|FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES|
1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
220. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 5, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Secret.1
Dear Mr. President:
We have had no further word from our Allies regarding the alternative formulations of the first sentence of Article III since the November 30 meeting of the North Atlantic Council when a number of them gave us their reactions./2/ At that time it appeared that those allies who are not members of Euratom could accept any of the alternatives. This is also true of Japan, whose views we also solicited. The Netherlands representative in NAC highlighted the point that the November 2 draft is no longer a viable alternative./3/ However, there has been no clear indication of the FRG's views.
/2/Not further identified.
/3/For text of November 2 draft, see Document 216.
Mr. Foster succeeded, with Roshchin's cooperation, in keeping the ENDC in session until the middle of December. The other ENDC delegations were willing to go along with this on the assumption that this would facilitate the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to reach agreement on Article III before the ENDC recesses./4/
/4/In 1967, the second session of the ENDC convened in Geneva on May 18 and recessed on December 14.
If we are unable to table an Article III before the ENDC recesses, there is likely to be a sense of heightened frustration on the part of the non-aligned delegations who have been kept waiting, first by the Soviet delay in agreeing to tabling a draft treaty with a blank Article III until August 24, and later by the delay in an evolution of a definitive Western position on Article III, a phase we are still in.
Ambassador Cleveland has been instructed to tell his colleagues that we would like to have the definitive views of the Euratom countries, and especially those of the FRG and Italy, at the Council meeting scheduled for December 6/5/ in order to permit us to determine if there is a basis for tabling an Article III before the ENDC has to recess in mid-December.
/5/See Document 219.
If the FRG and Italy do not give us their views at the December 6 NAC meeting, or if they insist that we continue to push the November 2 language which the Soviets reject, the completion of the NPT will have to be put off until next year.
Official reaction in the FRG and Italy to your December 2 speech offering to place U.S. peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards has been very favorable./6/
/6/For text of President Johnson's address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first nuclear reactor, December 2, 1967, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 1083 - 1085.
We hope the speech will help in producing a more favorable position on Article III in these countries.
Adrian S. Fisher
Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III
1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom allies)
"1. . . . undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system . . . ."
2. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether now acceptable to Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG; apparently rejected by Italy; acceptable to most other allies)
"1. . . . undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA . . . ."
3. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; not clear whether acceptable to Italy; acceptable to most other allies)
"1. . . . undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA . . . ."
221. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, December 5, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. The typewritten date of December 4 has been corrected by hand to read December 5.
In a telegram of December 2 (Tab A),/2/ Amb. McGhee raised a number of important questions about our negotiations on Article III of the NPT. He warned that we may be faced with a choice between the NPT and keeping Germany as an ally. He subsequently reported that the Germans recognize that there are dangers in getting too far out in front in their opposition to the NPT and that Chancellor Kiesinger had turned down a proposal to send you a "stiff letter on the NPT. "In addition, Foreign Minister Brandt publicly described your announcement that the US would place its civilian nuclear program under IAEA controls when the NPT becomes effective as a "significant step" toward resolving the problem of safeguards under an NPT.
/2/The attached telegram, telegram 5839 from Bonn, is dated November 2, not December 2. Another copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6.
The specific points raised by Amb. McGhee are as follows:
1. Duration. He urged that we give the Germans a draft of the new proposed Duration article. We now plan to do this at the NAC meeting on Wednesday./3/ This article, which was given to the Soviets on Saturday,/4/ provides for a conference after 25 years to determine by a majority vote whether the treaty should continue indefinitely or for another fixed period, and would permit any party to withdraw from the treaty at that time.
/3/For instructions to Ambassador Cleveland from Secretary Rusk in preparation for the December 6 NAC meeting, see Document 219.
2. IAEA/Euratom Negotiations. He proposed that Euratom begin preliminary discussions with IAEA on the form of a safeguards system while we continue negotiations on the text of Article III. Such informal discussions should pose no problem; however, formal meetings could result in delaying a resolution of Article III.
3. US Ratification. He believes that we should give the Germans clear assurances that the US would not ratify the NPT if Euratom could not negotiate a satisfactory agreement with IAEA. (Euratom members fear that the NPT might preclude our selling them enriched uranium if they had not worked out an agreement with IAEA.) So far, State and ACDA have not wanted to go beyond stating we would "take into account" the status of IAEA/Euratom negotiations as part of our ratification process.
4. US-Euratom Consultation. Amb. McGhee believes that we should accept the Dutch and Belgian proposals to work out the language for Article III in a special meeting with representatives of Euratom minus France--so far our negotiations have been either bilateral or in NATO.
With regard to the current status of the consultations on Article III, we are meeting on this problem with NATO on Wednesday (Dec. 6). At that time, we should learn the position of the Germans and the other NATO members on language for Article III that we think will be acceptable to the Soviets. If the Germans are willing to let us negotiate with the Soviets on this language, there should be no problem with the other Euratom countries. If they are not willing, I believe we will have to be ready for high-level consultations with the Germans.
Amb. Cleveland suggested yesterday that the NATO Ministerial Meeting next week/5/ would provide Sec. Rusk with a unique opportunity to get together with Foreign Minister Brandt and the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, and Netherlands to resolve the Article III issue. There is a question as to whether we should pursue this with Euratom or bilaterally with Germany. In any event, Sec. Rusk will be able to discuss the NPT in his private talks with Brandt.
/5/See footnote 4, Document 219.
I suggest that you may wish to discuss the timing and tactics of this issue with the Secretary at lunch today.
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, December 11, 1967, 0353Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and to USNATO for Secretary Rusk. The text of the telegram was received from Walt Rostow at the White House and cleared for transmission by Under Secretary Katzenbach and Samuel G. Wise (S/S-O). The telegram text was submitted under cover of a December 9 memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson. Rusk recommended that it be sent in response to Chancellor Kiesinger's December 8 letter to President Johnson which "discussed unresolved German concerns over the Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . other bilateral issues and his recent trips to London and Asia." Rusk also suggested that "Since I shall be seeing German Foreign Minister Brandt in Brussels on December 12 and shall raise the Non-Proliferation Treaty with him there, I think it would be helpful for you to send the enclosed letter [the text printed here] in time to reach Chancellor Kiesinger before that meeting."
An undated memorandum from Leddy to Rusk, attached to the source text and its cover memorandum, indicates that EUR had prepared for the President a reply to Kiesinger's December 8 letter to Johnson, and that EUR had additionally prepared a draft telegram for the Embassy in Bonn for the Secretary's and President's approval containing instructions to deliver the reply to Kiesinger on Monday, December 11. Handwritten notations on the December 9 cover memorandum indicate that the EUR letter was not approved, but that a new text--printed here--was the final version sent to Bonn on December 11.
82479. Disto Tosec 5. US Mission NATO for the Secretary./2/ Please deliver following letter at earliest convenient time to Chancellor Kiesinger:
/2/Secretary Rusk left Washington December 10 to attend the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels December 13-14.
"Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I was heartened by the warmth and hopefulness of your recent letter.
This has been an eventful year for each of us, both our nations, and the international community our partnership serves. Our closeness of mind and heart has given vital momentum to the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is moving now in the direction we desire. I share your hope that the Soviet Union may accept the concept of verification of Euratom safeguards by IAEA. You can be certain that the United States will continue to press for that with all vigor and persuasiveness.
The momentum of the European integration movement must be maintained. A free flow, from country to country, of nuclear materials for peaceful uses is crucial to Europe's progress. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper such traffic between nations who enter into the treaty and carry out its obligations in good faith.
We have consulted with our allies in the North Atlantic Council on further action to obtain an effective safeguards article that also protects the principle of verification. Our Geneva delegates are instructed to tell the Soviet Co-Chairman of our firm belief that the road to agreement on Article III is through the draft on November 2./3/ The Soviets, as you know, have so far rejected this language. They claim it constitutes self-inspection by Euratom members of Euratom members. This is not so. Every effort will be made to reassure the Soviets of that.
/3/See Document 216.
We have emphasized to them the clear and basic intent of this article. The agreement between IAEA and Euratom seeks only to assure all Treaty parties that safeguards will be effective in practice. It intends only that IAEA can be certain that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I am assured that these key principles are consistent with the German position. Secretary Rusk is now en route to Brussels, and I have asked him to review the entire matter of non-proliferation with your Foreign Minister.
Your own journeys to London and Asia have given me real and timely encouragement. The British quest to join the Common Market is strengthened by your support. My own hopes for peace in Asia are lifted by the promise you found, and the example you left. I am no less grateful for your government's recent policy statement on defense. These are initiatives all the world can value. They speak eloquently and optimistically of your personal commitment to a world at peace, and your people's determination to advance that joyous day. Its coming is hastened by Germany's efforts to draw her eastern neighbors closer in one community pledged to the betterment of all. Americans are proud to share that vision with you.
For myself, it is a comfort to know the warmth of your friendship and the strength of your partnership in these trying days. With freedom at test and the future in hazard, it is good to recall the resolve we shared in our Bonn and Washington meetings. It will sustain me, and inspire all who work with us, in the new year that approaches.
May it bring us the blessings of peace and freedom that we seek. Should it also bring you back to my country, that too would be a blessing. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to the happiness of showing you more of America and her people.
We speak for all of them in sending you and Mrs. Kiesinger our kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."
223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, December 15, 1967, 1523Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Moscow, Rome, New York, Tokyo, and to the Mission at NATO.
2078. Disto/NATUS/Busec. Subject: Co-Chairmen Meeting on NPT, December 15, 1967.
1. Safeguards: Foster said that, as was the case with the procedure used to find a solution for Articles I and II, we should deal with heart of the matter as regards Art III and avoid complicating solution we both want by attempting to use politically unacceptable labels. After exhaustive allied consultations, US has concluded the road to solution lies through Nov 2 formulation./2/
/2/See Document 216.
Roshchin wondered whether the expression "road lies through Nov 2 formulation" meant that solution would have to be based exactly on that formulation or something similar. Foster said US has now made clear its firm view and he felt Sovs should be able to evaluate meaning of this expression. Foster reiterated we need deal with reality of Euratom's existence, its ownership of fuels, and its common facilities. Verification by IAEA would have to avoid extremes of complete duplication on one hand or mere paper check on the other. He was sure that arrangement resulting from agreement to be concluded with IAEA would provide equal treatment for nonnuclear parties as regards safeguards to guard against diversion of fissionable materials to weapons.
Roshchin felt situation complicated by fact that US resting on Nov 2 formulation while Sov prefer Sept 2/3/ and there is very little time left in which to bridge the gap. He wondered if Foster had any ideas as to the direction in which the US could move in order to help find a solution to Art III. Foster repeated that the Nov 2 formulation was the only one which could be made acceptable to our allies and he was not in a position to suggest any changes.
/3/The September 2 Soviet draft has not been further identified.
2. Amendments: Foster expressed preference for going back to first alternative amendments clause considered earlier./4/ If this not possible for Sovs, however, he suggested following language as way to make present amendments article more widely acceptable: "2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each party that deposits its instrument of ratification upon the deposit of instrument of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instrument of ratification of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other party upon the deposit of its instruments of ratification." Roshchin made no comment other than to say he would report language to Moscow.
/4/See enclosure to Document 220.
3. Duration: Foster expressed hope Moscow was considering our proposal regarding duration./5/ We believe such a clause will help gain adherence of several key position nuclear powers. He added that Sovs now had received all of our ideas concerning essential elements for NPT and were now in position to look at treaty in terms of a final overall solution. Roshchin expressed concern over tendency to reconsider understanding previously reached between US and Soviet Union and felt this could lead to interminable discussion with no result. As regards duration clause, he also wondered if US having suggested 25-year duration, others would suggest various shorter periods.
/5/See Document 221.
Foster stressed US still prefers unlimited duration but convinced that this matter required further consideration by US and Soviet Union if we are to obtain necessary signatories to treaty. It was pointed out that clause suggested by US was not designed to limit treaty to 25 years, but on contrary to provide for extension of treaty after 25 years. Foster added that if USSR and US reach agreement on such clause, they could stand fast against attempt to provide for shorter period.
4. Assurances: Roshchin said that he was not clear as to the meaning of proposed US clause on non-use of nuclear weapons (paras 6 and 7 state 74017)./6/ What was meant by the phrase "Not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state?" Would it mean in practice that this assurance would not apply to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Foster replied that US and Sovs would have considerable freedom in determining circumstances in which assurances would or would not apply. He believed it was clear that if member of one of these alliances attacked member of another, it would be presumed that it had the assistance of its nuclear ally. In any event each nuclear power was free to make this determination on the basis of its own judgment. Foster gave the same reply when Roshchin asked if the same situation would obtain with respect to a country like Spain or some other ally of US.
/6/Paragraphs 6 and 7 of telegram 74017 to the Mission to NATO, November 23, read: "6. New paragraph D for our draft UNSC Resolution: 'D. Welcomes the intention expressed by nuclear-weapon states to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state:' 'New paragraph 6 for our draft US Declaration (the existing para 6 to become para 7):' 6. The United States affirms its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or devices, or control over such devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state.'" (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)
Roshchin then inquired whether the declaration to be made on the subject of assurances would have to be similar or whether there could be some difference. Foster said that they should be at least similar in order not to detract from their value. Perhaps they need not be identical but two governments should consult in advance and compare their proposed statements.
5. Limiting Nuclear Arms Race: Foster took opportunity to remind Roshchin that US remains eager to discuss problem of halting and limiting arms race in strategic nuclear vehicles and hoped that Moscow was continuing to give matter favorable consideration. Roshchin repeated that his delegation had no instructions on this matter but that he would report Foster's view to Moscow.
224. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 26, 1967, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Foster on December 26. The conversation was held in Foster's office.
At my request Ambassador Dobrynin came to my office today to discuss the situation with reference to the reconvening of the ENDC on January 18.
I briefly recounted the proceedings at the last two or three meetings of the Co-Chairmen in Geneva with which he appeared to be generally familiar. I emphasized the necessity of our using the brief time between now and mid-January in an attempt to find some way of making progress on the remaining questions between us on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As had Ambassador Roshchin, Ambassador Dobrynin asked for any suggestions we might have as to changes in the first sentence of Article III. I emphasized to him, as I had to Ambassador Roshchin, that the November 2 formulation had been developed after intensive consultations with our Allies and met the five principles which Euratom had convinced our Allies were essential in order for the NPT to be acceptable to them./2/ Since it is most important that these Allies do find the NPT acceptable in order for it to be of greatest value, it therefore appears clear that we must find a way to proceed along the lines of the November 2 formulation and only through this method does such progress seem possible. I briefly sketched the remaining open questions on duration, amendments, and review conferences and the Ambassador stated he was aware of these points but had no specific new information on them.
/2/See Document 216 for the text of the November 2 draft and the relevant five Euratom principles.
I reviewed the important timing questions starting with the necessity of the Co-Chairmen meeting in Geneva about the 15th of January if the ENDC is to reconvene on January 18. The meeting of the ENDC on the 18th would allow approximately two months at Geneva in order to be able to meet the deadline of the U.N. Resolution which in turn leaves little time for other formalities prior to the scheduled meeting of the non-nuclear-weapon nation states on August 29. The Ambassador agreed with these concerns and felt that time indeed is running out since any substantial delay, in his opinion, would lead to decisions being made on the part of certain countries which would make it impossible to achieve limits on proliferation.
I told him that the discussions between Mr. Fisher and Minister Kuznetsov in New York covering the possibility of Mexican and other amendments being accepted and put before the ENDC on January 18 might allow a little more time for discussions on Article III between the Co-Chairmen, but not much time. We also discussed the possibility of a meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva if sufficient progress had been made so that the completion of the NPT appeared close to achievement.
He said he would report our discussions to Moscow but hoped that we too would consider the possibility of flexibility on the first sentence of Article III, Paragraph 1./3/
/3/For a discussion of the negotiations over the first sentence of Article III, paragraph 1, see the enclosure to Document 220.
I made known to him that I expect to be out of circulation for a period due to the probable necessity of an operation this week. He asked who would head the delegation at Geneva, and I said either Mr. Fisher or Mr. De Palma, at least at first.
In concluding, I mentioned again the deep interest that the United States Government has in the possibility of discussions on the limitation of offensive and defensive delivery systems. He responded that he was aware of this, having recently heard the same thing from Secretary McNamara.
225. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Secretary saw."
Upon my arrival back from Geneva I can report on the NPT situation as follows.
There have been no speeches at the ENDC by the non-aligned since the new text was presented on January 18./2/ All speeches to date have been by US or Soviet allies which wished to register prompt support for new text. It is highly possible there will be no speeches at all at the next plenary on January 30. Two things seem to account for this: lack of time to obtain considered reactions from capitals and the opening of UNCTAD meeting in Delhi next week, which will take several prominent non-aligned delegates to ENDC away from Geneva temporarily.
/2/For Fisher's detailed statement on the revised treaty draft of the NPT to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 18, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 11-17.
I believe the slow pace at the ENDC in the next few weeks has certain advantages for us. (1) It will give us an opportunity to make special representations on behalf of the new draft in the capitals of the Eight non-aligned members of the ENDC. (2) It will give us more time to work out the security assurances problem with the Soviets before non-aligned views start to jell in Geneva. (3) The non-aligned, and not we and the Soviets this time, are under pressure to state their positions before the March 15 deadline for a report to the UNGA.
The non-aligned will wish to put some stamp on the treaty. It is recognition of this which may have motivated the Soviets to refuse to agree to include a provision on periodic review conferences in the January 18 draft. I believe the Soviets will probably agree to such a provision but that they will not agree to loosen up the duration clause further.
It thus seems to be in our interest to canalize non-aligned activities to getting a periodic review provision into the treaty and perhaps also to include the original Italian suggestion of relating the purposes of the preamble to provision for review conferences. This would have the effect of giving the non-nuclear countries periodic opportunities to assess what progress is made on further arms control measures and thus help to meet the argument that the NPT is not sufficiently balanced with regard to obligations of the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
We are expecting a representation from the FRG regarding "flexibility." I think we should from the outset discourage the Germans from expecting any change in the duration clause, pointing out there seems to be a definite relationship between it and Soviet acceptance of the November 2 formulation for Article III. However, I would recommend telling the Germans that we shall seek to make the treaty more flexible through pressing for a provision for periodic review. At the same time I think we should avoid giving the Germans the impression that we shall insist on changes in the January 18 draft, since in any event such changes are unlikely to satisfy Strauss, who apparently is Kiesinger's main problem with the NPT.
Adrian S. Fisher
226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of an undated memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which enclosed for Rusk's approval "a self-explanatory Memorandum to the President recommending that the United States sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement."
1. In my memorandum to you of October 25, 1967 (Enclosure A), I recommended that you inform President Diaz of Mexico that the United States intends to sign Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Enclosure B)./2/ This Treaty, which has been signed by 21 Latin American countries and ratified by Mexico and Brazil, would prohibit Latin American Parties from producing, testing, or possessing nuclear weapons in their respective territories; it would also forbid the receipt or installation of any nuclear weapons in such territories. In addition, Latin American Parties to the Treaty would undertake to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Treaty contains two protocols which are open for signature by the United States.
/2/Enclosure B, entitled "Text of LANFZ Treaty" is not attached. For text of Protocol II, see 22 UST 754. The United States is not a signatory to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which was signed by 14 Latin American nations at Mexico City on February 14, 1967. Vice President Humphrey signed Protocol II to this Treaty on behalf of the United States at Mexico City on April 1, 1968.
2. Protocol I calls for countries outside the Treaty zone to undertake the obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within the zone. US adherence to this Protocol would result, for example, in the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the zone. On December 10, 1965, Bill Foster wrote the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America that:
"We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both of these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers . . . "
3. Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon states to agree to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty and to promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties to the Treaty.
4. On October 26, 1967, you informed President Diaz/3/ that the United States intends to sign Protocol II with an interpretive statement after consultations with the Congress (Enclosure C). These consultations, necessary because ratification of Protocol II will require the advice and consent of the Senate, are now complete. Both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Foreign Relations Committee have been briefed in executive session on the Treaty and on our plan to sign Protocol II. Except for Senator Curtis who questioned the reference to general and complete disarmament in the preamble (a similar reference appears in the preamble of the Limited Test Ban Treaty) no objections were raised. At Senator Fulbright's request, a personal call was made to Senator Hickenlooper who had been present at the Joint Committee but not at the Foreign Relations meeting. Senator Hickenlooper, without committing himself, indicated that, on balance, he would not object to signature of Protocol II with a statement of interpretation, but that he thought ratification should depend on the degree of acceptance of the statement of interpretation by Latin American countries. In addition, Senator Dirksen, the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee have been advised that we are giving sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II. No objections have been expressed.
/3/At the invitation of President Johnson, President Diaz of Mexico made a State visit to the United States October 26-28. For text of the joint communique issued by Diaz and Johnson on October 27 following private discussions, and for other remarks issued by both during this visit, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 945-962.
5. As indicated in my memorandum to you of October 25 (Enclosure A), I believe that, by adhering to Protocol II, the US would not only be identified with a major arms control measure of special significance to our hemisphere relations, but would also be in a better position to influence the implementation of the Treaty in a manner favorable to our interests. The interpretive statement (Enclosure D) which I would recommend to accompany signature is designed to resolve five matters of concern to the United States. The statement would: 1) make clear that ratification of Protocol II would not constitute United States acceptance of the territorial claims of Latin American Parties; 2) emphasize that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon our transit rights in Latin America; 3) explain our pledge in Protocol II "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties" so as to permit a nuclear response in the event of an armed attack by a Latin American Contracting Party in which it is assisted by a nuclear-weapon state; 4) reiterate the position of the United States that this Treaty prohibits Contracting Parties from acquiring nuclear explosive devices even if intended for peaceful purposes, but permits the United States to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for the Contracting Parties; and 5) state that the United States would act in the same manner with respect to the Latin American territories of Protocol I adherents as it would with respect to the territories of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty, thereby encouraging the Netherlands,/4/ France, and the United Kingdom/5/ to ratify Protocol I and providing additional evidence of our support for the proposes of the Treaty at negligible cost. Our "interpretations" would not constitute "reservations" which are prohibited by the Treaty and they would serve to offset interpretations which differ from our own. (For example, the dominant Latin American view, with which we concur, that Contracting Parties cannot acquire nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is not shared by Brazil and Argentina.)
/4/The Dutch have expressed concern to us that Protocol II does not expressly apply to their Latin American territories. [Footnote in the source text.]
/5/The United Kingdom signed Protocols I and II on December 20, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. The Latin American countries are observing US actions on Protocol II closely as an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of the Protocol, would be highly desirable in order to encourage ratification of the Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the NPT negotiations.
1. The United States should not sign Protocol I at this time because of security requirements.
2. The United States should sign Protocol II as soon as possible, accompanying signature with the interpretive statement set forth in Enclosure D.
3. You should publicly announce at an early date that the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II.
These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
Washington, October 25, 1967.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
I believe the President of Mexico will ask you whether the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, better known as the "Treaty of Tlatelolco." I recommend that you tell him that the United States intends to sign Protocol II.
Signing Protocol II with appropriate interpretative statements is in our view the best way of protecting our transit rights in Latin America for ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons. We believe that the most satisfactory method of achieving an effective interpretation on transit rights is to accompany our signature to Protocol II with an interpretative statement which would be circulated routinely to all signatories, including the 20 Latin American nations which have already signed. We may also wish to inform certain Latin American Governments in advance of the interpretative statements we would plan to make accompanying our signature of Protocol II. We believe the negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that our interpretation is the correct one, but we want to do what we can to assure that this interpretation is not contested by important Latin American Governments.
By signing Protocol II, we would agree first, to respect the status of denuclearization of Latin America and second, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on the territory of Contracting Parties. The second obligation would limit to some extent our flexibility of response with nuclear weapons in Latin America. However, we do not believe this limitation to be unreasonable in light of the agreement of the Contracting Parties not to acquire nuclear weapons. With an interpretative statement, we believe the United States' interests will be protected. The circumstances present in Latin America are such as to justify a departure from our past policy concerning limitations on our freedom of response with nuclear weapons.
There are three other questions which would be dealt with in an interpretative statement to be made at the time of signature. These would be designed to make clear our views on peaceful nuclear explosive devices, on the territorial extent of our Protocol II obligations, and on a definition of territory as it applies to sea and air space. An interpretative statement is not being worked out within the Government and need not be discussed with President Diaz at this time.
1. That, if asked by the President of Mexico, you might reply along the following lines: "I congratulate you, Mr. President, on an achievement of which your Government can be justly proud. This is the signature by 20 Latin America governments of the first treaty establishing a nuclear free zone. The American people join with me in saluting this unique achievement. We hope this treaty will be a milestone toward world-wide agreement to a non-proliferation treaty and further steps of disarmament. We have followed your efforts with great expectation and have given careful thought and much study to the treaty. We intend to provide you and the other Contracting Parties with a statement of our understanding of the scope and effect of the treaty, and on this basis we intend to sign Protocol II."
2. That, if you are asked when the United States will sign, you might state: "I am as anxious as you are to move forward on this important treaty as promptly as possible."
3. That, preferably, no public announcement be made of our intention to sign Protocol II at this time since we are not yet actually ready to sign it. If the subject of Protocol II is discussed privately, the communique should read: "The two Presidents discussed the nuclear free zone treaty. President Johnson congratulated President Diaz on this outstanding example of Latin American statesmanship and stated that we are giving our most sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II."
4. That, if you are asked whether we will sign Protocol I, you might state: "Our serious difficulties with Protocol I have already been made known to your Government." (FYI--the United States cannot sign Protocol I because to do so would require denuclearization of our territories in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. End FYI)
These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke.
/8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Washington, November 9, 1967.
In his conversation with President Diaz Ordaz, the President told him that we intend to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement after consultations with the Congress.
State and ACDA are authorized to proceed with consultations. The results of the consultations should be reported to the President, together with recommendations for the handling of the announcement.
Washington, January 14, 1968.
DRAFT STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY
"In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States Government wishes to make the following statement:
"The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims.
"The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges.
"As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty.
"The United States wished to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in Article 5 as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.
"The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear-weapon states in a commitment to do so.
"The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in Article 4, Section 2 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties."
227. Editorial Note
On February 21, 1968, ACDA Director Foster wrote a memorandum to Walt Rostow recommending disapproval of the Atomic Energy Commission's request to execute the nuclear testing cratering experiment Buggy I, a row charge experiment of five simultaneous detonations. The initial AEC request for this experiment and others was submitted on June 2, 1967, under the Crosstie authorization plan. Regarding the Crosstie test program, see Document 197. Foster argued against the approval of Buggy I "on the ground that it involves a very substantial risk of causing radioactive debris to be present in Canada in amounts that will be detected, publicized, and used to support charges that we have deliberately violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Such charges would, among other consequences, have a decidedly adverse impact on our efforts to secure acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--Plowshare Events, Vol. 3, Box 30)
On February 22, Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, wrote a memorandum to Rostow in response to Rostow's request for comments and advice on Buggy I. Nitzere commended going ahead with the experiment on the grounds that the behavior of the radioactive debris released from the firing of another Plowshare experiment, Cabriolet, on January 26 had followed an expected path within the U.S. boundary.(Ibid.)
In a February 29 entry to his Journal, Seaborg wrote that he received a letter that day from Rostow, which informed him of President Johnson's approval to execute Buggy I. (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 16, page 165) This letter has not been found. Buggy I was fired at approximately 12 noon on March 12 at the Nevada Test Site; it created a crater measuring 300 by 900 feet and 80 feet deep. (Ibid., page 201)
228. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 15, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Confidential. The source text bears the concurrences of Leddy, Pollack, and Tape.
As you know, an essential element for the success of the NPT is the achievement of the required safeguards agreements, including one between the European Community and the IAEA. We have already made known to both organizations our willingness to assist them in any appropriate way to reach agreement.
To formulate and coordinate a program for such U.S. assistance, and to provide continuing guidance in achieving our objective, I recommend that we establish a special task force, which would include representatives of the Department of State offices most directly concerned (EUR and SCI) along with AEC and ACDA. The task force will maintain close consultation with Ambassador Smyth and Ambassador Schaetzel.
I recommend that we designate as chairman of this task force Myron B. Kratzer, the AEC's Assistant General Manager for International Activities. I believe Mr. Kratzer is eminently qualified to undertake this task. Chairman Seaborg is willing to make Mr. Kratzer's services available for this purpose./2/
/2/At the AEC's Information Meeting 777, March 4, Seaborg and the Commissioners agreed that Kratzer should be designated Chairman of the Task Force. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 16, p. 173)
If you approve this recommendation, I will so notify the members of the Committee of Principals./3/
/3/Rusk initialed his approval on March 18.
Adrian S. Fisher
229. Memorandum for the Record of the 584th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, March 27, 1968, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 66, 3/27/68, Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Secret.
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
The President thanked General Abrams and asked Amb. William Foster to discuss the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Amb. Foster reported that two weeks previously the US and Soviet Union had jointly submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva identical drafts of a complete NPT./2/ They had also agreed upon a draft resolution on security assurances for the UN Security Council. The US, USSR, and the UK had also agreed on essentially identical declarations that they would each make in connection with the Security Council resolution./3/ He emphasized that the security assurances did not constitute a new commitment for the United States but rather gave promise of action by reaffirming our existing commitments under the UN Charter. He reported that the ENDC had now submitted to the UN its report forwarding the draft text of the treaty and Security Council resolution./4/ A Special Session of the UNGA on the NPT will begin sometime between April 17 and 24. He noted that we still had problems and that India and Brazil had indicated their reservations about the treaty. He stated that we shared with the Soviet Union a desire to convey the feeling that the present draft was the text of the NPT and not simply a proposal subject to general amendments. At the same time, however, we did not wish to join the Soviet Union in an attempt to railroad the treaty through the Special Session of the UNGA. He believed that it was important to give everyone an opportunity to talk the issue out completely. If the treaty did not run into serious problems in the Special Session, it could then be opened for signature later this spring. He reported that Ambassadors Goldberg and Malik were working out the tactics for the Special Session, and that we were working on India, Brazil, the FRG, etc., through regular diplomatic channels in an attempt to overcome their reservations. There is no question that there would be an effort by some countries to delay action on the NPT in the Special Session by attempting to amend it, to return it to the ENDC for further consideration, or to defer it to the next session of the UNGA. He noted that if the Special Session goes well, we sign, and the Senate approves, we will then have to decide, on the basis of the existing situation, whether to ratify and deposit the treaty immediately or to defer this action. He noted that, even if we have problems in the UNGA, we could still open the treaty for signature since there would in any case be very large support for it.
/2/On March 11, Foster and Roshchin introduced to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee a joint U.S.-Soviet draft on the NPT as a revision of the January 18 draft (see footnote 2, Document 225). For text of the March 11 draft, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 162-166. For statements by Roshchin and Foster to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on this draft, see ibid., pp. 172-174, and pp. 174-177, respectively.
/3/For text of the Tripartite Security Assurances Proposal, March 7, submitted by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom to the U.N. Security Council, see ibid., pp. 156-158. On June 19, the Security Council approved the resolution by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions. Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Paraguay, Senegal, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the resolution; Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan abstained.
/4/For the report, March 14, 1968, submitted to the ENDC, and for cross references to revised texts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the draft U.N. Security Council resolution, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 192-193.
Amb. Foster then raised the question as to what would happen after the NPT since it calls on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate "in good faith" toward nuclear disarmament. He noted that we had already made several major proposals--the comprehensive test ban; cut-off of production of nuclear materials for weapons; and the freeze on offensive-defensive strategic weapons systems. A new proposal is now being considered within the Government concerning the control of the seabed. In this connection, the Soviet Union the previous week had formally made a proposal to prohibit use of the seabed for military purposes beyond the 12-mile limit./5/ He thought therefore that we should quickly develop a forthcoming position on this issue. He noted that our policy was to support a comprehensive test ban provided there was adequate on-site inspection and that we had a forthcoming position on the nuclear cut-off. As for the freeze on offensive-defensive strategic systems, we were still waiting for a Soviet response.
/5/Presumably a reference to the statement delivered on March 20, 1968, by Soviet Representative Malik to the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the National Jurisdiction; see ibid., pp 194-196.
In response to the President's question as to his views on the status of the NPT, Under Secretary Katzenbach stated that he had nothing specific to add except the thought that bad things happen quickly and good things happen much more slowly. He thought that, while the prospects for the NPT were favorable, there were still many problems ahead.
Amb. Goldberg stated that the NPT would be the most momentous achievement for peace since the Limited Test Ban Treaty./6/ The President and Amb. Foster deserve the most credit for this accomplishment. The full significance and effect of the treaty had not yet fully sunk in with the public. With regard to the scenario, he stated that it now looked as though the Special Session would begin on April 24 although we had originally wanted to meet earlier. He would be conferring with the Soviets on tactics during the next few days. In general, it appeared we believed in a softer sell than the Soviets. There were clearly problem spots such as Italy; however, he thought these problems could be resolved. He thought the biggest problem would be the effort by opponents to delay action on the treaty until after the caucus of the non-nuclear states in August so that the debate could be resumed in the next session of the UNGA next September. With regard to the location of the signing, he favored independent signing in the three capitals--Washington, London, and Moscow. With regard to follow-on measures, he noted that the seabed problem was a very complex, sensitive subject. He would propose to send it back to the ENDC for full debate to avoid any premature commitments in the Special Session of the UNGA. He stated that while he was not as optimistic about the outcome of the NPT as Amb. Foster, he thought it could be accomplished but emphasized that this would require hard work. He estimated that the Special Session would last about five weeks. If the treaty were then opened for signature, there would still be time to permit its submission to the Senate before adjournment.
/6/See Document 3.
The President asked what the status of the seabed proposal actually was.
Amb. Foster replied that ACDA was now circulating a specific proposal at the working level and that a final version would shortly be sent to the Committee of Principals./7/ He agreed that the ENDC was the right forum. He observed that the introduction of this new proposal would take some of the pressure off of us on the comprehensive test ban issue.
/7/See footnote 4, Document 233.
The President asked about India's position on the NPT.
Amb. Foster replied that the measure was now before the Indian Cabinet and had not yet been decided. In the end, however, he believed that India may well sign. He noted that arrangements had been made for Dr. Jerome Wiesner to meet in Geneva with Dr. Sarabhai, head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, who has emerged as the principal Indian opponent of the NPT, in order to try to persuade him to modify his views.
Amb. Goldberg said he thought the Indian problem would be more difficult than this and he had encountered outright opposition from their representatives in New York.
The President asked what other countries presented problems.
Amb. Foster replied that Italy had been quite difficult. However, the Italian Parliament was definitely in favor of the NPT and it would be difficult for the Italian government to oppose it. Brazil opposed the treaty on the grounds that it wants to be able to develop independently nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes in order to help its economy. He stated, however, that such an exception would completely undermine the treaty since peaceful nuclear explosives suitable for peaceful purposes were equivalent to the most advanced nuclear weapons. He noted that Brazil's position might change since some strong counterforces were developing there on this issue. With regard to the FRG, he was very hopeful that they would support the treaty. He noted that in the course of the long negotiations with our allies the FRG had written half of the treaty.
The President expressed his pleasure with the success that had been achieved so far on the NPT and congratulated Ambassadors Foster and Fisher for their accomplishments. He then adjourned the meeting.
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
[Continue with the next documents]