1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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110. Abstract of the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals/1/ Washington, January 14, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2557. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The report contains a transmittal letter from Panel Chairman W.G. McMillan to General J.P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, USAF, January 14. Also attached is a cover memorandum from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to members of the Committee of Principals (JCSM-78-66), February 3, stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the U.S. Air Force as the executive agent to establish a panel for an independent analysis of technical problems relating to test ban proposals to evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints. In responding to the JCS request for an analysis of the technical aspects of nuclear test ban proposals, the Panel has focused upon the effects which either a Comprehensive Test Ban or a 4.75 Threshold Ban would have upon the keystone of US National defense: the strategic deterrent. Three areas of critical vulnerabilities, which if exploited by the Soviet Union would seriously compromise our deterrent, have been discussed in the context of the underground nuclear tests required for their correction. Upon examining the capability of the Soviets to exploit these vulnerabilities the Panel concluded that We have no evidence whether or not the Soviets have already achieved the necessary nuclear developments, but if not, even a comprehensive ban could not prevent their acquisition. To maintain our deterrent, our best course is to pursue with all vigor the programs now in progress for eradicating these vulnerabilities. Many of these programs involve underground nuclear experiments. The Panel therefore further concluded that From the standpoint of our current and planned military-technical programs the present is a particularly disadvantageous time for the US to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement. Looking forward to the future and the obvious continued need for a high level of competence in nuclear technology to maintain our deterrent, we see as one of our greatest potential losses that Under a comprehensive test ban our scientific and technical competence in nuclear weapons design and in weapons effects would deteriorate substantially in about three years and be seriously degraded in ten. [2 paragraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified] Turning to proliferation, which has been advanced as one of the principal motivations for extending the Limited Treaty, we find that On a purely technical basis, for a country bent on becoming a nuclear power, the lack of testing would inhibit the development of thermonuclear weapons and light-weight fission weapons, but could not prevent the development of primitive but effective fission weapons. After a section dealing in some detail with what might be done if a Treaty extension appears inevitable, the report attempts to answer the four specific JCS questions (Section X). Finally, a summary and list of major conclusions is presented. [Here follow a Table of Contents, the text of the report, and three appendices.]
111. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-37-66 Washington, January 15, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27. Top Secret, Restricted Data. SUBJECT 1. (S) In response to an oral request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 6 January 1966, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided on the position paper in the Appendix hereto, prepared by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)./2/ This paper recommends that the United States press for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) when it reconvenes on 27 January 1966. /2/Not printed. 2. (S) A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Implications of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was forwarded by JCSM-348-65, dated 11 May 1965, subject: "Analysis of Comprehensive Test Ban (U)."/3/ Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ACDA proposals for a comprehensive test ban and threshold ban were forwarded by JCSM-601-65, dated 5 August 1965, subject: "Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (U)."/4/ These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain valid and are relevant to the current ACDA position paper. /3/Not found. /4/See footnote 5, Document 109. 3. (S) The ACDA paper proposes that at the resumption of the ENDC on 27 January 1966, the United States attempt to negotiate a CTBT, providing for an unspecified number of on-site inspections. The number of inspections would be subject to negotiation but would have to be sufficient to give confidence that the treaty was being observed. On-site inspections would be conducted in accordance with a modalities paper prepared by ACDA. In the event that the USSR were unwilling to permit the on-site verification necessary for a CTBT, the United States would then propose an extension of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to underground tests with a seismic signal of 4.75 or higher without inspections. 4. (U) The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Threshold Test Ban (TTB) have been provided by JCSM-28-66, dated 13 January 1966, subject: "Test Ban Proposals (U)."/5/ The ACDA memorandum states that a modalities paper for on-site inspection will be circulated for comment at staff level. This paper has not been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it is emphasized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to make recommendations on any on-site inspection procedure prior to it being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. /5/Document 109. 5. (TS) There are serious gaps in hard US intelligence about the state of Soviet research in the newest weapon effects areas known to US scientists. However, there are indications that the USSR already may have made important gains in nuclear weapons technology beyond US capabilities, which could alter the military balance. Such gains may have occurred in their knowledge of weapon effects causing communications and radar blackout; they also may include advances in the area of enhanced gamma, cold, and hot X-rays for antiballistic missile (ABM) and offensive applications. This technology may introduce important vulnerabilities in the US strategic missile systems. 6. (TS) It is believed that the Soviets have begun to deploy an ABM defense; however, it has not yet been determined whether the defense will be an area or terminal system, or a combination of both. USSR deployment of an ABM system capitalizing on advanced nuclear technology (which the Soviets may possess), combined with improvements in strategic weapon design and potential counterforce actions which exploit US vulnerabilities, could upset the nuclear balance in favor of the USSR. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system, must remove known vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems, and must develop an advanced reentry system. These developments require vigorous nuclear testing which can be accomplished within LTBT restrictions. 7. (TS) It is important, from the standpoint of ability to monitor a CTBT, to assess whether there is a minimum yield below which crucial military gains could not occur through clandestine testing. [3-1/2 lines of source text are not declassified] Vigorous exploitation of low yield (less than 1 KT) techniques as a sole means of weapons development, if successful, could lead to important technical gains conceivably capable of changing the nuclear balance. As a practical matter, the yield below which crucial military gains could not occur through nuclear testing is unknown. 8. (S) The current US Atomic Energy Detection System can, with acceptable confidence, detect nuclear explosions in most environments at thresholds of approximately 10 KT in the Northern Hemisphere and as high as 100 KT in the Southern Hemisphere. If current improvement plans prove out, a reasonable capability can be expected in 2 to 3 years to detect signals from a 5 KT nuclear test in almost all environments in the Northern Hemisphere and 60 KT in the Southern Hemisphere. Testing below these levels may go undetected, and, with decoupling and evasion techniques, tests well above these yields may also go undetected. 9. (TS) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose a CTBT as not in the security interest of the United States. The United States must approach any nuclear test ban from a position of strength. Although it may be accepted that the United States enjoys a favorable strategic position, this advantage is threatened by the probable deployment of a Soviet ABM system and the important advances that the Soviets have probably made in weapons effects technology. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system and must remove vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems. To realize these goals, substantial underground testing is required. Additionally, verification procedures in being and projected are insufficient to insure that under a CTBT the USSR could not conduct sufficient tests to achieve important advances in nuclear technology. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to make recommendations on proposed on-site inspection procedures prior to their being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
112. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 19, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by William F. Miller (ACDA/IR) on January 27 and approved in ACDA/D. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this conversation was held at the British Embassy. Memoranda of two other conversations, January 19, are ibid. No memoranda of the January 20 conversations were found. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. Lord Chalfont considered that inability to make headway on a non-proliferation treaty at Geneva would make some movement toward a test ban desirable. The Canadians shared this view. A comprehensive test ban would also contribute to non-proliferation objectives. The U.K. considered that as a result of progress in seismic detection the risks involved in a comprehensive test ban without on-sites were so small as to be politically acceptable. The U.K. would, however, continue publicly to support the U.S. position, despite growing pressures at home. Lord Chalfont asked whether the U.S. saw any possibility of a comprehensive test ban without on-sites. If not, perhaps further thought might be given to suggestions for an international "detection club" or to the concept of "challenge inspections" suggested in the ICY report. Mr. Foster said that at this time there was no possibility of the U.S. abandoning its insistence on on-sites. "Challenge inspections" would introduce elements of such great instability as to make any test ban concluded on these bases less than useful. Mr. Foster said that consideration was still continuing within the USG of a half-a-loaf approach, including a threshold test ban. He did not feel that there was much basis for optimism as to the results of our consideration, however. In any event, the U.S. remained firmly opposed to any linking of a threshold ban and a moratorium. The U.S. had devoted considerable research to ways of simplifying on-site modalities and making them less intrusive, and it was not impossible that at some stage the Soviets might return to accepting some form of on-sites. Mr. Fisher elaborated further on the subject of "challenge inspections." He doubted whether they would have a strong deterrent effect against violation. If, as the ICY report admits, it was unlikely that the Soviets would admit inspectors into their territory anyway in response to a "challenge," it hardly seemed just that the onus for initiating withdrawal from the test ban would have to fall on the innocent party. A test ban based on "challenge inspections" would also have considerable de-stablizing effect in US-USSR bilateral relationship. Referring to studies on a threshold test ban, Mr. Fisher said on a personal basis that three main problems seemed to be involved: a) whether a threshold ban would have practical value if the USSR and countries such as India could still test under the threshold; b) whether it might seriously inhibit countries from going nuclear; and c) to what extent it would prevent us from doing what we want to do. Mr. Fisher asked for U.K. views on the possible inhibiting effect on non-nuclear states of a threshold test ban or even of the offer of such a test ban. In short, would it be worthwhile even to propose one? Lord Chalfont replied that in his opinion a threshold test ban would not have much concrete effect; its real value would be mainly tactical. However, the whole question of acceptability of a test ban seemed to be viewed on the U.S. side in absolute terms. The U.K. considered that the danger of breach of agreement on extension of the limited test ban to all tests was very small, since seismic capabilities were now so highly developed that a country would have to go to great lengths to conceal even very small underground tests. He realized that there were political factors that the USG had to take into account. A more important question, however, was whether the U.S. was able to give up underground testing. Mr. Fisher replied that he did not believe the U.S. could agree to cease underground testing unless the broader implications for other areas of some Soviet acceptance of the principle of verification made it worthwhile. However, for us to accept a cessation of underground testing without obtaining any change in the Soviet position on inspection would simply generate mistrust and suspicion of possible violation. Mr. Fisher recalled the atmosphere that had prevailed during the moratorium. Mr. Barber, describing DOD's interim conclusions on the effects in the bilateral US-USSR context, of cessation of underground testing, said that the U.S. would not be able positively to identify some 4-6 Soviet underground tests if they were to be conducted elsewhere than at presently known Soviet test sites. While the number of tests would be small, what was significant was that the few tests of these yields conducted in the U.S. test program had been very important for ABM warhead development. The question, therefore, was whether the U.S. could risk an agreement under which the Soviets might carry out such tests to their military advantage. Lord Chalfont said the basic question was whether it was likely the Soviets would sign a test ban if they intended to violate it. Mr. Fisher noted that our open society was incapable of the kind of secrecy that the Soviets could maintain, so that we could safely proceed only on the basis of what we could find out through verification. Lord Chalfont said that he was quite content to wait and see whether some movement might be possible on the U.S. side. A threshold test ban at magnitude 4.75 would be valuable for tactical and presentational reasons and could have some significance for non-proliferation. Sir Harold Beeley/3/ commented that the U.K. saw some advantage in "challenge inspections." Acceptance of this concept by the Soviets would involve admission by them that the only way of proving innocence is by on-site inspection. He thought that this would be a valuable gain for the West. Furthermore, he thought that if a challenge inspection were refused, it would be relatively easy to fix odium for the withdrawal on the adversary. Sir Harold further suggested that it might be possible to combine a threshold test ban with challenge inspections. Mr. Foster said that we would want to give study to Sir Harold's suggestion. /3/Deputy Head of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Sir Harold also thought that a threshold test ban might be strengthened if it were indicated that in time the seismic threshold could perhaps be lowered. Mr. Barber asked whether this would really be negotiable or was simply a suggestion as to possible tactics. Sir Harold replied that otherwise it might be difficult to defend a threshold ban offer against the argument that if it was possible to lower the threshold this far then why not all the way, that is, to zero. Mr. Foster said that we would give careful consideration to the British views. The test ban question could be discussed further by the Western Four in Paris, and it was also certain to come up at the NAC meeting. Lord Chalfont concluded that it would be very helpful to the U.K. if the U.S. could come forward at Geneva with a proposal of this sort (i.e., threshold test ban), since the British government was under some pressure at home to give up demands for on-site inspection.
113. National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-66 Washington, January 20, 1966. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament, Box 1. Secret; Controlled Dissem. 22 pages of source text not declassified.]
114. Summary of Action/1/ Washington, January 21, 1966, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. An attached list of participants is not printed. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's conference room. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS Draft of Proposed Presidential Message to the ENDC/2/ /2/A copy of the proposed Presidential message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is attached to the January 20 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy on the upcoming meeting of the Committee of Principals, January 21. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966) REFERENCE /3/Not found. 1. The paper used as a point of discussion for the meeting was the draft of the proposed Presidential Message to the ENDC, attached to the Memorandum referred to above. 2. Mr. Bundy suggested that the reference to "sophisticated" weapons be deleted from the Seventh item of the message because of our use of such weapons in Vietnam. It was agreed that the third sentence of the message should refer to an exploration of ways to limit arms competition among the countries concerned. In later discussion, General Goodpaster/4/ stated that, while the JCS supported the measure described in paragraph Seventh, they questioned whether it should be described in a Presidential Message. Mr. Barber said the DOD view was that this was a matter of tactics, not of basic position. Secretary Rusk thought it useful to have a Presidential endorsement of the idea (1) to put pressure on the many countries which have urged disarmament by the great powers, and (2) to show that the United States does not intend to stimulate arms competition between smaller countries. He added that he thought Congress was likely soon to take the U.S. out of much of the arms sales business anyway. Secretary Rusk indicated his belief that while the Soviet Union and the United States sincerely desired some form of arms limitations upon themselves, there was a great deal of hypocrisy about disarmament by many others. /4/Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Goodpaster suggested that the measure not refer solely to developing countries, which was agreed. Secretary Rusk suggested that an understanding among supplying countries be sought. Mr. Foster indicated that part of the plan was to seek some such understanding about not supplying costly prestige weapons to certain areas of the world. 3. Secretary Rusk suggested that the message, or Mr. Foster's first speech to the ENDC, should refer to the fighting in Vietnam. Mr. Foster read from testimony on that point he had given that morning to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee./5/ This testimony was to the effect that the great differences with the Communists over Vietnam made our common interests in preventing nuclear spread and curbing the nuclear arms race all the more important to pursue at the ENDC. Secretary Rusk agreed with this but suggested that the draft message also indicate that Vietnam was an obstacle to disarmament, or that the burden of armaments had increased because of the war there. He asked that the message include a statement that the United States Representative would be prepared to discuss, outside official channels and with other representatives to the ENDC, any avenues toward peaceful settlement of Vietnam. Such a settlement would permit a reduction of the burden of arms. The Vice President said we would be ignoring facts of life if we did not recognize the impact of Vietnam on the disarmament discussions. /5/Foster's testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 21, 1966, is printed in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series): Volume XVIII, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 1966 (Washington, February 1993), pp. 105-131. 4. General Goodpaster urged the elimination of paragraph Fourth of the draft message. This paragraph repeats prior proposals for a comprehensive test ban. The JCS objection was twofold: (1) no adequate system of verification had yet been devised; (2) even if verification were possible, recent scientific analyses show that information on hot x-rays which might help solve ABM and related problems may be available to the Soviets (although not to the U.S.) and could be exploited to the disadvantage of the United States. Chairman Seaborg explained that if this were so, and if we tested up to several hundreds of kts underground, the United States could also make progress in this area. Mr. Barber pointed out that there was no agreement within the government or within the intelligence community as to the recent analyses referred to by General Goodpaster. He reported Secretary McNamara's view that further analysis of the data should be made before any drastic change was made in the United States position. Secretary Rusk concluded that deletion of paragraph Fourth would reverse a Presidential decision made long ago. In his view our position should remain the same while making the further analysis desired by Secretary McNamara. Chairman Seaborg and others agreed. 5. General Goodpaster urged revision of the last sentence of paragraph Fifth (cutoff and transfer) so that it would refer to verification by "on-site inspection." It was agreed that the message should be revised to refer to "effective inspection." 6. General Goodpaster suggested that the last sentence in paragraph Sixth (freeze and reductions) should be revised to delete the reference to "issues involved in both a freeze and the reductions which could accompany a freeze." It was agreed that this be revised to "issues involved in both these proposals." 7. Chairman Seaborg suggested that paragraph Second relating to IAEA safeguards be amended to add a phrase to the effect that the non-proliferation treaty should itself provide a specific undertaking that such safeguards be applied to peaceful nuclear activities. Commissioner Tape said this would mean dropping out all of paragraph Second after the first sentence. Mr. Foster objected to a Presidential message urging that language be included in the treaty which we knew the Italians and the UK would object to before we had an opportunity to consult with them. Mr. Fisher was also concerned about deleting the remainder of the paragraph because of the importance of this language to the Government's effort to secure adoption of IAEA safeguards in other ways than through a non-proliferation treaty. After an exchange about the Senate debate on the Pastore non-proliferation resolution,/6/ Secretary Rusk suggested that the draft Presidential message endorse the Senate's discussion. The Vice President reported a discussion with Pastore before the resolution was introduced. Although he had agreed with Pastore that the resolution was a good idea, the Senate's position was now being interpreted as contrary to that of the Administration. He felt it useful therefore that the Presidential message refer with approval to the resolution. /6/Reference is to S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., introduced January 18, by Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) and adopted May 17, 1966, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution supporting the President's efforts to negotiate a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. (Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 306-307) 8. Chairman Seaborg objected to some of the language in paragraph Fifth and several other drafting changes were suggested by others present. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that there should definitely be a Presidential message to the ENDC. He asked that the draft be amended to reflect the comments made at the meeting and submitted to the White House for final drafting changes.
115. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 21, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Chairman Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy. Dear Dean: It has just come to my attention that proposals for transferring enriched uranium to West Germany and Italy for military rather than civil purposes are under study in the United States Government. Since such transfers would seriously affect both our efforts to broaden the coverage of international safeguards in non-nuclear countries and our efforts to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty, I feel I should give you my preliminary views on these proposals. I suggest that before any decision is taken to negotiate such an agreement with West Germany or Italy, there should be full discussion of these ramifications at the staff level among the Department of State, ACDA, AEC, DOD, and any other interested agencies. As you know, it is the current policy of the United States, as a key part of our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, to endeavor to broaden the coverage of international safeguards on nuclear facilities in non-nuclear countries. As part of this policy, we are transferring U.S. bilateral safeguards to international safeguards and urging other countries to do the same. In my view, the United States should not enter into agreements with any non-nuclear country to supply nuclear material for military purposes until: (a) We have considered thoroughly the serious problems which would arise directly and indirectly from establishing such a precedent, including the effects on our efforts to persuade other supplier countries not to make analogous transfers, and the effects on our non-proliferation treaty negotiations. (b) We have thoroughly explored alternative ways of meeting the desires of the requesting countries. With respect to the specific requests now under consideration, there would appear to be possibilities for working out such alternative arrangements. If, after consultation with all interested agencies of the government, it were to be determined that it is in the net interests of the United States to enter into any such military agreement with a Euratom country, I believe that we should carefully consider at least imposing a requirement that the transferred material be subject to the application of Euratom safeguards in addition to U.S. bilateral safeguards. While this would not eliminate all of the problems that such a military transfer would pose for the United States, it would somewhat reduce the extent to which the transfer would undermine our policy of promoting international safeguards on transferred nuclear material. While I recognize that Euratom safeguards now cover only non-military activities, I think we could probably persuade the country concerned to request and receive Euratom inspections designed to assure that the nuclear materials in question are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. If this were not done, a precedent would be established for a troublesome "loophole" in the application of the Euratom safeguards system to non-nuclear countries. I believe that both Euratom safeguards and other alternatives should receive our full study before a final decision is reached. Sincerely, Bill
116. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13. No classification marking. A January 24 cover memorandum to another copy from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that "this is the message to Mr. Kosygin as delivered by Ambassador Thompson at 3:00 p.m. today." (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 13) A January 23 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, transmitting the draft of this letter, reads in part as follows: "This letter now has the agreement of Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Foster and myself. We have managed to find language which gives a little more reassurance to the Soviet Government on nonproliferation than we have managed before now, while at the same time it fully protects our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us. The major contribution is George Ball's definition of proliferation in the fifth paragraph. That definition is a shade more binding than the language we have used before now, but it is entirely consistent with everything we have said to the Germans." (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13) My dear Mr. Chairman: I should like, first of all, to congratulate you upon your role in bringing together the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan at Tashkent and upon the agreement achieved there./2/ As you know, we encouraged both India and Pakistan to adopt a constructive attitude at these discussions. I am sure you share my view that the agreement leaves many difficult problems between these two countries unresolved, but progress toward peace anywhere is to be welcomed. /2/Reference is to the Agreement between India and Pakistan for a Withdrawal of Troops in Kashmir and Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, signed at Tashkent, U.S.S.R., on January 10. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 681-682. I regret that I am unable to report even a modest step toward peace in Vietnam as we have had no significant response from the other side. I am, of course, aware of the position of your Government in this matter and I refer to it only to express my disappointment that the efforts of the United States to stimulate the first moves toward peace in that unhappy area have been met merely by a public repetition of rigid positions which are known to be impossible for us to consider. I have read with care your letter on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on January 11, 1966./3/ I appreciate the forthright statement of your views and welcome this opportunity to respond frankly to some of the points on which our views differ. /3/Document 108. You have emphasized the great significance which your Government attaches to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The long-standing concern of the United States with this problem has been amply shown by the major initiatives we have taken, beginning with the U.S. draft non-proliferation declaration which was given to Ambassador Dobrynin by Secretary Rusk in April 1963./4/ The latest U.S. proposal was the draft non-proliferation treaty presented at the disarmament talks in Geneva on August 17 last year./5/ We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has also presented a draft treaty at this last session of the General Assembly./6/ /4/See footnote 3, Document 85. /5/See Document 92. /6/See footnote 2, Document 98. In order for us to approach a meeting of the minds on this question, I think we must first agree on the meaning of the concept of "proliferation." We believe that "proliferation" results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national capability or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. This is the reasonable meaning of the term. It seems to us that we are much more likely to reach an understanding by agreeing to a precise definition of "proliferation" such as this than by attempting to discuss the question in terms of such a loose concept as "access." If you agree to the above definition, you will, I believe, recognize that the United States has shown its willingness to enter into an agreement that would effectively forbid proliferation. Our willingness is based on the strong conviction that it would be contrary to the interests of the United States if any presently non-nuclear nation were to acquire such a right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. In this respect, I believe that your interests and ours coincide. Since you have concentrated your comment on the Federal Republic of Germany, let me make it clear that this position applies to the Federal Republic of Germany as to all non-nuclear powers, and is so understood by the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, I must also make clear that we are not prepared to enter into any agreement that would deny our allies the possibility of participating in their own defense through arrangements that would not constitute proliferation. The situation would be different if the European member states of NATO were not presently threatened by nuclear weapons. But the unhappy fact is that the Soviet Union has many hundreds of missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the territories of these nations. Under those circumstances our allies have a vital and just interest in participating with us in their defense. That is the purpose of NATO and that purpose is steadfast. None of the defense arrangements under discussion between the United States and its NATO allies would involve relinquishment of nuclear weapons to the national control of a non-nuclear country, now or at any time in the future. They are entirely consistent with, and indeed reinforce, the principle of non-proliferation. To deny the possibility of such arrangements might only promote proliferation by encouraging states to develop national nuclear forces for their own protection. Moreover, if because of unwarranted Soviet concern over possible NATO defense arrangements our two governments failed to act together to meet the real threat of proliferation which looms in other regions, that threat might spread even to Europe. Our two governments would bear a heavy responsibility. Some of the comments in your letter show a misunderstanding about the effectiveness of the control that the United States maintains over its nuclear weapons. Our physical and legal arrangements are and will remain such as to insure beyond doubt that these weapons will not be used without the consent of the United States Government. I can assure you that the concerns you express on this point are groundless. It would be helpful to me to have a similar assurance with respect to the arrangements you may have with any of your allies as to which you have not provided us with any information. I have noted your comments with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. I must take strong exception to your unwarranted use of the epithet "West German revanchists" in relation to the Bonn Government. The Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken a treaty commitment never to use force to achieve reunification or modification of its present boundaries, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes in which it may become involved./7/ The Federal Republic of Germany is the only nation in the world that has renounced the production of atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons on its territory./8/ Chancellor Erhard has stated as recently as last month that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intends nor desires to acquire national control over nuclear weapons. As stated in the communique following his visit here in December, Chancellor Erhard and I firmly believe in the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons./9/ There is no conflict between this principle and the understanding that we reached during his recent visit that there should be continued discussion between our countries and with other interested allies to work out arrangements to assure NATO members an appropriate share in nuclear defense. /7/Reference is to the Declaration by Chancellor Adenauer, recorded in the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, London, October 3, 1954; text in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 422. /8/Reference is to Protocol III on the Control of Armaments, signed at Paris by the Foreign Ministers of the Western European Union (including the Federal Republic of Germany), October 23, 1954, to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948; entered into force May 6, 1955. Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 979-984. /9/See the joint statement issued on December 21, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167. There can be no question of priority between arrangements for such defense and a non-proliferation agreement since they are not in conflict with one another. I can assure you that any arrangements we may conclude within NATO will not result in proliferation. You can satisfy any concerns you may have on this score by joining with us in a treaty that would prohibit all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States stands ready to sign such a treaty now. To expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty, I accept your proposal that representatives of our two governments exchange views during the forthcoming session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The U.S. Representative will be authorized, in his capacity as Co-Chairman, to conduct such an exchange of views with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It is my hope that the opportunity thus afforded will be fully utilized to remove any further misunderstandings that may hinder the achievement of a mutually acceptable draft non-proliferation treaty. My Government will make every effort toward that end. I would also hope that, while giving urgent consideration to working out a non-proliferation treaty, the Co-Chairmen will also renew their consideration of other measures that could contribute to halting or limiting the nuclear arms race. For if the treaty we seek is to receive the widest adherence, we must take account of the view expressed by a number of non-nuclear countries. They have made clear that their renunciation of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by evidence that the nuclear powers are themselves prepared to halt the nuclear arms race. Our Governments have a strong mutual interest in acting together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in achieving a closer understanding on other means to curb the nuclear arms race. I want to assure you of my earnest intention to make the exchange of views that is about to take place in Geneva a fruitful one and to contribute to the successful outcome I am certain both of us deeply desire./10/ /10/Printed from an unsigned copy.
117. Editorial Note The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held two sessions at Geneva in 1966--January 27-May 10 and June 14-August 25. President Johnson's message, which was read to the conference by U.S. Representative William C. Foster on January 27, proposed a seven-point program: (1) a nuclear nonproliferation treaty; (2) application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes to nonnuclear states; (3) strengthening international security arrangements for nonnuclear states; (4) a verified halt in fissionable materials production for weapons along with demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons and transfer of their nuclear materials to peaceful purposes; (6) a freeze on numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and (7) halts in regional conventional arms races. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 92-94. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reach agreement on these matters during the period under review. Its report covering the period January 27-August 25, 1966, was issued as U.N. document A/6390.
118. Telegram From the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)/1/ Geneva, February 16, 1966, 1323Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6. Secret; No Distribution; Eyes Only. A February 16 cover memorandum from Fisher to McGeorge Bundy states that the telegram arrived by special channel because of the reference to the President's January 24 letter to Kosygin. Fisher added that he was sending a copy to the Secretary of State. Gen 064. Re Foster/Tsarapkin meeting, 10:30 am today. In response to Tsarapkin's question on amended language for Article I, described more fully in regular reporting cable this date,/2/ Foster said that President's letter went further than before in clarifying our purposes/3/ and amendments were designed to assure that the Treaty itself was consonant therewith./4/ Foster said that as the President's message to Kosygin made plain we envisaged no plan which would involve relinquishing control over U.S. weapons. Foster read following from President's message: /2/Telegram 1464 from Geneva, February 16, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) /3/Document 116. /4/Reference presumably is to U.S. amendments to the U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, subsequently presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 21. (Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 159-160) "Our physical and legal arrangements are and will remain such as to insure beyond doubt that these weapons cannot and will not be used without the consent of the United States Government. I can assure you that the concerns you express on this point are groundless." Tsarapkin then took text and read back to Foster following: "Chancellor Erhard and I firmly believe in the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no conflict between this principle and the understanding that we reached during the recent visit that there should be continued discussion . . . to work out arrangements to assure NATO members an appropriate share in nuclear defense." Tsarapkin then said that obviously the U.S. continued to want to establish a new category of nuclear weapons state as evidence by continued emphasis on nuclear sharing with FRG. Tsarapkin then further said that as long as this was the U.S. position it would be impossible to make progress; on contrary, if U.S. would but sign and accept the Soviet Articles I and II Soviets considered that no access could take place and we could thus achieve non-proliferation together. Please inform Secretary.
119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, February 20, 1966, 12:38 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Text received from the White House on February 20. This text is apparently a White House revision of the draft text transmitted by memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson, February 19. (Ibid.) 4853. For Amb. Bruce From McGeorge Bundy. The following message transmitted directly to Prime Minister Wilson from the President is for your information and requires no action. Begin Text: As you leave for Moscow, I want to share my thoughts with you on one further problem that you may have occasion to discuss with the Russians./2/ This is the problem of relations between the negotiations on non-proliferation and our efforts to get an agreed Atlantic nuclear policy. I think we have to walk a careful line between contending groups which would give one or the other of these related problems an overriding priority. /2/British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Minister of State Lord Chalfont visited Moscow February 22-24 for talks with Chairman Alexei N. Kosygin and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev. See Documents 121 and 122. The Soviet Government continues to assert that any form of cooperation with Bonn in the nuclear field is dangerous. While this position may in part reflect a genuine concern about the Germans getting control over nuclear weapons, it is also plain that the Soviets are seeking to use the issue as a means of causing trouble in the NATO Alliance. The main point of Soviet tactical pressure in the coming weeks is likely to be the language of the non-proliferation treaty. They will be pressing for language which would bar what they call "access" to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. Their evident purpose is to foreclose the possibility of nuclear arrangements in NATO which would involve the Germans more intimately in the business of nuclear defense. We are inclined to think that the best way to counter the Soviets on this--and to get on with a constructive treaty--is to focus discussion on the true meaning of proliferation, and, at the same time, to convince Moscow that we will not sign a treaty which would rule out NATO nuclear arrangements which would not, in fact, involve proliferation. In our new draft treaty,/3/ we have suggested that proliferation results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national control, or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. In addition, there should be no increase in the number of states and organizations which have control of nuclear weapons. In general, the draft represents an attempt to come to grips with the real problem of proliferation without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear members of the Alliance. /3/See footnote 4, Document 118. In any case, I think it most important that we not let the Soviets maneuver us into a position which would arouse strong and honest resentment in Germany. To let them do this would be no service to the cause of non-proliferation, since it would increase the very dangers the Soviets constantly stress. The Soviet Government is surely not blind to one further aspect of this matter--namely, that there is, on this issue, a pronounced difference of emphasis between your public opinion and ours. They are bound to see advantage in trying to exploit that difference to set us against one another. We must be careful not to fall into that trap. My own view is that we should keep an absolutely evenhanded view of these twin problems. A sound non-proliferation agreement and a sound Atlantic nuclear policy are in truth mutually consistent and reinforcing. I do not accept the argument that we must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty. But I think we should equally reject the notion that we can push aside the Alliance problem now, and go along with a treaty which would rule out, or drastically narrow, possibilities for a NATO nuclear arrangement which would not result in proliferation. On non-proliferation, we can meet the legitimate interests of the Soviet Government because they are the same as our own. But we must not let the Soviets use this most important issue to undermine German confidence in our willingness to treat their nuclear problem seriously and constructively. This course naturally tempts some in Moscow, but it is no more in the Soviet interest than in ours. I thought it would be useful for me to give you this indication of my own thinking, because of the great advantage which comes to us both when we stand together. I hope you will have a good trip and I send you once again my best wishes for success in your effort to get Soviet help in reconvening a Geneva Conference. I am doing what I can to keep the public discussion here from complicating your task, but it is an understatement to say that I do not control it completely. End Text. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |