1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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60. Minutes of Discussion/1/ Washington, January 7-8, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on January 19. The minutes cover the third meeting of the Gilpatric Committee, which met in the Old Executive Office Building from January 7 at 10 a.m. to January 8 at 5:45 p.m. COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 1. Briefings by the Principals (January 7, 10 a.m.-5:45 p.m.) Presentations and responses to questions on the part of Chairman Seaborg, General Wheeler, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster took place in Executive Session on January 7. Minutes of their remarks are set forth as attachments to this memorandum./2/ /2/Minutes of each of these briefings are ibid. For a memorandum of Secretary Rusk's briefing, see Document 59. For Seaborg's account of his briefing, see footnote 7 thereto. 2. General Review (January 8, 9 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) Mr. Gilpatric stated his preference for a world with a limited number of nuclear powers, finding it implausible that additional proliferation could be compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized and comparing the consequences for the world of the Sarajevo incident. He found it all the more unlikely that a nuclear conflict involving 1.5 billion Chinese, Indians and Japanese could not affect our own security. Furthermore, the United States is already committed to Asian defense, both through treaty and through the President's October 18 message./3/ We cannot avoid fulfilling these commitments and we have the power--more usable today than ever before--to do so. The additional price, for example, $5 billion for an ABM, is not beyond our means, and Mr. Gilpatric would wish to recommend to the President that he make good on the course he's set for himself. /3/For the text of President Johnson's October 18, 1964, message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pp. 1377-1380. Mr. Webster said that he felt a rearguard action to keep proliferation to the minimum is to some extent inevitable although the characterization is perhaps oversimplified. He questioned whether we should be prepared to pay the ultimate price to stop proliferation--for example, a nuclear umbrella to India which might be too much temptation for Indian adventures; he would not give the Indians the ultimate military guarantees. On the other hand, he favored the taking of all steps reasonably necessary to slow proliferation, to approach the problem on a case-by-case basis. He felt he was nearer to Secretary McNamara's "Model A" world than to "Model B,"/4/ but not so close as Mr. McNamara. /4/In his briefing of the Gilpatric Committee on January 7 (see footnote 2 above), McNamara developed two models. In "Model A" the United States would push for a world in which there were no additional nuclear weapons nations; in "Model B" the United States would acquiesce in a world in which there would be a limited amount of further nuclear proliferation. Mr. McCloy focused on the form of the guarantees that might be necessary, feeling that thorough analysis is needed. He said that it is not the answer alone to say that we have tremendous military power, but that we must instead acknowledge the political limitations on the use of that power. We have been convincing on our guarantees of Berlin, but the character of our determination will be diluted if we have 20 such commitments and our fundamental image of capability to defend the free world might be impaired. He is not convinced that a guarantee is the price we should pay; as to India, for example, we should try first to get an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons without offering an umbrella. Mr. Dulles concurred. Mr. McCloy went on to emphasize that it is "fantastic" to assume that the problem of European security is solvable by the "other side" alone, as suggested in NSAM 322. He feared that our position in the Alliance is rapidly deteriorating and that we risk both losing the Alliance and non-proliferation as well. We are going to have to confront de Gaulle's belief that a return to nationalism in the Twentieth Century is appropriate; nationalism isn't adequate for conventional weapons and is not adequate for nuclear weapons. Mr. McCloy thinks that the United States is drifting in a situation where proliferation in Europe is more serious than in Asia or the Middle East. He questioned the view that we owe the Germans nothing, emphasizing that such an approach opened the door to German insecurity in the 1920s. Mr. Watson said that the ideal is the "Model A" world although he was puzzled by how we were to get it going without participation by the French. Soviet cooperation, he felt, would be desirable, at the price of overcoming their historical fears of Germany. Mr. Gilpatric suggested that perhaps at some time we may have to give up the "Holy Grail" and move to a "Model B" world. Mr. Watson emphasized that he was concerned with the need for a long-range plan for the future of the Germans. At the same time he said that it is a terribly dangerous course to repudiate France. He felt that some horse-trading would be necessary to soften the blow to the French of making Germany the dominant power in Europe. He said it was hard for him to see the practicality of alienating both the French and the Russians in order to achieve an Allied Nuclear Force. Mr. McCloy added that we did the same before on both the Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and he felt that the Russians will adjust once again, even though they hate Western unity. France's equivocal position, Mr. McCloy said, was readily stiffened by de Gaulle because our approach to the MLF has been so maladroit. Mr. McCloy emphasized that a solid Western Community was far more important than de Gaulle and is the essential basis for both the long-range prospects of disarmament and a modus vivendi, even affecting China. General Gruenther indicated that his views had changed in the course of the study and that a "Model A" world is not impossible, stating that he feels we have to go forward to achieve it whatever the cost. He felt that a principal problem would be the selling of increased American commitments on India to the American public. Mr. Dulles believed that we should begin with Course II as outlined in the Committee's planning and move to Course III as we find targets of opportunity./5/ We have to be sure that when we move to more adventurous positions we will be successful. /5/Reference is to the undated and unsigned planning paper for the Gilpatric Committee, "Problems Concerning Alternative Course of Action" (see footnote 6, Document 56), which developed four possible courses, as follows: "i. Course I. Avoid costs and risks of trying to stop proliferation; attempt to establish regional stability based upon new balances of power, in the hope that the U.S. can avoid dangerous external involvements; assist proliferation where useful in creating such stability (e.g., India and Japan as counter-balances to China). "ii. Course II. Attempt to slow proliferation everywhere while at the same time preserving other goals and avoiding major risks. Use the extra time to learn to live with the problem. "iii. Course III. Accept substantial costs and risks in exchange for a materially increased probability of halting or greatly retarding proliferation. "iv. Course IV. All-out efforts to stop proliferation; most or all other policies subordinated; acceptance of large costs now to avoid greater costs in the future." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5) Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that for our own lifetime we might prefer to live in a "Model B" world, but his thoughts about his grandchildren have changed his mind and commit him strongly to seek the "Model A." To term such action rearguard, he believes, is a concession of defeat. We must wage a campaign to keep proliferation at a minimum and be prepared to lose individual battles, but not the overall war. First, we should be prepared to impose pressures and present inducements to others. He felt the non-European world is at least as important as Europe in the light of growth in population and technological innovations. He is convinced that guarantees are essential to security in this area but that they should not be given promiscuously. He also thought that our own example will be essential and that we should press measures of arms limitation and increasing understanding with the Soviet Union. Mr. Dean indicated that he, like General Gruenther, had changed his views somewhat to support "Model A" if the United States will pay the necessary costs. To succeed, he said, we must involve the Soviet Union. In this context, he thought it wise that we weigh reunification as an alternative to the MLF. Dr. York came out squarely for "Model A." Guarantees, he believes, are possible, and in the short run at least, United States lives need not be at stake in India to support a guarantee, although we must also be able to withdraw from guarantees, if necessary. "With nervousness about the long run, I am for 'Model A' as a goal for the short run." Dr. Perkins emphasized that proliferation is not the totality of United States policy and that the subject should not be expanded until it covers all of our interests and those of our allies. He also emphasized the need to relate our short-run actions to long-range objectives. First, he felt we should emphasize our conventional military option and seek to make it convincing. In regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy, he felt our restraints should be relatively mild because such restraints are not likely to prove especially significant in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, he had some distress about NSAM 322 and its exclusively regional basis. He is concerned that we are seeking to get out of a difficult situation rather than to work out an appropriate alternative. In the Far East, he felt that a strict treaty with India is not necessary but that we should consider a regional alternative, such as NATO in Europe, and to this end, start conversations with the Indians, the Japanese and the Filipinos to work out regional arrangements on a series of national agreements. Internationally, he felt we should strive for the non-proliferation and comprehensive test ban treaty, whether we are likely to get them or not. We should beef up the IAEA to make it the inspectorial system around the world. In terms of long-range objectives, he urged: a. A beginning of considerations about United States-USSR "sharing of nuclear power progressively," which he defined as two sharings between allies of the respective super-powers. (Dr. York interjected that perhaps we should seek a United Nations Security Council "that really runs the world.") b. With regard to the French, Dr. Perkins feels we are too optimistic to think that our policies will change after de Gaulle and that we should consider now what kind of a French role we expect, what kind of relationship with the French we should desire, and what kind of Atlantic Community we can have after de Gaulle's passing. c. The Chinese are the biggest problem of all because of their size, intransigence and isolation which, together, make the rest of our problems seem academic. He emphasized that it should be the highest order of business to achieve a study of our future policies on China as a follow-on to the activities of this Committee. d. In regard to Africa and Latin America, he felt we should quickly push for denuclearization in order to achieve a 5-25 year breathing space. Mr. Gilpatric, in summation, pointed to the problems of defining appropriate guarantees on a selective basis. Dr. York stressed that such guarantees should be extremely limited, and Mr. Gilpatric emphasized that we could give them only so long as the protected country remains non-nuclear. There followed a review by members of the staff of problems of special significance to them. Mr. Keeny stressed that he believed the net security advantage for the United States fell in "Model A," which course we could change to "Model B" if "Model A" fails. Dr. Rathjens and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union in future efforts to stop proliferation. Mr. Rivkin pointed to the overall security position of the Soviets in the face of possible Chinese and German nuclear weapons capability, urging that the United States be prepared to negotiate directly with the Soviets on their long-range security situation, and suggesting that we consider denuclearized, guaranteed German re-unification as an early alternative to the ANF. Mr. Garthoff expressed reservations about the consequences of Course III, some of which he felt could be either bad or disastrous. He indicated that if we give up the ANF to achieve non-proliferation, we avoid getting the British out of deterrence. He warned, with regard to dealing with the Soviets, that we might be exchanging good relations with our allies for an uncertain detente. He believed that Soviet participation is not essential to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Any proposal to the Soviets for halting strategic delivery vehicle deployment should not be allowed to affect Polaris. In summary, he preferred Course II, "with liberal borrowing from Course III and perhaps with Course I and Course IV." Professor Fisher emphasized the need for continuing studies. Existing policy, he said, is based on getting along with our allies, regardless of the consequences. The problem of guarantees, he thinks, has been over-emphasized, and little more is required than has been given already. He desires a policy to make nuclear weapons appear bad and the undertaking of progressive policies to eliminate United States reliance on nuclear weapons. Reunification of Germany, he said, should be clearly considered as an alternative to the MLF since it is the only policy which appears to resolve all our needs. He felt that the Committee should recommend the study of orderly controls on uranium exports and that it also consider the organization of the vigorous mechanism within the government necessary to stop proliferation. Dr. Kistiakowsky noted that arguments in favor of Plowshare are based on an unsymmetrical assumption about technology in which Plowshare improves and conventional excavating technology stays the same. There was general agreement, in conclusion, that our hopes to stop proliferation are based on two basic "ifs": Soviet cooperation and future Chinese behavior.
61. Message From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, January 14, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text bears no salutation. Attached is a January 14 memorandum from Thompson to McGeorge Bundy in which Thompson indicated, inter alia, that he would give the message to Dobrynin during the latter's call the same day. Now that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk have had a series of discussions of our mutual problems,/2/ I wish to reply to the message from your Government of November /3/, 1964, which was transmitted through Ambassador Dobrynin.3 I was particularly pleased to have the expression of the interest of your Government in first restraining and limiting the arms race, and then decisively reversing it. I think that we can take some satisfaction in the fact that both our Governments have been able, without formal agreement, to reduce our military budgets by amounts which may be small in relation to our total arms expenditure but are nevertheless of some significance in that we have both succeeded in putting an end to the annual increases in this heavy burden. I am able to tell you now that our budget for the fiscal year 1965 will call for expenditures in our Department of Defense of $47.9 billion, which is more than $2 billion less than was requested in my budget submitted to the Congress in January 1964. /2/See footnote 1, Document 53. /3/In his November 3, 1964, message to President Johnson, Kosygin discussed defense budget reductions, mutual cutback of troops in Europe, U.N. financing, and various bilateral matters. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR--Vol. 1) As I have already touched upon disarmament questions in my New Year's message to you,/4/ I will not discuss them further at this time, other than to say that I continue to believe deeply that there would be advantage to us all in progress toward the specific arrangements I have proposed. In particular, we are convinced that the interest of our two peoples, and indeed of all mankind, would be advanced by steps beyond the limited test ban treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. I am able to confirm to you once again that it is this fundamental policy that underlies all our actions in this field, including those about which your Government has expressed concern, in the area of the nuclear defense of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. I remain convinced that if we work together with the common purpose of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be able to eliminate misunderstandings between us and serve our common interests. /4/Dated December 30; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pp. 1673-1674. I fully share your view that agreements reached between our Governments should be honestly observed by both sides, and I can assure you of our good faith on this score. Many of the problems which today plague the world, and which in one way or another involve the Soviet Union and the United States, are highly complex, both in their origins and in their ramifications. I am hopeful, however, that with good will on both sides, a steady and consistent effort to resolve them can succeed. We shall, of course, have to proceed step by step, but every success will, in my opinion, make the remaining problems easier to resolve. You may be sure that I am determined to persevere on this path. [Here follows discussion of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, various bilateral matters, and the President's "hope for a visit from your side to the United States."]/5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
62. Notes of Meetings/1/ Washington, January 19, 1965. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 73 and 75. No classification marking. [Here follows discussion of a swearing-in ceremony and telephone conversations about irradiated food and personal matters.] At 2 p.m. I attended the Meeting of Principals in Secretary Rusk's Office in the Department of State. Others present at the meeting included Rusk (Chairman), Ball, McNamara, Bundy, Llewellyn Thompson, McCone, Foster, and Fisher. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the venting of the January 15th Soviet underground test. McCone described the evidence upon which the conclusion was based that venting had occurred. The acoustic signals were somewhat anomalous, which is consistent with the venting nature of the event, but makes the determination of the energy vented into the atmosphere a little indeterminate. Substantial debris was picked up over Japan, which together with the other evidence makes it clear that it was a Soviet test that had vented. It was decided that there should be a press release, accompanied by a background briefing for key press people. McNamara, Foster, and I had draft press releases available, and these were used as the basis for drafting the press release (attached),/2/ which was agreed to by the group. /2/Not printed. AEC press release, January 19; ibid., p. 74. It was also read to news correspondents by a Department of State spokesman on January 25. (Department of State Bulletin, February 8, 1965, p. 187) I argued for the inclusion of the statement that this was not a violation of the limited test ban treaty, but the others disagreed with this point of view. McCone was particularly strong in his feeling that this was, in fact, a test ban violation, while the others felt that it should not be so regarded, but they didn't feel it would be wise to so state in the press release. There seemed to be general agreement that the venting was accidental. There was some discussion of the U.S. Kiwi-TNT test, in which McCone and I explained that this was definitely not a weapons test but a planned excursion of a nuclear reactor./3/ /3/Anticipating the Soviets' complaint about this U.S. test held on January 12, Seaborg noted on January 15: "It appears that they may try to cover a venting by accusing the U.S. of violating the Test Ban Treaty in the Kiwi-TNT (reactor excursion test) held at the Nevada Test Site a few days ago." (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 56) Concerning this Soviet complaint and the U.S. response, see Documents 65 and 67. At 3:15 p.m. I attended the Meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Others present at the meeting included President Johnson, McNamara, Ball, Foster, McCone and Bundy. Ball began the meeting by saying that its purpose was to discuss the venting of the Soviet nuclear underground test that took place on January 15th. He and McCone described the evidence for this. The detection of radioactive debris over Japan, at about the predicted time, made it quite clear that it was a Soviet nuclear test that had vented. Ball suggested that, in view of the fact that the Japanese would probably detect the radioactive debris soon and would announce this fact, it seemed highly desirable for the U.S. to make an announcement immediately. The proposed press release that had been composed by the Principals in their meeting during the previous hour was placed before the President. He read it and said he thought it was generally all right, but perhaps a little obscure with its somewhat technical language. Bundy explained the need for the particular phraseology used and that much of it constituted words of art understood by the interested press people. The President then agreed to the wording of the release and authorized its issuance without change. It was agreed that it would be issued for 6 p.m. release, and that there would be a background briefing of the press at the State Department at which Ball, Fisher and a representative of the AEC (to be designated by me) would participate. (Kavanagh was chosen to play this role.)/4/ /4/Dr. George M. Kavanagh, Assistant General Manager for Reactors, AEC. It was also requested that Rusk inform Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate [Foreign] Relations Committee; I would inform key members of the Armed Services Committee of the Soviet venting and the impending press release. The President then went on to complain about the leaks to the newspapers that had occurred within the last few days. He was particularly direct and vociferous in his complaints to Ball, McNamara and McCone, as the leaks had involved their departments. He reiterated that the leaks to newspapers must be stopped. At 4 p.m. I talked with Holifield, Pastore, Hickenlooper (at Secretary Rusk's request) and Mrs. Eileen Case in Hosmer's office, and advised that we have detected debris from the Russian test which, to us, means that it vented. I said that the U.S. is going to announce this in a rather low key. We are reasonably sure the Japanese have detected this, and we wish to announce first. [Here follows discussion of personal matters and inaugural events.]
63. Editorial Note On January 21, 1965, at 1 p.m., the Gilpatric Committee met with President Johnson to present its report on nuclear proliferation. In addition to the members of the Gilpatric Committee, Vice President Humphrey, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Seaborg, McCone, Foster, Hornig, and George Ball attended the meeting. In preparation for this meeting, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to President Johnson, January 21, in which he reviewed the work of the Committee and the conclusions of the report. He also noted: "The committee comes down hard on one side of this tough question [of proliferation], and at least one of your advisers--Dean Rusk--has real doubts about its recommendations. For that reason there will be no public discussion of the report at present, and you yourself will probably wish to reserve your position until the matter has been studied by your own people." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Presidential Task Force--Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 35) For Seaborg's account of the meeting, together with his later editorial comments, see Stemming the Tide, pages 144-145. Following the meeting, the White House issued two press releases, which noted the meeting, listed the names of the Committee members, and provided the text of the President's formal statement to the Committee on that occasion. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Gilpatric Committee) The President's statement is also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, page 74. For text of the Gilpatric Committee's report, see Document 64.
64. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation/1/ Washington, January 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Report (Final, 12/21/65), Box 8. Secret. The report and a 13-page "draft of an NSAM which would in the opinion of the Gilpatric Committee give execution to its recommendations," was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Foster, Seaborg, General Wheeler, McCone, and Hornig, January 23, 1964 [1965], with the President's admonition that "these papers not be shown to anyone outside the Committee of Principals without his direct approval in each case . . . . I cannot overstate the strength of the President's conviction and concern for the security of these documents." A copy of the draft NSAM, not printed, is ibid. The NSAM was never formally issued. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON At your request, we have studied the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In our examination, we consulted widely with your principal officers from relevant agencies of the Government. In the process, we considered a range of possible policies for the future and their consequences for the Nation. We have noted a significant diversity of views within the Government about the feasibility and the costs of preventing nuclear proliferation, and consequently about appropriate policies for the United States. Among ourselves there was also a diversity of opinions at the outset of our study. As a result of our study, however, the Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest despite the difficult decisions that will be required. We have concluded, therefore, that the United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds: (a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements; (b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and (c) example by our own policies and actions. Specifically, we have concluded that: 1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States. New nuclear capabilities, however primitive and regardless of whether they are held by nations currently friendly to the United States, will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the United States. As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war. Nevertheless, even then, we could not escape the problem. There would be additional nuclear powers--perhaps some in this hemisphere--individually possessing the capability of destroying millions of American lives. Major defensive efforts might help substantially to diminish such limited threats, but millions of American lives would always be at risk. 2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power programs are placing within the hands of many nations much of the knowledge, equipment and materials for making nuclear weapons. The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program has brought particular pressure on India and Japan, which may both be approaching decisions to undertake nuclear weapons programs. Although one might be tempted to accept Indian or Japanese nuclear weapons to counterbalance those of China, we do not believe the spread of nuclear weapons would or could be stopped there. An Indian or Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel and the UAR. In these circumstances, it is unrealistic to hope that Germany and other European countries would not decide to develop their own nuclear weapons. We are convinced, therefore, that energetic and comprehensive steps must be taken in the near future to discourage further acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities or an accelerating increase in the number of nations engaged in nuclear weapons programs will occur--possibly beginning within a matter of months. 3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort. Although non-proliferation has been a declared part of United States foreign policy since 1945, we must now greatly intensify our efforts--both to obtain appropriate multilateral agreements and to affect directly the motivations of individual nations--if we are to have any hope of success in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. We have been impressed in the course of our study by the fact that actions affecting the spread of nuclear weapons also relate to a very broad range of United States interests: relations with our allies and with other nations, weapons deployments at home and abroad, programs in peaceful atomic energy, and commerce with foreign nations. In order that our efforts to stop nuclear proliferation may succeed, each of these areas of interest, as well as the agencies of Government which deal with them, must be truly responsive to our non-proliferation policies, and must give such non-proliferation policies far greater weight and support than they have received in the past. We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation. 4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The dangers of proliferation affect all countries, creating a widespread common interest in early and effective steps to halt the nuclear spread. To date, initiatives within the United Nations and in disarmament negotiations have been only partially successful, but the Irish Resolution of 1961 and the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 continue to offer a basis on which to take more comprehensive and effective steps. There remains broad support for multilateral measures to control nuclear proliferation. We believe that the Soviet Union, because of its growing vulnerability to proliferation among its neighbors, probably shares with us a strong interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Further, we believe that the change of leadership in the Soviet Union and the possible resulting review of Soviet nuclear policies may now provide an immediate opportunity for joint or parallel action in the near future to stop the nuclear spread. Of course, even major efforts on our part may not be successful in halting or greatly retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. But we are unanimous in our agreement that such efforts should be made. The rewards of long-term success would be enormous; and even partial success would be worth the costs we can expect to incur. RECOMMENDATIONS We therefore recommend that the United States undertake the following measures to implement its policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: 1. Multilateral agreements. Measures to prevent particular countries from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are taken in support of a broad international prohibition applicable to many countries. We should seek to obtain on a multilateral basis formal treaty commitments of three kinds: a. Non-proliferation agreement. We should intensify our efforts for a non-proliferation agreement and seek the early conclusion of the widest and most effective possible international treaty on non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to bring strong pressure on significant countries (including Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) to achieve their participation in such an agreement. Our initiatives in this area should not wait, or be dependent upon, the resolution of any issues relating to an Atlantic nuclear force, however helpful such resolution might be. As recommended in paragraph 3 below, we should intensify our efforts to persuade the Soviets of our strong non-dissemination objectives in connection with any Atlantic Nuclear Force in order to make it possible for the Soviets to take the lead with us in seeking worldwide support for a non-proliferation treaty. In any event, any conflict between our non-proliferation and ANF objectives may not become critical until the future of the MLF/ANF is known; but if it arises strongly before then, the priorities of the two proposals with respect to our overall national security should be carefully reviewed. b. Comprehensive test ban. We should renew our efforts to negotiate a verified comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union. Assuming there will be an adequate withdrawal provision in the treaty, we should be prepared to go ahead without the participation of either France or China. We should be prepared to accept the minimum number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union that would be consistent with a viable treaty. In this connection, we should consider our anticipated improved capabilities for seismic detection and identification, and our other relevant unilateral intelligence capabilities. Inspection procedures and quotas covering other countries should also be reviewed to facilitate the widest and most effective application of the treaty. We should be prepared to propose an exception to such a treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions if a satisfactory procedure can be promptly devised that would preclude the development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful explosives program and if such an exception would be acceptable to other nations. An early approach should be made to the Soviet Union, and we should seek the widest adherence to the agreement and be prepared to bring strong influence to bear on significant countries to participate in it. c. Nuclear free zones. We should actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear free zones. To facilitate such agreements, we should be prepared to modify our requirements for verification and our position on transit rights and declarations with respect to United States nuclear weapons to the maximum extent consistent with demonstrable United States security needs. 2. Policies toward non-nuclear powers. In conjunction with the multilateral measures described above, we should intensify our efforts on a country-by-country basis to influence the decisions of individual non-nuclear powers not to undertake the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and to secure workable commitments to this effect. We should ourselves refrain from actions that would contribute to or suggest a future contribution to the development of nuclear weapons by these countries. The State, Treasury and Commerce Departments should develop programs of economic restrictions and other measures which could be quickly imposed by Executive action and which would be strong enough to produce a reversal of any decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. a. India--to deter India from building nuclear weapons: (1) While attempting, if possible, to avoid formal guarantees, we should be prepared, to the extent necessary and if requested by the Indians, to offer credible assurance of United States action in the event of a nuclear attack on India in exchange for an Indian commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to undertake, if requested by the Indians, parallel action with the Soviets and/or the United Kingdom. Appropriate agencies of the Government should give early consideration to the form such United States assurances might take. (2) We should assist India in reasonable and economically justifiable scientific programs designed to build the prestige she might otherwise attempt to obtain from the development of a nuclear device. Such programs should be of a character that will not contribute significantly to future nuclear weapons capabilities. Particular attention should be given to those areas (such as natural resources, health and birth control) most relevant to India's economic and social problems. We might also initiate a major coordinated United States-Indian program of scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. In consultation with appropriate agencies, your Science Advisory Committee should be called upon to submit recommendations regarding United States assistance to Indian scientific activities and United States-Indian exchanges. (3) We should back India for a larger role in the United Nations. Such support, and, to the extent feasible, any new role, should be conditional on India's remaining a non-nuclear power. (4) We should reconsider the level of our economic and military assistance to India in the event she decides to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that advance knowledge of this intention by Indian officials would be likely to have a constructive influence, it should be disclosed to them. b. Japan--to deter Japan from building nuclear weapons: (1) We should reaffirm, and if necessary, reinforce our present defense commitment. As in the case of India, early consideration should be given to the form these commitments might take. (2) We should, as in the case of India, attempt to help the Japanese with appropriate prestige alternatives. (3) We should support Japan's desire for a more important role as a world leader. c. Israel-UAR. (1) Israel. As long as Israel remains a non-nuclear power, we should continue to give Israel assurances against being overrun by the UAR. We should make clear to Israel that these assurances would be withdrawn if she develops a nuclear weapon capability and that we would be prepared to consider other measures as well. (2) UAR. We should make it clear to UAR that our policy restraining an independent Israeli nuclear force is unlikely to be effective if the UAR acquires nuclear weapons. If the UAR should make a decision to do so, we should be prepared to take measures designed to reverse that decision. (3) We should make major efforts to persuade France, Germany or others against providing missile or nuclear assistance to Israel or the UAR, and should work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the Israeli-UAR confrontation non-nuclear. d. Spread of weapons technology. We should revise and broaden NSAM 294 so that it will restrict United States contributions to the development of nuclear warheads or strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of any country (including the United Kingdom if she can be induced to fold her strategic nuclear force into the ANF). Moreover, we should seek to enlist the cooperation of other advanced nations in parallel actions designed to complement the actions of the United States. 3. Policies toward Europe and the Atlantic Nuclear Force. Our present policies in this area are defined in NSAM 322. In dealing with the Soviet Union, it should be made clear that any Atlantic Nuclear Force must reinforce and contribute to our basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, it should be emphasized that any treaty establishing such a Force would include undertakings whereby the nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons to the independent control of non-nuclear members and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to develop or acquire or obtain control over nuclear weapons; that in all cases the agreement of the United States would be required in order to have the Force fire nuclear weapons; and that the voting procedures could be revised only with the unanimous agreement of all participating nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that any ANF agreement would prevent the proliferation of individual nuclear capabilities among the participants and may reduce the number of nations having independent strategic nuclear capabilities by at least one (the United Kingdom). Several of the members of the Committee believe that an MLF/ANF or something like it may be essential if the Germans are to be inhibited from eventually acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Others feel that more modest measures such as increased sharing in nuclear consultation and planning and further exploitation of bilateral arrangements for nuclear weapons systems would suffice to deter the Germans from an independent nuclear course, particularly since the Germans are aware that such a course would be strongly opposed by France and the Soviet Union. In addition, it could be made clear to the Germans that the maintenance of United States forces in Germany would be inconsistent with the independent possession of nuclear weapons by Germany. Others of the Committee, seeing a basic incompatibility between the goal of German reunification and German acquisition of nuclear weapons, feel that greater emphasis should be placed on reunification as a means of shifting German interests away from nuclear weapons toward an objective more consistent with long-term European stability. In any case, all members agree that the appropriate agencies of the Government should continue urgent exploration of possible alternatives to an MLF/ANF which would permanently inhibit Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, but would nevertheless assure that, in the absence of German reunification, West Germany would remain as a real ally on the Western side. 4. Policies toward existing nuclear powers. a. France. While maintaining a place for France in the structure of any ANF, as provided in NSAM 322, we should make it clear to France that her insistence upon the development of an independent nuclear-strategic capability and upon atmospheric testing are unacceptable. Accordingly: (1) We should in no way assist the French atmospheric or underground nuclear test program and should be prepared to support international measures initiated by others having the effect of impeding or penalizing French nuclear tests. (2) Insofar as France is concerned, we should interpret NSAM 294 strictly. b. United Kingdom. (1) We should continue to favor the incorporation of the United Kingdom independent strategic nuclear deterrent in an ANF-type arrangement. (2) In consultation with the United Kingdom, we should undertake an appropriate revision of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act authorizing nuclear assistance to nations with advanced weapons capabilities that would be consistent with the future course of a special relationship with the United Kingdom while removing the implicit encouragement of existing law to other countries to achieve advanced nuclear capabilities. c. Soviet Union. In view of the great importance of Soviet support and cooperation in connection with efforts to stop nuclear proliferation, we should undertake new initiatives to obtain such support. We should make early approaches to the Soviets, seeking cooperation on as broad a basis as possible in achieving the objectives described in this report, and to the extent possible, the relevant specific actions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of these recommendations. In addition to the direct non-proliferation measures described in paragraph 1 above, we should undertake early initiatives toward the following United States-Soviet arms control agreements as a means both of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and creating an atmosphere conducive to wide acceptance of restraints on nuclear proliferation: (1) A verified fissile materials production cutoff for weapons purposes, to be established by treaty (with appropriate provision permitting the production of tritium). (2) A verified strategic delivery vehicle freeze coupled with significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) in strategic force levels, to be established by treaty. (3) An 18- to 24-month halt in the construction of new ABM or ICBM launchers, to be accomplished by reciprocal Executive action based on unilateral verification capabilities. d. China. We believe that it will prove difficult over the long term either to halt nuclear proliferation or to obtain worldwide peace and stability until China has joined the society of nations and is willing to participate responsibly in arms control measures. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the problem, we recommend that the Government undertake a major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China, taking into account the effect of those policies upon all aspects of our national security and our alliances in the Far East. 5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy. While we recognize that in the long run fissionable materials will probably be available in all industrial countries as a result of nuclear power programs, we believe that every effort should be made at this time to ensure that peaceful atomic energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. We should in all cases insist on adequate safeguards for all peaceful programs. Moreover, our support should be limited to those programs which will advance the economic development of friendly countries; and we should not press such programs with special subsidies. Careful consideration should be given to the political stability and reliability of countries where such programs are undertaken. We should make an effort to get all potential suppliers to agree to offer materials and facilities only under adequate safeguards. We should take the following actions with regard to IAEA and Euratom: a. IAEA. (1) We should increase our efforts to build up the IAEA, including broader responsibilities, increased operational activities, larger budgets and improved technical capabilities. (2) We should exert stronger influence on all nations including supplying nations and the Soviet Bloc to accept IAEA safeguards on reactors and separation plants and should offer, in return, to extend safeguards to additional United States facilities. (3) We should explore additional means of establishing control practices with respect to uranium and fuel elements which would reduce the risk of nuclear power facilities being used for military purposes. b. Euratom. (1) We should press Euratom in order to obtain satisfactory United States verification of Euratom safeguards. (2) We should work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguards and IAEA acceptance of Euratom. While we recognize that the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives (Project Plowshare) may have long-term economic importance, we do not believe that the program should be allowed to jeopardize a comprehensive test ban treaty or to encourage interest in nuclear weapons. Undue emphasis on such programs tends to make nuclear explosives appear desirable, necessary and acceptable for countries presently considering undertaking nuclear weapons programs. In addition, attempts to incorporate provisions permitting such programs under a comprehensive test ban treaty may be difficult, if not impossible, without providing a loophole under which nuclear weapons could be developed. We should not, therefore, actively seek to interest other countries in such programs until we better understand their relationship to the comprehensive test ban and the general nuclear proliferation problem. 6. United States weapons policies. If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments. It is also important that our physical arrangements minimize the possibility of unauthorized seizure or compromise of design information regarding United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Accordingly, we should take the following actions: a. NATO strategy. We believe that the prospects for success of our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be enhanced by adoption of a revised NATO strategy, along the lines now being proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placing greater stress on a non-nuclear option and relying less upon tactical nuclear weapons. (Such a policy would of course maintain a tactical nuclear capability for deterrence, credibility and flexibility.) b. Physical security. The program for the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) in weapons deployed in Europe should be continued and expanded to apply to all weapons deployed overseas. Intensified research to develop improved safeguards against seizure or unauthorized use should be continued. We should consider appropriate assistance to the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in connection with the development of PALs and safety devices for their respective weapons. c. Research and development. The Department of Defense should reexamine future requirements in the light of the policies recommended in this memorandum. Consideration should be given, among other matters, to damage limitation systems effective against lesser nuclear threats; to detection and identification systems related to such threats; and to the development of any weapons systems necessary to back our commitments to nations electing not to develop their own nuclear weapons. The program outlined above should not preclude other measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and the appropriate agencies of the Government should be called upon to undertake to develop additional proposals to that end. All agencies should carefully consider the implications for nuclear proliferation of all their actions and information policies, and their progress on non-proliferation matters should, we think, be followed closely by you and your senior advisers. Arthur H. Dean
65. Aide-Memoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State/1/ No. 3 Washington, January 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. No classification marking. In a January 22 telephone call to Seaborg, Foster said that Dobrynin made this oral reply to Thompson at 3:15 p.m. the same day. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 87) Dobrynin handed the aide-memoire to Thompson, saying it was not related to the inquiry Secretary Rusk had made of him concerning the Soviet test on January 15. When Thompson responded that he hoped there was no relationship between the two inquiries, Dobrynin "said he thought that in fact there may have been some similarity between the two events in that both may have been accidents." (Memorandum of conversation, January 22; ibid., p. 89) According to Associated Press Agency reports, a nuclear rocket engine of the "Kiwi" type, which is a prototype of engines for space ships, was exploded for experimental purposes on January 12 of this year in the U.S.A. The purpose of this experiment, as the Agency points out, was to establish what might occur in case of an accident during the launching of a rocket with nuclear fuel. As an Associated Press correspondent reports, there occurred as a result of the explosion "a tremendous cloud of dust and a flash of light which blocked the sun" for some time. Judging by the report of this Agency, published prior to the experiment, the self-generating explosion of the nuclear rocket engine must have been accompanied by the dissemination of radioactive particles from the explosion over a large distance. In connection with this the Soviet Government cannot but come to the conclusion that if these reports of the Associated Press Agency about the nuclear explosion which has been conducted conform to reality, then there has taken place a violation by the United States of the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater," signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and which entered into force October 10 of that year. As is known, in point 1, Article I, of the cited treaty it is stated that each of its participants "undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control," in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Considering the full seriousness of the situation which can arise in the case that there really took place a nuclear explosion falling under the prohibition stipulated by the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. will give the necessary clarifications regarding the character of the experiment carried out in the U.S.A. on January 12 of this year.
66. Oral Reply From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 25, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limdis. A copy is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 101. An underground nuclear explosion was indeed carried out in the Soviet Union./2/ This explosion was carried out deep down underground. The quantity of radioactive debris that leaked into the atmosphere was, however, so insignificant that a possibility of its fallout outside the territorial limits of the Soviet Union should be excluded. Thus, the underground explosion that was carried out does not affect the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. /2/Regarding this Soviet test, see Document 62.
67. Aide-Memoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limit Distribution. A copy of the aide-memoire is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 98-100. The source text is undated, but is attached to a January 26 memorandum from G. William Moser to the Committee of Principals indicating that a copy of the aide-memoire was given to Ambassador Dobrynin on the same day. Llewellyn Thompson, who handed it to Dobrynin, wrote of their meeting: "I handed the Ambassador our reply to their aide-memoire on the Kiwi reactor. After reading it, the Ambassador quoted from the language of the Treaty, stating that in addition to weapons tests, 'any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described' was prohibited. He stated that this experiment had been described by the American press as a nuclear explosion. I said that although the matter was a technical one, my understanding was that the operation of any nuclear reactor could, in one sense of the word, be described as a nuclear explosion. My understanding was that in this case in order to develop reactor safety, a reactor was speeded up to the point where it burned itself up, but that this was not comparable to what we would consider a nuclear explosion by a very wide margin. "Dobrynin said he would of course transmit our aide-memoire and that it would be studied in Moscow, but he clearly indicated that he did not consider we had made a convincing case." (Memorandum of conversation, January 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Vol. I, Box 31) The aide-memoire from the Soviet Government, dated January 22,/2/ requests that the Government of the United States provide clarification regarding the Kiwi reactor safety experiment as to whether it constituted a nuclear explosion falling under the prohibition stipulated by the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water." Reactors are designed as stable power sources and are intrinsically unsuitable for use as weapons. Neither reactor safety experiments nor reactor accidents which they are designed to stimulate or reproduce constitute nuclear explosions. Therefore, they do not fall under the prohibition stipulated in the Treaty. Nevertheless, in view of the interest of the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States provides the following information concerning this experiment. /2/Document 65. The Kiwi experiment of January 12, 1965, at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Nevada, was the latest of the series of reactor safety experiments to obtain information to ensure the safe operation of nuclear reactors and to assess the potential consequences in the unlikely event that a reactor accident occurred. Reactor safety experiments have been freely discussed at the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy/3/ and elsewhere. All of the previous U.S. reactor safety experiments including those involving reactor destruction, such as the Spert test conducted during November 1963, and the Snaptran test in April 1964, have been reported in the open literature. The same procedure is being followed for this experiment. The experiment was announced publicly in advance and the press was present. /3/Regarding this conference, held in Geneva, August 31-September 9, 1964, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 145-156 and 178-180. The Kiwi reactor safety experiment involved a deliberate burn-up of a nuclear rocket reactor designed for space exploration. This experiment was necessary to obtain data on the behavior of reactors of this type under rapid changes in power levels. Extensive safety studies have been performed to determine the effects of various postulated accident conditions which might theoretically cause such rapid changes in power levels. This experiment was conducted to confirm or correct the predictions of those safety studies. The Kiwi reactor is a uranium carbide fueled, graphite moderated reactor of approximately 1,000 megawatts thermal power. The experiment was conducted as planned and produced a relatively small amount of energy over a time period thousands of times longer than the period involved in nuclear explosions. Specifically, according to preliminary data, a total energy of about 15,000 megawatt-seconds was produced over several milliseconds. This release of energy caused portions of the reactor to vaporize and the reactor to destroy itself. Results were in good agreement with pre-test predictions. The experiment therefore lends confidence to the reactor safety studies which are so important in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
68. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, February 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR--Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. The source text contains no salutation. The February 1 date is the day Dobrynin delivered it to Thompson. (Memorandum from Thompson to Bundy, February 1; ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8) Your personal message of January 14 of this year/2/ has been attentively studied by us. On that same confidential basis we should like to inform you of the point of view of the Soviet Government both regarding the questions raised by you and also regarding several other international questions. /2/Document 61. We received with satisfaction the response, which we found in your message, to the ideas of the Soviet Government, which were transmitted to you on November 3, 1964/3/, regarding the necessity to resolve ripened problems by means of discussions and regarding the importance of honorable observance by both sides of agreements already reached between our governments. /3/See footnote 3, Document 61. We agree with the statement contained in your message that measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons would answer the interests of our two peoples and all of humanity. In this connection, it goes without saying that there should not be left a single chink (for access) to them by states not now possessing such weapons--direct or indirect. However, what is now happening in the West is, unfortunately, going in the opposite direction. You know what a negative attitude is called forth in the Soviet Union and in countries who are our friends and allies by plans to establish NATO nuclear forces in any of their variations--"multilateral" or "Atlantic." These plans likewise are plans to disseminate nuclear weapons, and in the most dangerous region of the world. Giving Western Germany access to nuclear weapons, in whatever form it might be planned, we cannot regard as other than a step directed against the interests of the security of the Soviet Union and of the countries united in the Warsaw Pact organization, as a step strengthening the threat of war. We know that you have a different point of view. You say that between the Governments of the USSR and the USA there exists a "misunderstanding" in this regard. In our view the case is much more complicated. The Soviet people has its own experience--an experience costing millions of lives--with the treachery and aggression of the German militarists, whose well-known pretensions, as is widely recognized even in the West, mainly stimulate the development of plans for the dissemination of nuclear weapons, for example under the flag of NATO nuclear forces. We should like with all frankness to tell you of our serious concern that in several regions of the world and first of all in Southeast Asia there continue to take place cases of breaking international agreements and even military actions against the democratic republic of Vietnam. Such actions cannot fail to call forth a corresponding answering reaction among us and among our friends and allies. We are convinced that realism in policy demands elimination of the dangerous tension which has arisen in Southeast Asia especially in Vietnam and Laos, and that the way out lies in unbending observance of the principle of respect for the sovereign rights of peoples and for valid international agreements. The Soviet Government considers that at the present moment it would be appropriate to separate out from the group of problems which were the subject of an exchange of opinions between the Governments of the USSR and the USA those problems with regard to which it would be possible to reach an understanding. We have been successful in reaching an understanding without formal agreement, for example, on the question of reducing military budgets. In your message you state that the Government of the USA intends to reduce somewhat military expenditures for the 1965 fiscal year, as we have also done with regard to the Soviet budget. Our views both with regard to the usefulness of this meas-ure as well as with regard to its limited significance, obviously coincide. The Soviet Government takes as a point of departure the fact that it is now important to develop such concrete and realistic measures as would narrow the scope of the arms race and would lay a path toward the resolution of the basic questions of disarmament, toward general and complete disarmament. Soviet proposals, which in our opinion serve this goal, were presented for the consideration of the XIX Session of the UN General Assembly./4/ The Government of the USA promised to study them. We await the results of this study. /4/Presumably a reference to the Soviet Union's memorandum of December 7, 1964. See footnote 4, Document 54. Some questions concerning the problem of disarmament are touched upon in your New Year's message./5/ You mentioned, in particular, an inspected world-wide all-inclusive prohibition on nuclear weapon testing, a combination of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes with measures assuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and an inspected freeze on strategic delivery systems. The American proposals on these questions have already been discussed in detail, as is known, at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, and the positions of the parties on these questions have been fully determined. If it is a question of concepts which have been in the field of view earlier, then we are prepared to consider them with full attention. /5/See footnote 4, Document 61. [Here follows discussion of European security and a German peace settlement, the U.N. financial situation, bilateral matters, and the possibility of a personal meeting between the two leaders.]/6/ /6/Printed from an unsigned copy.
69. Editorial Note Following the U.S. announcement of the venting of radioactive debris into the atmosphere from the Soviet test of January 15, 1965 (Document 62), and the Soviet Government's oral reply, January 25, denying any violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Document 66), the Committee of Principals grappled with this issue at its meetings on January 25 and February 3. At the former meeting the Principals decided to issue a Department of State press release that summarized the Soviet's oral reply and stated, "The United States is continuing its own evaluation of the facts involved." (Department of State Bulletin, February 8, 1965, page 187) McGeorge Bundy's handwritten edited version of the draft press announcement, January 25, which had been prepared by Seaborg, is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Volume I, Box 31. Notes of the January 25 meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 10, page 103. A summary of actions of this meeting is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Volume 2, Box 14. Foster also prepared a draft oral statement from Rusk to Dobrynin, January 25, for the January 25 meeting and he circulated a revised version of it under cover of a memorandum from him to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Seaborg, Hornig, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone, January 26. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217) At its February 3 meeting, the Principals further considered the matter in light of intelligence data gathered about the Soviet test and wrote a draft aide-memoire, February 3. (Ibid., S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-May 1965) Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 10, page 133. A later revised version of the aide-memoire, February 8, is in Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Regarding the decision to present the aide-memoire to the Soviet Union and the final draft text, which contained a few revisions of the February 8 draft, see Document 70. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |