1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 23, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 399, 404, and 409. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting pointing out that in view of the difficulties over Article 19,/3/ it might be a long time before non-proliferation would come up at the General Assembly. Mr. Foster stated that the paper on "tactics" on non-proliferation for the General Assembly had been prepared by the Thompson Committee at this time/4/ since a US position was necessary long in advance of the formal discussion at the General Assembly. Three questions which involve important policy matters were highlighted in the covering memorandum./5/ He also stressed the need for secrecy on the proposal for the Irish to present the resolution at the General Assembly/6/ since any leaks might prejudice the US position. Furthermore, he emphasized that the resolution was illustrative since changes might of necessity occur during the process of presentation. /3/Reference is to discussions in the U.N. General Assembly on the question of the applicability of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter to the costs of peacekeeping operations. Article 19 specified procedures for U.N. member states that were in arrears in the payment of their financial obligations. /4/Reference is to the November 9 paper, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," which was sent under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, November 12. Foster explained in his memorandum that the paper set forth a general course of action on the proliferation problem for the United States at the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly: "While, as the paper notes, it will be necessary to retain tactical flexibility in order to take account of the results of consultations and the developing situation with respect to the General Assembly, it seems appropriate for the Principals to consider and approve the general tactical line." (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) Foster's memorandum is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 405-407. /5/The three points were: 1) Should the United States try to include a non-acquisition pledge into the resolution; 2) Should such a resolution include a provision calling upon non-member states of the United Nations to declare their readiness to undertake the same obligations; and 3) The danger of an amendment to the resolution seeking to prohibit a MLF. /6/At the prompting of the United States, the Republic of Ireland during the summer of 1964 quietly began to circulate a draft resolution on non-proliferation to a number of delegations in the U.N. General Assembly. (Memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) No record of Ireland's introduction of this resolution in the General Assembly has been found. Secretary Rusk asked the basic question of whether the US should oppose other countries' obtaining nuclear weapons over the next ten years. Should it always be the US which would have to use nuclear weapons against Red China? He could conceive of situations where the Japanese or Indians might desirably have their own nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara stated that this question had not been staffed thoroughly in the Department of Defense, but he thought it unlikely that the Indians or Japanese would ever have a suitable nuclear deterrent. He thought a group should be established to study this basic policy. Secretary Rusk stated he had asked a committee to investigate inter-Asian security problems, giving consideration to a US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile. Mr. Foster agreed that these alternatives should be looked at but that in the meantime it was necessary to maintain a strong non-proliferation policy. Once a nation had taken the nuclear road, it would be impossible to turn back. Secretary McNamara concurred that the resolution should be available, if needed, but that the Gilpatric Committee and a US Government group should study the desirability of non-proliferation. He raised the question of whether a non-proliferation policy automatically meant providing a nuclear guarantee to all countries for, if so, this would be a major policy change. Mr. Foster pointed out that when the General Assembly convenes we will be under major pressure in this area since a number of other countries would be pushing actions which would be less acceptable to the US. He did not believe that the proposed course of action would preclude a different non-proliferation policy which might develop from the studies proposed. Secretary Rusk emphasized that the present discussions should continue with a clear understanding that US policy favored non-proliferation. Chairman Seaborg stated that he saw no other pattern than non-proliferation since anything else would involve a loss of US control. Mr. Foster discussed the bracketed points in the draft resolution./7/ Ambassador Thompson believed that the Germans should be consulted since Par. 3 puts them under considerable pressure. Secretary Rusk said that the British Prime Minister had today made a strong statement against the MLF. He raised the problem of concealing a treaty obligation (bracketed Section in Par. 2) in a UN resolution since a resolution had no mandatory authority. Perhaps Par. 2.c. might ask States to inform the Secretary General of their intention not to acquire nuclear weapons. He also questioned the desirability of inserting "national" before "control" in this paragraph. Without this the Canadians might claim they were forced to give up their participation with NATO nuclear forces. He felt it most unlikely that the Germans would be willing to undertake the obligations in bracketed Par. 3. /7/The bracketed parts are contained in three paragraphs of illustrative UNGA Non-Proliferation Resolution, October 30, attached as Tab 1 to the November 9 paper, as follows: "2. Welcomes the fact that the Member States voting for this resolution which do not possess nuclear weapons hereby declare [that they do not intend to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons, and] that they are ready to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under UN auspices, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons; "[3. Calls upon all states not possessing nuclear weapons to declare their readiness to undertake the same obligations;] "6. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to undertake on an urgent basis the preparation of a draft international agreement as called for in resolution 1665 (XVI), which would be open to all states [and to report to the UN Disarmament Commission as soon as possible and in any event not later than 30 July 1965]." Mr. Foster emphasized that the bracketed Par. 2 was the most constructive action in the resolution and would have major value during the interim required for negotiating the treaty. Mr. Fisher pointed out that this was the only major addition to the Irish resolution and also stressed that we had always construed the use of control as in the Irish resolution to refer to "national." The insertion of "national" at this point would weaken this interpretation for other documents in which it was not present. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that the most critical problem in the General Assembly would be the introduction of an anti-MLF clause into any non-proliferation actions. The Canadians felt that some such self-denying ordinance as a proposed resolution was necessary on the part of those states having nuclear capability who had not chosen to develop weapons. Mr. Thompson indicated that the Swedes were reluctant to have to vote again at this time on the proliferation issue. In view of this discussion, Secretary Rusk questioned whether the procedural resolution would not be better than the proposed non-proliferation one./8/ Mr. Foster believed that pushing the procedural resolution first would look like a stalling action. Mr. Thompson said the matter was one of tactics of deciding to push for a resolution with which we could live with or getting a lot of resolutions which were unacceptable and then might be handled by the procedural resolution. Mr. Cleveland indicated that the UN Staff felt we needed something more than the Irish resolution; perhaps some intermediate resolution would be satisfactory. Certainly, we would have to do something more than to agree to go to a meeting. Mr. Foster pointed out that there have been several international meetings on the subject, such as the OAU and non-alignment conferences. The other nations wish to get on with the problem of non-proliferation and also to limit the MLF. The US resolution tends to get the MLF out of the picture and satisfy their desires to get on with non-proliferation. The US would have a difficult time, at best, and therefore we needed a positive policy. /8/Reference is to Draft Procedural Resolution, October 30, attached as Tab 2 to the November 9 paper. Secretary Rusk stated that it was disconcerting to see gaps in the concern about disarmament in many countries. There was no evidence that many countries were worried about non-proliferation. Most countries ignore disarmament for themselves and support sweeping resolutions on disarmament for the world. He felt there should be limitations on conventional weapons transfer as well as nuclear. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that the purpose of this exercise was to go beyond idle statements and reach some kind of semi-binding international agreement similar to the "ban the bombs in orbit" resolution./9/ Mr. Foster felt that the non-proliferation proposal had broader support than other possible items, the inclusion of which might only serve to muddy the waters and preclude achieving a meaningful resolution on non-proliferation. /9/See footnote 3, Document 15. Chairman Seaborg stressed the importance of the enforcement side and discussed the progress being made in instituting IAEA safeguards. This program was moving in parallel to the one under discussion and he saw no inconsistency with the resolution except for the possibility that the resolution might justify some nations in rejecting the need for safeguards. He urged that we continue to press other countries to place reactors under safeguards and for suppliers, such as the UK and Canada, to demand safeguards in connection with their international programs. Mr. Foster pointed out that ACDA had circulated another paper relative to programs in this area which had been generally approved by the Thompson Committee./10/ /10/Reference may be to the ACDA paper on safeguards discussed at the September 25 meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. See Document 48. Secretary Rusk questioned whether the proposed resolution could be strengthened by inclusion of a requirement for safeguards in the international agreement. Following this discussion, the following actions were decided upon: a. Par. 2 of the draft resolution should be amended for further consideration to include a reference to a requirement for safeguards in any international agreements to be concluded. b. Par. 3 should be changed to substitute "governments and authorities" for "states." In concluding the meeting, Secretary McNamara again urged that the question of alternatives to our non-proliferation policy should be kept highly classified. Secretary Rusk and others agreed that there should be no question that the established Government policy is against proliferation of nuclear weapons.
51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 320/1/ Washington, November 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 320-Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 6. Confidential. TO SUBJECT The President has appointed a special Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, to study means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Task Force has been asked to examine the problem in its broadest ramifications. It is expected that the Task Force report will be available for the President by the end of January 1965. In addition to Mr. Gilpatric, the members of the Task Force are: Mr. Arthur H. Dean Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., National Security Council staff, will serve as Staff Director for the Task Force. The President assigns great importance to the work of the Task Force and has asked that all agencies assist the Task Force in the execution of its assignment. In view of the urgency of the nuclear proliferation problem, the responsible government agencies should continue their work in this field on a high priority basis in parallel with the work of the Task Force. McGeorge Bundy
52. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)/1/ Washington, November 28, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limit Distribution. SUBJECT /2/In a memorandum to the Committee of Principals, November 23, Foster outlined "a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation," as follows: "First, an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which includes a U.S. position on the MLF designed to facilitate agreement. "Second, the working out of an understanding to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. "Third, the reopening of technical discussions in order to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban. "Fourth, an understanding to halt new construction of land-based ICBM launch sites (and possibly ABM launch sites) verified by our respective national capabilities, while we negotiate a wider and more formal strategic nuclear delivery freeze. "Fifth, requested assurance that the announced Soviet cutback in planned production of fissionable material has in fact been made; with an indication that if this question is resolved we can move forward to a verified total production cutoff and a transfer of materials to peaceful uses, under IAEA safeguards, together with destruction of some nuclear weapons. "Sixth, if assurance on the fissionable material cut-back is forthcoming, a simultaneous announcement of planned reductions in military budgets." (Ibid.) In reply to your memorandum of November twenty-fifth, I have the following comments on Mr. Foster's memorandum for the Committee of Principals, dated November twenty-third:/3/ /3/Foster's November 23 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above is attached to a November 24 covering memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, McCone, and Seaborg. (Ibid.) No covering memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals, November 25, however, has been found. As a generalization, while I think we are all agreed that it would be useful if we could find some significant step to take with the Soviets in the field of disarmament, I suggest we should be on our guard not to fall into becoming victims of a standard Soviet tactic; that is, that we put forward sound proposals which they reject and, after a time, we abandon them and scratch around to find something else upon which we can agree. This often results in a serious weakening of our position. My point is that we should continue to plug sound proposals even though they are categorically rejected by the Soviets. On the question of non-proliferation, I do not think we should put forward, at this time, an assurance that the MLF would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. I do not think that such an assurance would change the attitude of the Soviets at this time and it would block any possibility of an Asiatic MLF before such an institution has been seriously examined. Even if it were decided to give such an assurance, I should think this would be one of the last concessions we would make in a negotiation. A comprehensive test ban treaty would probably eliminate any possibility of developing Plowshare. I wonder whether we should reopen the question of a comprehensive ban just at this time when the Soviets have shown some interest in Plowshare programs. I would agree, however, that a priority review of the present US position would be useful. Of all the proposals in the memorandum, the suggestion for a tacit agreement to halt new construction of ICBM sites without on-the-ground inspection seems to me the most likely to have some chance of Soviet acceptance. There would appear to be three troublesome problems with it however. One would be that it would probably have the result of pushing the Soviets to put their resources into sea-borne launchers which are more difficult for us to deal with. A second problem is that if MRBMs and IRBMs are excluded, the proposal may look to our European allies as an attempt to deal with our problem without worrying about theirs. A third problem is, as you point out, the question as to whether ABMs should be included or not. The Soviets may look at this proposal simply as a means of our attempting to freeze a US advantage, but it might appeal to them on the basis that it could reduce their costs at a critical time. In any event, before putting forward such a proposal, I should think there would have to be careful examination of the effectiveness of our national capability of detecting secret deployments by the Soviet Union. With respect to the cutback and eventual cut-off in fissionable material production, it is my understanding that if we should go in for multiple warheads in a big way, this would materially increase the need for plutonium. I should think that this question should at least be looked at before any decision is made.
53. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDe1/MC/8 New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Gromyko/Secretary Conversations, December 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 9. The source text is labeled "Part III of III." The meeting, which took place at the U.N. Mission, was one of several between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko in late November and December in New York and Washington. Memoranda of their conversations on disarmament on November 30 and December 2, 9, and 19 are ibid., and also in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH
SESSION OF New York, December 1964 SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko raised the subject of non-dissemination, noting the Secretary knew well the Soviet position on that subject. That position had been stated on a number of occasions, but, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state again that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the non-dissemination question. The U.S., too, had on a number of occasions stressed the significance of that question. In the past, the Soviet Union had the impression of the U.S. sincerely wanting a non-dissemination agreement. However, as time went on, it had become clear that this was not so because, in parallel with U.S. statements stressing the importance of non-dissemination and indicating the desire for negotiations and agreement on that subject, plans were being hatched for the creation of the MLF--in other words, plans for associating the FRG with nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko said that on behalf of the Soviet Government, he wished to state once again that the MLF plans were an obstacle to agreement on non-dissemination. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the MLF would be of no significance from the military standpoint, given the existing correlation of forces. But the situation in Europe and the world at large would become much more dangerous and alarming if the MLF were created. The Soviet Union could not ignore the fact that Germany had unleashed two world wars within the span of one generation. He said he wanted to repeat with all forcefulness that a non-dissemination agreement was obstructed by the MLF plans. If that obstacle were removed, a broad non-dissemination agreement could be concluded which would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and of the world at large. As to the content of such an agreement, the Soviet Union had given the U.S. a proposed text./2/ The Soviet Union regarded that text as not being out of date, but was prepared to discuss language at any time. He hoped that the U.S. Government would be prepared again to discuss the non-dissemination problem with the Soviet Government and any other party concerned. /2/Not further identified. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union was not impressed by tranquillizing statements regarding some separate arrangements between the U.S. and the FRG which allegedly removed the threat to the Soviet Union. Such statements were not tranquillizing at all and could not be accepted. The Secretary said we regarded non-dissemination as a very serious problem to all of us at this time. We believed that today at least half a dozen countries had the technical capability of detonating a nuclear device within two or three years, with the expenditure of about $150 million above what was being spent today on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Another half a dozen countries could do the same, but somewhat later. We regarded the spread of nuclear weapons as a very negative and dangerous development. It was in the very nature of nuclear weapons that those who had them and knew about them viewed their spread with dismay. Therefore, the U.S. had been consistently against dissemination. The Secretary then said he wished to ask Mr. Gromyko a couple of questions. He noted that most of what we were doing was known to the U.S.S.R. from our public statements or announcements, whereas the reverse was not true. We had certain information indicating that the Soviet Union had made arrangements with some countries on its side regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, and we were wondering about any arrangements the U.S.S.R. might have with those countries regarding actual nuclear weapons, their control, etc. The Secretary pointed out that while we were virgins with respect to dissemination, we were not certain about the U.S.S.R. The only cooperation in the nuclear weapons field we had was with the U.K., and such cooperation stemmed from our partnership in the nuclear weapons program during World War II. On the other hand, some of our visitors to Moscow, in talking with Soviet personalities, had received the impression that the Soviet Union had provided fuel for the Chinese detonation. He therefore thought it useful to ask Mr. Gromyko about Soviet arrangements with other parties regarding delivery vehicles and also about any Soviet contribution to the Chinese capability of detonating a nuclear device. Mr. Gromyko responded that as far as China was concerned, he had already given the Secretary certain clarifications, and there was nothing he could add. In any event, the U.S. should base its conclusions regarding Soviet actions on Soviet statements rather than on rumors stemming from dubious sources. Regarding allegations about delivery vehicle arrangements, which were also based on rumors, he could only say that in considering the non-dissemination problem, the U.S. should not look for any difference between Soviet words and deed. There were perhaps other governments whose words and deeds differed and whose policies of yesterday were not those of today, or whose policies of today might change tomorrow. He wished to stress that it was in the interest of peace to have a broad non-dissemination agreement concluded. Otherwise, if nuclear weapons were to spread all over the world, everybody would lose. Perhaps the U.S. Government would find it possible to consider this problem with a view to finding agreement between the two sides. He wished to note that discussions on non-dissemination, just as talks on any important subject, were no hide-and-seek game. The great powers particularly should keep this in mind, since no responsible government was free to say one thing and do another. Therefore, he wanted to appeal to the U.S. Government to approach non-dissemination in a serious manner; perhaps not everything was lost yet and perhaps there was still possibility of agreement. If no agreement should be reached, many non-nuclear powers would acquire nuclear weapons, the situation would be much more complicated and much more difficult to control, and all parties would stand to lose. The Secretary said he didn't wish to press the questions he had asked of Mr. Gromyko. However, he wished to point out some facts as we saw them. For instance, some Warsaw Pact countries had publicly displayed armaments highly inefficient for use as conventional weapons but highly suitable for use as nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko interjected that this might be a subjective appraisal. The Secretary responded that he couldn't help being who he was or being on his side. The Secretary continued that whenever NATO countries were in a similar position there were public statements giving the necessary information, but there was no such information in the case of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Secretary stressed that we were deeply concerned about proliferation. The danger of proliferation came from different sources. For example, Sweden and Switzerland, two countries with a long and profound tradition of neutrality, in signing the Limited Test Ban had stated that they were not giving up their right to any future decision regarding acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The French Prime Minister recently had made a speech in which he said that if a nation had the capability of producing nuclear weapons it was almost obligated to do so./3/ As Mr. Gromyko knew, we were in disagreement with France on this point. The Chinese detonation had raised questions in India and Japan. While we hoped that those countries would not embark upon a nuclear weapons program, this situation still presented a grave problem. Moreover, unfortunately, the question of acquiring nuclear weapons also arose among those countries who were the targets of nuclear weapons. It was one thing to have nuclear weapons and another to be in the bull's-eye of those weapons. He did not wish to recriminate, but the fact was that some NATO countries were in the target area of nuclear weapons. For this reason, those countries wanted a voice in nuclear defense matters, matters which were vital to their security. /3/Presumably a reference to French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou's speech in the French National Assembly on December 2. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 492-497. Turning to the MLF, the Secretary noted that he had discussed this subject with Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin on earlier occasions. What he wished to know was whether the Soviet Union objected to the MLF really on strictly non-dissemination grounds or whether its objections were due to some broader considerations. If the latter was the case, e.g., if the Soviet Union was objecting to the existence of NATO as such, there was nothing that could be done about it, although of course we hoped that gradually the situation would improve and tensions would lessen. On the other hand, if the Soviet objections to the MLF were based on non-dissemination, he wished to repeat that under the MLF arrangements, we would not permit transfer of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons technology to any non-nuclear member of the force. Of course, a great deal of information about nuclear technology was now available in popular publications which even high school students could read, but he wished to stress that under the MLF arrangements, no non-nuclear member would be involved in the overhaul or repair of nuclear weapons or would obtain custody of such weapons. In sum, no non-nuclear member of the force would be able to acquire national nuclear weapons capability through the force, no such member could employ the weapons on its own, and no such member could take apart or repair nuclear weapons. Consequently, we saw no arrangement envisaged for the MLF that would be inconsistent with the principle of non-dissemination. Our conscience was clear as regards non-dissemination in the MLF. If the Soviet Union was concerned that the MLF might be only the first step towards acquisition of national nuclear weapons capability, such concern could be removed, and we could state that the first step would be the last step. Indeed, this point was reflected in the non-proliferation language we had given the Soviet Union two years ago. While he didn't know about the situation among the socialist states, the Secretary said that the problem of dissemination did exist in non-socialist states, whether they were allied with us or not. The Chinese detonation was a great disappointment to us and we did not believe it was a good thing for us or the Soviet Union or anyone else. But those were the factors urging others to build their own nuclear weapons unless, of course, we succeeded in stopping the process. In the MLF, we gave participation to those who were the target of nuclear weapons so that they could know they would be taken into account in decisions regarding nuclear defense, but without transfer of nuclear weapons capability. However, with respect to such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, India, and possibly others, we needed Soviet cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that he had discussed all this on a number of occasions and there was nothing he could add at this point. The MLF was still under discussion, and as Mr. Gromyko knew, the British Prime Minister was coming to Washington next week./4/ Mr. Gromyko would surely learn a great deal about those discussions from newspapers. But, in any event, if the Soviet concern about the MLF was with respect to non-dissemination, we could meet it because we ourselves are against proliferation. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union was against NATO, we were afraid we could not do much about it. /4/Prime Minister Harold Wilson had discussions with U.S. leaders in Washington, December 6-9. For selected documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 58-63. Mr. Gromyko said Soviet objections to the MLF were based on both broad and narrow considerations. The broad consideration was that German imperialists had unleashed two world wars in thirty years. The Soviet Union had suffered tremendous losses in those wars, and particularly in World War II. It was good that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been on the same side in World War II, but still it was the Soviet Union which had had to bear the main burden in fighting the Germans. The Soviet Union could not ignore this fact in appraising the situation in Europe and in looking into the future. This is how he wanted to answer the Secretary's first question. In reply to the Secretary's second question, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state that the Soviet Union could not rely on U.S. assurances regarding the various technical safeguards such as keys, etc., because all such technical devices were subordinate to policy. The policy of German military quarters was well known to the Soviet Union; the ashes of World War II had been still warm when the German militarists advanced the slogan calling for a revision of the German borders established as a result of World War II. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. could not rely on those technical devices the U.S. maintained would prevent proliferation. In asking his second question, the Secretary had mentioned NATO. The Secretary knew the Soviet appraisal of NATO, which was that NATO did not serve peace. However, if we started discussing this question, that would lead us far away and there was really no point in doing so. Mr. Gromyko then stated that if the U.S. had definitely decided to create the MLF, it was assuming a great and heavy responsibility. The Soviet Government would regard the creation of an MLF, in whatever form, and the provision of access to nuclear weapons to the FRG as a hostile act towards the Soviet Union. If the MLF plans were implemented, the Soviet Government and its allies obviously would have to draw appropriate conclusions for their own policy. However, he still hoped that not everything was lost and that a broad and conclusive agreement on non-dissemination could be reached. The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on a few of Mr. Gromyko's points. He said he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko's remarks about German militarists. We knew the background of the two World Wars, in both of which our two countries had been on the same side. It was for this reason that we wanted a definitive settlement of the German problem in a period when we knew that the Germans wanted peace, when the Germans were deeply involved with the rest of Europe, and when it was possible to prevent a development echoing the past. As to the MLF, it was not up to Washington alone to make a decision. This question would be decided by a number of governments as a group and not unilaterally by the U.S. However, in any event, we were not talking about access to nuclear weapons and this was a fundamental point. No one--Germany, Italy, or anyone else--in the MLF would have access to nuclear weapons in the sense anybody could object to. No national nuclear weapons capability and no technical nuclear capability would arise from the MLF. There would be further discussions on the MLF among the allies, and the Soviet Union would surely be au courant as they proceeded. We hoped the Soviet Union would cooperate so that we could have general agreement on non-dissemination. However, the Secretary said, he wished to emphasize that he was talking about actual nuclear weapons and not about considerations having nothing to do with actual weapons. Mr. Gromyko noted the advanced hour and said that at the next meeting with the Secretary, he would wish to discuss the question of the reduction of troops in Europe. He would wish to ascertain the U.S. views on whether anything could be agreed upon in that area. In addition, he would wish to discuss the question of a German peace settlement and to see whether there was any possibility of agreement on certain aspects of the German problem. The Secretary said he had no objection to discussing these points. For his part, he would also want to get Mr. Gromyko's views about the prospects for agreement on the so-called bonfire. He wondered whether we could add certain armaments to those included in our original bonfire proposal. In addition, perhaps certain points from Mr. Gromyko's speech at the General Assembly could be discussed at the next meeting, since we assumed that Mr. Gromyko would speak before he met again with us. It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on December 9, prior to Mr. Gromyko's meeting with the President.
54. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 11 and approved in S on December 15 and by the White House on December 16. The meeting was held in the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U.S.S.R. [Here follow exchanges of pleasantries, Gromyko's general survey of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the President's optimistic assessment of the relationship over the past year.] The President continued that in the period of the Democratic administrations, we had been encouraged by the progress made in some fields. Agreement had been reached on the hot line, on the Limited Test Ban, and the Consular Convention now pending before the Senate. Also, there had been reciprocal actions by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in cutting back the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and substantial reductions had been made in our preparedness effort. We had observed with pleasure the desire of the Soviet Government to reduce its military budget. As far as we were concerned, in the brief period between 1964 and 1966, there would be a reduction in our military spending by some $2-3 billion; this was a substantial reduction, particularly if one took into account the military pay-raise, which obviously would not add to our military effort but would only make it easier for military personnel to acquire goods for their own use, such as housing, etc. Mr. McNamara's plan provided for the closing of 566 military installations; just recently, he had announced the closing of 95 such installations. This trend towards economy caused hardships in certain areas, but generally speaking the American people were pleased with it. The President then noted that he had tried, notwithstanding occasional failure, to understand some things he saw in the papers. He had tried to refrain from criticizing Soviet leaders personally, even though sometimes he read in the papers about their views on what he did in certain parts of the world. He simply took the papers home, showed them to his wife, and tried to forget, without replying. He did so because he sincerely believed that both of our countries wanted peace if they could only find it. They were like children hunting for Easter eggs, and it was important that both of them searched until they were found. Things would be all right if both of our countries showed patience and understanding and if they adhered to the principle of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Summarizing, the President said we wanted to do everything in order to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. He reiterated his pleasure at the hot line agreement, and said he was also pleased with the Exchange Program and the understandings reached in the field of outer space. He noted that he had received an excellent report from his Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, who had been very well received in the Soviet Union and who had greatly enjoyed his discussions there./2/ He had also received a good report from the U.S. businessmen who recently had visited the Soviet Union./3/ Reiterating that the Consular Convention was pending in the Senate, the President also noted that the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement was ready for signature; however, we didn't want to kill the former by signing the latter prematurely. The President reiterated that the November elections clearly showed that the American people rejected the course advocated by Goldwater, a course which was opposed to the one the present Administration was following. Some people had said rather ugly things about Mr. McNamara in connection with his economy drive. But we believed that the American people at large supported the policies of the present Administration. /2/Hornig headed a delegation of U.S. industrial research leaders that visited factories, laboratories, and engineering design institutes from Moscow to Novosibirsk in Siberia during a 2-week study tour in mid-November. No written report of Hornig's trip has been found. /3/Reference may be to the business leaders who accompanied Hornig. No written report of their visit has been found. Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said he would convey them to the Soviet Government. He thought there were two main questions relating to U.S.-Soviet relations. The first one was that of the arms race. Arms were constantly piling up; indeed, stockpiles were as high as the Mont Blanc. However, what was important was not only their quantity but also their destructive capability. The Soviet Government believed it would be important if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as well as other countries, were to find a radical solution to the armaments problem. In such a case, all would gain--both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and also the U.K., France, and others. Of course, this was a very complex problem and even if there was a will to resolve it, its solution would require time. Therefore, partial steps were needed. He did not wish to enumerate the individual steps which the Soviet Union believed would lessen tensions and facilitate disarmament, inasmuch as he had discussed them with the Secretary. However, he did want to draw the President's attention to one area where the Soviet Union believed there was possibility of agreement. The Soviet Union believed that it should be possible to reduce U.S. and Soviet troops, as well as foreign troops generally, in Europe. Such a step would not be important from the standpoint of the existing correlation of forces since such correlation would remain unchanged; however, such a step would reduce tensions in Europe and in the world at large. Referring to the President's remark about the closing of 95 bases, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that one could close 95 obsolete bases and build two new ones which would be more powerful than all the 95 taken together. He thought this point only emphasized the importance of disarmament. As to the President's remark about some statements aimed at him personally, Mr. Gromyko said they were probably an incorrect interpretation by the American press. There had been no statements by Soviet leaders aimed at personalities; they spoke only in terms of the principles of policy. Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to turn to the European problem, and particularly the German question. However, perhaps the President might first wish to comment on the arms race problem. The President noted that both sides had had a great number of discussions about disarmament and had submitted their respective proposals at various times. He said only today he had suggested to the Secretary that the Soviet December 7 statement on disarmament/4/ be fully explored in order to see whether it contained any hope of agreement. Earlier this year, the President continued, he had made a statement expounding the views of our Government on the subject of disarmament. He hoped progress could be made in this area. We were particularly concerned about the problem of non-proliferation. He had spent the past two or three days discussing this very problem; namely, how to keep nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of others./5/ As to the bases we were closing, they were not essential to the state of preparedness we believed was required, and we would save the salaries of 50,000-60,000 men who would be released as a result of that action. The President reiterated his pleasure at our intended reduction in military spending by $2-3 billion between 1964 and 1966, and at the Soviet-announced cut of 500 million rubles in their upcoming military budget. He said the U.S. would be willing to consider any suggestions regarding disarmament and repeated that we would evaluate the Soviet December 7 disarmament statement with a view to fully exploring the possibilities for agreement, if there were any. /4/Reference is to a Soviet memorandum on measures for the further reduction of international tension and limitation of armaments, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on December 7. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509-517. Extracts from Gromyko's speech to the U.N. General Assembly the same day, in which he expounded on the memorandum, are ibid,. pp. 500-509. /5/An apparent reference to President Johnson's talks with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson December 6-9; see footnote 4, Document 53. Regarding the remarks made about him personally, he did not mean that there had been comments about his height or looks, but he did wish to stress the desirability of not questioning the motives of other governments and of knowing what one was talking about. We had always refrained from questioning the motives of the other side and we believed this was better for our relations. The President then stressed the concern we had about the nuclear explosion conducted by the Chinese Communists. He said we were anxious to avoid a situation where others might follow in the footsteps of the Chinese. We were doing all we could to discourage others from embarking upon a nuclear weapons program. Mr. Gromyko said that since the President had stated the U.S. Government's support for disarmament and non-proliferation, he wished to state that it was the Soviet Government's firm position to do everything to facilitate disarmament and to prevent proliferation. Turning to Europe, Mr. Gromyko said World War II had left behind it a very complex situation. The Soviet Union did not regret the results of the War. Both of our countries had been on the same side of the barricades in World War II, and it was as a result of their joint struggle that Nazi Germany had been forced to its knees. However, now the situation was different. In the light of past experience, the Soviet Union wanted to create a situation in Europe where no seeds of a new world war could be sown. Thus, the Soviet Union believed it to be most important for the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the other states concerned to draw a line under World War II and to have a German peace settlement on the basis of the situation which exists as a result of that war. That would be in the interest of both of our countries. Mr. Gromyko said that the second point he wished to make was related to non-dissemination and to the general situation in Europe as well. The Soviet Union saw a great danger in the plans for providing the FRG with access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was not concerned over this because the existing correlation of forces would change. The FRG would not become stronger as a result of the implementation of those plans, but the possibilities for provocation by the Germans would greatly increase and the situation in Europe would become much more acute. He continued that the Soviet Union would welcome it if common language could be found on a German peace settlement and on the question of non-proliferation. He wondered whether the President could state his views on these points, noting that he had another brief point to raise later. The President reiterated that we were greatly concerned about the fact that the Chinese had developed and exploded their nuclear device, and that we wanted to do everything possible to prevent any other power from following the Chinese example. We realized that the more nations possessed nuclear weapons, the greater the danger, and we would not do anything which would increase that capacity. The U.K. now wished to minimize its effort in the nuclear weapons field, and we did not want to stimulate the Germans to exercise the capacity we knew they could possess. The President said he had tried to be very patient during his service as President, and we now had the U.K. discussing the problem with the Germans rather than Uncle Sam having to indicate any particular conduct. Of course, there were some who wanted to encourage the Germans to build up their own capacity. We were trying to counter this because we saw what happened in China. Thus, Mr. Gromyko could be sure that we were genuine and sincere in our attempts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. We recognized the tremendous power the Soviet Union had, and we also recognized our own tremendous power. We were not anxious at all to see the number of nuclear powers increase. He assured Mr. Gromyko that we did not want to encourage the proliferation process. The President said he was happy that both sides now seemed to be in agreement as to the importance of non-proliferation, and his people would be encouraged by what Mr. Gromyko had said on this point. As to Germany, we would be glad to receive any new ideas the Soviet Union might have on the German problem. Of course, we were familiar with the standing Soviet position that both German states should be recognized. The President said he did not believe much progress could be made on that basis. If the Soviet Union had any new ideas, he would ask the Secretary to stop traveling all over the world and get busy studying them. Reverting to non-proliferation, the President said we did not have in mind to give the Germans nuclear technology or to encourage nuclear aspirations in any other way. What we were trying to do was to deter them from seeking an independent capability and to forestall any pressures that might develop in that direction. The U.K. was now prepared to give up its independent capability and to get out of the picture; what we wanted to do was to prevent the Germans from getting into the picture. In this effort, we needed Soviet encouragement and maybe even their prayers. For, as frequently is the case in negotiations, we were not in complete agreement with our partners in the course of the past two days' discussions. The pressure for an independent nuclear capability in Germany was not strong today, but it could become so quickly in the absence of our leadership. Mr. Gromyko commented that while it was true that both sides said they were in favor of non-proliferation, they were in agreement only in theory and their actions were in different directions. The President has said the Germans might follow the Chinese example; however, the Soviet Union was providing an alternative, namely, a broad non-proliferation agreement. As to new ideas on the German problem, Mr. Gromyko said that if the exchange of views on the German problem continued, he did not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union's put-ting forward new considerations on some points, particularly on the question of the Western forces in West Berlin. The Secretary remarked that he would have discussions with his colleagues shortly and that he would be in touch with the Soviet side. [Here follows discussion of Cuba and the Caribbean.]
55. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff. At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard H. Davis (EUR), Henry D. Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Thomas L. Hughes (INR), and Richard N. Gardner (IO). SUBJECT Your memorandum of December 3/2/ raises a number of important and difficult issues which require further study. I believe that the subjects raised deserve careful attention and staffing before being considered by a meeting of the Principals. /2/Following receipt of comments from Thompson and other principals on his November 23 memorandum to the Committee of Principals (see Document 52), Foster sent a revised memorandum to the Committee of Principals on December 3. This memorandum recommended "a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation," as follows: "First, an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which clearly commits all parties to halt proliferation in any form. "Second, informal discussions to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. "Third, the reinstitution of negotiations looking toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. "Fourth, a proposal to extend our freeze proposal to include reduction of an agreed number of nuclear delivery vehicles and launch sites. "Fifth, an understanding to halt the construction of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and ABM launch sites after July 1, 1965, while we negotiate limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles." (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) A sanitized copy of Foster's memorandum is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 529B-529N. I am not at all sure that the present time is the most appropriate one to take up the dialogue on disarmament with the Soviet leaders. We are not certain as to what direction the policy of the new Soviet Government will take./3/ If the disarmament debate in the United Nations is delayed, as now seems possible, I should think there would be a delay in the resumption of the work of the ENDC. If this should be the case, I would suggest we might do well to wait to see how the Sino-Soviet quarrel develops. In any event, I doubt if the new Soviet leadership is yet ready to take any important steps in this field. /3/On October 15, it was announced in Moscow that Khrushchev had been removed from power and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, and Alexei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, would succeed him. Comments on Point 1--A Non-Proliferation Agreement (a) We are presently embarked on the course of seeking an acceptable Resolution in the UNGA which would hopefully reduce opportunities for Soviet obstructionism. This continues to seem to be the most promising course for progress on non-proliferation during the period of decision on Allied nuclear arrangements. (b) I do not believe that it would be appropriate or feasible for the US to approach the Soviets at this time with respect to assurances on such matters as the European clause of an MLF. We can, of course, restate our general assurances that MLF forces could not be used by national decision of any non-nuclear power. However, we should not go beyond this until the issues involved are decided in negotiations with our Allies. (c) I am still very skeptical of the wisdom of giving assurance that the MLF will not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities. It would appear to me that this will be worked out in connection with the MLF itself and, since I do not believe it would in fact change the Soviet attitude toward MLF, I do not think we should give such an assurance at this time, particularly in the absence of any quid pro quo. (d) In addition, I do not believe that any assurance, even one jettisoning the European clause, would buy acceptance by the Soviets pending final resolution of the MLF question. As you know, Ambassador Kohler shares this judgment. Comments on Point 2--Preventing the Spread of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (a) In the memorandum of December 3 much of the discussion is written in terms of "nuclear delivery vehicles"; it should specify strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in all cases./4/ Any question with respect to tactical nuclear delivery vehicles would pose a host of additional problems with respect to ongoing programs especially, but not exclusively, with respect to our European Allies. Although we would wish to define "strategic" vehicles as we have done in our production freeze proposal, we must recognize that the Soviets will almost certainly continue to challenge that definition. /4/In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: "correct!" (b) In consideration of any measure of this kind, it would be necessary to assure continuing freedom to transfer strategic delivery vehicles to an MLF. (c) At a time when we are still considering the implications of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons, we should preserve options for possible transfer of strategic delivery vehicles. (d) In addition to further study taking account of points raised above, we would need to consider whether we wished to make any informal agreement subject only to similar Soviet restraint. Comments on Point 3--A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (a) I think it is not quite accurate to state that the Soviets "have given no indication as yet that they would be prepared to permit any on-site inspection." It would be more accurate to note that the Soviets have withdrawn their earlier offer of three on-site inspections and persistently state that no on-site inspections will be allowed. (b) I agree heartily that we should initiate a priority review of the US position, but until this is done I believe we should not press the Soviets. Given their firmly stated position, I think it would be misleading to tell them that in our view "a treaty at an early date is feasible." I am pleased to see that you suggest that such a review should include a reappraisal of the impact on the military balance of possible undetected violations; I think it should also include reappraisal of the expectations for military gains from future underground testing both by the USSR and the US. In addition, the political effects of a comprehensive test ban should, of course, be included. (c) With respect to the provision for assurance that weapons development shots are not disguised as peaceful detonations, my understanding is that only sophisticated devices could be successfully used and I therefore do not see how the assurance suggested could be obtained without revealing US technology on any shots we undertake./5/ /5/In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: "Correct--We may have to drop Plowshare." Comments on Point 4--Extending the Freeze to Include Reductions (a) In the discussion, the Soviet proposal for a nuclear umbrella is described as an alternative to our freeze proposal. It is, however, not offered as a corollary measure but as part of the GCD plan. In addition, while the Soviets have not been precise, I think it is more accurate to say that the Soviets have indicated the number of strategic delivery vehicles which they envisage for the umbrella is very small, rather than "relatively small"; that they have in mind parity of numbers, rather than application of any percentage reduction; and that they have specified informally that only land-based ICBMs could be allowed. (b) At the time of earlier consideration of this question, the Principals rejected a freeze coupled with reductions and especially the possibility of variable reductions under which the US might cut a large number of ICBMs than would the Soviets. I would not object to reconsideration of this question, but I believe it clearly deserves further study before any discussion with the Soviets. Comments on Point 5--Halting Construction of New ICBM and ABM Sites (a) I think the proposal to halt construction of new ICBM and ABM sites is the most promising of the ACDA proposals from the point of view of Soviet acceptance, even though its implementation now would freeze a US advantage. We should, however, decide on a clearly defined proposal before initiating exploratory discussions with the Soviets. (b) Military consequences of the SNDV freeze have already been assessed and found satisfactory, as the paper notes. I am not, however, certain that an assessment of the consequences of implementation of a freeze only on certain land-based launch sites can be based on an assessment of a much broader proposed measure. Incidentally, I think there might well be a problem with respect to sites partly constructed at the time of any agreement. (c) ABMs are included on page 2, but their inclusion is left in the air on page 12. We continue to be concerned about the possible destabilizing effect of any freeze on strategic offensive delivery systems which would not also include strategic defensive systems. At the same time, I question whether we should tie our hand on this matter at a time when we are still considering the advantages of damage-limiting capability, and such questions as the value of an ABM for dealing with potential small Chinese Communist intercontinental capabilities in the 1970's. (d) I very much doubt if the Soviets would cooperate in excluding seaborne strategic delivery launchers, particularly since this would facilitate agreement on an MLF. However, if they were to agree to such a provision we would probably have pushed them toward a buildup in a submarine launch system. (e) A proposal limited to ICBMs, while it has certain advantages from our point of view, would also provoke Allied concern as to whether the US was reaching agreement advantageous to North America without equal regard for the Soviet missile threat to Western Europe. Assuming, however, that we could deal with these concerns, we might find new pressures rising for a NATO land-based MRBM system. (f) The proposed 18-24 month moratorium "pending negotiation of a freeze (on site construction? on vehicles?) with provision for verification" would probably vitiate considerably our bargaining power for agreement on verification. The onus for withdrawal and resumption of deployment, if agreement were not reached on verification, would rest on the US. (g) I believe the problem of the sufficiency and perishability of US unilateral intelligence collection capability requires careful consideration. Moreover, the question would doubtless be posed as to why, if the US is confident that it could detect ICBM deployments, it needs to overfly Cuba. I don't say that this question cannot be answered, but we would be faced with the need to give a rather precise reply. Finally, our general position on inspection for disarmament might be undercut.
56. Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation/1/ Washington, December 13-14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on December 19. The second meeting of the Gilpatric Committee was held in the Old Executive Office Building from December 13 at 10 a.m. to December 14 at 1 p.m. No approved version of the minutes has been found. 1. Opening Remarks Mr. Gilpatric outlined the intended program of the 1-1/2 day meeting, emphasizing the timeliness of the Committee's review in view of the need for imminent White House decisions on three export issues (transfers of U-235 to France for use in a stationary submarine reactor, and of plutonium to Euratom for its fast reactor program, and the sale of two computers to the French Atomic Energy Authority) and on the MLF. He reviewed progress in sub-group activities, which he hoped would continue in the weeks ahead. Prior to the next meeting, the staff would work to elicit views and reactions of individual Committee members, and thereafter seek to put together the basis for a report that could be circulated to members before the January 19 meeting. To achieve maximum usefulness, Committee views could be presented to the Government either piecemeal or on any other basis that might prove appropriate. 2. Export Control Policies and Problems Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, with assistance from colleagues, discussed the problems posed by U.S. efforts to control trade in technological elements useful for nuclear weapons programs, especially to France, while maintaining the fabric of normal commercial and political relationships. The U.S. has long, and to the extent possible, satisfactory experience with regard to export controls to the Bloc, where no countervailing commercial considerations exist. In regard to France, policy is now articulated in National Security Action Memorandum 294, of April 20, 1964 (attached),/2/ which bars /2/Not attached. A copy is ibid., National Security File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Dr. York Nuclear Proliferation Committee, Box 9. "exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate (the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity) by significantly affecting timing quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator." Mr. Kitchen emphasized the difficulty in discriminating within the "gray areas" of exchanges, i.e. transfers that would neither "significantly affect . . . " the French as in the case of major military systems or sub-systems nor make no significant contribution. Efforts within the past six months, centered in the Department of State with technical assistance from other agencies, have not been successful in identifying broadly applicable categories beyond specific end items, which even then, because of conflicting policy considerations can only be regulated on a "case-by-case" basis. He emphasized that ample legal authority for controls exist, but that we remain deficient in the ability to discriminate clearly and efficiently. Mentioning computers as a case in point, he cited pending transfers of a Control Data Corporation machine to the French weapons laboratory and an advanced IBM machine to the French Atomic Energy Authority for general research. Despite obvious French intentions with regard to these machines, Mr. Kitchen pointed to the hardships and likely retaliation to U.S. corporations and their European affiliates and the availability to the French of alternate facilities in Europe, should the sales be denied. Dr. York on the other hand, emphasized the material handicaps to weapons scientists of not having ready physical access to an appropriate computer, and suggested the significance of sales to the French be judged on the basis of their relation to overall laboratory expenditures. Mr. Kitchen pointed to the special and unsolved problems of regulating transfers where a domestic French company is controlled or partly owned by a U.S. supplier itself subject to effective control. Dr. Perkins emphasized the potential wide sweep of NSAM 294, overriding any narrow interpretation of its scope, through its provision barring the appearance of assistance to the French weapons program. He, Mr. Gilpatric, and Dr. York joined in identifying four dimensions of the export problem to France: --normal commercial relations, the direct current effort to hamper French weapons production, fulfillment of previous commitments to the French (e.g. submarine reactor U-235), and the indirect provision of assistance through Euratom. Mr. Kitchen emphasized the lack of intelligence and experience with the impact of exchanges of French weapons production sufficient to serve as a base for firm discrimination (although he said NSAM 294 merely confirms long-standing policy), and said that the French are now subtly trying to probe the inadequately coordinated U.S. control mechanism to achieve maximum advantage. Consideration, meanwhile, is now being given to the problems of broadening the NSAM's application to other countries. Discussion resumed with Mr. Kratzer of the AEC/3/ about the Euratom plutonium sale, in which he made the assertion, which was challenged, that the British are ready, willing and able to supply Euratom should we cancel our proposed sale. /3/Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, AEC. 3. U.S. Response to Pressures for Proliferation Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State, pre-sented a broad review of the factors making for proliferation and of U.S. policy alternatives, based on his paper "A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation,"/4/ supplemented by comments about individual countries. He traced our current policies back to the Post-War Baruch plan, and forward to the prospect of eventual arms control, emphasizing that meanwhile it is insufficient to try to stop proliferation to the exclusion of considering other U.S. objectives. He contrasted Soviet policy since 1956 (overhanging threat of nuclear war, pressure on Berlin as a divisive issue in the West, and maneuvers to get U.S. to start conflict) against successful U.S. policies of shoring up world security while working to lessen tension. Proliferation now holds the dangers of increasing the risk of war and posing a "dilemma of commitment" through U.S. efforts to maintain a more dangerous balance or withdrawal from exposed position. Alternatively, U.S. should seek to strengthen factors working against proliferation by (1) "giving our allies knowledge and maturity about the inherently collective nature of the deterrent," (2) emphasizing other routes to prestige than national weapons production, and (3) enhancing the "credibility and relevance to security of U.S. military power." /4/Not found. With respect to Europe, Mr. Rostow referred to a "package" of measures under consideration in the Policy Planning Council, including consultation, commitments to collective negotiation, and the MLF/ANF. He saw evolution in Britain since her first achievement of an independent deterrent, and in Germany "an overwhelming vote against an independent nuclear force." If the MLF fails to come to pass, he saw the need in Germany for either an extension of current bilateral relations with the U.S. or a link-up with the French, with whom the Germans are now "utterly at cross-purposes." The MLF, however, offers the Germans "prestige along with participation, and increasing credibility to the deterrent." If the U.S. maintained its veto, the MLF would be a logical extension of our two-key arrangements to meet the need for substitutions for the MMRBM and obsolescent QRA aircraft. He indicated four steps that would give substance to our evolving European posture: (1) Repeal the 1958 Atomic Energy Act amendment allowing transfers of military nuclear information when a country has made "substantial progress" in its own weapons capability, an implicit reward for undertaking weapons development. (2) Secure a non-acquisition pledge from the Germans as an element of the MLF. (3) Encourage the British to publish a white paper on the fruitlessness of their independent deterrent. (4) Dramatize our readiness for serious arms control negotiations. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed to technical anachronisms in the mixed-manning approach of the MLF, stating that such procedures are more suitable to systems more dependent upon cooperative human performance. Outside of Europe, Mr. Rostow pointed to the need to avoid premature U.S. reinsurance or "loss of options" in the wake of the Chicom explosion. Japan needed an outlet for its technology in support of its security, perhaps through an Asian MLF or weapons pool. In India, there will be difficulty in getting compatible U.S. and Russian commitments; Mr. Rostow notes deep nationalism in Indian youth, awareness of the costs of a nuclear deterrent, and a need for demonstration of technological success. A pool of weapons available to both India and Pakistan for defense against external attack might be suitable to deal with their mutual suspicion. Mr. Henry Rowen (DOD/ISA) predicted a difficult defense problem for the Indians, should they elect to achieve their own deterrent in the face of what will probably be a sophisticated Chinese program. He posed the need for serious and urgent U.S. study of steps necessary if we sought to discourage Indian efforts, specifically including the content and form of a treaty, the commitments necessary to make U.S. guarantees credible, the secrecy of our commitments, and the partners we would seek to involve (i.e. Russia?). 5. Status of the MLF Ambassador Gerard Smith (Special Assistant to the Secretary/MLF, Department of State) outlined the history and objectives of the Multilateral Force proposal, beginning with the post-Sputnik decision of the North Atlantic Council to provide an intermediate range force for SACEUR and European access to tactical nuclear weapons. The MLF is not proliferation, he said, because it represents an affirmative step to stop the loss of control over nuclear weapons and the loss of design data to other countries, while the U.S. exercises its necessary affirmative vote. In response to a question, Ambassador Smith acknowledged that MLF ships could be overpowered and seized, but not without risk of war. Any exposure of design data would be comparable to what our allies have already. Soviet surveillance and control would not be possible short of installation of extensive satellite systems, due to Western Europe's extensive coastal waters making evasion simple. Capital cost of the MLF was put at $2.3 billion for a 25-ship force, with $160 million annual operating expenses. 6. Underground Nuclear Testing Dr. Harold Brown (Director, Defense Research and Engineering) discussed military aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which he said would probably slightly favor the U.S. Detection capabilities available in 3-5 years will enable the U.S. to detect down to 0.0 kiloton in granite, 0.2 kt in tuff and 1/2-1 kt in alluvium. This would result in some 20+10 unidentified events above the present detection threshold of 1 kt in granite. He suggested that 2 or 3 inspections with these capabilities would provide the same level of protection as 7-8 under the previously assumed capabilities. The utility of continued testing relates to (a) effects tests bearing on ABM technology, (b) yield-to-weight improvements, and (c) tactical weapons developments. He emphasized that improved accuracy was more important than increased yield-to-weight ratios. The need for inspection remains, however, to identify suspicious events, to underpin political sanctions, and to serve as a precedent for other disarmament agreements. Dr. Brown believes our own underground testing to date has been more fruitful than that of the Soviets. He discounted the practicability and significance of deep-hole testing, simultaneous shots, or timing to accompany an earthquake. In regard to proliferation, however, Dr. Brown downgraded the significance of an all-environments test ban treaty, to stop proliferation because others need not adhere, weapons can be stockpiled without testing (although political prestige of an explosion would not be achievable), and because a "substantial measure of disarmament and action against the self-nuclearizers" would be more effective. Mr. Keeny asked whether this conclusion was not based on the questionable assumption that countries such as India and Japan would not sign such a treaty and that if they did sign, there would be much less incentive for them to test since they would lose the political prestige and military deterrent value of testing. Dr. Brown concluded that: "It is hard to conclude that a comprehensive test ban would be a serious mistake, since there are no substantial military disadvantages; it would probably be a net plus." Dr. Brown saw a need for continued R&D on land-mobile air-transportable MRBMs that could be moved every few hours. Though not as good as the original MMRBM concept (inertial guidance, trucks, 5-minute firing), they would be usable under appropriate control in Europe, the Far East and Southeast Asia. An ABM system sufficient to protect the U.S. from disparate threats could be effective to shore up U.S. damage-limiting strategy, based on modifications of an enhanced Nike-X system. Where a $25 billion system is estimated against a Soviet attack to reduce casualties from 100 million to 40 million people, a $5 billion system (plus fall-out shelter) against a less sophisticated threat could bring casualties down from 30 million to about 10 million or fewer. Other threats change the equation (suit-case bombs, ship-launched missiles, aircraft). He posed the alternative to expensive guarantees to discourage Nth country development of a U.S. defensive capability against modest strategic threats. "There is a discount rate to trouble, just as there is to money." However, he anticipated no major foreseeable breakthroughs in military technology, although the Chinese could mount an earlier threat to the U.S. through 400-mile missiles launched from ships than from ICBMs. He saw "no overwhelming losses" if Plowshare is delayed for 10 years. 7. Concluding Remarks Mr. Garthoff presented cautionary views under consideration in the Department of State reviews of problems of proliferation--that appropriate attention be given to the real effectiveness of particular measures, that problems be considered in all their significant dimensions, and that solutions applicable to a country-by-country basis be devised. Mr. Gilpatric outlined for the Committee four alternative courses of action: Alternative "Zero"--selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation; Alternative One--the current "prudent course"; Alternative Two--"positive efforts to hold the line where it is"; and Alternative Three--an all-out effort to stop and roll back nuclear proliferation./5/ He called for a staff paper laying out the pros and cons of the four courses, in the nature of proposed findings, which would enable the Committee to focus on the objectives and alternatives which various measures would serve./6/ Mr. McCloy emphasized the urgent need for increasing communications with the Germans and implicating them in a collective approach to planning for the future of the Alliance, especially in the event of a failure of the MLF to come into existence. That proposed device was conceived to deal with a set of real problems, that still remain to be confronted effectively. /5/A paper drafted by Rivkin, "Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation," bearing the handwritten date December 15, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. /6/An undated and unsigned paper, "Problems Concerning Alternative Courses of Action," is ibid.
57. Memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, December 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret. SUBJECT I believe that we have reached a crisis point in our efforts to develop concrete proposals to carry out the President's stated objective in the arms control field. In the attached memorandum to Bill Foster (Tab A),/2/ Ambassador Thompson essentially comes out against all of the arms control initiatives that ACDA has recommended for discussion with the Soviets in their memorandum to the Committee of Principals (Tab B)/3/ that we discussed last week. /2/Document 55. /3/Regarding these ACDA recommendations, see footnote 2, Document 55. As I pointed out previously, I understand that Secretary McNamara is prepared to support all of the ACDA proposals and that General Wheeler has indicated his willingness to go along with all of the proposals except the item on the moratorium on construction of ICBM and ABM sites which he wishes to consider further. It is my own judgment that the proposals are clearly in conformity with the President's stated arms control objectives; and that, if properly handled, all of the proposals are to our net security advantage. The attached memorandum from Ambassador Thompson is really a remarkable document that essentially calls into question our entire arms control and non-proliferation policy. I call your attention in particular to the second paragraph that characterizes in classic fashion a foreign policy based on a desire to react to external events rather than to influence them. Although I agree with several of the detailed points made in the Thompson memorandum, I am afraid it is basically a collection of arguments designed to assure that no action will be taken in this field in the foreseeable future. I am particularly concerned about their comments on the comprehensive test ban. While at first glance these comments appear to be only a delaying action, I am afraid they are in fact an effort to reopen the whole issue despite rather clear U.S. policy in this area. Among other things, the memo implies that there is no possibility that the Soviets will consider inspection with a comprehensive test ban. I do not think that we should take this for granted. (For your information, Mr. Faber, First Secretary of the British Embassy, reported to me today that a member of the Soviet Embassy in London had told a senior British official informally that he thought his government would be prepared to return to its original position of 2 or 3 on-site inspections.)/4/ /4/No record of this conversation has been found. There are a number of useful points in the Thompson memorandum, however, I believe that most of these could easily be taken care of on an informal staff basis and are not critical to the proposals. In general, I share the basic concern that ACDA has not done its homework better in spelling out the details of their proposals. On the other hand, these are not new ideas; we have studied the problems (e.g., comprehensive test ban) in great depth and are now presumably interested in indicating to the Soviets our desire to move forward and in determining what general proposals the Soviets might be prepared to pursue. More specifically, I share State's concern that the 18-24 month moratorium on construction of sites might be difficult to get out of and would complicate our subsequent bargaining position on verification rights. To minimize these effects, the time period, if any, should be short, the arrangement informal, and our future actions closely coupled with Soviet activities in this area. I agree also that Plowshare presents a serious problem under the comprehensive test ban. In order to avoid unacceptable risks or a meaningless treaty, we may have to exclude Plowshare initially with a provision that this subject be re-examined after a few years. However, this problem is one that we can resolve internally and is not immediately involved in reopening the dialogue on this question with the Soviet Union. I think it is most important that the Thompson memorandum does not become the State Department's formal position. If it does, the President will be faced with a serious problem that the State Department is effectively preventing the pursuit of his stated policy on arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bill Foster is going to recommend that you call a special meeting of the Committee of Principals next Monday in the Situation Room to discuss this problem./5/ He is asking you to do it this way to keep the number of participants down. However, I recommend that, if the opportunity presents itself, you discuss the problems privately with the President, Rusk and McNamara later this week to establish the President's desires in this area. /5/Seaborg's sanitized record of the discussion at the December 21 meeting of the Committee of Principals in Secretary Rusk's Office on Monday, is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 274-280. Spurgeon
58. Editorial Note Throughout 1964 officials in the Johnson administration discussed the wisdom and timing of Project Sulky, a proposed Plowshare test in nuclear excavation. President Johnson called for a Department of State report on the proposed event in NSAM 282, February 11 (Document 7). Upon completion of the Department of State report, May 7 (Document 27), the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests discussed the recommendations in the report. In a June 26 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Brigadier General Harry L. Evans, Alternate Representative of the JCS Chairman to the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, reported that the conclusions in the report were "sound" but recommended that the timing of the recommended actions be considered by the Review Committee. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, in a June 26 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, concluded that the recommendations were "generally sound" but opposed the suggestion that foreign observers be invited to witness the initial Plowshare type of test, and he recommended that the proposed Sulky test "be carried out before there is any public announcement of the event, either in this country or abroad." He also urged that the results of this shot and possibly other cratering events should be evaluated before any action is taken to negotiated changes in, or exceptions to, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The AEC advanced justifications for shot Sulky in two reports, "AEC Comments on Suggestions for Implementation of the Department of State Report on Nuclear Excavation," June 26, and "Analysis of Project Sulky," undated. Seaborg sent the two reports under cover of memoranda to Bundy, June 26 and July 15. All of this correspondence and the two reports are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. At a meeting of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests at the White House on July 16, the Department of State report was discussed further, and an "implicit approval to the Sulky shot in December was given." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 9, page 33) On July 20, Bundy sent a memorandum to holders of NSAM 282 indicating that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests had endorsed the three general courses of action proposed in the State Department's May 7 report, including "the desirability of conducting Project Sulky sometime in December." The AEC would include this shot in its regular authorization request for Whetstone II, and "final approval would be given at that time after the Review Committee had an opportunity to consider the final analysis of the predicted fallout associated with the test." (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a letter to President Johnson, October 13, Seaborg requested approval of Sulky as planned, and in a memorandum to Seaborg the same day McGeorge Bundy wrote that the President had approved his request. This exchange of correspondence is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 8, pages 235-236. Shot Sulky took place at the Nevada Test Site on December 18. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992, page 23)
59. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Garthoff. The attached list of participants is not printed. SUBJECT The Secretary opened by expressing appreciation that this Committee is working on the proliferation problem, and said that he was awaiting its recommendations with interest. The US opposes nuclear proliferation. Each nuclear power does not wish to see further proliferation. Thus it is easy for the US to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently. The problem of alternatives to national nuclear proliferation arises. It is easier to see solutions in cases where firm defense alliances with the US exist, e.g., Japan and the Philippines. The solution is not so clear or easy in a case such as India. De Gaulle doubts the US commitment even in Europe--it is much easier to have such doubt in distant areas not traditionally bound to us. Moreover, do we want to give guarantees which would guarantee that we will be involved at the risk of 100 to 150 million lives ten years from now in the face of possible Sino-Soviet alliances? An Asian nuclear defense community, perhaps with a US nuclear stockpile available for it to draw upon, may be one solution. A commonwealth nuclear committee for South Asia may be an answer; the UK is ready to commit its nuclear force in NATO, if we can find an answer to support for her commitment East of Suez. In general, a different organization of nuclear arrangements will probably be necessary. The Secretary remarked that General de Gaulle had said to him that unless the nuclear powers physically suppress proliferation, it is inevitable. De Gaulle opposes, and does not expect, such suppression. On the other hand, de Gaulle has indicated that France would not disseminate nuclear weapons to anyone, including Germany. The UK is more optimistic on agreements to curb proliferation. We have long sought a non-proliferation agreement; the Soviets have opposed it ostensibly because of the MLF, but really because of their more basic opposition to NATO. The Secretary noted that he had inquired of Gromyko with respect to Warsaw Pact arrangements, and had mentioned reports of Soviet nuclear aid to China in the 1950's. Gromyko made no comment on the Warsaw Pact, but said only that we should not listen to rumors with respect to Soviet aid to China./2/ In fact, the Secretary added, we did not know if they did anything more than assist the Chinese peaceful nuclear program. Soviet interest in non-proliferation is 95 percent centered on the FRG, just as we have been on China. The Secretary suggested that Soviet interest in the partial test ban in 1963 seemed to be based in part on a hope to restrain Communist China. This, however, is inference, since the Soviets steadfastly refuse to discuss China with us. For a long time the Soviets played down Chinese nuclear development, until shortly before the Chinese test. /2/See Document 53. Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary whether he had reassured the Soviets on the US veto and European clause in the MLF. The Secretary replied that he had. He had pointed out that the MLF was a move against proliferation and it was the Soviets who had put the FRG in the nuclear picture by targetting them. MLF arrangements would not give the Germans control of nuclear weapons nor would the Germans acquire nuclear weapons technology through it. In fact, he had pointed out that the MLF would be more secure than existing NATO arrangements. Gromyko kept objecting that the MLF was only the "first step" to a German capability. The Secretary noted that he had replied that the Soviets should then sign up on a non-proliferation agreement which would commit us all to the proposition that this "first step" was also the "last step." Mr. Ball commented that if the Soviets can use an issue to divide the West, they do so. Also, to the extent that the MLF would strengthen the Alliance, they also oppose it. Ambassador Thompson added that the Soviets also oppose an MLF because it would establish a longer term and closer knitting together of the US with Europe in defense. The Secretary then raised the question of nuclear free zones, stating that we were favorably inclined toward such zones in Latin America and Africa, assuming the problem of transit rights were worked out, because there would be no need for the nuclear powers to target these areas. Other areas are too closely involved both with the presence of nuclear weapons, and as potential nuclear targets. In the Far East there is a special problem of requiring an alternative to conventional forces for meeting the enormous Chinese masses. We therefore oppose the Chinese Communist proposal for no first use of nuclear weapons. General Gruenther asked the Secretary if he would comment further on France. The Secretary drew attention to the extreme sensitivity of the information he was about to give. For de Gaulle, the French nuclear program is strictly political, not military. There is a touch of Poincare in de Gaulle's view that France must have a special place, and is only safe when Germany is in a secondary position. [2 lines of source text not declassified] De Gaulle objects that an MLF would give Germany a preferred position, though France has always been invited to have that same opportunity. De Gaulle is not yet prepared to say that Europe should organize its defenses entirely separately from the US. He would preserve the Alliance, while giving Europe an independent ability to bring the US in. Messmer did say that France would talk about coordinating nuclear targetting with us when the Force de Frappe was ready. The Secretary noted that strategy is discussed in NATO on three levels: (1) Deterrence--with a premium on telling the opponent that all hell would break loose right away; (2) the question of how to wage combat--for example, there has been full agreement on the measured use of force in our Berlin contingency planning; and (3) talk about strategy, by those (such as de Gaulle) who assume there will be no war, and therefore manipulate strategic questions for present political purposes. Our forces are under the NATO Guidelines; the French are not. Mr. Ball noted the French justification for the Force de Frappe. Pompidou has said that [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Recently Raymond Aron has also written an article contending that proliferation is not a very serious danger./3/ /3/Reference is to Raymond Aron's article, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 215 (January 1965), pp. 44-50, which is an excerpt from the concluding chapter of his book, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy, published the same month by Doubleday. The Secretary raised the problem of US actions with respect to the French nuclear program. To begin with, we are clearly obligated not to transgress the provisions of the partial test ban. But there is a difficult question of where, beyond that, we should draw the line. The US has never openly opposed or adopted sanctions against the French program. Nor for that matter, the Secretary said, will US sanctions stop the French. We do not want out of vexation to open a spiral of economic reprisal and retaliation. Should we not sell to France that which we would sell to other Allies? Finally, there would be particularly serious consequences of attempting to stir up resistance to the French program. Mr. Gilpatric noted that Mr. Ball had earlier stated that the French expect such a policy of us. Mr. Ball replied that there were problems on the border line, but that we have not tried to use our power in the way the French might have if they were in our place. General Gruenther asked how the French react to our decisions on the sale of computers. Mr. Ball noted particularly the problem of a nuclear weapons laboratory as a designated recipient. Mr. Watson, remarking that he was not speaking from the standpoint of a selfish interest, raised the question of possible repressive retaliation by the French against a company with large assets in France. Mr. Ball agreed that we must look hard at this problem and that the French might use such instances as an excuse for action against American subsidiaries. The current instance of artificial limitations on the dollar element in the French treasury reserve is an example of political interjection. Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary's view on what the FRG would do if the MLF/ANF does not come into being. The Secretary replied that the German elections this year might make a difference. But more generally, in the long run the Germans would face a choice between two solutions: (1) joint development with France in a European force, or (2) a national nuclear weapons program. Mr. Ball remarked that Germany would probably first of all turn to us for bilateral arrangements with MRBMs in Germany under the two-key system. The Secretary remarked that the Germans seem to have drawn away from the idea of placing MRBMs on their own territory, where they would attract additional fire. He believed the FRG would probably reject de Gaulle's terms for collaboration in a basically French controlled force, so that in the long run the pressure would be for a German nuclear capability. Ambassador Thompson suggested the Germans might also increase pressure for more tactical nuclear weapons. The Secretary stated his agreement with Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson that in the first instance the Germans would seek bigger and better bilateral arrangements with the US, but that later they would seek their own. Mr. Ball remarked that many German ministers and others have been saying that without an alliance nuclear arrangement there will inevitably be pressures for a German nuclear force. The Secretary said that when Secretary McNamara had asked von Hassel why the latter wanted an MLF, he replied that he wanted it first to tie the US to Germany [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. McCloy noted that Erler of the SPD is also concerned over eventual pressures for a German force. Mr. Ball noted that after World War I four restrictions had been placed on German rearmament, but three went by the board very quickly, and the last by 1936. We can not make the Germans into second-class citizens. We can not subject them to a discriminatory state of original sin. In the first place, the Germans themselves would not put up with it, and in the second place, over time the West itself would refuse to press such discrimination. The Germans had already spent $850 million in atomic energy research. The Secretary said that in Adenauer's last year as Chancellor he had privately declared that the WEU restrictions were no longer binding by virtue of rebus sic stantibus. Mr. Dean inquired whether, if we have to give the Germans an MLF, does it not mean the Soviets would not agree to non-proliferation. Mr. Ball noted that the Germans will not sign a non-proliferation agreement except in a situation in which they participate in nuclear defense arrangements. Mr. Gilpatric asked whether it would be possible to put more pressure for German reunification. The Secretary replied that very morning the German Ambassador had told him, not officially under instructions, that there was German thinking along lines of holding back from any further commitments on nuclear non-proliferation as a bargaining counter for reunification./4/ The Secretary further commented in reply to Mr. Dean's question that the MLF does not involve proliferation. It would, on the contrary, deal with the German appetite for a nuclear role on a basis of equal participation. Mr. Dean noted that the Soviet delegates still oppose an agreement providing for an MLF. He asked whether this means abandoning a non-proliferation agreement. /4/A memorandum of Ambassador Knappstein's January 7 conversation with Secretary Rusk on this matter is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF). Mr. Dulles noted that we all agree that non-proliferation is desirable; the problem is in costs. We apparently need a big effort, with many kinds of measures, to have much chance of success. He then asked the Secretary if he would sacrifice a great deal in terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation. The Secretary replied that when faced with this question we had not decided in 1956-57 to launch an all-out effort against France, with threats and the like. We probably could not have succeeded even if we had tried. And we have not struck China to deal with its nuclear program. Non-proliferation is not the overriding element in US relations with the rest of the world. In individual cases--e.g., the UAR/Israel--it could become dominant. Mr. Gilpatric asked how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on others. The Secretary replied that each case is different. India may face a nuclear attack; the UAR does not. They must be dealt with differently. In general, the Secretary added, there is probably more time to deal with this problem in the Alliance than with respect to India, Israel, etc. Mr. Gilpatric asked what the terms might be if we decided that it was definitely in our interest that India remain non-nuclear. The Secretary replied that the Indians want guarantees from the Soviets and from us. We do not think that a joint guarantee with the Soviets would be feasible or desirable, and we do not believe the Soviets would grant a meaningful effective guarantee. Perhaps some Commonwealth arrangement can be reached providing nuclear weapons to support India in time of crisis. In further reply to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Ball noted that it was necessary to give these potential nuclear powers something concrete in order to get them to give up the nuclear option. A mere general undertaking would otherwise probably be no more effective than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Mr. Dean questioned whether we would be giving a blank check to India to do whatever it wanted. The Secretary agreed that the question of guarantees opened a difficult chain of problems. He stated that he did not favor one-way US guarantees; an alliance with reciprocal obligations, or to meet certain specified conditions, might be another matter. But a conditional guarantee satisfactory to us might not be sufficiently satisfying to India. Mr. Dean asked what would happen if Japan and India sign a non-proliferation agreement, then later when under threat asked for our assistance and we did not give it--would not the credibility of our commitments in general go down the drain. The Secretary replied that he considered the situation covered in cases where we have an alliance like Japan but not in other cases. Mr. McCloy asked the Secretary if he regarded Indian policy as a complete change from the time of Nehru. The Secretary replied that present Indian policy was not basically different. After all, Nehru had moved into Kashmir, Hyderabad, Ladakh, and Goa. The Indians are probably already working on the first stages of preparation for nuclear weapons if they later decide to proceed. Changes in Indian policy are due more to circumstances than to changes in the leadership. (Mr. Ball left the meeting at approximately this stage in the conversation.) Mr. McCloy remarked that while we were talking about the price of proliferation, he was concerned about the price of dissolving the Alliance. He expressed the view that NSAM 322/5/ placed the ball in the court of the Europeans, who can't handle it. He had received ominous views from Germany and Brussels of our stepping back from leadership. Is the MLF out? Mr. McCloy noted that Secretary McNamara had said he would give the MLF at most a 50 percent chance. Without arm twisting, we must nonetheless lead. The Secretary replied that he considered the idea of the Europeans looking to us for a lead as phony. They all want us to "lead" in different directions. The Europeans now feel secure, not under threat from the East. This gives them the luxury of playing around in pursuit of other objectives. With respect to the MLF we had attempted to respond to the European view that something was needed. After waiting a year or two after Nassau we said that we would then show them a way. There was at that time no serious objection in the Alliance and eight countries showed serious positive interest. Lord Home said privately that they would go along with the MLF after the election. We went further along the MLF path before meeting real objection in the Alliance. Then, in October 1964, France suddenly got worried about its success and the Scandinavians hardened their position from non-participation to opposition. The Secretary remarked that when he was in Paris the Quai had remarked to the press the incorrect notion that he would ask de Gaulle to coordinate the Force de Frappe with SAC and the ANF. Gordon Walker/6/ quickly objected, of course, to that idea. Meanwhile, Italy wants a special role with Germany in a Directoire of five. Mr. McCloy remarked that if not the MLF, we need something to keep the Western community together. He did not like the idea of dropping the MLF just to suit the Soviets and de Gaulle. The Secretary said that was not the point. Italy and Germany will next take the lead, then with the UK, and then with us. Erhard and Wilson will meet this month. Moreover, there is more maneuver in the UK position than has been disclosed so far. There is a strong impetus to do something with the UK nuclear deterrent. The problem of control in the ANF is open--the UK wants the veto for all principal members; Germany does not want the UK to have a veto. But the UK will eventually come through, even on participation in an MLF surface fleet component. In Germany the situation is complicated by the fact the present government does not want to give the SPD any chance for credit. Mr. McCloy reiterated his concern over talks among the Germans, Italians, and British without us. The Secretary replied that we will continue to be deeply involved, but that we must stand back from the position of appearing to be out in front of the rest, where we had been with the MLF. It is, he noted, essential to present the ANF to Congress as a unifying measure in the Alliance. /5/"Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance," December 1, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 322, Box 5) /6/British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Perkins inquired whether the Secretary wished to comment on the relation of this subject to German reunification. The Secretary replied that the MLF-ANF, as we had indicated to others, would not be permitted to stand in the way of German reunification, the unity of Europe, or major disarmament. Mr. Gilpatric requested the Secretary's view on the appropriate time to broach any non-proliferation approaches to the Soviets. Should such approaches precede or follow the Communist Party talks scheduled for March? The Secretary noted that we have been talking with the Soviets, that there is an on-going dialogue, and that we can approach them at any time that seems appropriate. He added that he was concerned at present about possible erosion of the atmospheric test ban. Mr. McCloy commented that General Wheeler had indicated that the JCS may oppose a comprehensive test ban. The Secretary remarked that he did not see urgency in seeking a comprehensive test ban at a time when France and China are testing. The Soviets, he noted, will not yield on inspection. He had discussed the question with Mr. Gromyko, and Gromyko had made quite clear that inspection is for the Soviets strictly a political question, and that they did not care about the technical side of the question. Moreover, the Secretary continued, it was not inconceivable that under some circumstances the Soviets might test clandestinely in China. In response to a doubting interjection, the Secretary recalled that the Stalin-Hitler Pact showed how two hostile totalitarian states could sometimes get together very quickly when it suited them. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that he was not convinced that a comprehensive test ban would yield a major gain for non-proliferation. (At this point, the Secretary was obliged to excuse himself to meet another commitment, and suggested that Ambassador Thompson take the chair.) Ambassador Thompson opened by suggesting that the March meeting of the Communist Parties, as it occurs, may tell us more about the Soviet position. Mr. Gilpatric asked for the Ambassador's view on the signs of displeasure in Moscow at the President's State of the Union address. Ambassador Thompson emphasized that Moscow's behavior at the moment is largely conditioned on their expectation with respect to the March meeting. He stated that for the Soviet leaders five other things take priority over general relations with the West: (1) consolidation of their power; (2) dealing with crucial internal problems left by Khrushchev; (3) dealing with the East Europeans; (4) dealing with Communist China; and (5) relations with other Communist Parties around the world. Under these conditions, the Soviet leaders seek to remain loose and flexible. Ambassador Thompson added that he believes the Chinese Communists will force a split in the movement, despite the fact that the Soviets have shrunk back from forcing a split. Dr. York inquired why this should be so. Ambassador Thompson responded by noting that the Chinese were doing well in splitting the Communist movement, especially in Asia. The Chinese leaders also feel that it benefits them, especially with respect to Taiwan, whenever they can raise hell anywhere for the US. The Soviets, by contrast, are playing a longer-range game of establishing their presence and influence in various areas without wildly provoking outbreaks. The Chinese have very real tactical and strategic differences with the Soviets. Mr. Dulles asked whether the Soviets are really very interested in non-proliferation. Ambassador Thompson stated that he did not believe so, except for their concern over West Germany. The Soviets did make threats when, several years ago, the Swiss considered developing a nuclear weapons capability, and have pressed the Swedes. But in some other areas they may be inclined to see problems caused for us. Mr. McCloy asked Ambassador Thompson for his views of the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Ambassador Thompson said that he thought such a development was very remote, that all evidence points to the depth of the split. Of course, as the Secretary has noted, for the very long run we must consider all possibilities. Mr. Gilpatric raised a question relating to putting pressure on Euratom. He indicated that Dr. Seaborg had said that we should not pressure Euratom because of the value of that institution to European unity, even if Euratom was delinquent in permitting us to verify its safeguards./7/ Ambassador Thompson replied that he believed we should proceed with the scheduled plutonium transaction, not only for reasons of supporting European unity but because failure to carry out a commitment could have serious disadvantages. We have faced a similar problem with South Africa. Many considerations enter such decisions, including the availability of other suppliers. Mr. McCloy asked whether we wanted the French to dominate Euratom. Ambassador Thompson replied that this was not the case. Mr. Perkins remarked that he had learned that the French serving in the Euratom staff were by no means partisans of General de Gaulle. /7/Reference may be to Seaborg's briefing of the Gilpatric Committee the same morning. Seaborg briefly summarized the briefing, as follows: "I spoke for keeping our commitment to deliver 425 kilograms of plutonium to Euratom (I believe I convinced them) for means of strengthening IAEA safeguards. I expressed my feeling that Plowshare is worth striving for in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 21) Mr. Gilpatric expressed his thanks to Ambassador Thompson for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He wanted to express his great appreciation to the Secretary for having made Mr. Garthoff available to assist the Committee. Ambassador Thompson thanked Mr. Gilpatric and reiterated the Department's readiness to assist in every way that it could. He noted that if Mr. Gilpatric found it useful to submit a draft of the Committee's conclusions, when such a draft is available, we would be happy to look at it. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |