1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 24, 1968, 12:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:32 p.m. Mr. President: Sect. Rusk reports as follows on timing of strategic missiles talks: --He raised the matter with Dobrynin. Dobrynin said he had no answer and assumed this was because the leaders in Moscow were "very busy." --Sect. Rusk assumes this is due to their preoccupation with the Czech crisis. --If the Soviets intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, he assumes that the President would wish to consider afresh the timing of these talks. --If, as a result of the current Soviet-Czech meetings the situation is peacefully resolved, he would propose going back shortly to Dobrynin and press him again. Walt
261. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson/1/ Moscow, July 25, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text identifies it as an unofficial translation. Dear Mr. President, We already have agreed between our governments to enter in the near future into the negotiations on the curbing of the strategic armaments race. My colleagues and myself attach great significance to the negotiations on this question. In fact this is one of the major questions of disarmament, which were discussed during the last 20-odd years. A complex/2/ limitation and then a reduction of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles would answer the interests of our countries and not only of our countries. Successful outcome of these negotiations would create favourable conditions for the solution of other big questions in the field of disarmament. /2/The word "overall" has been inserted by hand above this word as an alternate translation. It is also, we believe, far from being all the same for/3/ our countries that the reduction of the strategic armaments would lead to a great saving of money which is being spent now for these purposes. /3/Above the phrase, "far from being all the same for," has been inserted by hand as an alternate translation, "not a matter of indifference to both." We have no doubts that you are now considering, just as we are, all aspects of this problem. We think that within one month or a month and a half the representatives of both our countries could start the exchange of opinions on this question. Our view is that Geneva could be a suitable place for the negotiations. A concrete date of the negotiations could be agreed upon additionally and we will be glad to hear your considerations to that effect. Of course I must tell you frankly that whatever approach to the solution of the problem of curbing the strategic arms race might be it is impossible to consider it in isolation from the whole international situation, from the tension that exists at present in the world. I think that you too, Mr. President, understand this perfectly well. That is why it is necessary to exert all efforts in order to ensure most favourable conditions for the success of negotiations on this extremely important problem. Sincerely, A. Kosygin/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
262. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ SR IM 68-20 Washington, July 26, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. At the bottom of the first page is the following typewritten note: "This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence, Economic Research, and National Estimates." MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND Summary The Soviet decision to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the United States marks a point of convergence for widely differing views within the Kremlin leadership on internal economic goals, military force structure, and the use of military power. Central to the disagreement is the prospect that the relationship of Soviet to US strategic capabilities--which the Soviets have improved in the past few years through expensive weapons development and deployment programs--will erode in the 1970's as the US implements widely publicized plans for improving its strategic weapons. There is probably considerable doubt within the ruling Politburo about the technical prospects and economic effects of trying to counter these developments at this time with new weapons programs. Basic policy controversies may be sharpened as Soviet leaders attempt to formulate positions to be taken in the talks and decide what to do with the freed resources after an arms limitation agreement. Some Politburo members probably hope to divert resources from strategic arms to investment programs. A freeze on deployment of strategic weapons could eventually release as much as 2-1/2 billion rubles a year--equivalent to 13 percent of the total investment in industry in 1967--for other objectives, such as economic growth or an increase in funds for consumer welfare. It is also possible that strong elements within the Politburo see the prospect of stabilizing the strategic arms race as an opportunity to improve Soviet conventional forces and make them a more flexible and responsive arm of political power. The military has not publicly placed its stamp of approval on the talks. On the contrary, it has continued to stress the theme of international dangers and the concomitant requirement for strengthened Soviet defenses. There are, moreover, signs of a debate in military circles whether to pursue further improvements in strategic capabilities or to settle for a stable strategic relationship and broaden the capabilities of the conventional forces. The Kremlin View of the Future US-Soviet Strategic Relationship 1. Recent decisions in the US concerning the Sentinel ABM system probably were read by Soviet leaders as indicating that the US is willing to continue the strategic arms race despite pressures for economizing. On 27 June, Foreign Minister Gromyko included in his address to the Supreme Soviet a statement of Soviet readiness to hold arms control talks./2/ This was followed the next week by a nine-point disarmament proposal by Premier Kosygin./3/ /2/Movement on the decision to enter into strategic arms talks was first presaged in Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's 26 April UN proposal for limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic arms. Soviet media remained silent on Kuznetsov's proposal until he reiterated the line for arms limitations in another UN speech on 20 May. Gromyko's 27 June acceptance of US proposals to talk was promptly published in the Soviet press, with the notable exception of the military press--an indication that important pressure groups within the military had not become reconciled to the Soviet policy change over the previous two months. [Footnote in the source text. For texts of Kuznetsov's April 26 and May 20 statements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 234-243 and 368-378, respectively. For an excerpt from Gromyko's June 27 statement to the Supreme Soviet, see ibid., pp. 450-452.] /3/See footnote 6, Document 252. 2. While the USSR currently is in the final stages of its third-generation ICBM deployment and has an effective deterrent, this capability will begin to erode in the early 1970's if Moscow does not match announced US plans for upgrading its strategic defense and attack capabilities with the Sentinel, Poseidon, and Minuteman III programs. The USSR will have to improve its strategic forces substantially--qualitatively or quantitatively--to maintain its current position relative to the US. 3. What is probably most ominous to the Soviet authorities is that planned US force improvements may threaten the Soviet capability for deterrence. Thus they are faced with the possibility that despite all their planning, effort, and spending on strategic forces over the last 20 years, they will still have reason to be dissatisfied with the future strategic relationship. Guns or Growth: Alternative Uses of Economic Resources 4. Given such strategic considerations alone, Soviet leaders could have come to the conclusion that they had much to gain by breaking the 18-month period of indecision on accepting US proposals for talks on strategic arms limitations. The Politburo as a whole, however, probably opted for talks at this time because of divergent policy views reflecting still unresolved controversies regarding internal economic goals, military force structure, and the utility of various forms and levels of military power. Indeed, basic policy issues may be sharpened as political leaders struggle to form a consensus on a coherent negotiating position while proposals for arms control unfold. 5. Even the announcement of Soviet willingness to negotiate has exposed differences of opinion among leading spokesmen and interest groups. The government organ Izvestiya has endorsed the arms control initiatives contained in the speeches of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Premier Kosygin. Party chief Brezhnev endorsed the talks on 3 July, but qualified his approval at the 8 July military graduates' assembly when he reasserted the military spenders' line that "as long as imperialism exists" the socialist countries will take "every measure to strengthen their defense." The military press has chosen to highlight the harsher aspects of Brezhnev's line, while remaining silent on the desirability of arms limitations. 6. One issue likely to be divisive among the top Soviet leaders is the matter of where to reallocate any resources freed by an agreement. Owing to the vagaries of Kremlin politics, there is no basis for predicting exactly how the Soviet leadership might utilize the resources released by an agreement to limit the expansion of strategic forces. 7. It is possible that among those Politburo members who favor negotiations, strong elements see stability in strategic armaments, if achievable, as an opportunity to turn conventional military forces into a more flexible, efficient arm of political power. Strategic power, nevertheless, appears to hold top priority among these men, some of whom may press for continued qualitative upgrading of the existing strategic forces and an intensification of research and development on new weapon systems. Some Politburo members may not seriously expect that talks would, over the long run, be successful in stabilizing matters. But in the short run, the Politburo as a whole probably has serious reservations about the technical and economic desirability of countering currently programmed US weapons improvements. The majority could thus regard strategic arms talks at this time as a way, at the least, of exploring the US position and seeking to delay US programs at little cost to the USSR. 8. Another group within the Politburo--the more ardent advocates of economic growth--can make a strong case for a major reallocation from defense to the civilian economy at the present time. Increases in consumer welfare, coming on top of expanded military expenditures, are necessarily being accomplished at the expense of investment. The Soviet leadership is thus running the risk of slowing down the rate of economic growth, that is, of impairing future capacity for supporting military as well as civilian programs. Moreover, the substantial increases in defense spending that would be necessary to halt the erosion of the present Soviet strategic position would almost certainly cause long-term economic problems. 9. A precise calculation of the potential savings of any contemplated arms control agreement cannot be made until the detailed terms of the agreement are available. A general appreciation of the possible savings can be obtained, however, by examining the estimates of future Soviet expenditures for the deployment and operation of certain strategic weapons systems--long range bombers, strategic missile and space systems, ballistic-missile submarines, and the ABM--and assuming that there would be a complete moratorium on further deployment of these systems. Under these conditions, the Soviets could reduce expenditures on the average about 2.5 billion rubles a year for the period of the early 1970's. This calculation assumes that the Soviets maintain their current high levels of expenditures for research and development, space efforts, and nonstrategic defense programs. 10. The allocation of the presumed savings in defense expenditures to industrial investment programs would provide a base for accelerated growth in the economy--2.5 billion rubles representing about 13 percent of total Soviet investment in industry in 1967. Since these particular resources include the best managerial and technical talents available, their contribution to the sorely needed modernization of the Soviet economy would probably be even greater than indicated by monetary meas-ures alone. The Military Debate: Strategic Power Versus Usable Power 11. The professional military may have different considerations in mind. In fact, they seem to be of at least two minds on the goals to be sought: one, to pursue a costly attempt to attain a "massive retaliation," or even a first strike, capability; two, to settle for a stable strategic relationship through an arms limitation agreement and to refurbish and expand conventional capabilities to permit more flexible application of military power. Perhaps the division within the military leadership--in conjunction with the other considerations mentioned earlier--facilitated the decision to discuss arms limitations at this time. 12. At any rate, future force structure discussions within the Soviet military have recently carried a particularly polemical tone. For example, Colonel I. Grudinin writing in the late May 1968 issue of Communist of the Armed Forces referred to "certain authors" who fail to emphasize the necessity for "overwhelming" strategic superiority. In contrast to Grudinin-like arguments, Colonel General Povaliy, the planning chief on the Soviet General Staff, had noted two months earlier that overwhelming strategic superiority--or "massive retaliation"--had become "quite unrealistic and unconvincing." 13. The Povaliy article, in the 12 March Red Star, observed that NATO and the United States endorse the policy of fighting future wars with the weapons that "correspond to the nature of the possible clash." It went on to stress that the "imperialists" will continue to try to achieve their goals with the use of only conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. Under the concept of more flexible options, according to Povaliy, a state need not run the risk of nuclear war "in every situation in which its allies become involved" and can pursue its own military-political objectives with the least threat to its security. 14. Certain military leaders are wary of the current trend in Soviet doctrine toward rejection of the "massive retaliation" doctrine as the cornerstone of Soviet strategy. They have argued that the use of conventional forces does not undermine the reliance on nuclear weapons. The development of strategic attack forces, in their view, must continue to command priority. Advocates of this "massive retaliation" view remain a strong force within the Soviet military. French Defense Minister Mess-mer reportedly stated after a visit to Moscow in April that "old Russian generals are really old"--that they cling to a strategy of immediate all-out nuclear retaliation, uninfluenced by any of the recent military doctrines advanced in the US and elsewhere. 15. One well-known old Russian marshal, the late V.D. Sokolovskiy, was a proponent of strong strategic nuclear forces. His book Military Strategy, reissued late last year, reflected the view that any war between nuclear powers will "inevitably" escalate into a general nuclear conflict. The initial period of war will be decisive, the marshal claimed. He added that the Soviet Union will be able to detect preparations for a "surprise nuclear attack" and must have the means to deal the enemy a "crushing blow of decisive significance." 16. Sokolovskiy's views appear to be under attack within the military establishment by advocates of a flexible-response strategy. One such advocate mentioned above, Colonel General Povaliy, remarked to a US military attache that Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy was "obsolete," explaining that Soviet strategy has no label but that the Soviet Union is "ready to meet whatever the situation requires."
263. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin/1/ Washington, July 30, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a July 30 note from Bromley Smith to the President which reads: "This is the retyped letter containing the revisions you suggested in paragraph 2." Other drafts of this letter have not been found. Dear Mr. Chairman: I was much interested in you letter of July 25/2/ on the subject of talks about curbing the strategic arms race. I agree with your remarks about the great importance of this question to both our countries, to other nations as well, and to the general and urgent problem of disarmament. /2/Document 261. We agree that Geneva would be a suitable place for the negotiations. You indicate that a period of a month to a month and a half would provide a suitable interval for preparations. This time period of "a month to a month and a half" is acceptable. As for the level at which the talks might begin, we would be ready to initiate the discussions at the level of Chiefs of Government, Foreign Ministers, or heads of special delegations in Geneva. We will be glad to have your suggestions as to the exact dates and the level of representation. We should also consult upon when and how an announcement of the meeting should be made. There could be some advantage if the general situation would permit an announcement to be made before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Conference in late August./3/ /3/The Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, sponsored by the United Nations, met in Geneva August 29-September 28. See Documents 284 and 286. I do hope that our forthcoming discussions on the strategic arms race can produce constructive results because I believe that our peoples would join in a common desire for a successful outcome. We share, of course, your understanding that it is essential for both of us to make every effort to create the most favorable climate for these talks. If problems arise in the general situation which complicate prospects for success, we can of course be in touch with each other. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
264. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Working Group/1/ Washington, July 31, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Top Secret; Nodis. According to a memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, July 31 (reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 341-342), this paper is a revision of an earlier draft sent to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals on July 26. A copy of the July 26 draft is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. A revision of the July 26 paper, marked "ACDA-2956/Rev.2," dated July 30, and containing proposed last-minute changes by DOD, is attached to a memorandum from Shaw (G/PM) to Bohlen, July 31, with recommendations on the positions Bohlen should take on these proposed changes at the interagency working group meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12) STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated. I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems The proposal would impose a complete ban on the deployment of mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited. B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. V. ABMs The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equal number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed. VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems. VII. Technological Improvements There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement. VIII. Verification The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by national means. IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. B. Ten years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the 10-year period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months notice prior to 11 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
265. Memorandum for the Record/1/ CM-3549-68 Washington, August 5, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by General Wheeler on August 6. SUBJECT 1. On the evening of 5 August, I attended a dinner at the residence of the Netherlands Ambassador in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Stoessel, Ambassador-designate to Poland. Among the guests were Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. After dinner, when we were joining the ladies, Ambassador Dobrynin took the opportunity to engage me in conversation in company with our former Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Gronouski. Mr. Gronouski moved away after a few moments, leaving Ambassador Dobrynin and me alone until the gathering broke up more than 30 minutes later. 2. The early part of Ambassador Dobrynin's remarks were of a general nature. He commented on the differences in the roles of the top military in the Soviet Union and the United States, citing the fact that I regularly attend the Tuesday White House luncheons while the Soviet military never appear at the weekly meetings of the seven-man top ruling group of the Soviet Union and only attend the Politburo meetings when a specific item of a military nature is on the agenda. He commented also on the composition of the classes at our National War College and said they had nothing of a similar nature in the Soviet Union. After about ten minutes, he switched to the subject of the upcoming talks on limitations of strategic missiles which, because he repeated each point several times during the ensuing 25 minutes or so, I presume was the real purpose of his conversation with me. 3. Ambassador Dobrynin made, several times over, the following points: a. In a sense the United States has established goals which the Russians are determined to reach or even surpass. (In the context of his remarks, I was persuaded that he was speaking in this instance of non-military matters.) b. The upcoming Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) could be extremely important because they could lead to further improvements in relations and unspecified benefits to all. c. The Soviets are unsure as to exactly what we want to achieve. Is it a freeze? This doubt has been fertilized by statements by United States officials as to our military superiority in the strategic area. These statements lead to demands for more forces (missile, I assume)--100, 200, 300 more. d. The United States and the Soviet Union are both great nations. If we approach the talks on the basis of equality, results can be achieved. (By inference, Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed the impression that any other approach would negate achievement.) 4. Comment: Ambassador Dobrynin's manner throughout our conversation was very friendly and sincere. Obviously he was determined to make his points with me because he twice refused to be persuaded by our hostess from taking a seat with a group of ladies. He emphasized the importance of us approaching the talks on the basis of "equality." From the way in which he used this word, I gained the impression that he meant two things: First, the recognition on our part that we would be dealing with a militarily equal nation. (Of interest is the fact that the Ambassador said they believed themselves to be ahead of us in certain military areas while recognizing that we were ahead of them in others.) The other meaning which I think he conveyed by his use of the word "equality" was parity of forces; however, he did not at that time elaborate on this aspect nor did he use the word "parity" at any time. 5. As the dinner party broke up, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had enjoyed very much talking to me and hoped to be able to renew our conversation at an early date. Earle G. Wheeler
266. Notes of Meetings/1/ Washington, August 7, 1968. /1/Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 128, and 132-133. No classification marking. [Here follows discussion of a telephone conversation with Donald Hornig on the upcoming IAEA Conference, testing, and the Fermi Award.] At 10:30 a.m. I met with the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Present were Rusk (Chairman), Foster, Fisher, Bohlen, Hornig, Keeney, Helms, Scoville, Harold Brown, General Wheeler, Nitze, Clifford, Warnke; plus Labowitz, Kirby Gean, Ivan Selin (DOD), et al. Rusk opened the meeting by emphasizing that there is a need for finding positive ways to make progress in arms limitation. He suggested that the meeting start with a status report on the work of the interagency Working Group, and called on Adrian Fisher to give the report. Fisher called attention to the fact that the Working Group's conclusions were summarized in his memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, dated July 31, 1968 (copy attached), which enclosed the summary paper, "Strategic Missile Talks Proposal."/2/ He said that, in view of this, and assuming that the Principals have read the paper, he would not take the time to describe it here. He said that it deals solely with a freeze on missiles and not on the production problem. Fisher also referred to the CIA documents analyzing the national detection capabilities. He said we don't yet have individual agency positions on this matter, but we do have a DOD analysis on the military effectiveness of the strategic missile proposal. /2/See footnote 1, Document 264. Rusk then called for the DOD report. Clifford said that this has been a priority item within DOD and Selin would present the briefing. He stated that this material has not yet been evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Selin then made an analysis comparing the U.S. and USSR strategic forces and their effectiveness in first strikes and retaliation from first strikes with and without an agreement on limitation of strategic missiles. He gave us a paper that summarized his remarks. Secretary Clifford then called on General Wheeler to give us his views. Wheeler said that such an arrangement to limit strategic missiles would lead to political problems; one of these would be that it would create a strain within the alliance, another was the possibility the Soviets would clandestinely increase their land-based mobile system, which would be possible because we don't have means of verification. Another problem would arise if we should attempt to limit the radars because we can't verify this. He said he thought the limitations on the ABM might be the core of the problem, that this could make us vulnerable to attacks from Nth countries. Rusk raised the question whether we couldn't establish a Joint U.S.-USSR Commission on Strategic Missiles to serve as a forum to discuss the problems on a day-to-day basis and to monitor the progress in missile limitation. Such a Commission would look into any allegations of violations. This might be better than a formal treaty such as we have for the test ban. In this connection, he asked Foster to think of the form as well as the content of a strategic missiles limitation. Wheeler said he could visualize such a Joint Commission within a treaty, but that a Joint Commission alone would not receive the approval of Congress because they would want to have the terms spelled out. Both Rusk and Foster responded by saying they thought the Joint Commission could be put in a form so that Congress would approve; perhaps a joint resolution of Congress could be used for this purpose. Rusk asked me whether I had any comment. In referring to the briefing by Selin, I said I thought the Soviets surely would go to the building of MIRVs. I asked why this was considered as an uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions. Rusk said that they might want to seek an agreement to prohibit MIRVs, but that if MIRVs were not prohibited, it would seem like the Soviets would add them to their arsenal. I said we should make an analysis of the consequences of both sides eliminating MIRVs and bombers. We then turned to the third agenda item, even though Clifford had left the meeting to take a phone call. Nitze introduced this item, which had to do with the U.S. MIRV test program. He gave us a paper covering this item./3/ Rusk raised the question as to why MIRVs are better than separate re-entry vehicles, and was told by several people present that, for a given launch capability and cost, more coverage could be accomplished with MIRVs than with separate re-entry vehicles. Rusk asked when the first MIRV test is scheduled to take place and Nitze indicated it would be on August 15th or 16th. When Secretary Clifford re-entered the room, Foster asked him whether he thought it was wise for him (Clifford) to hold a press conference announcing the MIRV test program. Foster asked whether it wouldn't be better to have a DOD press officer, such as Phil Goulding, announce it. Rusk suggested that another alternative would be just to issue a written statement. He said there was some belief, for example in the recent Times article, that starting the testing of MIRVs forecloses the possibility of ever prohibiting them. /3/Not further identified. I said it should be remembered that the AEC has an accelerated, or crash program, for the construction of the nuclear warheads for the MIRVs, for Poseidon and for Minuteman III, and that authorization and commitment has already been undertaken for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of construction for this purpose, which is already underway. Rusk summarized the discussion by asking whether anyone was suggesting a postponement of the MIRV tests, and it was apparent that no one was suggesting such a postponement. Rusk indicated that McCarthy might make an issue in the election of suggesting a postponement. On the other hand, if the MIRV tests were postponed, Nixon would make an issue of it. Rusk suggested that DOD try to issue the most unexciting press announcement possible, and as soon as possible. He asked whether the press is always present at the MIRV test launchings, and Nitze said, "Yes, this has been the best policy." Rusk closed the meeting by indicating that the Principals would meet again a week from today, at the same time. I met with Secretary Rusk at 12 noon, at his request, following the Meeting of the Principals. [Here follows discussion of visas for an Israeli and South African to a Soviet conference. At the conclusion of this private meeting, Seaborg noted:] I indicated to Rusk that I have the impression the U.S. is depending very much on the MIRVs for its strategic offensive and deterrent capability and that it would be difficult to get agreement for any treaty which included as a provision the prohibition of MIRVs. [Here follow telephone conversations on the AEC General Advisory Committee and a proposed conference on nuclear power.]
267. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 12, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret. SUBJECT Status of Preparations for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks The Committee of Principals is scheduled to meet at 10:30 am, Wednesday, August 14, to review and prepare recommendations for the President on our proposed position (Tab A)/2/ for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). On Saturday, the JCS completed its review of this specific proposal that has been developed by an Interagency Working Group. On the basis of the JCS recommendation to Secretary Clifford, I believe that the Committee of Principals should be able to agree upon a favorable recommendation to the President on a slightly revised version of this proposal. The JCS, except for the Navy, bought the interagency proposal, subject to four clarifying changes, which should be acceptable to all the other agencies involved. The Navy split was in the form of a proposed modification favoring Navy systems which was not acceptable to the other Chief on the grounds of security. (General Wheeler prepared a separate strong paper rebutting the Navy position.)/3/ I assume, therefore, that Secretary Clifford will support the proposal subject to the changes proposed by the majority of the JCS. (Bob Ginsburgh has presumably obtained an advance copy of the JCS paper for you.)/4/ /2/Not found. Reference presumably is to a draft of Document 264. /3/General Wheeler expressed these views in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Clifford, August 9 (CM-3572-68). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) /4/The JCS position was contained in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford, August 9 (JCSM-498-68). Robert Ginsburgh, NSC Staff Member, forwarded this paper under cover of an August 10 memorandum to Rostow which summarized the paper. (Ibid.) At a meeting of the Committee of Principals last Wednesday, August 7, the status of preparations for the talks was reviewed, and the Committee endorsed Secretary Clifford's decision to proceed on August 16, as scheduled, with the first all-up test launch of the Minuteman III with a MIRV. (See attached Minutes, Tab B.)/5/ As you know, the latter point has been made a major issue by Senator McCarthy and Bob Klieman (New York Times), among others, on the grounds that the successful test of a MIRV would make a strategic freeze impossible. It was agreed that, on the contrary, quite aside from security considerations, a unilateral moratorium on such testing at this time could hurt the prospects for a agreement by its effects on the attitudes of both Congress and the Soviets. /5/Not attached. Seaborg's notes (Document 266) are the only record of the August 7 meeting found. The staff preparations for the talks are on schedule, and I believe in general are in reasonably good shape. The proposed position developed by the Interagency Working Group (Tab A) has been carefully drafted to take into account specific problems that have been advanced while retaining the form of a general commitment. There should be no misunderstanding as to the nature of the proposal on which interagency agreement and Presidential approval are being sought. Systems Analysis has prepared the attached detailed study of the proposal which was summarized for the Committee of Principals last Wednesday. (Presentation to Committee and complete study, Tab C.)/6/ You should read at least the summary presentation to the Committee. Although not formally agreed to within the Pentagon, it appears to be generally accepted as the point of departure in evaluating the proposal. The basic point is that our forces are so large and diverse that our assured destruction capability is relatively insensitive to most forms of qualitative improvements, cheating, or abrogation scenarios. The most serious threat appears to be the rapid clandestine deployment of a massive, highly effective ABM system; however, even in this case, there would be compensatory actions we could take to maintain a high level of assured destruction. /6/Not found. CIA has prepared the attached SNIE 11-13-68 (Tab D),/7/ which was approved by USIB, estimating the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor the proposal by national means. This is, in general, an excellent, responsible job, which comes directly to grips with the problem and does not hide behind qualifying uncertainties. You should read it in its entirety. It does not, however, answer all the questions. In particular, I am not satisfied with the treatment of MIRVs which, although not now covered in our proposal, could be subsequently introduced by the Soviets or ourselves. While on balance the judgment may well be correct that we would probably detect a Soviet MIRV test program, I am not yet convinced of the intelligence community's ability to back up this conclusion in the face of critics fearful of a Soviet clandestine program. /7/Document 257. CIA and DIA have also prepared a detailed report (Tab E)/8/ concerning the critical problem of the possibility of upgrading the Tallinn SAM system into an ABM system unknown to our unilateral intelligence. As I indicated above, the military analysis concluded that this type of development was the most serious threat we would face under the agreement. Unfortunately, this report is somewhat confusing since, although it concludes that the system could be upgraded to have ABM capabilities without our knowledge, it also concludes that the resulting system would have quite limited capabilities and be extremely vulnerable. The problem of defining present and future capabilities of the Tallinn system clearly remains one of the most serious and difficult issues to be dealt with in these talks. /8/Dated August 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) In view of the above, I think we can now count on being able to pre-sent an agreed-upon, forthcoming specific proposal, which has been staffed in considerable depth, in the event the talks begin in the next few weeks. There are, however, still some major tactical issues that will have to be resolved before the initiation of the talks. I believe the most difficult of these will be how we deal with the question of on-site inspections. Although it is agreed that our present proposal could be monitored by unilateral means, it is also obvious that it could be more effectively monitored if there were provisions for on-site inspection of critical facilities or suspicious activities. The JCS has specifically asked that an effort be made to obtain provisions for on-site inspections. How this is to be done in an effective manner in the talks without jeopardizing the prospects of success, since we have certainly implied our proposal would not require on-site inspection, will be a major challenge to the skill of our negotiators. There are also a number of major unresolved substantive issues which preferably should be resolved before the talks but will certainly have to be resolved early in the negotiations if they appear to be going anywhere. The most important of these is what level of limitation on ABM deployment we wish to achieve. Our present position calls only for a "set and equal number," and we have not as yet agreed on a preferred level. Consideration is currently being given to the relative merits of 0, 100, 600, and 1000. Closely related is the difficult issue of how to deal with the Tallinn system in defining its present capabilities and controlling future upgrading. Finally, there is the general question of whether the agreement should be in the form of a detailed formal treaty or some form of informal understanding. Spurgeon
268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 13, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. SUBJECT I. We have examined the Arms Control Proposal as described in Tab A,/2/ and have found that, on balance, and subject to the assumptions and conditions set forth in Section III below, an agreement based upon it/3/ would allow the actions necessary to preserve U.S. security. Specifically, we conclude that within the terms of such an agreement we would be able to: /2/Not found. /3/The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe that the proposal should be revised as indicated in Tab D. [Footnote in the source text. Tab D is an undated paper, "Modification of the Proposal Proposed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps."] a. maintain the U.S. deterrent posture; b. leave the Soviet Government and world opinion in no doubt as to the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent posture; c. be confident within the terms of the agreement that our deterrent posture could not be eroded by the actions of the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power, alone or in combination; d. maintain a U.S. capability to limit damage to the United States by Soviet forces if deterrence fails, at least as effective as that which we can expect to obtain in the absence of an agreement; and e. provide a strategic capability that would prevent nuclear powers other than the Soviet Union from threatening the stability of the agreement. II. Our conclusions in regard to the agreement are based on an analysis of the next 8-10 years. However, we cannot predict new Soviet weapon systems more than a few years ahead, and, therefore, we must continually have the freedom to reassess and to revise the agreement, or withdraw. We know of no way to determine whether the agreement--if it should remain unchanged--will continue to be in our interest. It is contemplated that we would exercise our right to terminate the agreement if we conclude that our national interest can be better protected in a different way. We must be prepared to withdraw at any time if our security requires us to do so. We also believe that the agreement proposed may well need modification from time to time if it is to continue to preserve our security. In particular, we are concerned that freezing the location and inhibiting our ability to harden existing land-based silos could over time lead to a situation of instability, in that our land-based missile force might be destroyed in a first strike by the Soviet offensive missile forces; this situation could develop if the Soviets were to exploit their potential for substantially increasing their present advantage in throw weight and installing MIRV's, both of which are permitted under the agreement. Over the next few years the proposed agreement cannot lead to major budgetary savings and could even require some increases in spending; over a longer period the savings could be substantial if we were able to forego the new programs that might be rendered unnecessary by Soviet acceptance of the agreement and the Soviets decided unilaterally to forego upgrading systems not limited by the agreement. Of greater importance, we believe that the agreement could lead to greater security for the United States over the next 8-10 years, provided that we take the necessary actions to maintain the effectiveness of our strategic forces and remain in a position to react promptly if the agreement is suddenly terminated. III. Our conclusion that the agreement would preserve the security of the U.S. is based on the following assumptions and conditions: a. We must be confident that we possess a means of verifying an adequate degree of compliance with the agreement. Based on both the assessment of the Intelligence Community concerning their capability to verify compliance and the sensitivity of U.S. security to Soviet cheating or abrogation, we believe that national means of verification would enable us to monitor the various specific limitations in the agreement, with varying degrees of effectiveness. We have confidence that we would be able to monitor the agreement in terms of numbers of fixed, land-based offensive and defensive missile system launchers of known characteristics. However, within the fixed offensive systems we have low confidence that we can verify the prohibition against upgrading IR/MRBM launchers to an ICBM capability and defensive missile systems to a BMD capability. We also have low confidence that national means of verification would permit us to monitor the terms of the agreement as they pertain to mobile offensive and defensive systems. We must therefore: (1) make a concerted effort to secure Soviet consent to some form of inspection involving intrusion into each other's territory and air space to verify limitations on systems other than those which we have reasonable confidence of verifying through unilateral means alone. Such agreed inspection procedures would increase the confidence of each side in the other side's compliance with the agreement, as well as the general confidence of allies that the results of the agreement are likely to be beneficial. It would permit a more comprehensive agreement. It also is likely to increase the stability of conditions and relationships; (2) be prepared to use the necessary information from intelligence sources to call possible violations to the attention of the Soviet Union; (3) be prepared to withdraw from the agreement, if necessary, justifying our actions by the public disclosure of data from intelligence sources; (4) be prepared to withdraw from the agreement if the Soviets take steps which erode our ability to monitor their compliance, since our verification capability would be significantly degraded by Soviet efforts at concealment, evasion, or interference. b. An upper limit on ABM defense should be set at an equivalent number of fixed land-based BMD-capable launchers and associated missiles, including reload missiles. The exact ABM limits would be determined during the course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, based upon an assessment of Soviet ABM-capable launchers and missile levels and our overall security objectives as they relate to other nuclear powers and to all the provisions of the agreement. The number should take cognizance of the need to defend against a threat from the CPR or other nuclear power during the period of the agreement. c. We must have satisfactory assurances that present and future antiaircraft missile systems are not and will not become BMD systems. We should take the initial position that, unless the Soviets can assure us that SA-5 (Tallinn) is not and will not become a BMD system, it must be included in the Soviet ABM launcher limit. The degree of assurance required will depend on the results of technical study of our ability to detect a Soviet program to upgrade Tallinn to achieve various degrees of BMD potential. d. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We must be assured that the Soviets do not replace existing IR/MRBM missiles unless they can satisfy us that the new missiles do not possess an ICBM capability. We would consider their failure to provide us with adequate assurances, as needed, as constituting grounds justifying our withdrawing from the agreement. e. The agreement covers only what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Specifically, there will be no prohibition on the development or deployment of aircraft and air defense systems (except to prohibit their acquiring a BMD capability), on civil defense, or ASW, on research and development, or on the qualitative improvement of forces within the constraints specified in the agreement. The development and deployment of improved post-boost vehicles capable of delivering MIRV's to individual targets or on depressed trajectories would not be prohibited. f. Our judgment of acceptability is based on examination of the proposal as a whole. We have not considered whether separate parts of it would constitute an acceptable agreement. We would want to examine any proposal which was confined to such separate parts, or which proposed an agreement of wider scope. g. When and if a proposal is approved for negotiation with the Soviet Union, we would want the opportunity to comment on negotiating strategy and tactics, instructions to the delegation, and on the initial presentation and other statements of the U.S. position. h. The agreement must be in the form of a treaty to be ratified by both countries./4/ /4/A handwritten notation in the margin next to this sentence reads: "Sect. Rusk questions this. W[alt]." i. The U.S. must make it clear to the Soviet Union that either party would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated--and in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement--under any of the following circumstances: (1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened; (2) if events lead either party to believe that its deterrent capability is threatened; (3) if there is evidence of substantial concealment of systems affected by the agreement or evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement; (4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement. j. A system of unilateral safeguards must be established to insure that the agreement continues to be in our interest and to insure that if the Soviets violate or abrogate the agreement, or we decide for other reasons to withdraw from the agreement, that we are in a position to take the steps necessary to maintain our security. IV. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concur in this memorandum. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concur in full in this memorandum. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concur in the memorandum except that they believe that the proposal should be modified as shown at Tab D. The views of the Joint Chiefs are at Tab B./5/ The views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on the CNO/CMC position are at Tab C./6/ /5/See footnote 4, Document 267. /6/See footnote 3, Document 267. Clark M. Clifford
269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 15, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT The Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals has developed and evaluated a U.S. proposal for Strategic Arms Limitation for discussion with the Soviets (Tab A). The recommended proposal would prohibit the initiation of further deployments of offensive strategic missile systems and limit the deployment of ballistic missile defensive systems. No reductions in forces would be called for, and qualitative improvements would be permitted. No limitation would be placed on strategic aircraft or on defenses against aircraft. The limitations in the proposal are proposed to be verified by external means. The Executive Committee has unanimously concurred in this proposal as a basis for discussion with the USSR. They have concluded that within the terms of such an agreement the U.S. would be able to: a. maintain the U.S. deterrent posture; b. leave the Soviet Government and world opinion in no doubt as to the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent posture; c. be confident within the terms of the agreement that our deterrent posture could not be eroded by the action of the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power, alone or in combination; d. maintain a U.S. capability to limit damage to the United States by Soviet forces if deterrence fails, at least as effective as that which we can expect to obtain in the absence of an agreement; and e. provide a strategic capability that would prevent nuclear powers other than the Soviet Union from threatening the stability of the agreement. The specific views of the Department of State and ACDA are appended at Tab B. The views of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are appended at Tab C./2/ /2/Document 268. I am preparing instructions for the U.S. Delegation based on this recommended proposal and would forward those instructions to you if you concur with the recommended proposal. Recommendation That you approve the attached proposal as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Union./3/ /3/There is no indication whether President Johnson approved or disapproved the recommendation. Dean Rusk
Tab A/4/ Paper Approved by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals/5/ Washington, August 14, 1968. /4/Top Secret; Nodis. /5/This paper was agreed to at the August 14 meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals. No formal record of this meeting has been found, but an earlier draft of this paper, ACDA-2956/Rev. 4, August 13, is identical to the source text except for the substitution in Part VIII of the word "external" for "national" in the August 13 draft. An August 13 memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals attached to the August 13 draft lists the changes in the August 13 draft from a earlier unidentified draft and indicates that the changes were suggested by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) For text of an earlier draft of this paper, dated July 31, see Document 264. Neither the July 31 or August 14 draft bears an ACDA document number. STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated. I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited. B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. V. ABMs The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles including reload missiles. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed. VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems. VII. Technological Improvements There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement. VIII. Verification The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by external means. IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. B. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to ten years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Tab B/6/ Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson Washington, August 15, 1968. /6/Top Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT The proposed strategic missile limitation agreement which has been concurred in by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, would, if successfully negotiated, be demonstrably in the net interest of the United States and, we believe, in the interest of the Soviet Union as well. By imposing limitations on the numbers of strategic offensive and defensive missiles which each side could deploy, the proposed agreement would contain the strategic arms competition and avert a likely dangerous and costly new spiral in the arms race between the two superpowers. The achievement of such an agreement would also demonstrate to others the common determination of the U.S. and the USSR to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus contribute to the goal of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would increase the chances of reaching more comprehensive agreements involving reductions in strategic arms and, hopefully, facilitate agreement on other bilateral and multilateral arms control measures. The agreement could be a major factor in reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war and in promoting a meaningful detente. Above all, an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR of this nature could profoundly alter the complexion of East-West relationships and provide a climate wherein cooperative efforts could be directed toward solving other critical world problems. The agreement would specifically enhance strategic stability between the U.S. and the USSR because of two primary factors: 1. Each side would retain a secure deterrent force, with minimum incentive for launching a first strike in times of crises; 2. The foundation would be laid for a continuing exchange of views on strategic matters, thus helping to avert the mutual suspicions and overreactions which have characterized the past strategic situation. The effect of the proposed agreement on the strategic balance should be compared with the future strategic environment which is most likely to prevail in the absence of such an agreement. Without the constraints imposed by the agreement, we estimate that the Soviet Union, by the middle 1970's, could have deployed at least 1,500 ICBM's, a submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet comparable to our present Polaris force, some new land-mobile offensive missiles, and an ABM system containing almost three times as many interceptor missiles as the planned U.S. Sentinel system. The Soviets are, of course, capable of deploying a strategic force even larger and more powerful. While our presently programmed strategic forces are adequate to cope with the probable future Soviet threat, we might be obliged to procure substantial qualitative and quantitative additions to maintain our deterrent if we were to see signs that the Soviets were moving towards more extensive offensive and defensive programs. If, however, the agreement were acceptable to the Soviet Union, Soviet strategic forces would be constrained in four important ways: 1. The rapid recent expansion of Soviet ICBM deployments would be halted at numbers of launchers essentially equal to the U.S.; 2. The number of new-generation Soviet Polaris-type submarines would be held to a level well below half of the U.S. force; 3. The otherwise very likely deployment of Soviet land-mobile ICBM's would be precluded; 4. The level of Soviet ABM's would be limited to an equivalent of a U.S. deployment. At the same time, the proposed agreement, if accepted in its present form, would have no significant effect on present U.S. plans regarding strategic weapons systems. We would still have the options of going ahead with the current programmed improvements in our capabilities, including advanced offensive missiles with MIRV's (Poseidon and Minuteman III). However, with the constraints placed on Soviet strategic forces under the proposed agreement, the United States would not have to procure major new strategic offensive systems, or an extensive ABM system, in order to maintain an adequate deterrent. Although we consider that limitations on radars for ABM systems is a most significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of the JCS concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The Executive Committee agreed that the problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn antiaircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations. Because of the strategic situation which would exist under the agreement, both our absolute and relative strategic deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power or combinations thereof--in terms of our assured destruction and damage-limitation criteria--would be at least as good as, and in many circumstances considerably better than, would probably be the case in the absence of an agreement. The United States Intelligence Board has prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate which evaluates our external capabilities; i.e., those that do not depend upon agreed access to the USSR, to verify strategic arms control agreements. Using external means alone, we have in some instances very high confidence of detecting Soviet violations at an early state; in all others, we are confident of detecting violations well before they could measurably alter the strategic balance. In those areas where our capabilities are lowest, it would still be in our interest to propose limitations since potential violations would not significantly affect our security and the limitations would provide inhibitions to Soviet actions which they might otherwise freely undertake if no agreement existed. Thus, we conclude that our ability to verify the agreement by external means alone is adequate, even taking into account the margin of uncertainty in some of our external verification capabilities and our need for adequate safeguards against possible Soviet violation or abrogation. This is reinforced by the fact that the agreement would not affect present U.S. programs but would constrain Soviet forces below the threat levels used to justify these programs. Therefore, we estimate that the potential risks to our deterrent due to possible Soviet evasion of the terms of the agreement are less serious than the risks we would face in the absence of an agreement. All of this, however, does not exclude the possibility of probing Soviet receptivity to a supplementary verification arrangement which would increase confidence in the viability of the agreement. No agreement dealing with the extraordinarily complicated question of limiting strategic armaments can be initially designed to solve all possible problems which could arise from technological or political changes which may occur after the agreement is reached. Recognizing this, the proposed agreement allows for mutually agreeable revisions to be made to the basic agreement in order to preserve its stability and satisfy the security interests of each party. It also contains a withdrawal provision in the event that one side comes to believe that its vital security interests have become endangered by the agreement. It may also be desirable to create some bilateral consultative machinery to ensure the viability of the agreement on a day-to-day basis. No recommendations are made at present as to tactics on how this proposal will be negotiated with the Soviets, but we do not believe that all elements in it should be presented to them at once. We recommend that you approve the attached proposal as a basis for the initial discussions with the USSR on limiting the strategic arms race. Dean Rusk William C. Foster [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |