1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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130. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 11-11-66 Washington, May 25, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-66, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by W.F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board; the representative of the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. THE IMPACT OF A THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ON The Problem To estimate the impact of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty on Soviet military programs, with particular emphasis on its impact on Soviet ABM activities; to discuss the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor such a test ban; and to evaluate Soviet capabilities for covertly violating it. Foreword The Threshold Test Ban Treaty considered in this estimate is generally in line with proposals under discussion in the US and abroad, but it does not reflect a specific proposed treaty. We assume continuation of the terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty now in effect, which prohibits testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; underwater (including both territorial waters and the high seas); or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. The Threshold Treaty considered in this estimate would add to the restrictions of the current treaty a prohibition of any underground nuclear test producing a seismic disturbance above 4.75 on the Gutenberg-Richter scale. It is assumed that treaty language will specify a method by which a mean magnitude for any particular event will be established, thus avoiding international disputes about the magnitude of reported events. It imposes no limitations on the underground medium in which the tests take place, or on the degree of decoupling employed. It provides no on-site inspection and no sanctions. Each participating national will have to decide for itself whether any given seismic event of magnitude greater than 4.75 was caused by a nuclear detonation and constituted a treaty violation. Conclusions A. We believe that for most of the Soviet military development programs which we can foresee over the next few years a Threshold Test Ban Treaty would impose no greater restrictions than those already imposed by the Partial Test Ban. However, the relationship between the yield of underground explosions and the resulting seismic readings is uncertain at best, and can be greatly altered by decoupling. The Soviets might therefore still test over a wide range of yields, depending on how far they were willing to risk violating the treaty and to support the cost and effort of decoupling. Practically speaking, we believe that they could develop weapons yielding [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by scaling up from lower yield tests which would have a fair chance of not producing seismic readings above 4.75. They might conceivably develop TN weapons with yields [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by expensive decoupling methods. (Paras. 13-19) B. With respect to ABM weapons, we think there is about an even chance that the Soviets have already [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] exoatmosphere ABM warhead yielding [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If they have not already done so, a Threshold Treaty would not, in our view, make such a development impossible, as we believe existing Soviet weapon technology would support it either without further testing, or with tests that would have a reasonable chance of not exceeding the threshold. (Paras. 10-12, 20, 21) C. We believe that a Threshold Treaty would impose prohibitive restrictions, beyond those of the Partial Test Ban, only for developing weapons which might need new warheads yielding [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. If the development of such weapons had a sufficiently high priority the Soviets might conduct tests virtually certain to violate the treaty, in the belief that the violation could not be proved against them. As few as one or two such tests a year could be of significant aid to their military programs. (Paras. 18, 19, 30-33) D. The US Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) would almost certainly detect all seismic events in the USSR with a magnitude of 4.75 or greater. Perhaps with help from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] sources, it could probably discriminate between explosions and earthquakes occurring in most parts of the USSR, but there would still be a few events a year over 4.75, especially in the Kamchatka-Kuriles area, which could not be so identified. Such events would represent possible treaty violations, but it would be extremely unlikely that intelligence could with certainty either confirm or deny that a nuclear event had in fact occurred. (Paras. 23-28) E. If a seismic event over 4.75 was identified as an explosion, it would almost certainly be nuclear in origin. Thus this evidence, combined with what might be available from intelligence sources, would probably be sufficient, except in a few cases, to determine to the satisfaction of the US government whether or not the explosion was nuclear in origin. Evidence sufficient to convince a world forum that an explosion was nuclear could almost certainly be derived only from on-site inspection, which is not permitted by the Threshold Treaty under consideration. (Paras. 25, 29) [Here follows the "Discussion" section, consisting of four parts entitled "Current Soviet Nuclear Weapons Technology," "Impact of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty on Soviet Military Programs," "US Detection Capabilities," and "The Possibility of Soviet Covert Violation."]
131. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 25, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Memoranda Files, FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. An unsigned handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: "Sir: We are informed by Ben Read that Mr. Foster mentioned this memo to you last evening. Copies have been sent by S/S to Messrs. Ball, U.A. Johnson, and Thompson." SUBJECT 1. Non-Proliferation. My final report to you from Geneva (Disto 2210)/2/ describes a possible shift in the Soviet position. As you know, both in public and private, the Soviets have previously taken a tough and extreme line against any FRG "access" to nuclear weapons, including "political access," such as the Special Committee. Their public attacks on our non-proliferation treaty have continued to be extreme. However, in private conversations at Geneva, both Soviet and Bloc representatives have now shown awareness of the need to accommodate any non-proliferation treaty to the reality of continued nuclear consultations and, by implication at least, to the reality of present nuclear arrangements in NATO. /2/At this point the source text bears the following handwritten note: "(below at clip; Sec saw)," referring to telegram Disto 2210 from Geneva; not found. From comments by Soviet and Czech staffs and Polish representatives, it appears they do not really expect any formal burial of NATO hardware proposals, which they say they consider "dead" anyway. They seem to want some assurance, presumably in the treaty, that continuing NATO arrangements, including improved consultative machinery, will not serve as a front for future hardware arrangements and that participants in any consultative group will not acquire power of decision regarding actual employment of nuclear weapons (as distinct from participation in questions of strategy, deployment, etc.). We have no way of knowing whether the Soviets and Bloc representatives are genuinely, though cautiously, seeking serious negotiations. As a result of increased tensions over Viet Nam, this may not be the case. Nevertheless, I believe we should consider whether there are ways we can test Soviet willingness to move to more reasonable positions. With this in mind, I recommended in cable 2210 from Geneva that we give serious thought to the possibility of a general non-proliferation formula which neither expressly permits nor prohibits a NATO "hardware" option. We do not believe the Soviets could utilize a withdrawal clause in such a treaty to interfere seriously in the affairs of NATO because withdrawal as such would not give them any practical basis for taking action against our interests, i.e., they will presumably not wish to disseminate in any event. Our allies would, of course, have to be consulted. In practical effect, this amounts to a recommendation that we take a serious look at the current price of getting a non-proliferation treaty. I shall want to discuss this further with you. I cannot help but believe that a non-proliferation treaty would have fundamental value beyond the field of non-proliferation. On the one hand, there would be unquestioned political value to us in achieving a major arms control agreement with the Soviets in view of the state of Sino-Soviet relations. On the other hand, it would be particularly unfortunate if the U.S. becomes isolated on arms control issues at a time when, because of the repercussions of the Viet Nam situation, the U.S. badly needs to demonstrate its desire to seriously negotiate measures contributing to international stability and curbing the nuclear arms race. 2. Soviet Willingness to Cooperate in Test Ban Verification. In Geneva, the Soviets requested a Co-Chairman's meeting in order to inform us of their willingness to participate in the exchange of national seismic data. Exchanges would be on a "voluntary" basis and analysis of data would be done by national institutions rather than by an international center. The Soviets professed an interest in bringing U.S. and Soviet viewpoints closer together to enhance long-range prospects for agreement. I replied that we welcomed their interest in data exchanges but this could not be a substitute for necessary on-site inspections. The Soviets did make clear that their interest in exchanging seismic data was not contingent on the U.S. dropping its demand for on-sites. Although the Soviets may be attempting to undercut our position on on-sites, it is also a possible indication that, in the arms control field, they are willing to work towards agreement, despite Viet Nam. We should not under-estimate the significance of the Soviet move. The Soviets know that international exchange of data is basically directed at improving the capability of other countries to determine what is happening inside the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union is, in fact, willing to exchange data toward this end, it will be a most important step. 3. SNDV Freeze and Reductions. On instructions,3 I formally asked the Soviet Co-Chairman whether his government would be interested in the possibility of a freeze on the manufacture of SNDVs if this could be accompanied by reductions. I read to him a list of issues which we proposed for discussion in the event they were interested. A week later, the Soviets indicated their recognition that we had made a serious proposal and requested a paper setting forth the issues to be discussed. We provided the paper,/3/ but have not yet received their response. /3/Not further identified. William C. Foster
132. Aide-Memoire From the British Embassy to the Department of State/1/ Washington, June 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean transmitted this aide-memoire to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, June 1. A cover memorandum of the conversation, June 1, indicates that Ambassador Johnson noted that "the Russians already seem to have heavily discounted the European clause option, and have been leveling their main attacks in the ENDC against any form of multilateral association. Consequently, it would appear doubtful whether a change in our position on the European option would substantially improve our tactical position in Geneva." A cover memorandum transmitting the British aide-memoire from Spurgeon Keeny to Walt Rostow, June 8, supported the British proposal for the nonproliferation treaty to exclude the possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of states, the European option. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) The latest version of the U.S. draft non-proliferation treaty (incorporating the amendments tabled at Geneva on the 21st of March, 1966)/2/ still permits the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of an association of States, provided that /2/Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 159-160. (a) this association includes at least one nuclear-weapon State; (b) there is no increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. As the United States Government are aware, Her Majesty's Government have always considered that a non-proliferation treaty should exclude the possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of States, whatever their membership and whether or not an existing nuclear power should cease to have control of nuclear weapons. Her Majesty's Government understand the considerations which have caused the United States Government to leave open a "European option" in their draft treaty. But it seems to them that the only such option strictly compatible with non-proliferation would be a fully federated European State, which would acquire by succession the nuclear status of either France or the United Kingdom or both. In such a case no transfer of control would be involved and there would be no need for a non-proliferation treaty to be so worded as to provide for it. On the other hand, the idea of transferring control of nuclear weapons to a European association of States, where decisions could be taken by majority vote, is not easy to reconcile with a straightforward statement of non-proliferation requirements. Her Majesty's Government believe that their concern on this point is shared by an increasing number of governments and that the need to preserve a "majority vote European option" constitutes an unnecessary weakness in the presentation of the Western case at Geneva. During the last session of the E.N.D.C. Soviet attacks have increasingly concentrated on the possibility of creating mixed associations with numerous non-nuclear members--and these attacks seem to have some success in enlisting the sympathies of the non-aligned countries. If the U.S. draft treaty could be amended so as to close this option, the West would be in a better position to rebut Soviet criticism and to persuade the non-aligned countries, at Geneva and elsewhere, of the sincerity of its support for non-proliferation. Her Majesty's Government hope that, if the United States Government agree with the above, they may be ready to support them in raising the matter once again, first with the Canadian and Italian Governments, and afterwards with the Federal German Government. They suggest that, in order to close the "majority vote option" in the U.S. draft treaty, it would be sufficient to omit Clause 3 in Articles I and II as well as the words "non-nuclear-weapon" and "such" where they qualify the words "association of States" in these two Articles.
133. Editorial Note On June 29, 1964 (15 UST 2128), July 15, 1965 (16 UST 888), and June 2, 1966 (17 UST 1966), the United States and the United Kingdom renewed their Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy of June 15, 1955 (6 UST 2709). In June 1965 the United States suggested that the renewed agreement should contain provision for safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on any material transferred. The British agreed to application of IAEA safeguards to enriched uranium purchased under a new agreement for use in the British civil power program. They also reserved their position in the event the United Kingdom joined Euratom for the application of Euratom safeguards on materials transferred under a new U.S.-U.K. Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy, signed June 2, entered into force July 15, 1966 (17 UST 862). Because of the intermixture of British civil and military atomic energy programs, they could not agree on the application of international safeguards to highly enriched uranium purchased from the United States for use in their civil research and development program. Documentation on cooperation with the United Kingdom in the civil uses of atomic energy is in Department of State, Central Files, AE 4 UK-US.
134. Editorial Note A June 6, 1966, letter from Glenn T. Seaborg to President Johnson submitted for approval the underground nuclear test program for fiscal year 1967, designated Latchkey, and a detailed plan for the first quarter (July-September), Latchkey I. The proposed program consisted of approximately 56 tests, including 38-42 weapons development and 7-9 Plowshare tests (including the deferred Cabriolet), sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission, and 1 test detection and 7 weapons effects tests, sponsored by the Department of Defense. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28) A memorandum from Rostow to the President, June 25, stated that the Review Committee on Underground Tests recommended approval of the program for fiscal year 1967, subject to the following reservations (with DOD and AEC concurrence): cratering experiments and tests executed off the Nevada Test Site required specific Presidential approval; and the large-yield (600 kt) [Greeley] test for the first quarter was subject to Dr. Hornig's review of test procedures and safety precautions. The President's approval line on this memorandum was checked. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28) Rostow informed Seaborg of this decision by memorandum of June 27. (Ibid.) Rostow's November 3 memorandum to the President stated that the Review Committee on Underground Tests recommended approval of the AEC tests program for November-December, the remaining months of Latchkey II, including the large-yield Greeley test, but it withheld authorization of Cabriolet pending the President's decision on that event. The President's approval line on this memorandum was checked. (Ibid.) A January 9, 1967, memorandum from Rostow to the President stating that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests had no objection to the AEC test program for the third quarter (January-March), recommended approval of Latchkey III, consisting of 14 tests including Cabriolet. That test, however, required issuance of a prior public explanatory statement, coordinated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State, with Department of State, ACDA, DOD, and White House clearances before release. The President's approval line on the memorandum was checked. (Ibid.) Rostow informed Seaborg of this approval by memorandum, January 11, 1967. (Ibid.) Ultimately the United States Government conducted 38 tests, including Greeley (870 kt), but not Cabriolet in the Latchkey series. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992, pages 28-30) Further documentation on the Latchkey series is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28 and in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. A summary history of the test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Flintlock and Latchkey: Events--Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, New Point, Midi Mist, 5 March 1966-26 June 1967 (DNA 6321F, 1984).
135. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, June 7, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A June 10 cover memorandum from Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow states that Keeny thought Rostow should be aware of McNamara's letter "suggesting that we reconsider our position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty." Dear Dean: I think the growing pressures for proliferation in India indicates that we should reconsider our position on the nonproliferation treaty. I suggest that we consider language in our draft treaty which would make clear that the United States and other nuclear powers would each maintain a veto over its weapons. I have enclosed proposed language to this effect. May we discuss these proposals at your convenience. Sincerely, Bob/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
Enclosure/3/ /3/Confidential. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY Present US Version--Article I Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes: 1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States. 2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association of such States-- (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparation for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons. 3. Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. 4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Proposed US Version--Article I Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of another nuclear-weapon State, any non-nuclear-weapon State, or any association of States. Additionally, nuclear-weapon States will take no action, direct or indirect, which would increase the total number of States or associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. Assistance or encouragement to the research, production, or test programs of non-nuclear-weapon States, which could result in the development of a nuclear weapons capability, is prohibited.
136. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, June 9, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 32, National Security Council. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT The President made an introductory statement apparently written for him by Rostow recognizing the urgency of some action in connection with the possibility of India making a decision to go nuclear. In those remarks he stated that this had great significance for the United States and the world and might, if India made such a decision, promote great instability in view of the fact that others would undoubtedly follow. He then called upon George Ball. Mr. Ball made an excellent statement based largely on the paper,/2/ but going beyond that in setting a framework of actions which needed to be taken, both in the way of creating obstacles against India taking the step, and in addition creating conditions which would encourage her to believe her security would be all right without taking the step. He listed alternatives which would act as obstacles such as the non-proliferation treaty, comprehensive test ban treaty and the threshold treaty, stating that the comprehensive test ban would be ideal in that it was nondiscriminatory but that in the circumstance of the difficulties concerning verification he felt that the threshold test ban treaty was a good step even though it did not assuredly prevent their going nuclear. It would, however, impose considerable restraint. He called attention to the rising price which India was implying it would need in order to accept a non-proliferation treaty. He pointed out the discussions we had had with the Soviet Union on assurances by both the Soviet Union and ourselves, and indicated his feeling that under present circumstances at least it would be impossible to get the Soviets to take a position so clearly in opposition to the Chinese. He gave support to the possibility of a General Assembly resolution which was later supported vigorously as apparently the answer to all problems by Ambassador Goldberg. /2/The paper has not been further identified. The President, following George Ball's presentation, called on Ambassador Goldberg and then on Bob McNamara. McNamara said that he would differ with Ball's conclusions on the ideal solution, but his differences were matters of degree and generally he supported the principles set forth by Under Secretary Ball. Ambassador Goldberg referred to the General Assembly resolution as having been premature last fall,/3/ but he believed that it was much more possible now in view of the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to use the General Assembly for the new space proposals. /3/The U.N. resolution has not been further identified. The President, following comments by those three asked what Mr. Ball's recommendations were. Mr. Ball recommended that there be a study which would be concluded within a month to make more precise the exact lines of action to be taken. Mr. McNamara supported that. The President said he thought this was all right. I asked to be heard at this point and said that I had no objection to this, certainly, except as a matter of timing since there was already a good deal of data on this and that in fact there would be a meeting of the Committee of Principals next week to consider one or more of the suggestions which had been made. My feeling of urgency was occasioned by the fact that the ENDC was opening next Tuesday./4/ It would last, presumably from 8 to 12 weeks, and I felt that it was essential that some proposals be put forward by the United States early in that period, otherwise no action could occur and the value of the ENDC might vanish. I felt that in the circumstances it should be possible to come up with conclusions within two weeks for decision by the President. Unfortunately, the President is apparently planning on a long weekend over the Fourth, so this probably puts it over until the Fourth. In any event, the conclusion of the meeting was that there would be a NSAM referring to State, DOD and ACDA the job of coming up with recommendations following this discussion. /4/The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva June 14-August 25. The Vice President indicated quite surprisingly that he thought India could have credible nuclear explosions and some capability for the expenditure of perhaps $50 million in addition to past expenditures. He appeared to be somewhat less than enthusiastic about a threshold test ban treaty and felt that the comprehensive treaty was the best solution. I did not disagree with him on this, but told him that we were concerned with the art of the possible and the only thing that appeared possible is the threshold test ban treaty. Incidentally, Hornig should be talked to by Pete Scoville because Hornig believes that many of the non-nuclear nations would be able to have an initial test up to 50 kilotons under the threshold test ban treaty by proper utilization of the many sources of alluvium throughout the world. I disagreed with this after the meeting and told him that I would have Pete talk to him. Under the circumstances, I think we got as much out of the meeting as it was possible to get. Leonard Marks brought up the question of next Tuesday being the 20th Anniversary of the Baruch presentation/5/ and thought that the United States should use the occasion to call for a major restudy of the problems of proliferation. The study should take place under the auspices of scholars from the academic as well as the government field. There was no response to this suggestion. /5/See footnote 5, Document 97. I do feel we must make some note of the Baruch anniversary in our opening statement at Geneva even though we are unable to accompany it with any dramatic proposals. William C. Foster
137. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, June 9, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Secret. SUBJECT Following up your request this morning for further information on the Dobrynin-Foster meeting reported in the President's Evening Reading for June 8,/2/ I met with Bill Foster and obtained the following additional information. /2/Reference is to a June 8 memorandum from Ball to President Johnson, "Items for Evening Reading," item 4 of which reads as follows: "Dobrynin-Foster Meeting--In the course of their meeting today, Ambassador Dobrynin and Bill Foster discussed non-proliferation, improved detection measures, and the freeze and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Foster reports receiving a clear implication that, if the Soviets could be sure that Germany would not use or would not be able to use nuclear weapons on their own decision, a non-proliferation treaty would be possible. Dobrynin stated that Soviet Embassies in NATO capitals had reported that no one except the Germans had any interest in a change in present nuclear arrangements. He said they were prepared to make arrangements with us at Geneva for the exchange of seismic data. In an aside he said they were shuffling their diplomatic corps to replace about thirty of their older Ambassadors." (Ibid.) The discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty came in the middle of an extended discussion of the status of a broad range of Arms Control measures. Foster reports that, while Dobrynin did not state flatly that the Soviets would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if we rejected the hardware solution to nuclear sharing, he did indicate quite clearly that this was the area of their concern and that they were not concerned with present US weapons in Germany or with the possibility of more substantive consultation between us and our allies on the use of nuclear weapons. Dobrynin said that he understood the UK was going to table revised Non-Proliferation Treaty language that would differ from ours. Dobrynin did not respond to Foster's comments on the importance of some sort of multilateral nuclear assurances for non-nuclear countries such as India in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the basis of my brief discussion with Foster, I don't believe there were any other particularly significant points to report. With regard to the freeze on strategic offensive-defensive delivery systems, Dobrynin commented that it was so complicated that he did not think there was much point in discussing it at Geneva now. Dobrynin appeared to agree with Foster's standard argument as to why we should have a freeze on ABMs but did not offer any suggestion as to what should be done about it. In response to Dobrynin's question as to whether we had actually made a no-first-use proposal to the Communist Chinese, Foster explained that we were simply trying to clarify what Chou En-lai had proposed in his earlier statement./3/ /3/In an address at a Sino-Albanian Banquet on May 10, Premier Chou said that "China has proposed to the United States that the two countries undertake the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. But U.S. imperialism has rejected China's proposal." (Documents on Disarmament, 1966, p. 280) Bill Foster is preparing a detailed memcon which we should get later today./4/ /4/Foster's memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin, June 8, is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6. Spurgeon
138. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, June 17, 1966, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State's office. No drafting information appears on the source text, though Lawrence D. Weiler is listed as Reporting Officer on the attached list of 23 participants. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 614 and 628. PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. REFERENCES /3/The memorandum attached a draft memorandum from Fisher to the President recommending that he propose a new test ban agreement extending the present Limited Test Ban Treaty to cover verifiable underground tests--a threshold test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, June 1966) (2) Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals dated June 9, 1966, from William C. Foster, Director, ACDA, subject: Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Proposal (U)./4/ /4/The memorandum transmitted a revised draft position paper on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the May 26, 1966 ACDA draft position paper as amended June 9. (Ibid., OSD/AE Files: FRC 72 A 4120, #3 Plowshare (Panofsky Panel)--1966) SUMMARY OF ACTION I. Threshold Test Ban Proposal There was agreement with the Secretary of State's suggestion that he prepare a memorandum for the President summarizing the argumentation and issues on the threshold test ban proposal. The Secretary said he would attach to the memorandum the more detailed comments that have been submitted from the various agencies. II. Non-Proliferation Treaty The Secretary of State said he would circulate as soon as possible for consideration by the Principals a revised non-proliferation treaty draft. The Secretary said the revised draft would be a more simplified version of Article I than the present U.S. draft and would focus on "physical access." Discussion Mr. Fisher outlined the principal reasons why the threshold proposal had been brought to the Principals once again, referring to the AFTAC report showing that seismic identification was excellent for events above 4.75, thus indicating a threshold could be verified without on-site inspection;/5/ Mr. Fisher said it was, moreover, important to keep the dialogue with the Soviets on non-proliferation open and it appeared that the threshold proposal was at this time the only way we could take some initiative in this area. It was, he said, ACDA's belief that the question should be raised with the President and he hoped the Committee of Principals would agree to submit the issues to the President. /5/The report by Dr. Evernden of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, "Critique of U.S. Capability of Discriminating between Earthquakes and Explosions," was distributed in February 1966, but has not been found. Mr. Fisher noted the AEC and JCS objections to the threshold proposal. He said it was, nevertheless, ACDA's view that the proposal was in the U.S. interest, recognizing that it would however require considerable political effort to obtain its acceptance in Congress. The inhibitions placed on non-nuclear powers would inhibit them, both technically and in a political sense, from achieving their nuclear ambitions. He said he recognized, however, that technically the threshold ban would not prevent a test by presently non-nuclear powers if sufficient effort were made to conduct one but nevertheless the inhibition would be there. Mr. Fisher commented that within the government the discussion had tended to go back and forth between moving in the non-proliferation field by enlarging the present limited test ban treaty or by making a new effort for a non-proliferation treaty. The Secretary of State said the first question was whether the proposal was in the U.S. interest and if the answer was affirmative the second was should we attempt to achieve it by formal agreements or by unilateral undertakings. Chairman Seaborg referred to the concerns regarding the proposal that had been expressed in his letter of June 16 to Mr. Fisher./6/ He said the Commission's view was that the IDA Study was overly optimistic with regard to possible modifications under a threshold test ban [less than 1/2 line of source text not declassified] for ABM warheads./7/ Chairman Seaborg made particular reference to the last two paragraphs of Enclosure II of his letter, the weapons laboratories comments./8/ [13 lines of source text not declassified] /6/A sanitized version of the letter is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 620-622. The original has not been found. /7/IDA Study S-235, "Special Nike-X Warhead Study," has not been found. /8/A sanitized version of Enclosure II, AEC Weapons Laboratories Comments on the IDA Study, is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 626-627. The Secretary of State commented that the problems described by Chairman Seaborg would apply doubly to a comprehensive test ban. He asked what our assessment was as to where the Soviets are with their ABM development. Admiral Raborn said there was some evidence that they are up to where the U.S. is at the present time. Mr. Fisher pointed out that Mr. Foster of the Department of Defense took a different view than the weapons laboratories with respect to ABM warhead developments that would be possible under the threshold test ban. The Secretary of Defense said Mr. Fisher's comment on Mr. Foster's views dealt with the first point he had wished to make, and the second was to inquire about the observations made by Chairman Seaborg in his letter to Mr. Fisher regarding the difficulties of differentiation and identification of events under a threshold test ban. Chairman Seaborg said there was no real assurance that we could test at 30 KT and not violate a threshold ban, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. Fisher commented that the 30 KT figure was based on the AFTAC studies. He also noted the hidden asymmetries between nuclear and non-nuclear powers that would make it more difficult for non-nuclear powers to initiate a test program under the threshold limitation. When Mr. Marks noted the differences between the ACDA and AEC judgments on the inhibitions a threshold ban would place on non-nuclear powers, Mr. Fisher reviewed the political as well as the technical inhibitions that ACDA believed would apply to non-nuclear powers under a threshold ban. The Secretary of State said that a non-nuclear state might well merely declare that it had a nuclear weapon but say it was not going to test it; he said if the Israelis made such a statement he would probably be inclined to believe them. Dr. Scoville commented on the ABM warhead need, saying he did not understand why we could not make better use of existing weapons technology [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. We already have this capability, he said, in the lower and higher yield ranges. The Vice President said this was a point that needed to be examined carefully. Chairman Seaborg said the IDA Study had examined the question raised by Dr. Scoville. Mr. Keeny commented that the IDA Study had merely looked at the existing devices. Chairman Seaborg said it might be possible to modify [less than 1/2 line of source text not declassified] and have some type of defense against ICBM's. The Secretary of Defense then summarized the objections and questions he believed had been raised by the AEC to the threshold proposal. They were, he said, that the threshold ban would not get us very much in the way of inhibiting proliferation; the price would be some reduction in our ABM capability, if it were decided to go this route; there was some question as to our ability to distinguish events above 4.75; and finally the problems raised by the peaceful uses question. In response to the Secretary of State's question about the possibility for cheating above 4.75, Admiral Raborn said the margin for cheating was very good. He said the Soviets could conduct two or so clandestine tests a year unless we had on-site inspection. General Johnson noted that the studies that have been made are for a period when the Soviets have been testing in their normal test areas and not attempting clandestine tests. Mr. Fisher stated that the AFTAC study indicated there would be an average of one event a year that would be unidentified by seismic means and that these events were almost all in the Kamchatka area. Moreover, for this area no low coupling material was available--therefore it would not make sense for the Soviets to go to an area where the coupling was not advantageous in an attempt to test illegally what they could test legally in other areas where coupling was more satisfactory for their purposes. Admiral Raborn restated his view that the Soviets could test clandestinely two tests a year. Dr. Scoville pointed out that the U.S. would be able to spot all suspicious events whether identified or not and to focus on these events with intelligence resources. Admiral Raborn said we could not, however, prove to the world any of our conclusions. After further discussion of the coupling question, Mr. Fisher pointed out that decoupling would be perfectly legal under the threshold test ban. Chairman Seaborg said there was no question but that the ABM problem was the most bothersome of the difficulties AEC had with the threshold proposal. He suggested that the U.S. go on as fast as possible to meet our testing requirements for ABM warheads and in a year or two we would have most of our needed testing for this purpose completed. The Secretary of State asked about the effects of a threshold at 5.0. Chairman Seaborg said this would help with the ABM problem but of course it would not be much of an inhibition on non-nuclear countries. Admiral Raborn said the intelligence community was agreed that a threshold test ban would have little effect in halting proliferation. Mr. Fisher questioned this assessment, pointing to the technical and political inhibitions he believed would apply. He said, moreover, that Soviet-U.S. agreement on a threshold ban would itself have a very real effect on potential nuclear countries. The Secretary of State said a threshold ban might, during the process of ratification that would take place in potential nuclear countries, precipitate a debate over the question of going or not going nuclear. Mr. Marks wondered if our posture would not suffer more by making the threshold test ban proposal and having the Soviets respond with a call for a moratorium than in not making the proposal. Mr. Fisher pointed out that new verification data will not remain unknown for very long and said that when it becomes known the U.S. will either have to be in favor of a threshold proposal or change its present position of being prepared to ban all tests that can be adequately verified. The Vice President wondered if a threshold test ban would really inhibit proliferation. Mr. Fisher said there was no certainty it would prevent proliferation but it would make it more costly and more difficult and therefore decrease the likelihood of proliferation. He said it was ACDA's conclusion that this was the only way we could move at the present time to inhibit proliferation in view of our policy on options we were keeping open on NATO nuclear questions. He said it was either moving on the threshold proposal or doing nothing. He added that the question for the meeting really was whether the issue should not be put to the President. The Secretary of State said he believed the President should be informed of the discussion. He thought it would be advisable for him to prepare a two or three page memorandum for the President, digesting the issues and arguments involved, with the detailed comments from various departments attached. The Vice President questioned the value of a country going nuclear if a potential adversary was likely to develop an ABM system, and he wondered if the cost factors would not be too high for various potential nuclear countries. The Secretary of State said he believed India, Israel, Sweden and others could afford to go nuclear, though they might underestimate the ultimate cost to them of doing so. Chairman Seaborg noted that with respect to the 4.75 limitation, the AEC would have to instruct the laboratories not to go above 10 to 20 Kt in their testing in order to avoid a risk of treaty violation. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In response to the Vice President's question as to the real objectives of a threshold ban, Mr. Fisher said it was both turning down the nuclear arms race and inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary of State commented that in terms of creating an atmosphere of peace the threshold test ban would certainly not be comparable to Soviet action for peace in South East Asia. The Vice President said that if the threshold proposal did not curb nuclear technology it was not clear how it would really inhibit the proliferation. Chairman Seaborg said that it was necessary to settle the Plowshare question before any decision was made on the threshold proposal. The Secretary said that if it were agreeable with the Vice President, he would put together for the President a digest of the issues on the threshold proposal. He said he would like to review the issues himself before making final judgment on the proposal. He commented that he was concerned about the problem of ultimate cheating and the problem of defending this possibility in any U.S. debate on a threshold proposal. The Secretary of State said he would like to turn for a moment to the question of a non-proliferation treaty. He said the Soviet representative in Geneva had seemed to put an emphasis on "physical access." He thought we might consider the possibility of a simplification of Article I of the U.S. draft treaty. The Secretary of Defense said he completely agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary of State said we should consider a simplified Article I that would prohibit the transfer of physical access to nuclear weapons. He said he would be sending to other members of the Committee of Principals as soon as possible a simplified text for their consideration. He added that it may be that the Soviets are beginning to move and would be prepared to gamble on their estimate that the MLF is dead. Mr. Rostow asked if a prohibition on physical access would be compatible with joint ownership. The Secretary said he did not believe ownership was relevant to the problem of proliferation, although he did not believe that we should be opposed to other countries paying some of our costs if they wished to.
139. Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ OD-ACDA-2623 Washington, June 17, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Dear Secretary Rusk: In accordance with your suggestion at today's meeting of the Principals,/2/ I am forwarding herewith a few comments, from the intelligence point of view, on the proposed Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). /2/See Document 138. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] On the Soviet side, we believe that ABM deployment has begun at Moscow. In our judgment, the chances are about even that the Soviets have developed an exoatmospheric ABM system [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Our evidence, however, is skimpy, and the Soviets may well be further along. If not, there will be great pressure on them to develop a highly sophisticated system, since they are certainly aware in general terms of U.S. plans for improving warheads and penetration aids, e.g., multiple re-entry vehicles. The Soviets have shown considerable willingness to risk violation of the present test ban treaty, and even one or two tests a year above magnitude 4.75 would give them significant advantages. Thus, the Soviets could forge ahead of the U.S., unless the U.S. were itself willing to violate the TTBT, or at least risk doing so. I do not believe that the TTBT will have much effect in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was agreed at the Principals' meeting that the technical restraints imposed by the treaty would create additional difficulties for non-nuclear states in carrying out nuclear programs meaningful to them, but would not prevent it. On the political side, we are all agreed that China will not sign. Hence, the pressures on the countries being threatened by China will continue to grow as China conducts further tests. I do not believe that the TTBT or even a non-proliferation treaty would deter a country from going nuclear if it felt that its vital interests were threatened. Regarding verification of a TTBT, there is an important distinction between convincing ourselves that a violation has occurred and proving it to others. There could be endless controversy about the magnitude and especially the nature of events which we believed were over magnitude 4.75. In general, convincing proof of a violation could come only from on-site inspection. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] Sincerely, W.F. Raborn [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |