1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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250. Editorial Note On July 1, 1968, at a ceremony attended by representatives from 56 nations in the East Room of the White House, President Johnson made a statement endorsing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opened for signature that day in Washington, London, and Moscow. For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 763-765. In his statement President Johnson also announced: "Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles." (Ibid., page 765) For Kosygin's suggested wording of this announcement, see Document 249. Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the U.S. Government at this ceremony, and many other nations, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, also promptly signed it. For text of the remarks of Secretary Rusk, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House ceremony, see Department of State Bulletin, July 22, 1968, pages 87-88. On July 9, President Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate. His accompanying message urged "that the Senate move swiftly to enhance our security and that of the entire world by giving its consent to the ratification of this treaty." For text of his message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 801-803. Testimony on the treaty is in Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1968), Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session (Washington, 1969), Part 2, and Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session (Washington, 1969). Regarding the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's favorable report on the treaty on September 17, see footnote 2, Document 283. Because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August and preoccupation with the Presidential election campaign, however, full Senate action on the treaty was delayed until the incoming Nixon administration. The Senate gave its consent to the agreement on March 13, 1969, by a vote of 83-15, and the treaty, which required the ratification of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 40 other states, finally entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification at Washington, London, and Moscow on March 5, 1970. For text of the treaty, see 21 UST 483. Regarding the position of the West German and other foreign governments on the treaty, see Documents 259 and 283. A survey and analysis of the status of the treaty in foreign nations is in CIA Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1582/68, "Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty," November 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Volume II, Box 26) For discussion of issues relating to Senate consent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see Document 293. Additional documentation on this question and U.S. ratification of the treaty is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6, and DEF 18 UN; and Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26.
251. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Members of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, July 2, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Memo dated July 2, 1968 re "Cutoff." Secret; Limited Distribution. SUBJECT For several years the United States has been proposing in Geneva that the nuclear-weapons powers agree to halt the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Since agreement on this proposal would clearly be in the U.S. net interest, we expect to propose it again at the forthcoming ENDC session this summer. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose updating one aspect of the verification arrangements for a cutoff treaty. The other aspects of the U.S. position on this measure would remain as we have previously described them in Geneva. The plants engaged in production of enriched uranium or plutonium for use in nuclear weapons would either be shut down or their product would be utilized for purposes other than nuclear weapons. Each country would provide a list of all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to ascertain that none of the produced fissionable material was being used for nuclear weapons. This would involve a major opening up of the Soviet nuclear energy program to international inspection. When the United States described this proposal to the ENDC four years ago, we dealt with the possibility of undeclared production facilities by stating, "There would be agreed rights to conduct a limited number of inspections of suspected undeclared facilities on an adversary basis."/2/ In the light of our current unilateral capabilities in this field, I recommend that we withdraw this 1964 formulation, and rely instead on our unilateral capabilities to verify that other parties to the treaty are not operating significant undeclared nuclear material production facilities. My reasons for this recommendation are as follows: /2/ENDC/134, June 25, 1964. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding this 1964 initiative, see Documents 30, 32, 33, and 35, especially footnote 6 thereto.] 1. The U.S. has high confidence that it has identified all current Soviet fissionable material production facilities which are capable of making a significant addition to the already large existing Soviet weapons stockpile. 2. [3 lines of source text not declassified] 3. [6 lines of source text not declassified] 4. Such elimination would remove a potentially troublesome discrepancy between the verification arrangements we would be willing to accept for a cutoff and those we have asked other countries to accept under the non-proliferation treaty. It is difficult to justify treaty rights to search for undeclared plants in a country which already has large stockpiles of fissionable materials, when the NPT does not set forth such rights for nations in which a small clandestine plant might be significant. A more detailed discussion of the proposed modification of verification arrangements will be found at Tab A. The United States initially proposed the cutoff in 1956/3/ after determining that such a measure would be in our net interest, and has reaffirmed this proposal on frequent occasions since that time. The relevant factors have recently been reviewed to determine whether that conclusion still obtains, and we have found that it does. The results of these studies are summarized at Tab B. /3/Regarding the 1956 initiative, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XX, pp. 320, passim. Accordingly, I recommend for your consideration that when we next propose the cutoff, we authorize the U.S. Delegation to describe the verification arrangements as similar to those of the non-proliferation treaty. William C. Foster
Tab A/4/ /4/Secret. Verification of a Cutoff of the Production of The proposed modification in the U.S. position relates only to verification for undeclared plants. No change is proposed in the procedures the U.S. has previously set forth for verification with respect to declared plants. Nevertheless, the latter procedures are also summarized below to facilitate evaluation of the overall verification requirements. A. Verification for Declared Production Facilities The United States has proposed that the IAEA would apply safeguards in order to verify compliance with the obligations of the cutoff treaty. These safeguards would be similar to those applied under the non-proliferation treaty. The IAEA would safeguard not only nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment facilities, but also the fissionable material in every other peaceful nuclear facility in each country, in order to ascertain that no fissionable materials produced was being used for nuclear weapons purposes. While the IAEA has not yet developed detailed procedures for safeguarding either uranium enrichment facilities or shutdown reactors, U.S. and U.K. studies have been made which can provide a basis for IAEA safeguards techniques for such plants. These techniques would be effective in detecting any significant Soviet diversion of fissionable material to weapons use. On December 2, 1967, President Johnson offered to accept IAEA safeguards on all U.S. nuclear facilities, except those directly related to national security, when NPT safeguards go into effect./5/ /5/See footnote 6, Document 220. During the last session of the ENDC, several speakers urged the Soviet Union to accept IAEA safeguards on its peaceful nuclear programs. The Soviet delegate replied that such acceptance would not be relevant to the proliferation problem. While the U.S.S.R. has always resisted proposals for inspection on its own territory, the Soviets may find it difficult to explain why they are unwilling to accept relevant inspection for the cutoff proposal when the inspection is essentially the same as the IAEA safeguards which the U.S.S.R. has urged other states to accept under the NPT. B. Verification for Undeclared Production of Fissionable Material To verify that other parties to the treaty are not operating significant undeclared nuclear material production facilities, each party would rely on unilateral capabilities. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Since the Soviets would realize that any significant violation would run a very high risk of detection, they can be expected to refrain from violations as long as they want the treaty to continue in force. If the Soviets wanted to terminate the treaty, they probably would find it preferable to do so by use of a treaty withdrawal clause, rather than by risking the onus of being caught in a violation. An early test of Soviet good-faith compliance with the treaty would be their initial declaration listing their nuclear facilities. If this initial declaration is complete, and coincides with U.S. present highly reliable information on this subject, and the IAEA is permitted to safeguard freely all such Soviet nuclear facilities, it would seem quite unlikely that the Soviets would then attempt to build a new series of clandestine nuclear plants which involve no shipments to or from any of their declared, inspected facilities. If they did build such plants which would add significantly to their already large stockpile, the U.S. would have a very high probability of detecting such a violation. [1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified] A Soviet refusal to permit such a non-intrusive inspection would provide a basis for the U.S. to explain its withdrawal publicly if withdrawal became necessary. The Soviet refusal would be assessed by other states in the light of the U.S.S.R. having already accepted extensive inspection of its nuclear facilities. Tab B/6/ /6/Secret; Restricted Data. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT ON The U.S. has proposed many times at the ENDC that the nuclear-weapon states halt all production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. transfer from their weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses agreed amounts of uranium-235 and plutonium. We have said that the U.S. would so transfer 60,000 kg of uranium-235 if the U.S.S.R. would transfer 40,000 kg. We have suggested that this transferred uranium could be obtained by demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, and that we would transfer to peaceful uses the associated plutonium from these weapons in amounts to be negotiated with the U.S.S.R. in advance. This combined proposal will be referred to below as the "cutoff-transfer" proposal. A. Impact on U.S. Strategic Posture
The U.S. has recently concluded that our military requirements for plutonium can be met by operation of four production reactors at Richland. We have already shut down five plutonium production reactors at this site. Presently planned nuclear weapons requirements can be met from the uranium-235 and plutonium on hand. (This includes weapons in stockpile awaiting retirement and materials in the pipeline.) Reactor development and research are absorbing most of the current plutonium production at Richland. A small amount of plutonium metal is being stockpiled to meet contingency plans. (Three reactors at Savannah River are being used principally for production of tritium. Two similar reactors there have been shut down.) Based on current plans, U.S. weapons requirements for the mid-1970's can be met from fissionable materials on hand now. Even with a transfer of 60,000 kg of uranium and agreed amounts of associated plutonium from destroyed weapons to peaceful uses, all strategic U.S. military requirements for the near future can be met from existing stocks.
It appears that the Soviets could meet their priority strategic requirements from existing stocks, even with a transfer of [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] from destroyed weapons to peaceful uses. However, they would not have enough fissionable material to MIRV their ICBMs and deploy an extensive ABM system.
Recent studies have shown that the earlier a cutoff-transfer measure is implemented, the more it would be to the advantage of the U.S. Such an agreement would be to our advantage now and would remain so until about 1976. Following 1976, the proposed measures would not present a significant military advantage to either country. By that time, both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would have accumulated such large stockpiles of fissionable materials that any cutoff of production for weapons uses would be of little military significance. [1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified] A cutoff in 1968 to 1970 would slow down the accumulation of fissionable materials by both countries but would be more advantageous to the U.S. A cutoff in 1972 or later would have only a small effect on the accumulation of that amount of fissionable materials calculated to be necessary for both U.S. and U.S.S.R. top priority and second priority military requirements. A cutoff in 1976 or after would appear to have no direct military effect, because the availability of fissionable materials for military uses will be more than any predicted requirements can utilize.
When the U.S. first offered in September 1965 to obtain the 60,000 kg of uranium-235 for transfer from demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, it was determined that this could be done [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Tritium was dealt with in the U.S. cutoff-transfer position paper of February 15, 1966, along the lines outlined below. There have been no developments since then which call for changing this position. Since tritium is not a fissionable material, it has not been covered in our past cutoff proposals, and we do not plan to initiate any discussion of tritium. (Of course, nuclear reactors, including tritium production reactors, would be subject to IAEA safeguards under a cutoff agreement.) If the U.S.S.R. should urge limitation of tritium production under the cutoff, however, the U.S. delegation has the following contingency guidance: If progress in negotiations warrants it, the Delegation may request approval to discuss tritium production limitations with the U.S.S.R. However, the disposition of tritium from weapons submitted for destruction should not be discussed. It is the U.S. position that enough production of tritium should continue under a cutoff to compensate for the radioactive decay of the tritium in the weapons inventory and the stockpile, and to provide for non-weapons uses. Uranium-235 required to fuel reactors for producing tritium for weapons replenishment would be obtained from existing stockpiles. A possible limitation on the amount of allowed production of tritium might be obtained by requiring that equivalent amounts of helium-3 be turned in. Results of an AEC study have shown that the decay of tritium is the only practical source of significant quantities of helium-3. However, tritium production rates are highly classified at this time and declassification would be necessary before any discussions that would reveal these rates could take place. B. Political Considerations Regarding Cutoff-Transfer Proposal Pressures from the non-nuclear-weapon countries for concrete measures of armaments reduction by the nuclear-weapon powers are likely to increase, particularly during the period when the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has been signed but not yet ratified by many countries. Key non-nuclear-weapon states will probably demand that the nuclear powers make progress toward disarmament by agreeing to measures that would constitute a "balance of obligations." While the non-nuclear-weapon nations will be serving their own interests by accession to the NPT, they will nevertheless strongly urge that the nuclear-weapon powers also contribute to the stability of the international scene and take steps to reduce the likelihood of a future nuclear conflict. It is likely that some non-nuclear-weapon states will attempt to make such steps by the nuclear-weapon powers a condition for their signature, ratification, or continued adherence to the NPT. One measure that the non-nuclear-weapon states have suggested as contributing to a suitable balance of obligations and which the United States has already proposed is a complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons uses. The destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and the transfer of the resulting fissionable materials to peaceful uses is a related measure which the U.S. has also proposed at the ENDC. These measures would constitute a logical post-NPT approach by the nuclear-weapon powers to a "balance of obligations."
252. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals/1/ Washington, July 8, 1968, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Another record of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 18, and 24-25. PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. REFERENCE /3/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11) The two ACDA papers attached to Scoville's memorandum are entitled respectively: "Strategic Missile Talks: Basic Position Paper," and "Strategic Missile Talks: US Opening Statement." Both are undated. SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 1. A Working Group, composed of senior representatives of each of the agencies represented on the Executive Committee and chaired by Mr. Fisher, ACDA, was established to develop positions and issues for consideration of the Executive Committee. 2. The Department of Defense was asked to draft a substantive opening statement which could be considered by the Working Group along with the draft opening statement already distributed to the Executive Committee. 3. In drafting the opening statement, consideration should be given to the possibility of consulting on the completed statement with Congress, but no consideration should be given to release to the press. In the meantime, answers to Congressional queries should be limited to statements that no date and place have yet been selected and that we are studying the substantive problems involved. 4. The Committee endorsed the USIB action to prepare an updated SNIE on U.S. capabilities to verify various strategic arms control measures. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the President had worked hard over a period of eighteen months to get the Soviets to agree to discussions on controlling the strategic arms race. He was concerned that the race would spiral to new plateaus with even greater expenditures without any increase in security. All agreed that the problems were very complex and that the difficulties of achieving a successful agreement should not be underestimated. However, it was the job of the Committee to translate this general policy into specific proposals for controlling the arms race. We had no indications from the Soviets as to the time and place, but they had urged the discussions be held in the nearest future. He pointed out that Mr. Foster would be returning to Geneva on Thursday,/4/ but he need not get into this question in his discussions with Roshchin. /4/July 11. He believed that the Government needed some special machinery to develop the U.S. position for these discussions and the present Executive Committee of Principals was established for this purpose. He also circulated an organizational paper, which had been previously coordinated informally./5/ This paper established an inter-agency working group under the Chairmanship of Mr. Fisher, ACDA, to develop U.S. positions and issues for consideration by the Executive Committee. /5/Reference apparently is to an unsigned procedural memorandum, July 8, which described the creation of a special interagency committee, with ACDA as chair, to prepare for the upcoming talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic missile systems. The procedural memorandum included Secretary Rusk's request that it should be circulated to all officers and agencies concerned with these discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) He stated that he had studied the draft Opening Statement (See Reference) and had no particular problems with it although he would welcome a few word changes. For example, he believed the term, "unacceptable damage," might be altered. Secretary Clifford said he had studied the State-ACDA draft opening statement and position paper together with the analysis of the position paper that had been prepared in the Department of Defense. He thought these were useful first efforts but that it was too early to proceed further with substantive positions, as in the draft opening statement. He believed that the discussion should start on a very general plane without any concrete proposals or U.S. concessions, since the Soviets would take these as agreed to begin with and move on to obtain further concessions. He thought the first sessions would be primarily administrative in nature in which we would have an opportunity to test the sincerity of Soviet intentions. He thought it was important to determine what the Soviets wished to accomplish as a result of these discussions. He considered verification to be the most important problem since he was worried about the Soviet attitude in this area. He wished to test them out and was not sure that we should depend on unilateral verification except as a fall-back. The discussions should be approached very carefully to assure that national security would not be jeopardized. He was reluctant to start with the position which should be reserved until the generalities had been thoroughly discussed. Deputy Secretary Nitze emphasized that we must understand all the facts on any positions before they are adopted. For example, the proposal to freeze land-based ICBMs was, in fact, a freezing of the launch holes. Since the Soviet holes are larger than the U.S. holes, they could exploit these to Soviet advantage. He thought that even though the verification might be difficult, throw weight might be a better criteria for control than launchers. One must assume that in time the U.S. would lose its technological advantage. It was important that we obtain fact sheets on each issue as had been done with the test ban. General Wheeler also emphasized the importance of the verification problem. He thought we should determine what are the critical parameters in missile capabilities and agreed that throw weight was important. He recommended that the Working Group list each issue which would become the subject of a separate paper since lumping all issues together often confused them. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the draft opening statement was intended to be the first substantive presentation, since the administrative arrangements could be handled without difficulty. Since the U.S. had been pressing the Soviets for talks for eighteen months, it was logical for them to expect us to state what we had in mind early in the negotiations. He expected some sparring, and we might get some very unrealistic suggestions related to complete disarmament or the Gromyko Proposal. He agreed that any U.S. proposals must be in the security interests, but he did not feel we would be moving into the area of insecurity by the talks. Rather, a failure to control the arms race would decrease security. He was not sure what the Soviets wanted out of the discussions; at best, they might have reached that conclusion that a new plateau with great expenditures without changing the net security situation should be avoided. In the worst case, they might hope that these talks would be demonstrations to the non-nuclear countries of their desire to halt the arms race but have no hope of agreement. They might make far-reaching proposals which might be attractive to the non-nuclear countries and would cause U.S. propaganda difficulties. Obviously, both sides would be seeking advantages from the talks. Deputy Secretary Nitze stated that hopefully we might find a position in which both sides gain, but the difficulty would be that each side hoped to make relative gains. Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen believed that there was undoubtedly opposition in the Soviet Union to the talks, but they may have been worried about increasing expenditures for new strategic systems. The Soviets may also have been motivated to counteract the U.S. offer for talks to improve their image in the context of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He was struck by the association of these talks to the Kosygin Nine Points for the ENDC which had many of the standard arms control proposals;/6/ although the Soviets had agreed to bilateral discussions, he doubted Mr. Foster could have private discussions in Geneva without informing the other members of the ENDC. Mr. Foster indicated that it would be possible to have private talks in Geneva; all the other nations had plenty of experience with U.S.-Soviet private discussions at the ENDC and would undoubtedly take it in their stride. Secretary Rusk tended to agree. /6/Reference presumably is to the nine-part Soviet memorandum (A/7134), July 1, 1968, on further measures to stop the arms race; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 466-470. Under Secretary Bohlen felt that we might consider attempting to get the Soviets to agree to inspections. While they had always been adamant against these, the Soviet requirements for secrecy no longer made sense and their attitudes might be different now. Secretary Rusk agreed that verification was a key problem since we must have confidence that any agreement would not adversely affect our security. Mr. Helms stated that USIB was in the process of updating SNIE 11-10-67/7/ at General Wheeler's request and hoped to consider it by July 18. He did not believe that the conclusions would change, but it would be useful to make sure that it was still current. He urged that in developing U.S. position papers, all groups use common intelligence estimates in order to avoid unnecessary discrepancies in the studies and indicated that Mr. Bruce Clarke, CIA, would be the central point for providing such information. /7/See footnote 5, Document 253. Mr. Foster indicated that studies on methods of controlling the strategic arms race had been going on for seven years; that we had accumulated large amounts of information which would provide a good basis for developing the U.S. positions and support for the discussions. He pointed out that we have already told the Soviets, with the President's approval, that the U.S. was prepared to consider using unilateral sources insofar as possible to verify any agreement and that it would be hard to backtrack from this position. Secretary Rusk indicated that unilateral information might be satisfactory for limiting the strategic arms race, but might not be for reductions. He indicated that if the verification problems could be solved, he might be in favor of the Baruch Plan since he thought it would be desirable to scrap all nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster suggested that one might agree on the basic principles to be accomplished in controlling the arms race before one got down to specifics. Secretary Rusk indicated that we need something like the draft opening statement which dealt with the substance and suggested that Department of Defense representatives try their hand at another draft. How it was actually used might depend on how the discussions develop. He thought Secretary Clifford should act as if he were the chief negotiator in Moscow and the Soviets asked him what he was proposing. Secretary Clifford indicated that Department of Defense would undertake such a draft which could be forwarded to the Working Group for consideration along with the present draft. Chairman Seaborg said he had only a limited time to study the papers but they left no doubt on the principles involved. He understood that the proposals did not include the controls on the development of the front end technology and particularly nuclear warheads. Secretary Rusk suggested that the Soviets might bring up the question of MIRVs immediately. Chairman Seaborg said he still had a job to do, such as warheads for Spartan. He agreed that we should have a substantive position for initiating the talks, but that perhaps we might hold back on the unilateral verification. Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen thought we should initially hold back on national systems and that the statements on Page 5 of the draft opening statement went too far. Mr. Fisher referred to the presentation (State 158191, March 18, 1967) made to Mr. Kosygin by Ambassador Thompson on March 28, 1967,/8/ which was essentially identical with that in the opening statement. Secretary Rusk indicated that we should rely on national means for what they were capable of verifying. He was pleased that USIB was updating the SNIE. For items which could not be adequately verified by national means, we would have to negotiate other verification arrangements. /8/See Document 192. Ambassador Thompson's presentation on March 28, 1967, has not been further identified. In summary, Secretary Rusk directed the Working Group to start immediately developing a position with the necessary back-up studies. Secretary Clifford indicated that Mr. Warnke would head the Department of Defense working team and be their representative on the working group. Secretary Rusk asked the Department of Defense to draft another opening statement to be considered by the working group along with the present one. Mr. Fisher asked guidance on the Congressional consultation. He suggested that for the present we should say that no time or place had been agreed upon and that we are still studying the nature of the U.S. position. Secretary Rusk hoped that the dates would not be announced for the next few days until the NPT was out of the way. One should consider in drafting the opening statement the possibility of consulting with the Congress on it, but he did not believe it would be desirable to make this statement available to the press since the subject was much too complicated at this stage. He stated he had seen too many occasions where we allowed details to block major U.S. policy objectives. He cursed the day when the Baruch proposal was turned down.
253. Summary of Meeting/1/ Washington, July 10, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Working Group-Strategic Arms Talk-Meeting, July 10, 1968. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. A July 9 date on the source text has been corrected by hand to read July 10. SUMMARY OF JULY 10, 1968 MEETING OF THE Schedule for Preparation Mr. Fisher said although no specific time for the talks appears yet to have been set, we must, for planning purposes, assume that the U.S. should be ready by the middle of August. He also said that when the President returns on July 21/2/ he will undoubtedly want to have a report on where we are in our preparations. Mr. Halperin said that it would be better if we could have until the end of August to complete our preparations. /2/President Johnson was in Honolulu for talks with President Thieu of South Vietnam July 18-20. Mr. Fisher hoped we could have the DOD/JCS re-write the opening statement by the first of next week. Mr. Halperin said they would try to get the opening statement by some time early next week. He said they could get the first part of it--dealing with principles and introductory material--to us by then but it was difficult to get the section dealing with a specific proposal agreed in the Pentagon until the basic position had been agreed upon. Mr. Bohlen said we would have to have a specific proposal when we start talking with the Soviets. Mr. Fisher noted we had already told them we would have a specific proposal when the talks start. Mr. Shaw/3/ noted there had been some misunderstanding regarding the message containing the later commitment and that DOD thought we would say we expected both sides to have proposals. /3/Probably John Shaw, Special Assistant for Communist Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM). Mr. Halperin said DOD would go on working on the specific proposal but would send around the first part of the opening statement so that the Working Group could get at that part at an early date. Mr. Fisher said if we were to have a position approved by the President by August 15th, the Working Group would have to have issues and recommendations before the Principals by around the 2nd or 3rd of August. Mr. Halperin thought it would take four weeks for DOD and JCS to have a suggested basic position for consideration by the Working Group. Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Keeny said such a schedule would not fit the need to have an agreed position by August 15. Mr. Keeny said we could not go to the President for a decision two or three days before the 15th since this would give him no time for any Congressional consultation. It was agreed by General Evans and Mr. Halperin that we should try to have a position ready by August 15. Verification It was noted that SNIE 11-13-68,/4/ which will replace SNIE 11-10-67/5/ on verification capabilities, will be ready July 18. /4/Document 257. /5/"U.S. Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Strategic Weapons Program," February 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4) Mr. Bohlen thought we should somehow find a way for the U.S. Delegation to probe the Soviets to see what we could get from them on on-site inspection. He and Mr. Fisher thought the U.S. had clearly implied in previous communications with the Soviets that national capabilities would be sufficient for fixed installations, Mr. Bohlen thought we had also indicated that mobile systems would have to have on-site inspection, but Mr. Fisher and Dr. Scoville said this decision had not been taken. General Allison said the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the earlier reference to "maximum reliance" on national capabilities left open the question of whether on-site inspection might be necessary even for fixed installations. It was agreed, however, that the verification question should be addressed after we receive SNIE 11-13-68, although preliminary work could be started on the assumption, reinforced by the remarks of Mr. Clark of CIA, that the new SNIE would not make major changes from SNIE 11-10-67. In connection with the verification question, Mr. Halperin said we should soon begin to address the question of what we say publicly and to members of Congress with respect to our existing national capabilities and suggested that the Bohlen Committee should address this question. Mr. Shaw felt we should wait awhile on this. Mr. Halperin did not agree. Mr. Clark pointed out that the Director of CIA has a statutory responsibility in this area which presents some problems unless a new look is taken at what we say about national capabilities. Mr. Fisher agreed that we should for the moment wait until we see how our position is developing before we address the question of some new decision by the Bohlen Committee. Mr. Halperin said we needed to look at what we would do with any Soviet agreement to permit some kind of on-site inspection. He said we need to know what kinds we would want if we could get on-site inspection and we need to look at the kind we might be offered by the Soviets. It was agreed that ACDA would do a paper on this subject. Mr. Shaw said he had an input for such a paper concerning the negotiating problems on raising on-site inspection. Mr. Fisher agreed to have a working group look at this question, but did not want to give it priority over other issues that the Working Group has to address. Mr. Halperin said one issue on verification we should be thinking about was what understanding we should have with the Soviets concerning the continuation of the capabilities for national verification; he said clearly we should have an understanding that neither side would interfere with certain existing national capabilities, and perhaps we should also have some form of understanding--though he recognized this was more difficult--that neither side would attempt to conceal what they are now not concealing. It was agreed the Working Group should give further thought to this issue. Additional Studies Mr. Fisher raised the question of additional studies or papers that the Working Group should have underway. He said ACDA would do a contingency paper on how we handled a Soviet "Gromyko proposal" should it be made in the bilateral talks. Mr. Shaw circulated the following proposed work program: 1. Covering Memorandum to the President (draft last)/6/ /6/Not found. 2. Position Papers a. Opening Statement (drafted and circulated) /7/See footnote 3, Document 252, for the opening statement and the basic position paper. 3. Background Papers a. Military Effects Study (being drafted) 4. Intelligence Estimate--SNIE 11-10-67, evaluating verification capabilities, is being up-dated. Mr. Halperin said DOD was doing a military analysis paper. He said he hoped to circulate soon an uncleared version of this paper. It was agreed that with respect to allied consultations we would have to prepare a cable to USRO for the NAC Meeting of July 15, in which we would give Cleveland guidance that would indicate to him that he could not expect to treat the strategic talks as we had the NPT as far as consultations were concerned. State and ACDA were to draft this message. Mr. Halperin said DOD wanted a study on what the Soviet military posture is likely to be, assuming an agreement of the State-ACDA type. He said this study should address what the Soviets are technically capable of doing within the framework of a State-ACDA type of agreement and also what they are likely to do. He said this would be complementary to a study DOD is doing of what they would be likely to do without an agreement. Mr. Shaw said this would have to be balanced by an assessment of what the U.S. could also do, and Mr. Halperin said this part would be done by DOD as part of its analysis. (Mr. Halperin mentioned in the course of the discussion that DOD's thinking was that the agreement would have to prevent silo hardening rather than attempt to prevent increase in the size of holes since it would be most difficult to determine whether holes were increased in size if construction for hardening was taking place.) With respect to the DOD suggested study, Dr. Scoville said the technical facts would not be difficult to assemble and could be done very quickly but that the basic question of a judgment on what the Soviets would do with technical capability would be the critical issue and might take more time. Mr. Clark agreed to prepare terms of reference and consult with other members of the group on them and to aim at a target date of August 1 for the paper. Mr. Halperin said the Working Group should also be thinking about what our position should be if, after a period of time, the ChiComs continued their strategic buildup; he said clearly we would not want to continue a Soviet-U.S. agreement indefinitely without modification in this event, and that we should provide in some way in the agreement for an understanding to this effect. It was agreed further thought should be given to this point. Mr. Shaw said that while we are waiting for DOD/JCS views on the basic position paper we ought to be reviewing it to see if any "corrections" need to be made of a factual nature. Mr. Clarke said there were some more recent figures that should be incorporated in the paper and he would be in touch with Dr. Scoville. Other Matters Mr. Bohlen raised the question of the impending initiation of MIRV testing in August and said this might well coincide with the opening of the strategic talks. He said he felt that these tests should be postponed. He said that as a minimum they should not be publicized in the manner presently contemplated. Mr. Halperin noted that the draft paper on the public announcement of MIRV testing had not yet been cleared in DOD. Mr. Fisher said we ought to look at this question at a further meeting. Next Meeting of Working Group It was agreed the Working Group would meet next week with the exact time to be set by telephone. Mr. Fisher said he would want to consult with members of the Working Group by telephone in the meantime on other questions that we might need to look at.
254. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Brussels, July 12, 1968. /1Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab B to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. Dear Mr. Secretary: I gather that among other uncertainties about strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians, the question is still open as to just how our bilateral negotiations will be related in practice to the consultative machinery of the North Atlantic Council. Since it is a special responsibility of mine to try to think hard about this, I want to set down for your consideration my thoughts on this matter as you prepare our national position on what may turn out to be an historic undertaking. My net conclusion is that we can manage to meet our commitments to allied consultation in a way which avoids either interfering with the inherently bilateral character of direct negotiations or appearing to play loose with our allies. To put it the other way around, our interests and the interests of our allies in this affair can be reconciled handily in practice. As to the interests of our allies, it is already clear from concerned conversations which my colleagues here have opened up with me that they are in no doubt whatever that when we negotiate with the Russians about the western half of the nuclear deterrent, we are negotiating about their vital national interests as well as our own. The dependence of our non-nuclear allies on our nuclear arsenal has just been copper-bottomed by the NPT; and their sense of involvement in our negotiations about nuclear missiles can only become more acute as the implications of this enterprise become more clear. As for our own interests, we have the positive one of continuing to nourish western unity and the negative one of avoiding the kind of divisive and potentially ruinous hassle we had over the MLF. With a lot of hard work and very late in the day, a dangerous drift on the military side of nuclear affairs was reversed by establishing the Nuclear Planning Group; now, we have to tackle just as creatively the parallel problem on the arms control side of nuclear affairs. And surely it is deeply important to us--in domestic political, as well as foreign policy terms--to choke off that irrational but just-beneath-the-surface possibility that the European politicians and press would feel inspired to revive the specter of "nuclear complicity" by the "Soviet-American condominium." Our proper course in these circumstances, it seems to me, is really quite simple. Consultations in the NAC must of course be geared to progress, or lack of it, in the bilateral channel. But it is easy enough to foresee an opening phase which I should think would take us through the summer and into the early fall. In this phase, our role in the NAC should be to explain the background, the environment, and the political and technical context, without the need to predict substantive US positions before we are clear about them ourselves. I already have speculated in the Council, along the lines of an INR analysis, about what may have inspired the Soviets to answer their mail on this subject at this moment of time. By inviting the speculations of others on the same subject, we have opened a "consultation" with no conceivable damage that I can imagine to US interests. On the other hand, I can well imagine spinning out this manner of consulting within the Alliance over the period it may take the US Government to pull itself together internally. At a second, later stage (say, early fall) I can imagine our floating some general propositions as a basis for NAC discussion. Surely we could, without danger to our own position, invite discussion of the kinds of rather bland "principles" we wrote into the Reykjavik Declaration on Mutual Force Reductions. At a still later stage it might help to induce a more pervasive sense of "participation" if the NPG-NDAC machinery were brought into play--not in direct relation to any specific aspect of the bilateral talks, but to review its own work on, for example, the level of assured destruction which is essential to the allied concept of nuclear deterrence. Surely it would be futile to attempt to foresee at what point and in exactly what way we are going to need the understanding and support of our Western allies in this affair. But just as surely, in my view, we would be derelict if we did not begin the process of education on which that understanding and support eventually must rest. We have persuaded our allies to continue to forego nuclear weapons by accepting NPT; we have predicted that sooner or later we are going to bring home some of our forces from Europe; we are now proposing to discuss possible limitations on the nuclear deterrent which we have persuaded them is the foundation of their security. I do not think it is alarmist to fear that out of such a sequence of events our European friends might be tempted to reassess their interests in directions which would not serve any US interests. In any event, we should certainly not risk losing any important opportunity for us to participate, via the consultative process, in their thinking about these matters. Warmest regards, Sincerely, Harlan
255. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 13, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ENDC, vol. III, Box 13. Confidential. Dear Mr. President: I am writing to comment on the proposed Presidential message recommended by ACDA to Secretary of State Rusk and to you for use at the forthcoming opening of the ENDC./2/ /2/Seaborg wrote this letter after Fisher informed him by phone at 10:45 a.m. the same day that he was going to recommend to President Johnson that he include in his message to the opening of the ENDC "a plea for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a complete cutoff of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons." Fisher, who already knew of the AEC concerns in these areas, agreed that Seaborg would write an accompanying statement giving the AEC's point of view. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, p. 47) The letter printed here is this statement. I and my fellow Commissioners have problems with Presidential reiteration or endorsement at this time of two of the measures which are suggested as part of the disarmament agenda. We feel that it would be a mistake to reiterate at this time our previously stated aim to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." We feel strongly that this is unrealistic in view of the absolute necessity for underground testing in order to meet our announced commitments in the field of strategic offensive weapons such as Poseidon and Minute Man, and strategic defensive weapons such as the Sentinel (ABM). Our second item of concern is a Presidential request at this time to reach agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for use in making nuclear weapons. As you know, we have shut down already seven out of fourteen of our plutonium production reactors and reduced our uranium-235 production by two-thirds. At a minimum, this would require further careful study; the last comprehensive study on a government-wide basis was made in 1964. If something needed to be said on this subject at this time, credit could be taken for what we have already done. Perhaps these measures should be studied by the Committee of Principals before any further public statement is made on them./3/ /3/Regarding the President's decision on his ENDC statement, see Document 256. Respectfully, Glenn T. Seaborg/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Seaborg signed the original.
256. Editorial Note After Glenn Seaborg had written his July 13, 1968, letter to President Johnson (Document 255), he sent it to ACDA Acting Director Fisher for possible inclusion with the draft Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee statement to be forwarded to the President. On the same afternoon Fisher telephoned Seaborg to say that in view of Seaborg's letter, Secretary Rusk asked that a second version of a Presidential ENDC statement be drafted, offering the President a choice. The second version would not reiterate the concerns expressed in Seaborg's letter but simply reference the fact that such offers had been made before. Fisher, DePalma (ACDA), and Allan Labowitz, Seaborg's disarmament assistant, drafted an alternative statement the next day which, according to Seaborg, "merely recites previous U.S. statements regarding a comprehensive test ban and fissionable material cutoff but does not press for them." (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 17, p. 47) Under cover of a memorandum to President Johnson, July 15, Walt Rostow forwarded a July 15 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson which attached a draft Presidential message to the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee the following day. This draft message contained bracketed language reviewing U.S. support for a verifiable comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk explained in his memorandum that he preferred to include the bracketed language, but then continued, "in view of the importance of having a Presidential statement at the opening of the ENDC and the difficulty of resolving conflicting views in the short time available, I recommend that you issue the statement with the bracketed language deleted. At the same time, however, I recommend that you authorize the delegation to the ENDC to reply in the negative if asked by the press or by other delegations whether the lack of any reference to these two items means a basic change in the U.S. position with respect to them." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ENDC, Vol. III, Box 13) In his covering memorandum, Rostow advised President Johnson to "proceed, as Secretary Rusk recommends, with the bracketed language deleted." The approval line, which reads "Statement cleared with bracketed language deleted," is checked. For text of the President's ENDC statement, July 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 815-817.
257. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 11-13-68 Washington, July 18, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; [code word]; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN The Problem To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor by national means limitations on certain Soviet strategic capabilities over the next five years or so. Note The Intelligence Community has been asked to review SNIE 11-10-67, titled as above, dated 14 February 1967, and to update that estimate because of the recent Soviet proposal regarding the discussion of certain arms control measures./2/ In this estimate we give primary consideration to the ability of intelligence to monitor the deployment of certain strategic weapon systems, but we also consider the likelihood of our detecting certain qualitative improvements to various weapon systems. /2/See footnote 6, Document 181. Conclusions A. In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment, we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale increases without our knowledge. The timing of detection and identification would vary with the nature and size of the program. We probably would identify a land-mobile offensive system, for example, but [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] it would be difficult to determine the magnitude of such a force. B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system being tested. Our capabilities are generally better in the case of offensive than of defensive weapons. We believe, for example, that we could detect and identify Soviet testing of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for intercontinental ballistic missiles. We could probably also detect test activity associated with an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements in the deployed forces are better in the case of defensive weapons than offensive ones. To optimize a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system for an ABM role would require such extensive changes that some would almost certainly be detected and identified [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. We see no prospect of determining whether MIRVs (if developed) or other significant improvements had been incorporated in deployed offensive missiles. D. Soviet employment of deception and concealment on a large-scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. While we still believe that substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected, detection would come later in the program, [6 lines of source text not declassified]. E. Factors affecting intelligence collection will vary over the period of this estimate, but intelligence is not expected to be able to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated one or more provisions of an agreement. F. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
258. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland)/1/ Washington, July 22, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab A to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. Dear Harlan: The problem of alliance consultation on the prospective strategic arms limitation talks, to which you refer in your letter of July 12,/2/ is one which we here have fully in mind in our planning. In general, I share your conclusion that our interests and the interests of our allies in this matter can be reconciled. /2/Document 254. I am glad to have your projection of various possibilities for use of alliance consultative machinery in coming months. Until our positions are more fully developed and the course of the talks becomes clearer, we cannot commit ourselves to any specific longer range program of action in alliance consultative and planning bodies. You should continue to make clear as you have already done, that we plan to consult in NAC as the situation develops. At this time, the exchange of views already underway in NAC on possible Soviet motivations and objectives is, in my view, an appropriate starting point for such consultations. You may also cite as appropriate the President's message of July 16 to the ENDC and its indication of an initial emphasis on a limitation or leveling off of strategic delivery systems to be followed by consideration of reductions of existing systems. If it would be useful in further allaying unwarranted concerns, you may point out to our allies that since the US, for sound reasons of national interest, could not conceivably agree to impair its deterrent, the interests of allied governments in maintaining this deterrent would not be affected. At present, there are certain difficulties which you should be particularly alert to avoid. I believe that studies by the International Staff, the NPG, or Polads at this stage could only be detrimental to US freedom of action as we approach discussions in this sensitive area. Moreover, we would not be able to make sufficient data available to them to assure a realistic analysis. Accordingly, you should seek to anticipate and avoid, insofar as possible, any actions or proposals to institute such studies, and continue to concentrate on the numerous other areas of disarmament activity already under consideration in the alliance. It is also important, when the limits of useful consultation cannot yet be delineated, to avoid any actions which would give rise to excessive expectations. As regards the substance of our position, you should be particularly alert to avoiding speculation and discussion of the issue of verification, which is, as you will appreciate, extremely sensitive. We will be giving consideration to a draft statement when the time comes for a fuller statement in the Council. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean
259. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 23, 1968, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Edwin D. Crowley (EUR/GER) and approved in S/S on August 5. The source text is labeled "Part IV of V." The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary His Excellency Franz Josef Strauss, Finance Minister, FRG Secretary Rusk asked Minister Strauss what was at the heart of the German problem on the NPT. Strauss said he would express opinions which were his and not those of the Cabinet nor of the SPD. He was aware that his government had inquired concerning a number of details and he did not want to go into them further. The FRG had been satisfied on most of them. He agreed with the goals of the Treaty. Who would want Nasser, etc., to have a nuclear weapon? The German problem is what will be the political changes over the longer range as a result of the Treaty. If the FRG does or does not sign, it will not change the real situation. He continues to agree that the FRG should not have a nuclear potential. This would be wrong for political reasons. He wondered what rights the Soviets might get from the Treaty for permanent intervention in Germany. Secretary Rusk said he did not quite understand how the Treaty gave the Soviets any new power in that respect. Minister Strauss said the Soviets gave up nothing but got everything including a permanent right of accusing the FRG of doing things it should not do under the Treaty. They will never be satisfied. The USSR would never give access to nuclear weapons to their friends. China already has them. He was also worried whether the Treaty would discourage or encourage unification of Europe. One had to live with the bomb just as one had to live with de Gaulle. Secretary Rusk said he did not see how the Soviets could interfere on the basis of the Treaty. The FRG did not have to accept Soviet safeguard inspectors. Mr. Strauss said his concerns were strengthened by the Soviet communication to the FRG of July 5. He was particularly concerned with references to Article 53 and Article 107 of the UN Charter. In the U.S. view, he knew that their application was overtaken by events. However, the Soviets continued to maintain their right to use military means against those defeated in World War II. Chancellor Kiesinger agreed with him, although he did not say it publicly, that there should be more assurance on interpretations. We have them from the U.S. but not from the Soviets. Secretary Rusk recalled we had gone over the interpretations in NATO. We have told the Russians what we are going to say. We do not expect their public agreement. It is clear if they object, the question arises as to whether there is a Treaty. He said the Russians were fully aware of our view on this subject. He understood it to be the clear desire of the FRG not to leave an option for the FRG but for Europe. The Soviets might object to unification even without a Treaty. France and the UK were not going to give up their nuclear weapons. Strauss said in the case of European unity they eventually would have to transfer them to the unified Europe. Secretary Rusk did not see the use of the withdrawal clause as any more difficult than a decision not to sign the Treaty. If the FRG did not sign, they would still be open to accusations. Strauss said we should not always worry about Soviet accusations. Secretary Rusk recalled that these problems did not just come from the East but from the West. Under Secretary Rostow said, with regard to Strauss' concern about the European option, he had discussed the problem at length with several, including Birrenbach./2/ As a result, he had reviewed the international law of succession, and concluded that whether Europe was formed federally or confederally, the doctrine applied when the parties said it did. Minister Strauss agreed. He recalled that the Secretary once said that the FRG should get rid of the Mercator Projection. It was a fact that the USSR had three neighbors--the United States, Communist China and Europe. If he were a Russian leader, he would do anything to avoid a unified Europe, even a unified Communist Europe. /2/Kurt Birrenbach, prominent West German businessman and member of the Bundestag. Secretary Rusk said that is why we want a unified Europe since if Europe were secure there would be no reason for war between the USSR and the US. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |