1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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100. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL), October 29. Thompson informed British Ambassador Dean of the Soviet oral message, allowing him to take full notes, November 6. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary The Ambassador said he had been instructed to make the following statement: "The contents of talks which recently took place between you, Mr. Secretary, and the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko,/2/ were carefully examined in Moscow. During these talks positions of both sides were stated and explained with regard to major international problems and questions of bilateral relations between the USSR and the US. /2/Document 97. "Now we would like to dwell on the question which, in our view, is not only one of the most urgent but appears to be more than other questions ripe for constructive discussion. "Proper attention was given in Moscow to your words that the U.S. Government and personally President Johnson most seriously view the question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons and that the US is anxious to see to it that nuclear weapons would not come into possession of countries which do not have such weapons now. "However, we cannot but feel concerned that while the consideration of the question of preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons has reached the stage of discussion of concrete drafts of an appropriate international agreement, there have been reactivated efforts leading in the opposite direction, towards drafting plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force. "Our position on this question is absolutely clear: we are against any forms and means of dissemination of nuclear weapons, we stand for true and immediate efforts to solve the problem of nondissemination. In no way can we be blamed for taking any steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. We strive for an agreement on an equal basis and seek no special purposes except a firm international understanding to the effect that nuclear weapons should really be not disseminated. If one evaluates the state of affairs objectively, the United States should be no less interested in such an understanding than the Soviet Union. "In this connection we have to emphasize once again that the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force are the main obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. While explaining the position for the U.S. Government with regard to the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force you have repeatedly stated--and you did so, too, in recent talks with A.A. Gromyko--that the United States considers these plans as a means of preventing the emergence of a national nuclear force in West Germany. Yet, the fact remains: the realization of these plans would not keep West Germany further away from but bring it closer to nuclear weapons. This would mean dissemination of nuclear weapons by bringing them within the reach of precisely those forces which have twice in our time plunged Europe and the whole world into bloody wars. "No one should ignore the experience of history and forget what attempts to satisfy revanchist claims of German militarism through one concession after another led to in the past. We would like to stress once again that plans to create a multilateral nuclear force or other similar plans to bring nuclear weapons within the reach of West Germany constitute a problem which directly concerns the interests of security of the USSR and states friendly to us. It goes without saying that in that case the Soviet Union and its Allies would take measures to safeguard their security. But implementation of such plans would exclude the possibility of concluding a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an action would considerably aggravate the situation in Europe and throughout the world, it would greatly damage Soviet-American relations, the state of which, even without this leaves much to be desired. "Now the moment has come when it is necessary to make up one's mind, to make a choice. If the United States intends, one way or another, to put into effect the plan to create a NATO nuclear force, any negotiations on the problem of preventing spread of nuclear weapons become devoid of sense and are doomed to failure in advance. But if the U.S. is really willing to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, it would be possible to start without delay business-like negotiations aimed at working out a mutually acceptable text of a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. For our part, we are ready for such talks. "A hope is expressed in Moscow that these considerations of ours will be carefully examined by the U.S. Government and personally by President Johnson."/3/ /3/A November 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy transmitting a copy of the memorandum of conversation suggests that Bundy send a copy to President Johnson "with a covering memorandum relating it to the current debate within the Government on MLF problems." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, NPT, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) A November 23 memorandum from Thompson to Bundy transmitted an ACDA draft of a reply. (Ibid.) A December 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy states that "attached statement [in reply to Dobrynin], which is consistent with the full range of solutions to the NATO nuclear sharing problem, is acceptable." It bears a check mark and a handwritten note "Hold for trip to ranch Dec. 7." (Ibid.) The Secretary stated he would wish to study the statement in detail, but it did not appear to him that the statement represented any movement in the substance of the question. He said it appeared to him that the Soviet Government was raising obstacles without knowing what the problem really was as they could not know the details of any nuclear arrangements since these had not been worked out. He also observed that it was not clear whether the Soviet draft of a non-proliferation treaty excluded existing NATO arrangements. Dobrynin said that if existing arrangements provided for nuclear proliferation, that the Soviet Union was against them. He said, however, that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss their draft treaty article-by-article. The Secretary said that in conversation with Mr. Foster, Mr. Tsarapkin appeared to make a distinction between delivery vehicles and weapons. Ambassador Dobrynin said that this matter could be looked at and the text of an agreement could be discussed. The Secretary said that one thing that struck him was that the Soviets seemed to be nervous about their security with regard to NATO nuclear arrangements that were more secure and more safe than existing arrangements. Dobrynin observed that this was a matter of judgment. The Secretary said he was being driven to the conclusion that there was something in the Soviet minds other than proliferation. Dobrynin repeated that the Soviets were prepared to discuss both the American and the Soviet drafts. The Secretary concluded by stating that he would wish to study the Soviet message but, at first glance, his impression was that it had not changed the situation.
101. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Beam) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 4, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos of the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by James S. Bodnar (ACDA/IR) and Beam and cleared by Helmut Sonnenfeldt (INR/RSB), Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM), Thompson (S/AL), and Vladimir Toumanoff (EUR/SOV). SUBJECT The following is in reply to your inquiry at the Nov. 4 Staff Meeting:/2/ /2/Not found. To date the Soviet position on what forms of nuclear sharing might be permitted under a non-proliferation treaty remains unclear. Indeed, in the course of US-Soviet bilateral talks on their respective draft treaties, the Soviets have introduced new uncertainties rather than clarified specific issues. It thus appears that by deferring any final definition of an acceptable formula for nuclear sharing and still allowing for the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Union hopes to retain a focus on its objections to nuclear sharing in the broadest sense. Moscow apparently hopes to exert pressure on the U.S. and possibly other Western governments on the eve of FRG Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States and the forth-coming NATO Defense Ministers' meeting. This suggests that while wishing to keep the focus on MLF the Soviets may desire to leave open the option either of retaining some element of potential flexibility on nuclear sharing, or conversely, of challenging present NATO nuclear arrangements should they consider this expedient. The Soviets may have had the latter alternative in mind when on September 24 they proffered their draft treaty at the UN. The language of the draft not only ruled out MLF, but could have been read as prohibiting a Special Committee, existing nuclear arrangements in NATO and perhaps even some in the Warsaw Pact itself. (The Soviets could, however, interpret this language in such a way as to use it against the NATO Stockpile without incurring similar penalties.) Subsequent conversations with Soviet officials conveyed an impression of a degree of possible flexibility on the subject of existing arrangements in NATO. That the Soviets might not be unalterably opposed to such arrangements was implicit in Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin's remark to ACDA Director Foster October 20 to the effect that the Soviet objections were not directed at the deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States in Europe. Pressing him further, Mr. Foster said that Tsarapkin's statement seemed to clarify matters on this point, but Tsarapkin remained silent. The issue of nuclear sharing also arose in the course of your talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 29./3/ In emphasizing the futility of negotiations in the face of efforts to create an MLF, Dobrynin did not raise the idea of a Special Committee but merely referred to Soviet opposition to "any forms and means of dissemination" and to the plans for a NATO nuclear force "or other similar plans" to bring nuclear weapons "within reach of West Germany." Though reluctant to talk about existing arrangements, he did state that if such arrangements provided for proliferation then the Soviet Union was against them. Thus, he again left open Moscow's appraisal of whether a Special Committee or existing arrangements fit the Soviet structures or as something to be decided later. /3/See Document 100. The sum and substance of official talks with the Soviets, leaving aside the more casual encounters with officers of the Soviet Embassy, is that on the one hand the Soviets first stated that they oppose "new proliferation" only, and that if future plans do not contemplate such new proliferation or new access to nuclear weapons, the Soviets would not object; on the other hand most recently they have taken a harder line across the board, indicating that they would find unacceptable any arrangement providing for, or even implying, a form of sharing or participation by non-nuclear parties in policy determination regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster has told me he will wish to report to you in detail on his latest talks with Tsarapkin./4/ /4/Foster met with Tsarapkin in New York October 26 and November 2 for discussion of their respective draft treaties on non-proliferation. Foster reported these discussions in telegram 1577 from USUN, October 26 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4), and in letters to Secretary Rusk, October 26 and November 2 (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Miscellaneous Papers). J.D. Beam
102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 25, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, U.S.S.R., Vol. XI, 11/25-2/66, Box 221. Top Secret. I attach a memorandum of conversation which I had yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin because it seems to me to lend clear force to your Armistice Day request that while we work on the Atlantic nuclear problem, we keep Soviet interests in mind./2/ We will have more on this next week when Ball and McNamara have completed their exploration in London and Paris,/3/ but I begin to think more and more that it is an opportunity for a real Johnson break-through here. It is clear that the Germans no longer really expect that we will support an MLF, and I believe that if you and Erhard could reach a firm agreement in early December, that no new weapons systems is necessary, the way might be open toward a non-proliferation treaty and toward a new collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO./4/ /2/Not found. /3/The NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Paris, November 27, 1965, to review "existing nuclear capabilities and arrangements within the alliance, means to improve Allied consultation concerning the use of nuclear forces, including strategic forces, and ways of improving and extending Allied participation in nuclear policy and planning." (Final Communique, November 27, printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1965, p. 939) /4/The phrase "--both at once" is handwritten on the source text. Dobrynin also raised the question of the pause, and I am doing a separate memorandum on that which will come to you in a day or two./5/ I continue to think that the considerations are very evenly balanced, but I now think there is just a little more to be said in favor of the pause than has yet been fully presented to you. /5/Not further identified. McG. B./6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
Attachment/7/ /7/Top Secret. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows: 1. European nuclear arrangements. The Ambassador raised this subject toward the end of the lunch--which is where he has usually raised the thing most on his mind in our past talks. The moment he raised the question, I told him that I was troubled by the lack of clarity in the Soviet position on ANF and MLF and other arrangements. Sometimes the Soviet Union seemed to be saying to us that it was only the MLF that was objectionable. At other times Soviet representatives seemed to be hostile to all possible arrangements, even those for simple consultation. The Ambassador parried by saying that the Soviet Union had a hard time telling just what we had in mind. He said that he had been unable to satisfy repeated requests from his government for an accurate account of purposes and meaning of the McNamara special committee (even his NATO colleagues in Washington had told him that they honestly did not know what it was all about). The Ambassador said that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to comment on our policy if it knew exactly what that policy was. He said that he knew there was a difference of opinion within the USG as between believers in collective weapons systems and believers in consultation. He said that he had the impression that there was not a firm decision in the USG and he implied that the Soviet Union could not express a fully defined position until it knew what it had to deal with on our side. I pointed out to the Ambassador that this position in turn created difficulties in Washington. We were determined to move ahead with necessary defensive arrangements, while at the same time we worked for the cause of non-proliferation. The Ambassador was certainly correct in believing that different kinds of arrangements were preferred by different groups here, but I pointed out that as long as it appeared that the Soviet Union was equally opposed to all arrangements, it would be hard for anyone in this government to believe the choice we made would have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said very earnestly that he understood this point and that for this reason it would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government if he could have a wholly private and informal indication of the real plans and preferences of the USG as soon as they might be decided. He was sure that such a private indication of our position would be helpful, almost no matter what it was. The Ambassador cited as an example the announcement today of a 700-man reduction in our forces in Berlin. He thought that 24 hours private notice of this decision would have been most helpful in Moscow. I told the Ambassador that I understood the value of private communication. The Ambassador, on his part, assured me that the Soviet Union would have no interest whatever in using any such private communication to undermine our relations with the Germans--he said that he thought we worry too much about that, and that this simply was not the framework within which these matters were reviewed within the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government's concern about the Germans was real and deep, as he had told me often before. The Ambassador remarked that he had often been told by his friends in the State Department that Soviet protests in the nuclear field were merely another example of the Soviet hostility toward NATO, and that he wanted me to understand that this was not the case. Of course, NATO was not a Soviet favorite, but the problem of nuclear proliferation and Germany was far different and much more serious. On non-proliferation, he added, the Soviet Government had exposed itself to severe criticism from quarters he need not name (I inferred China); that should prove its sincerity. I told the Ambassador that we understood the Soviet concern with Germany and that indeed we shared it. I told him that I could give him categorical assurance that there was no one in the USG who had the smallest intention of allowing the Germans to have national control of nuclear weapons, and no one who would support the Germans in any effort to use any German nuclear role as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The Ambassador indicated that he believed me, but he made it equally plain that his confidence was not shared in Moscow. My own private and personal conclusion from this extended exchange, the flavor of which I have not fully recaptured, is that we may well be able to win Soviet acceptance of any nuclear arrangement in the West which does not involve an immediate decision to build a new weapons system like the MLF, and which clearly avoids any increase in direct German access to the nuclear trigger. I believe that both the McNamara committee and the revised ANF now under discussion could meet this condition. I believe that Dobrynin is right and serious in his emphasis upon the value of early private communication with the Soviet Government when we know our mind in this matter. Since in fact no one now wants the MLF, I think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly. In sum, I believe that what Dobrynin said on this subject may open the way for us to meet our NATO responsibilities and move at the same time toward an agreement on non-proliferation. At the very least, the Ambassador's position seems to me to reinforce the importance of the President's stated view that we should approach the problem of Atlantic nuclear defense with a full awareness of the concerns of the Soviet Government. (I should add that I told Ambassador Dobrynin that this was the President's position.) [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, private communication, the Ford Foundation, and habits of the Soviet bureaucracy.]
103. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, December 2, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. The source text is Tab B to a December 3 memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which asks Rusk to get McNamara's concurrence on a draft letter from Foster to the Latin Americans on a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (Tab A). Fisher's memorandum states that the attached draft letter "maintains the pressure for the inclusion of Cuba but, in accordance with the position paper you approved, leaves the way open for subsequent U.S. agreement even if Cuba is not included." For text of the revised letter of December 10, see Document 105. Dear Bill: The Chiefs have reported to me their objection to a statement you made a few weeks ago that the Canal Zone will be included in any nuclear free zone. I understand that this statement, reported in USUN cable 1926 to State,/2/ was based on an ACDA policy paper which was approved by State but which was not reviewed by the DoD./3/ While I realize that current negotiations with the Panamanians may result in significant changes in the status of the Canal Zone, such policy has yet to be approved and in any case such negotiations have not been completed. Therefore, I would urge you not to make any further statements that the Canal Zone will be included. It seems to me that if we are asked our position on this matter, it would be appropriate to reply that pending the outcome of the current negotiations between the Panamian Government and the United States, it does not appear appropriate for the U.S. to take a position on this matter. /2/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9 LA) /3/ACDA paper is not further identified. The Chiefs also object to your statements concerning the inclusion of Guantanamo in a nuclear free zone if Cuba were also included. As long as the Latin Americans continue to assure our air and sea transit rights, I do not believe such a commitment, however unlikely, would affect our security. Furthermore, I understand it is very unlikely that Cuba will join a nuclear free zone. Therefore, our position appears to be based primarily on political considerations. In order not to give Castro an excuse for failing to participate, I would be willing to support the inclusion of Guantanamo in a Latin American nuclear free zone if and only if Cuba is also a member of the zone. Finally, the Chiefs have informed me that they consider it essential that they be consulted in the formulation of any inspection plan since such a plan might affect the current surveillance of the Cuban area. I agree with the Chiefs on this issue and trust that you will provide us an opportunity to review such a plan. Sincerely, Bob
104. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 8, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US Officials Memoranda of Conversation with Leading USSR Officials, 1965. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) December 9, and in S/S-S by John P. Walsh. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary The Secretary said he wished to make the following oral communication in reply to the oral remarks which the Ambassador had made to him on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: "The United States Government has carefully examined the oral statement made by Ambassador Dobrynin on October 29, 1965./2/ /2/Document 100. "The United States Government agrees with the Soviet Government's view that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a mutual interest in reaching an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We also agree that this is one of the most urgent problems and that it is ripe for constructive discussion. Finally, we agree that the objective should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated. As a recently-adopted General Assembly resolution which we both supported declares: 'The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.'/3/ /3/For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, pp. 72-73. "We must point out, however, that as long as the Soviet Union had hundreds of intermediate and medium range nuclear missiles aimed at the territories of our allies in Europe, our allies are naturally going to desire participation in their defense against possible nuclear attack, but without the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For this reason, no non-proliferation treaty which, in addition to barring proliferation, also bars such participation will be acceptable to the United States. We have no intention of signing any agreement which would preclude our allies from participating in their own defense, so long as such participation does not involve proliferation. "We have assured your Government in the past that no proposals for the defense of NATO nations which we have supported would produce proliferation. Our proposals are, on the contrary, designed to prevent it. If, as your statement indicates, you do not accept this conclusion and believe such arrangements could in the future lead to proliferation, then you should join us in negotiating a treaty to prevent proliferation from taking place in any manner. "The United States is prepared to negotiate a treaty, such as the United States draft, which bars dissemination in any form, directly or indirectly./4/ We are prepared to agree that no non-nuclear country acquires nuclear weapons, rational control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or information on how to manufacture nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of States, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Finally, to close any conceivable loophole that might otherwise remain, we are prepared to ban any action which would cause an increase in the total number of entities having independent power to use nuclear weapons. /4/For text of the U.S. Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 17, 1965, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 347-349. "We believe this to be a reasonable basis upon which a treaty could be negotiated, assuming the Soviet Government is interested in such a treaty. We believe it possible to proceed with negotiations promptly, in New York, in Geneva or elsewhere. To expedite those negotiations, Secretary Rusk suggested, and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed, that a beginning be made with the articles of the two draft treaties upon which agreement appears to be close, and such talks have begun. "The United States Government continues to attach the greatest importance to achieving progress on the problem of proliferation, and is ready for constructive discussions to this end." The Secretary added that if the concern of the Soviet side was proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement. We are not, and never have been, thinking about proliferation. We were as opposed to this as the Soviets for many of the same reasons. On the other hand, if the Soviet objection was based on the fact that they did not like NATO, we could not help them. The Secretary said he had not seen the British Foreign Minister yet to see if he has had any further reflections on his discussions in Moscow./5/ He was not certain whether Mr. Stewart would be coming with Prime Minister Wilson or not./6/ The Secretary said that this matter had had the personal attention of the President who was familiar with these discussions. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that he had spent yesterday at the President's ranch./7/ /5/British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited the Soviet Union November 29-December 3 for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. /6/British Prime Minister Harold Wilson visited the United States December 16-18 for talks with President Johnson and other administration officials to address the U.N. General Assembly on December 16. /7/Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy visited the LBJ Ranch in Texas on December 7. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book, 1965) No record of their discussions with President Johnson has been found. Dobrynin asked about the meaning of the word "entities," which was explained to him. After a long conversation on other subjects, Dobrynin returned to the subject of non-proliferation and said that our reply introduced nothing new. The Soviet impression was that we were yielding to pressure from the West Germans. The Secretary said if the Soviets were prepared to concentrate sincerely on proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement. Dobrynin pointed out that we wished to have an agreement but also an arrangement in NATO. He said it would have been easier for the Soviets to have confined themselves to criticizing our draft but they had put in one of their own, to which there was some opposition in Moscow, in an effort to get a solution. They would be prepared to sign tomorrow if the NATO issue could be cleared up. He pointed out that even the NATO representatives in Washington were not clear about the United States position. He said that representatives did not question United States sincerity but did not know what we were really planning. The Secretary said he had told Gromyko that neither he nor we knew what an eventual arrangement might be. Dobrynin said the Germans were now thinking of medium-range missiles. He had discussed this with members of the German Embassy here, who were quite frank about it and they were equally frank in Bonn. He said the Soviets believe that the future of Europe lay in reconciliation. Many Germans, and this had been particularly the case during the time of Adenauer and Dulles, believed that by creating military power of their own, they could get East Germany back. Some of them seemed to think they could exploit Soviet difficulties with China. We were making one concession after another to the West Germans. The Secretary said these questions did not arise in NATO until the Soviets created this enormous nuclear force, targeted on Germany. Dobrynin said that we had moved first in this matter and had put our missiles in Germany and then the Soviets had reacted. The Secretary said we took seriously the matter that the Soviet Union and we had heavy responsibility for peace. We were not trying to mislead the Soviets on non-proliferation, and could not do so in any event. The Soviets, in fact, sat at the NATO table on these discussions but when we ask about the Warsaw Pact we get no answer. Dobrynin rejoined that the Poles had given the Secretary a clear answer by saying they had not asked for nuclear weapons. At this point the conversation turned to other subjects.
105. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (Garcia Robles)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 626-627. The source text is an attachment to a memorandum of conversation between Gerard Gaussen, Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington, and Samuel DePalma, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR, December 15. Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to the Negotiating Committee's request to me on October 26, the following points reflect the attitude of the United States towards the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. The United States supports the creation of nuclear free zones such as a Latin American nuclear free zone, where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone. An effective agreement based on these principals, which were presented by US representatives at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly and reaffirmed by the United States at the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year, would complement efforts to achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As recently as November 22, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk stated before the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro the following: "The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American States. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City. The United States believes the project of a nuclear free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the Hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion."/2/ /2/For complete text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 20, 1965, pp. 985-994. We are aware that the governments of Latin America are now considering certain aspects of the proposed zone in preparation for additional meetings of the Preparatory Commission and its committees. Our final position, of course, will have to await decisions on the nature and scope of the zone. We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers. From the US point of view, we would be agreeable to inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone, although of course the well-established transit rights would not be affected by the establishment of the proposed nuclear free zone. We could also agree to include Guantanamo if Cuba participates./3/ /3/See footnote 1, Document 103. The United States believes it important that all states in the area should participate. The refusal of certain states to participate would lead us to consider whether their exclusion might render the agreement ineffective or meaningless, or whether the agreement would still be worthwhile. The United States heartily approves the proposal of the Preparatory Commission to apply IAEA safeguards to all Latin American nuclear activities, which would permit verification against the diversion of peaceful activities to weapons development. For verification against the introduction of nuclear weapons, we believe that other procedures would have to be considered. The United States understands that such other procedures are under consideration by Governments participating in the Preparatory Commission. In the hope that the governments of Latin America can successfully achieve a viable and workable nuclear free zone, the United States welcomes opportunities to exchange views with the representatives of the Preparatory Commission and the governments of Latin America. Sincerely, William C. Foster
106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, December 23, 1965, 1345Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. 2008. 1. Following is distillation of remarks on nuclear-sharing problem which were interspersed in my conversation last night with Gromyko (Embtel 2000)/2/ on general state of our relations. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL US-USSR) 2. Leaving question of Vietnam which we had been discussing, Gromyko said he wished to address question of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Soviet Government believed, he said, that it was not too late to remedy this situation. In common with UK, USSR and other countries, we should not allow nuclear weapons to spread. Time would come when we too might regret our current policy. USSR was resolutely opposed to FRG's access to nuclear weapons in any form, but believed this to be not just in Soviet interest but in interest of all major powers. Referring to his statement to recent meeting of Supreme Soviet,/3/ Gromyko said Soviets believed that door to solution of this problem was not yet closed and they would not like to see it closed. It seemed to him that President Johnson should now address himself with greater sympathy to their position on non-dissemination. /3/Reference presumably is to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's address of December 9 before the Supreme Soviet. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 454-456 and 494-497. 3. I said that I had always felt our interests were basically the same on non-proliferation, and I referred him to communique issued at end of Erhard visit which I thought served interest of non-proliferation./4/ I made point again that Soviets should understand interest of peoples, who had missiles targeted against them, in sharing in their own defense. I was glad to hear him say that door was still open, and I hoped we could make progress when the meetings in Geneva resumed. Our view was the same, I repeated, on point of not allowing additional political entities to gain control over nuclear weapons. Our differences related to means of accomplishing this purpose. /4/Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States December 19-21 for talks with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and other government officials on December 20-21. The joint statement issued following discussions with Chancellor Erhard is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167. 4. Gromyko responded by warning that if by any chance we reached agreement with FRG on access, including access on "political plane," to questions relating to use of nuclear weapons, that would close door to agreement on non-proliferation and Soviets would have to take necessary steps looking to their own security and that of their allies. In meantime, reports had appeared, Gromyko said, that de facto decisions had been taken to give access to Germans "on political plane." If this were so, truth would [come] out sooner or later and this would eliminate possibility of non-proliferation agreement. 5. I pointed out that this got down to question of definition, and asked Gromyko to clarify whether in his remarks on this subject to Supreme Soviet he had been referring to present arrangements. Gromyko replied that what he was talking about was the nuclear committee idea, which they considered unacceptable. For the Germans to take part in preparation of nuclear strategy would, he said, be considered access. When I remonstrated that this had nothing to do with access, he insisted that "if a country has a means of taking part in decisions on use of nuclear weapons, this is access." 6. I said I believed we were following more realistic policy on this matter than they were. If a country, whether it was a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, had hundreds of missiles trained upon it as Soviet leaders had publicly said was case with respect to FRG, wasn't effect of this to exert pressure on them to secure their own in absence other defense arrangements? If Soviet Government was going so far as to consider that political consultation constituted "access," they were putting tremendous pressure on a country to get its own weapons. While Soviets focussed on Germany, it seemed to me that Soviet position barring political consultation had still broader implications for countries like India which had nuclear capability plus a hostile neighbor on its border. Gromyko protested that this was introducing unrelated question. 7. I told Gromyko that I appreciated his willingness to discuss these issues frankly with me, and that I would carefully report his remarks. Kohler
107. Draft Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 11, 1966, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR). The conversation was held in Ball's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin called, at his request, on the Acting Secretary. He said he wished to present a personal message from his Prime Minister to President Johnson on the subject of non-proliferation./2/ The Ambassador noted that the message was confidential and that it was being handled in the same way as previous confidential communications between Soviet leaders and the President. Although the original text in Russian was not signed, the Ambassador reiterated that the message was from the Soviet Prime Minister. He handed to Mr. Ball an unofficial translation in English of the Prime Minister's message. /2/Document 108. After reading the message, the Acting Secretary said that it would be transmitted to the President at once and that a reply would be prepared. The Acting Secretary commented that we have a difference of view with the Soviet Government with regard to what we consider as the same purpose, namely, that the FRG should play a constructive role in Europe and not a destructive one. In this connection, our stand is conditioned by the effects of efforts in the past to stabilize the situation in Europe. If we are to prevent developments which could lead in the direction of destroying Europe, we must make it possible for non-nuclear powers to exercise some influence in the control of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the energies of these powers might be channeled in harmful directions. The Acting Secretary said that he was sure this line of argumentation was familiar to Ambassador Dobrynin and he regretted that we have not been able to persuade the Soviet Government of the correctness of our views. The Acting Secretary emphasized that we do not envisage a situation where a German Government would have the possibility of making an independent decision to detonate nuclear weapons. We see three alternatives in regard to the control of nuclear weapons: 1. Attempt to maintain a situation where the powerful nations already possessing nuclear weapons do not share their nuclear power with others and keep non-nuclear countries in a state of permanent inferiority. 2. Allow countries not having nuclear weapons to develop nuclear capability on an independent, national basis. We consider this a disastrous course. 3. Establish a collective arrangement where control over nuclear weapons would be shared and no new independent capabilities would be created. We feel that this offers the best prospects. The Acting Secretary said that we are very sincere in desiring non-proliferation and that we have given great thought to our policy in this regard. He did not know if it would be possible to reconcile the United States and Soviet views but he assured the Ambassador that the Soviet message would be studied carefully.
108. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. A January 12 memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that this message seemed to renew the "pen-pal" correspondence. TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE HANDED ACTING SECRETARY
OF Dear Mr. President. We have decided to address this communication to you in order to set forth our views on a question, the urgency of which is recognized by everybody. This question is the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has been discussed for a long time on a bilateral basis and at international conferences, but the solution of which has not progressed so far. The Soviet Government, as you undoubtedly know, attaches great significance to the program of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We believe that if the dissemination of these terrible weapons of mass destruction is not blocked and these weapons continue to spread more and more throughout the world, that would inevitably lead to the growth of the threat of war and would immeasurably increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Having in mind the importance of this problem the Soviet Government submitted it for consideration by the twentieth session of the UN General Assembly, by introducing a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are aware of the official position of your Government on this question. We have taken note of the statement of the U.S. Government, transmitted on December 8, 1965, through Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that it is interested in reaching an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and that "the objective (of such an agreement) should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated."/2/ We also note that the U.S. Government agreed that such a treaty, as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1965, adopted at its twentieth session, "should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form."/3/ /2/Document 104. /3/Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 73) If one proceeds from these statements it would not seem to be very difficult to work out a mutually acceptable text of a non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The American draft treaty and even more steps actually taken by the U.S.A. indicate that the Governments of our countries by no means give the same content to the very notion of "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." The Soviet Government has in mind such a treaty which would really exclude the possibility of any dissemination of nuclear weapons whatever which would make it impossible for non-nuclear powers to acquire access to these weapons in any form, directly or indirectly. As for the Government of the U.S.A., our understanding is that while declaring its readiness to reach an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has in mind an agreement which would provide a significant exception to the principle of non-proliferation by permitting the implementation of plans, now under discussion within the framework of NATO, for providing access to nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear member states of this military alliance, including West Germany. It is precisely this that is the main difference between the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government has frequently drawn the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that statements on striving to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons are in no way compatible with actions actually leading to the spread of such weapons. We have invariably emphasized, since we have most weighty reasons for doing so, that what is especially dangerous is a policy of satisfying step by step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government, creating thereby conditions which make it easier for the West German revanchists to get access to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is a fact that the U.S.A. on an evergrowing scale provides the FRG and the other NATO allies with atomic information. It is a fact that the U.S.A. trains military personnel of those countries in the methods of using nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the U.S.A. provides some of its allies, including the FRG with the very weapons which are capable of carrying nuclear shells, although it declares at the same time that the nuclear warheads for such weapons remain under the control of the U.S. Moreover, as it was recently reported in the Western press, American nuclear warheads are now not only assigned to the armed forces of several non-nuclear member-states of NATO and deployed on their territories but in some cases West German planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel are even equipped with these nuclear warheads. There are going on in NATO and at bilateral meetings of representatives of Western powers active discussions of various plans, the essence of which, no matter what might be said, is only one thing: how and to what extent to satisfy the growing nuclear demands of West Germany. A new concession to West Germany which creates obstacles on the road to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the proposal providing for the FRG's participation in decisions on the question of nuclear strategy in NATO within the framework of the so-called "McNamara committee."/4/ /4/Secretary of Defense McNamara suggested the establishment of a select committee of four or five members reportedly including France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris May 31-June 1, 1965. A Special Committee of the Defense Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany met at Paris, November 27, 1965, for this purpose. It set up three working groups concerned with communications, data exchange, and nuclear planning under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the participating countries. See Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1965, p. 993, and December 13, 1965, p. 939. And today the Bonn Government is now putting forward new claims and is getting ready to demand even more tomorrow. The final goal pursued by the West German Government is obvious, although it tries meanwhile to camouflage it, is the possession of nuclear weapons. Frequent attempts have been made to convince us that West Germany allegedly has no such goals and its access to nuclear weapons is not involved. But what is left of these assurances if the Defense Minister of the FRG von Hassel openly states that West Germany will not be satisfied until it possesses atomic weapons, and other Bonn leaders now publicly say that the FRG will not sign a non-proliferation agreement if it blocks the creation of a NATO nuclear force. Thus, the FRG Government in effect challenges the whole world, the United Nations, which called for earliest conclusion of a treaty to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons. And how can one evaluate statements by the head of the West German Government that during his recent visit to the U.S.A. he received not only a promise to provide West Germany with "appropriate participation in nuclear defense"/5/ of NATO, but also agreement that the settlement of NATO nuclear problems would be given priority over the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty? /5/The phrase "appropriate participation in nuclear defense" is in the Joint Statement issued December 21, 1965, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167) These statements by leaders of the FRG Government were not refuted by the American side although their meaning is at variance with the position of the U.S. Government as it was stated to us in the communication of December 8 and earlier statements made to us by official representatives of the U.S.A. Moreover, the Western press has carried a report that the United States indeed gives priority to NATO nuclear plans in the belief that the non-proliferation agreement can wait, since even if these plans should be resolved, the Soviet Union allegedly would not abandon its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In connection with such baseless speculations we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that no matter what intentions the United States and other Western powers may have in connection with those plans now under discussion in NATO, the Soviet Union will never agree that West Germany should acquire access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. No matter how one evaluates the FRG's policy,--we know that your assessment of this policy differs from ours,--one thing is clear: the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons would create a direct threat to European states and would cause a new, sharp aggravation of the whole international situation. The Soviet Government has already unequivocally stated that if the FRG got access to nuclear weapons either through a multilateral or an Atlantic nuclear force, on the basis of creating some "atomic committee" or in any other form, the Soviet Union would be forced to take all measures which it, along with its allies and friends, would consider necessary for securing peace in Europe. This is a question of the vital interests of the Soviet Union, and we not only have the right but believe it to be our duty--this stems from the Potsdam agreements as well--to prevent West Germany from becoming the source of a new war. Now, Mr. President, the moment has come, when it is necessary to make a definite choice: either we shall firmly adhere to the position of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without any deviations from this position or the situation will inevitably lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is said that this whole question is still under consideration by your Government and that final decision has not yet been made. We would like to believe that this is so. Knowing that the decisive word on this rests with you, we hope that you will personally devote the most searching attention to this question. The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is so important that it is necessary once again to weigh with utmost responsibility all possible consequences of the decision to be made. It would be a mistake in this matter to try to derive some unilateral advantages. A non-proliferation agreement must meet in equal measure the interests of all countries and all peoples. For its part, the Soviet Government, consistently standing for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, is ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare such a non-proliferation treaty. Taking into account the considerations put forward by the American side in the statement of December 8, we propose that during the forthcoming session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, along with the discussions of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Committee itself, representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. carry on a bilateral exchange of views in order to expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty.
109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-28-66 Washington, January 13, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject Files, Disarmament, 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), Vol. II, Box 13. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A January 14 cover memorandum by R.C. Bowman, transmitting a copy of the source text to McGeorge Bundy, states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "strongly oppose any new test ban proposal at this time," because the likely Soviet development of an area anti-ballistic missile system could reduce the U.S. strategic deterrent capability to a dangerous level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted continued testing for several years and at the same time improvement in detection capabilities to an adequate level for monitoring a test ban. SUBJECT 1. (S) In response to the request by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-28246/65, dated 23 December 1965,/2/ subject as above, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided on a memorandum by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to Members of the Committee of Principals, dated 17 December 1965, proposing a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),/3/ as amended by a second memorandum, dated 29 December 1965, subject: "Addendum to December 17, 1965, Memorandum on 'Test Ban Proposals'(U)."/4/ /2/Reference is to a cover memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Adam Yarmolinsky to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler requesting his views on the ACDA memorandum of December 17, 1965, to Members of the Committee of Principals, which proposed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), Nov.-Dec. 1965) /3/Not printed. (Ibid.) 2. (S) A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Military Implications of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was forwarded by JCSM-348-65, dated 11 May 1965, subject: "Draft Message to Soviet Leaders on Disarmament (S)."/4/ Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ACDA proposals for a comprehensive test ban and a threshold ban were forwarded by JCSM-601-65, dated 5 August 1965, subject: "Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (U)."/5/ Many of the previous views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have relevancy to the current ACDA memorandum. The Appendix to this memorandum restates and amplifies previous positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which are germane to this issue./6/ /4/Not found. /5/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), Aug. 1965) /6/Not printed. 3. (S) The ACDA memorandum proposes that, at the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) on 27 January 1966, the United States attempt to negotiate a CTBT. In the event that the USSR is unwilling to permit the on-site verification necessary for a CTBT, the United States should then propose an extension of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to underground tests with a seismic threshold of 4.75 without inspections. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the foregoing references concerning a CTBT remain valid and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a CTBT would prejudice the national security interests of the United States at this time. The views concerning a 4.75 TTBT follow. 4. (S) The ACDA memorandum assumes that the United States could verify a threshold test ban using its existing national system and would rely heavily on unilateral US intelligence to identify suspicious events. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the United States Intelligence Board (USIB),/7/ have consistently stated that US intelligence capabilities should not be used as a primary means of verification of any arms control measure. Seismology, at best, can identify some seismic events as earthquakes; it cannot now identify seismic events as nuclear detonations. For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their position that a separate means of verification, including on-site inspections, should be established and in operation on the effective date of implementation of any such proposal. /7/TCS 3236/65/USIB-D-32/12/3; available in SAO channels. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there will be inadvertent violations of such a treaty and many suspected violations because of the uncertainties and possible ambiguities associated with monitoring. For this reason, they believe that such a treaty may well create more suspicion than it dispels and may increase international distrust. 6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the effects of a TTBT upon the strategic nuclear balance may be sufficient to justify rejection of the ACDA proposal. The United States must approach any nuclear test ban from a position of strength. Although it may be accepted that the United States enjoys a favorable strategic position, this advantage is threatened by the deployment of a Soviet ABM system. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system, must remove known vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems, and must develop an advanced re-entry system, such as Multiple Individually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). To realize these goals, tests beyond those permitted by the proposed test ban are required. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] 7. (S) While ACDA acknowledges the importance of a hot X-ray ABM system, the argument set forth by ACDA appears to be that the USSR does not possess the needed know-how to exploit this potential capability and that further restriction, at this time, could freeze the USSR and US ABM race. The NIE statement, "there is no evidence that [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] is not sufficient assurance in this case. The USSR has had the opportunity to discover this and other effects under the present treaty as well as in their 1961/1962 high-altitude, high-yield tests. These latter tests might also have uncovered effects we know nothing about. We cannot assume that the USSR knows less than the United States about these effects. 8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there may be political advantages to the United States signing a TTBT, such as a limited impact on proliferation. However, there are important political disadvantages which, with the military disadvantages, are overriding in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They concur with the consensus of the Committee of Principals in the 25 August 1965 meeting in which it was noted that the imprecision inherent in monitoring such a treaty may lead to disputes, suspicion, acrimony, and distrust. 9. (S) On balance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the ACDA proposal would prejudice the security interest of the United States. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to a threshold treaty as proposed because: a. There are no provisions for policing a TTBT effectively. b. Primary responsibility for verifying compliance with a TTBT would have to rest with Atomic Energy Detection System and US intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as USIB, believe that these sources should not be relied upon for verification nor should they be so employed. c. The inexactitudes of the science of seismology, as it applies to nuclear detonations, preclude a definite and unarguable policing of a TTBT. Such a treaty may lead to disputes, suspicion, acrimony, and distrust. d. The TTBT would prevent the development of high-yield area defense ABM systems, as well as advanced re-entry warheads. e. A TTBT would prevent rectification of serious vulnerabilities in existing US ballistic missile forces. f. A TTBT would have a debilitating impact on the ability of the United States to maintain a competence in nuclear weapons technology. 10. (U) The ACDA memorandum states that a modalities paper for on-site inspection will be circulated for comment at staff level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their desire to make recommendations on any on-site inspection procedures prior to their being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /8/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |