1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva/1/ Washington, March 8, 1967, 6:05 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bonn. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA/DD); cleared by Leddy (EUR), Rostow (M), and Walsh (S/S); and approved by Rusk. 151197. For Foster from the Secretary. Subject: NPT Safeguards article. Following is for your use in the consultations which you will be conducting on your current trip./2/ Aside from European successor state problem, principal remaining NPT issue troubling Europeans is Article III on safeguards. Believe we well on road to providing effective explanations of many of technical issues raised by our proposed article. Unresolved are political issues raised by Article III which are concentrated on Euratom and its members. /2/ACDA Director Foster visited several European cities March 9-16, including Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels to consult with NATO allies on the non-proliferation treaty. A variety of factors lie behind US objective to establish a worldwide system of safeguards. Such a safeguards system will be more attractive to the potential nuclear powers outside of Europe who will see in an exception designed to take care of Euratom a special concession not granted to other countries of the world. Soviets objection to acceptance of Euratom safeguards on basis it involves allies inspecting allies has basis in principle; they could not accept unless they were in a position to create a Warsaw Pact mirror image of Euratom, something they might not now be able to do and which would not be in our nor FRG interest for them to do. U.S. nevertheless has accepted Euratom inspection as workable and effective and recognizes that question may be raised as to why necessary to impose additional inspection by IAEA and fear that nuclear version of Gresham's law may develop and drive out Euratom safeguards. U.S. sees, however, as more important issue the political issue growing out of feeling of discrimination resulting from inspection system contemplated Article III among Euratom members. Whereas Euratom safeguards apply to peaceful activities in all Euratom states, Article III safeguards would be applicable to only five of six members. Since France will be excluded from IAEA safeguards, some believe France will then become choice location for all nuclear research and development within Euratom community. In addition, from foregoing flow questions of continued life for Euratom and future of European unity if equality among Community members is impaired. FYI: While one may question rationale of some of this argumentation, fact is that discrimination argument is one France can play to her advantage and against us and our interests, and is subtly doing so now. Also clear from what Germans and Italians have told us Article III as presently drafted and in present state understandings between us not acceptable to them. We also know others in and out of Euratom have problems of sufficient magnitude as to invite opposition to inclusion present language this article in any draft NPT. End FYI. Because NPT provides an unparalleled opportunity to move forward on achieving an internationally accepted safeguards system, we wish to obtain maximum support of our allies before pushing forward. In considering text of a safeguards Article U.S. prepared to redraft it to take into account three suggestions allies have made. First would be to establish overall substantial transition period of three years for entire article. Second, to rewrite the provision relating to safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment to make it clear that it is only the fissionable material used or produced with these items, and not the items themselves, which are subject to safeguards. Third, to insert a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons development or manufacture. You could point out that these last two changes should reduce their fears that safeguards could be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial endeavors. In addition you could point out following two points that we could make outside the agreement which should alleviate FRG and others concerns. First, we can assure them that they will not have to accept Soviet inspectors from the IAEA by getting the FRG to understand that this is the case under the present IAEA rules, provided this interpretation is given FRG in writing and we assure them of our support in case their rejection of Soviet inspectors is challenged in the IAEA. Second, we can assure them that U.S. will continue to assure adequate fuel supplies for their peaceful nuclear program, including reactors which they export. Latter assurance will be dealt with more detail septel. FYI: Congressional consultation placing broad range of U.S. peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards proceeding favorably but not yet at point where Presidential decision appropriate. However, if your discussions with allies take a turn where it appears that concern over discrimination and potential industrial espionage is really based on fear of competitive disadvantage with U.S. in reactor sales, you could ask if this is the case and indicate we can take appropriate action to allay such concerns. End FYI. You should also indicate desire to Euratom countries to consider with them following changes in safeguards article which might be discussed with Soviets after this phase allied consultation completed. Indicate that we have no draft to propose of such a revised article but prepared to consider idea of Article III requiring IAEA safeguards or international safeguards accepted by IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed with Euratom. We wish to describe ideas which might be incorporated so that they can be considered. This approach, like that of the Article we have been discussing would provide for a transition period of three years and if the IAEA and the agency administering the other international safeguards system (in this case Euratom) did not come to an agreement during that time, then IAEA safeguards would apply to the countries concerned. The U.S., however, feels strongly about effective safeguards article in NPT and would appreciate allied reaction to these ideas or any other ideas allies have which would produce a similar result. In this context allies should be aware that if the new element in the approach, verification of regional systems by IAEA, should prove non-negotiable with USSR we would have to consider other approaches, including those along the lines of a redrafted Article III that has been the subject of our recent discussion./3/ /3/See Attachment 1, Document 189. Rusk
191. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, March 14, 1967. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 304-306. No classification marking. [Here follow discussion of the selection of a new director for the Argonne National Laboratory and an account of the opening of a symposium on outer space exploration.] At 4 p.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in Secretary of State Rusk's conference room. Present were: Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Hornig, Helms, Rostow, Fisher, Webb, Kohler, Katzenbach, McNaughton, Marks, Scoville, plus Labowitz, Barber, Garthoff, et al. Rusk opened the meeting by calling on Fisher. Fisher referred to the State/ACDA paper, "Proposal on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Missile Systems,"/2/ that had been circulated before the meeting, and said this is a simple plan that would not go all the way that the Soviets want toward complete disarmament. Kohler went on to say that this plan has been essentially agreed to by all the Deputies. He said its potential success depends on the dependability of the unilateral detection system. Rusk mentioned that there are a couple of places in the paper in which it is suggested that the U.S. make concessions, even before the Soviets have said, no, and he thought we should at least feel them out before establishing these less desirable positions as the U.S. position. /2/Not found. Rusk then called on General Wheeler for his reactions. Wheeler said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the paper and came to the following five or six conclusions. They want a plan that would maintain the strategic superiority of the U.S. at all times. They would insist on on-site inspection. If on-site inspection was impossible, they would limit the plan to those systems that could be verified unilaterally, and this would mean only the fixed land-based systems. They do not wish to forego the possibility of the U.S. deploying an ABM in the future. They believe that the plan should be formalized as a treaty. They think there should be withdrawal provisions to come into effect if there were 1. hostile actions interfering with our information-collection systems, 2. attempts to deceive, or 3. deterioration of our ability to detect. Rusk then called on McNamara who said he does not think the U.S. is ready to put forward such a plan in written form. He also said that he thinks the U.S. should not agree to anything we couldn't check ourselves. Rusk then asked me for my opinion. I said I agree with McNamara. Rusk found it a frustrating situation because he felt we should do something along these lines, but we shouldn't do anything that we couldn't check, and that doesn't leave very much. Rusk called on Webb who said that he could live with the plan. Rusk called on Helms who said he is queasy about our ability to carry out the unilateral verification under the plan. Rusk called on Hornig who said he agrees with McNamara, but thinks some steps should be taken, and the question is how to begin. Rostow said he is especially interested in the nature of the Soviet Tallinn system,/3/ and thinks we should somehow learn more about it. This led McNamara to suggest that our first objective should be to try to establish the nature of the Tallinn system. He thinks we might use this as a basis for opening a dialogue with the Soviets, and perhaps we might be successful in a 6-12 month period of time. If we aren't successful, this particular plan is no good; and if we are successful, we might be in a position to proceed further. He said he thinks we should start with some exchanges on our capabilities, and maybe even show each other reconnaissance photographs. Rostow said, when we reach such a point, that might be the proper time to table a paper. /3/See footnote 4, Document 176. Fisher pointed out that we have been talking a long time, and that we must talk in a context of holding down offensive missiles. Kohler agreed with Fisher and expressed doubt that the dialogue approach that had been suggested would be possible with the Soviets. Katzenbach also indicated that he doubts such discussions would be successful, but that there might be a by-product, namely, we might end up in deciding on a mutually advantageous unilateral showdown. McNamara said he doesn't think we are very close, that is, within a year or two, to an agreement with the Soviets on any of these matters. (He left the meeting about 4:45 p.m.) Rusk made the important point that he regards detection by national means as limited to means within the power of the U.S. itself. He said he would have another go at this with Kohler and Fisher in order to prepare a cable for Thompson, to give him (Thompson) guidance to begin the dialogue with the Soviets. These instructions would perhaps be along the lines of probing further on three or four points. Rusk went on to say that verification is a key issue, and that we are already having difficulty on verification. He referred in this regard to the Space Treaty/4/ and to "Dr. Seaborg's treaty" (the NPT). I said I bought the idea of this being my treaty provided there were proper safeguards in Article III. Rostow expressed optimism that the dialogue with the Soviets would be successful. Rusk expressed the interesting thought that, as time goes on, we will find ourselves in the situation that we won't be able to make progress in these matters in bits and pieces; that we will need something dramatic to take a big step, and this within a few years. Rusk ended the meeting by saying he would circulate to the Principals the instructions that will be sent to Ambassador Thompson. /4/See Document 167. [Here follows a note on Seaborg's biweekly report to the President.]
192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, March 18, 1967, 4:55 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3546. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on March 16; cleared by Kohler, McNaughton, Fisher, Stoessel, Walsh, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 158191. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Subject: US-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks. 1. On basis Principals' discussion and your 3928,/2/ we have decided to proceed by your presenting paper transmitted by this telegram, calling for talks to begin on April 12. For such talks we contemplate sending small team of senior officials to assist you. /2/Not found. 2. Text of Oral Statement to be delivered to Gromyko, copy of which you may leave, follows (paras 3 through 8 below): 3. "The US Government has carefully studied Chairman Kosygin's letter to President Johnson of February 28/3/ and your statement/4/ to me on that same date. Despite some differences in approach, we see a common interest in ensuring the security of each side, without jeopardy to the security of the other, by avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of the strategic arms race, and by creating the basis for reductions in existing forces. Accordingly we believe it possible and desirable to proceed promptly with discussions between our two Governments. /3/See Document 185. /4/See Document 186. 4. "US Government shares the desire of the Soviet Government not merely to prevent possible disruption of the strategic balance, but to move beyond this to reductions of existing forces. We see the forthcoming discussions as the best means to work together to increase the mutual understanding that is necessary to make progress toward this common goal. 5. "While the US Government hopes that it will be possible to move rapidly toward agreement on strategic arms reductions, it may be feasible in the interim to find a way to 'level-off' strategic offensive and defensive forces. We agree that measures for this purpose would have to be designed to ensure the security of each side rather than attempting to solidify the precise current correlation of forces or to freeze an advantage to one or the other side. In other words, we recognize that some appropriate adjustments in the present forces of each side might be necessary and would still be consistent with our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the possibly disruptive effects and the great costs of continuation of a strategic arms race. It will of course be necessary to discuss the respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved, and what undertakings with respect to them would be agreed. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. With all of these considerations in view, we suggest that measures of agreed limitation on deployment should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and to all defensive strategic missile systems (launchers and radars) having a significant anti-ballistic missile capability. We can see now how stationary systems can be part of such an arrangement, but we will need to work out a way to include mobile systems. 6. "We continue to believe that it would be premature to consider the form in which agreements or understandings between us might be expressed--treaty or otherwise. The form would depend upon the content and nature of the understanding. 7. "The United States Government believes that a thorough and frank discussion of the general problem will in itself be of great value to both sides. Increased understanding should not only assist us in reaching agreements to limit and to reduce strategic forces, but can also assist in dispelling uncertainties which lead each side to hedge against doubts by acquiring larger forces than it might otherwise do. This in turn triggers the other side to do the same, activating a spiral in the arms race. 8. "In view of the complexity of this general question, the US does not believe that a formal agenda should be fixed. The US would welcome the comments of the Soviet Government. The US Government is prepared to send appropriate senior officials from Washington to support Ambassador Thompson in these discussions. It proposes that the discussions begin in Moscow on April 12, and it hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to agree to that date." 9. FYI: It has been decided to open the discussions without presentation at this time of a detailed US proposal. (The draft position paper pouched to you has not been decided upon.) As a result of our discussions, it has been concluded that our proposal in the first instance should be limited to elements outlined in paragraph 5 above. We hope it will be possible on this basis to engage in the dialogue necessary before we can settle on a specific proposal. At the same time [we] recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward discussions of the strategic balance. We hope that the positive reference to the long-term possibilities of agreements on reductions, as well as the broad and loose framework for possible mid-term "leveling-off" agreements, will provide a context in which it will be possible to introduce a more sophisticated approach to the whole problem than the Soviet Government has hitherto displayed. With respect to the short term, we hope that it will be possible to establish a dialogue in which we can, for example, demonstrate to the Soviets that it would be in their interest not to preserve secrecy with respect to the mission and performance capabilities of the Tallinn system which results only in the need for the US to assume the worst in planning our own [future] programs. The dialogue may assist each side to make better unilateral decisions, and to hold down the arms race, even if no agreements are reached. (We recognize that care must be taken to avoid the impression of an intelligence fishing expedition.) Increased understanding of the current and prospective strategic situation could lead to unilateral slowdowns in specific areas pending broader and perhaps more formal bilateral agreements. 10. Our flexibility is designed not only to leave open the possibility for an agreement under which the Soviets would be permitted, for example, to keep their current Moscow ABM and their current ICBM deployments, which we are virtually certain they will insist upon doing, but also to permit us to hold open the option for a limited ABM deployment. 11. At your discretion, you may wish to indicate to the Soviets the level of representation from Washington in your support in forthcoming talks. It will be from State, DOD, and ACDA--probably McNaughton, Garthoff, Fisher or another ACDA official, a representative of the Joint Staff, and a scientist. End FYI. Rusk
193. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 6, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 388.3, March-May, 1967. Confidential. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Mr. Barber has seen." SUBJECT In the course of our intensive consultations during the last few weeks, many of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, including many of our important NATO allies, have expressed concern that the proposed safeguards requirements in our draft non-proliferation treaty might hinder their peaceful nuclear programs and leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. It might help to overcome these objections if the United States were to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities. The justification for the exclusion of any U.S. facilities from the IAEA safeguards offer would be only on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. Such an offer would be made to apply at such a time as mandatory safeguards as specified in the non-proliferation treaty are applied to non-nuclear-weapon states. I recommend that you approve a statement to this effect to be made at such time as would best help to achieve a satisfactory safeguards article in the treaty. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this recommendation. This concept has been discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission with representatives of the major U.S. industrial and utility concerns involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of these representatives think it is quite a good thing to do in order to achieve an effective worldwide safeguards system, although some of them point out that there will be problems in implementation of the offer which will have to be worked out in the course of negotiating the necessary arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These arrangements will not only advance our national interest in achieving safeguards, but will promote industrial interests by establishing conditions which favor the widest possible export of nuclear materials and equipment under safeguards. It is our intention in making this offer to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear industry in implementing it, and our consultations have given us confidence that this cooperation will be forthcoming. However, if it becomes necessary in a few instances to rely on the Commission's regulatory powers to require the participation in the inspection system by specific companies, the Attorney General would have to determine whether the Commission's current authority extends to requiring a licensee to open his facilities to inspection by an organization other than the Commission or other U.S. agencies. If not, some clarifying legislation might be necessary to ensure enforcement in the unlikely event that the Commission's authority in this field were challenged. The British have indicated privately to us that if the United States were to make such an offer, the United Kingdom would do likewise. The proposed offer has been discussed with Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who concur. Senator Gore, Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, indicated general agreement. Senator Hickenlooper expressed interest but did not commit himself; in my judgment, he will support the idea because of his past support for IAEA safeguards, because what we are planning appears reasonable under the circumstances, and because it would not adversely affect industrial uses of atomic energy. Senators Mansfield and Dirksen were both noncommittal, but I think they will rely on the views of Senators Pastore and Hickenlooper, respectively. William C. Foster/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Foster signed the original.
194. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 8, 1967, 1:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "rec'd 1:45 P." Another reads, "4/9/67--Mr. Rostow telephoned Mr. Katzenbach." Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk endorses a memorandum from Bill Foster/2/ requesting that you approve an offer on our part to let the International Atomic Energy Agency apply its safeguards on "a broad scale" to our peaceful nuclear facilities in connection with the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. /2/Not attached; presumably a reference to Document 193. This proposal had been introduced earlier by ACDA in a February 21 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, Wheeler, Rostow, and Hornig. Fisher wrote "Several non-nuclear-weapon countries have expressed concern over the discriminatory aspects of the safeguards Article (III) for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fear that this would leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. One method which has been suggested for overcoming these objections would be for the U.S. to offer to apply IAEA safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities." Fisher requested that the addressees of this memo concur, by noon February 23, on a draft instruction cable to the U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council authorizing him to explore the U.S. offer with the Council. A special North Atlantic Council meeting was expected to convene Friday, February 24, to discuss Article III. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of Defense 1967) The draft safeguards article in the NPT would apply IAEA safeguards only to the peaceful facilities of non-nuclear-weapons states since it is clear that the Soviets will not accept IAEA inspection on their facilities at this time. This is considered discriminatory by some non-nuclear-weapons states and has also led to the charge that it might permit industrial espionage to the advantage of the existing nuclear-weapons states. This voluntary action on our part would help to answer these objections to the treaty. It is proposed to rely on voluntary cooperation of U.S. industry to implement this offer. However, if it became necessary, the government would determine the additional action required to enforce it. Sec. McNamara and Chairman Seaborg concur in this proposal, as do Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield, and it is reportedly acceptable to the atomic energy industry. Nick/3/ called this morning to urge that you clear this for presentation next week in NATO, because our willingness to do this may prove the key to solving the Euratom safeguards problem in the NPT context. /3/Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. Walt Approved, without further review/4/ /4/This option is checked.
195. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, April 15, 1967, 11:09 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (I) 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Top Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 2:20 p.m. on April 15. CAP 67291. Literally Eyes Only for the President From Walt Rostow. April 15, 1967. Herewith Sec. McNamara's account of his talk with Dobrynin. It is an important document and should help those in Moscow who are serious about stopping the arms race. You will also note Dobrynin believes serious Vietnam negotiations must begin secretly and without third parties. Early in April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy called me to say that during a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin,/2/ Dobrynin had suggested it might be useful if he and I had a conversation. I mentioned Mac's suggestion to the President and to Dean, both of whom urged me to arrange to see Dobrynin. /2/Not further identified. On April 5, I called Dobrynin and reported to him Mac's conversation with me. Dobrynin hedged a bit as to whether he or Mac had suggested we meet. In any case, he accepted my invitation for lunch on April 11. I gave him the choice of lunching at the Pentagon or at my home. He chose the latter. We met there for approximately two hours today. Among the subjects we discussed were the following: 1. Non-Proliferation Treaty. Dobrynin asked my view of the prospects for the Treaty. I stated I was uncertain of the attitudes of India and certain of the non-European powers, but believed that after possible clarification of a few points, western European nations, excluding France, would support the Treaty. He asked whether I believed the Federal Republic was really concerned about the U.S. and Soviet Union making a "deal" which would advance their interests at the expense of Germany. I replied that although we had no intention of doing so, many Germans feared we would--this was a factor which both we and the Soviets must take into account in connection with the proposed Treaty. 2. The Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group./3/ Dobrynin referred to a sentence in the communique which stated that Schroeder "led a discussion on the role of host countries in allied arrangements for the planning and use of nuclear weapons." He asked whether we planned to dilute the authority of the President in the control of nuclear weapons. I replied we had no intention of doing so; under the law we had no authority to do so; we had no plan for asking for a change in the law; and if we were to ask for a change in the law for this purpose, the Congress would probably not accede to our request. I added that no member of NATO had asked that we give up Presidential authority over the use or release of the weapons. The German interest in the role of host countries was associated with their desire for discussion of a possible veto [by?] host countries of the use of such weapons. I stated that heretofore such subject had not been discussed among the nations of NATO--this was one of the reasons why the non-nuclear powers had felt removed from the planning for weapons which were so fundamental to their security. It was to meet this problem that the nuclear planning committee had been established. /3/On December 14, 1966, Ministers of the Defence Planning Committee approved recommendations of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers which had been formed in 1965. The recommendations called for the establishment of two permanent bodies for nuclear planning: the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries; and a smaller Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of seven countries. The NPG's first meeting was held April 6-7, 1967, in Washington. For text of the communique, April 7, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 285-286. See also Foreign Relations, vol. XIII, Document 246. While discussing the President's command of nuclear weapons, I emphasized the steps we had taken to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of such weapons (the emphasis on safety precautions and the introduction of such devices as "Pal") and I indicated our uncertainty as to whether the Soviet Union had given equal attention to these matters. Although he professed that they had, it was clear that he himself had very little knowledge of the extent to which they had protected against accidental detonation or unauthorized use. I emphasized that as the number of nuclear weapons increased it was becoming increasingly important for the political authorities to monitor the steps that the scientists and military commanders have taken to assure that the weapons would be used only when authorized by appropriate political authorities. 3. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks. It was clear that this was the primary subject in which Dobrynin was interested. He asked how we expected to approach the talks. I replied that Ambassador Thompson had outlined a possible approach to Gromyko on March 23/4/ and we were surprised that to date we had received no reply to our suggestions. He seemed somewhat embarrassed to have to justify the delay and he indicated that it reflected some difference of view in his government as to how to proceed. He stated he would indicate to his colleagues in Moscow the importance we place on such talks and his own view that it would be wise to proceed with them. /4/Not further identified. He asked on what philosophy we would approach discussions of strategic weapons systems. I replied as follows: (A) We believe we must be capable of deterring nuclear or large-scale conventional attacks by members of the Warsaw Pact on any nation of NATO. (B) We can be assured of having such a deterrent power only if we have a force so strong as to be able to absorb a surprise attack and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on the nations of the Pact. (C) We believe we have that force today; we must provide it in the future; and the quantity of force required for the future will depend to considerable extent upon the actions of the Soviet Union, i.e., we will react to changes in their offensive or defensive force structure. (D) We believe the Soviets' requirement for a deterrent is the same as ours. We believe they have that deterrent today. We believe we cannot prevent them from maintaining it in the future if they act intelligently and if they are willing to use the resources available to them for that purpose. (E) Based on this philosophy, we conclude that if they deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, we must react to it by adding to our offensive power. We have already started to do so. Similarly, if we were to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system to protect our population against a heavy Soviet attack, they would react by increasing their offensive power. Because each of us would be faced with uncertainties, and we more than they, it is probable that after the installation of the defensive system, we would not only be worse off financially but that our security would be less as well. (F) For these reasons, we believe it may be possible to develop a series of actions to be taken by each side, which would reduce the military risks and reduce the financial costs without reducing the deterrent capability of either party and without changing the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I gave Dobrynin a copy of George Wilson's article from the Washington Post of April 9 and told him the article was based on a "background" conversation with me on Saturday, April 8. Dobrynin probed for specific actions we would be willing to take in return for actions by the Soviet Union, but I refused to give any indication of any particular points we would be willing to agree on, stating that I believed extensive discussion of the philosophy I had outlined above would be required before we could come to any possible agreement, formal or informal, on specific points. [Here follows discussion of events in Vietnam and China.]
196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Nodis. The source text is undated; however, it was submitted to the President under cover of two May 16 memoranda both from Walt Rostow. The first memorandum, 11:05 a.m., informed the President that "Secretary Rusk will probably wish to raise this at lunch today." The second, 4 p.m., requested that the President make a decision urgently in time for Secretary Rusk to send a letter to Foreign Minister Brandt explaining the U.S. position before the North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for the following day, May 17. The approval block of this memorandum is checked. SUBJECT The Federal Republic of Germany has objected to our proposal to table a Non-Proliferation Treaty jointly with the U.S.S.R. with the safeguards Article (Article III) left blank subject to further U.S.-Soviet efforts to achieve a joint proposal. They take the position that this might result in a safeguards Article which is harmful to the interests of Euratom. They also propose that we introduce a U.S. draft which would include our safeguards Article, with an additional clause to make clear that inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting safeguards inspections on their territory, and with certain other additions to the text which has been shown the Soviets. On Sunday/2/ the Germans, acting on instructions from the Foreign Minister, changed the emphasis on this approach to indicate that, although their basic position is that they still favored tabling two separate complete drafts, they would accept as a fall-back the tabling of a joint draft with Article III left blank, provided we assured them /2/Presumably May 14. (1) that we would obtain an understanding with the Co-chairman that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately, and (2) that if the subject of Article III was nevertheless raised in the Plenary, the U.S. would state that it considered an Article III like that which we have been discussing with the FRG as an essential condition for Western approval. In this fall-back position the Germans are now, in effect, asking that if, as is most likely, the Soviets won't at this time accept the German-preferred Article III and we table a joint draft with a blank Article III, the U.S. would in any future discussion of safeguards in Geneva become the spokesman for the German position. The fact that the Germans are backing off from their opposition to the tabling of a joint draft with Article III blank is in itself an encouraging sign. I believe a decision to table a separate U.S. draft treaty now would seriously jeopardize the prospect of achieving U.S.-Soviet agreement on a treaty. It would leave the Soviets free to introduce--or reintroduce--various ideas of their own which we and the FRG would find unacceptable. It is most unlikely that any worthwhile treaty could be concluded in the absence of U.S.-Soviet agreement. Nor can we object to the first of their conditions, namely that the U.S. would obtain an understanding with the Soviets that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately and that multilateral discussion at the Conference of safeguards would be suspended pending availability of language protecting Euratom interests to which the Soviets could agree. My recommendation is that, if the Soviets will agree to this procedure--as I believe they may--we proceed to table a jointly-recommended draft in the ENDC with Article III, safeguards, initially left blank. I have considerable difficulty with the second German condition. The German condition is based on a realistic assumption; it is certain that the Indians and others among the Eight will take an initial position that a safeguards Article should apply to the peaceful activities of all countries, both those which do and those which do not have nuclear weapons. We can accept this, but it will put great pressure on the Russians who will reject it. There is no reason that this discussion should be to our disadvantage. The United States need not assume the responsibility for the fact that the ENDC is not considering such an Article. We are justified in making it quite clear that it is the continuing refusal of the U.S.S.R. to accept safeguards on its territory that prevents acceptance of a non-discriminatory article. We can use this position as a basis for establishing a consensus at the ENDC in support of the position recommended by the FRG that IAEA inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting inspectors on their territories. It is not clear that this tactical advantage would extend to obtaining general support for the relationship between regional inspection systems (in particular, Euratom) and IAEA which the FRG has in mind. We should make every effort to reach agreement on this point and we should tell the Germans that we will do so. However, we should not now lose all flexibility on this subject by promising that it will be our current draft of Article III or nothing. We should rather indicate to the Germans that if we fail to obtain agreement on this approach, we would have to reassess the entire safeguards issue if it continues to stand in the way of an otherwise worthwhile treaty. We should indicate that we will do so through full NATO consultation and taking into account the views of all our allies. We should point out that the purpose of this negotiation is not to impose a treaty on anyone but to reach a treaty which all governments can accept in good spirit. This will involve extended negotiations in the period ahead which will be carried on in full consultation with our allies both in NAC and in capitals. We will expect the Western Four in the ENDC to be fully alert to protect the interests of NATO. The further point made by Minister von Lilienfeld on behalf of Chancellor Kiesinger to Walt Rostow was for a treaty of limited duration. The suggestion was that the treaty should either be limited to a period of 20 years or signatories should be able to accede for a limited period. The Italians have suggested an even shorter duration clause and I believe that other key countries will also want to limit the treaty's duration. It is most unlikely, however, that we could, at this time, negotiate a limited duration clause with the Soviets who would see it as the result of German pressure. This problem would be eased with the Soviets if it became clear that it was being raised by other countries. Moreover, the question of duration is closely linked with the amendment, review, and withdrawal provisions that are finally agreed upon. We, therefore, believe we should defer consideration of the duration issue until such time as we can see that a meaningful treaty is taking shape. If, as we expect, a number of other governments raise the duration issue, we ought to be prepared to think seriously about a treaty of limited duration provided it is long enough to accomplish the purpose of the treaty. We should not indicate to other governments anything specific on this subject at this time but rather indicate our willingness to consider all relevant questions with respect to the treaty, including the question of duration, in consultation with other governments and our own Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I recommend that you authorize me to convey these views to the FRG and, while recognizing the Chancellor's political problems, to indicate that the possibility of achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution is increased if the idea of a treaty of limited duration does not appear to be a German initiative. Dean Rusk
197. Editorial Note AEC Chairman Seaborg wrote President Johnson on June 2, 1967, requesting approval of Crosstie, the FY 1968 underground nuclear weapons testing program. (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 14, page 688) At a June 20 meeting of the Annual Briefing of the 307 Committee (Review Committee for Underground Nuclear Testing), Seaborg and other AEC members presented the Crosstie program which consisted of 48 tests, including 2 nuclear excavation tests, Cabriolet and Buggy I. (Ibid., page 772) President Johnson indicated his approval of Crosstie on a June 30 memorandum from Walt Rostow. However, the two nuclear excavation tests were not granted specific approval and thus were not included in the first quarter authorization. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) On July 3, Seaborg wrote Rostow that substitutions had been made in Crosstie I, the first quarter test program. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) On July 6, Rostow sent a memorandum to Seaborg informing him that President Johnson had approved Crosstie and Crosstie I, but that specific approval would be required for "cratering experiments or tests to be executed outside the continental United States." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) Crosstie I consisted of 11 AEC weapon development tests, 1 AEC test for peaceful applications, and 1 Department of Defense weapons effects test. All tests took place at the Nevada Test Site. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, page 30) In a September 15 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested Presidential approval of 15 tests in the second quarter test program, Crosstie II. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 44, Box 23) An October 10 entry in Seaborg's Journal reveals that Rostow sent Seaborg a memorandum indicating Presidential approval of Crosstie II. (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 15, page 377) This memorandum, however, has not been further identified. A total of eight nuclear weapons tests were conducted under Crosstie II, including Gasbuggy, a Plowshare test, which was tested at Farmington, New Mexico; the remaining tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, page 30) A request for approval of Crosstie III was forwarded to President Johnson in a December 22 letter from Seaborg. Crosstie III consisted of 18 tests including 6 deferred from Crosstie II due to "programmatic and technical difficulties." Specific requests for approval of Cabriolet and Buggy I, the two Plowshare cratering experiments, were not included in Seaborg's letter. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) President Johnson indicated his approval of Crosstie III on a January 5, 1968, memorandum from Walt Rostow. Sixteen tests were approved including Cabriolet; authorization for Buggy I continued to be handled as a separate matter. (Ibid.) A total of 14 nuclear tests were executed, including Cabriolet and Buggy I. All tests took place at the Nevada Test Site, except for Faultless which was conducted in Central Nevada. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, pages 31-32) The Crosstie IV program consisted of 19 proposed tests including 2 Department of Defense weapons effects tests to be conducted in the fourth quarter of FY 1968. Seaborg requested authorization for this program in a March 13 letter to President Johnson. (Johnson Library, National Security Policy, Subject File, Nuclear Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) In a March 25 memorandum from Rostow to the President, Rostow requested the President's approval of Crosstie IV. The President approved Crosstie IV on March 26, and Rostow wrote Seaborg on the same date relaying Presidential approval. (Ibid.) A total of 15 tests, all conducted at the Nevada Test Site, took place. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, pages 32-33) A summary history of this test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Crosstie and Bowline: Events--Door Mist, Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon, Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, 31 August 1967-20 November 1968 (DNA 6322F, 1985).
198. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 23, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walt Rostow and approved in S on July 5. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Gromyko asked: How soon could the obstacles be overcome and a non-proliferation treaty completed, including the achievement of agreement among the eighteen nations at Geneva? Secretary Rusk replied that once we tabled a draft, with or without an agreed paragraph on controls, the problem would lie with governments who have not yet seen the text; for example, India and Japan. He made clear that the U.S. does not have pledges from other governments. The U.S. and the Soviet Union may present the draft but then these principal problems would arise: --assurances for India; --the question of the length of the treaty, where the Italians and others seek a length that is something short of eternity, perhaps 25 or 30 years; --finally, both U.S. and Soviet Union will be pressed on the question of reducing and controlling nuclear arms as between themselves. Gromyko interposed that if you accept general and complete disarmament, that would settle it; or we might have a general provision in the preamble of the treaty indicating we would do our best to move towards disarmament. Gromyko then asked if we had seen the draft given by Soviet Union to India./2/ /2/Not further identified. Secretary Rusk said we have an important constitutional problem in giving nuclear assurances from the Executive Branch. This would require putting the matter as treaty to Senate, where a 2/3 majority vote is required. If we worked via a resolution in the Security Council, we could avoid this difficult constitutional and procedural matter. Gromyko said the Soviet draft was based on and rooted in the Charter of the UN. Secretary Rusk asked Gromyko if he had also gotten the impression the Indians had separated the non-proliferation treaty from the matter of assurances. Gromyko replied that he had always thought the statements of assurances would be made in connection with the treaty. They were flexible as to whether they would be attached in some way or be made as an accompaniment to the act of concluding the treaty. Secretary Rusk repeated the point that if we made a unilateral statement of assurance we would have to be careful because of the constitutional problem involved for the Executive Branch. Operating through the Security Council would be easier. Secretary Rusk then said: What would our position be if the Indians did not insist on assurances, and asked if Gromyko had any more information. Gromyko said Indians had raised the matter in connection with the NPT. Secretary Rusk said one problem might arise: If the Indians asked for assurances, the other non-nuclear powers might ask for them. Gromyko replied that the statement made would not be adapted specifically to India but to non-nuclear powers in general. Secretary Rusk said there might be differences of views as among non-nuclear powers as to what kind of assurances are required: Some might want stronger language than in the draft the Soviet Union gave to India. Secretary Rusk then asked if the U.S. and USSR tabled an incomplete draft soon, could the treaty be completed--perhaps by October? Gromyko said that seemed reasonable if the main obstacles were removed. Secretary McNamara agreed: Let us try for October. Gromyko repeated: That is reasonable, very reasonable. Secretary Rusk said we must wrestle with problems of control. Gromyko said that except for Western Europe, there is no problem. Secretary Rusk said we can't command Western Europe. The three communities of Western Europe have a new chairman, Mr. Rey, a Belgian. He had urged him to go deeply into the matter of the Euratom-Geneva control question. The ultimate problem is with General de Gaulle. Gromyko said he had gotten the impression in Paris that the French favor the treaty. They probably do not plan to sign it, but they are not definite even on this point. Secretary Rusk said they also take the view that Euratom must exercise its own controls. Gromyko replied: Let Euratom also use IAEA safeguards. Secretary Rusk said U.S. is not member of Euratom. We engage in technical cooperation with it but we have no direct interest. Gromyko said: Try to explain to them that their position makes trouble for the NPT: The question poses great difficulties. It is impossible to combine bloc and international principles of control. The three-year transitional period doesn't help. They must have an international system. Secretary Rusk said if the French were to discover its attitude were an obstacle to the treaty, it is possible they would change their mind. Gromyko said it is better you explain this to the French. Secretary Rusk said our ability to persuade General de Gaulle is somewhat limited. He then went on to ask Gromyko if he anticipated that the Soviet Union would be willing to have its peaceful atomic installations inspected by IAEA. Gromyko said that is a U.S. privilege; the USSR shall not do so. Secretary Rusk asked: What are the difficulties? Gromyko said there is no need for it. If you wish to, that's all right. But not for the Soviet Union. Secretary Rusk pointed out that acceptance by the Soviet Union, as well as by the U.S., would have good effect on Japan and India which were concerned with discrimination. In cases where discrimination is not required for non-proliferation, it would be wise to avoid it. It would be helpful if Soviet Union and U.S. would demonstrate that fact themselves. It would make a deep impression on countries which might make trouble in accepting the treaty. Gromyko concluded that when the text is sent to the Committee of Eighteen, four months ought to be enough to complete work. The target date of October was good. If possible, the treaty ought to be concluded sooner. Secretary Rusk asked when we would have a common text. Gromyko said that depends on when we overcome our differences on controls. On other matters, we are closer than before. Perhaps the Chairman and the President are now talking about it. He urged U.S. to pay attention to the question of controls, which must be international. Secretary Rusk said we find ourselves in a difficult situation. If we could give ourselves three years beginning now, we could gain time. Gromyko said what happens if the three years run out and there is no solution? But, he said: We do not exclude the possibility of submitting the treaty with a blank Article III. Secretary Rusk said we would work hard on this question. Gromyko urged Secretary Rusk to look into it again and try to find common ground and try to convince our allies. Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviet Union had again talked to the French. Gromyko said: Just in passing. He thought that Debre had mentioned Euratom. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the problem was not Euratom installations in France. France, as nuclear power, takes the view that the Geneva safeguards cannot be applied on its territory. Gromyko said: Why not have both Euratom and IAEA safeguards. Secretary Rusk said Soviet Union may underestimate the strong interest within the Euratom group against further nuclear powers in Europe; for example in Belgium and Netherlands. The Soviet Union should have more confidence in the Euratom safeguards system. Gromyko said he was not against the system but there was no organic connection between an international system and regional system. The two systems are different in scope and membership, although presumably many tasks would be similar. Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviets had a non-proliferation expert on their delegation? Gromyko said: Yes, Vorontsov. Secretary Rusk said perhaps Mr. Adrian Fisher could get together with him later. Secretary Rusk noted that the Latin Americans had concluded an agreement on a nuclear free region. Gromyko asked: Was the agreement formalized? Secretary Rusk replied, not yet. They have to clear up the alleged distinction between a nuclear explosion and nuclear weapons. But the missing piece of the puzzle is Cuba. Did Gromyko have any idea what the Cuban position was. Gromyko said he didn't know but thought they had stated their position two years ago. So far as he knew, their position had not changed. Secretary Rusk said he had the impression the issue had been raised by some Latin American countries with Cuba and they had gotten a negative reaction. He expressed the hope Gromyko would use Soviet influence to get them to join the Latin American agreement. Gromyko said he didn't know much about it. The Soviet Union had not been consulted. The question does not relate to the Soviet Union; but he thought Cuba had stated its position before at General Assembly in 1965. Secretary Rusk said he thought the Latin American agreement a good idea as example for other regions--the Middle East, for one. But these agreements don't work if there is one country outside. Gromyko said: But if the Middle Eastern nations sign a non-proliferation agreement, the problem would be solved, although he recognized that a treaty on a nuclear free zone went beyond a non-proliferation agreement. Secretary Rusk asked: Do you expect all Warsaw Pact countries will sign a non-proliferation agreement? Gromyko said that each will have finally to state its own position. Secretary Rusk asked whether the non-proliferation question came up in conversation with Prime Minister Moro and the Chairman. Gromyko said virtually not at all. Secretary Rusk said Italy is against a treaty for eternity. Gromyko said it is still a Catholic country. He had talked, however, at great length with Fanfani, perhaps two hours. He had explained in great detail the non-proliferation treaty and carried away the impression some points had been misunderstood: For instance, that the Soviet Union was against peaceful uses of atomic energy. He pointed out the Soviet Union was for unlimited uses of atomic energy for science and industry. He had the impression that his explanation to Fanfani had been helpful. Secretary Rusk said some countries misunderstood this question of the industrial uses, but those misunderstandings had now been overcome. Gromyko stated also on question of nuclear explosions, Fanfani understood better than before that there was no difference between explosive devices and weapons. Secretary Rusk said there were two points he would like to make. First, he would greatly regret if the tabling of the draft were delayed because of differences over control, and second, the US was ready to go to work on the question of control with the Soviet Union, but there should not be substantial delay. Gromyko replied, it would be better if we could agree. It would save time in the future. But he didn't exclude tabling the draft with a blank Article III. The Soviet Union was against "family control." There could be several layers of control, if people wished. The Soviet Union is interested in only one layer. Secretary Rusk said it could all be done very quickly if the USSR would say yes to our draft. Gromyko said this was also true, if the US said yes to the Soviet draft. Secretary Rusk asked: As you interpret your draft on the question of assurances to the Indians and others, would that instrument be put forward inside or outside the Security Council? Gromyko said that the UN Charter was the basis for their draft. The Indians wanted something more definite. Secretary Rusk said he was not being negative, but we have problems unless the Security Council has passed a resolution. We can vote for a Security Council resolution. Gromyko said the Soviet formulation would be all right for given problems in the United States.
199. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, June 24, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. SUBJECT This is a follow-up on our telephone conversation of yesterday evening. For your background I am attaching a copy of the U.S. Draft Article III and the Soviet Draft Article III which we have exchanged to date. As you can see, the primary differences are that the Soviet draft merely provides for the acceptance of IAEA safeguards and, by having no time schedule for their application, presumably provides that they should be immediate, while the U.S. Draft holds open the possibility that negotiations between the IAEA and the authorities of another international safeguards system (e.g. Euratom) should come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement under which the IAEA verifies the effectiveness of the other system. The Euratom countries, and in particular Germany, have a variety of interests in preserving the Euratom system. The first is the very simple one of keeping Euratom going and their feeling that they could not do so if they attempted to put Euratom facilities under the IAEA safeguards over the objection of one Euratom member, that is, France. If Euratom safeguards were to disappear, then an element of discrimination would be injected into the Community in that France would be the only Euratom country without safeguards on its peaceful activities. The problem is complicated by the common ownership of nuclear fuels and the presence on the territories of four members of facilities which are owned and operated by Euratom and, hence, immune from the jurisdiction of the state on whose territories they are located. Another concern is, of course, based on the feeling of Euratom members that the economic and political objectives which they hope to obtain through Euratom will be jeopardized if they do not negotiate with the IAEA on a group basis so far as matters within the competence of Euratom are concerned. One possible way of handling this concern has been suggested by a variety of sources, including an informal suggestion by a Soviet delegation officer in Geneva. It would provide for negotiation of "bilateral or multilateral" agreements with the IAEA. This concept is similar to that of the safeguards provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (LA-NFZ)./2/ It would permit individual or collective negotiations, and thus permit Euratom countries to deal as a group with the IAEA to safeguard their common interests. If you would like new draft treaty language along these lines before your discussions with the Soviets at Glassboro tomorrow or any other time, I will be available on an on-call basis. /2/The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in Mexico City on February 14, 1967, and entered into force April 22, 1968. The United States is not a party to this Treaty. For the English language text of the Treaty, see 22 UST 762. For specific reference to Article 13, the safeguards provision, see ibid., 772. You will recall that, in your letter to Willy Brandt,/3/ you indicate we would not depart from the NATO agreed Article III language without further consultation. Minister von Lilienfeld made a demarche yesterday stressing the importance of adhering to this understanding. /3/Not found. You also may wish to discuss with the Soviets the possibility of facilitating the handling of the Euratom point by having both the U.S. and the Soviets make an offer to put at least some of their peaceful activities under safeguards. This would, to all intents and purposes, eliminate the Euratom arguments. We believe that the Soviets have a number of facilities (e.g. power and research reactors) devoted solely to peaceful purposes which they could offer to be safeguarded by the IAEA without affecting their military programs. A talking paper on this subject is attached. Adrian S. Fisher
Attachment 1/4/ April 25, 1967. /4/Secret. U.S. DRAFT TREATY ARTICLE III For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material covered by this Article is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices: 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the requirements of this Article on all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of such State, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide (a) source or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material unless the special fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards; 2. After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has activities subject to any international safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic Energy Agency undertakes to facilitate verification by that Agency of the effectiveness of the international safeguards system applied to such activities; 3. To meet the requirements of this Article, international safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b) shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; 4. Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of another international safeguards system, as provided for in this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; and 5. The international safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technical development of the Parties having them./5/ /5/The substance of most of the remainder of this paragraph as it appeared in the April 25 draft we gave the Soviets has been incorporated in Article V of the draft Treaty prepared by the Co-Chairmen on June 7. [Footnote in the source text.]
Attachment 2/6/ May 20, 1967. /6/Secret. SOVIET DRAFT TEXT ARTICLE III Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.
Attachment 3/6/ TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS 1. US considers that, to overcome charges of discrimination in safeguards article requiring mandatory safeguards and to gain acceptance of such article, it may well prove necessary for nuclear-weapon signatories to offer to accept IAEA safeguards on at least some of their peaceful nuclear facilities. Such an offer would apply only after entry into force of an NPT with the desired safeguards article. The justification for exclusion of any facilities from offer would be on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. 2. Accordingly, US is prepared to make such an offer in order to facilitate acceptance of a safeguards article which requires mandatory safeguards and which is mutually acceptable to the US and the Soviets. We have indication that UK prepared to join us in offer. 3. While US and UK offer may be sufficient to gain widespread agreement on acceptable safeguards article, such agreement may also require some degree of Soviet acceptance of IAEA safeguards. US hopes that USSR would be able to offer to place at least some of its peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards, and accompany US and UK in a joint or parallel offer at the appropriate point in the negotiations. However, US for its part would be prepared to make offer without Soviets and without UK. 4. Properly presented, such a US-UK-Soviet offer should not only greatly facilitate acceptance of safeguards article, but could go far toward meeting non-nuclear-weapon states' demands for balanced obligations. 5. If Soviets are interested, we are agreeable to coordinating timing and manner of presenting offers for maximum beneficial effect. Background-Noforn 1. Recent cables indicate Soviet knowledge of possible US offer to accept IAEA safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and Soviet thoughts on making similar offer. 2. The approximate numbers of Soviet peaceful nuclear facilities which could be placed under IAEA safeguards are nine power reactors and twenty-three research reactors (including reactors estimated to be operational by 1968). The above totals exclude reactors designed for military use or for dual plutonium/power production, maritime reactors employing Soviet submarine reactor technology, and reactors located in or very near sensitive installations. 3. The Soviets could probably afford to have IAEA safeguards applied to all, or at least most, of the thirty-three reactors listed above without significantly impairing their plutonium supply for weapons purposes. The amount of plutonium produced in these reactors is estimated to be only a small percentage of the plutonium the U.S.S.R. produces and will produce for weapons purposes. 4. The Soviets have peaceful uses for significant amounts of plutonium. For example, at present a single Soviet research reactor uses a quantity of plutonium in its core which is almost equivalent to the total estimated annual amount of plutonium presently produced in all peaceful reactors. Also, they will need a large quantity (1000 kg) of plutonium for peaceful purposes in the early 1970's for the plutonium core of their BN-350 fast breeder reactor, presently under construction. 5. The Soviets have held closely the location and technology of fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing plants, and we do not expect any such plants to be part of any offer to accept IAEA safeguards. Most probably all such plants are mixed military/peaceful facilities to some extent, but undoubtedly have primary emphasis on their military aspect. 6. The following tabulation, listed for purposes of comparison with the U.S.S.R. peaceful program, includes approximate totals of peaceful U.S. and U.K. nuclear facilities which could be offered for IAEA safeguarding. The totals include facilities estimated to be operational by 1968. U.S.: Power Reactors--19 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Research Reactors--over 100 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Fuel Reprocessing Plant--1 Fuel Fabrication Plants--10 (while fabricating peaceful uses fuel) U.K.: Power Reactors--17 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Research reactors--20 (Included in power reactor listings are experimental power reactors and power demonstration reactors.) [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |