1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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150. Editorial Note The International Atomic Energy Agency held the 10th regular session of its general conference in Vienna September 21-28, 1966. In his remarks to the conference on September 22, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, delivered a message from President Johnson, emphasizing the U.S. commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards over peaceful uses of atomic energy as a principal instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. (U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Washington, November 1967), page 182) Seaborg's biweekly letter to President Johnson on October 11 highlights the proceedings of the conference as follows: "(a) The Polish and Czech delegates announced the willingness of their governments to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards provided West Germany would do the same. The USSR delegate endorsed the Polish-Czech offer, which is now under consideration. The West German reply stressed the fact that all of their nuclear facilities are already under effective Euratom safeguards. "(b) The Conference approved the 1967 regular (assessed) budget of $9.5 million and the 1967 operational (voluntary) budget of $2.4 million. For the first time pledges to the operational program were made by Soviet Bloc countries (USSR--about $111,000; Poland--$25,000, and Czechoslovakia--$14,000). "(c) The Conference approved the membership applications of Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Uganda, which will raise the number of IAEA countries to 99. "(d) The IAEA Board of Governors approved the application of IAEA safeguards to the U.S. bilateral agreements with Spain and Australia." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 13, pages 372-373)
151. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MC/11 New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15-11:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly, September-October 1966. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
SESSION SUBJECT /2/Part I dealt with a Civil Air Agreement; Part II with an Indonesian Creditors' Moratorium. (Ibid.) Part IV is Document 152. PARTICIPANTS US USSR The Secretary expressed the hope that the negotiations concerning an agreement for peaceful exploration of outer space could soon be brought to a successful conclusion. We felt that the discussions in the UN Committee had resulted in considerable progress and that the remaining issues had really narrowed down to one or two specific points./3/ He hoped that our colleagues could resume their discussions here in New York and reach agreement on these remaining points during the present UN General Assembly meeting. For our part we were prepared to undertake necessary measures for mutual use of tracking stations as far as US territory was concerned; we could not, however, force third countries to do the same, although we would be willing to do all we could to encourage all countries to take a cooperative position. The Secretary repeated his hope that our negotiators could bring the work they started in Geneva to a successful conclusion. /3/The Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in Geneva, July 12-August 4, and reached agreement on most points of the draft outer space treaty including one arms control measure, namely that "No party will orbit any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or station such a weapon on a celestial body." (U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Washington, November 1967), p. 14) The Legal Subcommittee resumed negotiations in New York, September 12, but reached no further agreement before it adjourned September 16. Mr. Gromyko agreed that the outer space negotiations had achieved positive results and that there remained only the one point the Secretary had mentioned. He expressed the view that all countries signing the proposed agreement must assume the same obligations and enjoy the same rights so that the principle of equality be preserved. If however some countries took the position that their "relatives" would be extended privileges while other countries would be denied these same privileges, the principle of equality was violated; what kind of cooperation would that represent? He was surprised that the Soviet proposal of equal rights and obligations had met such a negative response. He was sure that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would not affect the interests of the United States. He would, therefore, like to see a more positive attitude on the part of the US toward this principle of equality of rights and obligations. Did the Secretary see any possibility of overcoming this difficulty? If so, he thought a treaty could be signed soon. He asked the Secretary to think about this problem; the Soviet Union was not, after all, asking the impossible. The Secretary replied that given this Soviet position we would have to face the very real possibility that the US and the USSR would be the only two countries signing the outer space agreement; other countries might not be willing to sign. Such a Soviet and American signature in itself might represent a positive step; but, as is the case in negotiating "most favored nation" treatment in trade agreements, this was really a matter for bilateral negotiations between the countries involved. The Secretary did not believe that this single issue should stand in the way of signing an outer space treaty. Mr. Gromyko repeated that this difficulty would have to be overcome. He agreed that the representatives of the two countries should continue to exchange opinions on this matter, but would hope to see greater objectivity on the part of the United States. If all parties agreed to cooperate on an equal basis there was no problem, otherwise this represented an instance of discrimination against the Soviet Union. He realized that the United States had worked out use of tracking stations with other countries on a bilateral basis, and he did not blame the US for doing so, but this had taken place when an outer space treaty was not even being discussed. Now that such a treaty was under consideration, being a multilateral treaty, new arrangements on a multilateral basis, providing for the principle of equality, were in order. Ambassador Goldberg commented that we ought to be able to reach agreement; in fact, we had leaned over so far backwards for the purpose of reaching agreement that certain American newspapers had referred to the outer space negotiations as a succession of American retreats. On the UN General Assembly floor we had said today that we accept the principle on a bilateral basis./4/ We are willing to work out a bilateral tracking station agreement with the USSR; we are further willing to include in the preamble of the agreement a statement emphasizing the desirability of signatory countries working out practical arrangements with each other. As a practical matter this was not really a problem which easily lent itself to multilateral solution. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Lebanon and Australia wanted to have their own say in this matter. We did not encourage any opposition on the part of any country to working out suitable technical arrangements with the Soviet Union and with each other; this was not only a matter of equality of rights, but also a matter of very special technical arrangements. Thus, for example, tracking facilities set up for our purposes would not be of help to the Soviet Union, since different equipment would be required. The Ambassador emphasized that this was not a matter of opposition on the part of the US, but rather a matter of other sovereign states wanting to have their own say in the matter. As a matter of fact, some of our friends had told us that the offer we made today had put them in an awkward position. We should have a treaty before either of us achieved a landing on the moon. Later such a treaty would present many more difficulties. It is for this reason that we are willing to include a statement as to the desirability of bilateral arrangements being worked out in the preamble or text of the proposed treaty. /4/See Goldberg's statement before the U.N. General Assembly in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 962. Mr. Gromyko agreed that representatives of the two countries meet and discuss possible solutions; the points of view of both countries had been expressed clearly.
152. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MC/11 New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15-11:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
SESSION OF New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT /2/See footnote 2, Document 151. PARTICIPANTS US USSR Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs The Secretary raised the question of reaching an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that we believed very strongly that this problem was most urgent and important. The United States was opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not presently in possession of such weapons. We also believed that the Soviet Union was opposed to such proliferation. We had never discussed any arrangements providing for the delivery of nuclear weapons into the hands of any other state, neither in NATO nor anywhere else. This position of the US was really very old. Because of the very nature of these weapons we were determined to prevent their proliferation. We were somewhat puzzled over the difficulty of reaching agreement on this subject; we regarded the problem as being urgent and as one in which the passage of time was making it more and more difficult to come to an effective agreement. This was not really a problem between the United States and the Soviet Union. The true importance of the problem dealt with those states which did not now possess nuclear weapons, but were desirous of moving in the direction of acquiring nuclear capability. As time elapsed more and more obstacles were being raised by such non-nuclear countries. Some such states now say that they would not join in a non-proliferation agreement unless it also provided for agreement between nuclear countries for steps toward nuclear disarmament. While this in itself is desirable it should not be a condition of reaching agreement on non-proliferation. Some countries, such as India, for example, state that they must reserve the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; well, if you have that capability you also have the capability of using a nuclear bomb. As Mr. Gromyko knew, some non-nuclear countries have said that they could not participate in a non-proliferation agreement unless they had nuclear guarantees from nuclear countries in the event of an attack. The Secretary thought that difficulties of this type will keep on growing with time. In the meanwhile, we know that some countries are, as it were, "seven months pregnant." We thought that toward the end of the Geneva negotiations we had moved toward the prospect of an agreement between our two countries./3/ At one of the last meetings Ambassador Roschin had said that the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries was the real heart of the matter. We agree that this is so. In the past a variety of issues had been injected into the negotiations which had nothing whatever to do with non-proliferation. But in the recent discussion between Mr. Fisher and Amb. Roschin, the Secretary felt that there was a possibility of moving toward an agreement./4/ He wanted to emphasize the urgency and the danger involved in the time factor. A non-proliferation agreement was clearly in the interest of both countries; in this respect they had common interests. Perhaps a part of the difficulty consisted in both countries having become "frozen" to the texts of the proposed agreement; perhaps we could find new language to close the gap, which would offer the possibility of reaching agreement. We have not discussed this matter with our allies and any contacts between the two countries would have to be carried on on the basis of complete discretion; otherwise nothing could be accomplished. The Secretary would be glad to hear from Mr. Gromyko whether he thought Ambassadors Roschin and Foster could find some new language which might open the door to agreement. He was greatly concerned over the increasing difficulties presented by long delay in reaching agreement. /3/The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva June 14-August 25. /4/The discussions between Fisher and Roschin have not been further identified. Mr. Gromyko said that non-proliferation was an old question, which had been discussed at great length, and yet, if the Secretary had not raised it at this meeting, he would have done so himself because of its importance and because it concerned all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. We had already lost a great deal of time with detrimental consequences. Thus, for example, just one year ago the foreign minister of India had discussed non-proliferation matters in a very timid manner, whereas today India was taking a stronger position;/5/ the Secretary said he had noted the same thing. Later this point of view would become even more widespread and this could also be seen in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. Not only India, but other states also are beginning to tie non-proliferation to other questions such as halting the production of fissionable material, etc. The Secretary knew that if non-proliferation was tied to such matters there might not be any treaty at all. Mr. Gromyko wondered whether India and others proposing such tie-ins were serious or not, and whether a treaty with broad participation would be possible in view of such attitudes. He, too, therefore believed that there was no time to be lost in reaching agreement. As concerns the Soviet Government, it was ready to sign a treaty banning direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons. He wanted to ask the question very clearly, whether the US was ready to say so in the treaty. He defined what he meant by saying that the treaty must contain a prohibition against non-nuclear countries producing or receiving nuclear weapons directly or indirectly. Nuclear countries must be forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons into the national hands of any non-nuclear country, directly or indirectly. He added that the Secretary knew what he meant by the word "indirectly." He meant by that transfer of nuclear weapons through an alliance. If the treaty could contain such a prohibition, he would think that the major part of the difficulties was already behind us. It was true that there were some other points to be discussed also, but he did not now want to do so, they could be discussed later. He asked the Secretary to clarify the US position on these points and added that these questions should not be regarded as a matter in which one country would lose something while another gained, since both countries were equally interested in closing the door to nuclear proliferation. The problem was far too serious for considerations of tactics or prestige to be given any importance at all. This crucial problem affected the interests of nuclear and non-nuclear states alike. /5/The discussion in 1965 by Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and the current Indian position on nonproliferation have not been further identified. In reply the Secretary stated categorically that as far as the United States was concerned, we shall not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries; we shall not assist any non-nuclear country to develop or fire nuclear weapons; American nuclear weapons would be fired at the command of the President of the United States exclusively. If the United States joined in an alliance arrangement, nuclear weapons would still be fired only at the command of the President of the United States. If the Secretary understood Mr. Gromyko's question concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons correctly, his answer was an unqualified yes, and Ambassadors Roschin and Foster could discuss the language with a view to eliminating any possible hidden misunderstanding. He again emphasized the point that if this was merely a question between our two countries, we would not need a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The very essence of the situation made it clear that both countries must be opposed to the appearance of nuclear powers; even the present five were too many. Mr. Gromyko interrupted to say that even one was one too many. The Secretary agreed and blessed Bernard Baruch for having seen this fact in his time./6/ He said that if the US and the USSR could reach agreement on a treaty, while they would still be unable to force other countries to sign it, they would be in a much better position to influence them to do so. He pointed out that many of the arguments used by non-nuclear countries against non-proliferation were merely contrived pretexts, designed to hold their positions open for future negotiating purposes. He did not accept such arguments as genuine. The Secretary went on to say that he could not see why our two countries could not agree about the heart of the matter and then put their heads together to see what could be done to make other countries, which were presently merely "flirting," sign the treaty. /6/See footnote 5, Document 97. Foreign Minister Gromyko asked for clarification. The Secretary had said that without the US Government, indeed, without orders from the President of the United States personally, American nuclear weapons could not be fired. Mr. Gromyko said that this was not the question here, although this, too, raised some other questions he would prefer to leave for another occasion. The main problem was to find out where we now stood. The Soviet Union proposed that the treaty prohibit non-nuclear countries from manufacturing and receiving into their national hands nuclear weapons from nuclear countries and further that they not be given access to nuclear weapons through blocs, alliances or military organizations. Conversely nuclear countries were to be forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons into the national hands of non-nuclear countries or to grant non-nuclear countries access to nuclear weapons through blocs, alliances or military organizations. Did the Secretary agree that these two conditions must be reflected in a non-proliferation treaty, or not? It seemed to Mr. Gromyko that these two conditions, concerning direct and indirect transfer must be included in such a treaty. He wanted to ascertain that position of the United States in this respect at the present time. He knew that the US was interested in a non-proliferation treaty and he was sure the Secretary also knew that the Soviet Union was interested in it. He was only trying to tie what the Secretary had said to the language of the proposed treaty. In reply the Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko to go directly to the heart of the matter and to deal with it clearly. Unfortunately during the past two or three years a great deal of theology had accumulated around the use of certain terms, such as "give, dispose of, turn over to, contribute to the ability of non-nuclear powers to obtain the technology required" etc. The situation, on the other hand, was very clear. We should try to return to language which would cut through words and misunderstandings. We ought to see if such language could be found. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not believe the difficulty to be a matter of theology or semantics only. He would ask the question in a different way. There had been plans in existence for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force or an Atlantic nuclear force, mixed manning of ships bearing nuclear weapons, etc. The Soviet Union regarded all such forces as being a form of access to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. The Secretary was surely better informed than he as to the plans and status of such forces, but all of them, in the Soviet view, represented access of non-nuclear countries to nuclear weapons. The United States maintained that this was not the case, that you did not grant the Federal Republic of Germany or any other country access to nuclear weapons. Therefore he now asked whether these plans are still in existence or not, whether any plans the USSR considered to represent access are under consideration. Since the Secretary did not keep the Soviet Union informed of such plans and since the press also was not informed, he did not know. If there were no such plans in existence and if the United States was willing to accept a ban on direct and indirect proliferation, the Soviet Union would be fully satisfied and by these provisions in the treaty all loopholes would have been closed. It was this question that needed to be clarified. It was on this question that we stumbled two or three years ago and we have not been able to move ahead since. The Soviet Union was convinced that the United States would not lose by a non-proliferation agreement and Mr. Gromyko was willing to believe that the US was not interested in proliferation and that it did not dispute the Soviet Union's interest in reaching a non-proliferation agreement. Why, then, could not a way be found to do so? The Secretary replied that the US could not make the USSR the 16th member of NATO with veto power at the NATO table any more than the USSR could admit the US with veto power to the Warsaw Pact. What the two countries could agree to was a clear and precise ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States was willing to sign an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of non-nuclear countries, not to put any non-nuclear country in a position to fire nuclear weapons, to give assurances that such American weapons would be fired only at the order of the President of the United States, and not to help any other country acquire the technology required to produce nuclear weapons or to assist any other country in firing them; we had demonstrated our good faith in this respect by our attitude to France's nuclear tests in the Pacific. The Secretary suggested that between now and the meeting scheduled for Saturday evening (September 24, 1966)/7/ Ambassadors Roschin and Foster and any advisers they wanted to assist them attempt to work out a text acceptable to both sides. The Secretary added that he had not mentioned further talks with the USSR to our allies at Geneva simply because we did not then think that we had come close enough to resolving the difficulties. If anything needed to be said now it would only be that the US and the USSR were discussing the very heart of the problem. /7/For the record of the Rusk-Gromyko meeting on September 24, see Document 153. Ambassador Foster added that the Soviet Union had apparently been haunted by the specter of the FRG; yet, we had no intention of giving the Germans access to nuclear weapons for this would be contrary to the philosophy the US had been guided by for the past twenty years, namely that only we had the right to fire American nuclear weapons. We have no intention to give up this national control and we would not help any non-nuclear country obtain nuclear weapons, for we believe it to be contrary to our interest to increase the number of nuclear powers. The matter of reaching agreement on non-proliferation is most urgent, for the price of obtaining other countries' consent keeps on going up day to day. Now may very well be our last chance to work out an agreement. Mr. Gromyko restated his position to the effect that a general statement of intentions, without more precise definition, concrete obligations, would lead to a variety of interpretations of a specific act on the part of a signatory country. The US would tend to interpret its own acts one way and the Soviet Union another, and vice versa. We would then find ourselves in a trap and such a treaty would have been stillborn. Therefore it was not enough to prohibit just in a general way the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also be necessary to define channels, forms, concepts, etc. We should attempt to put this more precisely in the text of the treaty. This is a problem, which must be solved, no matter who puts their heads together. The Secretary proposed that this question be considered again by looking at some language to be drafted before the meeting Saturday evening and Mr. Gromyko agreed. The Secretary further proposed that the press merely be told that some preliminary discussions on questions of mutual interest had been held at the present meeting. Mr. Gromyko agreed.
153. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MC/16 New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30-11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (OPR/LS (Interpreter)) and approved by Thompson (S/AL) and by S on September 26. This conversation was held during Foreign Minister Gromyko's dinner for Secretary Rusk at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Rusk visited New York September 19-25 and October 4-8 during the general debate at the U.N. General Assembly. (Johnson Library, Rusk's Appointment Book) SUBJECT /2/Vietnam was the subject of Part II. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84) PARTICIPANTS US Participants USSR Participants Non-Proliferation Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he would like to take the present opportunity to express his thoughts on non-proliferation in the most precise words and asked that both sides be outspoken in order to clarify as accurately as possible whether or not a sound foundation for a non-proliferation treaty existed. Personally, he did note a certain rapprochement between the two positions. If this was indeed the case, he suggested that both sides join in a concerted effort to work out appropriate language for a treaty. After the discussion which had been held during the past two days his representatives had informed him of such rapprochement, but it still remained unclear how to express this in mutually acceptable language. He wanted to repeat what he had said many times, namely that we should not sign a treaty which could be open to misinterpretation, for, after all, after its signing the principals would go their separate ways to Washington and Moscow and would not be in a position to resolve differing interpretations. For this reason it was not enough to word the treaty in general language only, we had to be more precise so as to avoid misinterpretations. In addition, it seemed to him that both sides must try to put aside purely diplomatic formulations; the interests of both countries as well as of others, indeed of the entire world were involved, and this in itself precluded the signing of a non-proliferation treaty which was not worded precisely and accurately. He emphasized once again that he hoped both sides would be frank and outspoken in their search for agreement. The Secretary wanted to comment briefly on the problem as he saw it. He was going to be frank and would rely on the Soviet side's complete discretion. First, he wanted the Foreign Minister to understand that if we would be able to find mutually acceptable language, we would have to consult our allies before we said finally that we agreed. The Secretary therefore reserved the right to carry on such consultations. Secondly, he felt that Mr. Gromyko was seriously underestimating the depth and the strength of our interest in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also the depth and the strength of the opposition of certain countries to such a treaty. Yet, it was a matter of quite harsh and selfish American policy, our purely national policy, that caused us utterly to oppose any arrangement which would involve our providing nuclear weapons to other countries. Further, within NATO there was strong opposition to providing the FRG with an independent nuclear capability. We knew very well that Soviet policy was frequently affected by memories of World War II as far as the Germans were concerned. But, Mr. Gromyko must also realize that in the NATO alliance many other countries also have dark memories of World War II--France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain and others. Thus there were strong reasons in NATO against the FRG receiving nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to know that President Johnson was utterly serious in his determination to resolve this question. We had no doubt that US and Soviet policy on non-proliferation was truly identical. In the past the Soviet Union had raised some issues in connection with non-proliferation, which really were quite extraneous and had nothing to do with non-proliferation. But he thought that if we now concentrated on the heart of the matter it should not be impossible to find the language which would express the common policy of the two sides. He quite agreed that it was important not to use language which would conceal the true points of view; on our side a treaty would be open to examination by the Senate, indeed it would be open to very broad public examination, so that all our agreements with the Soviet Union would inevitably become public. The Secretary did believe that some progress had been made during the past days and weeks, undoubtedly because both sides recognized the urgency of the time factor. The longer we delayed the more difficult it would become to get other countries to join in the treaty. The Secretary was not thinking so much of the FRG in this respect as of other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Japan, India, Israel and others. It was important and urgent to act now, before the horse escaped the stable; then it would be too late to close the door. The Secretary urged Mr. Gromyko not to worry about the ghosts of the future but rather to help us now draft a treaty. We were opposed to furnishing nuclear weapons or nuclear information to any country which was not now a nuclear-weapon state. We thought that the Soviet side was equally opposed to this. The Secretary hoped that we could find simple language to express this serious interest of both sides without trying to write into the treaty provisions that would cover every possible future contingency, however remote. He thought that during the last two days we had exchanged language which would help us move closer together. He had had no chance to consult with the President since his last meeting with Mr. Gromyko because the President was in Texas. But he knew of the President's serious concern with the urgency of the matter. He was concerned that it might be too late unless we took quick action to induce other governments which were active in a nuclear direction to join in the treaty, governments which neither we nor the USSR could control. He therefore hoped that we could work this out while Mr. Gromyko was still here. Each of us would probably have some difficulties with our respective allies, and both of us with countries not in either alliance; but, the very first step had to be for both of us to reach agreement. If we concentrated on the essence of the matter and left aside considerations which were not realistic we could move ahead. We should deal with this essence without any delay because of theoretical considerations. Mr. Gromyko referred to the three alternative versions worked out by the negotiators this afternoon and asked for clarification in answer to one specific question. Could we have agreement that no nuclear-weapon power would transfer nuclear weapons, etc., directly or indirectly to any non-nuclear-weapon state individually or by virtue of such non-nuclear-weapon state's membership or partnership in a grouping of states, alliance or bloc? This question, in his view, had not been answered so far, although if he understood the Secretary correctly both countries were thinking in the same direction. How could it then be possible that we could not reach agreement? There should be no possibility of a 50-50 chance of misinterpretation. He proposed that we now discuss the situation from this angle. If we agreed on the content of the treaty, then our representatives could put this down on paper; after all, the purpose of language was to express thoughts and ideas and agreements precisely. It did not matter for the purpose of this discussion whether or not the Soviet Union underestimated one thing or another; we should not be concerned with the past. As for his side, he took careful note of the Secretary's statement concerning the determination of the United States to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that it seemed to him that we did not have agreement on 99% of the problem. This concerned three very simple propositions: 1) that we not transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear country directly or indirectly; 2) that we not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state become a nuclear power in any possible way; 3) that we never delegate the right to fire US nuclear weapons to anyone else. It seemed to the Secretary that the controversy over the remaining 1% was really just a controversy over concepts. For example, the notion of ownership seemed to cause some difficulty. The non-nuclear-weapon states in NATO were, after all, the targets of Soviet nuclear weapons; it could very well be that some non-nuclear state in the alliance would make a financial contribution toward the maintenance of American nuclear weapons on its territory. The Soviet Union might well object to this, but in reality this had nothing to do with non-proliferation. Another such concept was represented by the word "control." We could not tell our allies that they would have no voice in any decision to go to war. The concept of access was another difficulty. If, however, we would concentrate on these three simple ideas: not to transfer nuclear weapons, not to provide nuclear-weapon technology to any non-nuclear state, not to delegate the firing of nuclear weapons, then we did really have 99% agreement. Mr. Gromyko said he had two remarks to make concerning the Secretary's statement. When the Secretary said that allies must participate in any decision to go to war he raised a question which would lead the discussion very far afield. Mr. Gromyko had not raised this question, although he might well return to it later. Secondly, he, Mr. Gromyko, had asked the question concerning access of non-nuclear-weapon states to nuclear weapons in their capacity of participants or members in a group of states or an alliance. This was not just a question he was raising by himself, rather it was a question posed by life itself. Suppose that agreement were reached concerning transfer of nuclear weapons into the national hands of a non-nuclear-weapon state, the question concerning transfer to an alliance which included both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states still remained unanswered. Would in such a case non-nuclear-weapon states participate in the decisions of the alliance, in ownership, control and use of nuclear weapons, as members of the alliance? Mr. Gromyko thought they should not so participate. This was what he meant by using the word "indirect." The Secretary asked Ambassador Foster to clarify the three alternative drafts of Article I of the proposed treaty. Was the first alternative based upon the suggestion of the Russian colleagues? Ambassador Foster said that both sides had contributed to it. Inasmuch as the concept of "right to fire" required further qualification from the American point of view (i.e. "except at the direct orders of the President of the United States") and the concept of "access" had raised difficulties, both concepts had been struck from the draft of Article I. The Soviet side had suggested adding the words "control over" and we had accepted this as useful. This afternoon the Soviet negotiators had presented a second alternative which included a prohibition against transfer of nuclear weapons to military alliances or groups of states, instead of the former formulation "through military alliances or groups of states." We had taken the position that, while this provision would be in full accord with our national legislation, which we had no intention of amending, it would at this moment in history be politically unwise to word it just that way. A third alternative draft had then been suggested, which would not specify the possible recipient, but would merely use the words "to any recipient whatsoever." Ambassador Foster thought that this alternative answered everything. Mr. Gromyko said that he had seen all three alternative drafts and that what he had just said had been in answer to them. To Ambassador Goldberg's question as to what he objected to specifically in alternative three, he replied that all the American versions spoke of groups and alliances as mere transmitters of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology instead of prohibiting ownership, control and disposal of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states individually as well as in their capacity of participants in groups or alliances. Supposing that the American side did not attach any great importance to these points; it should, however, consider the fact that the Soviet side did think them important and therefore attempt to find language to close the door to all possible loopholes as they were seen by the Soviet side. Ambassador Foster replied that he thought the third alternative draft accomplished exactly that by speaking of "any recipient whatsoever." Secretary Rusk pointed out that we were discussing a situation in the absence of a state of war. If war did occur, then, of course, all bets were off. We were therefore only speaking of conditions in times of peace, up to the beginning of a war which he sincerely hoped would never occur. Secondly, we were not discussing the question of decisions to go to war. We could not in our alliances reserve this right exclusively to ourselves. It would have to be a decision in which all allies would participate, including, of course, the United States. Mr. Gromyko said that these were political considerations, while we were here discussing nuclear weapons as such. The Secretary pointed out that the more we were talking about the heart of the matter, that is the physical weapons themselves, the more it became evident that we were in agreement. Mr. Gromyko added that the formulation "to any recipient whatsoever" would also be unacceptable because it appeared to prohibit transfer to oneself. It would certainly be open to at least two interpretations. The Secretary asked for clarification by asking the question whether, in the Soviet view, the three Polaris submarines we had assigned to NATO would constitute a violation of a non-proliferation treaty if such treaty were now in force. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know and would ask the same question of the Secretary. In any case this concerned existing arrangements and the present was not yet the time to discuss such existing arrangements. It seemed to him that this begged the question as to whether these subs were an American force or part of a joint force. He restated his question concerning nuclear weapons in national hands of non-nuclear-weapon states, either directly or because of their participation in an alliance. He felt this was a simple question. If the United States intended to create a joint force, then it should say so now and he would know where he stood; the US position would then be clear to him. If no such intention existed, and it was his impression that it did not exist, then there should be no obstacle to working out a treaty. The Secretary said Mr. Gromyko was quite right in believing that we had no intention to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, either directly or indirectly through their membership in alliances. However, we could not say to our allies that the question of war was none of their business; after all, they were sitting on the targets, they were very much involved. We had never had the slightest idea of transferring nuclear weapons and do not now intend to do so. Mr. Gromyko still felt that there was a serious misunderstanding. It was not only a question of transferring nuclear weapons into the national hands of non-nuclear-weapon states, directly or through alliances, but also a question of not granting access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states in their capacity of participants in groups or alliances. The United States was a nuclear-weapon power and would remain a nuclear-weapon power regardless of a non-proliferation treaty, but the question of access remained unsolved. At this point Mr. Gromyko used three teacups to illustrate this point visually. The Secretary reminded Mr. Gromyko that he had intended to comment on the question of consultation. Mr. Gromyko said that he was not raising the question of consultation in connection with a non-proliferation treaty. In the Soviet view the treaty should state that which is to be prohibited rather than that which is to be allowed; although he could draw certain conclusions from the Secretary's statement concerning the participation of the FRG in any decision to go to war. The Secretary said that considering the problem for the physical weapons point of view only seemed to simplify it. Here we were dealing with the question of who had such weapons, who could fire them, who could manufacture them, who had nuclear technology, etc. He could not see why it should be so difficult to find appropriate expressions to cover these points. When we said "directly or indirectly," in our minds we were 100% clear as to what this meant. Somehow we ought to be able to put this down on paper. Mr. Gromyko replied once again that this was open to a 50-50 interpretation. Each side would place its own interpretation on such wording. He could not dispute the right of the United States to interpret such language in its own interests, and naturally other countries would be guided by their particular interests as well. We were dealing with two kinds of entities--national entities and groups or alliances or blocs. The Secretary reminded Mr. Gromyko that he had asked for a frank discussion. He therefore hoped Mr. Gromyko would not mind the following. We assumed that in the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union retained for itself the decision to use nuclear weapons, although non-nuclear-weapon members of the Warsaw Pact had received nuclear vehicles. Mr. Gromyko wanted to know if this was a question. The Soviet Union had not in the past and is not now taking any steps leading to a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that in the NATO alliance we retained complete control over the firing of U.S. nuclear weapons. He wanted to ask the Foreign Minister a frank question. We do say to our allies that even though we retain the final decision they must be consulted in any group discussion in which we are, of course, a party. Perhaps Mr. Gromyko did not care for this arrangement to become known to his Warsaw Pact partners, who then might ask him for the same kind of thing. Mr. Gromyko said the Secretary had raised two questions. One of these is political. We had agreed to discuss only the question of the physical nuclear weapons themselves. He preferred not to discuss the other question. Secondly, it seemed to him that the Secretary had implied that the question of proliferation and the question of the right to fire were not related. And yet, when plans for mixed manned ships, the MLF and the ANF, were considered in the past, the Secretary had made that distinction. He suggested that question be set aside. If the Secretary was opposed to proliferation to non-nuclear-weapon states as national entities and as members of groups and alliances, then there should be no difficulty. Reservation of the right to fire appeared to point in this direction. The Secretary remarked that this reservation applied to American nuclear weapons only; General de Gaulle had said that he would not give us control over his nuclear weapons. The Secretary said it seemed to him that we had usefully excluded three questions: 1) the situation in the event that war occurs; 2) political decision as to whether or not war does occur; and 3) political relationships among states. Concerning the physical nuclear weapons themselves it appeared to him we were in agreement. The problem was to find the right language to express this agreement without involving extraneous matters. The three latest drafts seemed to have narrowed the gap. Apparently the formulations tried in the last 48 hours had come fairly close but had not as yet satisfied both sides completely. He hoped that the answer could be found while the Minister was still in this country. We did not envisage and had never discussed a situation in which American nuclear weapons ceased to be American nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the representatives of the two sides get together again to continue their search tomorrow or Monday./3/ /3/No record of conversation on September 25 or Monday, September 26, has been found, but a memorandum of Foster's September 28 conversation with Roschin in New York reports that Roschin "felt that considerable progress had been made and a common understanding reached on the most substantive article of the draft treaty, although the Soviet side had not gotten all it wanted and was not really satisfied." (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-6) The Secretary said he had instructions from President Johnson to make a maximum effort to reach agreement and he assumed Mr. Gromyko's instructions were the same. After Mr. Gromyko confirmed this fact the Secretary again stressed the importance of finding a solution while Mr. Gromyko was still here.
154. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, October 3, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, 1966. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. SUBJECT I've had a brief rundown by classified telephone of the Goldberg-Gromyko conversation this morning. A cable will be coming later in the day./2/ /2/Not further identified. There were no significant Soviet reactions except that at the close of the conversation Gromyko referred to the outer space treaty as an hors d'oeuvre which depended on "getting a better picture of the main meal." This is interpreted to mean in New York Soviet unwillingness to agree to a space treaty without some progress on non-proliferation and possibly Vietnam.
Ambassador Goldberg explained the U.S. was eager to reach agreement on a treaty as evidence of a mutual desire for good relationships. He mentioned the problem of equal facilities and expressed willingness to shift from the preamble to an operative paragraph a provision whereby the parties would agree to consider granting of facilities. He did not give Gromyko specific language. Gromyko indicated no real awareness of details but commented this did not get over the problem of discrimination from the Soviet point of view and the U.S. should "show more imagination." [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
Ambassador Goldberg noted that this was something Gromyko would wish to discuss with the President and therefore he would not go into any detail. He told Gromyko that the President had said to him yesterday that he would not go along with any change in U.S. law that would remove the need for his approval for firing of any nuclear weapons. Gromyko responded that firing was not the whole problem. Goldberg added that the President had also said he would not go along with arrangements where others could tell him where or when the U.S. would employ nuclear weapons. Gromyko just nodded. He asked whether Ambassador Goldberg was telling him the U.S. was really anxious to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. Goldberg said "yes." Gromyko repeated it would have to be a treaty which avoided any dissemination through the structure of an alliance. [Here follows discussion of Chinese representation.]
155. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach/1/ Washington, October 5, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Datus C. Proper (IO/UNP). A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the "Acting Secretary saw." SUBJECT Yesterday the Soviet Union gave Ambassador Goldberg an advance look at new space-treaty language which they will make public today./2/ In summary, a few problems still remain, although the new Soviet proposals show significant movement towards a workable compromise. /2/Telegrams 1251 and 1252 from USUN, October 5, transmitted Soviet texts which Morozov gave Goldberg on that day with a view to disposing of outstanding issues in the negotiation of an Outer Space Treaty. (Ibid.) On the same day, telegram 1256 from USUN reported Goldberg's reactions to the Soviet proposals in part as follows: "Morozov gave clear impression of Soviet readiness to proceed to reach agreement speedily on outer space treaty without reference to subjects lying outside space field. He indicated continuing desire to finish the job before outer space item is taken up in First Committee and Assembly." (Ibid.) Goldberg's consultation with the friendly fifteen (less Argentina, Australia, Iran, Lebanon, and Sweden) is reported in telegram 1264 from USUN, October 5. (Ibid.) With respect to specific provisions, the Soviets have accepted our compromise proposal on access to installations on celestial bodies. They have made only very minor changes in our proposal for reporting activities on celestial bodies, another major point. They have significantly qualified their request for third countries to grant tracking facilities to all parties on an equal basis, by recognizing that the actual tracking station arrangement has to evolve from bilateral negotiations between the countries concerned. The original Soviet demand caused concern to our friends, and we have asked them to seek instructions from their governments on the latest Soviet offer. Ambassador Goldberg will be meeting at 3 p.m. today with the Soviet Representative to give him our preliminary assessment of the new proposals. I understand that Mr. Sisco is telephoning you on this subject.
156. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials Memoranda of Conversation 1966. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL), October 10. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Ambassador [Dobrynin] made the following statement: "On September twelfth this year, there took place an ejection of radioactive products into the atmosphere during the conduct of an underground test of a nuclear weapon at the American proving ground in the State of Nevada./2/ The Soviet side asserts that this is already the ninth case of ejection of radioactive materials in the conduct of American underground tests of nuclear weapons since the conclusion of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. /2/The U.S. Government reported the "accidental release of radioactivity detected off site" as a result of its underground nuclear test named Derringer at the Nevada Test Site on September 12. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, p. 28) "Since such ejection of radioactive materials contradicts the spirit of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Soviet side expects that the American side will present necessary explanations concerning the facts of the appearance of radioactive materials in the atmosphere as a result of these tests and will take precautionary measures in order that compliance with the terms of the treaty will be duly ensured." I inquired whether it was considered that any atomic debris had gone outside the borders of the United States. After checking his notes, he observed that this aspect was not mentioned.
157. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson (S/AL) and approved by the White House, October 13. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko said he would like to raise the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He had had an exchange of views with Secretary Rusk./2/ The Soviet Union considered that every lost day made the problem more difficult. They believed that every nation in the world was interested in achieving an agreement on this subject. He said that every government had its advisers and there were perhaps some that thought the Soviet Union was not interested in signing such an agreement, but he urged the President not to believe this. The Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement in two weeks when an agreed text was achieved. The Soviet position was that nuclear weapons must not fall into individual national control of non-nuclear powers or into the collective hands of any grouping that included non-nuclear powers. He would like to have the President's views on this subject and said that if the conditions he had outlined could be met, the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude an agreement and perhaps the Foreign Ministers might meet before the end of the year, perhaps at Geneva for this purpose. /2/Document 153. The President, in referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark about advisers, said that there were no two men in which he had more trust than Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson. He said when they speak, they have my complete confidence and he said that sometimes he thought he trusted them more than he trusted himself. He said that he had been happy that we appeared to be on the verge of reaching an agreement on civil aviation and he would do all he could to conclude the Consular agreement. He appreciated the Soviet handling of the fisheries question. He was also interested in dealing with the question of trade, and settling other problems. The President said that we had a law in this country which said we could not transfer the power of decision to fire nuclear weapons to anyone else./3/ Mr. Gromyko could be sure that only the President of the United States would exercise power over nuclear weapons. He presumed that the Soviet Government could give a similar assurance, but he did not ask the Soviet Union to tear up the Warsaw Pact and to have no allies. He did not see why we could not get our pencils out and work out an agreement. Sometimes he thought that we did not understand each other. /3/Reference presumably is to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 42 USC 2122. The President concluded the discussion by saying that no country was more against the proliferation of nuclear weapons than the United States.
158. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 11 and approved by S on October 13. This conversation took place in the Department of State, probably at an informal dinner that the Secretary hosted in the Madison Room. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. USSR The Secretary began the conversation by pointing out that each side has a legitimate interest in insuring that nuclear powers do not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers. This is the heart of the proliferation problem. If we are prepared to commit ourselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into the hands of non-nuclear powers--as we are--then the Secretary felt that this should meet the Soviet concern. What we cannot agree to is the proposition that we consent to an arrangement which in effect would amount to our telling our allies that the nuclear problem is none of their business. Mr. Gromyko must understand that this would be an absolutely untenable position for us and one which would not be understood or supported by our allies since they, after all, are targeted by Soviet nuclear weapons. Gromyko said that the Soviet position on non-proliferation is to provide for an agreement which would insure that nuclear powers not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states or to an alliance to which such states belong. The Secretary said that he wishes to be very frank with Gromyko so that each side would understand clearly what was in the other's mind. We know and we can assure the Soviets that we will not transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear state--ever--or to any group of non-nuclear states. By his insistence on language which would cover the alliance concept, Gromyko seemed to take a position which would result in the erection of a barrier between ourselves and our allies. It was this that we could not accept. Gromyko said that this was not the Soviet intention. The Secretary went on to say that we have never discussed any nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO that we would not be happy to see applied to the Warsaw Pact. Gromyko must understand that we are obliged in our nuclear planning to take into account the views of our allies just as the Soviets would take into account the views of their allies./2/ /2/At this point the EUR Bureau typist of this memorandum inadvertently omitted the following paragraph: "Gromyko pointed out that the Soviets do not suggest that a treaty should include a provision banning consultation. This was a separate matter to which he might wish to return, but he did not intend to discuss it in connection with the treaty." (Memorandum from Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) to John Walsh (S/S), October 18, cleared by Thompson (S/AL); Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966) The Secretary felt that we are perhaps not far apart on basic policy and that the problem might be simply a matter of language. One answer to the problem might be simply to state that we would not transfer nuclear weapons out of our hands without concerning ourselves with the question of "to whom." An alternative solution might be to adopt Mr. Foster's suggestion of adding "to any recipient whatsoever." Gromyko said this would not be adequate since the formula did not preclude the possibility of transfer into "collective" hands. To meet this point the wording should provide for a ban on transfer "individually or collectively." While the Soviets are prepared to accept the proposition that the United Stares intends to retain control and possession of its nuclear weapons there is always the possibility that such control and possession might be shared with others. It is this point that concerns the Soviets. The Secretary said that if the Soviets should be worried about the possibility that some day a United States nuclear weapon might be fired by a German soldier on order of a German government, and without U.S. consent, he could assure Gromyko that this would and could never happen. We are of course not talking about a condition of war. Gromyko assured the Secretary that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept that this is the intention of the United States Government. The Soviet view is, however, that the guarantee should be absolute; the Soviets may be sure of United States intentions but they do not have the same confidence with regard to the intentions of others. The Secretary said that we seemed to be agreed on the heart of the matter--on the basic concept of non-proliferation. Our trouble is that we can't seem to find language that does not involve what we regard as extraneous matters. It is important to recognize that the psychological and political implications of language we should adopt must be taken into account if we are not to jeopardize our alliance relationships. We cannot agree to any wording which would amount to informing our allies that their nuclear defense is none of their business. Mr. Leddy pointed out that the West Germans have never asked us to transfer possession of or surrender our authority to fire nuclear weapons. Gromyko said this may be true but there has been much talk in the past of plans for the creation of joint nuclear forces such as MLF and ANF. Such plans if realized would accord a participating role to the West Germans, and it is this that concerns the Soviets. It is not the prospect of a German "voice" or other "voices" in nuclear defense planning which bothers the Soviets. The Secretary commented that if this were the case then there should be no problem. We should be able to resolve our differences by agreed language so long as we steer clear of the metaphysical and concentrate on the concrete. The Secretary asked if Roshchin would remain in New York after Gromyko's departure. When Mr. Gromyko confirmed that this would be the case, the Secretary suggested that Messrs. Foster and Roshchin continue their efforts to work out language which would satisfy the concerns of both sides. He himself would wish to discuss precise language with the President. The Secretary's view at the moment is that the problem could be met by language which would commit us not to give our nuclear weapons to anybody and not permit anyone else to use our nuclear weapons without our permission. Gromyko said that this was not the whole problem. If, in fact, the United States does not intend to share control with others he failed to see why this could not be reflected in treaty language. The Secretary felt that some way could be found to get around the problem. Gromyko must realize, however, that we cannot accept any language which would be tantamount to our saying to our allies that nuclear defense arrangements are not their business. Mr. Gromyko commented that at times he has the feeling that our positions are similar. He would point out, however, that the views of the United States on the problem are not always expressed in the same terms and occasionally are even somewhat contradictory. The Secretary said that he felt we could make progress if Gromyko would cease to be preoccupied with what seems to be philosophical problem. We did seem to be agreed on the "gut" aspect of the non-proliferation problem and he felt that Roshchin and Foster should be able to work out acceptable language. Gromyko agreed that Foster and Roshchin should continue their efforts in New York. Foster said that he would be in New York Tuesday afternoon and would contact the Soviet Mission at that time. In parting Gromyko said that he wished to thank the Secretary and through him the President for their warm and gracious hospitality while he was in Washington. The Secretary said that he was glad Gromyko could fit the Washington trip into his schedule since it was always pleasant and useful to talk with him. He wished to reiterate the President's thought that our two countries have a special responsibility for the peace of the world and that for our part we are prepared to go more than half way in an effort to resolve the problems which are of vital concern to both of us. Since Mr. Gromyko would face a battery of reporters on his exit from the building, it was agreed that he would take the following line in response to queries: The discussion at dinner focused on disarmament matters including the non-proliferation problem. Both sides agreed that this was a problem of great urgency and that discussions should continue in an effort to reach agreement.
159. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Nuclear Free Zone, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV), October 18, and cleared in S/S and S, October 19. Although the source text provides no time, this conversation apparently took place at the same informal dinner referenced in footnote 1, Document 158. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. USSR The Secretary said that in his recent visit to New York/2/ he had had an opportunity for discussions with some 70 Foreign Ministers, including most of the Latin Americans. As Gromyko was aware the Latin American countries are very interested in reaching agreement on establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America. There was some difference of opinion among the Latin American Foreign Ministers as to whether they should proceed without Cuba. The Secretary felt that anything Mr. Gromyko could do to urge Cuba to participate would be helpful. Ambassador Dobrynin asked if all Latin American countries were devoted to the nuclear free concept; he had the impression that at least one country had some reservations about this. The Secretary responded that perhaps one country was somewhat bemused with the idea of developing a nuclear capability but he felt strongly that its reservations with regard to a nuclear free zone could be overcome if Cuba were to participate. /2/See footnote 1, Document 153. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |