1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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80. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)/1/ Washington, May 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, National Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. Your letter to the President of February 18, 1965, transmitting a document, "The National Nuclear Test Program," has been noted./2/ It was also noted that the plan contained in the document is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This approach is sound; flexibility should continue to characterize our planning. In addition, we should continue to keep in mind the thought expressed in your letter that any test series which might eventually be conducted in any of the prohibited environments would be developed in response to the particular objectives considered most important at the time. Such tests might be somewhat different and fewer in number from those contemplated in "The National Nuclear Test Program" as presently drafted. /2/A sanitized version of Seaborg's February 18 letter is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 184-186. At several points in the document, there is expressed an expectation that underground testing would continue essentially unchanged and at approximately the same rate even after we resume testing in the atmosphere. This assumption seems open to question. The need for and feasibility of continuing a full-blown underground testing program simultaneously with atmospheric testing would be a matter on which the President would have to decide. I suggest that those portions of the document that appear to establish such assumptions with respect to underground testing be revised to leave the question open. I also request one other revision in the document, a change in the section on ultra-high yield weapons to make it explicit that the President has not yet made a decision as to how far the development of such weapons will be carried. Except as indicated above, it appears that "The National Nuclear Test Program" document is an excellent statement of the current plan for continuing to maintain the state of readiness which has already been achieved by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. It is requested that the plan contained in the document be periodically reviewed to ensure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and by the other research and development work at the laboratories. In addition, the plan should be reviewed in collaboration with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to ensure that the planning takes place with appropriate political guidance and in light of our best estimate of significant developing conditions. Any significant changes that occur in the program and the reasons for them should be brought to the attention of the President either on a periodic basis or whenever the program is formally revised. McGeorge Bundy
81. Editorial Note In a June 10, 1965, letter to President Johnson, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, submitted for approval the basic plan for the underground nuclear test program of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1966 (Flintlock), and the detailed plan for the first quarter (July-September 1965), Flintlock I. The fiscal year 1966 budget allowed for a program of 42-46 weapons development tests, 5-7 Plowshare tests, 10 effects tests, and 3-5 detection tests, but Seaborg described some 45-57 Atomic Energy Commission events and 13-15 Department of Defense events to allow sufficient latitude in the final underground test program. In addition, one British event (Charcoal), Seaborg stated, had been approved for the Nevada Test Site. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Volume IV, Box 28) At its meeting on June 28, the Review Committee on Underground Tests, to which Seaborg's letter was referred, recommended among other things approval in principle of the AEC proposal for fiscal year 1966 underground testing and specific approval of the first quarter (Flintlock I) test program, except that the three line-of-sight tests proposed in Flintlock I would be given further technical review. The Committee would later advise the President if the review would result in further deferral of the tests. It withheld approval of the Plowshare catering experiments and the Vela Uniform detection tests, except for Long Shot, pending receipt of more detailed information. (Memorandum for the Record from Charles E. Johnson to the members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, July 1; ibid.) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, July 1, approved the fiscal year 1966 program in principle, but deferred approval of Plowshare cratering experiments, tests above 300 kilotons yield, and Vela Uniform detection series, excepting the Long Shot event at Amchitka Island, Alaska, which had been approved in principle, but was still subject to detailed Review Committee consideration. Specific approval was given to the tests proposed in Seaborg's letter for the first quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock I, consisting of 13 Atomic Energy Commission tests, 1 Department of Defense test, and 1 British test (Charcoal). [text not declassified] The three tests involving use of line-of-sight pipes would be given further review. If the review raised questions of safety or possible venting, the President would be informed. (Ibid.) In a September 10 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of the underground nuclear test program in the second quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock II, consisting of 15 tests, including 5 previously approved for the first quarter of fiscal year 1966, but postponed primarily because of labor unrest at the Nevada Test Site. Included in Flintlock II was the Department of Defense Long Shot event, which the Department of Defense recommended for execution after reevaluating it. (Copy of Seaborg's letter to President Johnson, September 10, attached to memorandum from Brigadier General Delmar L. Crowson, USAF, Director of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, to the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, September 13; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, September 30, approved Seaborg's request for underground tests for the second quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock II, consisting of 12 Atomic Energy Commission and 2 (sic) Department of Defense underground tests. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Volume IV, Box 28) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, September 29, authorized conduct of the Sepia event and reauthorized the Kermet test, if deferred, for the second quarter of fiscal year 1966. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a letter of December 15 to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of the test program for the third quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock III, consisting of 16 tests, including 8 previously approved for Flintlock II but postponed because of labor troubles at the Nevada Test Site. Project Cabriolet, a Plowshare cratering experiment scheduled in March 1966 would be the subject of a complete analysis in January 1966 for review by Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Affairs. (Copy of Seaborg's December 15 letter to President Johnson enclosed with the memorandum from Crowson to the Review Committee on Underground Tests, December 16; ibid.) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, January 3, 1966, stated that the President approved all the tests proposed by Seaborg for the third quarter of fiscal year 1966 except for Cabriolet, which was subject to submission of details to Hornig and the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests for further reconsideration and recommendation. (Ibid.) Analysis of Project Cabriolet was enclosed with a letter from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, February 15, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, Vol. 2, Plowshare Events (Cabriolet), Box 29) A March 25 letter from Seaborg to President Johnson requested approval of the underground nuclear test program for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock IV, consisting of 16 Atomic Energy Commission and 4 Department of Defense tests, including 5 events postponed from the third quarter due to the unstable labor situation at the Nevada Test Site. Three of the tests would employ vertical lines of sight to the surface, permitting weapons effects measurements. It was expected that each test would be conducted within the constraints of the limited test ban treaty. (Ibid., FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Vol. IV, Box 28) In a memorandum of March 31 to Seaborg, President Johnson approved the testing program proposed for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1966. (Ibid.) In a letter of May 26 to W.W. Rostow, Seaborg advised modification of Flintlock IV, deferring one test (Ajax) for technical reasons and adding two less complex tests (Puce and the Plowshare test Vulcan). The modification lay within the scope of the underground test program for the fiscal year and resulted in an increase of one test over the program approved by the President for the fourth quarter. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In all, of some 49 authorized tests in Operation Flintlock, 48 underground nuclear tests were conducted. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, pages 25-28) A summary history of the tests series is in U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Flintlock and Latchkey: Events--Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, New Point, Midi Mist, 5 March 1966-26 June 1967 (DNA 6321F, 1984).
82. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, June 15, 1965, 2345Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential. Reported to Geneva. Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 5028. Subject: Disarmament. After DC meeting this p.m.,/2/ Foster and Tsarapkin discussed resumption ENDC. Foster recalled ENDC decision that co-chairmen should consult on resumption date conclusion disarmament discussion at UN and then consult with other ENDC members. /2/The U.N. Disarmament Commission, consisting of all U.N. members met in New York, April 21-June 16, 1965. Tsarapkin said Sovs do not object to ENDC resumption in principle. Noted, however, he had mixed feelings about resumption when no agreement and only fruitless discussion in prospect. Inquired whether today's NYT story about new US proposals was a leak and asked Foster to give at least some indication of what US planned to do if ENDC reconvened. Foster referred to his reply to Syrian Rep today (see septel),/3/ noting US had attempted produce new ideas and proposals at every past ENDC session and would make every effort to do so in future as well. Pointed out even if next ENDC session produced no specific agreement, discussions would be useful and certainly more constructive than those at current DC session. In course brief discussion of US proposed freeze on SNV,/4/ Tsarapkin reiterated freeze out of question since it would involve control. Said Gomulka Plan,/5/ while also providing for freeze, quite different inasmuch it would not involve control on either US or Soviet territory. /3/Not found. /4/In his message of January 21, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, President Johnson proposed that "the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 171-172) /5/The Gomulka Plan to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe was proposed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee, United Worker's Party of Poland, in a speech in Plock, Poland, December 28, 1963. (Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 651-652) A memorandum by the Polish Government transmitted through diplomatic channels, February 24, 1964, outlined the proposal. (Ibid., 1964, pp. 53-54) In response Tsarapkin query, Foster suggested July 6 or 13 as suitable date for ENDC resumption. Tsarapkin said would report to his govt and in view his departure for Moscow June 17 respond through Dobryn-in in Washington. When we asked what other ENDC members should be told at this time, Tsarapkin suggested we say co-chairmen have agreed to ENDC resumption in principle but resumption date subject further consultations. Suggested that once US-Sov agreement on resumption date reached, it would be easier for US to get in touch with other ENDC members via NY and obtain their reactions. Throughout conversation, Tsarapkin carefully avoided committing himself to early ENDC resumption. When we pointed out non-aligned Res, which adopted today, envisaged an ENDC session before 20th GA, he said Sovs had abstained on that Res and therefore were not bound by it./6/ /6/In pursuance of Resolution DC/225, adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission on June 15, 1965 (ibid., 1965, pp. 260-262), the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva on July 27, 1965. Stevenson
83. Report by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, June 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA/Foster. Confidential. The source text was sent under cover of a June 21 memorandum from Foster to President Johnson, stating that the report was his evaluation of the results of the session. "I hope you will agree," he concluded, "that on balance, it went well for the United States." Summary of Session of United Nations After almost two months of discussion, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adjourned on June 16, having adopted two resolutions: (1) a Yugoslav-sponsored resolution recommending that the General Assembly urgently consider the convening of a world disarmament conference "to which all countries would be invited"/2/ and (2) a "non-aligned"-sponsored resolution recommending the early resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva to consider various measures, with particular emphasis on a comprehensive test ban and non-proliferation. /2/Resolution DC/224, adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission, June 11, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 47) The resolution on the world conference was adopted by a vote of 89-0, with 16 abstentions. However, vigorous lobbying by the United States delegation had succeeded in obtaining some revisions in the resolution, including deletion of one of its more objectionable features. The United States abstained, but most NATO countries, led by the United Kingdom supported the revised proposal. The predominant issue was the strongly expressed desire of most members to associate the Chinese Communists with disarmament negotiations and the desire on the part of many to bring them, via such negotiations, into the United Nations, although some said they expected only to create a situation where the Chinese Communists negative attitude toward disarmament could be fully exposed. Despite opposition by the Soviet Union, the "non-aligned" resolution carried 83-1-18, with the United States supporting despite some reservations, Albania opposing, and the Soviet bloc abstaining. Until the very last moment the Soviets made strenuous--but unsuccessful--efforts to have that resolution revised so as to omit language implying a condemnation of Chinese nuclear explosions and to include a formulation on non-proliferation aimed at possible NATO multilateral arrangements. The Soviet Union apparently grossly misjudged the support it could develop for its two draft resolutions, one calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases,/3/ and the other for outlawing nuclear weapons and as a first step for a non-first-use pledge by the nuclear powers./4/ Rather than risk defeat on the bases and troops resolution and a poor showing on the ban-the-bomb resolution, the USSR declared at the last moment that it would not press its resolutions to a vote. The United States then agreed to refrain from pressing to a vote its own draft resolution which had been introduced to counter the Soviet proposals. The United States resolution urged ENDC consideration of the United States proposals for a cut-off and transfer agreement and a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and paralleled the non-aligned text in calling for priority negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation agreement./5/ /3/DC/218, May 27, 1965; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 206-207. /4/DC/219, May 27, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 207-208) /5/DC/220/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 244-245) The most salient features of the Disarmament Commission's session were: (a) the coming to the surface of a growing resistance on the part of non-nuclear states, particularly those which are potential nuclear states, to a non-proliferation arrangement prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons without imposing any obligations on nuclear states in terms of limitations on, or reduction in, their own nuclear capabilities; (b) the relative sophistication and realism displayed by many delegations in the course of the debate, in large part due to the leadership displayed by the Eight who had participated in the ENDC at Geneva and who were well informed as to the substantive issues involved; (c) the obvious misjudgment by the Soviets of their ability to use its attacks on United States action in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic as a means of ramming through two politically motivated resolutions; and (d) growing sentiment that the deadlock between the great powers should be broken by mobilizing the voices of the world at large, coupled with the desire on the part of some of the non-aligned--particularly Yugoslavia, the UAR, and India--to play a prominent role in that effort and thus strengthen their general position of leadership among non-aligned nations. On the basis of our contacts with the Soviets in New York, it appears questionable that they will agree to a resumption of ENDC negotiations this summer. They have expressed skepticism about the usefulness of reconvening the ENDC in the absence of prospects for agreement. However, their position seems to be determined by broader political considerations relating in particular to their dispute with the Chinese Communists. For our part, we have suggested July 6 or July 13 as a suitable ENDC resumption.
84. National Security Action Memorandum No. 335/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Confidential. TO SUBJECT In his speech at the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations, President Johnson stated: "We of the United States would hope that others will join with us in coming to our next negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind."/2/ /2/The text of the address by President Johnson at the 20th Anniversary Commemorative Session of the United Nations in San Francisco, June 25, 1965, is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 703-706. The President has directed the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to prepare for submission to him a proposed new program of arms control and disarmament, including a proposed program for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. The initiative in preparing this program should be with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Its proposals should be presented to the President together with preliminary comments from other interested agencies of government. The purpose of this procedure is to assure that the issues and the points of view of the interested agencies of the Government are brought to the attention of the President in a timely and orderly manner in order to permit a decision by him at the appropriate time. The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prospects for international negotiations. McGeorge Bundy
85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations/1/ Washington, July 11, 1965, 10:26 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (EUR/RPM) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA), cleared by Thompson (G), Leddy (EUR), Jeanne W. Davis (S/S-S), Ball (U), Klein (White House), and initialed by C. Arthur Borg (S) for Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Rome. A July 12 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk states that Weiler's name was added to the source text as a co-drafter without his knowledge. Weiler had worked with Spiers on an earlier draft which ACDA concurred in except for paragraph 6. It included an FYI section, supported by ACDA, which reads as follows: "US non-proliferation policy is currently under review, and it is possible that new approaches and changes in past position will result. Accordingly, we do not want to give impression that 1963 draft treaty or above points are immutable." Fisher's memorandum maintains that this section was excised from the draft telegram transmitted to Rusk without ACDA's being informed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6) 53. Following are points US intends to make to UK with respect to general question of non-proliferation treaty and specifically re their new draft (CA-13995)./2/ We hope that British, in light these comments, will not pursue subject at this time, but if they do continue to desire discussions in NAC, US should be guided by these points. /2/CA-13995 to NATO capitals, Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Wellington, Dublin, and Geneva, June 25, transmitted a copy of the U.K. draft Non-Dissemination Treaty, May 1965, as Attachment A, and a copy of the Canadian draft treaty, "Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," April 8, as Attachment B; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. 1. US believes draft non-proliferation agreement which Secretary gave Dobrynin April 13, 1963,/3/ after document had been circulated in NAC in February 1963, represents best position for West to adhere to, certainly for the present. We are prepared to drop Minute attached to that draft (CA-6451 of December 13, 1962)/4/ and to substitute a withdrawal clause based on limited test ban treaty for last sentence of present paragraph 3./5/ US does not see any particular tactical advantage to tabling revision of this draft at this time. /3/Secretary of State Rusk handed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a draft Non-Transfer Declaration with an appended clarifying Minute on April 12, 1963. (Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VII, Supplement) /4/CA-6451, December 13, 1962, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-1362. The draft Minute of interpretation is quoted in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 249. /5/A cover memorandum from Fisher to Bundy, July 12, transmitting a copy of the Draft Non-Transfer Declaration together with the Minute which Secretary of State Rusk discussed with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12, 1963, reads in part as follows: "If amended pursuant to Topol 53, the Minute would be dropped and the attached clause would be substituted in lieu of paragraph 3 of the Declaration." The attached clause reads as follows: "Test Ban Type Withdrawal Clause for 1963 U.S. Non-Proliferation Declaration. This declaration shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any signatory to withdraw from the declaration if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the declaration have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatories three months in advance." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6) 2. We do not see that UK draft has any advantages over US 1963 proposal, although we are prepared, of course, to listen to British arguments in this connection. 3. UK draft has number of substantial drawbacks in our view. We consider particularly that it would be tactically dangerous to negotiate on basis UK formulation whereby exclusion of MLF/ANF from ban on transfer of control of nuclear weapons to "any association of states" (Article I (1)) hangs tenuously on definition of "control" in separate and subsequent article (Article III (c)). Exposed definition of "control" might be so tempting a target for Soviet negotiators that it could be self-defeating in terms of Western effort to bring Soviets to face-saving agreement. 4. Language of UK draft would also limit evolution of MLF/ANF under "European clause" by requiring maintenance of veto by one of existing nuclear powers. The "European clause" was introduced into MLF discussions in response to apparent desire of Europeans and in reflection their aspirations towards eventual political unity. As far as US is concerned, we are not ourselves insisting that any MLF/ANF charter must include a "European clause," but we do wish to respond effectively to largest possible consensus among interested European allies, and their collective view of this matter is not yet clear. 5. As indicated above, we are ready to introduce in non-proliferation agreement withdrawal clause similar to that in test ban. 6. We continue to attach importance to having agreement cast in terms of prohibiting transferring weapons into national control of individual states so as not to leave any ambiguity re effect of agreement on new NATO nuclear arrangements such as ANF/MLF which in our view are consistent with our non-proliferation objectives and should not be precluded by non-proliferation agreement. Rusk
86. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Moscow, July 21, 1965, 3-4:40 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text is enclosure 1 to Airgram A-151 from Moscow, July 26. Drafted by Marshall Brement on July 26. Ambassador at Large Harriman visited the Soviet Union July 12-21, during his July 10-August 3 trip to Europe to seek European support for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war. PARTICIPANTS USSR US [Here follows a discussion on agricultural matters.] The Governor stated that he was glad to inform Chairman Kosygin that President Johnson had read with great care his report of their previous conversation./2/ The President, he said, shares Chairman Kosygin's view that the U.S. and USSR have heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. "You may be assured," the Governor continued, "that U.S. action in Vietnam will be what is necessary--but only what is necessary--to stop the armed attacks which have been mounted, under the direction of Hanoi, against the people and government of South Vietnam. The President agrees with your emphasis on (1) the tasks of disarmament; (2) the importance of bilateral relations between our two countries and (3) the advantage of personal contact in appropriate circumstances. The President is now making a final review of our disarmament position for the meeting in Geneva. He hopes very much that the Soviet Union will join in a constructive approach to these problems and he agrees with the Chairman as to the special importance of non-proliferation." In this connection, Governor Harriman told Kosygin that Mr. Foster would head the U.S. Delegation at Geneva and asked him who would head the Soviet Delegation. /2/The substance of Harriman's July 15 conversation with Kosygin was transmitted in enclosure 1 to A-120 from Moscow, July 22. (Ibid.) Kosygin replied that a final decision on this had not yet been reached. However, he assured Governor Harriman that the head of the Soviet Delegation will be a responsible official fully empowered to act, report, make decisions and not just "sit on the fence." When asked by Governor Harriman as to whether he had any comments on the Governor's previous statement, Kosygin replied that he was pleased to learn that the President is concerned about the same problems which bothered him. He was personally convinced that progress could be made on the questions which had been discussed and to which the President had reacted, if it were not for Vietnam. The Vietnamese problem is an impediment to the solution of many important problems such as disarmament, nuclear weapons and the like. The reasons why progress cannot be made in these fields, he said, now boils down to a lack of confidence between us. "I would like to venture my personal opinion that if it were not for the Vietnam issue we could find a new approach to the disarmament problem, a different angle to view it from than that which we have used in the past. One possibility would be for a meeting to be held--not necessarily in the USSR or U.S., it doesn't matter where--prior to a disarmament conference where a fundamental understanding could be reached on these important issues. A meeting of two or more heads of state or government might reach a prior understanding in principle and make a disarmament conference more productive. Such a meeting could in a matter of hours make important decisions in principle, which might require years of discussion at a formal conference. On questions relating to nuclear arms and disarmament no side can be dishonest since, sooner or later, lies must come to the surface and destroy mutual confidence. Naturally, progress could be made by conventional methods as well, but faster progress might be made by adopting unconventional ones. However, nothing can be done today because of the Vietnamese problem. Thus, the Vietnamese problem--which is a small problem--becomes large and influences all other important issues." Governor Harriman asked whether this meant that Chairman Kosygin would be willing to meet President Johnson to discuss these issues. He also inquired as to whether Chairman Kosygin was thinking in terms of a bilateral meeting, or one which would include other heads of state. Kosygin replied that his ideas on this subject had not yet been worked out, but that he did not exclude either bilateral or multilateral high-level meetings. For example, in connection with such an important problem as non-proliferation both forums could be useful. Kosygin emphasized the real relief throughout the world if agreement in these fields could be reached. Governor Harriman said that he knows the wisdom of Chairman Kosygin's words from personal experience. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which he had signed in 1963 was only a small step, but it had been greeted with great relief all over the world. Wherever he went, the Governor said, people still talk about it. If we could move further toward disarmament, any such steps would, of course, be greeted with even greater relief by the people of the world. The Governor referred to the fact that the UK, France and unfortunately Peiping are now involved in nuclear issues and asked Kosygin whether the problem of dealing with the Chinese might be discussed bilaterally between the U.S. and USSR. Kosygin replied that the Chinese were not a major issue. The U.S. and USSR are the only real owners of nuclear weapons. Others have some capability, he said, but are not now of any importance. However, science is making great strides and is the property of all states. Cheaper bombs, which do not require the present tremendous amount of electric power for their manufacture, will be developed, Kosygin said. Many states will thus be able to possess nuclear weapons and when this happens, there will be no guarantees as to who might take these weapons into their hands. Hitler existed in the past. What guarantees are there that another Hitler will not arise tomorrow? he asked. "These weapons are terrible. We must do all in our power to prevent proliferation of these weapons. This is why the American proposal to pool nuclear weapons--which amounts to giving weapons to the Germans--arouses such emotional opposition in the USSR." The Soviet Union, he said, would be forced to respond by sharing nuclear weapons with its own allies. Governor Harriman said that President Johnson fully shares the first part of Chairman Kosygin's statement. Regarding MLF, Secretary Rusk had previously pointed out to Gromyko that the USSR should sign the non-proliferation treaty and thus prevent forever the possibility of independent possession of nuclear weapons in Germany. Governor Harriman told Kosygin that the U.S., like the Soviets, had suffered twice from aggressive German leadership and was mindful of the possibility that such leadership could arise in the future. Mr. Kosygin must believe that the U.S. does not want the Germans to possess nuclear weapons independently. The Governor stressed that he was speaking very frankly and that it would be most unfortunate if what he had just said were discussed with others. He stated that he was encouraged to speak in an open manner because of the frankness which Kosygin had displayed in their last conversation in speaking of Soviet problems with the Chinese. [Here follows a discussion on Germany.] Governor Harriman offered to bring back any message on Germany which Premier Kosygin would like to send to the President. He then inquired as to when Chairman Kosygin thought a high level meeting could be held on nuclear questions. Kosygin replied that such a meeting was both possible and necessary but that it could only take place when the Vietnam issue leaves the scene. Such a meeting would not be possible earlier since, if it took place, everybody would think that the meeting was only to discuss Vietnam. What is immediately necessary, he said, is to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible. [Here follows a discussion on Vietnam.] Governor Harriman stressed the hope that everything will be done to minimize the influence of the Vietnam issue on bilateral relations. He referred to Kosygin's observations in his previous talk that the U.S. had violated a commitment to reduce its military budget by making a supplementary allocation of $700 million to deal with the Vietnam situation, and presented Kosygin with the following memorandum (based on Deptel 190)./3/ Governor Harriman said that this memorandum demonstrates that the statement made by Secretary Rusk to Gromyko on this subject was still valid. /3/Telegram 190 to Moscow, July 17, is ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman. U.S. Military Expenditures and Budget (Billions of Dollars) Comparative totals for United States Department of Defense military functions plus military assistance are as follows for fiscal year 1964 (July 1, 1963 through June 30, 1964) and 1965 (July 1, 1964 through June 30, 1965):
Fiscal year 1965 expenditures were $3.8 billion less than in 1964. New obligational authority, including the supplemental of $700 million for Southeast Asia for fiscal year 1965 was $500 million below fiscal year 1964. For fiscal year 1966 (July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966) new obligational authority requested by the President in January 1965 for the Department of Defense was $48.6 billion and expenditures were then estimated to be $49. billion./4/ /4/For the Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1966, January 25, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 82-99. It is thus presently estimated that United States military expenditures for fiscal year 1966 will be considerably lower than estimated in a statement given to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko by Secretary of State Rusk on December 5, 1964, which indicated that "military expenditures in fiscal year 1966 will be at least $1.25 billion below the level of fiscal year 1964."/5/ /5/The quotation is an excerpt from Secretary of Defense McNamara's press conference in Texas on November 10, 1964, which Secretary Rusk gave to Gromyko at the outset of their December 5, 1964, meeting. (Secto 28 from USUN, December 5, 1964; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR) Whether and when supplemental appropriations will be requested for fiscal year 1966 depends upon developments in Southeast Asia. Kosygin, after glancing at the memorandum (which was in English), repeated that according to U.S. statements, it is planning to increase its budgetary appropriation by $700 million. He hit on the figure of $50.4 billion (for FY 1965) in the memo, stating that this was a figure which had been published previously and that the $700 million must, therefore, increase that figure. "My memory is very good. I remember figures," he said. Governor Harriman noted that we may have to increase our military expenditures if the situation in Southeast Asia worsens. Kosygin said that if faced with a similar situation, the Soviet Union would have given very serious thought as to whether it would increase its own military expenditures; and that if it found it necessary to do so, would only take such action after informing the other side. Ambassador Kohler explained that the figures given in the memo clearly show that the savings, even including the $700 million appropriation for Southeast Asia, were much greater than previously anticipated and considerably below the figure which Secretary Rusk had quoted to Gromyko. Governor Harriman added that 1965 expenditures, including those for Vietnam, are $3.8 billion less than those for 1964. Savings in other directions have more than offset additional expenditures for Vietnam. Kosygin stated that another point which bothers the Soviets is that in the USSR funds not expended by the end of the fiscal year are terminated, whereas in the U.S. such funds continue to be available to the Defense Department. Governor Harriman quickly responded that Secretary McNamara was ready to appoint an expert to meet either in Moscow or Washington to consult with a Soviet expert on mutual budgetary structure and practices in order that there could be understanding of each other's methods. Kosygin responded that if this issue were connected with disarmament measures, then a need might indeed arise to examine each other's procedures. [Here follows discussion of commercial and other bilateral relations, Vietnam, and China.]
87. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 299-303. No classification marking. The source text is undated, but Seaborg indicates elsewhere in his Journal that the meeting occurred on July 22; ibid, Vol. 11, p. 77. The source text notes the meeting took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room from 5 to 6:30 p.m. For additional background on the issues discussed at this meeting, see Document 90. PRESENT Rusk opened the meeting by saying to Bill (Foster) that he has quite a party coming up to discuss disarmament, although we may be rearming the very day that he gets to Geneva. He asked him to comment on the strategy of starting the meeting when he gets there. He asked whether Foster might open by making a statement updating what we have already proposed, or whether he should make a general policy statement possibly preceded by private talks with the Russians. Foster said he thought he would start with a statement as to why we are in Viet Nam and he would go back to the Khrushchev letter of January 8, 1964,/2/ and the answer from President Johnson of January 21, 1964;/3/ he would describe the nuclear threat that faces the world, especially the proliferation problem. He thought that this might all be in his own statement, not a Presidential statement. Then he would go to Tsarapkin to talk privately, emphasizing that in spite of Viet Nam the nuclear race needs to be controlled. He would point out that there have been many meetings last year and this year, and that 114 Nations are vitally interested in the outcome. /2/Not found; reference presumably is to Chairman Khrushchev's December 31, 1963, message to world leaders. (Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 654-665) /3/Not found; reference presumably is to President Johnson's January 18, 1964, letter to Khrushchev. (See footnote 6, Document 2) Rusk said to Foster that he would have to deal with Viet Nam rather directly, pointing out that we are willing to cooperate, but that our efforts have not borne any fruit, and that he might recapitulate those efforts. Fisher protested that too much detail on Viet Nam might lead to the wrong impression as to our objectives, and he said that the Soviets will certainly bring up this question in any case. Foster pointed out that the Soviets will be the first to speak. Rusk again made the observation that Tuesday of next week, the opening day of the ENDC Conference, will be a hell of a day to make a speech on disarmament./4/ He asked Foster when he planned to leave. Foster said he would leave on Saturday morning, seeing the British on the way, at their request. Rusk then read from a message that he is sending to the British/5/ in which he is sharply critical of the British response to our counter proposals to their draft treaty on nonproliferation. This message would state that a reply is hoped for before July 26. The problem is that Germany insists on retaining the concept of MLF, while the UK resists putting in any nonproliferation agreement statements which provide for a MLF. The British feel that this weakens the nonproliferation treaty in a serious manner. Bundy suggested that we might try to persuade the British to add a clause which would be helpful with the Germans, and less objectionable to the British. This language was handed out at the meeting by Fisher, and is attached to this memorandum./6/ Rusk asked if this language would permit the MLF, and Bundy responded that it would. Bundy was concerned that we should not table something in the NAC that would lead to a civil war of words among the Western Alliance. Foster pointed out that the UK had already tabled their resolution in the NAC./7/ Rusk said that in his opinion the UK wouldn't do much before their election. He also said he thought Germany would not give up the MLF. Perhaps it would be best to find out what the Russians have in mind by talking to them before we start; their aim may be primarily to break up the MLF, McNamara's Select Committee,/8/ NATO, etc. Bundy again stated that the UK objects to the US version of the nonproliferation treaty/9/ because it clearly was written by someone who was defending the MLF. Foster pointed out that Prime Minister Wilson made a speech on December 16, 1964, in which he, in fact, said that he couldn't do what the US would now have him do./10/ Bundy suggested that the Rusk message should be sent to the UK so that we could see what their response would be. He read a copy of Wilson's speech of December 16, 1964, and said that he thought our language is consistent with this and that we should say this in the Rusk memorandum to the UK. Rusk agreed to this. Bundy and others suggested that maybe the Soviets would agree to going back to the earlier '63 language/11/ saying they would withdraw from any nonproliferation agreement if there should turn out to be a MLF. Rusk made the observation that it is entirely possible that by the time a MLF came into being that the Soviets would say that it isn't a proliferation step. In any case, we shouldn't conclude this nonproliferation agreement before the German elections. Bundy summarized by saying that we would send the Rusk memorandum to the UK in order to have one more try. /4/Secretary of State Rusk possibly had in mind the decision to increase U.S. fighting strength in Vietnam announced by President Johnson at a news conference on July 28, the day after the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 794-803) /5/Document 88. /6/Not found. /7/Not further identified. /8/Reference is to the NATO Select Committee proposed by McNamara at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Paris on May 31, 1965, to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation. /9/The U.S. draft "Treaty on the Prevention of the Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," which the Committee of Principals considered, forms Annex A to the memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, July 16, 1965, "Position Paper on a Non-Proliferation Agreement." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), 7 July 65-31 July 65) /10/Reference is to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's statement in the House of Commons on December 16, 1964, in which he reported on his visit to Washington, December 7-8, 1964, for talks with President Johnson and administration officials, and outlined the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-1966, Vol. XV, p. 20525A) /11/See footnote 3, Document 85. Rusk then suggested to Foster that we go back to a discussion of his opening statement. Foster said that he would probably open by defending our valid position in Viet Nam, probably as a response to an earlier Soviet statement on this. He would re-emphasize the continued US resolve to respond to subversion; he would then say something on the nonproliferation question and something on the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty and something on the destruction of nuclear warheads. Rusk said he doubted that Foster should say anything on the destruction of nuclear warheads on Tuesday, in view of the other statement that would be issued about then concerning our future plans in Viet Nam. Foster said that he had in mind saying that such destruction would be on the basis of the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses. Bundy agreed that this might not be the right thing to say early next week. We couldn't be in the position of going in to get new Congressional authority and then mention at the same time that we were going to destroy nuclear warheads, creating the impression that we did not need them. Rusk was of the opinion that perhaps the best strategy would be to go into a general negotiating situation, discussing these matters for about a week or so before revealing our detailed position. Humphrey expressed the opinion that Foster should limit his statement to the nonproliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban, or at least give these the emphasis. He said he thought that Foster should proceed like a boxer, and feel them out for a while before committing himself. He should let someone else carry the ball. It might be all right to also propose a cutoff of fissionable material with emphasis on peaceful uses. He said that if we do all the rest that we plan for next Tuesday, and tell the Nation that we have a hell of a job in Viet Nam and that we are in a hell of a mess in Viet Nam, we shouldn't at the same time say we're cutting back on warheads. Humphrey said he thinks we can sell the nonproliferation concept and that we can sell the comprehensive test ban. Foster remonstrated that we have an approved position in the US on the destruction of warheads. He then went on to ask if there was general agreement on what he might say about the comprehensive test ban treaty, reading from a memorandum that had been prepared as a possible guide for a Presidential message on this. (Attached.)/12/ /12/Reference presumably is to the "Outline of Points for Presidential Message to the ENDC" in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 81-82. It suggested, inter alia, that the President refer to progress in detecting clandestine underground tests opening up "a wider range of possibilities for extending the scope of prohibitions on nuclear testing." (Ibid., p. 82) Seaborg objected to the phrase which said that significant advances had been made in the detection of underground nuclear explosions. Foster said that this was nothing more than the language that Stevenson had used in April./13/ Seaborg then read the entire Stevenson April statement, which included reference to the need for inspections. /13/Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, spoke to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on April 26; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 59-77. Bundy and Rusk both agreed with Seaborg that Foster shouldn't make a statement that would make it impossible to maintain the position that we would need inspections, or that would decrease the flexibility of our ultimate position because we have not yet decided on the various alternatives for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Bundy emphasized that we shouldn't tie our hands. Foster countered with the statement that the Ruina report,/14/ with which the AEC people were involved, declared that significant progress has been made in the detection of underground [sic]. Seaborg disputed this, saying that he had seen a resume of the Ruina report and it did not say that. Seaborg said that the improvements to which Mr. Foster referred had to do with Large Aperture Seismic Arrays, which were yet to be built and demonstrated, and to underwater Arrays yet to be built and demonstrated. /14/The report, presumably by Dr. Jack P. Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, is not further identified. Rusk summarized by saying that perhaps we should recommend to the President that he give a brief message of greeting and that Foster would make the main speech. Bundy suggested that with respect to the comprehensive test ban treaty, Foster use both parts of the Stevenson statement, that is, that significant success had been achieved with underground detection, but that verification is still needed in a treaty. Rusk asked Foster whether he now had what he needed, and Foster said that he thought he did, that he basically needed instructions on the content of his message to the ENDC, and instructions to be tough with the British on Sunday. Humphrey said he thought that the thing to worry about most in Geneva would be the Russians on Viet Nam, and on the attitude of some of the nonaligned countries. Foster said he didn't think we needed to worry about the nonaligned countries, and Humphrey answered that he hoped Foster was right. Foster pointed out that this will be a closed session, although it was also noted that there would be the usual corridor briefings of the newspaper people. Bundy, in a recapitulation, said that we would be counter-attacking on Viet Nam following a Russian opening statement, and Humphrey agreed that this was the best approach. Foster said he would have a contingency statement ready for this purpose. Rusk said that NATO had never before been confronted with a disagreement between the US and the UK such as this, and he said that, therefore, a longer meeting than planned would be necessary with NATO. The meeting broke up with the understanding that the President would give a general message of greeting, and that Foster would make an opening statement that included a rebuttal on Viet Nam, and statements on the US desire for a nonproliferation treaty and for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, with the description of the comprehensive test ban to be general enough so as not to tie our hands in the future. Possibly Foster's message should include some other aspects of arms limitations as well, such as cutoff of fissionable material. G.T.S./15/ /15/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
88. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, July 22, 1965, 9:43 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Sec. Rusk/UK Officials 11/64-12/65. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk on July 22 and cleared by Alexander L. Rattray (S/S). The source text is stamped "Sec Def has seen. 26 Jul." 395. Please deliver ASAP the following message to the Foreign Secretary: "Dear Michael: I am deeply concerned about the failure of our respective colleagues to reach a meeting of the minds on a draft proposal regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. "First of all, I am sure you and I could agree that both our governments are deeply preoccupied with and committed to the attainment at the earliest possible date of a satisfactory treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Our problems arise over questions of how best to reach that objective. "After the most careful consideration of the draft treaty your government presented for our consideration,/2/ your government was informed in London and in Washington on July 19th,/3/ of suggestions for amending the draft treaty to a modest extent that would permit the US to support a United Kingdom initiative at the ENDC,/4/ after adequate consideration by the North Atlantic Council and, hopefully, with a united allied front. /2/See footnote 2, Document 85. /3/The conversation in Washington between British Ambassador Dean and ACDA Director Foster on the U.K. draft Non-proliferation Treaty is reported in telegram 302 to London, July 19, and in the memorandum of that conversation, including an attached British aide-memoire of July 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) /4/Telegram 299 to London, July 17, transmitted the text of the British draft Non-Dissemination Treaty as amended by the United States. (Ibid.) "My colleagues attempted to make clear the United States understanding of your government's domestic situation and its commitment to some form of early action with regard to a non-proliferation treaty. At the same time, they emphasized our equal desire to avoid any schism in NATO. In the latter regard, our suggestions took into account what we judged to be certain long-range but serious preoccupations of the Federal Republic of Germany. "I have just been informed today of the rejection by your government of all of our suggested changes in the draft treaty and of your government's intention promptly to table the draft at the ENDC, after NAC consultation apparently of only one day's duration./5/ In the circumstances I foresee, as virtually certain, results clearly contrary to your interests and ours. Following the sharpest of disagreements within the North Atlantic Alliance, in which the UK draft treaty could not receive support from at least the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, other even more unfortunate developments would be bound to occur. There could be no successful negotiation of the treaty at the ENDC without the support of the United States or the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to sign it. This would present a heaven-sent opportunity to the Soviets both to exploit allied differences and to rebuff United Kingdom efforts as unacceptable in view of the provision that would still permit some form of nuclear sharing within NATO. Only you could judge the political gains or losses for your government. But such developments could clearly not be regarded as advantageous to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of its elections only two months from now. In my own country there would inevitably arise further doubts about the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. /5/Telegram 313 from London, July 21, reported that Chalfont had just informed the Embassy of British Ministers' rejection of U.S. amendments to the U.K. draft non-proliferation treaty. He said that in view of the U.K. position on an Atlantic Nuclear Force, it was not possible for political reasons to leave any options unsettled in any U.K. initiative. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) A memorandum from Foster to Bundy, July 21, stated that the British draft "excessively restricted the possible development of an MLF/ANF with a European clause." Foster's memorandum attached a draft message from Rusk to Stewart or from the President to the Prime Minister, much of which was included in the present message. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda and Letters to the President, 1965) "I am aware of your Prime Minister's statements in the House of Commons on this subject, particularly those on December 16, 1964, that we should not have any new fingers on the nuclear trigger./6/ I believe that the language that we have proposed--that there should be no increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons--takes this consideration into account. /6/See footnote 10, Document 87. "Further, it seems to me that we should not anticipate too much the attitude of the Soviet Union in the forthcoming Geneva talks. They have indicated non-proliferation as a matter of high priority to them. We do not know whether they will amend their previous objections arising from possible NATO nuclear arrangements. We should face candidly, I think, the fact that Soviet objections are spurious and have nothing to do with the central problem of non-proliferation. They have strongly condemned the MLF, the ANF and now even the special committee suggested by Secretary McNamara. Gromyko finally confessed to me that their objections to MLF were not based solely upon non-proliferation. They clearly would like to block any increased cohesiveness in NATO and to create as much dissension as possible in NATO ranks. "I felt that our counter proposals with respect to a draft which your government could table at NATO and in the ENDC were constructive and went a very long way toward meeting your needs. Some margins of dissatisfaction on the part of some of your colleagues seem to me to be offset by the disadvantage of tabling proposals which the United States could not accept. Our intimate cooperation in the nuclear field over the years would make such a divergence of view inexplicable. "Given all that is at stake with regard to our mutual basic interests, I would be deeply grateful for a reply, hopefully before July 26, indicating that your government is prepared to adopt a position that we here could support. "With personal regards, "Sincerely, Dean Rusk" Rusk
89. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ London, July 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Secret. The source text is attached to a covering note of transmittal from British Ambassador Dean to Secretary of State Rusk, July 23. The source text contains no salutation or signature. Thank you for your message about our draft treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons./2/ /2/Document 88. I am as anxious as you are not to cause strains in the Alliance or to allow the Russians to exploit Western disagreements, although we must recognise that a real difference of view exists between our two Governments on the question of the so-called "European option." I should make it clear that our draft treaty has been in the hands of NATO Governments for several weeks, which should have given ample time for them to form views on it. But we shall certainly want to review our position, rather than proceed at once to tabling the draft treaty at Geneva, if unfortunately we cannot get a NATO consensus of view. I am naturally very glad to hear that Mr. Foster will be able to come to London to discuss the whole problem with Lord Chalfont before the NATO meeting on Monday,/3/ and I very much hope that a satisfactory way of handling our differences can be found./4/ /3/Telegram 354 from London, July 25, reported that in his meeting with ACDA Director Foster in London on that day (Sunday), Lord Chalfont agreed to inform other NATO members at the NATO meeting on July 26, that he did not intend immediately to table a draft treaty at Geneva and that "there would be opportunity work out agreed language." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) /4/Printed from an unsigned copy. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |