1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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270. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 15, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. Dear Dean: The proposed memorandum for the President concerning Arms Control on the Seabed has been reviewed within the Department of Defense./2/ /2/Secretary Rusk sent a memorandum to Clifford on July 31, requesting his concurrence on an attached memorandum to President Johnson seeking Presidential approval of a proposed statement on arms control of the seabed to be made by the U.S. Representative to the upcoming conference of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed at Rio de Janeiro. The memorandum also provided rationale for the proposed statement. Clifford forwarded the memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment; they responded with a memorandum to Clifford (JCSM-497-68), August 10. These documents are ibid. I agree that there may be serious disadvantages in a United States refusal to be forthcoming on the issue of peaceful purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this view. However, we have certain difficulties with the specific arms control proposal set forth in the draft formulation of a U.S. statement on this subject. I am therefore enclosing an alternative draft statement incorporating some changes which I believe will cover the concerns expressed in the discussion portion of the draft memorandum while affording more adequate protection for the national security interest./3/ /3/Tab A. I am in general agreement with the discussion which supports the proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested some changes in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this section which will more accurately reflect their previously expressed views. I agree with these suggested changes so they are also attached./4/ /4/Tab B. Sincerely, Clark
Tab A/5/ Memorandum for the President Washington, undated. /5/Secret. Crossed through text on the source text reproduced here as underlined text. SUBJECT Recommendation: That, during the August 19-30 meeting of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed, the United States Representative be authorized to state: "The United States supports the adoption of a General Assembly resolution declaring that the seabed and deep ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The United States has previously supported, in the Space Treaty of 1967, the use exclusively for peaceful purposes of the moon and other celestial bodies. As we said then we understand that the test of whether an activity is 'peaceful' is whether it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of international law. "We believe it is important to prevent the spread of the arms race to new environments. It is appropriate that the General Assembly should go on record in support of this proposition as the Assembly addresses itself to the future use of the seabed and deep ocean floor. A resolution declaring that the deep ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It is evident that preventing the spread of the arms race to this new environment requires meaningful and effective measures of arms control, and to that end the careful elaboration of legal instruments taking the form of an international agreement. There must obviously be reliable and effective means for verifying compliance with such an agreement. However, considering that the term 'peaceful purposes' does not preclude military activities generally, specific limitations on certain military activities will require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement. "To that end the United States proposes that the ENDC undertake negotiations with a view to achieving an examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement pursuant to may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or deep ocean floor, beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed at launching platforms and delivery systems as well as weapons themselves. These discussions must also consider the need for reliable and effective means for verifying compliance with such an agreement. Other military activities would continue to be conducted in accordance with the principle of freedom of the seas and exclusively for peaceful purposes. "We propose that (this Committee or General Assembly) request the ENDC to take up this question."
Tab B/6/ /6/Secret. EXCERPT FROM JCSM-497-68, dated 10 August 1968 "3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have no objection to the "Discussion" provided the following changes are made: a. Substitute the following for paragraph 5: "5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understandably have been concerned about the question of verification of a ban on seabed emplacement of nuclear weapons. On 27 April 1968, they stated that the United States did not have a verification capability./7/ They also stated that they did not believe that any nation had such a capability. However, this issue is now under intensive study by the intelligence community. In any event, during discussions in the ENDC there will be a full opportunity to investigate the problems of verification and to satisfy ourselves as to how they will be handled before we enter into new treaty commitments." /7/Document 236. Reason: Accuracy. b. Substitute the following for paragraph 6: "6. Although there is no formally planned weapons system on the deep ocean bottom, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that the option of a future nuclear weapons system in this environment should remain open. Should technological developments by the United States make this option feasible, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the use of the deep ocean bottom would be more advantageous to the United States than to the USSR. Paragraph 3 of the recommended statement uses the language you recently approved for use in the United Nations. This language was carefully formulated so as not to foreclose any military options prematurely. We have taken action to reassure our NATO Allies that it is not our intention to foreclose this option but only to define those factors vital to the consideration of an agreement in this area. The definition of these factors, along with the progress made in the strategic missile talks to which a seabed agreement is a logical corollary, may determine whether an agreement in this area should be pursued." Reason: To make the discussion support the recommended change to paragraph 3 of the proposed statement and to express more clearly the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /8/Printed from a copy that indicates Sianis signed the original.
271. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 11-12-68 Washington, August 15, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS The Problem To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor a ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed--defined as the ocean floor outside territorial waters--and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet or third country deployment of such weapons, during the next 10 years or so. Scope For the purposes of this estimate, the following types of weapons are assumed to be prohibited: a. Manned or unmanned installations containing nuclear weapons or missiles, encapsulated nuclear missiles, and nuclear mines, resting on, anchored to, or imbedded in the seabed. b. Nuclear weapon systems designed to operate primarily on the seabed but having the characteristic of mobility. While chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction could theoretically be emplaced on the seabed, the problems of their detection and identification would be the same as in the case of nuclear weapons. Likewise, the considerations affecting intent would be virtually the same. Hence in this estimate, only nuclear weapons are specifically discussed. Mobile strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems of mass destruction whose principal object is to make use of the seas, as opposed to the seabed, are assumed not to be banned and are, therefore, beyond the scope of this estimate. Neither will the temporary anchorage of ships or submarines to the seabed, whether for emergency purposes, for purposes incident to navigation, for purposes of avoiding detection, or for preparations to launch missiles, be considered in this estimate. Conclusions A. We believe that neither the USSR nor any other country would, during the period of this estimate, deploy weapons of mass destruction on the seabed in violation of an agreement banning such deployment. If any signatory decided that it could no longer tolerate the restrictions imposed by the agreement, we believe that it would abrogate the agreement openly rather than try secret evasion, probably after making covert preparations for the prohibited emplacement in advance of the announcement. B. The time required for detection and verification of a violation would vary with the nature, size, and location of the prohibited deployment. It would be difficult for us to identify a seabed weapon system as such prior to deployment. Detection of predeployment activity, however, and of support systems and activities associated with installation, checkout, maintenance, resupply, and command and control, would arouse our suspicions and would probably lead to eventual detection and identification of the prohibited deployment. C. We believe that deployment under the open ocean would be detected before a large number of missiles became operational. The deployment of a small number might escape detection for some time after they became operational. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] D. Even after detection of deployment, verification of a violation would probably be a costly and time-consuming process, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Discussion I. General Considerations 1. In assessing our ability to monitor an agreement of the sort being considered here, it must be remembered that we are dealing with the development and deployment of radically new weapon systems, the characteristics of which we can only imagine on the basis of our knowledge of relevant US and Soviet technology. Essentially, we are faced with consideration of two general types of weapon systems. The first would employ a missile deployed on the seabed and launched to a distant target. Such a system would be highly sophisticated and would use new technology and new methods of operation and control. The other type would consist of a nuclear weapon emplaced on the seabed near its intended target to be exploded without ejection from the water, in the nature of a mine. The characteristics of any such systems would be much different from the characteristics of those weapon systems upon which our past monitoring experience is based. In this respect, any judgments which we make with respect to our capability to monitor a seabed weapons agreement must necessarily be tentative. 2. Our regular sources of intelligence information--SIGINT, overhead photography, and human sources--would be a significant part of our detection capabilities [5 lines of source text not declassified]. 3. [11 lines of source text not declassified] [Here follow Part II: "The Likelihood of Seabed Weapons Deployment" and Part III: "The Monitoring System."]
272. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 15, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Secretary Rusk on August 16. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH In a relaxed and extensive informal talk with Ambassador Dobrynin on the evening of Thursday, August 15th, the following points emerged: 1. I pointed out that the alternatives which we had suggested as to the level at which offensive-defensive missile talks might begin were for the purpose of making a prompt reply by the Soviet Union somewhat easier if our original suggestion had caused complications. The alternatives were given in a rough order of priority as far as our own choices were concerned. The Ambassador said that he might have a reply on the 16th or 17th because the Soviet leadership has its meetings usually on Thursdays--similar to our Tuesday luncheons at the White House. I told him that I thought there would be advantage in our being able to announce the time and place of such talks before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Conference later this month in Geneva./2/ /2/Regarding this conference, see footnote 3, Document 263, and Documents 284 and 286. 2. On the substance of the offensive-defensive missile talks, Dobrynin reflected great earnestness in the importance of the talks and the seriousness with which he considered the subject. I told him that I thought that these talks might well be the most important talks between our two countries since World War II--and he agreed. He asked about our Poseidon and Minute Man Tests and I told him that it was not possible for us to proceed on the basis that we already had an agreement prior to reaching one. I said that these tests have been laid on for a long, long time and that the timing was not connected in any way with the timing of discussions. He seemed quite relaxed on this point. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and recent Soviet contacts with Senator Mansfield and Richard Nixon.] 6. I reminded the Ambassador that he had telephoned me last week expressing concern about the Euratom countries entering a "reservation" at the time of signing the NPT. I told him that my information was that these countries did not intend to enter a "reservation but were stating that the timing of the ratification of the NPT on their part would be related to an agreement between Euratom and IAEA on safeguards. [Here follows discussion of Gromyko's upcoming visit to the U.N. General Assembly, ratification of the Consular Agreement, Soviet proposals for a communications satellite system, and U.S. domestic politics.] DR
273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson c Washington, August 16, 1968, 3:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Secretary Rusk submits for your approval a strategic arms limitation proposal (Tab A)/2/ for discussion with the Soviets. The proposal has been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). /2/Document 269, including Tab A. In the JCS review, Generals Wheeler, Westmoreland, and McConnell concurred in the proposal as submitted to you; however, Admiral Moore and General Chapman recommended certain modifications favorable to the Navy that were not acceptable to the other Chiefs. Paul Nitze and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also concur in the proposal as submitted. I regard the agreement reached--and the collegial way it was accomplished, on a most difficult issue--as the functioning of the U.S. Government at its best. Attached to Rusk's memorandum are more detailed memoranda to you from Rusk and Foster (Tab B)/3/ and Clifford (Tab C)/4/ to which are also attached the Chiefs' position and General Wheeler's personal recommendation against the Navy position. /3/Printed as Tab B, Document 269. /4/Document 268. In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge that you read these attachments in their entirety. I have also attached, for your information, SNIE 11-13-68/5/ concerning U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor such an agreement, which is a critical issue in evaluating this proposal. /5/Document 257. This proposal represents the coordinated effort of the community to define a reasonable package, which might be negotiable with the Soviets, within the following basic ground-rule: that the agreement be verifiable by external means alone to the extent necessary to protect U.S. security interests; that is, it goes as far as we can safely go without on-the-ground inspection. Although there is now agreement that the proposal is in a form that can be discussed with the Soviets, there are still certain important unresolved features of the proposal and underlying issues of which you should be aware: --The most important unresolved aspect of the proposal is the level of limitations that would be placed on ABM deployments. Our present position calls only for a "set and equivalent number" of ABM launchers, and we have not yet agreed internally on a preferred number. Our final decision will be influenced by the Soviet position on this subject. --Closely related to this is the very difficult underlying intelligence problem of how we should deal with the Tallinn SAM system in defining its present capabilities and controlling future upgrading that might give it some ABM capability. While it is agreed that the relationship of radars to this question will have to be studied further and discussed with the Soviets, it is not yet agreed precisely how this should be handled and whether it should be formally dealt with in an agreement. --There are also difficult tactical problems yet to be resolved, such as how to deal with "on-site inspections" in the proposal. Although the proposal has been developed on the assumption that it could be monitored by external means alone, there is no question that on-site inspection would be very helpful in building mutual confidence and greatly help unresolved issues such as those presented by the Tallinn system. Secretary Clifford and the JCS have asked that an effort be made to include on-site inspection in the agreement we finally reach with the Soviets. How this can be done effectively with any chance of success without jeopardizing the prospects for the talks presents a major challenge to our negotiators. The community is now working on basic instructions for the negotiating delegation which will deal with this and other tactical problems. As I noted earlier, I believe that the preparation of this proposal is an example of intra-governmental cooperation at its best. If the talks prove fruitful, we will face many difficult issues that can only be successfully resolved if this cooperative attitude is sustained. I recommend that you tentatively approve the proposal as a basis for additional preparations for the talks, subject to a meeting with the Principals as soon as we obtain agreement from the Soviets on the nature and timing of the talks. Walt Approve proposal subject to final meeting with Principals /6/None of these options is checked.
274. Editorial Note During the summer months of 1968, U.S. and Soviet principals explored the possibility of a summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. Following the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1 (see Document 250), for example, Secretary Rusk and Dobrynin privately explored the possibility and timing of such a meeting which, they agreed, might focus particularly on the strategic missile talks. (Memorandum of Conversation, July 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union, Box 11) Finally, on the afternoon of August 19, Dobrynin handed Walt Rostow a note, which proposed that President Johnson meet with Soviet leaders in Leningrad in early October and also suggested the text of the announcement of the President's upcoming visit. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, August 19, ibid.) Moreover, in an August 20 letter to President Johnson, Kosygin proposed that the missile talks might open in Geneva on September 30 and suggested the text of an announcement of the talks. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 20, Walt Rostow wrote: "The agreement announced this morning that the President will confer with leaders within the Soviet Union in early October is the outcome of a long process," and he proceeded to provide a detailed summary of the background of the steps leading to the anticipated summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. He provided all this information to Rusk "for your and my backgrounders tomorrow," presumably to brief the press on the upcoming summit meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, "Trip to Soviet Union," Box 11) No announcement of a summit meeting on August 20 has been found, but Rostow apparently meant a public announcement the following morning. Rostow concluded his August 20 memorandum to Rusk, as follows: "Although the opening of the strategic missile talks was probably a catalyst that led to this decision by the two Governments, the meeting of President Johnson with Chairman Kosygin will undoubtedly be the occasion to consult on: --a variety of bilateral matters; --next steps in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; --the possibilities of bringing our positions closer on the Middle East and on Vietnam." With the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops on the night of August 20-21, however, the proposed summit meeting was put on hold. At a meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 8:15-8:42 p.m. on August 20, which Dobrynin requested, the Soviet Ambassador informed President Johnson and Walt Rostow of the military intervention. At this meeting nothing was said to indicate that the summit would not be announced as planned. But at a hastily summoned meeting of the National Security Council from 10:15-11:10 p.m., it was agreed that the summit announcement would be delayed indefinitely and that Secretary Rusk would summon Dobrynin to his office to tell him about the postponement of the summit announcement and to raise the administration's concerns about the military incursion into Czechoslovakia. Records of these meetings are printed in Foreign Relations, volume XVII, Documents 80 and 81. Context for the changing U.S. position on the evening of August 20 is given in Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pages 487-489, and Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, page 438. Several weeks later, John P. Roche, who had recently resigned as Special Assistant to the President, confirmed that the announcement of the summit was scheduled for August 21 but was not made because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (New York Times, September 24, 1968, page 5) Additional documentation on a proposed U.S.-Soviet summit in the latter half of 1968 is scheduled for publication in volume XIV.
275. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals/1/ ACDA-3024 Washington, August 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Typewritten notations on pages 3 and 7 indicate that they were revised on September 11. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room. PARTICIPANTS /2/Not printed. REFERENCES /3/Attached to the August 21 memorandum, "Initial Presentation of US Position and Basic Position Paper," are earlier drafts, ACDA-2951/Rev. 3 and ACDA-3009/Rev. 2. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83 Committee of Principals Master Book #2, July-September 1968) /4/The August 22 memorandum is entitled "Suggested Changes in Initial Presentation and in Basic Position Paper." (Ibid.) Summary of Actions 1. It was agreed that hereafter the term "national" means of verification would be used in place of "unilateral" or "external." An explanation of this term should be prepared and consideration given as to informing the Soviets of our understanding of its meaning. 2. Paragraph 7 on page 3 of the Basic Position Paper (ACDA-3009/Rev. 2, August 20, 1968, which was attached to Reference 1 above) was revised as follows: "7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the delegation.)" 3. Paragraph V-4 on page 14 was revised as follows: "4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the U.S. Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be/5/ included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense." /5/Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert "limited and" after "must be" in line 5. [Footnote in the source text.] 4. The Secretary of State recommended that consideration be given to modifying Paragraph X-1 on page 22 as follows: "1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Any agreement should be sufficiently explicit to minimize subsequent possible misunderstandings. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time."/6/ /6/Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to delete second sentence of proposed paragraph X-1 and insert the following sentence at the end: "Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions." [Footnote in the source text.] 5. No comments were made on the other changes agreed and recommended by the Working Group in its memorandum of August 22, 1968 (ACDA-3011). Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the question of going ahead with the talks and the timing were now obviously uncertain as a result of the Czechoslovak situation./7/ However, it was not the purpose of the Executive Committee meeting to consider that, but to give to the President the necessary material to permit him to go ahead with the talks if and when he desired. /7/See Document 274. Mr. Foster reported that, as a result of a suggestion by the Defense Department, the Working Group had met in the morning and prepared some revisions to the draft Initial Presentation and Basic Position Paper previously forwarded to the Executive Committee (Reference 1). With the exception of the four items covered in the memorandum from the Working Group to the Executive Committee (Reference 2), the Working Group agreed on all other changes. Mr. Fisher then discussed point No. 1 of Reference 2 dealing with what term to use to describe certain verification methods. It was pointed out that in previous correspondence with the Soviets the terms "unilateral" and "national" had been used, and that there was some worry that inserting a new word might confuse the Soviets. Mr. Rostow suggested that a word be picked, and then the delegation establish a legislative record in the talks with the Soviets on the meaning of the word, including reference to observations from satellites. Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviets might object to any formal understanding on this point, although they had already agreed tacitly. Mr. Rostow thought that in this critical case it might be desirable to get a formal understanding. Secretary Clifford stated a preference for either "unilateral" or "national" over the word "external" which had been agreed upon at the last meeting. Secretary Rusk said he was quite willing to return to the term "national" and that it might be useful to have an explanation of the meaning of the term. With reference to point No. 2 of Reference 2 relative to negotiating instructions on the subject of verification, Mr. Fisher stated that discussion had centered on the degree to which the delegation should push for supplementary inspection procedures. With the exception of the Department of State representative, all members of the Working Group had agreed with the underlined wording proposed in paragraph No. 2 of Reference 2. Secretary Rusk stated that in his view the negotiations might proceed as follows: First, a general discussion of verification in which the desirability of supplementary verification procedures would be placed in the record on a low-key basis. Secondly, the discussions would then turn to the details of the items to be limited. After these had been agreed upon, the discussion would proceed to verification required for each of the specific items. He felt that to ensure Congressional support for any agreement it would be necessary to make it clear that we had pressed for that verification which we believed to be useful, if not essential. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that we would have to be careful not to give the impression to the Senate that the Soviets had talked us out of something that was necessary. Secretary Brown felt we should not press vigorously for on-site inspection as a principle, but push for specific cases (e.g., Tallinn) where one could justify that supplementary procedures would significantly improve confidence that the agreement was being complied with. Secretary Katzenbach thought that the inclusion of the words "vigorously" and "fallback" in the proposed instruction might be too strong and suggested deleting "vigorously" and modifying the final clause as follows: "precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification." The Executive Committee agreed with this substitute formulation. With respect to paragraph No. 3 on instructions re the Tallinn system, Mr. Fisher pointed out that two alternative formulations had been put forth by the representatives of DOD and JCS on the one hand and by State and ACDA on the other. He pointed out that there were two basic differences of views: (1) should we seek assurances that the Tallinn is not now an ABM system in view of the agreed intelligence analysis which had already received considerable publicity that it was not an ABM system; and (2) should we consider the Tallinn launchers and missiles to be included in the agreed Soviet ABM limitations if assurances could not be received that they would be upgraded, or only at such a point as we believed they had been upgraded? Mr. Helms stated that no one in the Intelligence Community really thought that the Tallinn system was now an ABM system, but there were some who thought it might be upgraded to become one. Secretary Nitze agreed that the present deployment was against aircraft, but that it might have a self-defense capability against missiles. Furthermore, if a Dog House were added, it could have increased ABM capabilities and was therefore now an ABM. General Wheeler stated that if it were hooked up to Hen-House, which would be impossible to determine, then they could have some ABM capability today. Mr. Foster asked whether the Soviets informing us that it was not an ABM would satisfy us. Secretary Nitze said it might be useful for them to tell us this, and Secretary Brown said there might be some questions which could be answered which would give us increased confidence. Secretary Rusk stated that he was not in favor of an agreement which justified very large numbers of ABM's. One of the purposes of the discussions was to try to limit ABM's to a low value. He did not like to see an agreement which allowed several thousand ABM's on each side just because we could not obtain any greater assurance than we have already that Tallinn was not an ABM system. Secretary Nitze thought they might give us some interesting information on radars, but Secretary Rusk pointed out that, at the JCS' recommendation, we were not limiting radars. Secretary Nitze said we would have to if we were to prevent upgrading. Secretary Rusk asked the status of the Working Group studies on radars, and Mr. Fisher stated that the Working Group had nothing to report at this time. Mr. Helms pointed out that page 15 of the proposed instruction directed the delegation to raise the question of radars and to attempt to obtain an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn-type radars would be forbidden. Mr. Fisher said he understood that the Tallinn system was of little value without new radars. Secretary Nitze agreed, but said we were not stopping radars. Secretary Brown pointed out that it was not the DOD's objective to have an agreement which allowed large numbers of ABM's, but only to provide a lever to get information from the Soviets which would increase our confidence that the Tallinn system was not an ABM. He also pointed out that since the Tallinn's effectiveness as an ABM would, in any case, be very low, the equivalence between Tallinn missiles and Sentinel missiles would not need to be on a one-for-one basis. Secretary Rusk asked whether we would be in favor of an agreement that banned all ABM's if the Soviets offered this. Secretary Clifford said not necessarily, since we had to worry about China. Secretary Nitze said it might be in our interest, but that was not obvious at this time. Mr. Fisher pointed out that we should keep in mind that the Soviets are likely to raise Nike-Hercules as the counterpart of the Tallinn system and that it might be difficult, even though we were presumably willing to disclose information on Nike-H, to prove to the Soviets that it was not tied in to the Sentinel system. There was no intention to sweep the problems of the Tallinn system under the rug, and he did not believe that any of the proposed wordings did this. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Tal-linn problem would be the first test case of our ability to obtain adequate assurances from the Soviets. Situations will undoubtedly arise on many occasions during the negotiations and after any agreement is in effect. After considerable discussion of alternate language to follow the third sentence of paragraph 4 on page 14 of the Basic Position Paper, it was agreed that the following sentences would be inserted: "The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be/8/ included in the agreed Soviet ABM level." /8/Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert "limited and" after "must be". [Footnote in the source text.] With respect to item 4 on the Instructions re the form of the agreement, Secretary Rusk stated that he could not accept any language which committed us to a formal treaty at this time, even though this might turn out to be the form when the agreement had been reached. He suggested that the following sentence be inserted at the end of paragraph X-1 on page 22 of the Basic Position Paper: "Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time." There was only a limited discussion of this suggestion, and it was agreed that the Working Group would see if this suggestion would be satisfactory.
276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/ JCSM-519-68 Washington, August 24, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Secret. The source text was sent under cover of a September 6 memorandum from Halperin to Fisher, which reads as follows: "The current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a possible cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes are forwarded for your information. You will note that the JCS oppose a cutoff of production at this time. I believe that it would be useful if ACDA would circulate substantially in advance of the reconvening of the ENDC (or the GA if the issue will come up there) a proposed U.S. position on the range of issues related to the cutoff question." SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), dated 2 July 1968, subject as above./2/ The response to the reference has been delayed by the decision to give the concerned agencies a chance to analyze the results of the ACDA draft "Interim Report" of the interagency working group established to determine if and when a cutoff of the production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States./3/ This draft "Interim Report" was distributed to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals (COP) on 5 August 1968. /2/Document 251. /3/This draft report has not been found but is elsewhere identified as an "ACDA study on the impact of a cutoff on the assured destruction capability of the U.S. . . . . This report (Project Impact) was distributed on August 5, 1968, and it concludes that our assured destruction capability would be maintained with the postulated cutoffs." (Rationale for Approval of Draft Speech to ENDC on Cutoff, undated, Attachment 2 to memorandum from Foster to Clifford and Seaborg, August 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to Secretary of Defense, 1968) The ACDA study was undertaken after General Wheeler objected that the report transmitted under cover of ACDA's July 2 memorandum had "not been coordinated with nor distributed to the member agencies," and he argued that it was "premature to review the current verification arrangements until further analysis proves our capability to be good enough to warrant a change to presently proposed verification methods." (Memorandum from Wheeler to Secretary Clifford, July 9, CM-3460-68; ibid., RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, May-July 1968) 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this draft "Interim Report" and have concluded that: a. It is impossible to determine by the systems analysis approach when and if a cutoff would be to the net interest of the United States. The uncertainties in parameters and multiple scenarios possible in a study of this type do not permit conclusions of sufficient validity and certainty to provide a basis for prudent national security decisions. Areas of these uncertainties in parameters include 30 to 40 percent possible error in intelligence estimates of Soviet cumulative production, similar uncertainties as to the amount of fissionable material that the Soviets plan to use in their weapons, effectiveness of the Soviet's ABM, yield and accuracy of their offensive missiles, and which of many possible options they are likely to select for weapon allocation. Examples of possible variations in scenarios that have not yet been considered include pindown attacks, employment of fractional orbit bombardment systems, and limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems. b. The study highlights the tremendous complexity and uncertainties associated with attempting to determine precise weapon requirements and associated fissionable material. Because of this complexity and the conservatism appropriate to decisions involving the national security of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the study be terminated and the future primary criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the fissionable material available at the time of cutoff to meet the Nation's forecast weapon requirements. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also reviewed the reference, which proposes a revision of the US position on cutoff of production of fissionable material and transfer to peaceful uses. Primarily, this proposed revision would result in a changed US position on verification of adversary nuclear production facilities. This proposed amendment would result in a verification procedure similar to that of the Nonproliferation Treaty; namely, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for verification of declared production and operating facilities and unilateral intelligence for the discovery and verification of undeclared facilities. Although the United States has the capability to detect with high confidence any facilities large enough or numerous enough to make a significant addition to the large amounts of fissionable materials already in the Soviet stockpile, the type and rate of production cannot be determined accurately. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the procedure proposed in the reference, provided the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods. Acceptance of this modification regarding verification is germane only if, at some future date, a decision is reached that a cutoff would be in national security interests. 4. (S) The 2 July ACDA proposal states, "The other aspects of the U.S. position on this measure would remain as we have previously described them in Geneva." To assure a clear understanding by the COP as to what the US position is on the "other aspects," the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal. The remarks in the Appendix hereto/4/ represent the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US position that is reflected in Ambassador Goldberg's statement to the General Assembly on 23 September 1965,/5/ as supplemented by the Presidential Statement read at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference on 27 January 1966./6/ /4/Entitled "Additional Comments"; not printed. /5/For an extract from Ambassador Goldberg's statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 433-436. /6/See Document 117. 5. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Recommend that the study being performed by the interagency working group to determine if and when a cutoff of production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States be terminated and that in the future the criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the available fissionable material at the time of cutoff to meet forecast weapon requirements. b. Do not object to the changed US position on verification providing the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods, if at some time in the future a cutoff is clearly in the US national interest. c. Oppose a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons as it would not be in the national interest of the United States at this time. If a cutoff had been effected in 1965, there would have been some uncertainty as to its relative implications, but, on balance, the degree of such uncertainty was sufficiently limited to permit an assessment of US advantage within a reasonable margin of risk. Such is not the case at present nor can such be forecast for the coming 5- to 10-year period. The magnitude of uncertainties both as to weapon requirements and material availability for both sides makes it impossible to rule out, with reasonable risk, a potential for significant disadvantage to US interests in a cutoff proposal. These many basic uncertainties are further compounded by uncertainty related to possible strategic nuclear arms limitations discussions with the Soviets. Until the prospects for, general outlines of, and possible implications of such talks become more clear in the months to come, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a cutoff proposal would, at best, be imprudent and could involve major risks to US security. d. Prefer the United States not enter into a transfer to peaceful purposes agreement. e. Do not oppose a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons agreement provided: (1) US weapons design and construction would not be compromised. (2) Procedures would guarantee that the USSR was positively destroying nuclear weapons. (3) An inspection and verification system is tested to assure feasibility and practicality. (4) Only weapons scheduled for retirement are destroyed. f. Oppose a plant-by-plant shutdown. g. Recommend, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, that it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler
277. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 29, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. II, Box 26. Top Secret; Nodis. Handwritten notations in the margin read: "Jane told Rostow" and "Mr. Rostow notified; also Mr. Keeny." Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk submits for your approval/2/ the Initial Presentation (Tab A) of the US position and the Basic Position Paper (instructions for the delegation) (Tab B) for use in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. These papers have been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). The papers are based on the specific proposal, which was previously submitted to you with the unanimous endorsement of the Committee of Principals. /2/Secretary Rusk's August 27 memorandum to the President transmitting Tabs A and B is not printed. The preparation and agreement on these papers are a further example of the excellent intra-governmental cooperation that has been achieved on this subject. In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge you to read the two papers in their entirety. I call your particular attention to the manner in which the difficult question of verification is dealt with in the Initial Presentation, pages 6-7 (para. 12-14) and in the Position Paper, page 2 (para. 7). The basic proposal has been developed on the basis that we could agree to rely exclusively on verification by "national" means, which is now the agreed term to describe all intelligence resources that do not involve direct access to Soviet territory. However, in keeping with the desire of OSD and the JCS that an effort be made to obtain some inspection, the Initial Presentation calls for consideration of procedures for "selective direct observation on US and Soviet territory," which is the new term for "on-site inspection," as a desirable means of increasing the confidence of each side in the agreement. In the Position Paper, the delegation is instructed that "This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification." I also call your attention to the instructions to the delegation in the Position Paper, pages 8-9 (para. 4) on how to handle the extremely difficult and important issue of the Tallinn SAM system. The resolution of this problem in the negotiations to our satisfaction is central to the acceptability of the agreement. Moreover, this can establish the necessary precedent for a continuing dialogue on how to deal with suspicious or controversial problems which arise under an agreement. You should also be aware of the question of the form of the agreement in the Position Paper, page 14 (para. 1). Although there is complete agreement on the instructions to the delegation to defer this issue, this bypasses a substantive issue since the JCS believe that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty while Sec. Rusk wishes to maintain the option for consideration of less formal understandings. I recommend that you tentatively approve these two papers as the basis for further preparations for the talks. Walt Tentatively approve Initial Presentation and Basic Position
Paper/3/ /3/This option is checked.
Tab A/4/ Washington, August 24, 1968. /4/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-2951/Rev. 4. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, Russia, 1968) STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION 1. On behalf of my Government, I wish to express deep satisfaction that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics are now meeting to discuss the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. 2. There is perhaps no more important step in the field of foreign relations which our two Governments might take than to reach an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would enhance the security of both sides, could permit each side to devote to peaceful endeavors substantial resources which could be saved from future military expenditures, and would contribute to world stability overall. It would also constitute a most important step in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by our Government under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ratify and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 3. The United States has presented to the Soviet Union over the past year and a half several messages relating to the subject of these talks. It remains the position of the United States Government that our discussions should include both offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. 4. We believe that it is important, and should be possible, to reach agreement on limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without resolving all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that the first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms limitations should be to restrain further increases of strategic missile forces. Such a step would be of value in avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous upward spiral of strategic missile deployments, and would help pave the way for reduction of strategic arms. 5. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race. 6. The problem we are facing is urgent. As each month goes by, armaments increase and grow more complex on both sides. An agreement should be easier to negotiate today before further deployments take place than it will in the future, and it could result in important saving of resources. 7. We recognize that achieving strategic arms limitations which meet our separately perceived requirements of national security is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. Moreover, we recognize that in reaching an agreement some adjustments from currently deployed strategic forces may be necessary. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained. 8. We believe that the US and the Soviet Union have the following strategic arms limitation objectives in common: --To achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles. --To enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating US and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces. --To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. --To improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of meaningful discussion of issues arising from our strategic relationship. 9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States proposes an agreement comprising the following basic elements. The U.S. Delegation will be prepared to discuss these elements in greater detail at an appropriate time after hearing the views of the Soviet Government. 10. The United States suggests cessation of the initiation of construction of additional strategic offensive land-based ballistic missile launchers. This weapon category should include launchers for offensive ballistic missiles of intermediate and medium range (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as for longer-range intercontinental missiles. There should also be a prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines, and on installing on surface ships facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles. The difficulties in verifying limitations on specific numbers of deployed mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and launchers are such that the United States proposes that there be a complete ban on mobile, land-based strategic offensive missile systems. 11. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile systems is more complex. It would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be a set and equivalent number of fixed anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles which each side could deploy. The U.S. also proposes that the deployment of mobile ABM launchers and associated missiles be totally prohibited. 12. There must, of course, be adequate verification of any agreement. In previous discussions leading up to these talks, we have indicated that the United States is prepared to rely to the maximum possible extent on verification by national means available to the two governments in order to verify an agreement limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons systems, and we indicated that major steps in limiting the deployment of strategic missile systems should be possible on that basis. 13. An agreement of the scope just outlined may, however, involve certain aspects which will be difficult to verify with full confidence through national means alone. To meet these potential problems the United States believes that consideration should be given to supplementing national means of verification by some mutually arrived at arrangements for reassurance. Such agreed procedures would increase the confidence of each government in the other's compliance with the agreement and could permit a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, we should explore at an early stage of our discussions what supplementary means of reassurance could be agreed. 14. It would appear that arrangements involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on U.S. and Soviet territory are the best way of providing this reassurance; there may be other means of contributing to reassurance. The essential point is that each state needs to be able to satisfy itself that the other state is living up to the agreement. 15. The United States Government believes these talks can lead to an agreement beneficial to both sides. By our agreement, we could demonstrate to the world at large that our two nations, each endowed with great military power, can act to limit that power. The U.S. Delegation would welcome hearing your comments on the U.S. proposal and any other views the Soviet Delegation is prepared to advance. We hope the Soviet Delegation will agree that the position we have outlined today provides a sound basis for an agreement.
Tab B/5/ Washington, August 24, 1968. /5/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-3009/Rev. 3. (Ibid.) STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS BASIC POSITION PAPER (Instructions for the Delegation) General
1. This paper presents guidelines governing the U.S. position during the first phase of U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic missile limitations. 2. It is not possible to draw up a detailed scenario covering the talks; much will depend on initial Soviet reaction and how we choose to respond to it. It is also for this reason that, with few exceptions, no attempt has been made to spell out alternate U.S. positions, which will have to be developed later through normal U.S. Government procedures.
3. This paper deals with the major issues likely to arise in connection with the presentation of our proposal. A certain amount of discussion and clarification of individual features, in isolation from other factors, will be necessary. However, we wish to stress in the discussions that the U.S. proposal should be viewed as a comprehensive entity. We wish to avoid conceding to the Soviets the advantage of concentrating on the inequities of this or that measure. We should point out that, because of the asymmetries in the respective strategic postures of the U.S. and USSR, it would be unrealistic and unnecessary to strive for equality in each category of strategic weapons. Rather we should accept existing asymmetries as a point of departure and strive for an agreement which, in its overall effect, would satisfy the security interests of each side. 4. The Delegation should proceed with due caution in presenting the U.S. position. We do not wish to engage in a protracted discussion of generalities, but neither do we wish to show our entire hand without having first obtained at least a general impression of the Soviet approach. 5. After settling on formalities, the Delegation should give the "Initial Presentation of U.S. Position" (see separate paper) which contains, in general skeleton form, the outlines of the U.S. proposal. 6. It should be emphasized that, in the ensuing discussion of the U.S. position, the Delegation is not required to present the totality of the position as it is written below for a particular category of weapons in its initial presentation. It may wish to withhold some of the details, particularly on highly technical matters, until later stages in the negotiations. 7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The Delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The Delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the Delegation.)
8. The judgments of the Intelligence Community on our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed agreement are contained in SNIE-13-68 and various supplementary documents which are available to the Delegation.
9. The Delegation has available to it a series of Intelligence Community reports and DOD official documents showing the currently existing and possible future Soviet and U.S. strategic systems.
I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers
1. The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more that 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed, including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.
2. In presenting this position, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of the technical details concerning the issue of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition. 3. At some point it should be made clear to the Soviets that the prohibition on additional deployments applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers
1. Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km.) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles or intermediate or medium range.
2. As in the case of ICBM launchers, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition set forth in the first sentence of the above paragraph. 3. The U.S. Delegation may, at its discretion, point out that the Soviet Union at the present time has deployed a large number of this type of missile which presumably are targeted at Western Europe. The United States has no such missiles at its disposal. Thus, the inclusion of this category of missiles in a mutual "freeze" agreement would concede to the Soviet side a certain advantage. This is one of the asymmetries in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces which an arms limitation agreement must take into account. If we are willing to concede an advantage to the Soviets in this category of weapons, they should be prepared to tolerate a certain advantage to the U.S. in another category. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems 1. The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km.). Missile systems with such ranges carried by water-borne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.
2. The Delegation should stress that prohibition should be placed on mobile land-based offensive systems, since under conditions of a ban on further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers, the arms race could be diverted to the deployment of mobile systems, thus negating the value of the agreement. 3. In justifying a total ban, the Delegation should point out that verification by external means of an agreement limiting mobile missile systems to a specific number would be difficult. The possibilities of concealment and redeployment are obvious. However, verification of a total ban would be very much simpler, as the detection of any such system or part thereof clandestinely produced or deployed would be more likely and thus establish a violation. 4. The Delegation should point out, at some appropriate stage, that the ban, in addition to prohibiting production and deployment, also would prohibit the testing of missiles in a mobile system configuration. This ban would otherwise not extend to R&D. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems 1. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBM's or SLCM's, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped, i.e., ballistic or cruise missiles. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.
2. In initially presenting the above position, the Delegation should omit any reference to the completion of the construction of submarine starts underway, and refer simply to a "prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines," as stated in the Initial U.S. Presentation. The reason for this caution is the uncertainty concerning the exact number of such submarines the Soviets have under construction; we wish to avoid leaving them an open field for their making exaggerated claims in this regard which would be difficult to refute with hard evidence. 3. The U.S. can accept the completion of the ballistic missile submarines the Soviets have under construction as of September 1, 1968, provided a satisfactory understanding were reached on the exact number. If the Soviets raise the issue of completing submarines under construction, the U.S. Delegation should ask the Soviets to indicate the number of submarines under construction. The Delegation should seek instructions based on the number indicated by the Soviets. 4. Even with this understanding, Soviet negotiators would almost certainly object to the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it preserved a distinct advantage for the U.S. and cut short a major Soviet weapons expansion program. Our response should be that certain asymmetries are inevitable in an arms limitation agreement of this sort. Just as we accept the preponderance of Soviet IRBM/MRBM launchers, they should accept the imbalance of SLBM forces. We should also point to the substantial Soviet force of submarine-based cruise-type missiles which can be directed at land targets and which have no U.S. equivalent. 5. The proposal contemplates an understanding concerning the problem of the growing obsolescence of existing submarines over an extended period of time. The proposed form of such an understanding would be to provide that there would be no initiation of construction for replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period, the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. 6. The Soviets may raise this issue themselves as, over the short run at least, they would benefit more from a replacement program (many of their missile-launching submarines are obsolescent) than would the U.S. The Delegation, therefore, should not initially raise the issue but should await a Soviet initiative. But the Delegation should raise the issue at some point if the Soviets do not. 7. In presenting the U.S. proposal, the Delegation should make clear that we consider strategic ballistic and cruise missiles (launched from submarines) of any range as falling within the definition of offensive strategic weapons whose launchers are subject to the limitation. Antisubmarine weapons would not be considered strategic missiles. New ballistic missiles may be retrofitted in ballistic missile submarines and new cruise missiles but not ballistic missiles in cruise missile submarines. 8. While cruise missiles carried on submarines can be defined as having strategic capabilities, those on surface vessels are more difficult to use for strategic purposes. Therefore, no restrictions would be imposed on cruise missiles aboard surface vessels. The proposal would, however, prohibit the installation of facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles on surface ships. V. ABMs
1. The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles, including reload missiles. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.
2. For your information, with regard to the numerical limit on ABM launchers, we do not yet have a position. We wish to see if the Soviets accept our proposal in principle, or if they present an alternative proposal. If an understanding is reached on the principle of set and equivalent numbers of anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles, we would then discuss the precise numerical limit. 3. There are two reasons why we believe this to be the most feasible approach. On the one hand, each side has announced plans to deploy, or is deploying ABMs. These circumstances, as well as the nuclear forces of third countries, must be taken into account. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that an unchecked race between our two countries in the deployment of ABMs would create pressures on both sides to increase their strategic offensive forces, thus making meaningless or impossible any arms limitations in this latter respect. 4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the US Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM capability (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The Delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn systems must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense. 5. In discussing the equivalence of the U.S. and Soviet ABM limitations, the question of reload would have to be considered. If the Soviets deployed Moscow-type ABM launchers having one reload, they might be limited to a lesser number of launchers than we would deploy. On the other hand, the Soviets could agree to deploy an equal number of non-reloadable launchers. 6. Although we consider that radars for ABM systems are a significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn anti-aircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations. VI. Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Systems
1. The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.
2. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have described the subject of the discussions as concerning both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, we cannot exclude a discussion of strategic bombers if the Soviets raise the subject. 3. The U.S. Delegation should not refer to bombers unless the Soviets do so. If they raise the issue, the Delegation should say that the U.S. does not believe that bombers should be limited at this time. The Delegation should explain that there is a wide variety of performance characteristics of the aircraft at the disposal of the US and USSR, and it would be difficult to agree on a definition of "strategic" aircraft. Moreover, the strategic effect of these aircraft depends to a large degree on the missions assigned to them. This is a variable factor, subject to change within a very short period of time, and hence less susceptible to a formal agreement. 4. Bombers have not figured importantly in the increase of either side in strategic nuclear delivery capabilities in recent years. In fact, both US and Soviet intercontinental bombers forces have been decreasing in size even without any agreement or limitation on reduction of bombers. Consideration of bomber limitations would also raise the complex issue of air defense. 5. Thus, the US should seek to persuade the Soviets to restrict initial discussion to land and seabased missile and anti-ballistic missile limitations, excluding or if not, possibly deferring, the question of possible aircraft (including air to surface missiles) limitations. If the Soviets present a specific proposal on bomber limitation, the Delegation should say that it will refer the proposal to Washington for consideration. 6. Upgrading of Air Defense systems to give them an ABM capability would be prohibited. VII. Technological Improvements
1. There would be no prohibition of technological improvements within the constraints of the agreement.
2. Technological improvements in the characteristics of ballistic missiles and launchers have--and will have--an effect on the strategic balance. These include, for example, the size of warheads or throw weight of launchers, the accuracy of missiles, the number of warheads carried by a missile, penetration aids, and the hardening of missile warheads. 3. The Soviets may well raise the question of the announced U.S. MIRV programs. They are likely to cite American sources in support of the argument that MIRVs will give the U.S. an advantage, and that they should be prohibited. The Soviets probably will refer to the commencement of U.S. MIRV testing and may demand that the U.S. stop testing immediately. The U.S. should note that this testing was part of a continuing development program which had been planned for a long time and which would continue for several years before the development was complete. Since the Soviets had continued their development and testing of new systems during the year and a half since President Johnson had proposed the talks, we saw no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in anticipation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this issue, the U.S. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verification for any limitations on MIRVs and other technological improvements. Any specific Soviet proposal that the U.S. halt MIRV testing or deployment must be referred to Washington for consideration. VIII. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal
1. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. 2. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to 10 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. 3. Either party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
4. The U.S. Delegation should at an early stage in the discussion indicate that the agreement will have to include provision for revision and withdrawal procedures. The presentation of our specific proposal can await progress in determining areas of agreement on limitations. The U.S. Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that either side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated, and in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement. The following are illustrative grounds for revision or withdrawal from the agreement: (1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened; (2) if either side believes that extraordinary events have undermined the stability of the agreement; (3) if there is evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement; (4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement. IX. Reductions
1. The proposal is not designed to achieve reductions in existing strategic forces.
2. The U.S. Delegation should, in its opening statement, express its conviction that agreement now on measures to curb the strategic arms race not only could lead to substantial savings of national resources to both sides in terms of avoidance of future expenditures but also would help pave the way for substantial reductions of forces in being. The U.S. would be prepared, at an appropriate stage, to discuss such reductions. But we must acknowledge that an agreement designed to achieve reductions in strategic forces, involving as it would great uncertainties for both sides, would be more difficult to achieve than an agreement on leveling off the strength of these forces, which we now propose. The U.S. is convinced that the necessary first step is an agreement on restricting the present arms race. X. Modalities
1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time. Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions. 2. The Soviets have already agreed to bilateral discussions, and presumably they will stick to this formula. We should oppose any effort they might make to include British or French forces in an agreement, to shift the discussions into the ENDC, or otherwise to broaden the bilateral discussions and eventual agreement. 3. In addition to the provisions for revision and withdrawal discussed in Section VIII above, the Delegation should make clear the right to call for consultations with respect to developments which may raise the question of possible violation by the other party. Some organizational arrangement such as a standing US-USSR commission would be desirable to provide consultation on a continuous basis.
278. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 30, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Top Secret. Sent through Ambassador Bohlen. SUBJECT I have rather hurriedly examined the position papers and instructions for the strategic missile talks/2/ and submit the following observations. /2/See Tab A and Tab B, Document 277. Although I realize that because of the vital security interest involved, there cannot be much give in our position, the Soviets will recognize that our initial position is loaded in our favor. In general, it will permit us to continue with our own plans while restricting them in carrying out some of their own programs. I am troubled by the position which prohibits hardening of medium range launchers but allows hardening of ICBMs. Not only will this inconsistent position be hard to defend, but it would not seem to be in our interest since the Soviets have a number of soft ICBM launchers, whereas we do not. Since at best it would be some time before any agreement could go into effect, it would seem to me far preferable for us to do any additional hardening we wish to do now and work for an agreement which would prevent any hardening of either MRBMs or ICBMs. I am particularly troubled by the position on the Tallinn system. It will probably be impossible to get any satisfactory evidence from the Soviets on what this system is. They are already suspicious that our purpose in starting these talks is simply to elicit information. I would anticipate that the Soviets would press hard for the inclusion of bombers on the ground that they constitute a delivery system with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers. The instructions provide no argumentation for handling a Soviet move to include the French and British in any agreement reached. I suggest that we should have a clear position on this matter before the talks begin.
279. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 4, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Popper (IO) on September 4. SUBJECT The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds concluded its work at a meeting in Rio de Janeiro which ended August 30./2/ Appreciable progress was registered in major areas of U.S. concern. The work done by the Ad Hoc Committee has thrown basic issues into sharp relief and has educated Committee members on the hard conflicts of interest which must be resolved before comprehensive international cooperation on the seabed can become a reality. /2/Regarding the formation and early work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed, see footnote 2, Document 270. For text of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, August 30, which also summarizes developments at the conference in Rio de Janeiro, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 595-615. The major accomplishments of the Rio Session were as follows: 1. Utilizing the formula you worked out with Secretary Clifford,/3/ we were able to join all other members in affirming the principle that the deep seabed should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. We made it clear that it was for the ENDC to take up specific deep seabed arms control measures such as our denuclearization proposal. /3/See Document 270. 2. Through intensive effort we did much to overcome underdeveloped country suspicion of our motives in proposing an International Decade of Ocean Exploration. The Committee welcomed and generally supported the Decade, as an element in long-term UN programs. 3. With unusually solid cooperation from a Western Group, including Japan and Australia, we succeeded in obtaining the support of a number of Asians and Africans for a statement of bedrock legal principles which might govern the exploration and use of the deep seabed. Nevertheless the Latin Americans remained immovable in the light of their fears that their 200-mile claims would be adversely affected, and the Soviet Bloc was unexpectedly rigid in refusing to endorse any principles. The Western formulation will be a starting point for future UN work in this area. 4. There was virtually complete consensus for a Standing Committee to work toward internationally agreed arrangements which will permit the orderly development of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction in the interest of the international community. We are now preparing for General Assembly discussion of the Seabed Committee report. We will attempt to persuade Assembly members that real progress can only be made in this matter by proceeding through consensus rather than numerical majorities. We will stress that this is the only alternative to an open split between underdeveloped and advanced countries, which would frustrate the whole exercise. Dave Popper headed the U.S. Delegation at Rio. Leonard Meeker represented us on legal matters, and Dr. Vincent McKelvey of the Geological Survey, on technical matters. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |