged in hardening of sites, etc. It was obvious that the Soviets are trying to strengthen their position, faced as they are with U.S. overall superiority. On the other hand, economic pressures may be working on them to reduce expenditures. We should try to lead them toward this objective but Secretary McNamara doubted whether this could be done by a public statement of the kind envisaged which he felt might have unfavorable effects on Vietnam, our European allies, etc. In reply to Mr. Foster's question regarding the two plutonium reactors which the Soviets said they would not complete,/5/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It was possible, of course, that they may have decreased by that number the new reactors they plan to build. If two were actually shut down, they would probably be earlier types. /5/Reference is to Khrushchev's statement in his April 17 message to President Johnson and repeated publicly in his April 20 statement that the Soviet Union was stopping construction of two large plutonium reactors. See Documents 23 and 24, respectively. Mr. Foster thought it would be valuable to obtain more knowledge about Soviet military expenditures and an attempt to secure records would be useful. The question is, and the answer would seem to be affirmative, whether it would be advantageous to the U.S. to have a commitment from the Soviets, proceeding from the Geneva discussions, to reduce their military expenditures. A statement along the lines proposed might have a good effect on the smaller nations, might furnish the Soviets an opportunity to make reductions, strengthening their hand in their dispute with the Chinese communists. Some kind of understanding on how to deal with budgets was probably the only hopeful area for progress at this session of the ENDC. Essentially the decision before the Committee of Principals was a political one and it should be examined in the light of a balance between potential advantage and disadvantage to the U.S. Mr. Foster informed the Committee that he intended to return to Geneva during the first week of September for the remainder of the session which is due to end September 17. Secretary Rusk thought that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft statement offered the best possibilities and were the only things really requiring agreement./6/ We favor these ideas, the Soviets do not. As regards paragraph 6, we make this information public anyway and perhaps we should try to get the principle accepted as a minimum; later we might examine other avenues. We should not "express satisfaction" with Soviet budgetary announcements, since we don't know their meaning./7/ Secretary Rusk suggested the Committee approve paragraphs 5 and 6 which could be set forth in a speech and might lead to the setting up of a useful technical mechanism for the examination of budgets. /6/Paragraph 5 called for a joint statement on the technical questions involved in establishing commonly understood budgetary procedures. Paragraph 6 was a recommendation to the U.N. Assembly that all nations submit to the U.N. Secretary-General annual reports on their actual military expenditures for the preceding year, planned military expenditures for the following year, and supplementary data to permit evaluations of the scope of and changes in expenditures devoted to the military effort. /7/An apparent reference to paragraph 2 of the draft joint statement: "An expression of satisfaction at the announcement by the Soviet Union and the United States of reductions in their current military budgets." Mr. Bundy was reluctant to encourage disclosure beyond existing budgets since we would not wish to give supplementary information in some fields. Secretary Rusk pointed out our foreign military aid programs were mostly public knowledge; we should try to engage the smaller countries in doing something about disarmament. Among the non-aligned Eight at Geneva, Mexico was probably the most sincere since many of the others were expanding their military establishments. Secretary McNamara approved paragraphs 5 and 6 but opposed any suggestion there should be a mandatory reduction. In reply to Mr. Foster's question whether a revision of the paragraphs preceding 5 and 6 in the draft statement might be acceptable, Mr. Bundy expressed doubt about the usefulness of a statement. Reductions were important but the suggested timing and place for a statement of this kind seemed inappropriate. As regards the reported feeling of malaise among the non-aligned at Geneva, this might possibly be confined to the delegates only and might not apply to their Governments as such. Since it might merely be a question of personal feelings, the matter did not seem to be of major substantive importance. Mr. Foster said a statement might benefit the work of the Geneva conference. At any rate, the Soviets had shown some interest, even though we had been unsuccessful in obtaining their agreement to a technical working group on budgetary matters. An understanding at Geneva might be helpful in easing tensions which could arise in the General Assembly and among the Africans with respect to difficult questions such as non-dissemination, MLF, etc. It might be possible to avoid the bad effects which a statement on budgets might produce on NATO. In any event, we should not let the decision as to whether a statement was useful or not go by default. Secretary Rusk indicated the Committee could agree on something along the lines of paragraphs 5 and 6 as the basis for a statement at Geneva which could be helpful in mitigating crisis tensions. The statement should not exaggerate the limited progress achieved but could expand on the objectives we are seeking through our disarmament discussions.
43. Summary of Actions/1/ Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS 1. Statement Relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures Reference: August 11 ACDA Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Recommended Content of a Joint Statement relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 42. At an appropriate occasion a statement may be made in the ENDC utilizing the substance of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft attached to reference paper; statement would also relate question of military expenditures to broad U.S. disarmament objectives./3/ /3/See footnote 6, Document 42. 2. Other Business A new ACDA non-dissemination paper, responsive to the discussions at the 16 June meeting, will be distributed this week to the Principals./4/ /4/See Document 37. For the draft U.S. position paper, see Document 44.
44. Draft Position Paper/1/ Washington, August 14, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Noforn. The source text was forwarded to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Foster. Foster's memorandum indicated that the paper "is based in part on discussion at the June 16 and July 23 meetings of the Committee of Principals and also sets forth a U.S. response to the recent resolution of the Organization of African Unity on this subject." Regarding these two meetings of the Committee of Principals, see Documents 36, 37, 40, and 41. The OAU resolution refers to the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity at Cairo, July 21. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 294-295. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS I. The Problem Our current estimate is that there could be a test of a Chinese Communist nuclear device at any time, but that it may not occur until late 1964 or early 1965. This estimate is being reviewed now but is still considered valid. There are today at least three or four states in addition to the nuclear powers which could make a national decision to produce nuclear weapons with assurance that they have the national capability to support this decision. This number will increase as nuclear technology continues to develop throughout the world, as it becomes increasingly feasible to use manufacturing techniques amenable to clandestine operations, and as large nuclear power reactors are placed throughout the world producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium annually. The detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists will place great pressure on these countries to make a national decision to develop nuclear weapons in some cases for reasons of security, and in other cases for reasons of prestige. Because of regional rivalries a national decision by any of these countries may force other countries perhaps technically less qualified to make a similar national decision to engage in an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons either by development or by other means. Once this process starts it may be impossible to halt. The problem which faces the United States is how to prevent it from starting--how to develop political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities which are sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation. The problem which faces the United States is how to develop these political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities within the limited period of time available to us. If we do not solve this problem--either because of mistake or because of delay--we will soon be faced with a world in which there are ten and then possibly twenty states having national nuclear capabilities. This would be a world of the greatest danger and insecurity. II. The United States Position 1. The United States should intensify its program to prevent the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities which should include the following lines of action, which are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued in parallel. They should include: (a) efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs; (b) efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development and production of nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union a nuclear non-proliferation agreement open to accession of all states; and (d) efforts to develop the widest possible political consensus favorable to such a non-proliferation agreement which will make a national decision to acquire a nuclear capability more difficult even before such an agreement comes into effect. 2. With respect to our efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs we should examine on a case-by-case basis the feasibility and desirability of bringing appropriate arguments, pressures and inducements to bear on countries which are estimated to have both the technical capability and a strong incentive to manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of, nuclear weapons. Where legitimate security concerns may represent a principal source of the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, the usefulness of security arrangements or guarantees, in which the United States might participate or assist, should be given special consideration. Consistent with the foregoing we should: (a) accord high priority to the development of an approach to the problem of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by India; and (b) develop approaches in the case of additional countries determined to warrant such consideration. 3. With respect to efforts to impede the spread of technical capabilities required for development and production of nuclear weapons, we should undertake the following courses of action. (a) We should consider arrangements among major suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment to permit exports to only those nations prepared to accept adequate safeguards. We should not limit our consideration of this problem to formal agreements offered in arms control and disarmament negotiations. (b) We should seek to strengthen arrangements to prevent or delay the dissemination of relevant technology, including such developments as the gas-centrifuge process. (c) We should continue our efforts to strengthen the capabilities of the IAEA to assure the use of fissionable material for peaceful purposes only and continue our efforts to win acceptance of IAEA safeguards. 4. The U.S. should continue its efforts to negotiate, initially with the Soviet Union, a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. A revised text to be used for this purpose is attached as Annex A. (a) As a government, we recognize that no agreement with the Soviet Union on non-proliferation would be possible in the foreseeable future were we to make inclusion of the Chinese Communists a precondition. The U.S. should refrain from raising the question of whether Communist China must be a party to a non-proliferation agreement. If the USSR asks for our views on this matter, we should state that Communist China in our view should be a participant in any such agreement both because of the problem of India and because of the desirability of having the agreement world-wide in scope. We should not indicate that we consider Soviet acceptance of this view a precondition to further discussions of the subject. We should indicate that we are prepared to defer consideration of this problem until we have completed the discussion of other aspects of the agreement. (b) In order to increase the negotiability of the non-proliferation agreement by lessening the implication that Soviet acceptance of the U.S. text would constitute Soviet endorsement of the MLF, a letter to the Soviet Government (attached as Annex B)/2/ should be used in place of the earlier U.S. draft minute for the purpose of giving reassurance with respect to the MLF at the time of the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. The U.S. should give in the draft letter (final paragraph of Annex B) an assurance that the "European clause" of the MLF Charter would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. should support and encourage appropriate efforts which may develop among participants in the MLF to register a commitment on non-acquisition in connection with adherence to the MLF. /2/Not printed. (c) In discussing a non-proliferation agreement with the USSR, the U.S. should suggest that a willingness to accept International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities of states not presently possessing nuclear weapons should preferably be made a part of the agreement. However, the U.S. should be prepared to adhere to the position already made known to the Soviets and accept an agreement without such international safeguard provisions if the USSR rejects such provisions. 5. The U.S. should continue its efforts to develop the widest possible political consensus favorable to a non-proliferation agreement, and thus make more difficult prior to such an agreement any national decision to acquire a nuclear capability. The Cairo OAU resolution of July, 1964, in which the OAU member states declared their willingness to undertake in an international treaty "not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons," and called upon "all peace-loving nations to adhere to the same undertaking" should be used as a vehicle to obtain such a consensus by the following line of action: (a) By means of private consultation with selected OAU member states at appropriate times, the U.S. should urge preparation of language for a draft U.N. resolution and a draft treaty which does not conflict with the MLF, U.S. transit rights, or other U.S. objectives, so as to assure that the proposed resolution and treaty could be supported by the U.S. and its allies when the disarmament discussions resume in the U.N.G.A. (b) The United States should review the question of the desirability of the international conference called for in the OAU resolution and should also consider other means of developing the treaty called for if a conference is determined not to be in the best interests of the United States. (c) We should continue to state publicly, at appropriate times, that we welcome the basic objectives of the OAU resolution as a valuable step toward such a consensus, and we should quietly encourage other states to associate themselves with the OAU resolution. III. Discussion A. Efforts to Discourage Individual States from Embarking on a Nuclear Weapons Program. At the present time Israel, India, Sweden, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have the technical capability to support a national decision to produce nuclear weapons. The development of a national nuclear weapons capability by any one of these countries would exacerbate international tensions and tend to induce additional states to follow suit. At the present time the United States has an on-going program to deal with the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and with the broader aspects of the Middle East arms race. The U.S. should, of course, continue this program. It also should expand it, on a case-by-case basis, to discourage other states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs. It should do so at a level of urgency commensurate with the need to develop political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. It should consider, where feasible, the desirability of security arrangements, in which the U.S. participates or assists, where legitimate security concerns may represent a principal source of the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. In considering tactics and timing--in gauging the sense of urgency required--it must also be recognized that the estimates as to when these various countries could detonate a nuclear device is not a true measure of the time available to us. The critical time is the time of national decision to develop nuclear weapons. This could be made very soon by any of three or four governments, with confidence that they have the technical capabilities to back it up. Once made, such a decision may be hard to change, even though the actual nuclear detonation may not occur for some period of time afterwards. In considering such an expanded program, high priority should be given to the problem of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by India. The detonation of a Chinese Communist nuclear device will put great pressure on India to make a national decision to develop nuclear weapons of its own. The development of nuclear weapons by India would be a serious--perhaps irreparable--break in the political and psychological barrier which now restrains proliferation. The U.S. should make every effort to prevent such a development, including the consideration of the possibility of appropriate security arrangements. The U.S. should also consider developing approaches with respect to the other countries which have been mentioned. In considering such an expanded program there must be recognition of the fact that, in several key states, the success of such bilateral efforts may depend upon parallel progress toward a non-proliferation agreement open to accession by all states, and the attitude of the United States concerning the creation of additional centers of decision over nuclear weapons in the context of the MLF. Looking at the other side of the coin, the success or failure of our efforts to prevent other countries from developing national nuclear capabilities will also have a direct bearing on the success or failure of MLF. If the political and psychological barrier which now restrains proliferation is broken down, the objectives of our MLF policy will be seriously threatened. For example, should India, Israel, Japan, or Sweden acquire an independent nuclear capability, the Federal Republic would probably come to feel that it had accepted second-class status in limiting its nuclear power to that provided by the MLF. B. Efforts to Impede the Technical Capabilities Required for Development and Production of Nuclear Weapons. Efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development of production of nuclear weapons systems cannot be a substitute for the political approaches to prevent national decision to develop nuclear weapons outlined in the other portions of this paper. As indicated earlier in this discussion there are already at least five countries (apart from China) which now have the technical capabilities to support a decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, the problem of developing a modern delivery capability daily appears less of an inhibition on any decision of an industrialized nation to seek a nuclear capability. Effort to impede these technical capabilities is necessary to keep the political problem one of manageable proportions. A political program of the type outlined in the preceding and succeeding portions of this paper may be manageable if it has to cope primarily with the five countries mentioned. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, if the number is increased to fifteen. For example, there will soon be many countries with nuclear power reactors producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium per year. If some form of action is not taken to prevent the diversion of this plutonium to weapons, it will be almost impossible to bring this problem under control. It is for this reason that the political program outlined in the other portions of this paper must be accompanied by continuing efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development and production of nuclear weapons systems. These measures should include continued efforts to strengthen the IAEA, the consideration of an arrangement among major suppliers of nuclear materials to limit export to those nations prepared to accept adequate safeguards and a consideration of ways to impede dissemination of relevant technology. C. Negotiation of a Non-Proliferation Agreement.
The reopening of discussions with the Soviet Union on the question of a non-proliferation agreement emphasizes the question of the participation of Communist China in any such agreement. Communist China will almost certainly refuse to adhere to any nuclear non-acquisition agreement. At the present time, therefore, the United States cannot continue to insist on Chinese adherence without foreclosing all opportunities for achieving such an agreement. The Soviets are also aware of this, and it would not be in the interests of the United States to indicate to them that we are not really interested in such an agreement at the present time. Moreover, we should not delay our efforts to work out a multilateral agreement as part of our overall efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, such as Israel, Sweden, India, and Germany, until the Chinese problem is settled. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world would not alleviate the problems raised by a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation. Even if the Chinese were to develop a nuclear capability, a world of five nuclear powers would be far preferable to a world of ten or twenty. One useful contribution of an agreement, even if it did not include Communist China, would be to isolate China still further in world opinion, and to undercut Chinese efforts to develop friendly relations among the less-developed countries of the world. Moreover, the agreement would strengthen the Soviets' hand in maintaining their non-assistance policy with respect to Communist China, regardless of any changes which might occur in their relations with the Chinese Communist leadership. As a matter of negotiating tactics, it would be unwise for the United States to take an initiative in indicating it is dropping its prior requirement of Chinese Communist participation. It would be preferable for the United States merely not to raise this subject when the problem of non-proliferation is next raised with the Soviets. If the Soviets raise the issue of Chinese participation, we could restate our position that Chinese Communists should participate, indicate that we do not consider this a precondition for continuation of discussions of a non-proliferation agreement and state that the question should be deferred until we have reached an understanding on other provisions of such an agreement. If we should be able to come to a satisfactory understanding on all other provisions of a non-proliferation agreement, we would then consult with our allies on the issue of Chinese Communist participation.
For more than a year, the United States has been trying to persuade the USSR to accept a non-proliferation agreement. The MLF has been cited by the Soviets as the only obstacle to reaching such an agreement. In attempting to persuade the Soviets to accept our language regarding non-proliferation to the national control of other states, the U.S. has stressed the argument that such an agreement will give further assurance that the MLF will not in fact become a device through which Germany could acquire such control. We have thus confronted the Soviets with the dilemma of either accepting such language or seeing the MLF come into being with no commitment of this kind to limit its evolution. The procedure which we have followed so far of using a minute to set forth our views on the MLF has one element of difficulty. The non-proliferation agreement and minute which we have proposed to the Soviet Union could be interpreted by them as implicitly sanctioning the MLF. It is unlikely that they will enter into any agreement which can be interpreted as having such effect, at least as long as they have any hope that the MLF will not come into existence. The present procedure, therefore, may have inhibited any progress on a non-proliferation agreement until there has been a final resolution of the MLF, if not for some time thereafter. This would not be a serious disadvantage were it not for the possibility that nuclear developments by other states might meanwhile progress to a point which would not only cause a further break in the non-proliferation dike, but, for the reasons indicated above, would probably make the Germans unwilling to remain satisfied with the MLF. The relevance of such developments to the urgency of a non-proliferation agreement should be pointed out to the USSR. The proposed procedure of using a letter rather than a minute is designed to make somewhat more likely Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement, since the USSR would not have to agree expressly to our letter. In addition, the U.S. letter (Annex B) contains an undertaking that if a nuclear non-proliferation agreement is concluded the U.S. will not agree to future arrangements that would increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. should point out to the USSR that this portion of the letter is intended to deal with the concern which the USSR has expressed regarding possible future evolution of the MLF. This portion of the letter is along the lines of the assurances which Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns, at our private suggestion, gave to Khrushchev last June./3/ The immediate question, then, relates not to what the U.S. position on the evolution of the MLF should be, but to when and how we should reveal our position. /3/Luns met with Khrushchev on July 8, 1964, and on the following day summarized their conversation in a meeting with Ambassador Foy D. Kohler. Kohler then reported: "Luns said conversation with Khrushchev had focused primarily on Germany and MLF. Discussion of MLF took nearly half of ninety-minute meeting and was based on Secretary's letter to Luns, content of which was incorporated in memo left with Khrushchev. Luns said Khrushchev listened carefully, asked pertinent questions and seemed impressed. Luns tried to establish the basis by demonstrating that Dutch losses in World War II were comparable to Soviet losses and that Dutch feeling with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons to Germany no less strong than those of Soviets. While Khrushchev's own remarks were consistent with established and often-repeated Soviet opposition to MLF, Luns feels there may be some chance for a shift." (Telegram 73 from Moscow, July 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Europe and U.S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Cables, Vol. IV, Box 218) The Secretary's letter to Luns has not been found. It has been argued that a clear U.S. acceptance of restraints now on the evolution of MLF, as desired by the British, would permit the British to gain their objectives without having to join, and hence reduce the pressure on them to join. It is more likely that the British decision will be governed at the proper time by considerations broader than those of mere tactics and will depend upon the UK's judgment of its basic interest in either joining or staying out. Since Britain's ultimate participation in the MLF is valuable to us, it seems worth facilitating by agreeing, at this stage, to the position which is recommended in this paper. This is particularly so since the basic US position, whose final form has been set even now by the almost certain insistence of Congress on restraints, is essentially the same as that of the UK. Any delusion or vagueness contrived for tactical purposes is not likely in the long run to enhance the effectiveness of German or Italian participation in the MLF. Vagueness about our position on the evolution of the MLF will also handicap our efforts to dissuade India, Israel, and other countries from embarking on nuclear weapons programs. As indicated earlier, failure in these efforts may undercut the MLF as an alternative to German national nuclear capability. An important consideration, moreover, is the possible effect of the proposed undertaking on negotiations with the USSR. While the Soviets will continue to oppose the MLF for a number of reasons, a large part of their stated concern is the prospect that the MLF is a step toward acquisition of a nuclear capability by the FRG. If the Soviets, by adhering to our proposed non-proliferation agreement, could obtain from the U.S. a clear undertaking against such evolution, the Soviets might reconsider their present negative position. Given increasing Soviet concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to a number of countries, as well as their incentive to find a new vehicle for isolating China in world opinion, it is possible that the proposed undertaking would tip the balance, at least to the extent of permitting resumption of serious negotiations on a non-proliferation agreement. It might also make prompt agreement possible once the MLF issue had been resolved. It is recommended that the U.S. support and encourage appropriate efforts which may develop among participants in the MLF to register a commitment on non-acquisition in connection with adherence to the MLF. It must be recognized it may be difficult to ask, much less insist, that a non-nuclear participant assume a formal non-acquisition obligation. The Italian Government recently expressed reluctance to take such a step and the FRG has indicated it will not expand its non-manufacture commitment beyond the WEU countries and especially not to the Soviets, unless it receives some return benefit. Something might nevertheless be accomplished by an approach such as the following to non-nuclear prospective participants: they doubtless can be persuaded to say they agree with us (and the FRG could hardly deny it) that non-dissemination is necessary; they must be convinced, as the U.S. is convinced, that MLF does not involve, but indeed obviates, the risk of dissemination; while they may feel unable at this time to volunteer a formal undertaking, public statements by authoritative officials acknowledging the foregoing points would support the credibility of MLF objectives. Furthermore, since it has been shown the Soviets value associations with some NATO countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, which have not yet decided to join the MLF, were those countries to make a decision not to join MLF for reasons of their own, they should be encouraged to state that they are of the firm belief that MLF as such does not involve dissem-ination of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear weapons non-manufacturing obligation should preferably include verification provisions to provide assurance that non-nuclear powers are not attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons. Such provisions should provide for the acceptance of IAEA or similar international safeguards against the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful to military purposes. If the IAEA provisions prove acceptable to the members of NATO and to the USSR, the United States, in private discussions with such ENDC members as India, Sweden, and the UAR, should attempt to persuade them to accept these provisions before the text of the draft agreement becomes public knowledge. In trying to persuade the non-nuclear states to accept such provisions, the U.S. could point out that, since violations of the agreement would threaten their own security more than the security of the nuclear powers, international inspection would appear to be in their own self interest. The U.S. could point out that IAEA safeguards are important for the following reasons among others: (a) From the point of view of proliferation, the construction of facilities for the production of fissionable material constitutes the most critical stage of the process of developing a nuclear weapons production capability. It is relatively easy to detect construction of these facilities by unilateral intelligence, considerably more so than the facilities used in other portions of the weapons manufacturing process. Once the existence of these production facilities is known, IAEA safeguards are well suited to see that the products of these facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. (b) In the absence of safeguards, it would be difficult to distinguish this critical stage from the construction of large-scale nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes which many countries are now planning to build. Several non-nuclear states would probably prefer to sign an agreement without such verification. The U.S. should try to link verification with non-proliferation in a single agreement, in order to obtain accept-ance of desirable verification provisions by the largest possible number of states. If it should prove impossible, however, to persuade these states to accept the IAEA provisions, we should stand on the position already made known to the Soviets. A non-proliferation agreement without such provisions would serve U.S. interests better than no agreement at all. The U.S. might also at that time consider the possibility of presenting a separate IAEA safeguards agreement for adherence by those states willing to accept it. D. Efforts to Develop Wide Political Consensus Favorable to Non-Proliferation: Response to OAU Resolution. An essential element in a non-proliferation program is an attempt on a broad multilateral basis to develop political inhibitions against the creation of further national nuclear capabilities. This element is not present in either our efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs or our efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union concerning a non-proliferation agreement. As already indicated the attempts to persuade individual nations are valuable. They should be continued and expanded. They cannot, however, take advantage of the fact that, as shown by the limited test ban, regional rivals may find it possible to agree to something in the context of an agreement open to all states that they could not agree to just with each other. The negotiation with the Soviets is valuable and should continue. It is being conducted primarily on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. basis with the thought that other countries will be approached when agreement is reached. It is not certain, however, that there will be agreement on the basis for such an approach to other countries sufficiently soon to meet the urgency of the situation. What must be guarded against is that while we (a) engage in private talks with individual states on a state-by-state basis and (b) engage in private discussions with the Soviets, we do not (c) fail to take the multilateral steps which may be an essential part in our actions to develop a broad political consensus favorable to non-proliferation which is sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Communist Chinese nuclear test. The Irish Resolution was a step in developing such a consensus, but it was adopted almost three years ago./4/ The limited test ban had a similar effect. By banning tests in the medium which might be the simplest for a country developing nuclear weapons it represented a political decision pointing away from such a development. But it does permit tests which could be used by a country developing such a weapon. Further steps to develop such a consensus therefore seem advisable. /4/Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, approved unanimously on December 4, 1961. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694. One device which has been considered to develop such a consensus was an attempt to seek broad international support for "declarations of intent" indicating willingness to adhere to a non-proliferation agreement of the kind we have discussed with the Soviet Union. Perhaps an even better method would be in the nature of a response to the Resolution on non-proliferation adopted in July by the Organization of African Unity (informal draft in Annex C)./5/ This Resolution contained a statement in the preamble confirming UN Resolution 1652, XVI, which, among other things, proposed the banning of transit./6/ It also reaffirmed the quite unrealistic resolution on general disarmament adopted by the Summit Conference of Independent African States of May 1963./7/ Nevertheless, it is based principally upon the UNGA Irish Resolution of December 4, 1961. It declares the readiness of OAU member states to undertake in an international treaty "not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons;" calls upon all nations to adhere to the same undertaking; and calls upon all nuclear powers to respect and abide by this declaration. It also invites the U.N. General Assembly to convene a conference with a view to concluding a non-proliferation treaty. /5/Not printed. /6/This resolution, approved on November 24, 1961, by a 55-0-44 vote, called upon member states to consider Africa as a denuclearized zone. The United States was one of the 44 abstaining nations. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 647-648. /7/Dated May 25, 1963; text ibid., 1963, p. 195. Notwithstanding the problems implicit in the call for a conference and the undesirable references in the preamble, the body of this resolution states its objective in terms which may make it possible for this resolution to be used in developing a consensus in favor of a non-proliferation agreement open to accession by all states and which would make it more difficult, while such an agreement is being worked out, for other countries to make a national decision to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Private consultation with selected OAU member states, the preparation of a draft U.N. resolution and a draft treaty which does not conflict with the MLF or U.S. transit rights, and a statement that we welcome the objectives of the OAU resolution (together with quiet encouragement to other states to make similar statements) could all be steps toward developing such a consensus. Consideration should also be given to having the draft resolution more than merely a call for an agreement but drafted in terms of a "statement of intent"--a statement of present intent not to proliferate or acquire--so long as there was no basic change in the situation.
Annex A/8/ /8/Secret; Limited Distribution. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT (Note: The following language is based upon the "Draft Non-Transfer Declaration" which has been discussed with the USSR,/9/ with the following changes: /9/Secretary Rusk handed a "Draft Non-Transfer Declaration" to Ambassador Dobrynin at their meeting on December 10, 1962. (Memorandum of conversation; Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 248. (a) Insertion of IAEA provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3. "Desiring to promote international peace and security, Desiring, in particular, to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race, Believing that the creation of additional national nuclear weapons forces will jeopardize these ends, Recalling that General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) urges all states to cooperate for these purposes, Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, 1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons. 2. The other signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will not manufacture nuclear weapons; that they will refrain from acquiring directly, or indirectly through military alliances, national control of any nuclear weapons; that they will not seek or receive assistance from other states in the manufacture of any such weapons; and that they will accept, as rapidly as practicable, International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards on all their nuclear activities in order to assure that such activities are not conducted in such a way as to further any military purpose. 3. All the signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will notify the International Atomic Energy Agency promptly of all shipments to any other states of source or fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, and will supply source or fissionable materials to states not now possessing nuclear weapons only if such materials will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards. 4. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Government of _____, shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory Government to be relieved of its terms if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this declaration, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country./10/ /10/The draft declaration presented to the Soviet Union in early 1963 was "subject to the right of any signatory to be relieved of its terms if another signatory fails to observe them or if any other Government takes action which signatories have declared they will not take;". [Footnote in the source text. As noted in footnote 9 above, the draft declaration was given to the Soviet Ambassador on December 10, 1962, rather than in early 1963.] In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this declaration." ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH 4/11/ 4. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Governments of _____ and _____, shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory Government to be relieved of its terms if it decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized because any Government takes action which the signatories have declared they will not take. /11/This alternate paragraph is stapled onto the bottom of the last page of the source text.
45. Editorial Note In late August 1964 Secretary Rusk directed the establishment of a new committee, within the framework of the Committee of Principals, to consider further steps that might be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He specified that Llewellyn Thompson would chair the new committee, which would be composed of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals, plus the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. In a memorandum to the Committee of Principals, August 24, Foster explained the terms of reference of this committee: "The task of the Committee is to develop, on a priority basis, specific recommendations for further action that should be taken by the U.S. to prevent the further proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. These recommendations should be developed in the light of the possible early detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Thus, particular attention should be given to the course of action the U.S. should take with respect to India. At the same time, however, consideration should be given to further actions which might be taken, either bilaterally or on a multilateral basis, with respect to the dangers posed by other potential capabilities of Israel, Sweden, Japan, and possibly the Union of South Africa. In developing recommendations consideration should include the way in which the U.S. could meet, either bilaterally or multilaterally, legitimate security concerns which may be a principal incentive to acquisition of nuclear capability." (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) This Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, as it was soon called, held its first meeting on August 28. Twenty-three officials, representing the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, White House, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Information Agency, attended this meeting. (Ibid.) Altogether, this interagency group held nine meetings from August 28, 1964-February 4, 1965. Discussions focused on general approaches to the problem of inhibiting prohibition, the spread of nuclear and related technology and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, possible substantive initiatives on nonproliferation at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the U.N. General Assembly, the problem of India, and draft treaty and declaration language. For the minutes of the fourth meeting on safeguards, September 25, see Document 48. Following the creation of the Gilpatric committee on Nuclear Proliferation in November (see Document 51), the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities met less frequently but prepared papers for the Gilpatric Committee. Memoranda, minutes of the nine meetings, and other working papers of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964, and ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons.
46. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 25, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on August 24. The source text forms Tab C-1 of a briefing book prepared for Secretary Rusk for the meeting of the Committee of Principals on August 27. SUBJECT I have reviewed the ACDA paper on non-proliferation/2/ to be discussed at the Principals' meeting scheduled for August 27,/3/ and consulted with the interested bureaus in the Department. With the exception of a divergent view held by Len Meeker, which I understand he will submit to you separately,/4/ the views in this memorandum have the concurrence of the other bureaus./5/ /2/Document 44. /3/The August 27 meeting was postponed without scheduling a new date. (Memorandum for the Files by John J. de Martino (S/S-S), undated; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) /4/Meeker explained his views in a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 25, which is attached as Tab C-2 to the briefing book cited in footnote 1 above. /5/At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard Davis (EUR), Henry Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Howard Furnas (S/MF), David Popper (RPM), and Joseph Sisco (IO). The ACDA draft position paper marks a substantial step forward, in my view, in placing greater emphasis than heretofore on recommending a case-by-case consideration of the key situations which could provide an undesirable trigger to proliferation. Communist China represents a special problem and is being dealt with separately. With respect to Germany, we have the MLF. Current efforts to deal with the Israel-UAR situation offer our best hope for that area. This paper notes, I believe correctly, the need to give high priority to the Indian case. Our concrete programs for the MLF and to deal with the Israel-UAR arms race were developed by careful consideration of local pressures and problems, and we believe additional case-by-case studies as now recommended by ACDA should be undertaken. Bill Foster has been in touch with me with the suggestion that I chair a group to consider these various regional case problems, and arrangements for this are going forward. In several other respects, the ACDA paper also contributes to advancing our tactical handling of the problem of preventing proliferation, in particular by suggesting a letter (though not the one ACDA has drafted) instead of a minute to express to the Soviets our interpretation of the relation of the MLF to non-proliferation, and to suggest (but not insist upon) specifying IAEA safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement with the USSR. In view of Soviet opposition to reliance on IAEA safeguards, it would not be desirable to make this a required element of our position. At the same time, I believe that the ACDA paper raises three major problems: (1) decision not to insist on Chinese Communist participation as a precondition to a non-proliferation agreement, (2) decision now to place sharp constraints and conditions on the MLF, and so to inform the Soviet leaders, and (3) advocacy of an attempt to use the recent OAU resolution on non-proliferation as a vehicle to open a new campaign for a world-wide agreement. I, and the other interested officers in the Department, have grave reservations on the conclusions of the ACDA discussion, and oppose several recommendations made in the paper. 1. Should we decide now to accept an agreement without Communist China? I believe that if we are able to agree upon a satisfactory non-proliferation agreement, we should probably accept it even without adherence of Communist China. I see no way to induce or compel Chinese commitment to forego acquisition of what they regard as an essential symbol, as well as instrument, of great power status. However, I strongly question the advisability of making that decision at this time. Even if, as ACDA proposes, we would not at once disclose such a position to the Soviets, I am much inclined to believe it would become known to our Allies, some of whom would be greatly alarmed at our giving up this card while pressing them to accept such an agreement. Similarly, India at least would probably be disinclined to adhere to such an agreement without Chinese commitment, and premature Indian realization of our position accepting an agreement without China could adversely affect our efforts to restrain India from initiating its own nuclear weapons program. Accordingly, as a clarification and alternative to the ACDA draft, we would propose adopting at this time the following US position: (a) If the Soviet Union should prove willing to accept a non-proliferation agreement on terms acceptable to ourselves and our Allies, we should, at that time and in the light of the circumstances then prevailing, consider the question of whether we should enter into such an agreement without the participation of Communist China. (b) If, at the time the US and the Soviet Union reach agreement, other countries should hesitate to adhere to the agreement without the participation of Communist China or other particular countries, we should consider the usefulness of their issuing declarations of intent to adhere at such time as the adherence of other necessary parties may take place. 2. Should we offer the Soviet Union, in connection with a non-proliferation agreement, a commitment that we will not allow the MLF control formula to evolve in a way that would increase the number of nuclear decision-making centers? It is highly unlikely that the US would or should give up a decisive voice in the control of the MLF unless this step involved abandonment of at least one of the existing European national deterrent forces and thereby had the effect of not increasing (or possibly of reducing) the number of "powers" controlling the use of nuclear weapons. But freezing our position now and offering a formal commitment to the Soviet Union on this score would damage important US interests without increasing the likelihood of early Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement. The question of the "review clause" of the MLF Charter is one of the most sensitive issues confronting participants in the MLF, including the US. To make this issue the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union, as ACDA suggests, would present severe substantive difficulties reaching beyond the MLF and affecting our basic position in Europe, and the timing of ACDA's proposal could not be worse. Taking both substance and timing into account, adoption of the ACDA proposal would have the following adverse effects: (a) It would lead to a deepening crisis of confidence in our relations with West Germany (the more so in view of the aide memoire left by Ambassador Knappstein with me on August 5, which expressed concern about the handling of the non-proliferation question at the Geneva Conference and which forecast difficulties in the forthcoming General Assembly)./6/ /6/The German aide-memoire, August 5, expressed "great concern" about the Eight-een-Nation Disarmament Committee discussions, which "are increasingly used by the Soviets to attack the policies followed by the Federal Republic and the creation of the MLF." The Germans felt the discussions were being "exploited by the Soviets as a welcome means to discredit us in the eyes of the world and especially in those of the uncommitted countries represented at Geneva." It further asked the U.S. Delegate in Geneva to avoid the subject of nonproliferation if possible and to consult with the Federal Republic of Germany in anticipation of future attacks that the Soviets would launch against the MLF in the United Nations. In a memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Ambassador Knappstein, August 5, attached to the aide-memoire, Thompson said that he did not expect further discussion of nonproliferation at the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and gave assurances that the United States would continue to respond to Soviet attacks on the Federal Republic and the MLF and would consult with his government on the nonproliferation issue in the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) (b) It would create a first-rate opportunity (which would not be lost) for the Gaullists in Germany as well as France to step up criticism of US policy in general. They would argue that the US was selling out European interests in dealing with the Soviet Union over the heads of the Europeans; that the US had, in effect, disowned assurances which had been given by both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson about possible evolution in MLF control as Europe moves toward unity; and that Germany should turn away from the MLF and cooperate with a force "that is really at Europe's disposition"--the force de frappe. All of this would weaken Erhard in his effort to fight off external and domestic pressures to abandon an "Atlanticist" outlook, in favor of narrow Franco-German collaboration. (c) While disturbing our relations with West Germany, the ACDA proposal would, evidently, not satisfy the British. As you know, the ACDA proposal is patterned after a suggestion initially put forward by the UK Delegation to the Geneva Conference and subsequently, in effect, disowned by the Foreign Office after implications for continuation of the British national deterrent were realized. To advance the language now suggested by ACDA would catapult the question of MLF control and its relation to the British national deterrent into the British electoral campaign, by making it appear that the US contemplated that the MLF would eventually absorb the British force. (This may be a desirable objective from our standpoint, but the way to achieve it is not by making it a partisan issue in the British election.) (d) From the standpoint of the MLF control issue itself, the ACDA proposal would be counterproductive. It would be strongly resented by such "Europeanists" as Jean Monnet and his Action Committee who, while not pressing for abandonment of the US veto, set great store on not precluding this possibility--if only to make it clear that their acceptance of joint US-European control is not the result of US pressures. The net result would be a revival of European pressures for abandonment of the US veto since the recent decline in these pressures (manifest in statements by Von Hassel, Monnet, and others) was partly due to a belief by the Europeans that they would be able to consider the issue on its merits, instead of having the answer dictated to them by the US. (e) Adoption of the ACDA proposal might divert and disrupt the MLF drafting exercise in Paris at a time when we are trying to bring this exercise--one of the few constructive ventures we now have going in Europe--to a successful conclusion by the end of the year so that the governments concerned can then reach the necessary decisions in a final negotiation. (f) Finally, while we can probably agree to a withdrawal clause in a non-proliferation agreement along the lines suggested, it would be undesirable to give the Soviets now a club to wield over the MLF prior to its ratification. While incurring the liabilities noted above, the ACDA proposal would not be likely to achieve its objective of hastening Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement. Ambassador Kohler's assessment (which I share, and which INR also shares) is that, as long as the MLF is in the formative stage, the Soviet Union will reject any non-proliferation agreement that does not bar the MLF. Past experience with the Soviet Union supports this conclusion, and the price of again confirming this experience by putting forward the ACDA proposal is prohibitively high for the reasons that have been presented. As an alternative to the ACDA proposal, we recommend the following: (a) As specific MLF arrangements emerge from the Paris discussions, we recommend further talks between you and Ambassador Dobrynin to clear up any Soviet misunderstandings of these arrangements. This would be in line with your previous assurance to Dobrynin that many Soviet concerns would be met when details respecting the MLF became available. (b) Continuing assurances should be given the Soviet Union that we will not permit the MLF to fall into the hands of any single country or of any grouping in which a single European country was predominant. (c) Later in the year, when the time comes for European governments to adhere to MLF, we can consider how this adherence should be related to non-proliferation. Tentatively, we are inclined to believe the best approach would be the issuance of appropriate non-acquisition/non-dissemination statements by MLF participants at that time, but this is a matter that we can consider and discuss with other MLF participants between now and then, and not unilaterally decide nor at this time. 3. Should we take the initiative in promoting support of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation?/7/ /7/See footnote 1, Document 44. ACDA proposes that we should endeavor to develop "the widest possible political consensus favorable to a non-proliferation agreement" by mounting an initiative on the basis offered by relevant sections of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation. In our view, there is today already substantial support for a non-proliferation agreement among those countries which have no possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, and to the extent that world opinion can pose a barrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries that can obtain them, that obstacle already exists. Accordingly, we doubt that there is much to be gained by a further major initiative, particularly one which would be resented by our Allies (as ACDA's earlier proposal concerning unilateral non-proliferation declarations was found to be unacceptable both to the Germans and Italians). Moreover, we have some difficulty in believing that the OAU resolution would prove to be a very sturdy vehicle for this purpose. Notwithstanding the fact that the OAU resolution is based in part on the Irish Resolution (which we supported),/8/ the UAR representative at the Geneva Conference has already sought to precipitate debate concerning the relationship of the MLF to non-proliferation and advocated holding-up the MLF pending agreement. Moreover, as ACDA recognizes, the OAU resolution, taken as a whole, includes some provisions that are either not acceptable to us (an implied ban on transit of nuclear weapons) or at least undesirable (an international conference on non-proliferation). It would, therefore, be undesirable for the US to "encourage other states to associate themselves with the OAU resolution." Finally, we recognize that the OAU resolution was a "holding action" by the African states instead of agreeing on a nuclear-free zone, and any efforts to influence them (such as ACDA suggests) would not only probably be ineffective but very likely also counterproductive. /8/See footnote 4, Document 44. While we do not, therefore, support the present ACDA proposal, we recognize that other countries may well take the initiative. OAU members may well press their proposal in the General Assembly; the Soviet Union will almost certainly inject attacks on the MLF into that forum; and, all in all, non-proliferation is likely to be a hot topic. Therefore, we believe that we should proceed now with an assessment of those tactics which would best protect our interests. In this context, further consideration could be given to the handling of the OAU resolution and to preparatory steps, in this or other connections, which it might be desirable for us to undertake in advance of the opening of the GA. Accordingly, we recommend that IO, together with EUR, S/MF, AF, and ACDA, be requested to prepare recommendations concerning our tactical approach. 4. Accession to a non-proliferation agreement. Finally, I am disturbed about the suggested arrangements for adherence to the new draft non-proliferation agreement which envisage a single depository government and state that it would be open for accession to "all governments." I believe some way must be found to deal with the problem of East German adherence, particularly if we are to have the support of the Federal Republic.
47. Editorial Note President Johnson sent a message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee when it recessed on September 17, 1964. The President's message expounded on the importance of international cooperation in controlling the spread and use of nuclear weapons, indicated U.S. previous arms control initiatives and past achievements in arms control, and urged the participating nations to resolve upon reconvening "to take additional steps toward peace." Text is in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pages 433-435. A draft of this message, September 8, was sent under cover of a memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals, September 8. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) A later draft incorporating changes suggested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Commission, September 15, was sent under cover of a September 15 memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.) The September 15 draft is identical to the September 17 message.
48. Informal Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities/1/ Washington, September 25, 1964, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on September 30. The source text was transmitted under cover of a September 30 memorandum from Thompson to the members of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. The fourth meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities met, under Ambassador Thompson's chairmanship, at 10:00 a.m., on September 25, 1964. A list of those attending is appended./2/ /2/Not printed. Chairman Seaborg expatiated on existing bilateral and multilateral safeguards, and the possibilities and problems in extending them more widely./3/ In answer to a question, he noted that US policy is consistent in not permitting reactor sales without safeguards. Attention was given to the problem of discrimination by the application of safeguards over transfers to non-nuclear powers, while nuclear powers are not obliged to apply such safeguards to their own operations. Insofar as the objective is to curb further proliferation, such a distinction is wholly justifiable; on the other hand, the sensibilities of non-nuclear countries are adversely affected by this distinction. /3/Seaborg's brief account of this meeting was as follows: "We discussed the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of safeguards and inspection in connection with the peaceful nuclear activities of new nuclear countries. I spoke strongly for a significant role for the IAEA and described the problems of getting the USSR to go along. I said that much progress in this line has been made in the last year or so." (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, p. 190) The question was raised whether the Soviets would acquiesce in safeguards on Soviet transfers to other countries, particularly to other "socialist" countries. It was agreed that the Soviets might agree to such safeguards over transfers to non-Bloc countries, but would probably not agree to safeguards on transfers to Bloc countries. They have shown themselves averse to any application within the USSR itself. In response to a question, Chairman Seaborg stated that he did not believe the Soviets would be concerned over technological intelligence with respect to any reactors they have been willing to supply to other countries. The Soviets have acquiesced to the IAEA safeguards program, but have objected to having the cost of inspections be borne by the IAEA. The question was raised whether safeguards on transfers of reactors and fissionable materials is adequate to prevent proliferation. Ambassador Thompson noted the recent remark by Dr. Kistiakowsky to the effect that a total test ban is necessary for this purpose. Chairman Seaborg agreed, but noted the value of also extending safeguards on transfers. It was observed that the US has been able to persuade countries such as Israel and India, particularly in the latter case only with considerable pressure, to accept IAEA safeguards on our transferred materials and reactors. India will not, however, accept safeguards on its own planned reactor. Our Ambassador in Tel Aviv has reported that Israel is ready to accept any controls acceptable to the UAR, so long as there is adequate inspection. It was remarked that the Swedes appear to have a misconception on the intrusiveness of safeguards inspection. Ambassador Thompson noted that the IAEA did not appear to be the appropriate body for inspection of nuclear free zones. Chairman Seaborg agreed that at least for the present the IAEA was not suitable. Dr. Scoville noted that the IAEA could inspect reactors in such zones, and this was generally agreed. The discussion drew attention to the problems posed for the US in seeking effective inspection for such zones, assuming there were no restrictions on transit, while opposing any inspection involving transit. The ACDA proposal for including provisions for IAEA safeguards in the draft non-proliferation agreement was discussed./4/ The ACDA proposal would include provisions both for applying safeguards on transfers, and on the indigenous programs on non-nuclear states. While the discussion was not conclusive, Ambassador Thompson noted that this question might be an appropriate one for determination by the Principals. /4/See Annex A, Document 44. In discussion of the problems posed by the separate Euratom safeguard arrangements, it was noted that many consider such arrangements as at best Western self inspection. Moreover, its safeguards apply only to transactions of the member governments conducted under the specific auspices of Euratom. The Soviets have denounced Euratom and prevented its recognition by the IAEA. The discussion concluded with two recommendations on which there appeared to be a tentative consensus, apart from the divided judgment on the advisability of including provisions for IAEA or similar safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement. The first recommendation was to consult with and urge the Western Suppliers Group to adopt a policy requiring IAEA safeguards on equipment transfers. The desirability of admitting Germany to the Group was also generally agreed upon. It was noted that the French have been offering reactor sales without safeguards, and do not consider themselves bound by decisions of the Suppliers Group. The second recommendation was to encourage Japan to submit its entire nuclear program to IAEA safeguards.
49. Editorial Note On October 16, 1964, the People's Republic of China exploded an atomic bomb in the atmosphere. Documentation on this development, which brought the number of nations having atomic weapons to five, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII. One effect of the successful Chinese test was to heighten concerns throughout the Johnson administration about nuclear proliferation. President Johnson's own concern was expressed in a telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George Ball, October 29, 9:10 a.m.: "Bundy said there was lots of feeling by the President that we should get a higher-level, harder look at the problem of nuclear spread--a better policy than we would be able to get by using our interhouse machinery. The thought has been expressed [that] a nuclear spread task force be established. He mentioned Ros Gilpatric in this regard, whom Ball thought would be excellent. It was decided that Bundy would tentatively mention this to the President, subject to what Secretary Rusk would have to say on it." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Disarmament, Box 3) On November 1, the White House announced the appointment of a special panel of citizens to advise the President on the proliferation problem. In this announcement the panel was asked "to explore the widest range of measures that the United States might undertake in conjunction with other governments or by itself." (Quoted in Glenn T. Seaborg, with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pages 136-137) Formally entitled the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, the group was often referred to more simply as the Gilpatric Committee after its chairman, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. The names of the members of the task force and the instructions to it were contained in NSAM No. 320, Document 51. The Gilpatric Committee received briefings and administrative support from the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, which had been created only a few months earlier. Regarding the establishment and work of this Committee, see Documents 45 and 48. The Gilpatric Committee held three plenary meetings on December 1, December 13-14, and January 7-8, 1965. For the minutes of the second and third of these meetings, see Documents 56 and 60. For Secretary Rusk's meeting with the Committee at this third plenary meeting, January 7, see Document 59. Regarding the Gilpatric Committee's presentation of its Report to the President, January 21, see Document 63. For text of the Report, January 21, 1965, see Document 64. Additional documentation on the workings of the Gilpatric Committee is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Gilpatric Committee, and Committee on Nuclear Weapons; ibid, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals; Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation File, Boxes 1-10; and ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Presidential Task Force-Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 35. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |