1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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240. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 24, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Glassboro State College, 6/4/68 Commencement Speech, Box 11. Confidential. SUBJECT /2/For text of President Johnson's speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 679-684. The timing of the NPT debate in the UNGA makes it extremely opportune for the NPT to be a central theme in a speech delivered in Glassboro on June 4. The plan is now to submit to Committee I on Wednesday of next week/3/ the agreed text of a resolution endorsing the NPT, together with a final version of the treaty. There is every indication that there will be a very substantial majority voting for it although some of the key countries will abstain. /3/May 29. In order to minimize the possibility of further amendments, it is planned to bring the resolution to a final vote as soon as possible. It is now estimated that the vote on the resolution will come on June 4! The resolution will then be referred to the Plenary session of the UNGA and will be voted on there again after a week or so. Although normally the vote would be the same in both forums, there is in this case a real possibility that some of the expected abstentions in Committee I might change to positive votes in the Plenary. The fact that the vote in Committee I and the speech may be on the same day presents the speech writer with some problems. We might be able to speed up the vote by one day and we could certainly delay it a few days. After the vote, the speech could welcome the first international endorsement of the NPT and at the same time to maintain the pressure looking toward an even stronger vote of endorsement in the Plenary of the UNGA. Before the vote, the speech could anticipate the international endorsement and maintain pressure on those who were undecided whether to vote yes or abstain in Committee I. I think the President might make the following points: 1. Welcome, or encourage, endorsement of NPT by Committee I. 2. Identify critical nature of nuclear proliferation problem. 3. Note the three purposes served by the NPT: a. Prevent proliferation. b. Permit peaceful uses of the atom without fear of diversion to nuclear weapons. c. New impetus on negotiations to halt arms race. 4. Treaty represents the collective efforts of the major nuclear powers and most of the rest of the world--first in ENDC, now in UNGA. 5. UNGA support for NPT represents an historic vote of confidence in man's ability to control his destiny--to create an environment in which nuclear energy will not be an ever-expanding threat but a benefit to all mankind. 6. NPT convincingly demonstrates ability of major nuclear powers to work together closely and effectively on matter of critical importance to all. 7. We and the Soviets must pursue negotiations for further steps on arms control and disarmament as called for in NPT. 8. Restate call for discussions on strategic weapons freeze. 9. Call on Committee I or UNGA Plenary for strong endorsement of NPT, depending on timing of speech. 10. Express expectation that treaty can be signed and submitted to this session of Congress. I am attaching for your reference the text on the NPT prepared by Bill Foster for the ACDA bill signing but held back for the "Swords into Plowshares" award./4/ I understand that this ceremony has now been deferred until June 6 and will be a small, private affair, so this material could better be used in connection with the Glassboro speech. I think you will find this text, which covers some of the above points, useful. /4/Not found. Spurgeon
241. Report of Meeting/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "latest draft." There are many brief handwritten inserts throughout the text in addition to those cited below. REPORT OF THE DEPUTIES MEETING ON At the meeting of the Deputies to the Committee of Principals on May 27, 1968, the Deputies discussed the ACDA proposal as amended and the key issues identified by the Committee of Principals at its meeting on May 14, 1968./2/ This report represents the extent of agreement reached by the Deputies with the exception of the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who does not concur in any portion thereof. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are attached hereto as Tab A./3/ /2/See Document 238. /3/See Document 236. In order to avoid legal complications and to clarify the fact that the proposal would not limit the deployment of submarines, we recommend that the proposal be amended to read as follows: "Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to [station],/4/ emplace, or fix/5/ nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath, or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state. For the purposes of this Treaty only, the term 'coast' is defined as the [baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.] low water line along the coast." /4/All brackets are in the source text. /5/The Department of Defense prefers to use, "implant nuclear weapons or other weapons . . . " [Footnote in the source text.] At the meeting of the Principals, the Secretary of State indicated that a U.S. position concerning arms control on the seabed is required in advance of the resumption of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on June 17, 1968 in order to be able to respond to views expressed by other governments. The U.S. needs a position in order to deal effectively with the proposals of other nations which could adversely affect U.S. security interests. A "demilitarization" proposal is clearly unacceptable. The "peaceful purposes only" approach would require carefully considered qualifications to be compatible with certain defensive military purposes. Adoption of a basic position on denuclearization would enable the U.S. to take a positive approach to arms control in a new environment, and at the same time fend off other less acceptable proposals. The Principals instructed the Deputies to analyze certain particular issues to serve as a basis for a recommendation by the Principals to the President. The following paragraphs present the views of the Deputies on the four major issues. 1. There is general agreement on the intended interpretation of what would be prohibited or permitted under the ACDA seabed proposal as amended. This interpretation is based on the illustrative listing in Tab B attached hereto./6/ /6/This attachment, entitled "Weapons Systems Prohibited or Permitted under ACDA Seabed Proposal," is not printed. 2. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State advises that the ACDA proposal, as amended, when coupled with explanatory comments as to our position, will not adversely prejudice future U.S. legal positions concerning the law of the sea./7/ /7/See footnote 6, Document 238. A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: "DOD questions this." 3. Although we see no military advantage to the ACDA proposal, it is our belief that this measure is in the overall net U.S. interest./8/ There are no planned systems in current DOD plans which are prohibited. The option to employ mobile sea-based systems (submarines) is preserved, and such systems can probably redress foreseeable asymmetries; permanently fixed sea-based systems are probably not necessary for this purpose. We recognize that future technological breakthroughs might jeopardize some of our existing weapons systems; however, we believe that the economic savings and political benefits from proscribing the emplacement of nuclear weapons in this new environment may outweigh these rather remote and unforeseen contingencies. /8/A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: "uneasy that State believes we have been mousetrapped [sic]." 4. U.S. capabilities to verify unilaterally compliance with the Treaty would vary in different circumstances. We could not count on detecting and identifying a seabed system in the R&D phase, but there is a good chance that we would detect the fact of development of most such systems before they become operational. The detection and identification of an encapsulated weapon system would be less likely than in the case of other new systems. Deployment of nuclear weapons in fixed installations which require substantial construction under the open ocean would almost certainly be detected. Our capabilities to detect the deployment of a few "bottom crawlers" or other similar systems which rested on the bottom, or of individually encapsulated weapons would be minimal. The fact of deployment of a large number of such weapons would probably be detected. Once we had learned that such weapons had been deployed, and the approximate location of such deployment, our capability to verify the deployment and the nature of the weapon/9/ would be good./10/ /9/A handwritten notation inserted after this word reads: "by obtaining at least one sample." /10/A handwritten notation at the end of this sentence reads: "in the probable time scale implied." We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would deploy large numbers of unprotected systems, such as individually encapsulated nuclear missiles, on the seabed due to the problems of command and control and the risk of one or more being discovered and acquired by the U.S./11/ /11/A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: "other than Sovs?" The verification capability indicated above appears to be adequate to protect U.S. security interests when considered in conjunction with the current and projected strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of clandestine deployments of this kind on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments.
242. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals/1/ ACDA-2927 Washington, June 3, 1968, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal (ACDA) and C. Normand Poirier (ACDA) are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. REFERENCE /3/See Document 241. Summary of Action The ACDA Proposal/4/ was remanded to the Deputies with instructions to prepare a statement reflecting a U.S. position in time for the June 17 meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee. The intelligence community was requested to review its position on U.S. unilateral verification capabilities. Mr. Meeker was to be requested to meet with R.Adm. William Hearn (U.S.N. JAG, Ret.) and reach agreement on the inner and outer limits of that portion of the seabed adjacent to the coast of each signatory state within which the prohibition will not apply. /4/See Document 233. Discussion Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to summarize the Report of the Deputies. Mr. Foster commented on the four principal points made in the Deputies Report of May 27. Secretary Rusk queried whether there was not a rough analogy in this situation to the Outer Space Treaty/5/ negotiations. /5/See footnote 5, Document 238. Mr. Helms said it was roughly the same. Mr. Nitze stated there was a problem. Under the Outer Space Treaty, the Soviets could orbit everything but the nuclear warhead. Under the ACDA proposal, the Soviets could deploy the weapon system on the seabed, to be armed with nuclear weapons at a time of their choosing--without (until the moment of arming) there being a violation of the treaty. They could aim for a first strike capability. Mr. Foster said we would know if the Soviets made a substantial deployment--we can keep track of the changes in their strategic position. Mr. Helms said Secretary Rusk's statement remains accurate: the ACDA proposal involves a rough analogy to the Outer Space Treaty. Mr. Nitze said that the seabed proposal would face a difficult time in the Senate. The Senate was much concerned with the Soviet FOBS development which followed on ratification of the Outer Space Treaty. He added that he had problems with each one of the four conclusions in the Deputies' Report. As to the first which stated that the Deputies were in general agreement on the interpretation of what would be permitted and what would be prohibited, Mr. Nitze disagreed saying that the Soviets could, without treaty violation, deploy the weapons system minus warheads. With respect to the second conclusion to the effect that the ACDA proposal, as amended, would not adversely prejudice future U.S. legal positions concerning the law of the sea,/6/ R.Adm. Hearn doesn't share Mr. Meeker's views. Adm. Hearn believes that substantial questions are involved such as the 12-mile territorial sea. The definition of the coast in the draft treaty text annexed to the proposal is tautological and does not take into account the USSR views on their so-called "internal seas." /6/See footnote 6, Document 238. Secretary Rusk said such a definition probably was prejudicial to Soviet views on territorial seas but not to the U.S. Use of the 12-mile exclusion zone raises a presumption that we are getting involved in the territorial sea, but we can make clear that this proposal has nothing to do with the law of the territorial sea. Perhaps we could accept some other outer limit such as 25 miles. Adm. Taylor asked if the 100 fathom isobath was practicable as the outer limits. Dr. Wenk said that isobath would have a tendency to be confused with the 200 meter isobath defining the outer limits of the continental shelf which, in some cases, is found at a distance of 156 miles from the coast. He believes that any line in terms of distance was less harmful than one in terms of depth. Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze if JAG's views would be met if we separated completely the outer limits of the exclusionary zone in the ACDA proposal from the law of the territorial seas? Mr. Nitze replied that he wasn't sure. Mr. Foster noted that it would solve a psychological problem. The considerations involved in the proposal differ from those involved in the law of the sea. Secretary Rusk said he saw no disadvantage in the ACDA proposal in an outer limit of the coastal zone which is clearly not related to the law of the sea. He suggested that Mr. Meeker and Adm. Hearn meet to resolve any differences. Mr. Nitze said he also had difficulties with the third paragraph in the Deputies' Report relating to the absence of military advantages and to the presence of economic savings and political benefits in the ACDA proposal. He could not see any economic savings since we may never wish a seabed deployment at all. We are talking of possibilities which may occur some 10 to 20 years in the future in the light of a technology much more advanced than it is today. We could be interested in alternatives to land based or submarine launched missiles. The seabed could offer the most economical alternative--unless we are to assume that we should not want such a deployment. Mr. Foster said the basic economic savings would be to avoid any expense by precluding an arms race on the seabed. Secretary Rusk asked if the Antarctic/7/ situation did not provide an analogy. /7/See footnote 4, Document 238. Mr. Nitze said that was not necessarily so. Mr. Foster stated it was U.S. policy to eliminate nuclear weapons in the entire world. First in Antarctica, then testing in the atmosphere, next deployment in Outer Space and now on the seabed. We can't eliminate such weapons in one day but the seabed represents an additional environment. When one considers the astronomical estimates of deployment costs reflected in the JCS staff paper,/8/ one is astonished. A movement in this direction would conform to our overall arms control policy. /8/Presumably a reference to Document 236 in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented extensively on the ACDA proposal. Mr. Nitze replied that the same principle could be applied to submarines even though it was more expensive to deploy missiles on land where it costs more than submarine systems to get the same degree of assured destructive capability. He found the logic of the situation wanting. Dr. Seaborg said we would have to assume the seabed had as much potential as submarines to make such an argument. Secretary Rusk added that if we decided in favor of such deployment, enormous defense budgets for this purpose would be inevitable. Dr. Tape said that the economic savings conclusion in the Deputies' Report was based on the assumption that we would retain submarines, and that no other system appeared more useful. Mr. Nitze replied that a mobile force was less costly and would not involve giving up anything. Dr. Tape said that any missile silo (Rocksite) program would be prohibitively expensive, so why do it. Secretary Rusk said it was his personal view that it was a military disadvantage to even have invented missiles. Mr. Nitze added that thermonuclear weapons were terrible. Gen. Wheeler stated that the same opinions had been expressed some 400 years ago with regard to gunpowder. Dr. Seaborg said that the same disadvantages were cited years ago against the Limited Test Ban Treaty./9/ Obviously other reasons had been found to more than compensate for the disadvantages. /9/See Document 3. Mr. Marks said that the argument applied to every new weapons system, and that this renunciation of a military option was a cheap price to pay for lessening of tension. Secretary Rusk queried whether the LTBT had resulted in a reduction of expenditures for testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing was extremely expensive. Mr. Nitze replied that any advantage in ACDA's proposal would be political, but that he had not seen much analysis of political gains. The proposal, if agreed, would be unverifiable, however. Dr. Hornig asked whether we would stand for the deployment of such a seabased weapon system, without warheads? Mr. Foster said we'd denounce the treaty. Gen. Wheeler said he also had thought we would denounce the Outer Space Treaty under a similar situation, but now had serious doubts that we would denounce either treaty under such conditions. Dr. Wenk gave his views on the economic savings and political benefits. The first related to the arms control measure which involved trade offs. The second involved international cooperation and collaboration in the sea--through the UN and other agencies. He believed that the present set of U.S. proposals on seabed resources could not proceed without an arms control measure. The political benefits were of an immediate nature which had to be weighed against the hypothetical long term military contingencies. The U.S. would be in a far weaker position on its overall long term seabed policy if it took a negativistic point of view towards arms limitations. The ACDA proposal represents almost the least we can do. Mr. Nitze replied that the ACDA proposal, if adopted, may not be acceptable to other nations and we'll be pressured to go further. Mr. Foster said he didn't think the proposal would be unacceptable to other nations. The Soviet "demilitarization" proposal would knock out SOSUS. ACDA's proposal is realistic. We wouldn't negotiate a treaty at the U.N. but rather in the ENDC. We would state a general arms control principle at the U.N. to accomplish the U.S. policy of limiting nuclear weapons. Secretary Rusk said this proposal would take care of 98% of the apparent objectives in the Soviet Arms control proposals. Dr. Wenk added he did not believe the Soviets were serious about their "demilitarization" proposal, but they would capitalize enormously on the political level if the U.S. were to do nothing in this field. Gen. Wheeler said he joined Mr. Nitze in the latter's stated views. He pointed out that if the Soviets were to deploy large numbers of weapons on the ocean floor, we could detect a massive underwater undertaking but nothing more. The JCS disagreed with the Deputies' judgment on U.S. verification capabilities as reflected in their report. He added that he did not believe that the Soviets would most likely not opt for seabed deployment. The U.S. had not seen that FOBS were in the net U.S. advantage, but the Soviets had concluded it was to their advantage. Secretary Rusk asked if we had any information whether the Soviets were deploying that kind of system (FOBS). Mr. Helms said the Soviets appeared to be flight testing FOBS. Dr. Hornig said it was not clear whether the Soviets were developing FOBS or ballistic missiles with depressed trajectories and deboost capabilities. Secretary Rusk asked whether we had any indications that the Soviets were contemplating a seabed nuclear weapon system. Adm. Taylor said that we had no indications and that it did not appear that the Soviets require a system of this type. The U.S. verification capabilities are based on a combination of sensors. We have to consider that the magnitude of the task of emplacement would be detectable. Once the emplacement was located, underwater verification should be adequate for U.S. to know what the Soviets are doing. Dr. Wenk added that the last paragraph of the Deputies' Report on the adequacy of U.S. verification capabilities must be read with its operating phrase "in conjunction with" ("the current and projected strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of clandestine deployments of this kind on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments"). The entire thought does not support Gen. Wheeler's judgment. Moreover, the Soviets are retarded in deep sea technology, and for the Soviets to develop such technology would be visible to the intelligence community in the R&D stage. The Soviet interest in purchasing the Star III, for example, supports this view since the technology represented in the Star III as constructed is 8 or 10 years behind the current state of technology. Adm. Taylor added that the basic question is the direction of Soviet oceanographic interest--the evidence points to increasing Soviet capabilities for fisheries resources. Secretary Rusk said that perhaps we could attempt to cooperate with the Soviets in exploiting and exploring the deep sea resources. Adm. Taylor thought it was a good idea, adding that we could then check on their technology. Secretary Rusk noted that without large expenditures it would be a long time before deep sea capabilities would come into being. Dr. Wenk said that most of the existing U.S. deep submergence vehicles were built by aerospace industries. Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze the reason for his interest in reserving the seabed for possible future nuclear weapons deployment. In view of the Antarctica, LTBT and the Outer Space treaties, an agreed restraint in this new environment would appear very real. Mr. Nitze said that the reason for DOD's support of the LTBT was to avoid further contamination of the atmosphere. Gen. Wheeler added that JCS support for the LTBT almost did not come to pass, and that the U.S. was paying a penalty for ratifying the treaty in the constraints the U.S. had accepted. The U.S. is performing underground tests at a much greater expense and delay than if the tests were conducted in the atmosphere. As for the Antarctica Treaty, no one wanted to fight over the Antarctic. It is easier to verify compliance with the Outer Space Treaty than under this proposed treaty. Secretary Rusk asked if DOD was concerned for the immediate future or for the naval officer of year 2000 who is going to be penalized for this decision. Would a duration clause make a difference? Gen. Wheeler said it seemed that we were giving up possible future strategic capabilities in return for a small political gain. Further, this might be only the first step toward a strategic straight jacket, particularly in view of U.S. verification capabilities. Mr. Foster said we must consider constraint in nuclear weapons. Was the U.S. sincere in seeking arms limitations on nuclear weapons? This proposal is a thoroughly consistent follow-up to Antarctica, LTBT, and Outer Space Treaties. It is a logical next step, and not a minor political advantage. Secretary Rusk said the U.S. better start finding some acceptable constraints. He wondered where we would come out if we continued the arms race in offensive and defensive missiles. As for the possibility of preprogrammed computerized missiles, there would be no decisions left to make and it would make the human condition appalling beyond description. There exists a real danger in having nuclear weapon systems: they may be beyond the control of human intelligence. Dr. Seaborg said he had no strong feelings on the ACDA proposal. He could appreciate the problems of Gen. Wheeler and Mr. Nitze. He could also see the political advantages. If we failed to give up an option, we could be doing ourselves a great deal of harm. We must make progress and show that we are taking steps to control the arms race. The NPT is in the U.S. interests. There does exist a dilemma with respect to verification of the seabed proposal. Perhaps this problem should be recognized for what it is and we all agree that it is overweighed by the political advantages. Congressional approval will be difficult to obtain. The proposal has not been presented as well as would be required to avoid Congressional difficulties. Gen. Wheeler said that Congress had recently queried him three times on whether FOBS constituted a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. There still exists grave doubt on this point in Congress. Secretary Rusk said that there doesn't exist that much difference in verification capabilities under the Outer Space Treaty and the ACDA proposal. It is very difficult to determine if a particular object in orbit is carrying a nuclear weapon. Adm. Taylor said he disagreed with the JCS on U.S. verification capabilities. He thought the estimative judgment in the Deputies' Report was supportable but was as strong a judgment as could be made. Secretary Rusk said the U.S. was faced with a problem of what to tell the Soviets and others in June and July. Mr. Foster said we could announce at the June 17 meeting our belief that restraints on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the seabed environment are possible, and hopefully discuss the matter in the ENDC in July or August. If we do nothing we face difficult political problems.
243. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Deputies--6/4/68, "Arms Control on the Seabed." Secret; Noforn. The source text was submitted under cover of a June 4 memorandum from Foster to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals informing them that, in accordance with the decision reached at the June 3 Committee of Principals meeting that he was forwarding for their concurrence a memorandum in draft form that recommended a U.S. position on arms control on the seabed. SUBJECT Recommendation That the U.S. Government adopt the position that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction shall not be emplaced on or within the ocean seabed, and that it is prepared to enter into serious discussions in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement in this area. Discussion The U.S. Government is strongly supporting international cooperative efforts involving the ocean, including your most recent proposal on "An International Decade of Ocean Exploration". A positive arms control approach to the seabed complements our current stated policies involving the ocean and its resources. It is important in its own right by prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in a new environment, will provide a means for fending off less acceptable seabed arms control measures which have been suggested by other nations, and could lead to further steps in controlling the strategic arms race. This position, if implemented, would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on or in the seabed. It would not prohibit any U.S. military systems in current DOD plans; the deployment of submarines and necessary surveillance and detection systems would not be limited in any way. Verification problems of this position are similar to, but somewhat more difficult than, those associated with the banning of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. I believe that our verification capabilities are adequate to protect U.S. security interests when considered in conjunction with the current and projected overall strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of limited clandestine deployments of such weapons on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments. Your approval of the recommended position will permit the U.S. Government to take a positive approach to arms control on the seabed at the meeting of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed opening June 17. It would serve as a basis for subsequent discussions at the resumed session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [Committee] in Geneva and the UN General Assembly./2/ /2/The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed meeting on July 18, after having been in recess since March 14. It reconvened for a period of approximately 6 weeks during which time the U.S. Delegation was headed by Foster. I believe that the foregoing represents a consensus of the views of most members of the Committee of Principals.
244. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, June 7, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Secret; Noforn. Dear Bill: Your proposed draft memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, circulated on 4 June 1968, has been reviewed within the Department of Defense./2/ /2/See footnote 1, Document 243. I believe it would be unwise to take a definite position on an arms control proposal banning weapons of mass destruction until we have a clearer determination of what kind of proposal, if any, is in the best interests of the United States. Based on the discussions between Mr. Meeker and Rear Admiral Hearn, I believe that a more acceptable formulation of ACDA's specific proposal would be: "Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to emplace implant or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, or beneath or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other State. A narrow band along the coasts of each State will be exempt from the provisions of this Treaty; the width of this band to be determined by negotiation." This statement cures the most immediate problem the Department of Defense has with respect to the legal aspects and affords better protection to various operating options we may wish to exercise in our mobile seabased strategic systems. The most important issue to be decided by the President is whether or not the support of arms control measures for the seabeds is in the best over-all interests of the United States. I recommend that your proposed memorandum be altered to emphasize this basic issue and that you append to it the attached memorandum from the Secretary of Defense. This SecDef memorandum outlines some of the considerations which the President should have in mind before deciding this issue. Sincerely, Paul
Enclosure/3/ /3/Secret. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson Washington, undated. SUBJECT At the recent meetings of the Committee of Principals on ACDA's proposal for arms control on the seabed/4/ there were four areas in which the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not reach agreement with the other members of the Committee. These issues are set forth below for your information, together with the extent of agreement and disagreement: /4/See Documents 238 and 242. Issue 1. What is permitted and what is prohibited. Agreed: 1. Intent of proposal is to ban emplacement or establishment of permanently fixed weapons of mass destruction from seabeds. 2. The banning of fixed sea-based systems is the least harmful possibility from a national security point of view. Not Agreed: 1. That we can really know what is being prohibited because of difficulty in determining exactly what is the precise meaning of "deployed," "implanted" or "emplaced." 2. That the language of the proposed treaty article insures against inadvertent banning of systems or operational modes intended to be permitted. 3. That such a treaty will not serve as a device for "legal" military and industrial espionage. 4. That weapon systems to be banned may not be useful at some future time for the safety and security of the U.S. Issue 2. Legal considerations involving relationship between Law of the Sea/5/ and ACDA's proposal./6/ /5/See footnote 6, Document 238. /6/See Document 233. Agreed: 1. That the most apparent and immediate legal defects of the draft ACDA proposal could be cured by redrafting. (This has been done.) Not Agreed: 1. That the legal aspects of any seabed arms control agreement reached at this time will not be the genesis of new and disturbing legal theories and precedents affecting the ongoing development of other seabed legal and jurisdictional regimes. 2. That it is possible at this time to determine the amount of sea room which may be required for the deployment of sea-based strategic weapon systems. 3. That we can reach an accommodation with the USSR with respect to a baseline from which the limits of prohibition are to be measured. Issue 3. The relative military value of future weapon systems options. Agreed: 1. That most fixed sea-based systems would be more costly from a fiscal, industrial and manpower resource standpoint than either mobile sea-based or fixed land-based systems. 2. That existing geographic and demographic asymmetries make the possible use of seabed strategic weapon systems more attractive to the US than to the USSR. 3. That ACDA's proposal does not afford the US any military advantage. 4. There are no weapon systems in current or projected DOD plans which would be prohibited by this proposal. Not Agreed: 1. That economic savings purported to arise from ACDA's proposal can be identified. 2. That the issue of economic savings is germane to discussions of ACDA's proposal. 3. That the long term political advantages to be gained from adoption of ACDA's proposal have been sufficiently identified. 4. That the possible economic savings and political advantages outweigh the possible strategic and military disadvantages which may accrue. Issue 4. Verification problems associated with proposal. Agreed: 1. There is a high probability that we could detect the development of a prohibited system before it became operational. 2. We could almost certainly detect large scale construction activity on the seabed but to determine exactly what was being constructed is a difficult problem. 3. It is unlikely that we could detect small scale deployments of some types of prohibited systems but could probably detect large scale deployments of these systems. Not Agreed: 1. That it is unlikely that the USSR would deploy large numbers of unprotected strategic systems. 2. That the extent of our agreed verification capability is adequate to protect our national security interests. 3. That the existing verification capability is capable of timely detection of a treaty violation. Concerns about the verification of a seabed arms control agreement lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff to believe that the adoption of a specific arms control proposal at this time would not be in the national interest and has a potential for grave harm.
245. Editorial Note On June 11, 1968, AEC Chairman Seaborg wrote President Johnson requesting approval for the FY 1969 underground nuclear test program, Bowline, consisting of 57 tests: 45 for weapons development and the remaining 12 consisting of 6 Plowshare tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission and 6 weapons effect tests sponsored by the Department of Defense. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1969, Vol. VII, Box 29) On June 27, Rostow wrote a memorandum to the President informing him of Seaborg's June 11 letter, and requesting the President's approval of Bowline. Bowline included one large excavation test, Schooner, scheduled for execution in the second quarter. However, Rostow advised that specific approval for it should be requested under separate cover, well in advance of the expected firing date. In fact, any large-yield test that "might cause domestic problems" was also to be submitted for Presidential approval under separate requests. A checkmark next to an approving line appeared on the source text which indicated President Johnson 's approval of Bowline. (Ibid.) In a June 28 memorandum to Seaborg, Rostow informed him that Bowline was approved "with the understanding that specific Presidential approval must be obtained for all nuclear excavation experiments, for all tests to be conducted outside the National Test Site, and for all tests with yields of one megaton or more." This memorandum also granted approval for Bowline I, the first quarter test program which consisted of 15 Atomic Energy Commission weapon development tests, 1 Plowshare experiment, Stoddard, and 2 Department of Defense weapon effects tests. (Ibid.) A total of 10 tests, including Stoddard which was fired on September 17, took place at the Nevada Test Site. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, page 33) Also on September 17, Seaborg wrote President Johnson a letter in which he requested the President's permission to execute Bowline II, the second quarter underground test program. Bowline II included 18 tests: 16 to demonstrate the performance, reliability, and safety of prototype warheads, and 2 other tests that would require specific execution authority under separate requests. These were Schooner, the one Plowshare cratering experiment, and Benham, the Spartan development event. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1969, Volume VII, Box 29) Rostow wrote President Johnson a memorandum, September 27, informing him of Seaborg's September 17 letter on Bowline II. President Johnson's approval of Bowline II is indicated by a checkmark on Rostow's memorandum. (Ibid.) The following day, September 28, Rostow wrote Seaborg informing him that President Johnson had approved Bowline II with specific approval withheld on Schooner and Benham. (Ibid.) Specific request for Schooner was made in an October 16 letter from Seaborg to Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-Plowshare Events, Vol. 3, Box 30) Objections arose, however, from Foster over Schooner's potential to violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In a letter to Rostow, October 30, Foster wrote, "I cannot recommend approval of the AEC request to execute the nuclear cratering experiment Schooner, since it involves a very substantial risk of causing radioactive debris to be present in Canada in amounts that will be detected, publicized, and used to support charges that we have deliberately violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Such charges would, among other consequences, have a decidedly adverse impact on our efforts to secure adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty." (Ibid.) On November 16, Rostow wrote President Johnson a memorandum which informed him of Seaborg's request to execute Schooner and of the support given to it by the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Bureau of the Budget. All agencies but ACDA, Rostow wrote, recommended granting approval to Seaborg to conduct Schooner. Rostow himself advocated approval and the President agreed by placing a checkmark on the approving line which appeared on Rostow's memorandum. (Ibid.) Schooner was eventually fired on December 8, and Benham, yet another Plowshare experiment, on December 19. In all, 17 Bowline II tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. (United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992, pages 33-34) A summary history of this test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Crosstie and Bowline: Events--Door Mist, Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon, Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, 31 August 1967-20 November 1968 (DNA 6322F, 1985).
246. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, June 18, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. SUBJECT At Tab 1 is a revised recommended US position on arms control for the ocean floor. You will note that we have added "and should be subject to the appropriate means of verification" to the end of the last sentence. My people tell me that we can live with this addition. Since it meets your basic objection, I hope that DOD can now join State in recommending its acceptance by the President./2/ /2/For the position taken by the Department of Defense, see Document 244. Frankly, the basic issue we must face is how we avoid a bloody nose in handling the Soviet initiative in New York. While I recognize that there is merit in DOD's position, I doubt that it is wise from a public relations point of view. Our failure to advance any proposal will clearly not inhibit other UN delegations from making proposals. Ambassador Malik in New York has informed our delegation that the USSR will press for a complete demilitarization of the ocean floor when he makes the Soviet speech later this week. If we have no affirmative and reasonable proposal of our own to put forward, we run the risk of being isolated by the Soviet tactic. In addition, we run the risk that the UN Ad Hoc Committee may adopt the Soviet proposal or something like it. I think you will agree that the latter result would be far less acceptable from your point of view than what we have here suggested. By putting forward a sound proposal of our own, we at least have some chance of directing the debate along lines that would produce an outcome we could live with. Since this is likely to be a luncheon topic tomorrow, I would appreciate your urgent consideration of the above. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Tab 1/3/ /3/Secret. ARMS CONTROL AND THE OCEAN FLOOR "The United States is prepared to enter into serious discussions at an international forum such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [Committee] in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement pursuant to which each party would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed not only at the weapons themselves but also at launching platforms or delivery systems for such weapons, and should be subject to appropriate means of verification."
247. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, June 21, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. The date is the day the letter was received. Dear Mr. President: We have in mind your messages of January 22/2/ and May 2/3/ of this year in which you spoke out in favor of reaching an understanding on questions concerning restraint in the strategic arms race. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., Vol. II, Box 11) /3/See Document 237. As we informed you earlier we for our part also attach great importance to these questions, having in mind that they should be considered together, systems for delivery of offensive strategic nuclear weapons as well as systems for defense against ballistic missiles. All aspects of this complex problem are now being carefully examined by us, and we hope that before long it will be possible more concretely to exchange views with regard to further ways of discussing this problem, if of course the general world situation does not hinder this. Sincerely, A. Kosygin/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
248. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, June 22, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Dear Mr. Chairman: I was greatly encouraged by your letter on strategic arms talks, which was delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 21./2/ /2/Document 247. As you know, the non-proliferation treaty, on which our representatives have worked so hard and so well in Geneva and New York, will be opened for signature in our two capitals as well as in London on July 1. I think it would be particularly fitting if, on that date, we could jointly announce our agreement to hold talks on the strategic missile problem. I believe this would do much to advance our common aim of achieving the widest possible endorsement of the treaty. I look forward to further work from you when you have completed your deliberations in Moscow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
249. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, June 27, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. Dear Mr. President: My colleagues and I have carefully considered your letter of June 22, 1968,/2/ concerning talks on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons delivery systems. We are prepared to publish in the Soviet press and over the radio on July 1 the following statement of the Soviet Government: /2/Document 248. "On the forthcoming talks on questions of curbing the strategic arms race. "An agreement has been reached between the Government of the USSR and the USA to enter in the nearest future into talks on limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems as well as systems of defense against ballistic missiles." We have no doubt that a statement in such a spirit made by our Governments should, undoubtedly, also further the task of inducing the adherence of the greatest number of states to the non-proliferation treaty. Sincerely, A. Kosygin/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |