1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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170. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Mr. Vance has seen." For context of this memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 169. The difficulty of predicting Soviet reactions is compounded by the fact that in the period since the end of the war, their reaction to actions on our part which were known to them were not what we would consider rational or called for in the circumstances. Soviet assessment of a U.S. deployment of a significant ABM system will vary considerably, pending upon whether we were reacting to a major Soviet deployment or whether we had initiated this new step in the arms race. I do not believe we can consider it as established that the Soviets have at this time decided upon a major ABM deployment. The Soviets have clearly embarked upon a plan to increase the number of their ICBMs and to deploy many of them in hardened sites. I believe they will carry this plan to completion. If we initiate major ABM deployment, I feel confident that the Soviet response in the first instance would be to do likewise rather than to increase the number of their ICBMs beyond already planned levels. I would doubt that the Soviets could both deploy a major ABM system and increase ICBMs beyond planned levels without taking drastic action in some other field, such as suspending their space program. If it is clearly the Soviets that initiate ABM deployment and we respond with a similar system, I would even more doubt that they would increase their offensive weapons beyond planned levels during the next five years or so because of the pressure upon their resources of other important programs in the non-military field. I think it quite likely, however, that as the significance of our planned improvement in the quality of our offensive capability becomes increasingly clear to them, they may respond with a similar program of qualitative improvement. I would expect that in any of these situations, the Soviets would increase their submarine launched missile capability. Since the last war, whenever the Soviets have been faced with a choice between the development of offensive or defensive capability, they have generally opted for the defensive. This can partly be explained by their belief in their own ideology, which postulates that Communism would inevitably spread over the entire world and that the principal military problem for the Communist countries is to protect themselves from the danger that imperialism in its death throes might lash out against them in a desperate military gamble. Given the economic problems which the Soviets already face in the allocation of their resources, which are insufficient to meet their goals, I believe that their civilian leaders would welcome an opportunity to avoid incurring the enormous expenditure which the deployment of a major ABM system would entail, at least over the next few years. On the other hand, the civilian leadership is weak in comparison to past regimes and it seems probable that this has automatically increased the relative influence of the Soviet military. As the Soviet military acquire knowledge of the qualitative improvement in our ICBMs, they may well argue that an ABM system is essential to offset or at least raise doubts in our minds as to the efficacy of our offensive capability, since we could never be sure how effective their ABM system was. On balance, however, I believe we have a good chance of negotiating an ABM, ICBM freeze.
171. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Mr. Vance has seen." SUBJECT 1. The attached paper provided to me by the Board of National Estimates states some views on likely Soviet reactions to an American decision to begin deployment of an anti-missile system. I am in agreement with the judgments made in this paper, and am therefore passing it along as my response to the request made to each of us in Mr. McNamara's office last Wednesday/2/ for a personal statement on the issue posed. /2/December 7; see footnote 2, Document 169. 2. Certain considerations which emerge from this study seem to me to be of primary importance. 3. The first is that the difference in scale between the two alternative United States deployment programs proposed would have little bearing on the USSR's reactions. The Soviets would, even in the case of the more modest program, assume that, once embarked upon, the effort would be enlarged. They would impute to us an intention to reduce to a minimum the threat which their offensive systems pose to us, and thereby to escape from the degree of deterrence which they now have. Either program would convey to the Soviets that we were not content to remain in a condition of mutual deterrence but were striving instead to gain a clear power advantage. 4. A second major judgment then follows. Faced with this situation, the primary Soviet concern would be to retain what we call an assured destruction capability, that is, the power to impose vast and unacceptable injury on this country regardless of the circumstances in which nuclear war might begin. The Soviets would therefore deploy ICBM's of such types and numbers as to insure retention of such a capability. In the end, after enormous costs to them and to us, the condition of mutual deterrence would be likely to obtain as before. 5. Finally, the political implications for Soviet society and for Soviet-American relations of such an intensification of the arms race seem to me to be of significant importance. The strains imposed by such an effort would at the very least retard what movement we have thought might be developing toward moderation in the Soviet outlook and toward liberalization in Soviet society. Similarly, a new surge of competitive arming would tend inevitably to sustain tension and mistrust between the two countries, and thereby to limit even more the possibility of moving our relations gradually into more constructive channels. Dick
Attachment/3/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /3/Top Secret. SUBJECT I. General Considerations 1. The Soviet leadership would recognize in a US decision to deploy an ABM system a major move in the Soviet-American power competition. The USSR is very sensitive to US economic and military superiority; it is acutely aware that the US has a GNP more than twice that of the Soviets and now has in numbers of deployed ICBMs roughly a 3 to 1 superiority. The Soviets have recently been engaged in a very rapid buildup of hardened and dispersed ICBMs which we believe will give them, by about 1968, much greater confidence in their retaliatory power and hence in their deterrent. Since 1962, moreover, they have been constructing an ABM system to defend the Moscow area, though we in CIA believe they have probably not yet begun to install ABM defenses elsewhere./4/,/5/ /4/There is, however, a differing view within the intelligence community, which is that another system (the Tallinn system) now being widely deployed in the USSR is likely to be an ABM; the implication of this view is that the Soviets are already several years down the road of widespread ABM deployment. [Footnote in the source text.] /5/See NIE 11-8-66, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 20 October 1966, and NIE 11-3-66, "Soviet Air and Missile Defenses," dated 17 November 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The summary portions of both are scheduled for publication in volume X.] 2. We believe that the fact of the US decision to deploy ABMs would be far more important to the Soviets than would the announced size of the US program./6/ The Soviets certainly have considered in their military planning the possibility that the US would eventually build ABM defenses. But an actual decision to deploy an ABM system would probably have a further influence on Soviet policy because it is a major new program with potential impact on the strategic situation. The US decision would tend to lend weight to interests in the USSR which press for larger military programs. /6/We refer here to the Posture A and Posture B programs which have been considered by the Secretary of Defense. Both programs contemplate ABM deployment for defense of key US cities; they differ in the level of defense to be provided. [Footnote in the source text.] 3. The Soviets would almost certainly see the US decision as having been at least accelerated by their own recent programs for missile defense and strategic attack forces. In any event, they would view it as evidence that the US was intent on maintaining and perhaps increasing its strategic advantage over the USSR, even at the expense of a continuation of the arms race. Some elements in the Soviet leadership would see the move as a sign that the US considered nuclear war somewhat more likely over the longer term. Associated US expenditures for a shelter program would probably strengthen the voice of those Soviets advocating this interpretation. II. Possible Soviet Military Responses 4. It is important to remember that Moscow's view of the strategic situation is the obverse of the view from Washington. While we worry about their strengths and our vulnerabilities, they worry about our strengths and their vulnerabilities. The Soviets have long been deterred from deliberately attacking the US by the power of our forces to visit unacceptable damage on their country in retaliation; they have also long feared that their own strength might not be credible enough to deter the US in all circumstances. Faced over the last two decades with the large, diversified, and steadily-improving US strategic attack forces, a major feature of the Soviet response has been straightforward defense measures, whereas our strategy has concentrated mainly on assured destruction. In the past year or so, however, the Soviets have begun the very rapid deployment of hardened and dispersed ICBMs, the bulk of which are SS-11's, useful mainly as citybusters. This intensive program to acquire an assured destruction capability represents a new emphasis in their strategy. They probably now see themselves as catching up with the US in this regard, and expect shortly to gain a kind of deterrent equality with the US. 5. At minimum, therefore, the Soviets will be concerned to prevent any US ABM deployment from robbing them of the assured destruction capabilities they are acquiring. From their point of view, either the Posture A or the Posture B program would threaten eventually to degrade the deterrent power of their strategic attack forces. This is because both programs are damage-limiting in nature--that is, they are designed to protect the population and property in major cities, which are the prime targets of retaliation--and because the smaller program, once initiated, could well lead to the larger. The Soviets would consider it essential to respond by improving their strategic attack forces to the extent required to maintain their assured destruction capabilities. 6. This Soviet requirement would probably not result in any immediate or dramatic changes in the USSR's strategic attack programs following a US announcement. The USSR would have time to weigh the alternatives, because the lead times required to deploy additional strategic attack systems like ICBMs, or to develop and retrofit advanced components like penetration aids, are not longer and in many cases are shorter than ABM leadtimes. The Soviets would have no difficulty in following the progress of our deployment and could plan to reevaluate the numbers and types of weapons they require accordingly./7/ /7/There is even a possibility that Soviet planning has already taken full account of the contingency that the US would deploy ABMs, and that the Soviets would therefore not feel the need to alter their future strategic attack programs at all. We think this unlikely, however, because it has been unnecessary for the Soviets to authorize any expensive new adjustments prior to an actual US decision. They must be aware of the favorable lead-time relationship referred to above, and they can be confident that major US decisions of this sort will be made public. [Footnote in the source text.] Effect on Specific Soviet Strategic Programs 7. In discussing the following Soviet options and possible courses of actions, we do not wish to imply that if the US does not decide to initiate either the Posture A or B program at this time, the Soviets will not undertake any of the programs discussed. In the strategic missile field, for example, there is always great pressure to advance the available technology through R&D and to deploy new systems and modifications designed to improve the effectiveness of the force. Specifically, the USSR is quite likely to develop and deploy more accurate large missiles with multiple warheads whether the US deploys ABMs or not. In general, we will probably never know the precise nature and extent of Soviet responses to a US decision to deploy, though we are convinced that such a decision would intensify Soviet arms programs in at least some ways. 8. There are a number of options the Soviets could exercise to preserve an assumed destruction capability despite US ABM deployment. Certainly such deployment would generate some upward pressure on numbers of Soviet ICBMs and sublaunched missiles, and it is one of the factors which might cause the Soviet missile force to approach or exceed the high side of our ICBM estimate for the period beyond 1968 (i.e., 1,100 launchers in mid-1971, leveling off to 1,200 in mid-1976). Additional deployment of existing systems would have the advantage of using tooled-up lines and proven techniques. Long-continued deployment of the SS-9 and SS-11 at the recent high rates would result in an ICBM force of as many as 1,600 launchers in mid-1971 and more than 3,000 in mid-1976, virtually all of them hardened and dispersed. 9. On the other hand, the Soviets could respond with more sophisticated measures. If they took the decision soon, we believe they could begin to install very accurate multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs ) in their large SS-9 ICBM or in a follow-on, by about the time our ABM system could become operational. Existing or follow-on systems could be equipped with penetration aids by that time or sooner, depending on the type of such devices the Soviets decide are most effective against our ABM system. The USSR has not flight-tested advanced reentry vehicles as yet, but we believe such testing need not begin more than 2 or 3 years before initial operational capability date in the case of MIRV's, and 1 or 2 years in the case of penetration aids. 10. A US decision might also cause the Soviets to intensify their development of depressed-trajectory ICBM's or fractional-orbit bombardment systems. Several firings from Tyuratam in the past year have suggested feasibility testing of such systems, and we have estimated that if development is pursued, initial operational capabilities could be achieved by late 1967 or 1968. Such systems would probably be less accurate than ICBM's. Used in small numbers against key soft targets, they could evade US warning systems in a Soviet first strike, but they could also be intended to complicate US problems of developing effective ABM defenses. 11. Finally, the Soviets have the option of placing greater stress on aerodynamic vehicles as means of circumventing US ABM defenses. They could intensify their current program of constructing cruise-missile submarines (whose missiles can be used against ship or land targets), perhaps by decreasing planned construction of the new ballistic missile class we believe they have started to build. US deployment of ABMs might even lead them to develop a new manned bomber for intercontinental attack, though we doubt that they would put much reliance on this approach to assured destruction capabilities because of the vulnerability to attack of bombers on the ground. 12. Of the several options we have examined, the Soviets will choose whichever combination they judge to be most cost-effective in the light of the nature and pace of the US ABM program, regardless of whether our initial decision calls for Posture A or B. Retrofitting advanced reentry vehicles into existing systems might be the cheapest approach for the Soviets, though reliance on such modifications to assure penetration involves some risk. Additional deployment of existing systems, on the other hand might prove a more visible increase in retaliatory power and therefore might appeal to the Soviets. In any case, we agree with the Secretary of Defense that the Soviets will act to maintain the deterrent of an assured destruction capability, and that they have the technical and economic power to do so. Effect on Soviet ABM Program 13. The Soviets' own ABM program might also be affected by a US ABM decision, but in ways which are less readily definable. In general those Soviets who urge bigger, faster ABM development and deployment would speak with louder voices, if only because the US had adopted a similar program. A US decision in the near future might have greater pertinence in this respect if, as we in CIA believe likely, the USSR is now deploying an ABM system only at Moscow and has not yet begun to install such defenses at other locations. 14. In our recent estimates we have judged that, regardless of US ABM decisions, the Soviet predilection for strategic defense and the massive threat they see in the US strategic attack forces would probably cause the USSR to extend ABM defenses more widely during the next 10 years. We have allowed, however, for the possibility that the Soviets might decide that sufficient ABM deployment for the general defense of the USSR was too costly. We think the costs for the Moscow system alone will be the equivalent of at least $3 billion (excluding R&D costs) over the eight years apparently required to deploy it, from 1962 to about 1970. Soviet willingness to spend such a sum is consistent with the high priority which has long been assigned to strategic defense and especially to the defense of Moscow. There is no question that the USSR could spend the equivalent of tens of billions more on future deployment of ABM defenses. But the Soviet economy is perennially stretched tight, and strains which might arise from still larger strategic expenditures could come to require the USSR to cut back on other desired military and economic programs. A Smaller US ABM Program 15. The US could, of course, initiate an ABM program of much more modest character than either the Posture A or B programs. We think that the more general Soviet concerns we have described would also be elicited by smaller programs, because the Soviets would expect any US decision to lead eventually to larger-scale deployment. Certainly they would not believe that any US deployment was intended solely to counter the type of threat which might eventually be posed by China. But Soviet military responses would be tempered by the lesser impact of smaller programs on the Soviet strategic position. Indeed, there is at least some chance that the Soviets would see a program to defend US ICBM forces in a quite different light than they would view the Posture A and B programs, recognizing that it strengthened US assured destruction capabilities while posing no challenge to their own such capabilities. Thus a US program to defend its ICBMs might cause the least adjustment in Soviet strategic forces. III. Some Political Implications 16. The foregoing discussion of measures the Soviets would probably take to counter a major US ABM program forecasts very considerable exertions by them to prevent the US from increasing its margin of strategic advantage and reducing their capacity to deter. The net result would be to leave both sides with a high degree of deterrence, much like that which now obtains, though obviously in a much more complicated and costly weapons environment. While the power equation would thus not be altered, some significant political effects would flow from the process of raising it to a higher level. 17. The new round of competition in nuclear arms would have a negative effect on the climate of Soviet-American relations. The arms race is not only a consequence of the power competition, but a stimulus to it. The tensions which arise from fear that the opponent is moving to acquire a decisive advantage would be increased, and the still more complicated array of weapons on both sides would enlarge the obstacles to arms control and reduction. 18. This general result would not follow because the US decision to deploy ABMs would give rise to a sudden alarm on the Soviet side. The Soviets have known for a decade that we were working on ABMs, they have claimed successful development of such weapons themselves, and they would know that the US decision to deploy could not alter the relation of forces suddenly. The negative effect on the prospects for improvement in Soviet-American relations would be the result rather of keeping alive on both sides the sense of the inevitability of a continuing arms competition. Against this background the likelihood of the kind of small but meaningful political undertakings which could over time move Soviet-American relations in a constructive direction would be greatly reduced. Moreover, the elements within the Soviet leadership which reject the possibility of any fundamental detente in Soviet-American relations would probably gain in weight and influence. 19. The Soviet economy will in any event be under strains resulting from the presently foreseeable military programs. A new round of costly competition in arms expenditure would impose additional strains on the Soviet economy. This would be unlikely to cause a breakdown, but it would mean that other highly desired programs would have to be cut back or foregone. In particular, hopes for any significant improvement in living standards would have to be disappointed for some time longer. This would mean in turn an increase in tensions in the society generally and probably sharpened conflict within the leadership over the allocation of resources. While these tendencies would not in our view go so far as to bring a reversion to anything like "Stalinist" rule, at a minimum the prospects for further advance toward internal liberalization would be retarded. In general, the strains arising from intensified arms competition can, we believe, only have an adverse effect on such internal forces as do work for constructive and moderating change in the Soviet system. Sherman Kent
172. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 11, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret; Limdis. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Clause (C) Our discussions with the Soviets about a safeguards article have revealed a unique opportunity to take a major step toward preventing the clandestine diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military purposes if our Euratom allies are willing to accept the application of IAEA safeguards after an agreed transition period. The Soviets have indicated they can accept a binding safeguards article provided it specifies IAEA safeguards and does not call for inspections of nuclear-weapon parties (Article III acceptable to Soviets attached at Tab A)./2/ Having firmly rejected our initial proposal calling for IAEA or "equivalent international safeguards," the Soviets also rejected our suggestion to substitute "effective international safeguards" for their language referring only to "safeguards of the IAEA." However, they acknowledged the need for an agreed transition period (as yet undefined) before IAEA safeguards could be phased into the Euratom area and said this period could be fixed by a protocol or declaration of understanding. /2/Tab A entitled "Safeguards Article acceptable to Soviets" is not printed. The Soviets make the following arguments for their position: (a) just as we have insisted on having US inspectors involved in inspection in the Soviet Union in connection with a test ban treaty, the Soviet Union will not entrust inspection of Germany to a group of NATO allies in the case of a non-proliferation treaty; (b) if their Eastern European allies are to be subject to inspection by the IAEA, there must be equality of treatment, with allies of the US (particularly Germany) being subject to the same international IAEA inspection; (c) it is unsound to endorse and perpetuate a regional approach to safeguards; and they ask what our view would be if some of the Arab League countries formed a Near East safeguards organization and who would judge if it was "equivalent to IAEA" or "effective. We see no reason to expect the Soviets to yield on this matter. They know their position will be endorsed by an over-whelming majority of potential signatories. Moreover, with no safeguards clause at all, the Soviets would expect Euratom safeguards to continue to apply to the FRG. We must, therefore, take at face value their statement that if we cannot accept the kind of article they can support, they would prefer no safeguards article at all. In this case they would be strongly supported by such potential nuclear weapons states as India, Sweden and the UAR. These countries have indicated their reluctance to accept the IAEA safeguards if some countries will have the privilege of being inspected solely by their allies. We, therefore, face a critical choice: Either we grasp this unique chance for US-Soviet agreement on an article applying safeguards to all non-nuclear countries, in circumstances where such joint support is essential to its general acceptance, or we defer to anticipated concerns of certain Euratom members and settle for a treaty lacking any meaningful safeguards provision, thus abandoning one of our major arms control objectives. The non-proliferation treaty provides our best (and probably our only foreseeable) chance to achieve the stated US goal of a single, effective system of nuclear safeguards applied worldwide. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards under a non-proliferation treaty would be a major step in establishing the validity of our concept of appropriate verification of major arms control undertakings. It would be accomplished through an institution established at our initiative and operating according to our concepts of international organization. Other US interests would also be served. The active and joint participation of Eastern and Western Europeans in the functioning of IAEA safeguards would foster practical cooperation in dealing with the major East-West issue of nuclear controls in Europe. Regarding the Near East, the inclusion of a binding safeguards article would offer our best prospect for achieving the safeguards which thus far the Arabs and Israelis have resisted. A treaty lacking a meaningful safeguards provision would encounter strong criticism in the Senate when it became known that our deference to Euratom had prevented US-Soviet agreement on such a provision. While such criticism probably would not be strong enough to affect seriously the treaty's prospects for ratification, it would give rise to the argument that our order of priorities is unsound in that we would have sacrificed an important principle in arms control (verification) in order to protect an element of Euratom's overall function which will become non-essential if IAEA safeguards are generally applied. In addition to enjoying strong Senate support, a binding safeguards article would also have the firm support of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Letters expressing such support are attached at Tab B, along with a similar letter from the US Representative to the IAEA./3/ /3/Tab B consists of three letters: Seaborg to Rusk, December 23, 1966, Dr. Smyth to Rusk, December 20, and John McNaughton to Fisher, December 21. None is printed. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards in the Euratom area need not impair Euratom's effectiveness or substantive functions. We and others would continue to treat with Euratom as a corporate entity. France, which can be expected to oppose IAEA safeguards in the Euratom area, would in fact not be directly affected since, as a nuclear-weapons state, it would not be subject to IAEA safeguards. Moreover, there would be no objection from the Soviets if Euratom wished to maintain its safeguards while accepting those of IAEA. The FRG would suffer no discrimination. We would, of course, consult with the FRG in working out means for dealing with anticipated attempts by the GDR to enhance its status under the treaty. Accordingly, I recommend the following course of action: 1. We should promptly inform our ENDC allies and the FRG initially, and then immediately other Euratom members, of the results of our negotiations to date with the Soviets on this matter, making clear we see no appreciable flexibility in the Soviet position. 2. We should tell them we attach major importance to inclusion of a meaningful safeguards article and that, accordingly, we plan to explore with the Soviets, still ad referendum pending further consultations with our allies, the following possible arrangement: a) Inclusion in the treaty of an Article III along the lines of that appearing at Tab A, with the addition of the words "as soon as practicable" at the end of the first sentence, and provided we achieve agreement on the modalities and timing of a transitional arrangement which would be specified in a public declaration; b) the transitional arrangement would inter alia provide: (i) that upon the entry into force of the non-proliferation treaty, Euratom and IAEA would exchange technical information on their respective safeguards procedures with a view to facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards in the Euratom countries; meanwhile IAEA safeguards would apply to Euratom nuclear exports sent to non-nuclear weapon countries outside the Euratom area; (ii) that at such time as IAEA will have completed arrangements for applying its safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of other advanced nuclear countries (informally agreed to comprise India, Sweden, Israel, etc) it will also apply such safeguards in the Euratom non-nuclear weapon countries (the modalities having been agreed between the two organizations during the transition period); the public declaration might have to include an agreed understanding regarding the time period within which the application of safeguards to all non-nuclear states is to be completed. 3. We should then seek to work out with the Soviets a concrete but ad referendum proposal along the above lines, including in these discussions our respective representatives to the IAEA. 4. If you approve this course of action, ACDA will collaborate with the appropriate Bureaus in the Department of State in preparing the necessary instructions to our Embassies for your approval./4/ /4/A handwritten approval line at the end of the source text is checked. William C. Foster
173. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2752. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A typewritten note on the source text reads "Draft 1/4/67 (Revised 1/17/67)." SUBJECT A number of events have occurred during the last year which, taken together, tend to bring to a head the long-standing issue of whether to produce and deploy a U.S. anti-ballistic defense: 1. The Soviet Union has accelerated the deployment of hard ICBMs beyond the rates forecast in last year's NIE/2/ (but not beyond the "higher than expected" case on which the U.S. Defense Program was based). /2/Presumably a reference to NIE 11-8-65, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," October 7, 1965, the conclusions of which are scheduled for publication in volume X. 2. The Soviet Union has started the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow and a second type of system, which may have an ABM capability, in other parts of the country. 3. The Chinese Communists have launched and demonstrated a nuclear-armed, intermediate range ballistic missile,/3/ and there is some evidence that they may be preparing to test a booster in the ICBM range. /3/On October 27, 1966, the People's Republic of China successfully launched a guided nuclear missile weapons test. For an excerpt from the communique issued by the Chinese Government, October 28, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 676-677. 4. Our own anti-ballistic missile system, the Nike-X, has now reached a stage of development where it may be feasible to start concurrent production and deployment. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an initial operational capability in FY 1972,/4/ a Nike-X system which would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and local defense of 25 cities against a "low" Soviet threat. /4/Reference is to JCSM-742-66, December 2, 1966, which is scheduled for publication in volume X. 6. The Congress for the first time since 1959 has appropriated funds to prepare for the production and deployment of an ABM defense system. There are three somewhat overlapping but distinct purposes for which we might want to deploy an ABM system: 1. To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a Soviet missile attack. 2. To protect our cities against a Chinese Communist missile attack in the mid-1970s. 3. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces (i.e., Minuteman) against a Soviet missile attack. After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded we should not initiate ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that: 1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that: a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased. b. The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense. The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them (e.g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of approximately 20%-30% of their people and 50% of their industry). We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs./5/ /5/Last year, as a hedge against a "higher-than-expected" Soviet threat--i.e., the deployment of a full-scale ABM defense and the incorporation of multiple, independently-aimed reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in their large, hard ICBMs--we proposed in the FY 1967 Budget, and the Congress supported, the following improvements in our strategic offensive forces: 1. The acceleration of the development of the Poseidon missile, including area penetration aids, on a schedule which could make it operationally available in the summer of 1970. 2. The production and deployment of the Minuteman III with three MK-12 multiple independently-aimed reentry vehicles each. 3. The production and deployment of the MK-17 reentry vehicle for the Minuteman II (the MK-17 promises a kill probability against 300 psi targets of about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] compared with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the MK-11 now used on the Minuteman II). 4. The replacement of all Minuteman I by FY 1972. 5. Initiation of engineering development of new area penetration aids packages for all Minuteman missiles and of a terminal penetration aids package for the Minuteman III. [Footnote in the source text.] There is nothing I have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead me to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the Nike-Zeus project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about $4 billion on ballistic missile defense research--including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Project Defender. And, during the last five or six years, we have spent about $1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes the Soviet Union is likely to undertake in the foreseeable future. We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or "Assured Destruction"/6/ force as the U.S. Therefore, deployment by the U.S. of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before. /6/A term used to describe one of two nuclear force capabilities. For a detailed explanation by Secretary McNamara, see an extract of his Military Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25, 1967, in Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 5-24. 2. With respect to protection of the U.S. against a possible Chinese Communist nuclear attack, the lead time required for China to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that required for deployment of our defense--therefore the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM system at this time. 3. Similarly, although the protection of our land-based strategic offensive forces against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack the Soviets may be able to mount in the late 1970s might later prove to be worthwhile, it is still premature to produce and deploy the Nike-X for that purpose. [Here follow 27 pages of text, which explore in detail the bases for these conclusions.]
174. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 18, 1967, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3541. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary received Ambassador Dobrynin at 7:00 p.m. at the latter's request. Ambassador Dobrynin read the following oral statement: "They have reviewed in Moscow the communication of Ambassador Thompson in a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on December 6, 1966, with respect to an exchange of views between Soviet and American representatives on the question of the possibilities of reaching a mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. relating to anti-missile defense systems. "This question, raised in the meeting of December 6 of last year, deserves attention. Indeed, the deployment of anti-missile defense systems involves enormous expenditures, and it would be desirable to avoid them. The Soviet Union has always come out for, and comes out for, the reduction of military expenditures, for the limitation or cessation of the arms race. "The Soviet Union constantly strives to reach an agreement on the liquidation of the threat of a nuclear missile war. That would be responsive to the interests of both of our two countries, and of all peoples. The question of reaching a mutual understanding with respect to anti-missile systems could be considered simultaneously with a solution of the problem of offensive means of delivering nuclear weapons and in close association with the problem of general and complete disarmament. If the Government of the U.S.A. has any reflections in this respect, these reflections could be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government." Ambassador Dobrynin left behind the Russian text of his oral statement (attached)./2/ /2/Not printed. In the ensuing discussion, Ambassador Dobrynin clarified that it was his understanding of his instructions that the Soviet Government was prepared in principle to enter discussions on this subject on the understanding that the discussions would cover offensive as well as defensive missile systems. The Ambassador added that he had alerted his Government to the urgency of the matter after his talk with Ambassador Kohler last Saturday, January 14,/3/ in order to obtain a reply prior to the President's presentation of his budget to the Congress. /3/Not further identified.
175. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 18, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. This conversation is presumably part of the 7 p.m. meeting between Dobrynin and Rusk. See Document 174. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary received Ambassador Dobrynin at the latter's request. Ambassador Dobrynin made the following statement: "I am authorized to confirm in principle our readiness to exchange opinions on the technical level in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, as this was discussed by you at the time of the 21st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As regards the time of the exchange of opinion, it would be possible to revert to this question a bit later." Ambassador Dobrynin left the Russian text of this oral statement. (Attached.)/2/ /2/Not printed. In an ensuing discussion the Secretary stressed the urgency and importance of this question in relation to consideration of a non-proliferation treaty. He said that the subject had been raised by many non-nuclear countries during our consultations. It was necessary that the Soviet Union and the United States be in a position to say that we were not foreclosing the possibility that non-nuclear countries could have access to the benefits of nuclear explosions. We should be in a position to offer to conduct nuclear explosions for justified projects. Ambassador Dobrynin said that this was a political question; whereas, what was now contemplated were purely technical talks and asked whether the Secretary was broadening his proposal. He pointed out that the technical talks would involve a certain group of experts, whereas, questions relating to non-proliferation were handled by another group on a political level. The Secretary said he would clarify the question. We had proposed technical talks as a beginning, and these would be useful. Such technical talks would lay the basis for coming to grips with the political aspects. The problem had protruded itself and become related to the question of a non-proliferation treaty. Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood this, but that he also understood that the Secretary was not proposing to marry the technical and political aspects at this time. The Secretary confirmed this understanding but stressed that the relationship with non-proliferation made it urgent that we get ahead more quickly with the technical talks than seemed to be contemplated by the Soviet side. He, therefore, hoped that Ambassador Dobrynin would ask his Government to put forward an early date for the beginning of the technical talks. Ambassador Dobrynin agreed to do so.
176. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-30-67 Washington, January 19, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Vol. IV, June 1966. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 18 January 1967,/2/ on the above subject, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper, dated 13 January 1967,/3/ on the above subject, prepared in the Department of State in consultation with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. /2/Not further identified. /3/Not further identified. 2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft position paper and interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling off strategic offensive and defensive missile forces. However, they reaffirm their recommendation that a decision be made now to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an initial operational capability in FY 1972. They do not believe that Soviet decisions as to future development of their offensive missile force are as directly dependent on the US ABM decision as is implied in the draft position paper. They believe that the Soviet problems and uncertainties of coping with a US ABM defense would reduce the risk of a Soviet attack. Accordingly, they believe that consideration of arms control agreements should not be permitted to delay a decision for an initial deployment of a US ABM system. If the Soviets are interested in an ABM deployment freeze, a prior announcement by the United States of a decision to initiate deployment of Nike-X should provide pressure on them to seek an agreement. 3. (S) Examination of various, previous strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV) freeze proposals has emphasized the many complexities in finding practical solutions to the conditions necessary to make a freeze concept acceptable from the standpoint of national security. The discussions presented in the draft position paper indicate the complexities inherent in attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union in this area. The following are assumptions and conclusions which are in the draft position paper and which are subject to serious reservations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. The exclusion of current construction of the Tallinn/4/ System, a most significant strategic deployment, from the freeze. /4/In the mid-1960s the Soviets began deploying a swath of radars and interceptors across the U.S. ICBM corridor. This system, code named Tallinn because it first appeared near the Estonian capital city of this name, may or may not have had ballistic missile defense capabilities. (Simon P. Worden, SDI and the Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 38-43) b. The dependence upon unilateral intelligence for verifying possible freeze agreements, and the stated acceptability of arrangements that cannot be effectively verified. c. The assumption that full scale testing is required before deploying MIRVs and penetration aids. d. The apparent assumption that a US ballistic missile defense deployment would not provide a useful contribution to the total US strategic posture with regard to both the USSR and Communist China. 4. (C) In view of the lack of interest expressed by the Soviets in this subject, it is believed that any US Government approach to the problem should be to determine, first, whether or not the Soviets are interested, in any way, in any form of an SNDV freeze and, if so, when and to what extent, including or excluding ABMs. 5. (C) If the Soviet representatives show any interest in this matter and indicate specific areas to be explored, the provisions of a freeze proposal should be developed with full, deliberate consideration, including review and analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to any commitment outside the US Government. 6. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently held that any arms control agreement should provide for adequate verification other than by complete reliance on unilateral intelligence. Disagreement within the US intelligence community on the ABM capability of the Soviet Tallinn System reinforces this position. Exploratory talks need not be blocked by failure to agree on verification procedures. The USSR should be informed early in the discussions that it will be necessary to establish appropriate verification procedures in conjunction with reaching a general area of understanding on forces to be frozen before there can be a formal agreement. 7. (C) Although the proposal would not preclude research, development, and testing, there is a seeming inconsistence in the discussion which indicates that under certain conditions the United States should agree to refrain from making the qualitative improvements now planned for strategic offensive forces (Poseidon, Minuteman III, and MIRVs) and that flight testing of MIRVs and other penetration aids should be precluded. In contrast to this, it is proposed in the paper that, since unilateral intelligence is incapable of detecting changes incorporated in missiles to improve their performance, no limit be placed on changes in missile characteristics as such. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, in order to avoid Soviet technological surprise and resulting degradation of US military posture, research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted under any freeze agreement and that US-planned improvements in its missile characteristics must be pursued. 8. (S) It should be noted that the US force posture and development/deployment actions are extremely sensitive to the possession of a MIRV capability by the Soviets. Therefore, the DOD established policy for its agencies on this subject is that all papers and discussions will be classified Secret-NOFORN Except UK and Canada. This policy was adopted to prevent acceleration of any potential Soviet MIRV capability resulting from failure to safeguard the concept and its strategic advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR. However, they recognize that the Soviets may raise this subject and that US participants in any such discussions must be prepared to respond. 9. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the draft position paper that the United States should in no way indicate its willingness to consider a trade-off of a freeze on manned bombers for a freeze of SAMs, with or without ABM capability. Any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability. 10. (C) With reference to discussion in the draft position paper of the nature of the agreement to be sought, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that exploratory talks should be conducted informally until a basis for an agreement is reached or it is evident that no agreement is possible. However, should an agreement be reached between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider it essential that such agreement be formalized as a treaty. 11. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling-off strategic offensive and defensive forces. However, this should not be interpreted as affecting their previous recommendations to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an operational capability in FY 1972. b. Believe that any US Government approach should be to determine first whether or not the Soviets are interested in a limitation on strategic arms and, if so, to what extent. c. Consider that any specific arms control proposal, prior to committing it outside the US Government, should be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. Such proposals should be analyzed in the light of the then current situation; for example, the required flexibility for handling the Chinese threat. d. Believe the USSR should be informed early in the discussions that the United States intends to address the subject of verification after a general area of agreement is determined. e. Consider it essential that research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted and US planned improvements in missile characteristics must be pursued. f. Oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR. g. Believe that any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability. h. Consider it essential that an agreement between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms be formalized as a treaty. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
177. Editorial Note On January 20, 1967, Leonard Meeker and Joseph Sisco wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk informing him of the preparations to sign the Outer Space Treaty. As summarized in the memorandum, it was proposed by the United States to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union that the signing take place in three depository capitals: Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, and that President Johnson host the Washington ceremony scheduled for 5 p.m. at the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4) The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union subsequently agreed to the proposed signing date. After Secretary Rusk and U.S. Ambassador Goldberg signed the Treaty on behalf of the United States, the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, and the Ambassador from the Soviet Union, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, signed it on behalf of their respective countries. For remarks by President Johnson at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pages 91-92. Signing ceremonies were also held in London and Moscow. Telegram 5985 from London, January 27, reported that the Outer Space Treaty was signed at 10:50 a.m. by Foreign Minister George Brown, Soviet Ambassador Smirnovsky, and U.S. Charge Kaiser. Foreign Minister Brown, the telegram related, "welcomed the Treaty as enlarging field of international agreement and as significant step forward in building mutual trust, understanding, and agreement in East-West relations." Smirnovsky also welcomed the Treaty as opening up an "era of cooperation in outer space." (Department of State, Central Files, SP 7) The Treaty was subsequently signed by the representatives of 57 other nations. On March 7, March 13, and April 12, the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings to consider granting its advice and consent to the Treaty. (Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session) Following his 2-1/2 hour testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on March 13, Goldberg telephoned President Johnson to report that "the Space Treaty has clear sailing because there appears to be no objection." The President interjected, "wonderful." Goldberg then continued that "there will be no reservations to the Treaty; there will be no understandings. The Committee report will reflect my interpretation of what we negotiated." He then indicated that he was able to satisfy the lingering doubts of certain Senators on the Committee. In concluding their conversation, President Johnson lavished praise on Goldberg: "I salute you and honor you for a job well done. . . . God bless you; you did wonderful[ly]." (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, March 13, 1967, 12:38 p.m., Tape F67.08, Side B) On April 25 the U.S. Senate gave its unanimous consent to the Treaty's ratification, and it entered into force on October 10, 1967. For text of the Treaty, see 18 UST 2410.
178. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, January 21, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret. The source text, which the President had cleared on January 14, was submitted for the President's signature under cover of a January 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have asked Mr. Thompson to return to the Soviet Union as my Ambassador/2/ because of the great importance I attach to the improvement of relations between our two countries. I have full confidence in him, and I hope that you and your colleagues will feel as free to discuss our mutual problems with him as you would with me if we were able to sit down together. I am, of course, always available to your Ambassador here through the channel we have established, or directly whenever necessary./3/ I have arranged for Ambassador Thompson to have a channel of communication which will be open only to Secretary Rusk and myself. /2/Llewellyn Thompson was appointed to his second ambassadorship to the Soviet Union on October 13, 1966, and presented his credentials on January 23, 1967. /3/The special "channel" refers to a direct line of communication first established in 1963 between Khrushchev and President Kennedy through which views on pressing issues were exchanged. Periodically during President Johnson's administration, he revived this channel to communicate directly with Chairman Kosygin. These communications were labeled "Pen Pal Correspondence." I have directed Ambassador Thompson as a matter of first priority to discuss with you and the appropriate members of your Government the possibilities of reaching an understanding between us which would curb the strategic arms race. I think you must realize that following the deployment by you of an anti-ballistic missile system I face great pressures from the Members of the Congress and from public opinion not only to deploy defensive systems in this country, but also to increase greatly our capabilities to penetrate any defensive systems which you might establish. If we should feel compelled to make such major increases in our strategic weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that you would in turn feel under compulsion to do likewise. We would thus have incurred on both sides colossal costs without substantially enhancing the security of our own people or contributing to the prospects for a stable peace in the world. I was accordingly glad to receive your message from Ambassador Dobrynin/4/ indicating that the Soviet Government is likewise concerned about this question. We have no inflexible views as to how to proceed and would welcome yours. Perhaps after Ambassador Thompson has made an initial exploration of this matter with your Government, it may prove desirable to have some of our highest authorities meet in Geneva or another mutually agreeable place to carry the matter forward. Similarly, we have no inflexible views as to the nature of an understanding between us. Our objective should be a mutually acceptable and stable balance of forces, verifiable to the maximum extent possible by our national means. I trust you will agree that this is a question not only of the greatest importance but of considerable urgency. /4/See Document 174. May I express the hope that in the coming year peace will return to this troubled world, and that we may find ways to cooperate in dealing with the problems that face mankind today and for which our two countries, by their very size and importance, carry a heavy responsibility. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, January 22, 1967, 1:27 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3543. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA) and Garthoff (G/PM); cleared by Rostow, McNamara, Kohler, Foster, and Walsh; and approved by Secretary Rusk on January 21. 123253. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. In your meeting with Gromyko you should make following oral reply concerning talks on strategic weapons question. You may leave an informal copy of your oral remarks. "The United States has studied the oral statement of Ambassador Dobrynin on January 18, 1967,/2/ concerning an exchange of views between Soviet and American representatives on the possibilities of reaching a mutual understanding concerning anti-ballistic missile systems. /2/See Document 174. "The United States Government accepts the Soviet Government's position that discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems as well as anti-missile defense systems. This position is, of course, without prejudice to whatever solutions may arise in the discussions with respect to possible understandings on feasible combinations of weapons systems which might be curtailed in order to curb the strategic arms race. "Today both sides realize that a nuclear war would be disastrous for both and that our strategic weapons can serve only to deter such a war. In this light, it seems that the present strategic situation may be the most stable we can hope to achieve in the near future. We each have large numbers of well-protected weapons, and each has the ability with high confidence to inflict terrible destruction upon the other, even after having received an initial attack. Therefore, the initiation of such an attack is not now rational. "There are, however, disquieting signs that suggest that this situation may become seriously altered in the near future. During the past several years, the United States has consciously restricted its deployment of strategic missiles and refrained from deploying ballistic missile defenses, hoping to see a corresponding display of restraint on part of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, it now appears that there is an acceleration in the deployment of Soviet systems. Although your deployments are no doubt prompted by concern to protect your people, we believe we should both consider whether this action, and whatever reactions on our part it will necessarily cause, are in the interest of either of our countries. "We believe that we understand your feelings on this point because they are probably very similar to our own. The safety and security of our countries must be the first concern of each of us. "It is in this context that we believe we should discuss the implications of the continued deployment of strategic missile and anti-missile defense systems. It seems clear to us that if unchecked your deployments could raise serious requirements for us with respect to our own deterrent. We will be forced to increase our offensive forces and perhaps start to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. These actions on our part could negate your new deployments and lead you to decide on still further increases in your strategic forces. All of this would be at great cost to both of us and might well lead to greater rather than lesser risks due to the upward spiral in the arms race. "It is also true that any evidence of progress in these talks would make easier the accession by certain non-nuclear states to the non-proliferation treaty which we both hope is nearing agreement between us. "It is for these reasons that we believe we should discuss urgently whether it is possible to curtail the arms race in strategic weapons systems. "High level representatives should, we believe, discuss a prompt cessation of deployment of additional strategic offensive missile launchers, and anti-missile launchers and associated launch facilities. It will be necessary to discuss respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved. It will also be necessary to be precise with respect to the undertakings regarding cessation or curtailment of further expansion of deployment. "The United States would be prepared to discuss the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification to meet the major objectives of ceasing further deployment of new missile and anti-missile launch facilities without requiring inspection on either party's territory. If discussions suggest that dependable curtailment of some aspects of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems would require on-site inspection, such questions too could be included. "We recognize that these and other complex questions will require careful consideration by our representatives. "The United States places no preconditions on these discussions. We do, however, note that, especially since the discussions may extend for some time, insofar as either side may make major changes in strategic offensive or defensive weapons system deployment during the negotiations, such changes might compel the other side to take the steps necessary to offset such further changes. "We suggest deferring consideration of the form in which an understanding between us might be expressed until we see what such an understanding might cover. And, after we have determined that such an arrangement is working to our mutual satisfaction, we might achieve the climate for broader, as well as more formal, agreements in the strategic arms area." Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |