1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
|
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
|
140. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)/1/ Washington, July 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--National Nuclear Test Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. The National Nuclear Test Program transmitted by your joint letter of February 25, 1966,/2/ has been reviewed by the Executive Office staff. I wish to confirm that it is most important that we retain a test readiness posture and maintain an active plan to resume testing should it be necessary. /2/The letter under reference transmitted "The National Nuclear Test Program, First Revision--January 1, 1966." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 72 A 4120, 93. National Nuclear Test Readiness Program (1964-66) The revision was requested by a memorandum from Bundy to McNamara and Seaborg, May 25, 1965. (Ibid.) I note that the Program is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the limited test ban treaty. This approach is sound, and its flexibility should continue to characterize our planning. The Program should be periodically reviewed to insure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and the other research and development work at the laboratories and within the Department of the Defense. Periodically this Program needs updating and any significant changes that occur in the Program should be brought to my attention. Lyndon B. Johnson
141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 26, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 388.3, January 1966. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A cover memorandum from Foster to members of the Committee of Principals, August 3, states that all the members of the Committee of Principals concurred in the memorandum with the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission, which suggested a number of minor changes that were incorporated in the memorandum sent to the President. SUBJECT A new arms control initiative aimed at inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been given serious consideration by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and discussed with the Committee of Principals at its meeting on June 17. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggestion is for a Presidential proposal for a new test ban agreement, expanding the present Limited Test Ban Treaty to cover verifiable underground tests. No consensus was reached at the Principals' meeting on the desirability of making a proposal for a threshold test ban at this time. It is suggested that you may wish to discuss this personally with the Principals. The following is a summary of the major issues which must be considered in reaching a decision on the U.S. proposal in this area. A more detailed draft position paper prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is forwarded as an annex to this memorandum/2/ along with comments thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency./3/ /2/Not found with source text. A copy is attached to June 9 memorandum from Foster to members of the Committee of Principals; ibid., OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, June 1966. /3/The cover memorandum states that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated June 29 (not found), the comments of the Atomic Energy Commission dated June 16 (copy ibid.), and the comments of the Central Intelligence Agency, June 17 (Document 139) were not circulated with this paper because they were previously made available to the Committee of Principals by the originating agencies. A. Technical and Political Effects of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty While all agree that as a technical matter a non-nuclear country could test its first weapon under a threshold test ban which could be reasonably verified at the present time, it would nevertheless increase the technical difficulties and cost and, at the same time, reduce the political and military gains from such a development. Key potential additional nuclear countries, i.e., India, Israel, Japan, Sweden and Germany, would doubtless sign a threshold test ban and as a result probably would be constrained to test at about the 5 KT level, since they seemingly have neither the soil conditions nor the experience to conduct tests at much higher yields without serious risk of violating the threshold. The threshold would prevent the development of an advanced military nuclear capability. There are differences of opinion as to the importance of these constraints and on the willingness of such countries to risk a violation if they had signed such a treaty. The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, however, believe that these constraints might be a significant factor in preventing a decision by these countries to go nuclear. We cannot be sure at this time what the Soviet reaction to such a U.S. offer would be, since previously the Soviets have always linked the threshold test ban to a moratorium on all underground tests. A moratorium is completely unacceptable to the United States. A Soviet response of this type would limit the political gains obtained by offering a threshold ban but on balance the U.S. position of being willing to ban all tests it can verify would be better than it would be otherwise, particularly when knowledge of the improved detection capability became public. B. Verification of Compliance with a Threshold Test Ban Treaty Recent developments in the field of seismic detection and identification of underground events indicate that all contained underground explosions with seismic magnitudes above 4.75 generate seismic signals with characteristics common to all such explosions and that only a very small number of earthquakes above magnitude 4.75 (on the average of one per year in the USSR) have signals which cannot be distinguished from explosions and which therefore might provide false alarms. The suspiciousness of even these few false alarms would be further reduced by investigation of their location and by the use of other intelligence sources. Furthermore, the number of these natural events which cannot be identified by seismic means decreases rapidly with increase in magnitude and is essentially zero at magnitude 5. There are differences of opinion among the Principals on the adequacy of this degree of verification at the magnitude 4.75 level. Some feel that even a single Soviet nuclear test above the threshold could have a significant effect on U.S. security and that either the low natural false alarm rate could be used as a cover for such a test or that the United States would not choose to denounce a violation and abrogate the treaty based only on seismic evidence supported by unilateral intelligence. They believe that some type of on-site inspections would be required as well in order to provide demonstrable proof to the world. Others believe that this verification capability would provide the United States the ability to satisfy itself that a violation had occurred and that the United States could take the necessary international actions if it felt its security were affected. [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified] C. The Military Implications of a Threshold Test Ban Although a 4.75 threshold test ban could preclude the proof-testing of certain advanced warhead designs the major effect in terms of existing requirements would be on the development of warheads for ABM systems. [4 lines of source text not declassified] The Department of Defense has had conducted a study which indicates that the presently planned effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus system designed against a Chinese Communist threat could be regained under the constraints of a threshold test ban by system changes at some additional cost./4/ Maintaining the effectiveness of a system designed against a sophisticated Soviet threat would be more difficult and would require considerably greater costs and could not as certainly be obtained. The Atomic Energy Commission does not believe that the warheads postulated in the Department of Defense study for the revised systems could be developed under a threshold test ban but notes that certain nuclear tests could probably be carried out within the next year or two in order to achieve such developments. There are also a number of differences of opinion as to the validity of the detailed systems aspects of the DOD-sponsored study on this ABM problem. /4/The Department of Defense study has not been found. The USSR is believed to lag somewhat behind the United States in terms of nuclear warhead development in the yield ranges which would be forbidden under the threshold test ban. In a recent NIE the belief is stated that for most of the Soviet military development programs which can be foreseen over the next few years a threshold test ban treaty would impose no greater restrictions than those already imposed by the partial test ban./5/ [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] /5/Document 130. D. Threshold Magnitude The magnitude of an event is proposed to be defined as the mean of the measurements obtained by at least nine standard stations located between 1,500 and 6,000 miles from an event. The United States now operates more than twelve stations, some of which are classified, which could be used to make a determination of magnitude by the United States with respect to events taking place in the USSR. Few stations now exist outside the United States jurisdiction which meet the qualifications for a standard station. Twenty-five to thirty properly distributed standard stations would be required in order to assure that at least nine stations at the desired distances will be able to measure the magnitude of events of m4.75 and above in the USSR, United States, India and Israel. Such stations could be constructed with equipment readily procurable in 1-5 years depending upon the intensity of effort and cooperation of host countries. In the absence of such a network of stations and the public availability of data therefrom, there would be no internationally accepted data base for a magnitude determination for a given event, leaving the way open to possible international controversy concerning the magnitude of a given event. The threshold magnitude proposed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and used as a basis for most of the studies was 4.75 which might permit tests up to 30 KT on the part of the United States and the USSR without significant risk of violations, and about 5 KT on the part of the key non-nuclear nations. The Atomic Energy Commission feels that the United States might be constrained to tests at lower yields to avoid risking inadvertent violation. Consideration has been also given to establishing the threshold at 5.0 which would allow U.S.-USSR tests at about 80 KT and non-nuclear country tests at about 12 KT. Such a threshold would reduce the number of false alarms from natural earthquakes in the USSR to essentially zero. It would also permit the development of some of the more conventional type Nike-Zeus warheads by the United States and presumably the USSR. On the other hand, raising the threshold would reduce the effect of the treaty in discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be difficult for the United States to justify raising the threshold to 5.0 in light of current detection and identification capabilities at 4.75, and there would be strong sentiment on the part of other countries to retain the familiar 4.75 threshold. E. Explosions for Peaceful Uses The present Limited Test Ban Treaty provides severe limitations on explosions for peaceful excavations purposes and a threshold treaty would add some additional limitations. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has proposed provisions in these treaties which might permit peaceful uses explosions but many believe that such provisions would provide legal or illegal opportunities for weapons development intended to be forbidden by the treaty. Studies are now underway in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to elaborate on the significance of such loopholes and to develop additional procedures to close them. The Atomic Energy Commission believes that the United States should not make any proposals on a threshold test ban until an agreed position is reached within the Government concerning the extent to which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be permitted under such a treaty, and the specific treaty provisions relevant to such purposes which would be acceptable to the United States. Dean Rusk/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
142. Editorial Note A July 29, 1966, letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to President Johnson requested concurrence in plans for conducting underground tests of yields up to 6-7 megatons at temporary supplemental sites, involving explorations of the following possible sites: (1) the Nellis Gunnery Range in Nevada adjacent to the Nevada Test Site for yields near 2 megatons; (2) in Alaska, north of the Brooks Range, or on the Island of Amchitka (6-7 megatons); (3) and other higher yield sites outside the United States, possibly central Australia, or on Christmas Island. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--General, Vol. I, Box 27) An August 4 memorandum from Keeny to Rostow transmitted for Rostow's signature a memorandum for the President concerning a Bureau of the Budget recommendation that $25 million in fiscal year 1967 funds be reprogrammed in connection with the Atomic Energy Commission's proposal to develop alternate underground nuclear weapons test sites. Keeny endorsed the Bureau of the Budget proposal to reprogram funds "to initiate the new Nevada site and to permit an initial unpublicized survey of Alaska for potential additional sites" as "a very reasonable interim solution to this problem." (Ibid.) An August 8 memorandum from Rostow to Seaborg stated the President's approval of reprogramming of $25 million of available funds for AEC use in fiscal year 1967 "for initial development of the proposed Nevada site and for an initial survey of possible sites in Alaska." It required prior clearance by the Alaskan Governor and Congressional delegation for the Alaskan survey. The President did not approve the proposal to approach the United Kingdom or Australia for the possible use of Christmas Island or Australia as alternate test sites. No action was to be taken in this regard without specific clearance by the Department of State and the White House. (Ibid.)
143. Memorandum for President Johnson/1/ Geneva, August 5, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty, Box 72. Confidential. For President Johnson and Secretary Rusk from Goldberg (Geneva, 676)/2/ /2/The source text apparently is a typed version of telegram 676 from Geneva. As you know, the Outer Space Committee has recessed Space Treaty negotiations which will be reconvened in New York before or early during the forthcoming General Assembly./3/ In addition to detailed reports which the delegation has made concerning the negotiations, I wish to make the following comments: /3/The Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in Geneva, July 12-August 4, and resumed negotiations in New York, September 12-16. On the whole, we can regard the negotiations to date as reflecting great credit upon the United States, for the following reasons: 1. Negotiations came about as a result of initiative taken by the President on May 7, in calling for negotiations looking to a treaty./4/ This was initially resisted by Soviets who finally had to go along under the pressure of world opinion. This fact recognized and emphasized during the course of negotiations here in Geneva. /4/See Document 127. 2. The attitude of the U.S. delegation in accordance with Department instructions has been forthcoming and this too has resulted in very favorable claim on world opinion both diplomatically and in the world press. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] confirmed that it is the shared opinion among the delegations irrespective of ideology that Soviets have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of forthcoming and conciliatory attitude of the U.S. delegation. 3. In final statements by delegates winding up this phase of deliberations, only Hungary and Bulgaria fully supported Soviet reservations which for time being blocked a treaty. It is interesting that statements by Poland and Romania did not expressly support key Soviet reservation on equal access and reporting. Unless the Soviets remain unwilling because of Vietnam to conclude an agreement in General Assembly, I see no reason why a final treaty text cannot be speedily concluded once the Committee reconvenes in New York. My own analysis of Soviet actions here is that Morozov, the Soviet representative, was acting under instructions not to make a final agreement in Geneva but to reserve a few points as a delaying maneuver. It is my impression that Soviets were unwilling because of concern about Chinese criticism to make it appear that they were agreeing with us too readily on an international treaty of this importance. An alternative explanation is that Soviet delegation at Geneva was concerned about the possibility of a government shake-up and desired to confirm their instructions in Moscow personally before making final agreement. Although present government was confirmed by Supreme Soviet during last stages of our negotiations in Geneva, Morozov in private conversation with me several times referred to the necessity of consulting with "new" government. Whatever the cause, it will be very difficult for the Soviets in the light of the great support the U.S. received in the Committee among other delegations including all non-aligned countries to block an acceptable treaty draft at General Assembly. Finally, I want to convey to the Department the excellent cooperation I received from all members of the U.S. delegation, particularly Meeker, Reis, Helman (State Department); Thacher (USUN); Sohier (NASA); Graybeal (ACDA); Moroncew (ACDA); and Captain Cole (DOD). They were a superb and hardworking team and contributed greatly to the progress we made in Geneva./5/ /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
144. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 8, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret; Exdis. An August 9 cover memorandum from Ball to the President states that this proposal had been "informally discussed with experts in ACDA and the AEC. If you think well of the idea we can go forward with full staffing and clearance with the interested departments." In a telephone conversation, August 10, Walt Rostow told Ball that "he had sent up Ball's Plowshare memo and it came down with note 'approve staffing and Departmental clearance.'" (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Disarmament, Box 3) SUBJECT 1. This memorandum outlines a possible new peaceful initiative in the nuclear field. Ambassador Thompson believes there is a fair chance that the Soviet Union might be prepared to join with us in this proposal. If so, it could pave the way for further nuclear cooperation at a time when we are at an impasse over a nonproliferation treaty.
2. As now worded, the language of the Test Ban Treaty severely restricts us in using peaceful nuclear (Plowshare) explosions to dig tunnels, harbors, etc. This is a point of concern, for example, in connection with the proposed Panama sea-level canal. 3. The Treaty does, however, permit underground explosions, whether for peaceful or military purposes, so long as they do not cause fall-out beyond national limits. Recently there have been some indications that India might set off underground explosions on the excuse that it was developing a Plowshare capability. In this way it could acquire most of the technology needed for military weapons. The proposed scheme would--among its other benefits--remove this excuse. It would thus discourage India and other countries from becoming military nuclear powers through the back door--on the pretext of acquiring Plowshare capability.
4. Under the initiative I propose we would invite the Soviet Union to join with us in a common undertaking to make available to all the nations of the world--nuclear and non-nuclear alike--the benefits of Plowshare explosions for public works projects in their countries. This would involve the creation of an international corporation or other entity that would arrange for, approve, and authorize the US or USSR to conduct such Plowshare explosions. Together we would seek an amendment to the Test Ban Treaty that would permit such explosions when approved and authorized by the international corporation./2/ /2/As more fully discussed in the attachment, the international entity could be given authority either over all Plowshare explosions (including presently lawful underground shots) or over only those explosions of the crater-making type that may violate the present Test Ban Treaty. The first alternative would have the advantages mentioned in the attachment. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. By providing for membership on the entity's Board of Governors for representatives selected by the 93 non-nuclear signatories of the Test Ban Treaty, we would assure a strong voice for non-nuclear states in the control and utilization of this new technology. At the same time the arrangements could be so set up as not to compromise the security of our own Plowshare devices or to create an intolerable risk of military advantages for the power conducting the explosion. 6. As you know, a proposal to permit Plowshare explosions was discussed during the Test Ban negotiations, and elicited some Soviet interest. A draft Plowshare section of the Treaty was largely agreed with some major open points but, by mutual consent, it was then dropped as too complicated in the rush to sign the ultimate Treaty. 7. However, the Treaty was made relatively easy to amend. With the approval of only one-third of the 96 signatories, the Original Parties (US, UK, USSR) can call a conference to consider a proposed amendment. The amendment itself can be adopted by a simple majority of the signatories including all three Original Powers. Dissenting signatories are legally free to withdraw, but are unlikely to risk the world-wide opprobrium that would result.
8. The proposal promises a number of cumulative benefits that increase in importance depending on how far we can get with it. For example: a. By presenting the plan to the Soviets, we could begin a useful dialogue with them, based on our mutual interest in deterring proliferation and in sponsoring peaceful nuclear applications. The discussion themselves would be valuable, regardless of their outcome. (The UK would, of course, have to be brought in at the outset.) b. If the discussions are fruitful, joint US-Soviet sponsorship of a Test Ban Amendment would be a major diplomatic breakthrough, regardless of whether the Amendment is ultimately adopted by the other signatories. Apart from the impact of a joint US-Soviet initiative, key features of the plan would have world wide appeal. The major nuclear powers would be offering the other signatories the economic benefits of peaceful explosions on attractive terms when and if Plowshare proves economically feasible, as well as a strong voice in the international agency that decides when and how such explosions would be conducted in the light of the military and fall-out risks and the economic and political criteria involved. c. If we get this far, it should be easy to get the support of one-third of the Treaty signatories to convene a Conference. The Conference itself would have major political value whatever its outcome, and could help to delay proliferation efforts by the nuclear-capable signatories (e.g., India and Japan). d. With the US, UK and USSR agreed, it should not be too hard to get the simple majority vote needed to adopt an amendment. If adopted, the amendment might help to deter the nuclear-capable signatories from proceeding with their own programs by lawful underground tests. The amendment would deprive them of both political and economic arguments sometimes used to justify going it alone. It is an open question whether the remaining military arguments for going ahead with national programs would be persuasive to most countries. e. If economically viable Plowshare projects are developed and if the international agency works out the many problems involved in approving them, the world can begin to realize another constructive potential from having unlocked the atom. But should the economics and hazards of Plowshare projects prove so intractable that few if any operations are approved and conducted for many years to come, we will still have achieved all of the other benefits described above. f. If the Soviets agree to the international entity plan, we could then discuss with them whether to offer the plan as an independent proposal apart from the current Anti-Proliferation, Threshhold Test Ban and Total Test Ban proposals now being discussed at Geneva, or whether to go the further step of agreeing with the USSR on some compromise version of one of those other proposals, and then offering the two as a single package. A joint package proposal would clearly be better if it proves feasible, but if we are able to agree with the USSR only on the international entity plan for Plowshare, I would favor proceeding with this alone. 9. I attach a memorandum spelling out some aspects of the proposal in more detail./3/ /3/Not printed. George W. Ball/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.
145. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 10, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald B. Helman (IO/UNP) and cleared by Joseph J. Sisco (IO), Leonard C. Meeker (L), and Elizabeth A. Brown (IO/UNP). An attached August 8 memorandum from Robert L. Bruce, S/S Duty Officer, to Thomas R. Shaver (S/S-S) states that Mr. Read would like him to discuss with the Legal Adviser the preparation of a Read to Rostow memorandum on the Celestial Bodies Treaty, setting forth the points agreed on and those not agreed on. A handwritten note on this memorandum states that Helman was doing this. SUBJECT Background--On May 7, President Johnson asked Ambassador Goldberg to undertake the negotiation of a treaty governing the uses of celestial bodies./2/ After some initial private conversations, and a letter from Gromyko to U Thant which indicated that the USSR was interested in such a treaty,/3/ both the U.S. and the USSR tabled drafts./4/ Ambassador Goldberg proposed a meeting on July 12 of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN's Outer Space Committee, and the USSR agreed. The meeting took place in Geneva between July 12 and August 4. /2/See Document 127. /3/Reference is to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's letter of May 30, 1966, to U.N. Secretary-General Thant, requesting inclusion in the agenda of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly of an item entitled "Conclusion of an international agreement on legal principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and conquest of the moon and other celestial bodies," and explaining the Soviet Government's interest in it. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 326-329. /4/The Soviet Draft Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies, June 16, 1966, is ibid., pp. 347-350; the U.S. Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, June 16, 1966, is ibid., pp. 352-355. Negotiations--We agreed at an early stage to expand the scope of a treaty from celestial bodies to outer space generally. The Soviet draft Treaty had proposed this broader scope with which we were prepared to go along, as the Soviet text was drawn in large part from UN resolutions which we had taken the leadership in obtaining. We held a number of private bilateral discussions with the USSR in which points of agreement and disagreement were defined. The proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee reflected the results of these discussions. Results--Agreement was reached on thirteen substantive points (Tab A). The most significant of these are (a) the translation into a treaty obligation of the UN resolution banning the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, outer space or on celestial bodies; (b) an unconditional commitment to assist and return astronauts who land in another state and to publish discoveries relating to astronaut safety; and (c) the proscription of claims of sovereignty over and national appropriation of celestial bodies. There are two principal issues which divide us at the moment: a. Access--We insist that the principle of free access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies be reflected in a treaty, subject only to reasonable safety precautions. The USSR has sought to qualify the right of access with such concepts as "reciprocity" and agreement as to the timing of visits. b. Reporting--Our treaty article as tabled provides for compulsory reporting to the Secretary-General on the nature and location of activities on celestial bodies and publication of information on the results of these activities for the benefit of the public and the international scientific community. The USSR insists that the reporting obligation should be voluntary. There are two other differences which should not prove as difficult. One relates to the types of military structures to be prohibited on celestial bodies and the nature of the equipment to be permitted. We are substantially in agreement with the USSR on permitted and prohibited structures and equipment, but have not been able to reflect this in treaty language. The other difference involves a USSR proposal which would require a state hosting a tracking installation to grant similar facilities to other space powers. We suspect that the USSR tabled such a provocative proposal to serve as a barrier to the conclusion of a treaty until they are ready for one. We received generally strong support from members of the subcommittee for our position on the disagreed provisions. Tab B contains a chart of agreed and disagreed principles./5/ /5/Not printed. Next Step--The results of the Subcommittee's work will be reported to the Outer Space Committee./6/ The Subcommittee also decided to hold further negotiations before or during the 21st General Assembly. We will be pressing for early talks but recognize that the USSR has the capacity to delay negotiations and agreement. /6/Reference is to U.N. Document A/6431, Report of Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; Annex III: Report of Legal Subcommittee on work of its 5th session, 12 July-4 August and 12-16 September 1966. BHR
Tab A/7/ /7/No classification marking. POINTS AGREED IN OUTER SPACE TREATY 1. The exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all mankind. 2. There shall be freedom of exploration and use of outer space for all states on a basis of equality. 3. There shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 4. Freedom of scientific research in outer space and international cooperation to that end should be assured. 5. Claims of sovereignty and national appropriation are barred. 6. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 7. The role of international law and the U.N. charter in man's future activities in outer space should be established. 8. There shall be an unconditional obligation to help and to return astronauts in distress and to exchange information relating to astronaut safety. 9. Launching states are liable for any damages. 10. There shall be no contamination or harmful interference in space activities. 11. Launching nations shall retain ownership over the objects sent into outer space and other states should return these objects. 12. Parties to the treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space. 13. No weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in outer space or on celestial bodies.
146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 2, 1966, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:52 p.m. the same day. The source text bears the following choices for approval: "Set up a special meeting, Put on Tuesday lunch agenda, Leave it to Secretary Rusk, and See me." The choice "Put on Tuesday lunch agenda" is checked. No record of the Tuesday lunch discussion has been found. Mr. President: In the light of my memorandum to you of August 12, 1966,/2/ I have talked with Bob McNamara at length about the non-proliferation treaty. /2/The memorandum under reference sets forth Rostow's conclusions from his thoughts on nonproliferation and arms control which he elaborated in an attached memorandum of the same date to the President. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 1, 1966-September 27, 1966, Box 30) He agrees that the heart of the matter is this: so long as we are committed to NATO we cannot, should not, will not give up our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons in that theater. The issue arises in connection with the "European clause": it never arose with the MLF, where the retention of our veto was universally accepted. There have been several U.S. statements in the past which implied that if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a presumably integrated European nuclear force. Behind these statements were three judgments: --It was wise to encourage the movement towards European unity, and unity would be encouraged by "not ruling out" the possibility of a European force with a right to fire as independent as that now enjoyed by U.K. and France; --If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration and seriously contemplated the problem, they would, in fact, not ask for the surrender of the U.S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U.S. commitment this would bring about than they would gain by this act of "independence;" --If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration, and there was a European executive equivalent to the President of the United States, a rational arrangement could be worked out with that executive consistent with the requirements of the alliance. The non-proliferation treaty forces us to face this issue sooner than we might otherwise have to face it; because the European clause in the treaty makes a reality out of a quite distant but important contingency. If we are now to probe Gromyko and the Russians deeply as to the possibility of a non-proliferation treaty, Bob McNamara's and my judgment is that the probe should take place on this question: Would the Russians sign a treaty if we were to guarantee that we would not surrender under any future circumstances, and whatever the form of nuclear organization in the West, our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons? As I said in my memo, this is the one issue on which the Russians might have a legitimate interest in the nuclear organization of the West, and it is an issue where Russian and U.S. interests converge with those of Europe, if the Europeans think the matter through. If Secretary Rusk should find that Gromyko was willing to accept a non-proliferation treaty based on this principle, we would, however, then face an interesting problem of persuading the Europeans to accept this proposition. I believe the job could be done because, at bottom, what the Europeans are really groping for--although they are not very clear about it--is not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons and its troops and go home. The British and French national nuclear capabilities and a future possible European nuclear force is a kind of insurance that, if we should ever move in this way, Western Europe would not be left naked of nuclear capacity. But so long as we remain a fully committed ally of Europe, Europeans can, I believe, be made to see: --that it is ridiculous for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours; and --that the threat to use a small nuclear force in Europe to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were not committed could only lead to the U.S. pulling back and dissociating itself from European defense. No American President is going to place in the hands of the Europeans--or anyone else--the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear war. The outcome of such sober and careful discussion with the Europeans would, I believe, be an understanding that so long as they wanted our total commitment, including a nuclear commitment, to the defense of Europe, a European nuclear force could relate to ours only on the same basis as the two-key system now works: namely, that affirmative action both by Europe and the U.S. would be necessary for the firing of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. Therefore, we suggest that: 1. Secretary Rusk focus on this question of the continued U.S. veto in his talks with Gromyko; 2. If it emerges that this is the critical issue with Moscow, we then tell Gromyko that we must talk with our allies and then come back to him. I am raising this with you at Bob McNamara's request. He feels that you, Secretary Rusk, and he ought to talk about this before the conversation with Gromyko is undertaken in New York. For some reason he did not feel free to raise it directly with Secretary Rusk, as I suggested he might. It is possible that Secretary Rusk would have views which differed from Bob's and mine in this matter; and he may have alternative formulae to suggest to try out on Gromyko. This matter is so fundamental that you may wish to budget for a small and quite leisurely meeting with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara in which we could hear Secretary Rusk's views about how to probe Gromyko; Bob McNamara would have a chance to express his; and you would have a chance to give Secretary Rusk guidance for his talks on this subject with Gromyko. To recall my own approach to this question of the U.S. veto, I am attaching my memorandum of August 12. Walt
147. Report Prepared by a Panel Appointed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/1/ Washington, September 2, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text has two cover memoranda: the first from Larry Williamson (S/S-S) to Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), et al., September 6, transmitting the report. The second from William C. Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals, September 2, transmits the Ad Hoc Panel's Report and explains the origins of the Panel as follows: "at the meeting of the Deputies to the Committee of Principals held on June 3, 1966, serious questions were raised about the possibilities of evasion of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty through provisions for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As a result ACDA organized a panel of experts consisting of Dr. Richard Blankenbecler, Dr. Warren Heckrotte, Mr. William J. Howard, Dr. William G. McMillan, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, and Dr. M. Carl Walske under the chairmanship of Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky to study the security implications of modifying various agreements to ban nuclear weapons tests while permitting explosions for peaceful purposes." REPORT OF THE ACDA PANEL ON SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MODIFYING VARIOUS AGREEMENTS TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS WHILE PERMITTING EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES [Here follows a table of contents.] I. Introduction The Panel to examine the security implications of modifying various agreements to ban nuclear weapons tests while permitting explosions for peaceful uses/2/ was convened at the request of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Panel was requested to address itself to the following questions. /2/Throughout the report the terms "Plowshare" and "peaceful uses" are used synonymously; and therefore the first term should not be interpreted as limited to the present U.S. program. [Footnote in the source text.] a. What types of weapons development or effects tests could be carried out as part of legitimate or defendable peaceful uses explosions programs within the terms of a limited, a threshold and a comprehensive test ban treaty? b. What would be the probability of verifying that no illegal weapons development or effects tests were carried out as a part of a peaceful uses explosions program? c. What is the military significance of developments which might be carried out under "a." above and by illegal means? d. What types of verification arrangements could be incorporated in such treaties in order to reduce to acceptable levels the risk that U.S. security might be compromised by development under "a." and "b." above? The Panel met in Washington on June 28, 1966; in Livermore, California, on July 14, 1966; in Los Angeles on July 30, 1966; and in Washington on August 21, 1966 to examine these questions and to receive information on the status of U.S. and USSR Plowshare and weapons test programs. Particular attention was paid to techniques for carrying out actual nuclear weapons tests. Sub-groups of the panel also met to examine various more specialized problems associated with the topic. It was not a function of the Panel to evaluate the usefulness of specific projects for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions or the value of such programs as a whole; likewise it was not a function of the Panel to evaluate the merits or demerits of specific test ban proposals per se, except insofar as additive provisions to such test ban proposals relating to peaceful uses explosions might provide opportunities for obtaining weapons development or weapons effects information, or contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Consequently it should be made clear that, although our report contains numerous definite conclusions, it does not contain recommendations for or endorsements of either specific test ban proposals or specific projects relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. The Panel would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation received from ACDA and from the AEC staff and its laboratories, particularly from the Livermore Laboratory./3/ /3/The LRL report "Technical Relation Between Plowshare and Weapons Programs Under Various Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Proposals" by G. Werth and W. Heckrotte, dated August 1, 1966, was made available to the Panel. [Footnote in the source text; a copy of this Livermore Radiation Laboratory report is attached to a September 6 cover memorandum from T.R. Shaver (S/S-S) to Johnson (G), et al. in Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2.] II. Conclusions This Panel was charged with analyzing the implication of a Plowshare annex to various forms of nuclear test ban treaties. In the conclusions to follow we interpret the term "annex" to mean an addition to the treaty that would provide for a declaration of purpose of a peaceful uses explosion combined with some kind of approval mechanism and that would permit observers with specified duties and powers to attend the operation. In addition to these general provisions, possible annexes might, for example, restrict the yields available to a Plowshare detonation or require that explosive devices be placed at an early specified time in a warehouse. We have assumed that disclosure of the device would not be permitted to other nuclear-weapons-powers or non-nuclear-weapon-powers. Disclosure to the latter would reveal weapon technology, and disclosure to the former raises serious and difficult problems of national security. The US has agreed to the present limited test ban in the hope of retarding the development and diffusion of military nuclear explosive technology. In the absence of a Soviet "open society," a basic policy of the US Government toward any arms control agreement is that it be adequately verified so as to give reasonable assurance that U.S. security interests are protected. While we see little incompatibility between a Plowshare annex and the limited restrictions on weapons development imposed by the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the basic question faced by this Panel centered around whether this policy of verification on the one hand and full development and exploitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on the other are compatible with further tightening of the test ban limitations. Our conclusion is that the answer to this general question is "no," primarily since even with an extensive observer program it is not possible to assure that the basic data needed for military device development are not being obtained in a given Plowshare operation. However, a more limited Plowshare program excluding excavation may be compatible with a further extension of the LTBT. In further detail we submit the following conclusions: 1. To the extent that Plowshare annexes of the types considered by the Panel extend the yields and types of tests permissible under the test ban treaty, they correspondingly open the possibility of some important weapons device development being carried out as part of Plowshare operations, and to an even greater extent in connection with tests for the development of Plowshare explosives. 2. It is possible through observers of a Plowshare operation to restrict severely the acquisition of diagnostic data on specialized device outputs or on weapons effects tests, depending upon the number of observers, their tools and their degree and duration of access. Achievement of an adequate observer program may be a serious negotiation problem. 3. Plowshare activities under any treaty annex would not make a technical contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations unless (a) the annex provided for disclosure of the design of the devices used or for their inspection, (b) the declaration of purpose or the permitted activities of the observers would reveal nuclear device design information, or (c) the annex allowed the development or detonation of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear nations. 4. If a Plowshare annex were to be added to the present LTBT the military potential of the nations now subscribing to the treaty would not be substantially affected in view of the large flexibility in terms of nuclear tests allowed under the present treaty. Although an excavation program permitted by a Plowshare annex is compatible with the restrictions on weapons development imposed by the LTBT, such an annex would set a serious precedent which could be incompatible with future more restrictive test bans./4/ /4/Dr. Heckrotte believes that an evaluation of a Plowshare annex to the LTBT as a "serious precedent" involves value judgments of Plowshare and test ban treaties dependent on technical, economic, and political factors, most of which were not within the purview of this Panel. [Footnote in the source text.] 5. A Plowshare annex to a seismic threshold test ban treaty (TTBT) that permitted an extensive Plowshare program would have the effect of circumventing the yield threshold for weapons development. A Plowshare annex based on a yield limit for explosions in hard rock corresponding to the yield legal in "soft" media under a TTBT could permit some underground engineering activity. If the annex permitted in effect a substantial increase in the nuclear test yield, then, for example, the impediment that a threshold test ban provided toward further development of area defense anti-missile warheads could be circumvented. In addition, the annex would leave the option open for Soviet Union developments in lighter-weight strategic warheads of high yield-to-weight ratio that would contribute to a MIRV development. Particularly serious is the loophole made possible by a Plowshare annex that would permit a few high-yield weapons development tests that could culminate illegally a series of lower-yield tests carried out legally under a threshold test ban treaty. These "loopholes" provided by the annex could have exceedingly serious consequences for the U.S. deterrent if the Soviet Union chose this means of evasion. 6. Under a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), a Plowshare annex would in effect decrease the "comprehensiveness" of the treaty by permitting, even in the absence of explicit evasion, continued nuclear device development over a wide range of yields and proof testing of the stockpile, and by maintaining the vitality of nuclear weapons establishments. The ability to maintain the vitality of the weapons establishments of both the U.S. and the USSR would make the asymmetry through possible Soviet cheating under a CTBT less significant than if no Plowshare program were permitted. However, an annex permitting an extensive Plowshare program,/5/ including excavation, would make possible weapon developments as discussed in Para. 5 above and also would add weapon development possibilities below the threshold. These loopholes, if used by the Soviet Union and not by the U.S. could have highly damaging military consequences. Such an annex adds extensive evasion possibilities to the limited evasion possibilities available without an annex. /5/Dr. Heckrotte believes that some attention should be given to the possibilities of accommodating a limited Plowshare program to more restrictive test bans. This could avoid risks which would be introduced at this time by an annex to more restrictive test bans which permitted an extensive Plowshare program; for example, see pages 14 and 16 and also the LRL report mentioned on page 4. [Footnote in the source text.] [Here follow Sections III-V of the report entitled "Nuclear Test Requirements for Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties," "The Evasion Possibilities and the Possible Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties," and "Military Significance of the Nuclear Test Program Possible Under Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties," respectively, and Appendix A, "Examples of Peaceful Uses and Nuclear Explosive Requirements."]
148. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 15, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT As a result of the recent private discussions with the Soviets at Geneva, I believe it should be possible to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement which would not interfere with the "McNamara Committee"/2/ type of nuclear consultative arrangements and which would not require changes in our existing bilateral NATO nuclear arrangements. I am transmitting the text of such an agreement./3/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 108. /3/Not printed. Although this draft treaty does not expressly so state, I believe we can only negotiate it if we make clear to the Soviets that we are no longer holding open the option of transferring ownership of nuclear warheads to the Federal Republic of Germany or to an association of states through which the FRG obtains joint ownership of nuclear warheads. U.S. law presently prohibits the exercise of this option and both the Administration and Congress have made it clear that they do not favor a change in this legislation. It is, of course, necessary to advise Chancellor Erhard of our thoughts on this matter and it might be advisable to do so prior to his visit at the end of this month. A draft of a possible letter from you to Chancellor Erhard is attached./3/ I recognize that there are other aspects of our relations with the Federal Republic which make this an unfavorable time to seek German recognition of the realities of the current situation but the passage of time will continue to make it increasingly difficult to clarify this matter. The Germans are undoubtedly aware that it is extremely unlikely that we will ever exercise this option and if we do not clear the matter up and are forced to reiterate at the time of the Erhard visit/4/ that we are keeping the option open, it may well cause increased doubts among Germans about U.S. frankness in dealing with them. /4/West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard visited the United States September 24-27 meeting with President Johnson and other high officials, September 26-27. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 207 and 208. Once we have come to an understanding with the Federal Republic, the United States would be in the position to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in the conversations between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko. I recommend that those conversations be preceded by a letter from you to Chairman Kosygin. I have attached a draft of such letter./5/ /5/Not printed. William C. Foster
149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 16, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret. A September 16 cover memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to Rusk reads as follows: "Pursuant to your commitment to the President at lunch last Tuesday, I have had the attached memorandum prepared setting forth the pros (from the AEC papers) and the cons (from Bill Foster's memoranda) and your recommendation that the President authorize the experiment to proceed. ACDA has approved the con portion of the memo and Alex Johnson has approved the whole memo. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum." A typed note on the source text states that the memorandum was "approved by the President. W. Rostow's office notifying AEC of approval." SUBJECT Recommendation: I recommend that you authorize the AEC to conduct the Cabriolet test, without prejudice to the decision on any subsequent cratering experiment in the Plowshare series which should be evaluated and decided on the merits at the time and in light of experience with Cabriolet. Problem: The AEC is requesting approval to conduct Cabriolet, a 2.7 kiloton nuclear cratering Plowshare experiment, about December 1, 1966, in Nevada. Some radioactive debris will be released into the atmosphere, since the object of the experiment is to produce a crater. There is no health hazard involved, but a detectable amount of radioactive debris can be expected to drift from Nevada and cross the Canadian border. The consensus among proponents and opponents is that there is a 50-50 chance that a certain amount of debris would be picked up and identified by the Canadians as coming from Cabriolet; a much slighter chance that detection would occur when the debris had proceeded beyond Canada.
The main arguments AEC and others have cited for conducting Cabriolet are: It would permit continued U.S. technical progress in nuclear excavation, which we have indications the USSR is also pursuing. It would help maintain the credibility of the nuclear excavation option for a sea level Panama Isthmus Canal. It would furnish data necessary to support the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission program, and permit tentative planning of follow-on experiments needed if the Commission's reporting schedule to you is to be kept. It would allay Joint Atomic Energy Committee concern that we seem to have stopped conducting a nuclear excavation program, whereas testimony to the Congress in connection with the Test Ban Treaty, as well as subsequently, indicated that cratering experiments could and would continue to be conducted without violating the Treaty or future amendments thereto.
The main arguments which ACDA and others have made against conducting Cabriolet are: There is an even chance that it would expose the U.S. to a charge of violating the Test Ban Treaty by depositing across our border detectable, identifiable radioactive debris from a U.S. test. Consideration of Cabriolet should not be separated from the decision to be made on the overall Plowshare program. To be meaningful, Cabriolet would have to be followed by other and larger shots, thus increasing still further the probability of charges of Treaty violation. If we are charged publicly with a violation of the Treaty as a result of Cabriolet, it could hamper consideration of other Plowshare peaceful explosion proposals, such as that suggesting the creation of an international entity to offer Plowshare services to the world. The ACDA General Advisory Committee on Disarmament, headed by John McCloy, expressed a formal consensus without dissent on September 13, that it opposed the conduct of Cabriolet, because of "prejudice to non-proliferation" and concern about a conscious violation of the Test Ban Treaty. The Committee includes men such as I.I. Rabi, Herbert York, John Cowles, George Kistiakowsky, Roger Blough and Tray Post. Discussion: This problem has been considered fully and carefully over a considerable period of time at the highest levels of government. It is my view that the advantages of proceeding with Cabriolet outweigh the risks. Dean Rusk/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |