1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, September 14, 1967, 0019Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM) on September 13; cleared by Philip J. Farley (G/PM), Wyle (DOD/OSD/ISA), Leddy (EUR), Fisher (ACDA), and Robert G. Houdek (S/S-S); and approved by Rusk. Beginning in mid-1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 37035. NATUS. For Cleveland from the Secretary. (Paris deliver to Cleveland 8:00 A.M. September 14) You should make following statement in special NAC meeting Thursday, September 14. Because of importance that language in variety of US statements be consistent statement should be given verbatim as follows: "I would like today to give you a further report on the US Government's thinking with respect to the ABM problem. I should here stress to you that there has as yet been no announcement in the US of the decision of my Government, described below, concerning ABM deployment. We expect to make this decision known shortly, but we wanted you to be aware of it in advance in line with the promise that I made last March to keep you advised of our thinking on this matter. Meanwhile, I must urge that what I say here today be held in the strictest of confidence. Of course, you will wish to advise senior officials in your own governments about the major points made in my statement. The ABM problem has, as you know, been a matter of interest in the Alliance for some months. Last March I described to the Council our efforts to open discussions with the Soviet Union to limit competition in strategic arms./2/ Since then we have made several efforts to open discussions with the Soviet Union, and the matter was discussed at the Glassboro meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin./3/ I must report to you again that the Soviets have thus far not agreed to initiate serious talks. We are, however, continuing to press them to begin conversations. /2/No specific record of this communication with the Council or of a Council meeting has been found. However, Fisher expressed hope in his undated Memorandum for the President (see attachment 2 to Document 189) that following Foster's March 9-16 European trip to consult with the NATO allies on the NPT, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council would be held as soon as possible. /3/President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met for personal discussion of world problems in two separate sessions, June 23 and 25 at Glassboro, New Jersey. The two leaders devoted their discussions primarily to the crisis in the Middle East, the Vietnam war, efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems, and bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations. Documentation on this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. Meanwhile, our own analyses of the ABM problem and the difficult and complex examination of whether or not to begin deployment of any ABM system has continued, and has brought us to the point where we expect now to announce soon a decision to deploy a limited system consisting of an 'area' defense of the United States together with a 'terminal' defense of some Minuteman sites. In general, the planned deployment has two purposes: to provide protection against the sort of missile attack which the Chinese might be capable of launching during the 1970's, and to protect our Minuteman missiles against a possible counterforce attack by the Soviets. We expect to have an initial operating capability in 1972. The deployment in question is scheduled to be completed by 1974. I also want you to understand why it is that we are proposing to initiate this deployment. As I indicated above, we are doing this for two reasons--to provide area protection for the US against the sort of unsophisticated attack which the Chinese might be able to mount in the 1970's and to protect Minutemen missiles. These two points may be considered separately. With respect to China, I should start with a brief summary of our current estimate of Chinese objectives and capabilities. It is clear that the Chinese are placing a high priority on the development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. It now appears to us that a principal CPR objective is to develop as rapidly as possible an intercontinental missile force capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We believe that they could have an initial ICBM operational capability as early as the early 1970's, and that they might deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs by the mid-1970's. Their initial system will be relatively crude and highly vulnerable, and they will not be capable of penetrating even a thin ABM defense such as we have described above. With respect to defense of the Minutemen, let me stress that by doing this we are hedging against a possible future improvement in the Soviet force, not against the present threat. We have, over the past several years, examined several ways of improving the survivability of the Minuteman. We have concluded that an ABM defense for at least a portion of our Minuteman force is the best means of insuring their survivability. We will thus insure the undiminished assured destruction capability of our landbased strategic missile forces. I may add that it is to this assured destruction capability, and not to any defensive measures, that we look and will continue to look for the deterrence of a Soviet attack against our own populations and those of our Allies. As Secretary McNamara made clear at the NPG meeting last April,/4/ we will not attempt to defend our cities against the sort of sophisticated missile attack the Soviets are already capable of launching. We believe that the Soviets, like ourselves, can and will respond to any threat to their Assured Destruction capability by making the appropriate offsetting improvements in their offensive forces. We have no plans to create a large scale urban defense directed against Soviet missiles. We intend to make this clear to the Soviets. /4/See footnote 3, Document 195. We also believe, on the basis of discussions with some of the major Asian countries, that our deployment of a limited ABM defense will help to reassure them and will reduce the pressures for acquisition of independent nuclear capabilities in Asia. We intend to explain our decision to our friends in Asia as we have to you, making particularly clear that it is not based on any major changes in our assessment of the Chinese threat, but is a prudent security measure which will enhance the security of all. We believe that it remains highly desirable and feasible for the US and the Soviet Union to discuss means of limiting competition in strategic arms. In fact, our current action may even stimulate more serious interest in such discussions by the Soviets. We think there are ways in which to define an agreed limited level of ABM deployment which would meet the objectives outlined above and not require other complex compensatory actions by the two major powers. As I have told you, we have not had much success in developing such discussions to date but we intend to keep trying. We are informing the Soviet Union of our decision and forthcoming announcement, and at the same time strongly reaffirming our belief that we should promptly enter into discussions on possible ways to limit the strategic arms race. We also believe that this decision should in no way interfere with the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. In so far as the defense is directed against China, it should in fact make clear that the US intends to counter Chinese nuclear capability. Thus, those countries which fear the growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities need not feel that their only alternative is to create a costly nuclear arsenal themselves. We are prepared to continue to consult through such mechanisms as the Disarmament Experts who will be meeting today, and the NPG which will be meeting later this month./5/ /5/See footnote 6, Document 202. In closing, may I once again request that my Government's thinking and decision concerning the ABM problem, as I have described them above, be held in strictest confidence. Thank you." Rusk
211. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 2, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. III, Box 6. Secret. Dear Mr. President: Mr. Fisher has been instructed to inform Ambassador Roshchin that the U.S. Delegation is prepared to stay in Geneva as long as necessary to reach agreement on Article III of the NPT. We would fully expect, however, to reach agreement by the end of October because as a practical matter it would be very difficult to defer an ENDC report to the UNGA much beyond that time. The EEC Council of Ministers is meeting today and tomorrow/2/ and it is hoped that they will develop a Euratom position on the draft Article III proposed by the Soviets. We expect to learn by tomorrow whether we shall be receiving these views before the NAC meeting on October 6. If we are not going to have Euratom's position before October 6, we propose to inform all NATO capitals on October 4 of U.S. views on the Soviet proposal and what amendments and understandings we believe to be negotiable with the Soviets./3/ If we are unable to bridge the gap between our Euratom allies and the Soviets in the next week or two, there is danger that the whole NPT project might be jeopardized because treaty drafting might get out of control of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as Co-Chairmen of the ENDC. /2/The EEC Council of Ministers met in Brussels. /3/In an October 2 memorandum from Foster to Rusk, Foster recommended that the United States inform its NATO allies of its position on the Soviet Article III draft. According to Foster, "If we were to wait until next week to make our position known to our allies, precious time will be lost and might result in a situation in which we found ourselves having to start discussions in Committee I with a blank Article III. This in turn would encourage non-aligned countries to make other unacceptable suggestions. If this were to happen matters could easily get out of our control and that of the Soviets." Foster further proposed that all NATO capitals except Paris receive an aide-memoire to be delivered on October 4 outlining the U.S. Government's position. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967) Faithfully yours, William C. Foster/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Foster signed the original.
212. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 4, 1967, 1:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret. Exdis. Drafted by Foster on October 5 and approved in S/S on October 6. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Following discussions in New York at dinners between U.S. and Soviet officials, and consistent with the suggestion of Messrs. Rusk and Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to luncheon at the Soviet Embassy to continue discussions particularly concerning non-proliferation. I reported to Ambassador Dobrynin that the Euratom meeting at which we had hoped for additional comments on the Soviet compromise draft Article III did not consider this subject. In view of that we were continuing our efforts to obtain the views of our allies and Euratom but that a further delay would occur. We went over once more the problems already foreseen with the present Soviet compromise draft mainly having to do with the question of facilities and the references to IAEA and its negotiating authority in relationship to that of Euratom and of the maintenance of Euratom as an entity owning materials and facilities as well as operating a safeguards system. I stated that we had not submitted the latest revision of paragraph 4 of the Soviet compromise draft since to start with we thought it was a retrogressive step and we hoped that they would accept our suggestion for rearrangement of the first sentence of paragraph 4. He did not seem concerned about the possibility of their accepting our suggestion on this but did not wish to comment in detail in view of my statement of possible further changes. In the circumstances he asked whether there was anything for them to do on this article at the moment, and I said I thought not but that, hopefully, we would soon be back to them with possible other suggestions felt to be essential by our allies. We then discussed suggestions the Mexican, Indians, UAR, and Sweden made in recent meetings at Geneva. It was his feeling that we should attempt to get all suggestions on the table for consideration by the Co-Chairmen and recommendation to the Committee when all suggestions were in. He thought, as we do, that certain of the Mexican proposals/2/ were possibly acceptable but felt that many of the others could not be accepted. /2/For text of Mexican Representative Castaneda's statement to the ENDC, September 19, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 395-401. I indicated that some of our allies were concerned about unlimited duration for the treaty and wondered whether the Soviet Union had given consideration to this question since Messrs. Rusk and Gromyko talked about it in June./3/ He said that they had not since they continued to believe that an unlimited duration treaty was important and he mentioned once more the thousand year figure. I asked whether Foreign Minister Miki of Japan in his talks on the NPT had mentioned the Japanese suggestion of periodic five-year conferences./4/ Dobrynin said he saw no real purpose in such periodic reviews. I also raised the question of the difficulties which some of the ENDC members have brought up concerning the very rigid amendments procedure and got no substantive response. /3/Following the Glassboro Summit in New Jersey June 23-25, Rusk met with Gromyko who was attending the U.N. General Assembly in New York on June 26 and 27. There they continued to discuss the topic of disarmament that President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin had earlier discussed at the Summit. For an account of the June 23 meeting, see Document 198. /4/Foreign Minister Miki delivered an address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 22, on the Japanese Government's views on the NPT; see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 413-415. On other non-proliferation matters such as the ENDC recess, the sanctity of Articles I and II, assurances, nothing new was added to the discussions at the New York dinners or in my discussion yesterday with Mendelevich./5/ /5/Not further identified. On another subject, we had an interesting and fairly lengthy discussion of the ABM/ICBM limitation proposal made by the U.S. in January./6/ He said that the reason for no response was not the lack of interest nor lack of attention having been given to the subject, but was because of the differing points of view within the Soviet Government on it. He stated that, unlike the U.S. Government where there appeared to be ready means of coordination on both the political and military aspects of such a proposal, in the Soviet Government the Foreign Ministry dealt primarily with political questions and all military matters were the responsibility of the Defense Ministry. In the Foreign Ministry there were few, if any, individuals having experience and competence in a subject of this sort and the military were unwilling to let the Foreign Ministry discuss the question in any way except what he characterized as "meaningless general terms." I told him that the U.S. Government had been studying this question not only intensively over the last couple of years but indeed, as he knew, had begun to broach it in the Surprise Attack discussions in 1958. He commented, however, that it was his opinion that when our decision was made to deploy a limited ABM system it really was a completely political decision. He wondered therefore whether there could be serious talks about specific military limitations when politically most of the emphasis appeared to be that the U.S. had a superiority of two to three to four times over that of the Soviet Union and that the Congress and the Pentagon in public pronouncements emphasized that the U.S. intended to maintain that. This made it very difficult for those in the Soviet Union who felt that such talks might be useful to convince the military that any serious discussion of limitations and possible reductions was in the Soviet interest. He said, nonetheless, considerations were continuing about how to approach this and he had personally been glad to hear Secretary Rusk's statement at dinner last week/7/ of the willingness of the U.S. to undertake detailed discussions at any level and anywhere that the Soviet Government might suggest. /6/Presumably a reference to Secretary McNamara's military posture statement delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25, 1967. For an extract, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 5-24. /7/Presumably during Secretary Rusk's attendance at the 22d Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in New York September 25-29. The luncheon broke up at 3 p.m.
213. Editorial Note In a letter, October 10, 1967, to Walt Rostow, Glenn Seaborg requested specific execution authority for Cabriolet. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Regarding earlier delays of this Plowshare event, see Document 164. Following the submission of Seaborg's October 10 letter to Rostow, a lively debate ensued about the costs and benefits of granting the Atomic Energy Commission permission to execute Cabriolet. For example, Foster wrote a memorandum to Walt Rostow on October 17 recommending disapproval of Seaborg's request. Foster feared that Cabriolet could violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and complicate, perhaps fatally, current negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing--Plowshare Events, Volume 2, Box 29) For an extract from this memorandum, see Seaborg's Stemming the Tide, page 335. The following day, in an October 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Katzenbach, Leonard Meeker recommended an indefinite postponement of Cabriolet and underscored Foster's reservations. Meeker argued, in part, "It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate time for the conduct of Cabriolet. The situation at the General Assembly seems virtually certain to ensure that there will be well-publicized charges of treaty violation, with the U.S. being taxed for shaving its own obligations at the same time it was asking the non-nuclears to engage in a further round of self-denial. The domestic political repercussions could be substantial." (Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) However, on the same day, Herman Pollack, Director, Office of International Science and Technology Affairs, Department of State, wrote a memorandum, October 18, to Ambassador Kohler arguing that Cabriolet should be executed because it could help rather than impede the NPT negotiations. "Conduct of the Cabriolet test on an open basis would demonstrate that we are seriously proceeding with our plans for learning all that is necessary about the yet untested technology in order to make its benefits eventually available to the rest of the world. On the contrary, our sincerity might well be challenged if on the one hand we exhort other countries not to work on Plowshare because they will have access to our services as soon as we develop the technology, and then on the other hand we decline to follow the orderly path of experiments which many scientists throughout the world recognize as necessary to develop our capacity to provide the services we have offered." (Ibid.) Under Secretary Katzenbach, however, agreed with Foster and Meeker that Cabriolet should be postponed. In an October 20 memorandum to Walt Rostow, Katzenbach wrote: "The NPT negotiations are at a critical stage. We simply cannot chance giving the FRG, the Italians, Indians, etc., an opportunity to charge us with playing games with our own treaty obligations . . . . I am persuaded that the possible dangers to the NPT--which is vital to the President--and the hell we would probably catch in the UN (and at home) if we went through with the test, are simply not worth the price." (Ibid.) For Seaborg's later critique of the several postponements of Cabriolet, see Stemming the Tide, pages 327-339. For the final decision on Cabriolet, see Document 217.
214. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 2, 1967, 1:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster on November 2 and approved in S/S by Walsh on November 10. The meeting took place in Foster's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Foster told Ambassador Dobrynin that Mr. Fisher had presented a copy of the Five Principles of the five non-nuclear weapon Euratom countries and a draft Article III embodying these principles to Ambassador Roshchin in Geneva on November 2./2/ /2/See Document 216. Mr. Foster said that the U.S. was authorized by its allies to work out an Article III with the Soviet on this basis. However, our allies wish to be consulted before an Article III is tabled. We will try to conduct such consultations in Geneva, but the Soviets should be aware that another meeting of the NATO Council may be necessary. Mr. Foster pointed out that the last two months have involved difficult and intensive consultations. We regret the delay in the ENDC's work, but the difficulties we ran into were genuine. These difficulties arose not only from the FRG but also from other Euratom countries. It should be stressed that the "five principles" are backed by all "Five."/3/ The French apparently played a passive role. /3/See Document 216. Mr. Foster also pointed out that if the Soviets would accept safeguards in some fashion they would find that other countries would be able to accept safeguards much more readily. A lot of objections to particular provisions of Article III would be forgotten if the Soviets themselves were prepared to accept safeguards on their peaceful activities. Mr. Foster expressed the hope that the Soviets can be flexible in considering our proposals for a compromise Article III. He said there would be no need to alter the basic framework of the September 1 draft./4/ The Soviets should assume the meaning of Article III realistically and be flexible about wording. /4/Not further identified. Mr. Foster then said he understood that Committee I in New York can be kept occupied with non-disarmament items at least until November 15. Perhaps breaking out the Secretary General's report on nuclear weapons would provide additional time. In any event, there is need for speed in working out an agreed Article III. We should aim to complete the NPT by November 20 at the very latest since the U.S. and U.S.S.R. share an interest in having it passed through the UNGA this year and signed as soon as possible thereafter. Mr. Foster then read the first sentence of the draft Article III presented by Mr. Fisher to Ambassador Roshchin. He said that Ambassador Roshchin had told Mr. Fisher that the omission of "IAEA" before safeguards was impossible for the Soviets to accept and represented a major stumbling block. Mr. Foster argued that inclusion of "IAEA" would not alter the fact that agreements between the IAEA and Parties to the Treaty would have to be concluded. He stressed the importance of making Article III acceptable to the Euratom countries. Ambassador Dobrynin copied down this first sentence and said he would report the issue to Gromyko. Mr. Foster then read the rest of the first paragraph and noted that Ambassador Roshchin had objected to Mr. Fisher over the absence of any reference to facilities. Mr. Foster pointed out that reference to facilities was not essential since this aspect of the problem of effective safeguards is covered by reference to a statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system. Mr. Foster then outlined the problem concerning the phrase "or carried out under its control anywhere" as a substitute for "carried out by it anywhere." Ambassador Dobrynin did not seem to think this was an important issue but he noted that this was a matter for experts. Mr. Foster then raised the question of the treaty's duration and said that "1,000 years" does not seem reasonable to many countries. Likewise there are genuine objections to the amendments provision which is too rigid and in practical effect would mean that no amendments to the NPT probably could ever be adopted. Moreover, politically speaking we had encountered objections to giving a veto to states who were members of the IAEA Board of Governors on the score that some important countries are not permanent members of this Board. Mr. Foster thought that the provision in the first alternative amendment's provision discussed last summer, which would not make amendments apply to states which did not accept them, was better./5/ Ambassador Dobrynin made no response to these points. /5/See footnote 3, Document 201. Mr. Foster then raised the subject of the Soviet draft convention on non-use. He asked whether the U.S.S.R. could really deny itself the option to use of nuclear weapons in a major war. Apart from the circumstances of the Soviet draft convention which will create difficulties for us, we think it is not advisable to raise this subject at the present time when we shall need to cooperate in order to smooth the path for the presentation of the NPT at the UNGA. It would be very important for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to avoid having the NPT go back to the ENDC next year. This would mean that the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States would convene in the spring of 1968 and that further difficulties for the nuclear weapon states in connection with the NPT would be created. Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether we thought that India and Brazil would go along with the NPT. Mr. Foster replied that he did not know. It is possible that the security assurances which we are already discussing with the Soviets would make it easier for India to sign. Ambassador Dobrynin said he recognized the urgency of completing the NPT and hoped that there would be a Soviet response to the proposals presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva, after November 7th.
215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. SUBJECT This is a good time to get Secretary Rusk's appraisal of where we are going on the N.P.T. Last week we made good progress on Article III (the safeguards clause): --The Euratom countries could not get together on their own Article III (only the Germans presented an "illustrative" draft)/2/ and contented themselves with giving us five "principles,"/3/ which we probably can live with. /2/Not further identified. /3/See Document 216. --We were able to hand to the Russians at Geneva on Thursday/4/ a revision of their own draft Article III incorporating much of the five Euratom principles, plus some key language from the German "illustration." Preliminary Russian reaction was reasonably forthcoming. /4/November 2; see Document 214. We still must be particularly careful with the Germans. There is a strong possibility that they will not ratify the N.P.T. even if (as seems likely) they grudgingly sign it. German adherence, however, is vital to the success of the Treaty. Yet we cannot afford to put so much pressure on them that we give nationalists an easy means of attacking Germany's U.S. ties. The political situation comes down to this: --Attitudes among top German politicians and officials range from total hostility, represented by people like Strauss/5/ and the right-wing press, to grudging acceptance, represented by Kiesinger and Brandt. /5/Strauss and his followers, who represented one of two powerful, often opposing wings of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the former Gaullists, feared that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would preclude the creation of a European Nuclear Force which they considered to be a necessary step toward European unity. --The basic German dissatisfaction with the Treaty makes it easier for people like Strauss to propagate the view that the N.P.T. represents a U.S.-Soviet "deal" made behind Germany's back at her expense. --The N.P.T. is not yet a big public issue; so far the issues it presents have been too complex to capture popular attention. We can be grateful, in fact, that opposition has focused on Article III, perhaps the most complicated aspect of the Treaty, rather than on basic principles. Nevertheless, the danger we face is that someone like Strauss will try to blow the Treaty up into a nationalist issue. We do not yet know how the Russians will finally react to our revised Article III. If they insist on their original formulation we will face a dilemma: --We must push the Russians hard to meet German concerns regarding Article III. Not to do so would give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the Treaty, and would seriously damage our relations with them. (We can ease things some by close and high-level consultations.) --On the other hand, an impasse with the Russians now would probably make it impossible to put a draft Treaty before this year's UN General Assembly and thus could delay the Treaty for as much as a year, if not kill it altogether. You will want to get Secretary Rusk's assessment of these risks. W.W. Rostow/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
216. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 11, 1967, 2257Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by George Bunn (ACDA/GC); cleared by Culver Gleysteen (ACDA/IR), Fisher (ACDA/D), George S. Springsteen (EUR), Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM), Abraham Katz (EUR/RPE), Walsh (S/S), Allan Labowitz (AEC) (informed), and Morton Halperin (DOD) (informed); and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. The telegram was sent to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, Moscow, and to the Mission in Geneva. 68052. Subject: Status US-Soviet NPT Safeguards Negotiations. Disto/NATUS/Busec. 1. You should leave following Aide-Memoire with FonOff on Monday, November 13. 2. For USNATO: You should circulate Aide-Memoire to PermReps and Brosio. 3. For USEC: You should deliver a copy of Aide-Memoire to Commission.
The U.S. wishes to inform its allies of the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1. The U.S. draft of November 2. On November 2, 1967, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the ENDC proposed to the Soviet Co-Chairman the draft Article III which is attached. At the same time, the U.S. Co-Chairman gave the Soviet Co-Chairman the five principles set forth below as well as the text of the interpretations contained in the Aide-Memoire of October 5, 1967. 2. The U.S. November 2 draft and the five Euratom member principles. We believe this text and these interpretations protect the five principles agreed by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in the following manner: Principle 1: "Safeguards under the NPT would be applied to source and special fissionable material and not to facilities." The November 2 U.S. draft deletes the third sentence of the Soviet compromise text which provided that safeguards procedures "should also extend to facilities . . . " (Emphasis added). As suggested by some of our allies, the second sentence is retained except for its reference to the IAEA Safeguards System. Principle 2: "There should be no misunderstanding that as far as EA member states are concerned, safeguards under NPT will be applied on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between EA and IAEA." The first sentence of the November 2 U.S. draft adds language stating that safeguards under NPT would be "as set forth in an agreement to be . . . concluded with the IAEA." It also makes clear that these safeguards would have to be "in accordance with the statute of the IAEA . . . ." The fourth paragraph of the text would permit non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude IAEA agreements "either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA." In presenting the revised text to the Soviet Union, the U.S. Representative made clear that the U.S. relies on the provisions of the IAEA Statute dealing both with "bilateral and multilateral arrangements" for safeguards and with "relationship" agreements between IAEA and other international organizations the work of which is related to that of the IAEA. He stated: "The U.S. is of the opinion that this language permits parties to the treaty to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the IAEA through Euratom to carry out their safeguards obligation and that an IAEA-Euratom agreement would result from these negotiations." Finally, the U.S. Representative told the Soviet Representative that the U.S. would state the following interpretation to the ENDC and to the IAEA Board of Governors: "The first sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft Article III permits the IAEA to enter into an agreement, concerning the safeguard obligations of the parties, with another international organization, the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned." Principle 3: "The agreement should be based on the principle of verification of EA safeguards by IAEA: the implementation of this principle shall be negotiated between the two organizations." As this principle recognizes, its implementation must occur in the Euratom negotiations with the IAEA. As indicated above, the November 2 U.S. draft would permit such negotiations. In addition, the November 2 draft continues the earlier language stating that acceptance of NPT safeguards would be for the exclusive purpose of "verification of the fulfillment" of obligations of the treaty. Moreover, the new language avoids calling NPT safeguards "IAEA safeguards." It makes clear, of course, that they must be in accordance with the IAEA statute and safeguards system. There is considerable flexibility in both. Interpretive principles dealing with the nature of the IAEA-Euratom Agreement which would be permitted by Article III were also presented to the Soviet Representative. These are the three points set forth in paragraph 5 of the U.S. Aide-Memoire of October 5. They are as follows: 1. "There should be safeguards for all non-nuclear-weapon parties of such nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness." 2. "In discharging their obligations under Article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties may negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA bilaterally or together with other parties, and specifically, an agreement covering such obligations may be entered into between the IAEA and another international organization the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned." 3. "In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Principle 4: "Pending the conclusion of the agreement between Euratom and IAEA, EA member states concerned wish to stress that there should be no misunderstanding that the obligations with regard to Euratom (or to its member states) entered into by any party to a NPT shall not be affected by provisions of Article III dealing with supply." The United States takes this to be more directed toward future action of the U.S. than toward the provision of Article III dealing with supply. This provision is essentially the same as the corresponding provision of the U.S. draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967./2/ /2/Not further identified. Like the April 20 draft, the undertaking concerning safeguarded supply of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon states does not apply until a specified period after the treaty enters into force. This period does not begin to run until a substantial (30-40) number of non-nuclear-weapon states have ratified. These ratifications will probably require substantial time. The U.S., whose ratification is also necessary to entry into force, will obviously have to take into account the status of the IAEA-Euratom negotiations before ratifying. We do not expect any conflict to arise between our NPT obligations and the supply obligations we have to Euratom and its members. We believe the time available for conclusion of an IAEA-Euratom agreement is sufficient, and we do not contemplate failure to achieve agreement in that period. Principle 5: "Euratom member states concerned, determined to act in common, have to be sure that the position of Euratom when negotiating to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with IAEA will not be prejudiced by any eventual provision of Article III, as for example on a time period." Like the U.S. draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967, the November 2 U.S. draft contains a time period for conclusion of Euratom's negotiations with IAEA. Unlike the April 20 draft, the November 2 draft makes that period applicable to IAEA negotiations with all states, not just with Euratom members. Without some time period, we see no way to secure worldwide implementation of NPT safeguards. We believe the time period is adequate if there are good faith negotiations on both sides. To sum up our views with respect to the five principles, we believe the November 2 U.S. draft protects them to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances. Insofar as this protection appears inadequate to our allies, they may follow procedures available to any sovereign state to insure that a satisfactory agreement with the IAEA is worked out. 3. Other provisions in November 2 draft. There are two other significant changes reflected in the November 2 draft which do not relate to the five principles but are designed to meet the requests of certain Euratom members. The first is to add the word "control" to the last sentence of paragraph 1 so that safeguards would be applicable to nuclear material in a peaceful nuclear activity of a non-nuclear-weapon party "carried out under its control anywhere." In presenting this change, the U.S. Representative made clear again that Article III would not require the application of safeguards to the French-Belgian or French-German facilities in France. The second such change is to add a provision to paragraph 3 referring to the preambular principle on instrumented safeguards. The last phrase of paragraph 3 would be amended to make clear that safeguards would be implemented in accordance with "the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble." 4. Soviet response to U.S. November 2 draft. At first, the Soviets objected to several key points of the U.S. draft and questioned some of the interpretations. Then, at a meeting on November 9, 1967, the Soviet Co-Chairman said that he would recommend to his Government as a package all U.S. proposals of November 2 provided the U.S. agreed to a reformulation of the first sentence. He said he would forego introducing other changes only because of the need to make progress as quickly as possible. He said he would wish to make an ENDC statement to the effect that IAEA safeguards would be generally applicable as the NPT safeguards system. He added that he would not take issue with the interpretive statements planned by the U.S. The reformulation of the first sentence involves the deletion of the word "negotiation," which the Soviet Representative said was superfluous, and a rearrangement of two phrases, which he said was very minor. As revised, the first sentence would read: "Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." 5. U.S. response to Soviet reformulation. The U.S. Representative said he could not recommend this reformulation to his Government since he believed the Soviet should accept the U.S. formulation. The U.S. is now urging Soviet reconsideration at high levels of the November 2 U.S. draft as the one best designed to ensure wide adherence to a non-proliferation treaty.
U.S. Draft Article III Submitted to Soviet Union November 2, 1967. 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed, or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article III of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with IAEA to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Rusk
217. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, November 28, 1967, 12:10-1:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1. No classification marking. An attached December 4 cover memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President notes the time of the meeting and lists the participants as McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Schultze, Hornig, Seaborg, Spurgeon Keeny, Robert Anderson, Tape, Fisher, and Foster. NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING ON The President: We are confronted with a difficult decision here on "Cabriolet." Secretary Rusk: These are the issues: You are being asked to approve a "cratering" shot important to the future of "Plowshare" program. This is directly related to the Interoceanic Canal and peaceful application of the atom. We first thought that the test ban treaty would not conflict with "Plowshare" program. Now we do not know. We must ask if this shot is sensible only if it is to be followed by other shots which infringe on the test ban treaty. We must ask to what extent do we support Plowshare? There is a problem of possible violation of the test ban treaty. The President should know the parameters of the problem. If there is a 50-50 chance of leakage, we could be in violation of the test ban treaty. We face a 50-50 chance of leakage on these tests. We are at a time when this could get in the way of NPT. It is therefore a decision between "Plowshare" vs. the test ban treaty. The treaty requires you to keep the debris from these tests at home. The President: The question is would Cabriolet violate the treaty? Secretary Rusk: There is a 50-50 chance and a danger of a small degree of leakage on this test. Chairman Seaborg: I gave assurance to the Senate the "Plowshare" experiments could be carried out. That was important to getting the treaty passed./2/ /2/Reference apparently is to Seaborg's Congressional testimony in support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. See, for example, his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 14, 1963, reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 162-226. Probably, there would not be "more hazardous" tests to follow. There would be a need for an amendment to the treaty at a later date for the test ban treaty. On the matter of leakage, the first assumption is that we would have a 20 percent chance of leakage. At 50 hours after the test there might be ten picocuriers at the border with Canada. In the air normally were about 100 picocuriers. Of this would only be a very small amount which is way below any health hazard and below any sensible level to cause a problem. This would be below the amounts which have resulted from the Soviet test. Chairman Seaborg said at the time of the treaty Secretary Rusk wrote the Congressional Committee that the U.S. would feel free to interpret the treaty more liberally if the Soviet were to./3/ To drop Cabriolet would be to drop "Plowshare." Brazil and India want a nuclear explosion system of their own. In order to prevent this, we have offered them the Plowshare program. /3/Not further identified. The President: Could you conduct Cabriolet without violation of the test ban treaty? Chairman Seaborg: Yes, under a liberal interpretation of the treaty. If debris crosses the U.S. border, it would be detected by our own public health service. The President: Is it your position that in order to keep faith with Secretary Rusk's letter to the Senate we should conduct these tests? Mr. Robert Anderson: The Congress will not give us any more money until this question is resolved. There is no agreed position on the level of radiation that will constitute a violation of the test ban treaty. Mr. Anderson said if we postpone Cabriolet indefinitely then we postpone indefinitely the development of nuclear excavation. He said if we start tomorrow it would take the next fifteen years before we could put the first ship through the proposed oceanic canal. "I do not want to debate what is in violation of the treaty. But it is unfortunate if we have gotten ourselves into the position where we cannot use this type of energy to do this work." "It will only be after all of these tests are completed that we will actually know if we can go through with a canal by nuclear excavation." "It is not reasonable for us to impose that fine distinction which will permit the Soviets to do what they have done and not permit us to conduct our test." "I propose that we announce these tests publicly and give the world time to prepare for it. We should be forthright and honest." (Inserted as an appendix to these notes is a summary of the recommendation by Mr. Anderson and the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission.)/4/ /4/Not found. Dr. Hornig said he was opposed to the proposal. Dr. Hornig said that this test would require only 2,500 tons of explosive while about 10 million tons of explosive was needed for the canal. Many think that a one million ton test and a 10 million ton test will be necessary before we can actually decide to go ahead with the canal. Chairman Seaborg: But these tests would not be for more than three years. Dr. Hornig: In any case you cannot go further with these tests without modifying the test ban treaty. Secretary Rusk: Why don't we go to the Soviets now or to the Security Council and work this thing out for the first test? Why not get international participation including asking the Soviets to come over here and deal with us in this program. Mr. Robert Anderson: The Corps of Engineers say we must conduct these tests before we can determine whether to build a canal. We need this first test so we can learn from it what will be necessary to avoid another delay. Director Schultze: These tests escalate as you go along. I question whether we should invest money in the research and development test that you recommend when you ultimately know you are going to have to ask for changes in the treaty. It does not make sense economically to spend this money on tests when you are uncertain whether or not you will be able to make meaningful use of this when larger shots are required. The most responsible estimates show that it would not hurt to have a two to three year delay on this. I believe, Mr. President, that we should get the diplomatic problem out of the way first. Chairman Seaborg: We've tried to talk to the Soviets for two years and we haven't gotten anywhere. Mr. Adrian Fisher: Ambassador Kohler has been in touch with the Soviets on this and has gotten nowhere. Director Helms: The Soviets have conducted 14 tests between March 1964 and February 1967. We are talking about only kilotons in this test. The Soviets have conducted tests ranging as follows: 450 kilotons, 200 kilotons, 85 kilotons, and 220 kilotons. Dr. Hornig: But the Soviet tests were well below the surface. Their seepage was highly fractional. These U.S. tests will be near the surface with a better than 50 percent chance of seepage. Undersecretary Katzenbach: There will be a radioactive cloud. We would be violating the treaty. The fact this cloud would go over Canada would make it extremely difficult politically. The Soviets have never taken another interpretation. They have never admitted their actions. Dr. Hornig: There will be two types of reaction. Here in this country I know the reaction will be that we have violated the treaty. If the test is detected by other countries, the reaction by them also will be that we have violated the treaty. Chairman Seaborg then read a statement which the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had submitted. In this statement, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed its deep concern over the fact that the Plowshare program had not been carried out as planned. The Committee said it did not like a strict interpretation being placed on the treaty. It pointed out that the Soviets have proceeded with testing very vigorously. The meeting adjourned with no decision being reached./5/ /5/A detailed account of this meeting also appears in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 545-548, and in his book, Stemming the Tide, pp. 335-338. Cabriolet was eventually conducted at 11 a.m. on January 26, 1968, at the Nevada Test Site after the AEC had publicly announced that it planned to do so on January 25. (Ibid., pp. 338-339; United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, p. 31) For further discussion of this test and others in 1968, see Document 227.
218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. SUBJECT We have reached a point in our NPT negotiations where we are faced with several alternatives. The treaty is almost complete, except for the difficult safeguards article, Article III, and the question of the NPT's duration, which we shall want to reopen. I am bringing the matter to your attention at this time because, at the end of this week or the beginning of the next, there may be some public indications by the non-aligned that the Geneva Conference is failing because of our inability to make progress on this issue. With respect to the safeguards article, the Soviets have accepted all the changes which we have proposed, except one. They have agreed that safeguards under the NPT should be applied pursuant to an agreement with the IAEA concluded pursuant to the IAEA Statute. Their position, however, is that the safeguards to be established pursuant to a Treaty should be characterized in the Treaty as "IAEA safeguards." I have urged Gromyko to reconsider this position but the Soviets are sticking to it. Mr. Foster is of the opinion that their position on this is definitive (see attachment 1--Geneva telegram 1861)./2/ /2/Telegram 1861 from Geneva, November 25, drafted by Foster for Secretary Rusk, is not printed. (Ibid.) In this telegram, in addition to a discussion of failed U.S. efforts to convince the Soviets to omit mention of "IAEA Safeguards" from their draft Article III proposal, Foster expressed the following about our European allies, particularly the FRG: "I recognize and support the strong feeling of Euratom members that their safeguards must continue and that Euratom, as such, must have the right to negotiate whatever verification procedures by IAEA are ultimately applied. Nonetheless, it seems to me that as a Co-Chairman we are now being asked to fight mainly for the interests of only one of our allies, as against our own national interests and those of the most of the rest of our allies and most of the rest of the world." The area of disagreement is reflected in three possible formulations of the first sentence of Article III (see attachment 2). We have asked urgently to have the views of our Allies on these formulations. Alternative courses of action now open to us appear to be as follows: A. We could press the Soviets to accept our November 2 formulation (which does not so clearly characterize as "IAEA" safeguards the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA) indicating that this is essential to us and that we must continue to insist on it despite Soviet rejection./3/ /3/For text of November 2 U.S. Article III draft, see Document 216. B. We could yield to strong non-aligned pressure to interrupt negotiations at Geneva and present an incomplete NPT to the UNGA with a blank Article III. C. We could tell our Allies that only the second or third formulations in attachment 2 (which more clearly characterize the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA and "IAEA" safeguards) offer a realistic basis for negotiations. We could add that prompt agreement along such lines would improve prospects for getting Soviet agreement to a limited duration clause. Implicit in the selection of the language for Article III is the problem of what sort of an agreement we contemplate between IAEA and Euratom, or, for that matter, between IAEA and the various countries whose nuclear activities are to be put under IAEA inspection. It is my view that such an agreement should provide for full use of existing safeguards systems, such as those of Euratom or those of our own AEC safeguards system, but that it should involve more than a mere examination of the paper records of those systems; it should be deep enough so that IAEA could satisfy itself that no diversion was taking place. Alternative A, insisting on our November 2 draft which does not so clearly characterize the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, will be the most acceptable course to the FRG, Italy and, apparently, Belgium among our NATO allies as it would strengthen the hand of Euratom negotiating with IAEA. None of these states (with the possible exception of the FRG) has indicated that we should insist upon this formulation even if it means the failure of the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty. On the other hand, our allies who are not in Euratom, as well as the non-aligned, are not interested in pressing for treaty language which appears to preserve a special position for Euratom which has overtones of self-inspection. Many of them have indicated that the U.S. should not press this position to the point of deadlock in the negotiations . Insistence on alternative A to the point of deadlock might lead to alternative B if an apparent stalemate in Geneva leads to pressure to break off the negotiations there and to take the issue to the UN General Assembly with a safeguards Article left blank. This alternative carries a risk that the Article III ultimately agreed upon would offer less protection to Euratom than the formulations currently under discussion. It probably would touch off a round of propaganda recriminations which would not promote prospects for early agreement on an NPT. Following the third alternative, characterizing the safeguards system as IAEA safeguards, would permit the prompt conclusion of the negotiations with the Soviets and prevent any talk of deadlock in the negotiations at Geneva. It would cause difficulties with the FRG, and to a lesser extent with our other allies who are in Euratom because of their feeling that this characterization would drastically weaken Euratom's bargaining position in the future negotiations with IAEA. The difficulties with the FRG might be particularly acute as the FRG would be forced to decide, on its own responsibility, whether it could accept a characterization of safeguards as IAEA safeguards. Accepting the characterization of the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, however, would be in the long range U.S. interest as far as the countries outside of Euratom are concerned. We have a long range interest in promoting IAEA safeguards as such. It is this interest which underlies our own willingness to place our own peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and it is not served by a refusal to characterize the safeguards of an NPT as IAEA safeguards. Dean Rusk/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment 2/5/ November 28, 1967. /5/Secret; Exdis. Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III 1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom Allies) "1. . . . Undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system . . . ." 2. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; less acceptable than 1 to Italy but more acceptable to UK and Dutch than 3) "1. . . . undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA . . . ." 3. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether later rejected by Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG and Italy) "1. . . . undertakes to accept safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA . . . ."
219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, December 5, 1967, 1602Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Also sent to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, the Mission in Geneva, and USUN. 79423. Disto/NATUS/Busec. For Cleveland from Secretary. Subject: NPT. Ref: USNATO 815./2/ /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) 1. The November 30 NAC meeting on NPT seems to me to have ended rather inconclusively. What we need now are the definitive views of the Euratom countries and particularly those of Germany and Italy. 2. Therefore, in advance of this week's NAC meeting,/3/ you should urge the Germans and the Italians to give their definitive views on the alternatives before them, taking into account your presentation on November 30, so that we will then be in a position to know whether we can take advantage of delay in ENDC recess until mid-December to attempt to complete the NPT. You should make clear that delay in ENDC recess was accomplished solely for this purpose. /3/Scheduled for December 6. 3. It seems that our allies have had sufficient time to try to pull themselves together and give us specific governmental positions. Since the last effort to reach an agreed Euratom solution was not successful, I am not too sanguine that any multilateral session as proposed by Dutch would produce a favorable result. Therefore we prefer handle discussions on this subject bilaterally. 4. I concur that my presence at NATO Ministerial will provide occasion, if necessary, for further consultations on unsolved NPT problems./4/ However, I would not want to become involved in multilateral negotiations on complex Article III problem which has highly technical overtones. Moreover, by time of Ministerial meeting I would hope that we would already have had clear indication as to where our allies stand on clear alternatives already presented to them. /4/A Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, attended by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 15 member countries, was held at the Council's new temporary headquarters in Brussels December 13-14, under the chairmanship of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, President of the Council for 1967 - 1968. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |