1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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90. Editorial Note On July 27, 1965, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed meetings in Geneva after a recess that began September 17, 1964. In a brief message of greetings to the conference, July 27, President Johnson set forth three objectives of the American delegation: nuclear non-proliferation, limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, and a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, page 790) This message was read by William C. Foster, head of the U.S. Delegation, in his opening statement. (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pages 281-286) The decision to limit President Johnson's message to general welcoming remarks was made at a meeting of the Committee of Principals, July 22. For Seaborg's minutes of the meeting, see Document 87. Recommendations for a comprehensive message are contained in a July 14 memorandum from Foster to McGeorge Bundy (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13), and Ambassador Thompson's memorandum to Rusk, July 21 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6).
91. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Geneva, August 1, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster. This conversation took place in the Hotel des Bergues. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At Lord Chalfont's request, I received him in my apartment at the des Bergues at 4:30 today. He said that the purpose of his visit was to make it clear that his government felt that it must table its present draft treaty with respect to the major articles on nuclear arrangements. Although appreciative of U.S. attempts to find compromise language which would reduce German and Italian opposition to their present language, his government felt that the statements of Prime Minister Wilson in December were so explicit on this subject that any backing away from that would be political suicide. They also believed that their formulation was the best possible in order truly to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. He said he recognized that our position is difficult in attempting to develop a European consensus and that as we had said in the Western Four meeting, our suggestions were probably as far as we could go in attempting to help achieve this consensus. He again stated that they had no objection to our proposed safeguards clause, nor to our concern about early tabling of any assurance clause. He said his government would be willing to make some concessions toward the Canadian draft in order to attract Canadian support./2/ While he recognized our difficulties with the proposed Canadian withdrawal clause including the possible submission of problems and decisions to the Security Council, he felt that they could accept the Canadian formulation to obtain Canadian support. /2/See Document 85, footnote 2. I expressed our disappointment that our suggestions could not be accepted, particularly since he had heard the strong objections to the U.K. formulation of the Germans and the Italians, at Paris and here. I inquired whether some general language which avoided the specific problem of ANF/MLF and the majority vote would allow them to change their current position. He said that they had considered this but believed that so much legal ingenuity had been expended in getting where we are that there is little hope for this as a promising course. He said that he and his government had perhaps misread what they thought were signals as to U.S. position as set forth in my Foreign Affairs article,/3/ the Kennedy speech/4/ and what he characterized as a leak of the Gilpatric report./5/ From those alleged signals they had concluded that the U.S. Government was assigning top priority to non-proliferation, even as against the necessity for achievement of an MLF/ANF. In view of that, he believed they may recently have promised too much too soon in the House of Commons and with the press, all of which may have caused much of the present embarrassing differences between the allies. I conceded that he might be right as to the embarrassment. I also said that non-proliferation continued to have top priority with us but that we also continued to support our basic commitments on MLF/ANF. Until after the German election, at least, any discussion in this field is very difficult for the present German government. This political problem for the FRG was much like his own estimate of his proposal as being essential for the political health of his own government. /3/Foreign Affairs, July 1965, pp. 587-601; annotated in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 265-280. /4/Reference presumably is to a speech by Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY); not further identified. /5/Document 64. In an attempt to find a possible way out of this dilemma, I inquired whether the speculation which I had heard from some source, which source I did not recall, as to their possible willingness, although admittedly reluctant, to accept as amendments our Articles I, II, and IV, after a U.K. treaty had been tabled. He said that this offered possibilities, and if they could table their present draft with some possible Canadian amendments and possibly the safeguard clause added, then we or one of our allies, or even one of the non-aligned, might offer U.S. amendments and they could (in what could be made to appear reluctantly) accept the amendments. They then would have carried out their political commitment. I said that this appeared to have possibilities and it might be that we could advise our allies that we still did not like Articles I, II and III, of the U.K. draft, as we have already informed the British. However, by agreement, we could perhaps publicly commend the British for their initiative but stating in low key that we would have to give more thought to their formulation since it had features which we felt were not the wisest. We would need to discuss such a statement with our allies before presenting it, so that each could weigh the political consequences, and, indeed, we would need to develop a scenario that could help answer many of our problems. I said that I hoped the British had also considered the political cost of appearing to diverge from a unified position with the U.S., both in terms of cohesion of the alliance and in terms of possible attacks from their conservative opponents at home. Lord Chalfont said he recognized this problem and hoped that any public evidence of the differences could be minimal. In concluding, he asked that our discussion and his personal tentative favorable reaction to this sort of plan be kept in the closest confidence while he discussed it back home as he presumed I would do also. I told him that I would only discuss it with Washington and with Mr. Bunn here in view of Mr. Bunn's participation in treaty activities. He said that he would discuss it only with his associate, Sir Harold Beeley, and that we could consult again later in the week when we had word back from home. He raised the question of the Italian position. I said we had not heard, but we both agreed that if we and the U.K. and probably the Canadians, agreed with the plan, and also the Germans came along, that the Italians could undoubtedly be persuaded also to accept.
92. Editorial Note Telegram Disto 2243 from Geneva, August 11, 1965, transmitted the text of a draft non-proliferation treaty negotiated by the American, British, Canadian, and Italian representatives of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) By agreement among the four Western delegations, the United States would sponsor this text and table it at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on August 17. (Telegram Disto 2251 from Geneva, August 12; ibid.) The Western Four fully agreed to a revised text (circular telegram 233 to 20 posts, August 13), except that the British intended to make an interpretive comment on Article I, indicating their intention not to relinquish their veto on any eventual NATO Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force (circular telegram 232 to 20 posts, August 13; ibid.). Article III of the draft treaty committed parties to the treaty to cooperate to facilitating application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to peaceful atomic energy activities. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who supported mandatory safeguards in the original American draft, expressed dismay with this provision in a letter to William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, August 13, 1965. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13) At 1:40 p.m. on August 13, Seaborg called Foster in Geneva to tell him that he was sending him this letter expressing concern about dropping mandatory IAEA safeguards from the draft treaty. According to Seaborg's record of this call, "Foster said it was this or nothing as far as our Allies are concerned. He said it has been made clear that the U.S. was accepting this deletion under protest. He said that it is the very definite intention of our delegation to push aggressively, in speeches, discussion, etc., in support of the basic idea of IAEA safeguards." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 11, page 189) In an August 16 memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., to McGeorge Bundy, transmitting a copy of Seaborg's letter, Keeny stated that in deference to the Atomic Energy Commission, "Foster will say something about the importance of the strongest possible provisions for the IAEA safeguards in his speech presenting the draft Treaty." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Volume 1, Box 13) On August 17, 1967, the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted the U.S. proposal for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pages 347-349) In his statement presenting the draft treaty to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 17, Foster said that the draft treaty was the product of consultation among NATO countries represented at the conference and that it embodied "important contributions from Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom." (Ibid., page 351) Foster explained the provisions of the treaty to the conference. Regarding Article III dealing with the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities, he said "this article does not set forth a precise or completely formulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement; namely that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries." (Ibid.) He added that "we have drafted this provision to take account of the views of all countries; including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances." (Ibid., page 352) A memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, August 14, attached several copies of the draft treaty, a memorandum for the President which Bundy might use to send him a copy of the treaty (not in the file), and an ACDA draft of the Presidential statement releasing the draft treaty (not in the file). Keeny stated that the draft statement needed "to be improved a bit." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NPT, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) A statement by President Johnson on the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was released in Washington on August 17, 1965. Among other things, it stated that Foster had presented the draft treaty to the Geneva disarmament conference on the President's instructions. The President said: "This draft treaty would bind its signers in a pledge to refrain from actions which would lead to any further increase in the number of nations having the power to unleash nuclear devastation on the world . . . . It plainly demonstrates that a treaty can be drawn which meets the legitimate interests of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, page 890)
93. Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m./2/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D) on August 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 304-307. /2/According to Secretary of State Rusk's Appointment Book, he attended this meeting beginning at 4:38 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book, 1965) Minutes of the Meeting: Secretary Rusk indicated that the meeting would begin with a presentation of background material relevant to consideration of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Mr. Fisher began by pointing out the importance that an extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground testing would have as a means of dealing with the question of proliferation of nuclear capabilities. With respect to the objectives of the meeting, he indicated that he believed that as a minimum the U.S. should probably be prepared to make available to the ENDC information on improved present and projected technical capabilities for detecting and identifying seismic events. Dr. Frosch of ARPA began the technical presentation by giving estimates of natural seismic events in the Soviet Union as a function of seismic magnitude, and with a discussion of the relationship between the yield of nuclear explosions and the earthquake magnitude scale. In so doing, he treated as extreme examples the possibility of explosions being conducted on the one hand in hard rock and on the other in dry alluvium, pointing out the range of uncertainty in our understanding with respect to both cases. He indicated that there appear to be limits to testing large yields in alluvium in the Soviet Union because, so far as we know, it is not available in sufficient depth. Dr. Frosch then summarized the results of a recent analysis of present and projected capabilities for detecting and identifying seismic events. [11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] With respect to each of these systems he gave estimates as a function of magnitude of the number of natural seismic events that could not be distinguished from possible explosions (indicating for example, that with the system of LASA's and ocean bottom seismometers there would be on an average approximately 30 such events per year in the Soviet Union of magnitude greater than 4.0). [1 paragraph (31 lines of source text) not declassified] In response to a query about the State Department paper which examined the effect of a comprehensive treaty on the proliferation question,/3/ Ambassador Thompson indicated his personal reservation that the Germans might not go along with the treaty. /3/Keeny's August 24 memorandum to Bundy and Hornig states that this paper by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) "concludes that all significant powers except China, France, and Indonesia will probably sign a comprehensive test ban agreed to by the U.S. and the Soviet Union." (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) The paper by Garthoff was possibly transmitted by the memorandum from Fisher to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals, August 19. (Meeting of the Committee of Principals, August 25, Agenda; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb 65), Aug. 1965) Dr. Seaborg asked about the possibility of Soviet evasion, to which Dr. Frosch replied that he felt that it would be possible for them to evade successfully at very low yields provided they were willing to make a considerable effort, but he considered it doubtful that very large tests, and in particular more than one or two large tests, could be done clandestinely. Thus, he felt that evasion around 2 kt would be feasible provided there were sufficient effort made, but that at yield levels significantly above that it would be difficult. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In response to a question from Dr. Seaborg, he indicated that clandestine testing at significant yields above ground would be very difficult. Dr. Howard then presented the results of some analyses of the implications of continuation of the present treaty, a threshold treaty, and a comprehensive treaty./4/ In so doing, he indicated those areas where there was a consensus within the Government and where there were differences in view, particularly involving the AEC, JCS, and OSD. He first discussed the implication for the US-USSR balance in offensive strategic systems, then in defensive systems, and then very briefly implications with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, and to the US-Chinese Communist balance. With respect to the last point, he observed that the Chinese position relative to that of the US and the Soviet Union will improve whether or not we and the Soviet Union test or not. Finally, he discussed the effect of the various treaties on the degree to which we would be able to meet requirements of the "Jackson" safeguards,/5/ including a discussion of the viability of the weapons laboratories and of our confidence in the status of weapons in stockpile. /4/According to the agenda of the meeting this item was entitled "'The Military Consequences of Alternative Test Ban Proposals,' dated August 11, 1965 (being reviewed in light of JCS and AEC comments) by Jack Howard, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) /5/The "Jackson" safeguards, presumably by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), are not further identified. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. Fisher to comment on the parliamentary situation in Geneva. Mr. Fisher indicated that we probably should make a presentation of revised estimates on detection and identification capabilities, but that for this session perhaps no more would be needed; it would, of course, be desirable in connection with the presentation of technical capabilities if there were some feeling about the direction in which we might be moving with respect to a comprehensive treaty. He indicated that difficulties in reaching agreement on a non-proliferation agreement and in particular because of difficulties on the MLF, suggested that an extension of the test ban looked increasingly like the most realistic way of actually making progress in preventing nuclear proliferation. He then stated as an issue whether or not the difficulties in a treaty along the lines favored by ACDA/6/ would be balanced by the gains that might be realized on the non-proliferation front. Secretary Rusk asked whether we could not achieve the same objectives with respect to non-proliferation through the Fanfani proposal./7/ Mr. Fisher replied that that remained to be seen, depending on the response of various non-nuclear powers, but that he was not confident that the Fanfani proposal would be acceptable to the nations about whom we were most concerned. He then discussed briefly the three alternatives that had been presented in ACDA background papers./8/ With respect to continuing to insist on a treaty involving an explicit number of on-site inspections he felt this was certainly a viable US position--but one that could prove to have been unduly conservative if, by having stuck with it, we would have been confronted a few years hence with a number of new nuclear powers, a possibility which he felt a comprehensive treaty might do much to head off. He conceded that the first ACDA alternative, and for that matter the second as well (a threshold treaty), would require such extensive discussion within the Government that it would be totally unrealistic to expect any decision in the context of the presently projected time scale for this session of the ENDC. /6/That is, one in which there would be an understanding that failure to provide adequate assurances of compliance through on-site inspection would be grounds for withdrawal. [Footnote in the source text.] /7/In a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on July 29, Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani said: "It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time limit, they would resume their freedom of action." The demands consisted of "having certain safeguards against nuclear attack" and "some progress in the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear countries." (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 288-289) /8/According to Keeny's August 24 memorandum to Bundy and Hornig, at the August 25 meeting of the Committee of Principals, ACDA would present "the following four separate proposals for consideration by the Principals: #1--The comprehensive ban with no inspections except in connection with the withdrawal process. #2--An uninspected partial ban with a threshold at Mag. 4.5. #3--a comprehensive test ban with a reduced number of inspections. #4--An uninspected threshold treaty that would become comprehensive without inspections provided a sufficient number of states adhere to it." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) The background papers are memoranda from Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals, dated July 16 on Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (not found), and July 19, on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban With Small Quota of On-Site Inspections. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), 1 July 65-31 July) In response to a query from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara observed that he felt that it was presently not the time for a new proposal on the part of the US and that we would pay a heavy price for what would ultimately not succeed. Secretary Rusk indicated agreement with the qualification that this would be true, unless of course, the Soviet Union should indicate--as they have not so far--some willingness to move in our direction on the verification issue. Mr. Fisher indicated that six of the non-aligned nations in Geneva have suggested going ahead with the threshold treaty. He realized that such a treaty might in fact not prevent a determined non-nuclear power from developing nuclear weapons while still complying with the treaty but that the negotiation of such a treaty might nevertheless have some useful political effect. The Vice President said he felt such a treaty would be a mistake--that it would be an invitation to acrimony and distrust. Ambassador Thompson suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union did not want an agreement of any kind at this time in view of the Vietnam confrontation. Secretary McNamara concurred. Secretary Rusk asked whether there would be difficulties on security grounds in making information available on detection and identification. Dr. Scoville indicated there would be some difficulty because of the sensitivity of the AEDS system, but felt that such problems could be dealt with. General Wheeler observed that he felt that the estimates given by Dr. Frosch with respect to a system of LASA's were overly optimistic. For example, he said he was informed that 16 and not 10 LASA's would be needed. Dr. Seaborg doubted that a system of LASA's could be installed as quickly as had been estimated (in from two or three years). Secretary Rusk inquired as to the cost of the system. Dr. Frosch replied that it would be about $250,000,000. General Wheeler observed that this price would not be excessive if the projected capabilities would be realized, but again expressed his doubts with regard to the estimates of projected capabilities considering the data so far available from the system. Dr. Frosch said the prototype in Montana was not operational yet, but that preliminary indications suggested that it would be as good or better than had been estimated. General Wheeler, with Dr. Seaborg concurring, advised conservatism in the use of estimates on projected capabilities. Secretary Rusk indicated that he concluded: (1) that the atmosphere was presently not encouraging for agreement; (2) that there was no interest on the part of the USSR in grappling with the problem of verification; (3) that the briefing that he had just heard indicated that we still had a verification problem to deal with; and (4) that he did not see that it would be profitable to go through the major effort required in modifying the US position, considering the benefits that could be obtained. He suggested that for the present ENDC our position should remain basically as it is, pending some indication of willingness from the Soviets to deal with the verification problem, but that we should go ahead with technical briefings at the ENDC. He suggested that our problem in connection with a comprehensive treaty was not with such countries as Egypt, but was with the Soviet Union. Mr. Fisher observed that he felt our most immediate problem was with India. Secretary Rusk replied that he felt that the preferred solution there would be along the lines suggested by Fanfani. Mr. Bundy supported Mr. Fisher in his contention that the major immediate problem was India, but suggested that we really do not understand what the Indian position is. He observed that we probably could modify our position on the number of on-site inspections but thought that is a US-Soviet problem that might be best dealt with other than in Geneva. Secretary Rusk raised the question as to why, if it is desirable to stop nuclear proliferation, the non-nuclear powers should not simply go ahead and get together to stop it. Mr. Fisher observed that we cannot take the position that nuclear proliferation is a matter of concern to the non-nuclear powers alone. Secretary Rusk suggested that perhaps a more effective way to prevent India from going ahead with a nuclear weapons program would be to threaten denial of US foreign aid. Mr. Fisher remarked that we had been considering the advisability of a "Sense of the Congress" resolution which would to some degree have had implicit in it such a threat, but that there had been opposition from the State Department to the use of such threats to discourage the Indians. Mr. Fisher argued for the necessity of our taking leadership in attempting to prevent nuclear proliferation and indicated the improbability of our being able to achieve the desired objectives through a non-proliferation agreement, in the light of the difficulties with the Germans regarding the MLF/ANF. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the difficulty was not Germany, but unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union to accept an agreement. In reply Mr. Fisher cited the recent outburst by former Chancellor Adenauer with reference to the Geneva negotiations. Mr. Bundy replied that if the Soviets would accept reasonable language we could certainly sign such a treaty despite Adenauer's opposition. Mr. Fisher continued, observing that the point he was trying to make was that it seemed unlikely that we were going to get a joint US-Soviet non-proliferation agreement very soon (though we could be surprised by Tsarapkin's response next Tuesday) and that, therefore, perhaps we should emphasize other approaches to non-proliferation. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. Fisher to draft some instructions along the lines of the attached summary of conclusions and desired actions./9/ With respect to the question of making available at the ENDC information on detection and identification capabilities, Commissioner Tape noted that we would be giving information on projected, rather than presently reliable, capabilities. His view was supported by Dr. Seaborg. /9/Document 94. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] Secretary Rusk then suggested that he and Mr. Fisher should talk further about whether and how there should be a review of our position on a comprehensive treaty. We could not do this for the present ENDC, but the problem would not die with that session. The Vice President observed that we ought not always to assume that we need come up with a new position and that he did not necessarily agree that because the Soviets have been recalcitrant with respect to verification we should necessarily look for something new. He suggested their attitude could change as it did abruptly in the case of the partial test ban treaty. He indicated his support of the Fanfani idea, and he agreed that it would not be realistic to expect a new Government position between now and September 9 (estimated date of adjournment of the present ENDC). He said we ought not to include in any treaty those things that build distrust, and suggested that a treaty that had no on-site inspections would suffer from that defect. He also strongly opposed a threshold treaty for that reason, and also because it did not do much toward preventing proliferation. Secretary Rusk observed that he felt that not many countries were really very much interested in disarmament. Ambassador Thompson suggested the possibility, assuming neither China nor France would be a party to a treaty, that some day political relations might even change so greatly that China might conduct tests for the Soviets and the French might test US devices.
94. Summary of Actions/1/ Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D), August 28, 1965. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. Subject Matter: Presentation of background material relevant to detection and identification of underground nuclear tests and consideration of possible modifications in the U.S. position on a treaty prohibiting or limiting such tests. Summary of Conclusions and Desired Actions (As stated by Secretary Rusk): (1) For the time being our basic position on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should not be changed. (In the context of the meeting it was clear that it was not the Secretary's intention to preclude the possibility of the number of inspections being reduced or the modalities of inspection changes in the light of technical progress, but rather to indicate that we should continue to hold that any new treaty or modification of the present treaty would have to include provision in it for adequate verification.) (2) We should welcome any indication from the Soviet Union of its willingness to consider seriously a treaty in which there was adequate provision for verification. (3) We should indicate willingness to engage in technical discussion with the Soviet Union on the question of detection and identification capabilities. (4) We should be willing, to the extent that security considerations permit, to make available to interested countries (presumably particularly at the ENDC) information on recent and prospective progress in detecting and identifying seismic events. In conclusion, Secretary Rusk suggested that he and Mr. Fisher get together to explore what further steps should be taken over a longer (than ENDC) time scale in reviewing the U.S. position on a comprehensive test ban treaty.
95. Editorial Note The ninth regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency met in Tokyo September 21-28, 1965. In his message of September 21 to the conference, President Johnson pledged U.S. support of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, page 1010) This message was read to the conference by the U.S. Representative, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in his statement of September 22. (Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1965, pp. 677-682) The conference, among other things, unanimously adopted a revised safeguards system, September 28. (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pages 446-460) Seaborg surveys his activities and discussions in Tokyo, September 18-24 in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 11, pages 347-365. Additional documentation on the meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled for publication in volume XXXIV.
96. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 29, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Peter S. Bridges (ACDA/IR) on September 28. The source text was transmitted through Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson. SUBJECT In the light of my recent conversation with you I am attaching herewith for your approval a position paper on the Latin American nuclear-free zone which discusses at some length the relation of Cuba to the proposed zone./2/ /2/Not printed. The paper calls for me to urge the inclusion of Cuba, which is a sine qua non for some other states in the area and which would involve Cuba's consent to a multilateral verification system in place of our unilateral surveillance to which it now objects; but the paper calls for us to support creation of the zone even if Cuba ultimately refuses to join, since establishment of a zone by other states would exert pressure on Cuba to join it and since the zone would generally be valuable in halting nuclear proliferation. We will shortly be approached in New York by representatives of the Latin American working groups on a nuclear-free zone, who are not perfectly satisfied with the limited statements of our views that we have so far made to them. Your approval of this paper will enable us to expand on those statements. Recommendation: That you approve the attached position paper./3/ /3/The source text bears the typewritten approval of Secretary Rusk on November 10, 1965. Adrian S. Fisher/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Fisher signed the original.
97. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/3 New York, October 1, 1965, 8:30-11:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (LS) and Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S on October 2. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their countries' delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly's twentieth session in New York, September-October 1965. Rusk was in New York, September 26-October 5, 1965. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION
OF New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U.S.S.R. [Here follows discussion of issues other than arms control.] Referring to their previous discussion of disarmament and a World Disarmament Conference/2/ Mr. Gromyko then asked the Secretary if there were any real possibilities of resolving some other matters during the present UNGA Session. /2/A memorandum of their conversation at Secretary Rusk's dinner for Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, September 29, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. The Secretary said that while he did not now want to make an official statement, he did want to express a few thoughts. One of the things that particularly disturbed him in the Disarmament question was the fact that countries other than the US and USSR appeared to have very little interest in resolving Disarmament problems among themselves. He recalled that at the very same moment, a few years ago, when the General Assembly unanimously adopted a Resolution for General and Complete Disarmament, some 70 countries were asking us for military assistance and some 20 countries were asking the USSR for such aid. He noted an almost complete lack of effort on the part of other countries in putting an end to the arms race in the Near East, in Latin America and in other areas of the world. He was hopeful that a limitation of armaments in other parts of the world would eventually be achieved, but was struck by the others' great indifference towards this problem. He had pointed this fact out to some other world leaders in private discussions; it was clear to him that Disarmament was of primary interest to the two great powers only. Did the Foreign Minister, for example, see any possibility of discussing the level of armaments as between Israel and Egypt; would he care to carry on a very private conversation concerning the possibility of limiting the quantities of arms being supplied to other nations by the US and by the USSR? Mr. Gromyko stated his views as to the reason for other nations' lack of interest in Disarmament. He ascribed this to the fact that while many good resolutions had been adopted in the past and many fine speeches delivered, nothing much had been practically accomplished. He was therefore not surprised at the fact that others had little faith in the effectiveness of the various resolutions. The Secretary said that we had, for example, tried to get Egypt and Israel to accept the Vienna safeguards on atomic energy. We had spoken to representatives of each country privately, but it was hard to get one to act before the other, or even together. He thought that if the US and the Soviet Union were to undertake joint efforts in this direction, it might prove to be more encouraging to the countries involved. Mr. Gromyko replied that even if this were so, it would still be difficult for the countries involved to reach the proper decisions since they could see that at the same time everyone else was continuing arms accumulation. He made a distinction between the regional and the partial approach to Disarmament. He did see merits in a partial approach provided it applied to all the countries which were relevant to the problem. As to a regional approach, what possibilities did the Secretary see in that? Secretary Rusk replied that the regional approach might be effective for entire continents, such as Africa and Latin America for example. He informed Mr. Gromyko that since their last conversation the Foreign Minister of Mexico had informed him that he intended to discuss the question of a nuclear-free Latin America with Cuba. He thought a similar approach could be taken with reference to a nuclear-free Africa, provided Israel were included in this region for this purpose, inasmuch as it would involve Egypt. He also thought that the US and the USSR could be of considerable assistance in pressing these countries to agree to a renunciation of nuclear arms acquisition. Mr. Gromyko informed the Secretary that since their last conversation he had tried to ascertain if there were any change in Cuba's attitude toward a nuclear-free Latin America, but that he had not been able to detect any new elements in this attitude. Mr. Gromyko recalled that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for nuclear-free Africa a few years ago, with support of all the great powers./3/ Why should we not now take some steps in the direction of giving judicial force to this resolution; he thought it would have a good effect in improving the international atmosphere. /3/Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI), adopted November 24, 1961; text in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, pp. 29-30. Secretary Rusk agreed that we would be interested in this undertaking. He wanted to talk to Mr. Gromyko privately concerning a strong effort to keep Cairo and Israel from going too far in the arms race, not only in the nuclear field, but also in the matter of other sophisticated weapons. He thought it might be possible to reach an informal understanding to bring pressure to bear upon Israel and Egypt in this respect to limit their arms buildup to certain levels; for the more sophisticated the weapons at their disposal, the more trouble could be anticipated. The Secretary cited the fact that just one squadron of supersonic planes involved costs equal to those of building and maintaining an entire university. Ambassador Dobrynin inquired as to the possible reaction of the two countries. The Secretary cited the suspicion and distrust between the two countries involved; they were unwilling to reach any agreement with each other. He could imagine that some day it might be possible for both the US and the USSR to jointly lay down the status quo in the Near East--to say to the countries involved "here are the borders, here is the settlement, and we will not tolerate the use of force to resolve disputes in the Near East." If the Soviet Union and the United States both made it clear to these countries that we would not accept force, we could establish a real peace in the Near East, so that these countries would no longer be burdened by the arms race. He realized that because of broader questions, there were some difficulties now involved in joint action. Mr. Gromyko inquired as to when this could be brought about. He thought the great powers themselves should first find a way to lessen their arms burdens. The Secretary replied that once we agreed upon what the status quo in the Near East should be, we could make such a policy effective. Ambassador Goldberg referred to the proposal of diverting a quantity of fissionable material to peaceful uses, which he had made in his UN speech at the suggestion of Mr. Foster./4/ Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that the procedure had not been made clear. Ambassador Goldberg said that while he had made the proposal officially, it would be up to the experts to work out the details. He pointed out that the diversion of necessity implied halting the further production of nuclear materials, the transfer of some of the existing stocks to peaceful uses and also the destruction of an appropriate amount of nuclear weapon carriers, although this latter aspect would also of necessity be limited. He assumed that both sides had more than enough weapons at present. /4/Reference is to the statement by U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to the U.N. General Assembly, September 23; text in Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1965, pp. 578-587. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that before his country could agree to the transfer of 40 tons of U-235, the major question of control, including control over industrial installations would have to be resolved. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not consider this proposal to be practical under present circumstances, in fact he considered it to be impossible of implementation. Unavoidably this proposal raised a number of other difficult questions of control; what was to be the scope of control, its depth and techniques? In fact many of the already familiar post World War II questions were being raised by this proposal. The Secretary said he wanted to ask a naive question. Was it possible that the word "control" had somewhat different meanings in the two languages? To us the word did not imply management, direction and the making of decisions. The Secretary mentioned that there was a subtle difference between the meanings of the word "control" as between the English and the French languages; could it be possible that misunderstandings arose because of a difference in meaning between English and Russian? The Foreign Minister did not attach any significance to the linguistic problem. There was practically no difference in meaning. The very earliest discussions on control had made it clear that the problem was not linguistic, but rather fundamental. For this reason he again pointed out that Ambassador Goldberg's proposal touched upon a great many difficult problems. Under present circumstances he could see no possibilities of getting it adopted. Still he thought it would be good if understanding on other practical matters could be reached. Ambassador Thompson remarked that the amount of control required could be relatively small. Mr. Gromyko continued his argument by pointing out that in the event the proposed quantities of fissionable material were diverted and such diversion verified, but due to the impossibility of reaching an understanding on control production of new nuclear weapons were to be continued, nothing would have been accomplished. This proposal was similar to the proposal made by the US several years ago regarding demolition of certain types of military planes. He did not think that the security of his country and indeed that of the rest of the world would have been enhanced by such demolition. Secretary Rusk thought that, on the contrary, in his opinion both countries would have gained something by carrying out the proposed plane demolitions. He reminded Mr. Gromyko of the fact that many weapons, which were obsolete for the US and the USSR were not by any means obsolete for other countries. It would be better to destroy them than to spread them throughout the rest of the world. Both the US and the USSR were often under great pressure to supply other countries with supersonic aircraft which had become obsolete for them, but were quite sophisticated for other countries. He therefore could see an advantage in their destruction. Mr. Gromyko thought it would be simpler not to furnish such aircraft to other countries, if we did not want them to be spread throughout the world. The Secretary pointed out that this question had not been thoroughly discussed and that there were some other considerations. For example, if Egypt were furnished supersonic aircraft, the Israelis would feel they too must have such planes, even though their country was almost too small for a supersonic plane to turn around without violating someone else's border; Israel would then proceed to acquire such planes from France, for example. In other words, there was a certain snowball effect in operation. Perhaps here was a subject--ceilings on sophistication--on which the US and the USSR could reach an understanding. Did Mr. Gromyko think this might be possible, in view of the beneficial effect this would have upon the budgets of other countries. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that the other countries involved would inevitably point to the military budgets of the great powers. He asked the Secretary if the United States estimated that there is any real danger of other countries producing nuclear weapons, that is countries which did not possess such weapons today. He meant not only capabilities, but also intentions and practical steps. The Secretary said it might be useful to exchange impressions on this subject with each other. He was prepared to do so in some detail. As to Egypt, at present that country did not have the scientific, technical and industrial capability of producing nuclear weapons. He thought that Israel did have such capability in view of the advanced state of science and technology in that country. For this reason we had insisted on inspecting their installations periodically. While they were not at present engaged in the production of nuclear weapons, they could do so in the future. As the Secretary had mentioned in his last conversation with the Foreign Minister, he thought Israel was "three months pregnant." The Israelis had assured us that they would not be the first country in the Near East to produce such weapons. It was conceivable, however, that Israel would some day announce that it had developed nuclear weapons, even without having first tested them. We do observe their activities closely. Sweden has the capability of producing nuclear weapons. At the time of signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Sweden had reserved its right to withdraw from the Treaty in the future if it thought its interests demanded such action. We do not believe, however, that they are producing today. They could move rather quickly, however. India probably had the necessary scientific and industrial base for nuclear capability. The Chinese detonations provided a stimulus for India's interest in the subject. Without pointing a finger at anyone, the Secretary wanted to mention that we had been informed that some Indians felt that they had been encouraged by some Soviets to develop nuclear weapons. Our policy has consistently been to discourage this and the Secretary hoped that this was the Soviet policy, as well. He did not believe Indonesia had any nuclear capability; if an explosion did occur in that area, we must conclude that it was of Chinese origin. The Secretary was not fully informed on what had happened in Djakarta today, but he did think it possible that the Chinese would detonate a nuclear bomb in Indonesia. As to Germany, it did possess the necessary industrial and scientific base. Mr. Gromyko interjected that the Secretary must have meant the FRG. He pointed out that there were two Germanys today. The Secretary went on to say that he thought this was true of both Germanys. But he could very frankly assure the Foreign Minister that this would not be permitted to happen, as far as Western Germany was concerned, for if it did, it would break up NATO. We did not see any political possibilities in this direction. These then were the key countries. For reasons of prestige a few other countries had stated their reservations at the time of signing the Test Ban Treaty, Brazil and Switzerland, for example. As to Czechoslovakia, perhaps the Minister knew the situation there. This, then, was the Secretary's assessment of the situation. Mr. Gromyko thanked the Secretary for the information. He said that he completely excluded the possibility that anyone from the Soviet Union had advised India to develop nuclear weapons. If such rumors were indeed current, he would think that they originated from countries which had had relations with India, and perhaps also with the Soviet Union. He did not think that the Secretary really believed such rumors. Such action on the part of the Soviet Union would have been completely contrary to its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He thought that if the position of the US on proliferation was identical with that of the USSR, it would be best to close all channels and all possible ways for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. He emphasized this point again with reference to an international treaty on non-proliferation. The Secretary said in his opinion it was in the nature of nuclear weapons themselves that the country, which possesses them is opposed to other countries acquiring such weapons. As for the United States, we had thought that even one nuclear power was one too many as evidenced by our position in the Baruch Plan in the forties./5/ Certainly, two, three, four or five were also too many. This is a Pandora's Box--we had tried to close the lid. We therefore concluded that in this matter our positions were identical. The Secretary appreciated the Minister's remarks about India and accepted his statement. Recently we had heard the doctrine of proliferation proclaimed from Peiping and Djakarta--statements to the effect that other developing nations in Asia and Africa should be encouraged to acquire nuclear weapons. The Secretary thought it would be useful to clear the decks of lesser problems by putting together a draft of a non-proliferation treaty containing provisions even now acceptable to both sides, and then to see if the Minister's doubts of possible nuclear arrangements in NATO could be cleared away in private discussions, before presenting a proposed treaty to the UN, a draft, in other words, agreed on all points except Articles 1 and 2 of the Soviet draft. We could in this manner get rid of the underbrush before proceeding to the trees. /5/Reference is to U.S. proposals for the international control of atomic energy made by Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946. For text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 865-871. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that in his view these two articles contained the crucial provisions of an effective treaty, but that he would leave this matter up to the Secretary. The Secretary continued by saying that he had in mind an effort to reduce and clarify the issues. For example, how many nuclear powers at a minimum would have to be a party to such a treaty; we had already informed the Minister that we thought three powers to be essential. Mr. Gromyko appreciated the Secretary's explanation, but he did see a real difference in the respective positions on the crucial issue. [Here follows discussion of European security.] The Secretary was particularly interested in general disarmament. Ambassador Dobrynin would notice this clearly next January and February when the Budget is discussed in Congress. We have embarked on a broad program of many social reforms; this means that disarmament has become even more important to us than it was earlier, since we want to be able to push more of our resources into taking better care of our own people. The Secretary therefore could assure Mr. Gromyko of the seriousness of his interest. While he could not speak for France, Great Britain or the FRG, he thought that perhaps there was some advantage in private, quite informal and relaxed conversations without any specific agenda. We would like to see some movement on these problems so as to lighten the tremendous burdens borne by the two countries at present. We would like to see a permanent settlement in Central Europe, which was fully guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States, so as to preclude the possibility of war. Mr. Gromyko noted that the Secretary had several times referred to military budgets; he concluded that this was of major importance to the US; why not then consider once again the possibilities of reducing military budgets? The Secretary pointed out that our two countries were not the only ones involved. We had recently heard some references to the advantages of a foreign policy conducted by the end of a rifle barrel--they come from another part of the world. There was no point in discussing budget reductions with the Soviet Union, to include reductions in the military budget of the country from where these statements came, since the Soviet Union could not deliver. We were of course referring to Peiping. Mr. Gromyko inquired if we would not agree that the US was far more powerful than China. The Secretary replied that in general this was of course true. However, we did have a specific problem on the ground, which had cost us a lot of money--Southeast Asia. We would have much preferred to use this money for peaceful development of many areas of the world, including North Vietnam, as the President had stated in his Baltimore speech./6/ /6/Reference is to President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, April 7. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 394-399. Mr. Gromyko remarked that the sooner the Southeast Asia situation was normalized, the better. In a sense he could see that the US Government was rather pessimistic regarding disarmament, reduction of military budgets and a secure European settlement. He recalled that President Roosevelt had once said we had nothing to fear but fear itself. He wondered whether our pessimism in itself did not now constitute a serious obstacle. The Secretary had two comments to make, one of which did not involve the Soviet Union and another, which did. In the largest historical and geographical sense the US had a compelling interest in peace in the Atlantic and Pacific. During World War II we had agreed with the Soviet Union that our first priority was the defeat of Hitler, but he wanted to remind the Minister that the second priority had involved a very large military effort. Therefore the portion of our present defense budget which pertains to the Pacific does not involve the Soviet Union. If Peiping pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, this would be a different matter, but we are now unable to agree with the Soviet Union on reducing our defense budget without regard to events in the Pacific and without regard to the policies of Peiping. The other problem is one in which the Minister could make a contribution. We realize that when we ask the Soviet Union for verification and control, we are asking the USSR to make a unilateral concession; this is due to the nature of our open society. Verification, control and information needs of the Soviet Union are answered by the very fact that our society is open to the extent of 97 percent of these needs. An additional 2 percent are contributed by the fact that people in our government cannot keep their mouths shut. The final 1 percent is accounted for by Soviet espionage, so that there is nothing unknown about us to the USSR. It is quite a different matter in the opposite direction. The General Staff of the USSR considers secrecy to be a strategic weapon, and people in the Soviet government do know how to keep their mouths shut. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to gather intelligence about the USSR. The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Minister appoint someone in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study ways of how the USSR could provide us with the necessary assurances on verification, etc. The Minister should not ask us to accept this on good faith. It was too soon to expect us to rely on good faith alone--we did need verification, inspection and other assurance. The Secretary wanted to leave this problem with the Minister. We are not trying to pry or control; all we needed was to find some basis of confidence that when we sign an agreement, the result will be what we anticipated when we signed it. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Secretary's references to the policies of China. Did he not think that to a great extent these policies were merely a reaction to the policies of the United States in the Pacific? He, the Minister, was sure this was the case. Another thing was the Secretary's reference to confidence and mutual trust. A minimum of these between the US and the USSR were essential--i.e. a minimum of trust which was not the result of physical checkups, control and verification. For example, in the handling of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty confidence and trust were most important. The Minister thought the Secretary had confidence in the Soviet Union's observance of its provisions and he, for his part, did not believe we were violating the Treaty. He wanted to take up the possibility of extending the Treaty to underground tests as well. A like attitude of trust and confidence would be needed, for example, to implement nuclear-free zones in Africa, Europe and other parts of the world. He did not think that control in itself was an absolute. It related to the specifics of each situation and he did not think this question had been sufficiently explored in relation to specific measures. Secretary Rusk replied that Mr. Gromyko's comment about Chinese policy being a reaction to US policy might be a possible explanation if only Washington had trouble with Peiping. But, there was also trouble between Peiping and Moscow. Ten days ago we had held our 127th meeting with Peiping in Warsaw. For the 127th time Peiping had rejected any kind of discussions with us unless we first were prepared to surrender Formosa. We replied we could not surrender 11 million people. If we were to offer recognition to Peiping tomorrow morning, without Formosa, they would say no. As concerns verification--our need for this is easily explained by the differences in our political system: we must be able to assure our own people that we are confident that certain things are or are not happening. In the case of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty extending to underground tests, we are certain that someone will say "those damned Russians are cheating." We have to be able to say to them: "No, we are sure of our own knowledge that they are not." From our point of view this question of verification is solely a matter of technology. Our policy will follow scientific and technical capabilities in this field. They have been and will be increasing, but they are not as yet adequate to place us in a position to extend the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to underground testing without verification. For this reason we would be very glad to have American and Soviet scientists cooperate on improving the applicable technology. Ambassador Goldberg added that with reference to underground testing he had stated that our position was flexible and that we had therefore invited Soviet representatives to come and see our latest scientific advances in detection, which made it possible to distinguish earthquakes from other explosions within a certain range. The Secretary inquired of the Minister whether he had understood the Soviet position with reference to underground testing correctly, that is that test of a level of 4.75 and above to be added to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and that a moratorium without time limitation be placed upon tests below the threshold. Mr. Gromyko replied that the proposal mentioned in his UNGA speech/7/ was that originally made by the UAR representative in the ENDC./8/ To a further question he replied that the two were of necessity connected. The Secretary stated that we could not agree to a moratorium below the threshold. Mr. Gromyko thought that if anyone would benefit by such a moratorium, it would be the United States, because it had a number of bases on the territory of countries surrounding the Soviet Union, from which any violation of the moratorium could be detected--for example Japan and other countries. The Soviet Union had no such possibilities, hence the moratorium could still be verified by the US. /7/Reference is to Gromyko's address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 24. (Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 436-441) /8/Reference is to the statement by Abdel F. Hassan, United Arab Republic Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, August 17, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 340-347) The Secretary pointed out that when we spoke of national capabilities, we were in fact talking of "international capabilities." These facilities were provided by other countries and if we were to lose some of them our capabilities would be accordingly reduced. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the proposed treaty could include a provision like that in the present Test Ban Treaty, which would make it possible for any signatory state to withdraw if it considered that its highest interests required it to do so. He did not want the Secretary to think that the Soviet Union's interest in this proposed treaty was any greater than that of the US. If we could not reach an understanding, we could go on as before. The reason that he could not separate the moratorium provision from the threshold band was that other nations would minimize the importance of the treaty if below threshold tests were to be continued. The nature of observance of the moratorium would be similar to that of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A certain amount of trust and confidence was needed and unavoidable. The Secretary stated that we were not concerned over the existing Nuclear Test Ban, since we could assure our people that it was being observed. But, if all testing were to be banned, the element of assurance would become extremely important. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that a separation of the two provisions could lead to arguments, such as 4.6 versus 4.75. The Secretary repeated that assurance for our people was indispensable and that we had no reason or intention to be picayune about the magnitude of an explosion. Mr. Gromyko suggested his comment about FDR's statement on fear be reexamined. Ambassador Fedorenko remarked that they were ready to trust us, but that we evidently were not ready to trust them. The Secretary ended the discussion by saying that we needed something to eliminate some of the fear, so that we could tell our people to relax. It was agreed between the Secretary and the Minister to tell the press that they had discussed problems of European security and United Nations problems, including disarmament.
98. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, October 4, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached for your information is a copy of the Soviet draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was submitted to the UNGA with a request that an item on the "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" be included on the agenda of the 20th Session of the UNGA./2/ Also attached are a talking paper for Rusk on the Soviet Treaty and a preliminary analysis of the Treaty by ACDA./3/ /2/For text of the Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, transmitted by letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the President of the U.N. General Assembly, September 24, 1965, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 443-446. /3/Not printed. The Treaty, the substance of which is contained in Articles I and II, clearly rules out the MLF and would also appear to rule out existing bilateral NATO arrangements. Note particularly the use of the extremely restrictive phrase, "participate in . . . use of nuclear weapons," in Articles I and II. Unless there were a clear understanding to the contrary, I would interpret this language to prohibit our existing NATO arrangements. This has always been the point that has worried me as lying behind our debate with the Soviets on the MLF and a non-proliferation Treaty. The question now is whether the Soviets have tabled this draft to answer criticism that they have not been forthcoming with specific proposals and will insist on the details of their draft, or whether the Soviets are simply trying to get a good bargaining position for future negotiations on a Treaty. For example, they might eventually propose to give up the language outlawing our NATO arrangements if we were prepared to give up the MLF. Only time will tell. Spurgeon
99. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is labeled "Part 2 of 6." This meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Stewart visited the United States October 11-14. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U. K. The Secretary suggested that Lord Chalfont and Mr. Fisher exchange views in advance of the meeting on October 14. Lord Chalfont asked whether there was any possibility of going further in linking a reduction of war heads with a freeze. The Secretary replied that there would be if we were engaged in serious discussions with the Russians. The trouble is that we have continued to make concession after concession with no response from the Soviet Union. Ambassador Thompson said that Gromyko had not been encouraging on the subject of the arms race in the Near East but appeared to want to keep the matter open. The Foreign Secretary said Gromyko had not discussed the Near East arms problem with him but had raised the question of denuclearizing Africa. On the matter of extending the test ban treaty the Secretary said the Russians insisted on linking the threshold concept with a moratorium on all other tests. He said that this amounted to an unverified test ban and was unacceptable. The U.S. had proposed technical talks on detection systems. But Gromyko took the position that there could be no inspection for political reasons, and therefore it was unnecessary to hold technical talks on the effectiveness of detecting systems. The Soviets had also been unwilling to talk about the comparability of defense budgets. The Secretary said that progress by mutual example in budget reductions had been interrupted because Peiping had entered the picture in South East Asia. Nevertheless we are seriously interested in disarmament and a mutual understanding of defense budgets in the USSR and the U.S. would be helpful. Secretary McNamara agreed with this. He pointed out that the U.S. had made some defense budget cuts which the USSR didn't understand because they weren't familiar with our complex defense budget system. A full understanding by both governments of the other's defense budget could well lead to practical results in mutual reductions in defense expenditures. Mr. Fisher raised the question of our attitude toward a World Disarmament Conference. We see no merit in the idea but the problem is how to deal with it in the General Assembly. Lord Chalfont agreed that a World Conference could not be an effective forum for negotiations. In view of broad world support for it, however, it would be best to avoid appearing to oppose it while allowing the obvious difficulties in sponsorship etc. to arise without helping to solve them. Lord Chalfont said that Gromyko had made it clear the conference should be outside the UN and should take place by the middle of next year. The Secretary agreed that no good could come from such a conference. He added that it would cause great difficulties with Germany and could endanger the work of the Committee of 18. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |