1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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280. Editorial Note Although the Soviet Union's military incursion into Czechoslovakia in late August 1968 abruptly undermined the prospect for an early summit meeting and the opening of the missile talks (see Document 274), both initiatives were revived in the last months of the Johnson administration. On August 6, Ambassador Thompson met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to consider these matters. Instructions for Thompson for this talk, August 5, and a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin are in the Johnson Library, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. At the President's instruction, Walt Rostow then invited Ambassador Dobrynin to come to Rostow's home on September 9 at 8:30 p.m. to discuss a prospective summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. At their meeting Rostow presented Dobrynin with six points, which Rostow had apparently developed with guidance from the President. These points summarized President Johnson's conditions and proposals for a summit. At his meeting with Rostow, Dobrynin took down these points and repeated them several times to make sure he understood them. The first of these points was, "The President does not wish to launch the missile talks at a meeting lower than the Kosygin-Johnson level." Concerning the missile talks, Dobrynin said early in their conversation: "He said, as he had said several times to Thompson, that he had seen the position papers of the Soviet Union. They were detailed and highly technical. Moreover, he said that as a diplomat he must report to me in candor that they represented not a final position but a bargaining position. He assumed that our papers would be similar in character. To complete the negotiation on the missile question would, in his judgment, take considerable time. Therefore, if concrete results were to emerge from a first meeting between Kosygin and the President, he thought we should consider two possible steps: "--an early exchange of papers at the Ambassadorial level: via Thompson in Moscow and Dobrynin in Washington. This could be done quietly and would give each side a chance to see what elements in them could be the subject for an interim agreement in principle at the Summit meeting; "--an effort be made, before a Summit meeting, to agree on these matters of broad principle which would guide the negotiations in the wake of a Summit meeting." (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, September 10; ibid.) The remainder of their long conversation covered the problems in the Middle East, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia and their relationship to the proposed summit. The six points are contained in an unsigned paper, September 7; ibid. Discussions on a proposed summit and preparations for the opening of the missile talks continued to the end of 1968. See Documents 281, 282, 287, 294, 295, 297, and 299.
281. Note From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States/1/ Moscow, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, September 13, 1:45 p.m., indicates that Dobrynin orally delivered the contents of the note to Rostow just before 1 p.m. on September 13, and also left with him Dobrynin's "handwritten translation from which we typed up his communication, literally." The handwritten text is ibid. Rostow also summarized the points he raised with Dobrynin following the latter's presentation, as they might pertain to a prospective summit meeting. None of Rostow's points involved the strategic missile talks or arms control. Rostow offered his "very tentative first thoughts" on the Soviet message in a memorandum to President Johnson, September 13, 3 p.m. Concerning strategic missiles, Rostow wrote: "The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communique." Later in the same memorandum, he called this formula "promising." (Ibid.) In another memorandum to the President, September 13, 6:40 p.m., Rostow related his just completed conversation with Secretary Rusk about the Soviet note. As summarized by Rostow, their discussion did not touch on the missile talks or arms control. (Ibid.) (Copy of Ambassador Dobrynin's handwritten paper) (Sep. 13, 1968)/2/ /2/The September 13 date is not included in the handwritten text. 1. As before the attitude in Moscow is positive to the idea of meeting with the President of the United States for an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The wish of President Johnson to have some degree of certitude in the positive outcome of his possible visit to the Soviet Union is understandable to us. It is also far from being indifferent to us what will be the result of such an exchange of opinions, though it is obvious that efforts from both sides will be needed to gain a success. There is no objection in Moscow as to a discussion during such a meeting of questions named by the American side: curbing of strategic armaments race, question of Viet-Nam and the situation in the Middle East; this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of an exchange of opinion on other questions too. 2. So far as the question of strategic armaments is concerned, our point of view is that an exchange of opinions on this question during the meeting could result in an agreement that fulfilment of certain restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security. It would be possible to agree further on certain basic principles of limitation and then reduction in complex of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles, having in mind that this would constitute a directive of the two Governments to their delegations to engage then in working out of an agreement on the concrete aspects of this problem. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, the Middle East, and the long-range importance of a summit meeting for U.S.-Soviet relations.]
282. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, September 16, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. Originally drafted by Secretary Rusk following Rostow's September 13 meeting with Dobrynin (undated memorandum from Rusk to Rostow; ibid.), with the understanding that Rostow would hand the text of the message to Ambassador Dobrynin, and revised by Rostow (memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, September 15; ibid.). Rostow forwarded the revised message to President Johnson under cover of a memorandum, September 16. Also attached were "rough guidelines for my 'personal' remarks [to Dobrynin} which would be done as reflecting the President's attitude as I've perceived it, with no trace of ultimatum," and a "paper of issues and actions that lie down the line if you decide to proceed." (Ibid.) The message forwarded to President Johnson is identical to the text printed here. In a September 16 memorandum for President Johnson, Rostow reported that he handed this memorandum to Ambassador Dobrynin, with whom he met from 6-7:30 p.m. that evening, noting that it had the same status as Dobrynin's September 13 "oral communication." After reading the memorandum carefully, Dobrynin "said in general that the communication was 'positive and clear.'" Concerning the missile talks, Dobrynin made the following observations: "He understood our objective in proposing an amplification of the principles. He wanted to know, simply, whether the response of the Soviet government should come back through his channel to me or through normal diplomatic exchanges. I said that until we were clearer as to whether the conditions for a Summit were mutually understood and agreed, he might let their response come back to me. I then went through the points that it was agreed that I should make on a 'personal basis' as reflecting the attitude of the President, as he had indicated it to Sec. Rusk and myself." (Ibid.) The President has considered very carefully the observations made by Ambassador Dobrynin on September 13./2/ He attaches serious importance to the understanding of Soviet leaders that a positive outcome of a highest level meeting between the two sides is essential to a success; and he agrees that this requires efforts from both sides. /2/Document 281. The President wishes the Soviet leadership to have his further reflections about how such a success could be achieved. With respect to offensive and defensive missiles, the President agrees that it ought to be possible to establish certain common basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in such nuclear weapons systems. He further agrees that, following an accord on general principles at the highest level, representatives of the two sides would have to address themselves to the translation of general principles into the more concrete aspects of the problem. It would, however, be desirable to go beyond a general statement that "restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security." With this in mind, the President would be glad to know whether the Soviet leaders could accept the following general objectives as guidance for our respective delegations or would wish to suggest any amendments for his consideration: --To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles. --To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating U.S. and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces. --To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. --To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. [Here follows extensive discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.]
283. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 17, 1968, 1:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Foster on September 17 and approved in S on September 18. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to lunch primarily to discuss the situation with reference to NPT. By the time I had arrived, he had obtained the results of the Foreign Relations Committee meeting and its favorable vote./2/ I gave him the details of the vote as we knew it, in which he was interested. I said this was favorable, and had been done in spite of the action of the Soviet Union in connection with Czechoslovakia. However, it had been very difficult to achieve because of the question of their intentions. I said that if there were further similar events in Romania and Yugoslavia, the NPT and other arrangements between us might just as well be forgotten. He asked why I felt there would be such other events, and I said certainly that there were rumors on a broad enough scale to raise question. He said that he had officially informed Mr. Rusk there would be no further action and he reiterated that assurance to me. It was impossible, he said, to conceive of additional action in connection with Romania and Yugoslavia where conditions were completely different. He was interested as to further appraisal of chances for floor passage of the NPT, which I said were good in my opinion, although the brief period for the remaining weeks of the session made it difficult to be sure as to the passage of any floor bills. I said we continued, however, to be hopeful now that a major hurdle had been overcome in the committee. /2/On September 17 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended, by a vote of 13-3-3, that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For text of the Committee's report, September 26, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 642-667. We then talked about other disarmament items including a possible expansion of the ENDC, which he felt was dangerous since opening the doors to include the Japanese, who were likely candidates, would mean pressure from other nations. We discussed the NNC,/3/ regarding which his government had the same concerns that we did, particularly as to the request for greater assurances, free gifts of nuclear equipment, fuels and know-how, and the possibility of regular continuing sessions of a fundamentally irresponsible body. /3/Regarding this Conference, see footnote 3, Document 263. He asked as to our plans for the General Assembly on disarmament. I responded that we would, of course, be prepared to talk on the Report of the ENDC including further discussions on the NPT, the seabed, and CBW, with particular reference on this latter to a Secretary General's study of effects. He informed me that the Soviet delegation to the UNGA would not arrive until September 30 and he was already attempting to make arrangements for the arrival of the special plane for their delegation. He didn't know whether Mr. Gromyko would be coming or perhaps Mr. Kuznetsov, in view of his intimate knowledge of the situation in Prague. He told me of the Soviet inscription in the General Assembly of an item of urgency to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. I emphasized throughout the responsibility which his government had if further advances in arms control were to take place since events such as Czechoslovakia would prevent any progress whatsoever. He again attempted to reassure me that things would be much better rather than worse. It was clear from his conversation that he had had no advance notice of the intrusion into Czechoslovakia.
284. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/ Washington, September 20, 1968, 0026Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by D.L. Aaron and A.F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) on September 19; cleared by officers in ACDA/IR, IO, EA/AA, EUR, NEA, AFI, ARA, and G/PM; and approved by Adrian Fisher. The telegram requested action from all posts except Algiers, Dar es Salaam, Cairo, Kabul, Khartoum, Lusaka, Saigon, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, and Bucharest. 241963. Disto/IAEA. Subject: Perpetuation of Non-Nuclear Conference (NNC)./2/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 263. 1. A primary concern at NNC is likelihood that resolution will be passed either calling for permanent machinery to carry on tasks of NNC or calling for periodic meetings--or both. In view of possible disruptive effects of continuing activity of the sort transpiring at NNC, we believe we should make every reasonable effort to forestall or water down proposals for NNC perpetuation. 2. Unless you see overriding objection, action addressees should approach FonOffs ASAP at most effective level to explain US position as follows. Subjects being discussed at NNC are matters which in one form or another already are being considered constructively in other bodies--security issues in GA; disarmament in ENDC, as well as in GA; peaceful uses in IAEA, General Conference and Atoms for Peace Conference. These bodies will continue to consider and have responsibility for these questions regardless of what the NNC may accomplish. In some cases, such as in GA, such consideration will begin promptly after NNC concludes. It would be relatively meaningless for NNC to carry over what some may consider unfinished business to a later session, since in the meantime these subjects will be actively dealt with elsewhere. Moreover, fact that nuclear powers are not voting participants in NNC is in itself argument for conducting further discussions in existing forums where virtually all interested parties are represented, on equal basis. 3. In view above, you should state that USG does not plan participate in further meetings of bodies organized along lines NNC and cannot support fixing any date for future conferences of this sort. We would not be able to support establishment of any permanent machinery to carry on tasks of NNC because of existence of various organs and agencies charged with responsibility for matters under discussion of NNC. You should accordingly strongly urge that host Govt not support NNC perpetuation. 4. You may also say that one acceptable alternative to NNC perpetuation would be for NNC to recommend putting item on agenda of early GA session (e.g., 24th) which would provide opportunity to re-examine conclusions of NNC in light of progress made in interim by the responsible organs and agencies. You should emphasize we will continue our intensive efforts in these existing agencies and bodies for promotion peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to work towards disarmament objectives. We are convinced that existing organs and agencies provide most practical and realistic vehicle for concrete progress in these fields. 5. Addresses, in case of governments not attending NNC, may at their discretion make above demarche if it would favorably influence position host Govt at UNGA. Rusk
285. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Drafted by Leddy and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S) on September 24. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin had asked to see the Secretary either today or on Monday./2/ The Secretary agreed to see him at 12:30 p.m. today. /2/September 23. Dobrynin began by referring to the question of technical talks on PNEDS (Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices). He said that the idea of the US and the USSR meeting on this subject had been at the US initiative, that the US thought it would be useful with the non-nuclear conference in Geneva and that the Soviets were now prepared to go ahead with the talks on October 7, as suggested by the US. The Secretary asked whether this subject had been discussed with Ambassador Foster when he and Dobrynin met the other day./3/ Dobrynin replied that they had just discussed the NPT and that Ambassador Foster did not wish to discuss the PNEDS talks. /3/Document 283. The Secretary said that he would have to discuss this question with the President and Ambassador Foster, and that he would let Dobrynin know later. He observed that there were complications. The Secretary said that the Executive Branch, as the Ambassador knew, was attempting to move the non-proliferation treaty through the Senate. In response to the Ambassador's question, he said he thought the matter would not come to a vote before the Fortas nomination had been settled,/4/ probably not until the end of the month. /4/President Johnson nominated Abe Fortas, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to be Chief Justice on June 26. [Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany.]
286. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Shaw) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen)/1/ Washington, October 2, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Limited Official Use. SUBJECT A significant result of the otherwise confused Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States was the adoption of a resolution, sponsored by Pakistan and encouraged by Canada, endorsing the US-Soviet agreement of July 1 to hold strategic arms limitation talks and "urging the governments of the USSR and US to enter into such bilateral talks at an early date."/2/ It is particularly noteworthy that the resolution was: /2/Reference is to Resolution D, approved by the Conference on September 27. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, p. 675. 1. Adopted by the largest majority for any resolution which won NNC support (79-0-5); 2. Supported by all of our NATO Allies participating in the NNC, including the FRG (Karl Lahusen, third-ranking member of the German Embassy here, spoke to me approvingly about this action); 3. Supported also by such other US Allies as the entire Latin American bloc, Korea, Vietnam, and the GRC; and 4. Supported by Yugoslavia and Romania. With the exception of Thailand, none of the five abstaining countries (Thailand, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) plays a significant role in international affairs. The abstentions of Tanzania and Zambia presumably reflect Chinese influence. In sum, there would appear to be overwhelming international support for an early beginning of these talks. None of our Allies which are most concerned about the consequences of Czechoslovakia or are generally leery about signs of US-Soviet collaboration either opposed or abstained on the resolution. You may wish to bring this development to the attention of the Secretary, if that has not already been done./3/ /3/In a September 27 memorandum to President Johnson, Walt Rostow brought this resolution to the President's attention, stressing that "All NATO allies present, including Federal Republic of Germany, voted in favor of the resolution." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26) JPS
287. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States/1/ Moscow, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking; Unofficial Translation. A handwritten note on the source text reads, "handed to Sec. Rusk by Gromyko on Oct. 2." Gromyko apparently gave it to Secretary Rusk along with the Russian text. (Ibid.) President Johnson's observations on the subject of his meeting with Soviet leaders which were communicated by W. Rostow to the Soviet Ambassador on September 16/2/ have been attentively considered in Moscow. In this connection we, for our part, should also like to express some ideas. /2/Document 282. I. It has been noted in Moscow that the President has reacted favorably to our suggestion that in the course of the meeting there should be established basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in strategic armaments. We, for our part, agree that simultaneously the general objectives of our two countries in this field should be formulated in a more detailed form. On the whole as a result of the exchange of views on the question of restraining the strategic arms race it could, in our opinion, be stated that the two sides had arrived at a conclusion on the expediency and feasibility of achieving a mutually acceptable understanding on this question, and that the implementation of measures to restrain the strategic arms race would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the interests of strengthening international security, and that this would also generate more favorable conditions for solving other major issues in the field of disarmament. Specifically, it could be agreed that the two sides would be guided by the following general objectives: --To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic armaments. --To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating Soviet and U.S. willingness to limit their strategic armaments. --To provide mutual assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. --To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. At the same time it could be agreed that the task of limiting and subsequently reducing strategic armaments should be resolved in compliance with the following basic principles: (1) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out with due regard for the integral interconnection of the two principal components of such armaments, i.e. offensive and defensive weapons systems. (2) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out as a complex including both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems. (3) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantages and that equal security should be assured for both sides. There could also be registered an agreement of the two sides, along with implementation of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, to study the question of taking steps to rule out the accidental appearance of conflict-fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments. In conclusion it could be agreed that special delegations of the two governments, guided by the above-mentioned objectives and principles, would promptly address themselves to devising an agreement on the concrete aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. Agreement, reached during the meeting, on the above-listed aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments could, in our view, then be set forth either in the final communique of the meeting or in the form of a joint statement of our two governments. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.]
288. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ ACDA-3548 Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3548. Top Secret. SUBJECT The Soviet memorandum/2/ is, in general substance, consistent with the US proposal which has been developed for presentation to the USSR. The memorandum sets forth certain "general objectives" and also the "basic principles" which would be utilized in seeking to reach these objectives. It is contemplated that these objectives and principles would be set forth in a communique or joint statement following an initial meeting. In our view, any such agreed statement should embody the following changes: /2/Document 287. (1) The first proposed general objective, at the top of page 2, is "to achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence." The word "achieve" may be intended to suggest that some adjustment of the present nuclear balance is required to bring about numerical equality in some respects. We should take the position that effective deterrence now exists and that the proper objective is to "maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence." (2) The first two "basic principles," at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3, phrase differently the subject matter of the proposed arms limitation agreement. The first of these refers to "offensive and defensive weapons systems" and thus would include manned bombers and missile systems designed to defend against manned bombers. The subsequent paragraph refers to the limitation and reduction of "offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems." This would appear to cover manned bombers, but not bomber defenses. Our proposal does not include limitations either on aircraft or on anti-aircraft systems. In view of the fact that the two paragraphs cover essentially the same subject matter, we should propose dropping the second and leaving the first with its general language about "offensive and defensive weapons systems." This would leave us free in the course of negotiations to determine the advisability of including or excluding bombers and bomber defenses. (3) The third basic principle, contained in the second paragraph on page 3, talks of assuring "equal security" for both sides. Here again, the intent may be to provide for an adjustment in the existing nuclear balance to achieve numerical equality in one or more areas. US and USSR forces are not symmetrical at the present time and our security needs differ in some respects. We should point out that the word "equal" is tautological as a qualifier of "security" and should be deleted. (4) The third paragraph on page 3 does not clearly convey the thought that the two sides should study means for preventing the development of situations which pose the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The word "minimize" might be substituted for the words "rule out" in line 3 of paragraph 3. The word "possible" might be added at the beginning of line 5 of paragraph 3. (5) It is our understanding that the last two paragraphs of the memorandum contemplate that there will be an initial high-level meeting at which agreement will be reached on the "general objectives" and "basic principles" which will then be recorded in a communique or joint statement. Thereafter, special delegations will meet to develop a final agreement, guided by these objectives and principles. The memorandum thus apparently does not foreclose the possibility of a formal treaty although it does not specify the form that a final agreement is to take. Clark M. Clifford
289. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/16 New York, October 6, 1968, 7:30-10:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The source text is labeled "Part V of VIII." The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE New York, September-October 1968 SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. USSR Ambassador Malik inquired as to the prospects of Japan, Brazil and Argentina signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Secretary Rusk replied that it was his opinion that Japan would sign the Treaty; it would take some time, but he thought Japan would sign before the end of the current year. As for Brazil, he wanted to say in strictest confidence that it was really a matter of their Foreign Minister having some strange ideas to the effect that Brazil needed to retain the right of developing its own nuclear capability for the purpose of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions. But, in the end, he was confident that the Foreign Minister would not present any obstacles to Brazil's signing the NPT. The main problem, though, was that Brazil's delay created problems for its neighbor, Argentina, and Argentina's delay, in turn, created problems for Chile; it was in the nature of a chain reaction. Ambassador Malik said the situation resembled that of India and Pakistan. The Secretary agreed and said the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had told him he could not sign unless India signed as well. He hoped that the Soviet Union would influence India in the direction of signing the Treaty. To Mr. Gromyko's question as to when the US Senate could be expected to take up the ratification of the NPT, the Secretary replied that he hoped it would be this week. We had a count on the Democratic Senators in this respect and had no problem here. Tomorrow morning he was going to see Mr. Nixon and hoped that he could persuade him privately to press Republican Senators for ratification now. In reply to Mr. Gromyko's question the Secretary said that he hoped Mr. Nixon would approach the problem with proper understanding. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |