1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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230. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg)/1/ Washington, March 29, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Dear Glenn: Your letter of March 15, 1968 enclosed a draft letter to Euratom and asked me toagree that such a letter should omit any reference to the potential relevance of the NPT./2/ /2/Seaborg's March 15 letter to Rusk is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 222-224. An unedited version of the March 4 draft letter to Spaak is ibid., pp. 225-228. I agree that it would be wise to omit the reference to the NPT and thus avoid the political repercussions of such a reference at least until the negotiation of specific long term supply contracts. I would appreciate it, however, if you would consult the State Department and ACDA before undertaking such contract negotiations. In my view, the omission of any reference to the NPT makes it desirable to make certain modifications in your draft letter designed to remove any basis for Euratom to claim that the letter itself constitutes a commitment to supply additional fuel or that it contains a complete list of the conditions under which such fuel will be supplied. A marked copy of the draft letter indicating such modifications is enclosed. Sincerely, Dean
Attachment/3/ /3/This draft attachment is an edited version of the draft cited in footnote 2 above. The final text of the letter, which was sent to Cancellario D'Alena (not Spaak) on May 1, is scheduled for publication in volume XXXIV. Dear Mr. Spaak: As you are aware, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission recently received statutory authorization, through an amendment to the Euratom Cooperation Act permitting the transfer to Euratom of up to a maximum of 1,500 kilograms of plutonium (an increase of 1,100 kilograms over the previous authorizations) and up to 215,000 kilograms of contained uranium 235 (an increase of 145,000 kilograms). In this letter, I would like to describe general arrangements/4/ that we would consider applicable to the transfer of this material. These conform to the proposals that I outlined to you in our meeting in Washington on January 25. /4/The original text of the first part of this sentence reads: "In this letter, I would like to delineate the general conditions that we would consider applicable to the transfer of this material." With this new statutory authority, the Commission will be in a position to transfer or to approve the transfer of additional quantities of plutonium and uranium 235 to the Community within the newly authorized amounts./5/ /5/The original text of this paragraph continues with: "under the conditions set forth in this letter. The following paragraphs summarize the general conditions which, in accordance with AEC policy, will be applicable to the transfer of the additional plutonium and enriched uranium to the Community."
Plutonium 1. Of the 1,000 additional kilograms of plutonium to be made available, acquisitions from private operators in the U.S. would not exceed at any time 50 percent of the total plutonium which the Community has obtained or has commitments to obtain from the United States. Further, no more than 75 percent of any one private operator's plutonium would be so made available to the Community. The remainder of the plutonium to be supplied under the new authorization would be obtained from the USAEC. The price for the AEC material would be the Commission's established price in effect at the date of delivery, which currently is $43 per gram of fissile isotopes in the form of plutonium nitrate. 2. The research and development work to be performed with the additional 1,000 kilograms would be covered by appropriate information exchange arrangements under which the USAEC would obtain the information derived from the use of the material. 3. Any transfer of such additional plutonium would, of course, be subject to the provisions of our Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended. We would appreciate receiving as soon as practicable your best estimates concerning the quantities and quality of plutonium desired by the Community, including a schedule of anticipated deliveries. Enriched Uranium 1. Insofar as the additional quantity of enriched uranium is concerned, it is our understanding that your estimates for the next five years include the entire additional 145,000 kilograms of U-235 that has been authorized. We would appreciate receiving confirmation from you to this effect. Upon receipt of such confirmation, we will consider 215,000 kilograms of U-235 as the new ceiling quantity transferable under our additional Agreement for Cooperation, and pursuant to the necessary contracts./6/ The five-year period contemplated in Article I of the Additional Agreement would commence for the additional quantity on the date of your written reply. /6/The original text of the latter part of this sentence reads: "Agreement for Cooperation, subject to the various terms of the Agreement for Cooperation including the conclusion of the necessary contracts."
2. The supply of the uranium 235 would be in accordance with the current AEC "net amount concept" which was the basis used by Euratom and the USAEC for calculating the U-235 increase. A definition of the "net amount concept" is appended to this letter. 3. The AEC normal mode of supplying the enriched uranium to the Community for power reactor applications would be through toll enrichment while comparable services are made available to licensed users in the U.S. The Additional Agreement contains wording broad enough to encompass toll enrichment. Accordingly, it would provide a basis for the performance of such services in connection with projects within the scope of that Agreement, including joint program projects to the extent that both parties wish to employ toll enrichment. In conformance with its current policy, AEC sales of the newly authorized quantities of enriched uranium to Euratom would take place only on a single transaction basis rather than through long-term contracts. All of these terms regarding the availability of enriched uranium are fully consistent with U.S. supply policies which have been discussed in public in recent months./7/ /7/The original text continues with an additional paragraph which reads: "The transfer of the plutonium and the enriched uranium referred to in this letter will be subject, of course, to mutually satisfactory safeguard provisions in accordance with the terms of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation." We look forward to receiving confirmation from you that the understandings set forth in this letter are acceptable to the Community. Sincerely yours, Myron B. Kratzer/8/ /8/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ ACDA-2915 Washington, April 5, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2915. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM) on April 2. There is a typed notation on the source text for Ambassador Thompson's concurrence, but it is not initialed.
SUBJECT On March 16, following a briefing which ACDA gave you, you instructed me to form a committee to examine the ACDA recommendations on controlling the strategic arms race. This review has now been completed by representatives of the Department, ACDA, and DOD/ISA, and I wish to submit for your consideration and approval the following proposals. Though the working group was initially in substantial agreement on these proposals, I understand that Ambassador Foster has certain reservations and will be submitting to you a separate memorandum on the subject. However, the proposals set forth in this memorandum have the full approval of Ambassador Thompson and DOD/ISA. They will be presented simultaneously by DOD/ISA to Secretary Clifford. If you and Secretary Clifford agree on them, they will be checked with the JCS prior to submission to the President for his approval. Objectives The main aim of the US in engaging the Soviets in negotiations on strategic missiles would be to reach an agreement which would maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship, primarily by controlling the number of offensive and defensive missile launchers. Even if unsuccessful in this quest, the US would benefit indirectly from such talks. They would promote a better understanding of the concerns each side has in the developing missile race. Also, a new US-Soviet agreement to hold such talks, if announced in the near future, would help secure support for the NPT (see below). Initial Negotiating Position The US should be prepared to submit a concrete initial negotiating position to the Soviets even prior to their agreement to set a date for talks. Some Soviet contacts have intimated that such a step would help the Soviet Government (i.e., those favoring talks) to reach a positive decision on this matter. It would be taken as an earnest of our intent and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we were merely bent on an intelligence fishing expedition. The attached initial negotiating position (Tab A), drafted in the form of an oral statement to be presented by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, is a revised version of the paper submitted to you, the Secretary of Defense, and the Acting Director of ACDA in early March./2/ It incorporates recommendations made by ACDA relating to the general principles which would underlie a strategic arms agreement. However, like its immediate predecessor, it essentially is based on the draft proposal approved by you on September 23, but modified to take account of objections subsequently voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/ /2/The paper sent to Rusk, Clifford, and Fisher in March has not been further identified. /3/The draft proposal approved by Rusk on September 23 has not been further identified. Whatever may be the decision on the timing of the delivery of this oral statement, it would be desirable to reach agreement now within the US Government on an initial negotiating position, so as to provide a base for further examination of the problem and to be prepared for talks should they eventuate. Timing of Presentation As for timing the proposed initiative, both you and Secretary Clifford indicated in early March that the time was not ripe for such a move. This may still be the case today. However, new considerations have arisen. The President's initiative, and the North Vietnamese response, on limiting bombing have cast a better international climate in regard to the Vietnam War. Also, on March 14, the ENDC completed its work on the NPT and submitted a draft treaty to the UN General Assembly for its consideration and endorsement. Preliminary soundings indicate that General Assembly support for the NPT may be anything but overwhelming. A number of non-nuclear weapons states have complained, among other objections, that the nuclear powers have assumed no meaningful obligation under the NPT to move forward with the business of disarmament. In order to dispel this charge, as well as to hold out an added inducement to the Soviets to agree to talks, it is recommended that Ambassador Thompson deliver the proposed statement under Tab A promptly after his return to Moscow (April 17) and that he preface this statement with a message from the President to Chairman Kosygin (Tab B), arguing that it would be advantageous to the cause of the NPT if the US and USSR were to announce during the General Assembly session their agreement to commence on a given date bilateral discussions of limitations on strategic arms./4/ /4/Tab B is a telegram to Moscow, drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM), Sidney N. Graybeal (ACDA) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA) on April 24; cleared by Ambassador Bohlen and Foster (ACDA); and approved by Secretary Rusk. A typewritten notation on Tab B reads: "Draft. See OD-ACDA-2915 dated April 5, 1968, (not sent in this form, per Mr. Shaw)." Tab B was apparently revised and incorporated into a May 2, 1968, message which was sent directly from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin. See Document 237. Negotiating Tactics Once negotiations begin, we should pursue in parallel discussions of concrete proposals and of principles, embodying the concept of an agreed limitation on the strategic arms race. The latter dialogue would be helpful in convincing the Soviets of the desirability of our proposal, as well as in obtaining a clearer idea of Soviet thinking on this arms-disarmament complex, which in turn might influence our final negotiating position. The general principles contained in the ACDA briefing paper of March 16 could serve as guidelines for such a discussion. Negotiating Problems and Alternatives It is recognized that our initial negotiation position contains a number of significant omissions and almost certainly would be challenged by the Soviets on certain points. Several of them were examined in the ACDA study. In some problem areas, it would be relatively easy to construct convincing rebuttals. In other cases, we might at some point want to reconsider our position. However, I do not recommend that decisions on these problem issues be made at this point. This would have to be done after negotiations have been in progress for some time and we have a clearer idea of Soviet intentions. I understand that S/P, at your instruction, is preparing a separate study on the problem of strategic arms control and that it proposes a rather substantial reduction of missiles. This study will be given careful consideration and may prove useful for future contingencies. However, I believe that, at this stage at least, our aim should be to obtain Soviet agreement to level off the strategic arms race. Alternative contingency proposals such as this could be considered by the Committee of Principals. Recommended Action (1) That you approve the proposed oral statement set forth in Tab A, either to be delivered shortly (see below) or to be held as a contingency position. (2) That you approve the proposed Presidential letter to Chairman Kosygin (Tab B), to be delivered along with the above oral statement by Ambassador Thompson on his return to Moscow./5/ /5/There is no indication whether Secretary Rusk approved or disapproved these recommendations.
Tab A/6/ /6/Top Secret; Nodis. It is uncertain if this undated, unnumbered telegram was ever sent to Moscow. It was drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM) and Mort Halperin (DOD/ISA) on April 3, and prepared for clearance by Bohlen, Clifford, and Thompson, and for approval by Rusk, but no initials appear on the source text. Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks. 1. You should seek earliest opportunity to approach Kosygin or highest available responsible Soviet official to request again a favorable response to our proposal/7/ for early talks on strategic missile controls. You should outline our views on possible strategic missile controls and on desirability of early talks, as set forth below; text of your oral remarks may at your discretion be left with Soviets. /7/On March 2, 1967, President Johnson held a news conference at which he revealed that Chairman Kosygin had responded on February 27 to his letter of January 21, 1967 (see Document 178), to enter into discussions on limiting defensive and offensive nuclear missiles. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 259-260. For background on the ABM issue, see Documents 173 and 174. Regarding subsequent high-level exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union, see Documents 178, 179, 185, and 186. 2. Begin Text: The United States Government initially proposed discussion on strategic anti-ballistic missile systems because of our belief that deployment of such systems, even if justified in military terms, could not help but spur on a new and costly cycle of the strategic nuclear arms race. We agreed, however, in the very first exchange of views with the Soviet Government's suggestion that such discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems, as well as anti-missile defensive systems. This has remained throughout, and continues to be, the position of the United States Government. 3. The United States Government has proposed these talks within the framework of the Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961,/8/ accepted by our two Governments as a basis for disarmament negotiations and as offering the best means to begin to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. As we have noted earlier, we believe that it should be possible to reach agreement more quickly on important limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without waiting for agreement on all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that measures to curb the strategic arms race would help pave the way for substantial reductions, and would have great value in themselves inasmuch as they would avoid a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of strategic missile deployments. The first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms control should be to restrain the further growth of strategic forces. It may not prove easy to find mutually acceptable limitations, but we are prepared to work earnestly toward that end, and we assume what you will as well. /8/For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, transmitted to the 16th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 20, 1961, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.
4. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race, and even to make reductions in existing forces, without the necessary participation of others. Moreover, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would sign and continue to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will be demonstrating that we are moving toward disarmament as we are committed by the treaty to try to do. 5. Over a year has passed since we first proposed these discussions. Not only is delay regrettable, but the problem which we are facing can become more difficult with time. However, our task is to take account of the existing situation in devising mutually acceptable measures to curtail the strategic arms race. As each month goes by, the existing situation is one of greater and more complex armaments on both sides. An agreement a year ago, when the United States first proposed talks, might have prevented many of the increases on both sides which are now in process. An agreement today to curtail future deployments would have the same effect as an agreement a year from now to effect a reduction in deployed weapons; it should also be easier to negotiate, and would result in important savings of resources for us both. 6. We recognize that limiting strategic arms consistent with our mutual interests and common goals is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we start with a common understanding of a problem and are striving for similar goals. In this context, we believe that there are some basic principles underlying the early achievement of any such mutually beneficial restraints on the strategic arms race. 7. Any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. It would be futile for us to attempt to define such concepts as "superiority" or "parity", these notions have little meaning in a situation, such as the present, in which each of us is certain that the other has the capability under any circumstances to inflict unacceptable damage. We recognize that some adjustments in the deployment of the strategic forces of each side might be appropriate. Such adjustments would be designed to meet our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding possible disruptive effects and the great cost of a continuation of the strategic arms race. 8. Our respective national means of verification should be adequate for achieving meaningful strategic arms control constraints. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on such verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. For other more comprehensive measures, some supplementary inspection arrangements may be required; we would be prepared to include the minimum inspection necessary for effective verification. Our position on this subject is flexible and is governed by the principles that verification of compliance with agreed undertakings is necessary, that maximum reliance should be placed on unilateral ability to verify compliance, and that when additional procedures are required for adequate verification, they must, of course, be provided. 9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States suggests that consideration be given to cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. This weapon category should include strategic missiles of medium and intermediate range (ranges greater than 1,000 KM), as well as longer-range intercontinental missiles. If the agreement were to be limited to fixed land-based missile systems, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. In view of the difficulty of verifying through national means the deployment of sea-based or mobile land-based strategic missile launchers, the possibility of an agreed limitation applying to these weapons could be the subject of discussion. 10. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-missile systems is more complex. While some ABM systems may be required in light of the offensive strategic missile systems of other countries, we must recognize that as far as our own two countries are concerned they may also be an important factor in the strategic balance between us. This importance will, of course, be increased if there are agreed limitations on offensive missile systems. In general, it would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be an agreed number of anti-missile launchers and associated radars which each side could deploy. As in the case of strategic offensive missile systems, we believe that national means of verification would provide assurance with respect to the scale of deployment of fixed land-based defensive anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. Concerning land-mobile or sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems, the same considerations would prevail as are noted above in regard to mobile offensive systems. 11. The United States Government has presented these views in the expectation that representatives of our two Governments will meet shortly to discuss these matters. End Text./9/ /9/Printed from an unsigned copy.
Tab B/10/ /10/Top Secret; Nodis. Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks. 1. You should deliver without delay the following personal message from President Johnson to Kosygin: Begin Text: Dear Mr. Chairman: Ambassador Thompson has informed me of the talk he had with Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 26. Concerning the proposal for our two governments to hold discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race, I understand Foreign Minister Gromyko to say that the Soviet Government is still studying the problem and that it attaches great importance to it. I am gratified with the latter statement because it corresponds to my deep conviction about the need for such negotiations. I am concerned, however, about the necessity to initiate meaningful discussion as soon as possible. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration, which leads me to write you this letter. As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents. During the resumed GA session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face a most critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in the fall of this year. It is important that our two governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date. To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to commence bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement. I am convinced that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through these private bilateral discussions it should be possible for our two countries to reach some agreement on initial steps for curtailing the strategic arms race. We believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we can reach a common understanding of the problem and are striving for similar goals. In our view, any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. We continue to believe that meaningful strategic arms control constraints involving limitations on the deployment of certain strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems can be adequately verified by relying on our respective national capabilities. Progress on controlling the strategic arms race, while important in itself, will also contribute to our mutual objective of achieving and maintaining the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I hope and trust that these actions will bring our two governments into closer working relationships. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson. End./11/ /11/Printed from an unsigned copy.
232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/ Washington, April 10, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and Leon Sloss (G/PM). The source text was sent under cover of an April 15 memorandum from Foster to Katzenbach, in which Foster recommended that Katzenbach send the letter to Clifford "informing him of the background of the U.S. interpretations of Article I and III before he (Clifford) goes to the NPG meeting at The Hague, April 18-19." Foster also proposed to Katzenbach that he suggest that Clifford make a statement "setting forth our opinion that the NPT will not affect the activities of the NPG. The FRG has requested that such a statement be made. Messrs. Bohlen and Leddy concur." Dear Mr. Secretary: Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense. The FRG has requested in particular that we make it clear that the realization of the NPT will not affect the work of the NPG. The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements. In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko,/2/ it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A). /2/On October 10, 1966, Rusk met with Gromyko at a working dinner at the Department of State to discuss the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; see Document 158. The FRG agreed with us that it would not be desirable to request comments from the USSR on these interpretations, since the USSR could not be expected to be bound by unilateral interpretations or a treaty made by others. However, the Soviets were informed that if they took an official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious problem would arise. The Soviets also were told that we expected that during ratification hearings the US Senators would ask similar questions as allied governments, and we expected to make the same responses on our understanding of Articles I and II. We have not heard from the Soviets any indication that they will contradict the US interpretations when they are made public in the process of consideration of the treaty either by the US or by our allies. This does not mean that they will necessarily agree with them. We do not believe it would be in our interest or that of our allies to have a public discussion of the US interpretations prior to the time when the NPT is submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. On March 13 the FRG Embassy here requested that a statement be made by you at The Hague NPG meeting and also at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May to the effect that the NPT will not hinder the work of the NPG or further nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the NPT. (Memcon and FRG working paper attached as Tab B.) We think it would be useful for you to make such a statement on both occasions suggested by the FRG and see no objection to using substantially the language proposed by the Germans. We have slightly rephrased the FRG language (Tab C). I suggest that you include such a statement in your presentations both to the April 18-19 NPG Meeting and at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Tab A/3/ April 28, 1967. /3/Secret. QUESTIONS ON THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
ASKED BY U.S. ALLIES 1. Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the draft treaty? A. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of "nuclear weapons" or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. 2. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and planning on nuclear defense among NATO members? A. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results. 3. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned and controlled by the United States within the territory of non-nuclear NATO members? A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. 4. Q. Would the draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon state was one of the constituent states? A. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity.
Tab B/4/ Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 13, 1968. /4/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Minister von Lilienfeld said he called on instructions of his Government to express German concern as to possible effects on the work of the NPG of the Soviet exploitation of the NPT. He gave Mr. Leddy the attached paper containing talking points which he described as a "non-paper" having no official status. He recalled that the NPG was closely connected with the earlier MLF to which the FRG had attached importance. The FRG also attaches a great deal of importance to the work of the NPG both from the standpoint of defense policy and from the psychological point of view. Mr. Leddy, referring to the talking points, asked the Minister whether he considered our participation in the NPG had had a restrictive effect. Minister von Lilienfeld said there is a feeling in German circles, especially in military circles, that the US is resisting the sharing of knowledge and decision-making in the nuclear field. Mr. Leddy pointed out to the Minister that the NPG was established to meet the problem to which the Minister referred and that he thought it was doing good work. He was not aware of any basis for the reported German concern that our participation has had a restrictive effect. As to the desire expressed by the Minister that the Secretary of Defense make statements at the NPG Ministerial meeting on April 18 and at the NATO Ministers' meeting in May, we would look into the matter. He said we certainly will not talk to the Soviets about the NPG. The situation is clear on that score. The Minister explained that it was not the desire of his Government that the Secretary of Defense make formal declarations. The German Government had in mind that the Secretary would include in his remarks at these meetings statements along the lines set forth in his talking paper.
Attachment/5/ Undated. /5/Secret. Talking Paper I have instructions to raise the question of the possible repercussions which the non-proliferation treaty might have on the nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. We raise this question particularly with respect to the ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group schedule in the Hague on April 18 and 19. The interpretations which the US delegate in Geneva handed the Soviet Co-Chairman on April 28, 1967 deal with this problem. These interpretations had been the subject of consultations within the Alliance and also bilaterally between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The interpretations safeguard the nuclear arrangements as they presently exist within the Alliance. We consider it desirable, however, that the US Government make it clear vis-a-vis its allies that the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not impair the future work of the Nuclear Planning Group nor the further development by the Nuclear Planning Group of nuclear arrangements already existing. We are motivated by the fact that the Soviets have time and again criticized the already existing nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. We, therefore, have reason to expect that--by referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty--they will attempt to block any further development of such arrangements, especially in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group. Although the legal validity of such attempts were to be doubted, they could produce a dangerous political impact, thus hindering the future work in the Nuclear Planning Group and jeopardizing concrete improvements in the field of consultation on nuclear matters. We recognize that the Nuclear Planning Group already has produced some good results and has done important preliminary work for an improvement of nuclear consultation within the Alliance. But we share the opinion of other members of the Alliance that there is still a long way to go before satisfactory and final arrangements of the problems the Nuclear Planning Group is dealing with are reached. Work within the Nuclear Planning Group proceeds slowly and sometimes there is the impression that a certain restrictive tendency impedes faster progress. As far as we know, Secretary General Brosio occasionally has expressed similar concerns on this matter. All these reasons make it even more urgent that the US Government gives the clarification we request. We feel, however, that this should not be done through interpretations to be handed to the Soviets. We, too, would consider it prejudicial if hereby a discussion about the Nuclear Planning Group would be initiated with the Soviets. We would appreciate it if the Secretary of Defense at the ministerial meeting at the Hague on April 18 and at the Conference of the NATO Defense Ministers in May 1968 could make such a statement. In our view it would be desirable if such a statement would state --that the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not interfere with the determination of the US Government to further actively the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to cooperate in the aim of finding a solution satisfactory to the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance for the formulation and execution of nuclear planning within NATO; --that the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not hinder the further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the Alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the NPT.
Tab C/6/ /6/Secret. Proposed Statement to be Included in
Presentations The US Government holds the view that the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not interfere with the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. The US Government intends to continue to pursue actively the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to seek to find solutions satisfactory to its non-nuclear partners in NATO for the formulation and execution of nuclear planning within NATO. It also is the view of the US Government that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not hinder the further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
233. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, April 12, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret; Noforn. A stamped notation on the source text reads: "Sec Def has seen Brief." SUBJECT Last December, the U.N. General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider future uses of the seabed and ocean floor./2/ During the recent meetings of this Committee, there was widespread interest in applying arms control measures to the seabed. The kinds of measures which were mentioned fall into the following three categories: /2/On December 18, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly established a 35-member Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The Ad Hoc Committee held three sessions in 1968. The first two were held at U.N. headquarters in New York; the first March 18-27, and the second June 17-July 9. The third was held in Rio de Janeiro, August 19-30. a) Demilitarization of the seabed. b) Reservation of the seabed for peaceful purposes. c) Prohibiting the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. On the basis of our studies of the desirability and feasibility of an arms control measure, and as a result of staff-level discussions with other agencies, ACDA has concluded that the proposal for demilitarization of the seabed would be inimical to U.S. national security because of its effect on critical U.S. underwater surveillance systems. The reservation of the seabed for peaceful purposes would require careful definition of the meaning of such a reservation in order not to preclude the use of such surveillance systems. Further study is required before the U.S. position on a peaceful purposes proposal can be determined. Since a proposal to reserve the seabed for peaceful purposes only can be expected to attract wide support, ACDA believes that its implications should be explored on an urgent basis. I do believe that the U.S. should urgently adopt a policy in favor of negotiating a treaty to prohibit the stationing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. I believe that such an arms control measure would be in the U.S. interest. Taking such a position will enable us to fend off more general proposals that might adversely affect our security interests. It should be noted that in the period following the NPT, the U.S. will be under considerable pressure to demonstrate that it is prepared to negotiate further arms control measures as required by Article VI of the NPT. A seabed arms control proposal appears to be the most readily acceptable measure for multilateral negotiation in light of the Soviet announcement of March 20 at the U.N. that they favor discussing it in detail at the ENDC./3/ /3/For a summary of the statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik), see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 194-196. A proposal for arms control on the seabed is herewith enclosed for consideration by the Committee of Principals./4/ It is recommended that the Principals approve the following: /4/An attached 15-page draft paper entitled "U.S. Proposal for Arms Control on the Seabed" is not printed. That the U.S. attempt to negotiate in the ENDC a treaty, or the relevant provisions for a more general seabed treaty, in which each state party to the treaty undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath, or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state. It is proposed that this subject be discussed at a meeting of the Committee of Principals which will be called some time after April 29. William C. Foster
234. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/ JCSM-235-68 Washington, April 15, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy Files: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3566. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text was sent under cover of a April 18 memorandum from Clifford to President Johnson forwarding the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on possible proposals on arms control on the seabed. Clifford further related he had just received from ACDA a proposal on arms control on the seabed which was under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by his staff. Clifford proposed that a Committee of Principals meeting be held to discuss the ACDA proposal, after which their views on the proposal would be forwarded to President Johnson. SUBJECT 1. (S) The USSR, at the organizational meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee for the Oceans, on 21 March 1968, proposed that the UN General Assembly adopt a principle to ban military activities as well as nuclear weapons from the seabeds beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction./2/ In appraising this Soviet initiative, the US Ambassador to the United Nations indicated that the proposal is certain to have a prominent place on the forthcoming agenda of the UN Ad Hoc Committee. He predicted that the Soviet proposal will receive broad support from nonnuclear states and asked the Secretary of State for an urgent determination as to what the United States would lose by agreeing to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean bottoms, provided effective control methods could be worked out. He stated that a negative US stance could have highly unfortunate effects on deliberations concerning the nonproliferation treaty./3/ /2/Specific reference to Malik's proposal delivered on March 21 has not been further identified; however, Malik addressed the same U.N. Committee on March 20 and delivered a statement advocating such a proposal. For a summary of his March 20 statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 194-196. /3/Ambassador Goldberg's statement in response to the Soviet initiative has not been further identified. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the US Ambassador to the United Nations that the United States should prepare an effective counter to the Soviet proposal./4/ Whatever the Soviet motive--which might well be entirely political--international acceptance of their resolution would have grave consequences for US national security interests. A demilitarization agreement according to the Soviet format could easily entail an interpretation making the US Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) illegal, with consequent severe impact on our antisubmarine warfare capability. The Soviet proposal could also prevent the development and/or deployment of future military systems which may be required for US national defense. /4/Presumably a reference to the ACDA proposal cited in footnote 4, Document 233. 3. (S) Another consideration is that an agreement to demilitarize the seabeds could, by implication, lead to international pressure to extend controls and prohibitions to the surface and subsurface of the oceans. 4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while noting the opinion of Ambassador Goldberg that acceptance of a denuclearization proposal might serve the immediate political purpose of helping to develop a climate of opinion favorable to the nonproliferation treaty, believe that the long-range consequences of banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds would be detrimental to the security of the United States. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the ocean bottoms, our option for their use would be politically foreclosed by the terms of this proposed agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a requirement is a distinct possibility. As new technological or political factors are introduced into the strategic posture of nuclear weapons nations, new concepts are being explored to meet the changing threat. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it is not a question of current programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 5. (TS) Possible future risks to the US nuclear forces include enhanced effects of nuclear weapons, such as X-rays and electromagnetic pulse, on US strategic missile systems. Another risk can be identified in terms of the advancing technology in long-range underwater surveillance systems. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that scientific or technological breakthroughs could make US strategic offensive and defensive missile systems vulnerable to enemy attack. To avoid this eventuality, the United States might well be required to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. In this context, an arms control agreement which would restrain the United States would be detrimental to US security. 6. (TS) If "pindown" and submarine vulnerability were to become a reality, the geographical features of the United States and the USSR would become of great importance. The fact that the Soviet Union has a land area over twice that of the United States would give it an obvious land-deployment advantage over the United States. However, the United States has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. Its coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range or site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. Clearly, it would be advantageous to the USSR if it could offset these geographical handicaps with an international arms control measure. 7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not oppose the consideration of arms control measures, including those affecting the ocean environment, if an effective control system is established and provided such measures will not have the effect of weakening the relative strategic posture of the United States. The United States does not have a verification capability now, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation has now or will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an effective control system for either a seabed "demilitarization" or a seabed "denuclearization" agreement could not be developed satisfactorily. In sharp contrast, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations have the present technology to emplace weapons of mass destruction and other military devices on the ocean bottoms with virtually no risk of detection. For example, the United States has been able to plant extensive SOSUS networks from surface ships, despite difficulties in avoiding and deceiving Soviet surveillance ships. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that no demilitarization (including denuclearization) agreement could be verified effectively. 8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the establishment of a Johnson specialized agency to encourage international cooperation in oceanography is in US interests. It is their opinion that discussion and/or negotiations concerning the undersea environment should be limited at this time to such matters as scientific research, exploration and exploitation of resources, and establishment of marine parks and preserves. Although future marine research and exploration may well indicate that there are arms control measures which, if verifiable, would be in the national interest, US support for arms control measures on the seabeds or in the ocean space would not be in the national interest at this time and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm. 9. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that their views on arms control in the seabed be forwarded to the President. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Harold K. Johnson
235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 23, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret. Mr. President: Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster recommend that you send the attached letter to Chairman Kosygin/2/ proposing that the US and Soviet governments announce during the UNGA debate on the NPT that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations within a specific time period on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Such a declaration could be very helpful in countering the anticipated basic complaint that the Soviet Union and the US are not themselves undertaking steps toward nuclear disarmament while calling on the rest of the world to adhere to the NPT. It would also bring to fruition our efforts of more than a year to engage the Soviets in a discussion of this subject./3/ /2/Not found; however, for the letter later signed by President Johnson, see Document 237. /3/For documentation on the development of this issue beginning with President Johnson's initial statement of January 1967 regarding curbing strategic defensive and offensive nuclear missiles, see Documents 174, 175, 178, 179, 185, and 186. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster also recommend that you approve the attached message, which would be delivered at the same time as your letter, outlining in more detail our views on the strategic talks. In addition to setting forth the arguments for an early agreement in this field and the principles on which we would be prepared to negotiate, the message presents a specific new proposal for consideration (paras. 9 and 10). Specifically, we would propose a cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. Moreover, if this agreement were limited to land-based missiles, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. We would also propose to limit strategic anti-missile defense systems to an agreed number of launchers and associated radars. This would also be monitored by national means of verification in the case of fixed land-based systems. We would also be prepared to discuss the problem of monitoring more extensive agreements./4/ /4/See Tab A, Document 231. It is believed that a reasonable, concrete proposal would help convince the Soviets of our serious intent in these negotiations and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we are not merely on an intelligence fishing expedition. Some Soviet contacts have also intimated that a concrete proposal would help those in the Soviet government favoring talks to obtain a positive decision on this matter. Secretary Clifford has not yet cleared the letter or statement, although I understand that he and Paul Nitze had previously supported the proposal in principle. The JCS yesterday afternoon came out against the proposal and, I understand, want to delete all of the oral message starting with the last sentence of para. 6 on page 3 through para. 10 on page 5. If this is to have a useful impact in the UNGA consideration of the NPT, a decision should be taken on the letter and message as soon as possible./5/ /5/A handwritten notation by Rostow at the end of the source text reads: "Mr. President: I believe this requires a special meeting." Walt
236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/ JCSM-272-68 Washington, April 27, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, January 1968. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. (TS) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-35409/68, dated 16 April 1968, subject as above, which requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper prepared by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)./2/ /2/The ISA memorandum of April 16 has not been further identified, but the "draft position paper" is presumably a reference to ACDA's April 12 proposal to the members of the Committee of Principals on arms control on the seabed; see footnote 4, Document 233. b. JCSM-235-68, dated 15 April 1968, subject: "Arms Control Proposals for the Ocean Bottoms (U)," which recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward to the President the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US support for arms control measures on the seabeds would not be in the national interest at this time and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm./3/ /3/See Document 234. 2. (S) ACDA proposes a treaty in which "each state party to the treaty undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state." ACDA also proposes that any verification required for compliance with the seabed arms control agreement would be by "unilateral verification capabilities." 3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not oppose the consideration of arms control measures provided such measures will not have the effect of weakening the relative strategic posture of the United States and if an effective control system is established. Reference 1b sets forth the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the broad subject of arms control measures on the seabeds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm those views at this time. In that memorandum, while noting arguments that acceptance of a denuclearization proposal might serve the immediate political purpose of helping to develop a climate of opinion favorable to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the long-range consequences of banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds would be detrimental to the security of the United States. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the ocean bottoms, the option for their use would be politically foreclosed by the terms of this proposed agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a requirement is a distinct possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 4. (TS) Possible future risks to the US nuclear forces include enhanced effects of nuclear weapons, such as X-rays and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), on US strategic missile systems. Another risk can be identified in terms of the advancing technology in long-range underwater surveillance systems. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that scientific or technological breakthroughs could make present US strategic offensive and defensive missile systems vulnerable to enemy attack. To counter this possibility, the United States might well be required to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. 5. (TS) If "pindown" and submarine vulnerability were to become a reality, the geographical differences between the United States and the USSR would become of great importance. The fact that the Soviet Union has a land area over twice that of the United States gives it an obvious land-development advantage over the United States. However, the United States has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. Clearly, it would be in the best interests of the USSR if it could offset any US geographical advantages with an international arms control agreement. 6. (S) A distance limit in connection with a seabed arms control proposal would prejudge and reduce the credibility of our current position on territorial seas. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions on the breadth of the territorial sea. 7. (S) The United States does not have a verification capability now, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation has now or will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. In their opinion, an effective control system for a seabed denuclearization agreement could not be developed satisfactorily, and an international agreement by itself accomplishes little unless it can be effectively enforced. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis. 8. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that discussion and/or negotiations concerning the undersea environment should be limited at this time to such matters as scientific research, exploration and exploitation of resources, and establishment of marine parks and preserves. Although future marine research and exploration may well indicate that there could be arms control measures which would be in the national interest, adoption of the present ACDA proposal would not be in the national interest and, in fact, has a potential for grave harm. 9. (U) In view of the wide variety of argumentation presented in the ACDA proposal, additional specific comments are provided in the Appendix. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler
Attachment/4/ JCSM-272-68 Undated. /4/Top Secret. APPENDIX Specific Comments on ACDA Proposal The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the rationale contained in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) proposal are as follows: A. (C) Background ACDA implies that the Pardo proposal/5/ was adopted by the UN General Assembly; whereas, in fact, it was not adopted. The UN General Assembly did adopt a US sponsored resolution to establish an ad hoc committee to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor. /5/For the statements by the Maltese Representative, Pardo, to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, November 1, 1967, in which five proposals for inclusion in a treaty on the peaceful uses of the ocean floor and seabed were advocated for adoption by the United Nations, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 547-554. B. (TS) Political 1. The statement that the United States should develop a position with regard to the seabed now, before technological possibilities become operational programs, is not supportable. The fact that we do not know the ultimate use of the seabed is reason enough for the United States to retain the option for its future use. 2. ACDA states that the proposed measure could be used to counter less acceptable measures which have been suggested in the UN General Assembly Committee One and the ad hoc committee. It is not appropriate to "counter less acceptable measures" with other unacceptable measures. 3. ACDA's assumption that its proposal would "preserve the nuclear-free status of the seabed" is insupportable. The value of any agreement which does not include all nuclear-capable nations is questionable. 4. ACDA stresses that its recommended US position would: appear to be forthcoming with respect to the Soviet demilitarization proposal; soothe purported feelings of resentment concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and demonstrate continued cooperation with the USSR in dampening strategic nuclear competition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a potentially vital US strategic advantage should not be offered as a negotiation tactic, believing it to be harmful to the national interest and dangerous to the security of the United States. The NPT should be debated on its own merits. Whatever derivative political benefits might result from the ACDA seabed proposal in terms of approval of the NPT are not at all clear and in no case match the potential substantive US strategic advantage that might thus be lost. 5. ACDA assumes that the 12-mile proposal would: a. Be more acceptable than other possible formulations. b. Avoid the issue of the extent of national jurisdiction. c. Not affect recognition of the breadth of the territorial sea. These assumptions are not supportable. There is currently substantial support in the world community for a 12-mile territorial sea. The endorsement of a 12-mile limit in connection with an arms control proposal would further reduce the credibility of our current 3-mile position. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions with the USSR on the subject of the breadth of the territorial sea, and weaken US ability to obtain navigational rights for vessels and aircraft which are necessary before a 12-mile limit can be accepted. C. (TS) Military 1. A prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed could be contrary to the security interest of the United States. The USSR and Communist China have a combined land area almost 3-1/2 times that of the United States and its possessions; thus the land-deployment base of our most powerful potential enemies is greatly superior to our own. Conversely, the United States enjoys greater access to ocean areas than do the USSR and Communist China. The ACDA statement, that the emplacement of weapons on the seabed does not appear to offer us any significant strategic advantage because the United States currently has no such program, is not supportable. Although strategic, technological, and economic factors thus far have caused exploitation of the seabeds to be a matter of lesser urgency than other development programs, there is not justification for assuming that this condition will continue to exist indefinitely. Strategic factors such as EMP X-rays and submarine vulnerability may require the United States to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. It is not a question of current nuclear programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 2. The statement that the Soviets would forego the same options to use the seabed as a potential area for deployment as the United States is misleading. If it should become necessary to use the seabed because of possible US strategic vulnerability, giving up options to utilize the seabed could be of greater disadvantage to the United States than to the USSR. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. 3. The ACDA statement that, within 12 miles of our coasts, the proposal would still leave us with over 140,000 square miles of underwater area for weapon deployment is misleading. Weapon dispersal considerations and the US geographical land deficiency compared to the USSR could dictate seabed weapon deployments in the deep oceans. D. (TS) Verification 1. ACDA proposes reliance on unilateral verification. It can be stated categorically that the United States does not now have the necessary technology for unilateral verification. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. Any arms control agreements which lack effective verification could work more to the detriment of the security of the United States than no arms control agreement at all. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States while creating an opportunity for nations disposed to exploit or circumvent international agreements to gain significant military advantages. 2. The ACDA assumption that undetected weapons could be limited to "a few" is not supportable. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably covertly emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis. In short, in the absence of a detection/verification capability, there can be no real substance to an arms control agreement--only trust--and history testifies to the ineffectiveness of trust in restraining potential enemies. 3. Throughout the paper, ACDA states that the existence of a seabed treaty should deter weapon emplacement and should help the United States to obtain widespread "international support" for whatever response to weapon emplacement on the seabeds by other nations the United States would choose to promote. The degree and effectiveness of this "support" is doubtful. Neither the existence of the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor world opinion against atmospheric testing has restrained Communist China and France from continuing such nuclear tests. 4. ACDA states that its proposal was drafted to provide assurance that the collective security interest of the United States and its allies would be protected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposal has a potential for grave harm and that some of our allies may take the same view.
237. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, May 2, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special U.S.-U.S.S.R. File, Pen-Pal Series, 1968. Top Secret. On May 3, at the request of Secretary Rusk, Dobrynin met with him confidentially to receive a copy of this letter, and was asked to deliver it to Kosygin. Bohlen also attended this meeting. (Ibid.) The text of the letter was also telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow on May 7. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have endeavored to use this channel only when I consider that the matters to be discussed are important and urgent./2/ In that spirit I communicate with you now on the following subjects: (1) The question of arms limitation in the Middle East, and (2) the long overdue question of our discussion in regard to offensive and defensive ballistic missiles. /2/See footnote 3, Document 178. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East crisis.] The other subject I wish to take up with you again is my proposal, which goes back to December 1966,/3/ in regard to holding discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race. I understand from Ambassador Thompson that Foreign Minister Gromyko told him on March 26 of this year that the Soviet Government was still studying the problem and that it attaches importance to this subject. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration which leads me to raise this matter with you now. /3/Not further identified; however, at Secretary Rusk's December 21, 1966, news conference questions regarding a possible freeze on antiballistic missiles were posed to him. Rusk replied "we would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures [for antiballistic missiles]." See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, p. 509. As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments./4/ I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents. During the resumed General Assembly session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face a critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in the fall of this year./5/ It is important that our two governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date. /4/On March 11, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the ENDC. For text of this joint draft, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 162-166. This draft became the subject of an extensive debate in the General Assembly, which reconvened on April 24. /5/The U.N. Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States convened in Geneva on August 29 and adjourned on September 28. To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement, as well as proceeding to discuss the related matters mentioned above. I would hope that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I very much hope you will reexamine the question of holding these discussions, whose importance I hardly need emphasize in this communication. I very much hope to hear from you in the near future. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
238. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, May 14, 1968, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Principals Meeting, May 14, 1968. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal and George Bunn of ACDA are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. REFERENCES /3/See Document 233. Summary of Action The Committee of Principals discussed an ACDA proposal to prohibit the fixing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond 12 miles from the coast of a party and up to the coast of other countries. It was concluded that the Deputies to the Committee of Principals should meet promptly to prepare an agreed analysis of particular issues to serve as the basis for recommendations by the Principals to the President. Since a U.S. position will be needed by June 17, the Deputies were directed to prepare such an analysis in time for Principals' consideration by June 5. Discussion Secretary Rusk put a broad policy question before the Principals: Should the U.S. support international action to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the deep ocean? Putting aside for the moment what the exact boundaries should be, is it advisable to create a nuclear free environment in the deep oceans like that in the Antarctic/4/ and outer space?/5/ /4/The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959, (entered into force June 23, 1961) by the United States, Soviet Union, and ten other countries in Washington to demilitarize the Antarctic continent. For text, see 12 UST 794. /5/The Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies was signed on January 27, 1967, in Washington, London, and Moscow, and entered into force on October 10, 1967. For text, see 18 UST 2410. Secretary Nitze said that, to answer this question, one should ask another question: What kind of an area would the U.S. want as a platform for its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles? Would we want it to be small, limited and closer to cities? He thought the answer to this question was negative. The Soviet Union has a larger land mass than the United States. The U.S. has better access to the sea than does the Soviet Union. The sea was, therefore, a better place for the U.S. to put nuclear weapons than for the Soviet Union. General Wheeler added that the Principals should consider what the problems might be in 20 years. There were now developments in Soviet weapons which give us difficulty. In the future, with further developments on the Soviet side, ocean bottoms could be a desirable deployment area for U.S. strategic weapons. Dr. Wenk pointed out that the ACDA proposal was limited to fixed emplacements. He asked whether it would embrace the anchoring of Polaris submarines. Mr. Foster replied that the ACDA proposal would not affect anchoring incidental to the purpose of navigation or perhaps for other reasons. Secretary Rusk said that if there were fixed anchoring, the submarine would be in trouble under the proposal. Mr. Foster then asked General Wheeler exactly what kinds of systems the DOD was considering for the bottom of the sea. General Wheeler listed the "ULM" (a submarine mobile platform carrying ICBMs), the "Turtle" (a bottom crawler or sitter), the "Sinbad" (a three-section submersible, the midsection remains on station and the end sections provide transportation and support), and tunnels for encapsulated missiles ("Rocksite"). He added that none of these devices were in today's 5-year program for DOD developments. However, they are under consideration, and there might come a time when they would be desirable. Mr. Foster pointed out that it was U.S. policy to move toward halting the nuclear arms race in all environments, and that non-armament was usually much easier than disarmament to accomplish. He added that the proposals of the Soviet Union and many other countries went much further than did ACDA's proposal. The UN debates had considered complete demilitarization of the seabed and reserving it for peaceful uses only, whereas the ACDA proposal dealt only with weapons of mass destruction. He thought the best defense against other proposals was a good offensive, namely, a good proposal of our own. He listed the political advantages of the proposal and added that he thought it would contribute to U.S. security. Dr. Hornig pointed out that whenever a new class of weapons was discussed there was a fundamental dilemma: Was there greater risk in limiting such an expansion of the nuclear arms race and foreclosing future military options than there was in developing and deploying the new weapons? Secretary Nitze thought that the problems involving arms control of the deep ocean bed had not been thought through to the same degree as had been the problems involved in the test ban. He pointed to two specific problems: (1) What was the relationship of the ACDA proposal to the Law of the Sea?/6/ He added that we have disagreements with the Soviet Union on where the baseline is from which to measure the breadth of the territorial sea. We are now working on developing a position concerning a new Law of the Sea treaty. The relationship of the Law of the Sea problems to the ACDA proposal must be thought through. (2) The most significant arms control measure to be discussed with the Soviet Union was a freeze on offensive and defensive missiles. For that discussion, it had been decided to exclude mobile land-based intercontinental missiles because the verification problem was difficult. In Secretary Nitze's view, the verification problems involved in the deep oceans were far greater. Under these circumstances, Secretary Nitze questioned whether we should be considering arms control for the deep oceans. He added that the ACDA paper was more polemical than analytical. He thought that a subcommittee of the Principals should work out an agreed analysis to form the basis of the US position. Dr. Seaborg stated that precise definitions of what was prohibited and what was permitted were necessary. Mr. Foster agreed that the strategic missile freeze was a more important measure but pointed out that it could only be discussed bilaterally with the Soviet Union at the present time. The seabed proposal was already being discussed at the UN on a multilateral basis, and the U.S. needed to have a position. He thought the ACDA proposal would not interfere with the Law of the Sea negotiations. Secretary Rusk added that, in any event, countries favoring the 3-mile limit were a disappearing breed. He didn't think differences over the breadth of the territorial sea should be conclusive of the Government's decision on the ACDA proposal. /6/The Law of the Sea Treaty on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas was signed by 35 nations on April 29, 1958, in Geneva and entered into force on March 20, 1966. The U.S. signed the Treaty with an understanding. For text, see 17 UST 138. Secretary Rusk then spoke of the need to prevent further diversion of scarce national resources to the development and deployment of more sophisticated nuclear weaponry. He pointed out that both sides already had enough weapons to destroy the US, Soviet Union and Europe, and he doubted that our large stockpiles had increased the security of the American people. He hoped, if possible, to avoid pursuit of a higher plateau in the nuclear arms race which would not increase our security. If the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons on the bottom of the sea, he said, their target would be U.S. cities. We could not transfer the Soviet target for these or other ballistic missiles to the ocean by our deploying nuclear weapons on the ocean bottom. He asked why the same considerations which have resulted in placing Antarctica and outer space off limits should not apply to the seabed. He thought that such deployments would be a futile exercise and very expensive. Unless the human race found a way to limit the arms race and prevent further massive diversion of resources to weapons, we were in deep trouble. Dr. Seaborg suggested a fast staff study for the Principals. Mr. Foster said the Deputies to the Principals could handle such a study. Secretary Rusk thought they should consider such problems as (1) whether the baseline should be that set forth in earlier Law of the Sea treaties, or simply the low water mark, (2) whether the proposal should deal with "emplacing " nuclear weapons on the seabed and (3) whether the proposal could be simplified for further discussion. Dr. Seaborg added that the problem of how long a submarine could sit on the bottom should be dealt with by the Deputies. Secretary Rusk asked how accessible the deep ocean bed was now. Secretary Nitze said that by 1969 we would be able to go down 4,000 feet deep in the ocean. Dr. Wenk said that this was with one small, experimental submarine designed in 1960. He added that there was a long way to go and a lot of money involved before deployment of a strategic weapons system would be possible. The small research submarine had cost $60 million. Effective nuclear weapons systems would be enormously more costly. Dr. Hornig pointed out that the deep ocean was not an attractive prospect for strategic weapons deployment now. He didn't see how one could really study the possibility in great detail since so little was known. Dr. Seaborg suggested that the tops of under water mountains might be attractive locations for deployment. Dr. Hornig replied that they might be and that the Bering Sea might also be attractive, but a very major deployment expense was involved in either case for either side. Dr. Wenk pointed to the recent Presidential statements concerning the peaceful uses of the sea./7/ He added that the Principals needed to keep in mind that the ad hoc UN committee chairman had pointed out two proposals which the UN should consider in the near future: (1) the U.S. proposal for a decade of international development of the sea, and (2) the Soviet proposal for demilitarization of the seabed./8/ Dr. Wenk referred to a Navy paper which contained a spectrum of the arms control possibilities for the seabed./9/ The ACDA proposal was the least restrictive of any of the arms control measures listed in the Navy's paper. /7/Presumably a reference to President Johnson's special message to Congress on conservation, delivered on March 8, in which he proposed an "International Decade of Ocean Exploration for the 1970's." See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, pp. 355-370. /8/Presumably a reference to Soviet Representative Malik's statement to the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, delivered on March 20, 1968; see footnote 3, Document 233, which the Soviets subsequently presented as a specific initiative in the Committee on June 20. See Documents on Disarmament, 1968, p. 445. /9/Not further identified. Dr. Hornig indicated that stationing nuclear weapons on the seabed would involve a host of problems such as how to protect the weapons from theft or accidental triggering. He doubted that the U.S. would want to put many nuclear weapons at remote distances from its shore. Mr. Foster added that to do so would be destabilizing. Dr. Wenk asked who would benefit by moving in this direction. The ACDA paper, he said, suggested that a nation with a few nuclear weapons might use them for crude nuclear mines. He added that with the ACDA proposal in effect, the U.S. would be in a better position to get wide political support for dealing with such a deployment. Secretary Nitze replied that countries didn't ordinarily deploy mines in peace time. In war time, the treaty would be ineffective. Dr. Wenk thought that it was still the country with the small nuclear force which might find deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed advantageous. He suggested that the Chinese Communists might do so and that the ACDA paper would give the U.S. a better political basis for dealing with the problem if they did. Secretary Rusk asked when a U.S. position was needed. Mr. Foster replied that the UN ad hoc committee would meet on June 17 and that the NATO POLADs would meet on June 30. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Soviets knew about our SOSUS system. Admiral Taylor said they did. Secretary Rusk suggested that if our proposal dealt with weapons of mass destruction and the Soviet proposal dealt with complete demilitarization, there would probably be a standoff between the two. Dr. Seaborg asked whether the ACDA proposal would be violated if the U.S. lost another nuclear weapon on the bottom of the sea. Mr. Foster replied there would be no violation. Secretary Rusk asked about the problem of verification. Mr. Helms replied that this was a difficult problem because the sea was so vast. If you know where to hunt, you may well find a nuclear weapon deployed on the bottom of the sea. If there is a large-scale construction involved, you could probably detect it. On the other hand, he was not happy about verifying deployment of one or a few nuclear weapons on the seabed. But this problem was with us with or without the ACDA proposal. Secretary Rusk said that this sounded similar to the problem of verification involved in the Outer Space Treaty. Dr. Hornig pointed out that a country deploying strategic weapons system on the seabed which might threaten us would need an adequate command and control system which would probably involve a communications system which could be detectable. In addition, the country would need to move a great deal of material. Clandestine deployment would be quite difficult. Mr. Helms agreed. If there were a large deployment, he added, we would find it. If it was sneaky and small, it might escape our detection. Secretary Nitze said he was sympathetic to the need for a U.S. position but more precise staff work was needed. Secretary Rusk added that, at a minimum, we must have speech material for the U.S. representative by June 17. He pointed to the need for giving the President sufficient time to deal with this problem and hoped we could avoid presenting it to him at the last minute. He asked for a initial paper to be submitted by the Deputies to the Principals for consideration by June 5.
239. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 17, 1968, 1-3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy (EUR) and approved for distribution by J.P. Walsh (S/S) on May 20. The source text is labeled "Part I of V." The conversation took place in the Secretary's dining room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS For the United States: For the Soviet Union: About two-thirds of the 2-hour luncheon was devoted to the NPT. US-Soviet Cooperation Both the Secretary and Kuznetsov expressed their appreciation for the close cooperation which had taken place at the UN between the Soviet and American delegations on the handling of the NPT. The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that this close collaboration should continue; that the two governments should stand firm against any changes, certainly for the time being; and that if, at the very end, and if both agree, there were minor changes in the text of the Treaty which would not affect basic substance, and if by these changes it would be possible to get significantly wider adherence to the Treaty, the two governments would then consider whether these changes could be accepted. Kuznetsov emphasized that he was under instructions to agree to no changes at present and stressed the problem of opening a Pandora's box if alterations were to be considered at this stage. The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that the two countries could be more flexible in dealing with the proposed GA resolution endorsing the NPT than with the text of the NPT itself; but that any changes in the text of the GA resolution must also be acceptable to both the US and the USSR. Significance of the Latin American and African Vote Kuznetsov said that before coming to Washington he had had a talk with Robles, the UN Delegate of Mexico, which was the leader of the Latin American group. He stressed the importance of bringing around the Latin American vote and urged that the US do everything it could to bring the Latin Americans into line. The outlook was not discouraging, but US help was needed. The Secretary said that we would do everything that we could on an urgent basis. According to Kuznetsov, Robles had said that the Mexicans would sign the NPT even if there were no changes in the text, but Robles urged changes in order to bring around the rest of the group. The Secretary observed that Robles was probably more Mexican than the Mexicans. He pointed out that Carrillo Flores, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, was personally strongly in favor of the Treaty. Kuznetsov said that the Mexican proposal/2/ to include in the NPT Treaty--or possibly in the GA resolution--a reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,/3/ would cause serious difficulties for the Soviets. Such a reference in Soviet eyes would bind them to the principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which they are still considering and about which they have reservations on two main points: /2/For a detailed account of Mexico's position on the non-proliferation treaty and its relationship to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Garcia Robles' statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 16, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 345-357. /3/See footnote 2, Document 226. (1) On the principle of permitting peaceful explosion by non-nuclear weapon states--(Art. 18) and (2) on the huge area covered by the treaty, which embraces half the Atlantic and half the Pacific./4/ /4/On May 20, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov delivered a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At this time, he expressed, in broad terms, the reservations held by the Soviets about the Mexican proposal. See Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 368-378. Turning to Brazil, the Secretary told Kuznetsov that the US was not in agreement with the Brazilians on their proposed amendment regarding peaceful nuclear explosive devices (Pineds)./5/ He said that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the Brazilians would not press their amendment on this subject or urge the other Latin Americans to support it. He thought the Brazilians would probably not sign the NPT now but might come along later. He observed that the Brazilians, like a number of other countries, were attempting to use the NPT in order to get bilateral bargaining advantages from the US on such questions as fuel supply, peaceful uses, the S.W. Africa issue, etc. Kuznetsov said he hoped we would make good use of our bargaining power to get adherence to the NPT. /5/Brazil was one of several ENDC members which urged that peaceful nuclear explosions should be exempt from prohibition under Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see footnote 2, Document 226) specifically permitted the signatories to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in cooperation with third parties. See the statement by Brazil's Foreign Minister de Magalhaes Pinto to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 3, regarding Brazil's proposed amendments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 278-283. Reference was made to the fact that Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores was now visiting Moscow. It was suggested that the Soviets could raise the NPT with him during his visit, while the US would approach the Mexicans in Washington or Mexico City. Kuznetsov said that the Africans were being troublesome. The African opposition bloc was led by Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Their tactic is to promote a resolution which would postpone consideration of the NPT until the 23rd GA. Kuznetsov had had a talk with the UN representative of Kenya within the last few days and had ascertained that an important element in the African position was the attitude of South Africa on the NPT. If the South Africans could be brought to support the NPT unequivocally, this could be very important in swinging the entire African vote. At this point the Secretary showed Kuznetsov a telegram which the Department had received this morning from our Mission in South Africa, explaining some of the South African preoccupations and recommending that a US technical expert be sent to Pretoria in order to clarify these problems. The Secretary said that the US would take steps to do this immediately in an effort to help the situation. The Secretary asked whether the Soviets felt that the negative Tanzanian attitude was influenced by the Chinese. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets were quite certain of it. The Tanzanians had said at the UN that the NPT was nonsense and what really mattered was disarmament. Their whole idea is to postpone the NPT with the hope it will be killed. In response to Kuznetsov's question as to whether the US could do something with Tanzania, the Secretary replied that our relations were only fair, but we would do what we could. The Secretary asked whether Kuznetsov felt that the Africans were attempting to use the NPT as a means of pressing their views on S.W. Africa. Kuznetsov confirmed that they were and referred to a recent Asian-African meeting at which a decision was reached that there would be no action on NPT until the S.W. African problem was solved. The Secretary said that this created real difficulties. Ambassador Bohlen asked Kuznetsov what he felt was the attitude of the francophone Africans. Kuznetsov said "not good"; that according to a recent talk he had with Bernard (French Ambassador to the UN) the French would be neutral on NPT although it really favors the Treaty. Mr. Bohlen recalled that de Gaulle had said a few years ago that he did not believe in treaties which have no real powers of enforcement. Concluding this aspect of the discussion Kuznetsov once again emphasized the importance of the Latin American vote and the importance of US efforts with the Latin American countries to obtain favorable results. FRG Activities at the UN Kuznetsov said that the FRG observer at the UN (Von Braun) had recently distributed a press release (which he said had been prepared over a year ago, but with new thoughts introduced) designed to bring uncertainty and doubt about the NPT. The Soviets were wondering whether they should not speak out against this action. From the Soviet view, the FRG is trying to sow seeds of doubt. Meanwhile, while the FRG has two people at the UN the GDR can't get visas from the US to be present at the UN, and the Soviets think that they should. The Secretary said that, speaking very frankly, he would like to offer the Soviets some advice. There was an internal problem in the FRG on the NPT. Some were hostile to it, but others, including Kiesinger and Brandt, were prepared to move. Birrenbach was troubled; Strauss was not in favor. The Secretary thought that the FRG would sign the NPT, but he advised the Soviets not to make an issue about the FRG observer's statement; this would only complicate an already serious problem both for the FRG and for the US and would make more difficult FRG support for the Treaty. In any event, he said, the question of a GDR observer at the UN raised a difficult problem in itself. (Mr. Bohlen briefly mentioned the recent GDR interference with the travel of West German citizens over the autobahns to Berlin. Kuznetsov quickly said this was an entirely different question and had nothing to do with the NPT. Mr. Bohlen said he had raised the matter only because Kuznetsov had mentioned the question of visas for GDR observers at the UN.) The Secretary said one of the reasons for the internal opposition in the FRG to the NPT was the thought of making a commitment to the Soviet Union for nothing in return. The US would like to keep the NPT quite separate from all extraneous matters and he again urged that the Soviets take no action regarding the FRG statement at the UN. He added that the members of NATO were strongly interested in assurances of FRG adherence to the NPT for reasons which would be understood. US-Soviet Talks on Nuclear Weapons Kuznetsov acknowledged that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to start bilateral talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons this would be helpful at the UN on the NPT. However he could only say that Moscow was still considering the US proposal that talks begin. Security Assurances Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that there is considerable dissatisfaction at the UN over security assurances. There was the problem of when to put the draft resolution to the Security Council. The membership problem was not encouraging and it would not be easy to find 9 members in support of it. He had tried to find out what the French attitude would be. The French delegate had told him that he would not be active, but had no answer on the final French position. Probably they would abstain. India would probably also abstain. Ethiopia and Pakistan were doubtful. The Secretary thought that Japan and India face the most serious problem in connection with security assurances. He said that he personally was 1000% against India becoming a nuclear-weapon state; but that if he were the Foreign Minister of India he would certainly understand the difficulties confronting India in view of the Chinese threat. Kuznetsov said the Japanese were very active in the GA and have prepared a draft statement. Japanese reservations relate to the questions of security assurances, peaceful uses and disarmament. The Secretary said his personal view was that Japan would sign; Kuznetsov thought that they and others would nevertheless try to postpone. Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that he had no definite answer from the Romanians. The Romanians were not active in the UN. His best guess was that the Romanians would not vote in favor of the GA resolution endorsing the NPT, but would abstain. The Secretary emphasized two points in connection with security assurances and the position of the US: 1. The US is not prepared to enter into any additional commitments of alliance in order to give security assurances relating to the NPT. We have enough allies as it is and the Senate will not approve any additions. 2. The US is not ready to entertain the prospect of a possible war with the Soviet Union in order to get the NPT. Therefore, the Security Council approach which we had agreed upon with the USSR is the only approach possible for the US. The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war--perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the US. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the importance of solidarity between the US and Soviet Union in not making any material changes in the Treaty except as outlined above. Procedures for Signing NPT The Secretary said that the US has not made up its mind on the procedure for signing the NPT. This would have to be discussed with the President. The US had no strong objections to signing the Treaty at the ENDC in Geneva. But if this procedure were adopted two problems would arise. If signature of the Treaty were open to all on this occasion, then the question of the non-recognized (implicitly the GDR) would arise. If signing were limited to members of the ENDC, there is the question of how many members we could get to sign. Perhaps it would be less complicated to use the formula followed in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, i.e., to sign in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets favored signing in Geneva in order to maximize public attention to the importance of the treaty. This would be analogous to the procedure followed for the Test Ban Treaty (which was signed at one place, in Moscow). He said that if problems should arise about non-recognized states (presumably referring to GDR) in a Geneva ceremony, he thought that this could be taken care of. The Secretary then made a personal suggestion, which he asked the Soviet side not to report, that perhaps there could be an initialing of the text in Geneva with formal signatures taking place in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. He said that he would talk over this whole question with the President. 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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |