1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
|
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
|
120. Letter From the German Charge d'Affaires (Lilienfeld) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 25, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A cover memorandum by Francis M. Bator, which transmitted this letter to President Johnson on February 25, states that Chancellor Erhard was concerned that the recent changes in the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty "will narrow the possibilities for NATO nuclear arrangements involving hardware." Bator stated that "we will be able to reassure the Germans on this score." My dear Mr. President: Chancellor Erhard has asked me to transmit you the following telegram: [Here follows the German text of the letter.] "Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of 12 February in which you informed me about the result of your Honolulu talks with the leaders of the South Vietnamese Government and about American intentions regarding future economic support for South Vietnam./2/ I have read your message with close attention, and I may assure you that the German Government, too, in conformity with our talks in Washington, is looking for ways and means to afford South Vietnam effective assistance in the non-military field. /2/President Johnson's February 12 letter to Chancellor Erhard is in circular telegram 1531 to 15 Embassies, including Bonn, February 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Special Correspondence File, Germany, 6/25/65-2/25/66, Box 17) I have followed with great interest the reports on the presentation before Congress of the United States Government's position. I would congratulate you on the obviously deep and convincing impression which your Government's explanation of its policy has made. The purpose of my present letter is above all to expound to you my views on the Geneva negotiations concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I was able to explain to you during our meeting in Washington,/3/ the German Government shares your wish that it may be possible to halt the peace-threatening spread of weapons of mass destruction. /3/See footnote 4, Document 106. Naturally, we must in this connexion give thought to problems affecting our own security. The basis of our security is the confidence in the Atlantic alliance and in particular in the declarations made by the U.S. Government within the alliance. I have particularly appreciated that you received my ideas about the development of a joint nuclear force within NATO which I put before you during my visit to Washington, with positive understanding. Provided that this plan will be realized, we are prepared, as repeatedly stated, to envisage further international commitments in the nuclear field. In view of the security requirements of the alliance we have welcomed the draft treaty submitted by your Government on 18 (sic) August 1965/4/ as an important contribution towards solving the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. We have now noted that your Government intends to make some changes in the wording of the draft treaty which, in the American view, are not supposed to affect the substance of the treaty./5/ /4/Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 347-349. /5/See footnote 4, Document 118. On examination of the changes proposed by your Government doubts have, however, arisen whether the amendments envisaged would not in fact narrow down the present possibilities of the alliance to settle the nuclear question. Thus, the new wording in particular raises the question whether it is still beyond any doubt that the establishment of a European nuclear force, in which majority decisions on the use of the weapons could be taken, remains possible. Furthermore the new wording of Article II of the draft seems to exclude the cooperation of non-nuclear countries in the atomic armaments production of nuclear states and thus to block certain perspectives which the German Government would not like to see given up in view of future possibilities of European-Atlantic cooperation, however remote they may be at present. Generally speaking, we feel that the new draft because of its complicated wording may give room for misinterpretation, a possibility of which the Soviet Union may avail itself to the detriment of the Atlantic alliance. Thus the Soviet Government might argue that the use from German soil of tactical nuclear weapons under the command of SACEUR was not admissible, even after a general release by the U.S. President. This would make an element highly significant for NATO defense a subject of discussion with the Soviet Union. I would be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if another exchange of views could take place between your Government and the German Government on the extremely important question of how the objective of nuclear non-proliferation could best and most effectively be attained. Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration. m.p. May I in this connection once again express the hope that political developments in 1966 will allow you to visit Europe including Germany. You may be sure of the enthusiastic concurrence of my countrymen. Mrs. Erhard and I would be extremely glad to welcome on that occasion Mrs. Johnson as well. Very sincerely, Yours (sgd) Ludwig Erhard." Respectfully Yours, Georg von Lilienfeld
121. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, March 2, 1966, 2116Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, London, and Warsaw and pouched to all other NATO capitals. 5414. Subject: NAC, March 2: Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. 1. This message reports Chalfont's briefing of NAC on his and Wilson's discussions in Moscow last week./2/ (Other aspects Moscow talks and NAC disarmament consultation covered septels.)/3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 119. /3/See footnote 3, Document 122. 2. Most important aspect to come out of Chalfont briefing and subsequent discussion in NAC was that "moving target" is being presented by Soviets and their allies so far as defining what proliferation really means in NATO context. As brought out by Chalfont and Cleveland, Soviets seem to have moved from defining proliferation as FRG sharing in ownership, to FRG access, and now to FRG "association" with nuclear arrangements. Chalfont pointed out that Polish rep at ENDC on Mar 1 went one step further by objecting "to any increased influence in the Western alliance by the FRG." 3. Following are highlights Chalfont presentation on Moscow talks: He said Kosygin spoke of the one "insuperable" obstacle to non-proliferation treaty as the whole complex of nuclear sharing problems. Kosygin was harder and more vigorous than other Soviet spokesmen, and made clear, with no ambiguity, that so long as NATO contemplates any arrangement bringing the FRG into closer association with nuclear weapons, there will be no chance of a treaty. Soviets totally rejected UK views that nothing contemplated in NATO involves proliferation. Soviets said we are trying to bring the FRG into closer association and this constitutes a "political proliferation." (In reply to question from Alessandrini (Italy) as to origin of phrase "political forms of proliferation," Chalfont said this term originated with Gromyko.) Soviets specifically said it would do no good to suggest that consultative arrangements are acceptable, since this too is proliferation. 4. Chalfont, expressing his distress over Soviet attitude, said it is up to US to assess whether this is negotiating or final position. When pressed for his personal assessment, Chalfont said he thought Soviets are serious in wanting non-proliferation agreement, and that they will finally, after long process, accept NATO nuclear arrangements which we can make clear do not constitute proliferation. However, Soviets are aware of differences within NATO, see an opportunity to make trouble within Alliance, and will play this as hard as possible. 5. At this point Cleveland commented that Soviets have presented moving target on what they might accept in sharing arrangements (para 2 above). He was not, however, clear as to whether Moscow talks threw any further light on Soviet attitudes toward existing NATO arrangements in Europe, which their treaty draft seems to exclude. Chalfont replied that he could make only general comment that Soviets seemed not to wish to attack existing arrangements, although he pointed out that UK was careful not to raise this specific point in Moscow. 6. Concluding, Chalfont agreed with moving target description, saying that Soviets are broadening objections from technical to political forms of proliferation. He described this new Soviet position as totally untenable and unnegotiable. We must therefore see whether it is only a negotiating position. In these circumstances the prior and urgent need is for East-West agreement as to what a non-proliferation treaty would bar as proliferation. It appears, said Chalfont, that while we can proceed with discussions at Geneva, this is a matter for specific, high-level political decision. Cleveland
122. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State/1/ Paris, March 3, 1966, 1950Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, Geneva, London, Moscow, and Warsaw. Pouched to all other NATO capitals. 5463. NATUS. Subject: NAC March Two: Other Disarmament Matters. In addition discussions reported Embtels 5414/2/ and 5416,/3/ following additional disarmament subjects raised on occasion Lord Chalfont briefing of NAC. /2/Document 121. /3/Telegram 5416 from Paris, March 2, deals with North Atlantic Council consideration of Chairman Kosygin's proposal in his February 1 message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to include, among other provisions in a non-proliferation treaty, "a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." (Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 9-13) At the NAC meeting on March 2, Ambassador Cleveland, the U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council, said it was important to point out at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that the Kosygin proposal was "unsatisfactory in order to avoid leaving the field open for the Soviets to exploit their proposal." He stated that the United States "thought it best to shoot for a UNGA Resolution" and he "suggested best venue for any further discussions would be Geneva, leaving to NATO its continuing work on improving Western security arrangements, including the nuclear variety." (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) 1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Chalfont reported meeting a blank wall in Moscow so far as any Soviet flexibility on CTB is concerned./4/ UK told Soviets they are eager to extend TBT to underground testing, but state of detection and identification art is such that a small number of on-site inspections would still be necessary; however UK indicated number of inspections open to discussion. Soviet reply was that they too were anxious for extension of TBT, but that any monitoring would have to be external. If West insisted on on-site international inspections, discussion was completely blocked. /4/See footnote 2, Document 119. When Chalfont tried to probe regarding acceptability of suggestions such as those from Egypt and Sweden (challenge inspections), Soviets show no spark of interest. Chalfont said they would not discuss any variations. Chalfont said this Soviet attitude was reflected at Geneva. 2. Freeze and Reduction of SNDV's. Chalfont reported Soviets extremely hard on this point. They describe freeze as involving inspection without disarmament and said that only safe way to approach this problem is to abolish SNDV's entirely. 3. Nuclear Free Zones. In response Norwegian question, Chalfont said this was discussed only briefly in Moscow. While both sides agreed NFZ's in Latin America and Africa would be useful step, they disagreed completely so far as Central Europe concerned. UK made clear any progress in Central Europe would have to be made in context of general political settlement, including reunification of Germany. Cleveland
123. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 18, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) on March 19. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR At a luncheon which the Secretary gave for Ambassador Dobrynin today, the Secretary raised the question of peaceful uses of atomic energy which had been previously discussed at the luncheon which the Ambassador had given for the Soviet delegation on Cultural Exchanges on Wednesday, March sixteenth./2/ The Secretary gave the Ambassador a pamphlet on possible uses of atomic energy for the construction of a sea-level canal to replace the present canal in Panama./3/ He said, of course, that our interest extended beyond this and there was a possibility of building ports in countries which needed them and other uses of this sort. He pointed out that one of the issues which arose was that of radioactive debris getting into the atmosphere as a result of operations for such purposes. The Secretary said we would be prepared to have technical talks with a view to exchange of information in this field, as well as discussions concerning the relationship of peaceful uses to the limited Test Ban Treaty. The Secretary said he was not making any proposal but simply thinking out loud and said he could imagine the possibility of some sort of machinery by which the Soviet Union and the United States could assist countries interested in using nuclear energy in peaceful projects. He said it seemed clear that neither side would wish to let others have access to its nuclear devices, but he understood that there could be the possibility of observation to make clear that the operation was the peaceful one it purported to be and not a test of an atomic weapon. /2/The March 16 memorandum of the conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy on peaceful use of nuclear explosions states that Thompson proposed U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union in this field in accordance with the memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy which Chairman Seaborg and Chairman Petrosyants concluded in Moscow in 1963 (15 UST 631). Thompson told Dobrynin, "I assumed that we would proceed by each appointing a group of scientists to get together to discuss the problem and to exchange information." (Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) /3/Not further identified. The Ambassador asked if Panama had given its consent to the use of nuclear energy for the construction of a new canal. The Secretary did not answer this question directly but mentioned that several possible sites were under consideration, both in Panama and in other countries. The Ambassador said that he would discuss this matter with his Government when he returned to Moscow.
124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 2, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Typed notes on the source text read as follows: "Signed original hand carried to President 4/2/66." "Approved by President 4/2/66. Announcement made by President 4/3/66 [sic]." This memorandum apparently was generated by a memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker (L) and Joseph J. Sisco (IO) to Secretary Rusk, April 1. (Ibid.) SUBJECT Recommendations/2/ /2/All three recommendations have been checked as approved. 1. That you announce, as a U.S. initiative, proposals for a treaty to govern activities on the moon and other celestial bodies. A suggested statement is contained in Enclosure 1./3/ /3/Not printed. The draft statement is identical to the statement issued May 7 except for a change of the preposition "on" to "of" in the last sentence. See Document 127. 2. That Ambassador Goldberg (a) circulate the announcement to U.N. Members in New York, and (b) propose a meeting of the appropriate United Nations committee to take up our proposals. 3. That Ambassador Thompson inform Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a day or so in advance of the U.S. announcement and urge an affirmative Soviet response. He will give Dobrynin a brief paper outlining the basic elements for a treaty to be covered in the U.S. announcement. Discussion Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. General Assembly on December 18 that the U.S. would make a definite proposal for a treaty governing activities on celestial bodies./4/ We are not ready to put forward such a proposal. I believe doing so would constitute a constructive U.S. initiative. It would emphasize once again our interest in international cooperation in outer space, and it would signal the progress of this country in moving toward a manned lunar landing. /4/Reference is to the statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1965. (Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, pp. 163-167) We have cleared with other Executive Branch agencies the text of a draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Enclosure 2)./5/ This treaty would bar claims of sovereignty to the moon and other celestial bodies, guarantee freedom of scientific investigation and free access, and call for international cooperation in studies relating to celestial bodies. The treaty would prohibit military fortifications, military maneuvers, weapons tests, and stationing nuclear weapons on a celestial body. /5/Not printed. This draft treaty is virtually identical to the one Ambassador Goldberg transmitted to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on May 9, cited in Document 127 except for one substantive difference. Article 3 of this draft contains the following sentence that is not in the later draft: "A State conducting or planning to conduct activities on a celestial body shall provide reasonably in advance of each mission, notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." I think the best way to move ahead is to make an announcement publicizing the principal elements of the proposed treaty. Later, when negotiations are begun, we will be ready to discuss with other governments the text of treaty provisions. Dean Rusk/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
125. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, April 13, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Test Ban Treaty, Box 11. Top Secret; Eyes Only. SUBJECT Attached are what appear to be some afterthoughts by two members of the nine-man scientific committee which turned out the McMillan Report./2/ These comments will be distributed to the Committee of Principles in the near future. /2/A March 9 letter from Marvin L. Goldberger and Franklin A. Long, members of the McMillan Panel, to General J.P. McConnell, USAF Chief of Staff, enclosed their comments on the McMillan Panel report (Document 110), concluding that the report correctly identified vulnerabilities of the U.S. strategic deterrent, but that it did not properly relate these weaknesses to the problem of the credibility of U.S. deterrence. They added that the possibilities of a crash program in advance of a new treaty, or failing this, "experimental simulations" had not been adequately considered by the McMillan Panel as means of coping with U.S. deterrence problems. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Last fall General Wheeler persuaded the JCS to make a more thorough evaluation of test ban questions. Among other actions, we established a scientific panel under Dr. McMillan which rendered a report that was distributed to the Committee of Principles with the understanding that it would be very closely held. The McMillan Report noted very serious weaknesses in the present US nuclear deterrent forces stemming from the following critical vulnerabilities: (a) in-silo vulnerability to blast, shock and possibly EMP The panel concluded that this was a particularly bad time for the US to consider entering into a comprehensive test ban. The Soviets were seen to have a considerable advantage in any test ban situation: greater internal security, greater manpower control, larger payload capacity of ICBMs, and ability to advance through clandestine testing. In my judgment, the attached comments further underline the seriousness of the situation, since these two men who were disposed against testing from the beginning indicate agreement with the technical vulnerabilities highlighted by the basic panel report. Further, the basic report had already been softened considerably in the process of obtaining the original approval of these two gentlemen. On 17 March the JCS forwarded a study to SecDef/3/ recommending increases in manpower and funding for research and weapons effects testing in our effort to eliminate the vulnerabilities cited by the McMillan report. /3/Not further identified. RCB
126. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 2, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA A-Z 1966. Top Secret. A May 2 cover memorandum from Adrian S. Fisher to Secretary of State Rusk states that he is sending the memorandum to the President, as well as to Secretary of Defense McNamara, and he asks for Rusk's comments on the draft letter to Chairman Kosygin. No record of Rusk's comments or of the dispatch of the letter to Kosygin has been found. In a memorandum to Rusk of May 2, Ambassador at Large Thompson opposed this initiative, partly because it was unlikely to draw a constructive response from the Soviets. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Rostow, May 2, Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., suggested that they not send the proposal to the President until they got McNamara's and Rusk's reactions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10) SUBJECT Enclosed for your consideration is a draft letter to Mr. Kosygin setting forth a proposal for an eighteen-month halt in the construction of fixed land-based strategic offensive missile launchers and antiballistic missile launchers./2/ The proposal could be adequately verified by our respective national capabilities to satisfy both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the national security of our countries was not being adversely affected by action taken contrary to its terms. It, therefore, would not require negotiation of the complex arrangements for formal international verification. /2/Not printed. You will recall that last January 4 Mr. Foster suggested for your consideration the possibility of including a similar proposal either in your State of the Union Message or in a private letter to Soviet leaders. It was decided at that time that the matter was more appropriate for a private letter than a public speech but no private communication was dispatched because of a feeling that it might confuse the discussion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which had become the subject of private correspondence between you and the Soviet leadership on January 11./3/ /3/Document 108. I believe the present time is appropriate for resuming the consideration of a letter from you to the Soviet leadership making such a proposal. Such a letter would be a logical follow-up of the discussions on the problem of strategic nuclear vehicles which Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster had with Ambassador Dobrynin prior to his departure for Moscow. A letter from you would assure such a proposal the appropriate careful consideration by the Soviet leadership. We would of course wish to review the letter should Ambassador Dobrynin, upon his return from Moscow, raise any matters relating to this subject. But with this caveat in mind, I believe it would be worthwhile to proceed now with the appropriate consideration of this subject within the government. I believe that such a proposal would clearly be to the net advantage of the U.S. in terms of relative ratios of forces. Nevertheless, there may well be serious interest in such a proposal on the part of the Soviet leaders. It might well afford a rationale for Soviet leaders to forego an extensive Soviet ABM program, which would result in an economic payoff for the Soviet Union in terms of decreased expenditures. Such an undertaking would also involve the promise of possible future reductions in defense spending. In addition, the political consequences of such an arrangement may be sufficiently attractive to induce serious consideration of the proposal by Soviet leaders. And finally, at a minimum, it would open up a dialogue at the highest level, something that seems particularly needed at this time if we are to move towards a greater meeting of minds upon practical methods of curbing the arms race. This proposal has not been coordinated within the Government although it takes into account some of the views expressed within the Government when the earlier suggestion was made by Mr. Foster in January. It will, of course, be advisable to have the discussions of the problem presented by this memorandum, including the problem of what allied consultation should be held, before sending a letter of this kind. A back-up study which supports the proposal in the draft letter is attached./4/ /4/Not found. Against the possibility that you might wish to consider this matter further, I have taken the liberty of sending copies of this memorandum and its enclosures to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara with a request for their comments on the draft letter. If you think the suggestion has merit, it might be appropriate to hold a meeting at which the appropriate advisers would discuss the draft letter with you. Adrian S. Fisher
127. Editorial Note In a statement of May 7, 1966, President Johnson expressed the need for a treaty governing the exploration of celestial bodies. He outlined the essential elements of such an outer space treaty, including a provision that "no country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden." (Statement read by Robert Fleming, the President's Deputy Press Secretary, at a news conference in San Antonio at 11 a.m. on May 7; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pages 487-488) This statement was quoted in a May 9 letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, requesting an early convening of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Outer Space to consider the U.S. proposal. (Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pages 276-277) On May 11, Ambassador Goldberg gave a U.S. outline of points for inclusion in a celestial bodies treaty to Nikolai T. Fedorenko, the Soviet Representative to the United Nations. (Ibid., page 304) On June 16, Soviet Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Platon D. Morozov, transmitted to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant the "Soviet Draft Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies" for consideration by the U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., pages 347-350) A June 16 letter from Arthur Goldberg to Kurt Waldheim (ibid., pages 350-351) quoted the U.S. outline, transmitted the text of the "U.S. Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (ibid., pages 352-355), and suggested that the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space convene on July 12 to consider this subject, a suggestion to which the other members subsequently agreed.
128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, May 10, 1966, 7:03 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald B. Helman (UNP) and Herbert K. Reis (L/EUR); cleared by Meeker (L), Stoessel (EUR), and Jonathan Dean (IO/UNP); and approved by David H. Popper (IO). Repeated to Moscow and Paris. Shortly before leaving for Geneva to negotiate an outer space treaty with the Soviet Union, Ambassador Goldberg telephoned President Johnson on June 28 to brief him on the latest developments. Goldberg said that the U.S. draft of the treaty was very similar to the Soviets' draft. "We should be able to make an agreement because they took the points from your letter and incorporated [them] in their treaty, a very interesting development," he remarked. In briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the previous day, he had said that the treaty contained no military or security considerations and both Senators Symington, who attended as a representative of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Anderson said they supported the U.S. draft. Throughout Goldberg's presentation, President Johnson interjected "good" or "sure" after nearly every sentence. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Arthur Goldberg, June 28, 1966, 5:21 p.m., Tape F66.17, Side B) Reference to the President's "letter" above presumably is to his May 7 statement, which Goldberg quoted in a May 9 letter to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Outer Space Committee. See Document 127. 2639. Subject: Celestial Bodies Treaty. A. We hope it will be possible for Amb. Goldberg at meeting with Fedorenko May 11 to move ahead on celestial bodies treaty. We think it desirable that you give Fedorenko paper containing "Outline of Points for Inclusion in Treaty on Celestial Bodies" (text follows)./2/ This outline is an elaboration of the treaty items mentioned by the President in his May 7 announcement/3/ and is designed to give picture of treaty we have in mind without getting at this early stage into problems detail and drafting. /2/Regarding this outline, see Document 127. Telegram 4852 from USUN, May 11, reported that Soviet Ambassadors Fedorenko and Morozov gave Ambassador Goldberg a "sympathetic but noncommittal reception in course of presentation per reftel" on May 11. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN) /3/See Document 127. B. Meeker can come to New York May 16 if desired to assist in consultations with other members of Legal Subcommittee and Waldheim. Possible pattern for such consultations might be (1) Old Commonwealth, (2) Waldheim, (3) friendly fifteen and (4) non-aligned. C. "Outline of Points for Inclusion in Celestial Bodies Treaty 1. The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration by all in accordance with international law. 2. Celestial bodies should not be subject to any claim of sovereignty. 3. There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies. 4. A State conducting explorations on a celestial body should report on the results of a mission. 5. Open access to all areas of celestial bodies should be assured. 6. Celestial bodies should be used for peaceful purposes only. No country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Military fortifications, weapons tests, and military maneuvers should be forbidden. 7. A launching State should be entitled to exercise authority over its facilities on a celestial body and persons participating in its activities there. 8. Ownership of objects landed, constructed or used on a celestial body should be retained by the launching State. 9. Astronauts of one country should render assistance to other astronauts as may be required by circumstances. 10. States should pursue studies and take appropriate steps to avoid harmful contamination. 11. Consideration should be given to a provision for the settlement of any disputes that might arise. 12. Final clauses--there should be appropriate provisions on signature, ratification, depositary, entry into force, amendment, duration, and registration with the United Nations." D. Department will inform Soviet Embassy here./4/ /4/Telegram 2651 to USUN, repeated to Moscow as telegram 2638, May 12, reported that Stoessel and Meeker called in Soviet Charge Alexander I. Zinchuk to give him the outline. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN) Rusk
129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret; Limited Distribution. SUBJECT In NSAM 345 you requested proposals for U.S. initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union./2/ To this end, Mr. Foster and I would like to submit for your consideration the following suggestions in the field of arms control and disarmament. /2/NSAM No. 345, dated April 22, on Nuclear Planning is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 159. Non-Proliferation Agreement The subject that has received the greatest attention during recent negotiations is, of course, a non-proliferation agreement. Such an agreement is looked upon by many as the most logical and urgent next step forward in arms control and disarmament. An initiative on our part to break the present deadlock on this subject is dependent upon the decisions that are to be made on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. If these decisions do not involve a "hardware solution," it may well prove possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union without sacrifice to any legitimate interest of any member of the NATO alliance. The United States should, we believe, avoid dismissing a non-proliferation agreement with the oversimplified arguments that since the Soviets do not intend to proliferate anyway, there is little value in an agreement with them; and that if other countries wish to go nuclear, this would be a matter of such supreme national interest that a treaty would not stand in their way. Without a non-proliferation agreement it is fair to say that we have no hope of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons on the basis of unilateral appeals. On the other hand, if we and the USSR were to agree to a non-proliferation treaty, probably all of the non-nuclear powers that are in danger of going nuclear would find it difficult not to adhere to such a treaty. Thus the issue would not be whether a treaty would stand in the way of the supreme national interest of such countries. The issue would rather be whether a US-Soviet sponsored international consensus, finalized in a treaty, would be a factor to be taken into account in determining what the supreme national interest of these countries was. Clearly it would be. ABM and Missile Launcher Freeze A second possible initiative would be the suggested letter from you to Chairman Kosygin proposing an eighteen-month "truce" in deployment of anti-ballistic missile launchers and strategic fixed land-based missile launchers. This proposal was outlined in the memorandum I submitted to you on May 2, 1966./3/ /3/Document 126. Threshold Test Ban Recent significant improvements in seismic identification capabilities now make it possible for the US to verify through national means an extension of the Limited Test Ban agreement to cover all underground tests having a seismic magnitude of 4.75 or higher. Thus we are, with respect to underground tests of a magnitude of approximately 30 KT or higher, in a situation very similar to that of 1963 with regard to tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. An agreement of this type would not be a complicated one since no international inspection machinery would have to be created. Moreover, the mere making of such a proposal would itself be highly regarded throughout the world as a constructive step forward. Attached is a paper which deals with the threshold test ban proposal in greater detail./4/ We plan to submit the proposal in the near future to the Committee of Principals but thought it advisable for you to be aware of this possible initiative in the context of NSAM 345. /4/Not printed. I am sending copies of this memorandum and its attachment to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in the event that you may wish to discuss these suggestions with them. Adrian S. Fisher [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |