1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. SUBJECT /2/Regarding discussions leading to the preparation of this message (aide-memoire), see Document 69. 1. As you know, we picked up radioactive debris from a Soviet test that vented on January 15, 1965. We reported this fact to the Soviet Union and asked for an explanation. 2. Ambassador Dobrynin came back with an oral statement in which the Soviet Government agreed that there had been venting, but denied the possibility of fallout outside the limits of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we got pictures of the crater, and we have been refining our analysis of the Soviet test. It is now reasonably certain that the test was intended as a Plowshare excavation experiment. The explosion was very clean, with a yield of 300 to 400 kilotons. We believe that the venting was not accidental but was inherent in the cratering design of the experiment. On the other hand, the weather conditions at the time may well have led the Soviets to believe that there would be no fallout beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. 3. The test clearly raises a question of its legitimacy under the test ban treaty, and we face something of a dilemma. On the one hand, if we do not keep pressing the Soviets for a fuller explanation, we may seem to be giving our tacit approval to a violation. On the other hand, if we take a prosecutor's attitude we may only succeed in pinning ourselves to a position of rigidity, on very small amounts of venting, that will work against our own interest at some later stage when we may wish to make similar tests of very clean devices of our own. 4. The conclusion that we have reached is that we should register our dissatisfaction with the existing Soviet position and ask for more information. This will protect us from seeming to accept an explanation that is simply not in accordance with the facts, while at the same time we avoid the position of a prosecutor under the treaty. Moreover, if by any chance the Soviets do provide additional information, it will help to strengthen the precedents for full disclosure of the facts surrounding any cases of venting in the future. 5. The Committee of Principals (State, Defense, AEC, JCS, CIA, Hornig, and Bundy) agree upon the Aide-Memoire attached at Tab A, for presentation by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin./3/ /3/The approved option at the end of the memorandum is checked. McG. B.
Tab A/4/ /4/Confidential; Limdis. February 9, 1965. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF AIDE-MEMOIRE CONCERNING /5/This aide-memoire has not been found, but was later referred to as dated February 15. See footnote 7, Document 76. U.S.-Soviet discussions on this Soviet test apparently continued, for Seaborg later recounted: "On November 19, 1965, the State Department announced, 'on the basis of discussions with the Soviet Government,' that the venting from the Soviet test had been a result of 'miscalculation' and that the United States had asked the USSR 'to take precautions to assure observance of the limited test ban treaty.'" (Stemming the Tide, p. 225) The United States Government has studied Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement of January 25 together with all other presently available data on the Soviet Union underground explosion of January 15, 1965 in the light of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The United States has noted the observation contained in Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement that the quantity of radioactive debris that was placed in the atmosphere was "so insignificant that a possibility of its fall out outside the territorial limits of the Soviet Union is excluded." However, we are unable to reconcile the scientific findings with respect to the radioactive debris resulting from the Soviet Union's test with the observations in Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement. On January 19, 20, 21 and 22 radioactive debris, which can be associated directly with the Soviet nuclear explosion on January 15, was collected outside the USSR. U.S. aircraft operating in the Sea of Japan acquired fresh fission fragments traceable to the Soviet test. In addition, the Radioactivity Countermeasures Headquarters of the Government of Japan has published data collected from many ground stations on January 20, 21 and 22 indicating concentrations of radioactive debris which were as much as 10 to 100 times the levels on previous days. Article I (b) of the Treaty imposes an obligation on parties to prohibit, prevent and not to carry out any nuclear explosion in any environment including underground, "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits" of the party conducting the test. In view of the foregoing, the Government of the United States requests further information concerning this event.
71. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. SUBJECT The attached draft message on disarmament has been circulated by Bill Foster to the Committee of Principals with the suggestion that it be discussed in the near future at a meeting of the Committee of Principals./2/ While I believe the attached draft is, in general, pretty good, I think that it is clear that the next pen-pal message should cover a number of current issues in addition to arms control. I hope that Ambassador Thompson will draw on this ACDA draft in the message he is preparing./3/ I am afraid he may not, however, since the word I get from both ACDA and Dave Klein is that Thompson does not consider this entire subject as a "starter." For my own part, I am not prepared to rule out entirely the possibility that we might in the relatively near term reach some sort of an agreement with the Soviets on some modest arms control proposal such as a non-proliferation treaty. Even if one discounts this possibility entirely, I believe that it is still important to restate and develop our ideas on arms control as part of the background mood music for a continuing dialogue with the Soviets. /2/Not found. /3/No record has been found that a message was sent at this time. The ACDA draft calls for exploration of essentially all of the proposals currently being considered within government that appear to have any chance of being cleared by the Principals and negotiable with the Soviets. While I believe we should refer to specific arms control areas in the next pen-pal message, I don't think we need throw in everything we have at this time. Actually, I believe that ACDA made their package this comprehensive to increase the probability that something would survive. The ACDA draft also names Foster as our negotiator to explore the problems with the Soviets. While I have no objection to Foster doing the job, I wonder if naming him specifically is a wise tactic at this time since it invites a Soviet reply that he should deal with his opposite number, Tsarapkin, (an old-line bureaucrat who, I doubt, is very close to the top of the Soviet Government) rather than opening up the relatively high-level discussion which I believe it called for. In considering the priority of the items in the ACDA package, I agree with ACDA that the most important is an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. With regard to the ANF, ACDA has suggested some very cautious language that is calculated not to upset the State Department; however, I am afraid that it will not prove sufficiently reassuring to the Soviets to be of much value. I have, therefore, suggested an alternate, more controversial, text that I believe expresses our actual intentions in this matter./4/ In this connection, ACDA suggests that we explore the possibility of joint reassurances to nations that forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons. I like the idea, but I do not think we should open this up until we have further clarified our own thinking and have explored the question further with the Indians who are, of course, the principal nation concerned at the moment. /4/Not further identified. I believe that the next priority should be to reaffirm our interest in a safeguarded comprehensive test ban. The Soviets seem to be putting out the word that we are no longer interested in such an agreement and we must not let them convince themselves that this is the case. I believe we should also reassert our desire to discontinue the production of fissionable material for weapons, and I agree with ACDA that we should use this opportunity to press the Soviets for a clarification of the steps the Soviets have actually taken to carry out Khrushchev's announcement of cutbacks last spring./5/ /5/See Document 24. I think it is also important that we set forth at least one or two new ideas. I believe the best candidates are the proposal to couple reductions of agreed numbers of strategic missiles and launching sites to our strategic freeze proposal and the proposal for a two-year moratorium on the construction of new land-based facilities for strategic missiles and for anti-ballistic missiles. These are substantive matters that would, of course, require clearance with the Pentagon. They have, however, been previously staffed and I understand that McNamara will support a proposal to explore them. I place a lower priority on, but do not object to, the proposal to explore arrangements to include the destruction of the non-nuclear components of agreed numbers of nuclear weapons in conjunction with the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. This idea, which has been worked out in some detail by ACDA, is an interesting response to Soviet charges that our transfer proposals don't really affect nuclear weapons; however, I don't really believe the Soviets will be very attracted by the proposal at this time. Similarly, while I strongly support the concept of nuclear free zones and do not object to discussing it with the Soviets, this is not the critical forum since we have correctly taken the position that the initiative for nuclear free zones must come from the areas involved. I have placed the lowest priority on proposals to explore informal restraints on the proliferation of strategic nuclear vehicles and the proposal to consider reductions in launch facilities and associated strategic vehicles prior to working out a strategic production freeze. I have not thought these proposals through very carefully yet and have some questions about them. Moreover, I think there would be considerable difficulty clearing these two concepts quickly. Finally, I do not believe that we should include ground observation posts in Europe and the associated question of possible reductions in force levels. While it is true that we have previously proposed observation posts to guard against surprise attack, I am afraid that this creates more political problems in NATO than it is worth. In any event, the suggestion that we explore reductions in force levels seems unwise at this time. I have indicated a number of detailed editorial changes on the ACDA draft, but have not attempted to rewrite the draft in accordance with the above comments. Spurgeon
72. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on March 31. The source text is labeled "Part 2 of 5." The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington, March 21-24. SUBEJCT PARTICIPANTS UK Side US Side Foreign Secretary Stewart said that Gromyko in his talks in London last week had refused to include in the communique any mention of resumed disarmament discussions at Geneva./2/ Nevertheless, he had indicated that the Soviet reply to the US proposal regarding resumption of the talks would be forthcoming shortly. Mr. Stewart listed three subjects which he had discussed with Gromyko: (1) a non-dissemination agreement; (2) extension of the test ban to cover underground tests; and (3) a combination of a freeze on delivery systems with the destruction of some means of delivery. Gromyko had been emphatic that so long as there is a prospect of MLF or an ANF there can be no agreement on non-dissemination. With respect to an extension of the test ban to include underground tests, Gromyko maintained that there is no need for on-site inspections. He did not respond to Mr. Stewart's suggestion that scientists on each site should examine the scientific basis for the Soviet contention that on-site inspections are unnecessary. /2/Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who visited London March 16-20, 1965, for talks with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, did not mention resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which had adjourned in Geneva on September 17, 1964. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Stewart said that Gromyko had not made any suggestions regarding a reconstitution of the membership of the Geneva Conference, for example, to include Communist China. In discussing other forums for disarmament negotiations, however, Gromyko had referred to the possibility of a five-power meeting, including Communist China, to discuss nuclear weapons. Mr. Stewart believes that the Soviet Union will probably agree to resume discussions at Geneva but in doing so is likely to attach various restrictive conditions. The Secretary said that the U.S. does not exclude the possibility of Chinese Communist participation in disarmament negotiations. We have always recognized that at a certain stage their participation will be necessary. The Foreign Secretary reported that Gromyko in discussing a possible budgetary approach to disarmament had been unresponsive when the problem of differences in budgetary accounting between different countries was raised with him. The Secretary said that we would be interested in a budgetary approach to the problem of disarmament but a necessary preliminary would be a discussion of the comparability of budgets. We have informed the Soviet Union of reductions in our defense budgets pursuant to the idea of encouraging reductions by mutual example. Mr. Foster said that some parts of the U.K. draft agreement on nonproliferation caused us concern. He mentioned in this connection implications with respect to MLF and ANF with which we did not agree. Mr. Foster also expressed doubts about the desirability of early tabling of such a proposal in disarmament discussions. He emphasized that we are in accord with the importance of a non-dissemination agreement and the urgency of the matter. With respect to an extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground tests, Mr. Foster said that for scientific and political reasons there is still a need for on-site inspections. He recalled that our last offer had been for a minimum of seven on-site inspections while the Russians had proposed three and then later had withdrawn their offer. Mr. Foster expressed doubt about the desirability of our proposing a new number of on-site inspections until the Soviet Union has accepted the principle of such inspections. Mr. Stewart agreed with Mr. Foster on this point. The Foreign Secretary, reverting to the recent UK/German talks,/3/ said that the Federal Republic is not prepared to consider any form of discrimination going beyond its present undertaking not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The Germans are unwillling to enter into new contractual obligations with the Soviet Union without concurrent progress on reunification. The Secretary said we do not agree that this is a card the Germans are entitled to play. If we reach agreement on an MLF/ANF we can, however, say the German reunification would necessitate review of the situation. /3/Probably a reference to West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder's talks with British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker in London on December 11, 1964, largely on the NATO nuclear issue.
73. Aide-Memoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy/1/ Washington, March 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, Miscellaneous Microfilm Files, U.S./U.S.S.R. Conversations. Confidential. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), March 30, states that he asked Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to come to the Department of State to give him the aide-memoire. Dobrynin said he would transmit it to his government, but he made no comment on it. In its note of March sixth, requesting further clarification of the Kiwi reactor safety experiment, the Soviet Government apparently misinterprets the position taken by the United States Government in its Aide-Memoire of January 26, 1965./2/ /2/Document 67. The position of the United States Government is that the Kiwi experiment did not constitute a "nuclear explosion" within the meaning of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The experiment was a reactor safety test and its technical characteristics are readily distinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Reactors are legitimately present in all parts of the world; accidents in which they burn up or experiments designed to simulate such accidents have never been considered to be nuclear explosions, and consequently are not within the scope of the Treaty. As a continuation of the discussions in these scientific areas held at the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy last September in Geneva, detailed descriptions and analyses of the Kiwi experiment will be made available to the world scientific community at the International Symposium on Fission Product Release and Transport Under Accident Conditions, at the Oak Ridge Laboratory during the first week of April. The Soviet Union has been invited to send representatives to attend and participate in that meeting and thus will soon have an opportunity to obtain further information concerning that experiment.
74. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 30, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Foster. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At Ambassador Dobrynin's invitation, I joined him at luncheon at the Soviet Embassy about 12:30 p.m. Before sitting down to luncheon, he first asked about the intent of Long Shot./2/ He outlined his own interpretation which was that from this experiment we would prove out our theories that we would be able to detect and identify all underground events. With that information added to our present information, he stated his own belief that from a scientific viewpoint there would be no questionable events and, therefore, there would be no need for on-site inspection. He stated his further conclusion that the only reason for on-site inspections was political and in view of the fact that there was no risk to the security of the U.S. because of the possibility of a few unidentified events, it would be well to proceed to a comprehensive test ban, if, indeed, the U.S. still wanted it. I explained that from our viewpoint, while our ability to detect and identify had improved, there was little likelihood that all events could be identified. In view of this, both from a scientific viewpoint and a political viewpoint, there continued to be a requirement for some on-site inspections, even though, as we had stated on a number of occasions, our approach to this requirement is flexible. /2/Long Shot, a Department of Defense nuclear test detection experiment of about 80 kilotons, took place at Amchitka Island, Alaska, October 29, 1965. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992, p. 21) At luncheon two basic points were discussed. The first had to do with the Ambassador's puzzlement as to why we had not responded to the confidential note on the matter of arms control and disarmament which had now been in our hands almost three months./3/ I stated this, in my opinion, was a reasonable question, but that the conditions in the world had been such in the interval, that so far it had not seemed appropriate to respond. The other basic point, and the primary reason that he had asked me to luncheon, concerned a formal Soviet Government proposal which will be made to the U.N. Secretary General, I presume almost immediately, and which calls on their part for a convening of the U.N. Disarmament Commission in order to discuss disarmament proposals, as they say, consistent with the statement issued in Geneva by the ENDC at the time of their adjourning last September./4/ He read to me an English version of what presumably will be the content of their note/5/ in which the Soviet Government called attention to the wording of the recess statement and said that, due to "the futility of the discussions at the last session," it was necessary to discuss the disarmament situation at the U.N.G.A. and, following that discussion, the question of a further return to the ENDC might be decided. The note will apparently call for a convening of the Commission at the earliest possible moment in order to move ahead with the important work of disarmament. I said that, of course, we would give attention to this immediately when it was officially set forth. I said also that in a preliminary way I had some question regarding the utility of such a discussion, since without instruction from the G.A. on an established procedure or definite time limitations such a Commission with 100 or 115 participants could degenerate into a futile exercise. However, the U.S. Government obviously would give appropriate consideration to the proposal and we would be in touch with him further when the official version had been presented. /3/Reference presumably is to February 1 message from Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson, Document 68. /4/Reference is to the Fifth Interim Progress Report by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the U.N. Disarmament Commission and the U.N. General Assembly, September 17, 1964. (Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 435-440) /5/A letter from Soviet U.N. Representative Fedorenko to U.N. Secretary-General Thant, March 31, 1965, proposed convening the U.N. Disarmament Commission, on which all members of the United Nations were represented, as soon as possible in the first half of April 1965. (Ibid., pp. 30-31) I suggested that it might be useful to consider on a concurrent time basis some bilateral discussion of what might be the most fruitful specific areas for discussion when, as, and if we returned to Geneva. I also said that I would make inquiry as to the status of a response to their earlier official government note on disarmament. Our discussion ended at 2:15.
75. Aide-Memoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State/1/ No. 12 Washington, April 29, 1965. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 437-438. No classification marking. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), April 29, reads as follows: "Dobryn-in handed me the attached aide-memoire concerning the recent Plowshare experiment. I made no comment." (Ibid.) This aide-memoire seemed to Seaborg "to be a political move, possibly in anticipation of discussion of mutual problems in conducting Plowshare programs." (Ibid., p. 435) According to a report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission an underground nuclear explosion was conducted, on April 14 of this year in the state of Nevada,/2/ as a result of which there took place the ejection of earth to the surface and the penetration into the atmosphere of released radioactive materials. Inasmuch as this explosion was conducted under the "Plowshare" program and, as is indicated in this same report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, a crater of large dimension formed at the site of the explosion--350 feet in diameter, 100 feet in depth, and forming a 60 foot lip--it is evident that with this underground nuclear explosion there took place not an accidental but a pre-planned ejection of a significant amount of earth and, consequently, a pre-planned ejection of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. /2/Reference is to Palanquin, a Plowshare cratering test, with a yield of 4.3 kt, which released radioactivity detected off site. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, p. 25) At the same time it is known that Article I (b) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water contains the obligation of the parties of this Treaty to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear explosions in any environment, including underground "if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits" of the State which conducts the explosion. In this connection the Soviet Government requests that it be given more detailed information about the nuclear explosion conducted in the U.S.A. on April 14 this year since the assertion of the Atomic Energy Commission that the fallout of radioactive debris is within the boundaries of the U.S.A. is unconvincing because the Commission does not control the air streams carrying radioactivity, and there is reason to believe that with the conduct of this explosion there took place a violation of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments.
76. Aide-Memoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy/1/ Washington, May 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Thompson. The draft memorandum was considered at the meeting of the Committee of Principals on May 13; for a brief summary of the meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 478. A May 14 memorandum from Foster to the members of the committee transmitting the final version stated that it would be delivered to Ambassador Dobrynin at an early date. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65) May-June 1965) The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet Government's Aide-Memoire of April 29, 1965,/2/ concerning the April 14, 1965, experiment conducted by the United States Atomic Energy Commission as part of a program for developing peaceful uses of nuclear explosions./3/ /2/Document 75. /3/See footnote 2, Document 75. In planning the experiment of April 14, the United States took numerous precautions to avoid violation of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. In fact, the purpose of the experiment was to obtain data on a method to enhance the containment of radioactive debris from underground nuclear excavation explosions. The explosion had a yield of about four kilotons and was buried at a depth of 280 feet in hard rock. The depth was specifically chosen to be the same, scaled for the size of the explosion, as a previous test which did not produce a crater. As in the case of the previous test, the experiment was permitted to take place only under meteorological conditions carefully chosen to avoid the escape of radioactive debris from the territory of the United States. As has been announced, the experiment did produce a crater and small amounts of radioactive debris were projected into the atmosphere. Most of this debris was deposited in the vicinity of the site of the experiment. In accordance with meteorological predictions, the small quantity of radioactive debris which went further was blown northward within the United States for several hundred miles from the Nevada test site and then southeastward over the central United States. During this time, the airborne concentrations of radioactive debris were determined by measurement to have been diluted by fallout, radioactive decay, and dispersion to extremely low levels. The United States Government will continue to take the greatest care in the conduct of nuclear detonations including its program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. The United States Government affirms its commitment to the preservation of the Treaty with unimpaired authority. In this connection the Government of the United States believes it necessary to revert to consideration of a very much larger nuclear explosion conducted in the Soviet Union on January 15, 1965,/4/ seemingly directed at a similar application as that of the United States on April 14, 1965, but which resulted in many times as much radioactive debris being released to the atmosphere. /4/Regarding this Soviet test, see Document 62. The United States Government has studied Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statements of January 25/5/ and March 9, 1965,/6/ and has examined all other available data on the Soviet underground nuclear explosion. As was pointed out in the United States Government's Aide-Memoire of February 15, 1965,/7/ radioactive debris from that Soviet explosion was detected on the ground by the Radioactivity Countermeasures Headquarters of the Government of Japan in concentration from as much as 10 to 100 times the levels on previous days. /5/Document 66. /6/Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement of March 9, 1965, has not been found. /7/Not found, but see the draft aide-memoire of February 9, attached to Document 70. If the Soviet Government were more forthcoming in response to the request of the United States Government for further information concerning the January 15 Soviet test, the United States Government might be better able to conclude that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to violate the terms of the Treaty. A nuclear explosion such as that of January 15, which causes such large amounts of radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the USSR, causes grave concern. Repetition of such a release of debris outside the borders of the USSR as occurred after January 15 could jeopardize the very existence of the Treaty, a consequence which the United States would view as extremely serious. The United States Government considers the maintenance of the obligations of this Treaty to be of utmost importance and trusts that the Soviet Government will take every precaution to ensure that the Treaty will be observed.
77. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 18, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 1965), May-June 1965. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson, May 18. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I handed Dobrynin our Aide-Memoire of today's date/2/ in reply to the Soviet Aide-Memoire on the Palanquin experiment./3/ He queried the meaning of the sentence to the effect that we would be in a better position to believe that they had not intended a violation of the Test Ban if they had been more forthcoming with information on their experiment. /2/Document 76. /3/Document 75. I reminded him that we had asked for further information and that this had been refused. He asked if we really believed they intended to violate the Treaty. I said I did not think so, but that it would have been much easier to say so directly if we had been given more information. He shrugged and said that this was a matter for their atomic people to deal with.
78. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ New York, May 19, 1965, 1:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Foster, who was in New York to attend meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission which met from April 21 to June 16. PARTICIPANTS At my request Ambassador Tsarapkin lunched with me in my suite at the Waldorf Towers. I wanted to continue the discussion with Tsarapkin which we had at the luncheon Ambassador El-Kony gave for us on May 17 (reported in separate memcon)./2/ /2/Not found. It became perfectly clear from Tsarapkin's first remarks that the position of the Soviet Union has decidedly hardened with reference to a return to Geneva unless and until the U.S. states that it is willing to agree to a number of things, which largely we cannot accept. We had an extensive discussion as to no first use of nuclear weapons. Tsarapkin contended that as long as the U.S. continued to engage in aggression, such as in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, it was impossible to achieve any real agreements. I stated that what we were undertaking in South Viet Nam was not aggression. We had a long argument about the historical background of the 1954 Agreements,/3/ the election which had been called for in 1955, the line between two parts of the same state, and the introduction of U.S. troops which, he said, was designed through pressure to subjugate South Viet Nam to U.S. desires. Tsarapkin expounded on what he said were U.S. attempts to subjugate many countries around the world where the U.S. had bases, troops under the guise of advisers, etc., etc. /3/Reference is to the Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, done at Geneva, July 20, 1954; texts in American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents: 1950-1955, vol. I, pp. 750-767. I brought up the subject of non-proliferation, but this was discussed only briefly since he said that this was directly linked to our desire to give nuclear capabilities to the FRG. As long as the U.S. had that approach there was no way possible to achieve a non-proliferation agreement. I then asked: "What exactly does the U.S.S.R. want as an outcome of the meeting of the UNDC?" He said he felt that the UNDC must agree on specific arrangements by which we could achieve several things: A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; a non-proliferation agreement without ANF/MLF; a reduction of bases and troops on foreign territory; a no first use agreement; and a decision to call a world conference on disarmament in which the Chinese would participate. Obviously, several of these are non-starters. As to the world conference, I said that while the U.S. recognized that at some point in disarmament discussions it would be essential for the Chinese to be included, we saw no evidence that their inclusion at the moment would further arrangements on arms reduction and disarmament. I reminded him that we had active and current discussions with the Chinese in Warsaw during which proposals for arms control and disarmament had been suggested by the U.S. but that no affirmative response had ever been received. In view of that it was difficult for us to comprehend how progress could be made by present inclusion of the Chinese at the ENDC, or at a world conference, or at the U.N. itself. It was interesting that when I asked him how he would suggest the Chinese could be included in a way to have constructive results, he shrugged his shoulders and said it was up to the U.S. I told Tsarapkin that we had delivered an aide-memoire to Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday in response to their questions about the Palanquin shot./4/ I said that we were quite clear that the Palanquin shot was not a threat to the continuance of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but we were not so clear that their shot of January 15 was in the same category. We had previously asked the Soviet Union for further information about that shot and about its possible impact on the treaty,/5/ and we had reiterated that question because we were concerned about the magnitude of the shot and the extent of radioactivity outside the borders of the Soviet Union. I expressed the personal hope that they continue to believe, as we do, that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was of great importance and should be supported by both of us. /4/Documents 75 and 76, respectively. /5/See Document 66. We moved from that to a discussion of the Comprehensive Test Ban, and Tsarapkin said that this was one of the things where there is no necessity of returning to Geneva, since they were aware of our point of view concerning the requirements for on-site inspections. If we were unable to accept the realities of the situation--no on-site inspection requirements--no progress could be made at Geneva and therefore there was no reason for returning there. I made no impression on him by reiterating the advances which we had made as a result of the extensive research which we had undertaken. Tsarapkin said both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. knew that it was possible with national capabilities to detect and identify any violations of a treaty and all that was needed was the utilization of national resources. During the course of the discussion about the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Tsarapkin attacked us on the maintenance of the Guantanamo base in Cuba. He said that the U.S. contends that it has troops and bases only in those countries where the people wanted U.S. assistance for purposes of mutual security. He said obviously that the people of Cuba did not want us and therefore we should withdraw. I said that Guantanamo was there because of a long established treaty,/6/ promulgated by a desire of the Cuban people, and that a treaty of this nature continued to be binding. We then had a lengthy discourse on the sanctities of treaties. The point Tsarapkin was making was that any time the mood of a people changes, treaties should be abrogated. I said that this was a reason for real concern about their willingness to adhere to treaties and whether we could depend on such arrangements. /6/Reference is to the Agreement for the lease to the United States of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations, signed at Havana February 16, 1903, and at Washington February 23, 1903; entered into force February 23, 1903; 6 Bevans 1113; continued in effect by the Treaty signed at Washington May 29, 1934; entered into force June 9, 1934; 6 Bevans 1161. My conclusion after this extended luncheon (he departed at 4:30) was that Tsarapkin is operating under harder instructions both as to the return to Geneva and as to the flexibility which he might be able to exhibit on proposals where in the past there has appeared to be some possibility of mutual acceptance.
79. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 11-2-65 Washington, May 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-65, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM The Problem To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program over the next five to ten years. Conclusions A. In a nuclear test program of more than 15 years duration, the USSR has developed nuclear weapons in a variety of designs and sizes which we believe have yields ranging from fractions of a kiloton up to 100 megatons. Soviet weapons technology has differed from that of the US in certain respects. In thermonuclear weapons, the Soviets have emphasized the development of multimegaton devices rather than relatively small, light weight lower yield weapons, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. (Paras. 10-14, 16-17, Table III) B. In fission weapons the Soviet program has been directed toward development of reliable, efficient, and economical devices. They have emphasized development of unboosted devices but they have also developed some high-performance boosted devices, probably in order to achieve reductions in size and weight. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Our evidence is insufficient to determine whether the Soviets decided not to pursue development of lightweight fission weapons or whether the apparent lack of development in this area is because of our failure to detect the evidence of such a program. However, there have been a number of Soviet tests on which we have little or no data and the Soviets have probably developed and stockpiled a number of fission weapons which we have not identified. (Paras. 18-20, 22-23, Table IV) C. We have detected 11 Soviet underground tests since the test ban treaty took effect in 1963. We believe that most of these were related to thermonuclear rather than fission weapons, possibly directed toward development of [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The rate of underground testing detected to date does not indicate that the Soviets have made an extensive effort to improve their fission weapon technology. (Paras. 15, 21) D. The Soviets are continuing an active weapon development program which is almost certainly creating new test requirements. This, together with the active US program of underground testing is probably generating considerable pressures for a vigorous test program. The pace of Soviet underground testing will probably increase. However, we do not believe that research, development, and military requirements will become so pressing as to cause the Soviets to withdraw from the treaty in the near term. (Para. 31) E. In thermonuclear weapon technology, an area in which the Soviets could make significant advances--the submegaton and low megaton yield range--is susceptible to improvement by underground testing. Future improvement in fission devices could be in the direction of further development of small diameter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads. The Soviets could also obtain a limited amount of data on weapons effects by underground testing, but one of their strong-est requirements in this area--effects data on high-altitude nuclear explosions--could be met only by atmospheric testing. (Paras. 32-36) F. The Soviets are continuing to expand their facilities for the production of fissionable materials. Our estimates indicate that by 1975 Soviet [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] U-235 production will increase by more than one-third, resulting in nearly a four-fold increase in cumulative production by that date. These estimates are subject to wide margins of error. Nevertheless, a significant expansion of these facilities has continued despite Khrushchev's statement to the contrary in April 1964./2/ (Paras. 1-9, Tables I and II) /2/For the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, see the footnote to paragraph 4, page 5. [Footnote in the source text. The cited text and footnote are not printed.] G. In industrial and military applications of power and propulsion reactors, the Soviet program has been characterized by certain technological weaknesses. Inadequate developmental testing has tended to degrade operational reliability, chemical engineering has lagged, and capabilities in stainless steel technology has been notably weak. As a result, the Soviets encountered major problems with their first marine propulsion system. This system has been considerably modified and improved and probably will give satisfactory performance in the newer ships and submarines. But the Soviets are still several years behind the US in marine propulsion technology. Technological difficulties, together with economic constraints, have also slowed the Soviet nuclear electric power program. The Soviets are now embarked upon a program of expansion which incorporates many of the power reactor concepts under development in the West, but we doubt that they will achieve their planned expansion to a 2,000 megawatt generating capacity by 1970. (Paras. 39-45) H. Soviet research reactors appear to be adequate in quality and quantity to meet the needs of the atomic energy program, although nuclear research has probably been hampered somewhat by deficiencies in instrumentation and by the limited availability of large fast computers. Reactor research seems directed toward power and propulsion application with emphasis on containment materials, coolants, moderators, and fuels capable of withstanding high irradiation levels and temperatures. (Paras. 37-38) I. More advanced research in thermoelectricity and thermionics will probably find application in space power supplies, which will eventually permit the use of electric propulsion systems in space. The Soviet program of research on controlled thermonuclear reactions is the world's largest, and Soviet scientists have made major advances in plasma physics. We do not believe, however, that the USSR will achieve a controlled fusion reactor in the next ten years. (Paras. 45-51) [Here follow a four-part "Discussion," entitled "Soviet Production of Nuclear Materials," "The Nuclear Weapons Program," "The Nuclear Reactor Program," and "International Activities," and a three-part Annex.] [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |