1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State
Washington, DC
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of State |
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290. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster)/1/ Washington, October 9, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. The letter is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 332-333. Dear Bill: Events in Czechoslovakia seemed to have overtaken any urgency for the ENDC speech proposed in your memorandum of August 16, 1968/2/ and thus, the need for my immediate reply. I believe, however, that you would be interested in our general views on the subject of an agreement for a cutoff of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. /2/See footnote 3, Document 276. From the standpoint of AEC's responsibilities, we are principally concerned with the effect that a cutoff would have on the ability of the AEC to meet possible weapon production requirements. To that end, we plan to make a study of our ability to meet foreseeable requirements for fissionable material and tritium under conditions of a cutoff, and will be happy to make the results of that study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals. Changes in US requirements for fissionable material and tritium for weapons, in projected demands for fissionable material for non-weapons use, and in AEC's production operations have occurred since the Committee of Principals last reviewed the US position on a cutoff, several years ago. We believe that another review by the Committee of Principals would be very useful in terms of over-all perspective concerning the desirability of a cutoff. We are also concerned about the present adequacy of the inspection procedures which were outlined in 1964 (ENDC/134)/3/ to apply to nuclear-weapon states under a cutoff agreement. In particular, demands for uranium enriching services to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors have expanded at a much greater rate than foreseen in 1964, and this raises a question as to the suitability of the monitoring procedures provided for in ENDC/134. Progress in the development of the technology of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge has also been substantial. The procedures for monitoring operating uranium enrichment plants were based on the premise that such plants would continue operation at low production rates to meet demands for enriched uranium for non-weapons use, and that those demands would be small relative to existing stocks of fissionable material. ENDC/134 recognized that the monitoring procedures will have to be reviewed "as peaceful uses grow and involve substantially larger quantities of fissionable material." We believe that it would be desirable to consider whether the monitoring procedures outlined in ENDC/134 are still appropriate in the changed circumstances. Accordingly, we intend to study this question and will make the results of our study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals. /3/See footnote 2, Document 251. In order that our studies may be most useful, we would appreciate your providing us with the specific language of the cutoff proposal you would like to have considered for possible use at the ENDC. With respect to the existing alternate proposal of plant-by-plant shutdowns, we believe that US actions since 1964 require that such a proposal be reformulated. We now have completely shut down two production reactors and have placed five others in standby. The reactors in standby are available for our use, given adequate lead time, for the production of plutonium or tritium for use in weapons or, alternatively, for production of materials for non-weapons use. Furthermore, some of the reactors still in operation are being used entirely for the production of materials for uses other than weapons. Accordingly, we believe that if and when any plant-by-plant offer is restated, consideration should be given to phrasing it in such a manner that it comprehends the following alternative actions: (1) shutting down permanently, under verification, of an operating reactor; (2) placing in standby under verification (for possible subsequent verified operation for permitted uses) of a currently operating reactor; (3) placing under verification a reactor already shut down or in standby, which had previously been a source of fissionable material for use in weapons; or (4) placing a currently operating reactor under verification to assure that the material being produced is only for permitted uses. Cordially, Glenn
291. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 11-16-68 Washington, November 7, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin--Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence departments of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency; concurred in by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence), Thomas L. Hughes (Director, INR), Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA), Marshall S. Carter (Director, NSA), and Dr. Charles H. Reichardt (AEC). William O. Cregar (FBI) abstained; the subject being outside his jurisdiction. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL/2/ Note /2/Some of the considerations which bear on this subject are discussed in greater detail in NIE 11-4-68, "Main Issues in Soviet Military Policy," dated 19 September 1968. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-4-68 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4.] This paper is addressed primarily to the subject of the Soviet attitude toward negotiation of limitations on strategic weapons systems. It also evaluates briefly the significance of the Soviet nine-point memorandum on disarmament issued on 1 July 1968./3/ /3/See footnote 6, Document 252. The Estimate I. Background 1. Traditionally, the Soviets have appeared to view arms control and disarmament primarily as a field of political warfare. While such considerations have continued to color much of the Soviet attitude during the past few years, the USSR did enter into agreements on nuclear testing in 1963, on weapons in outer space in 1967, and this year on nuclear nonproliferation. There were advantages to Soviet foreign policy in doing so, and in addition, the progress which was being made in their strategic programs gave the Soviet leaders confidence that their relative position would not be disadvantaged by these limited agreements. The willingness of the Soviets to entertain more far-reaching agreements with the West will obviously depend on a very complex interplay of military, political, and economic considerations. 2. The Soviet nine-point disarmament memorandum publicly issued on 1 July 1968 was primarily a propaganda document. With various points addressed to different potential forums, the memorandum was evidently not intended as a package proposal. Probably it was aimed mainly at claiming the initiative for the USSR and obscuring the fact that it was the US which, for more than 18 months, had pressed for a new effort to negotiate limitations on strategic weapons. Most of the proposals contained in the memorandum are old standbys which have been used in a propaganda context for many years (e.g., calls for banning the use of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, for abolishing foreign military bases, and for prohibiting nuclear armed bomber flights outside national frontiers). But a few of them concern matters on which Moscow has expressed interest in other ways, and on which it may see advantage in serious negotiation. Such proposals concern limitation of strategic weapons systems, peaceful uses of the seabed, banning underground nuclear testing, and some measures for regional arms control. None of these is fundamentally new either; all are items that have been periodically promoted by the USSR at the UN and elsewhere. Clearly, the first of these is the most basic in its implications for the relationship between the two powers and the only one now contemplated for bilateral negotiations. 3. The Soviets had, of course, agreed to have talks with the US on strategic arms limitations several days prior to the issuance of the nine-point memorandum, which was released in connection with a Kosygin speech made at the Moscow signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The moment chosen for the USSR's belated acceptance of the US proposal suggests that the motives which underlay the decision must have been complex. The response came during a period when there seemed to be no noticeable relaxation in Soviet propaganda attacks against the West; it coincided with the buildup of heavy military and political pressures against Czechoslovakia; and it was announced only months before a change of administrations in Washington. Moreover, the Soviets had long maintained that major steps toward improving relations with the US were impossible during the Vietnam War. While on the face of things the moment chosen may seem improbable, some of these circumstances may actually have given the Soviets incentives to move when they did. 4. Both political and military factors probably figured in the long delay of the Soviet response. For one thing, the Soviets have customarily responded to US arms control initiatives with a great measure of caution and suspicion. On so complex and sensitive an issue as strategic arms limitations, the misgivings--probably, in fact, the resistance--of certain elements both within and outside the Soviet political leadership must have been considerable. The period of delay permitted a further narrowing of the gap between Soviet and American strategic forces; the Soviets are now approaching the US in numbers of operational inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and are also building a submarine force similar to the Polaris. They must now have strengthened confidence in their possession of an assured destruction capability, and considering qualitative differences in weapon systems such as warhead yield, the target system to be attacked, and damage-limiting capabilities, they may actually consider that they have now achieved rough strategic parity with the U.S. Thus, they must believe that their bargaining position in negotiations has become stronger. 5. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has complicated the political environment bearing on arms control. It indicated that Moscow's determination to preserve a secure position in Eastern Europe outweighed other considerations, including its interest in early negotiation on strategic arms control. It is still too soon to evaluate the full implications of the Czech crisis for Soviet policy, and specifically for Soviet attitudes toward arms control. The move toward new disarmament negotiations was probably calculated to help offset the opprobrium the USSR suffered from the Czech intervention. How Moscow's attitude toward strategic arms talks now develops will also depend on the impact of recent events on attitudes and policies in Washington. The Soviets have maintained that the Czech crisis is no one's business except their own and Eastern Europe's and a matter quite apart from questions of mutual interest to both East and West. It was in this spirit, at least, that Gromyko recently reaffirmed Soviet desires to begin talks with the US. II. Considerations Affecting the Soviet Approach to Negotiations
6. Having significantly improved their relative position in strategic forces in recent years, the Soviets probably believe that a considerable sustained effort will be necessary to maintain the position they have now achieved; the Soviets must recognize that the competition in this field will not stand still. They probably fear that projected US programs will once again increase the US relative advantage considerably, unless the Soviets themselves undertake strenuous new efforts. The choices posed for the Soviet leaders at present are: (a) to attempt to keep pace by making the indicated effort; (b) to permit the US to move out far ahead once more; or (c) to attempt by agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship at a point less unfavorable to the USSR than it ever has been. 7. It seems likely that, after the effort they have made and the resources they have expended, the Soviet leaders would find it intolerable to see their improved position degraded. No doubt there would be some who would argue that the forces the Soviets will have under current programs would give them an assured destruction capability for many years to come, regardless of what the US did. But it is unlikely that the pressures of military leaders and the play of Kremlin politics would permit resigned acceptance of a widening gap. The argument for staying in the race, for political as well as security reasons, would probably prevail in the end. 8. Faced, however, with the oncoming US programs--Poseidon and Minuteman III (with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles), and Sentinel--the Soviets must recognize that, if they want to stay in the race, they have their work cut out for them. Not only would there be enormous economic costs, but the Soviets would inevitably have some doubts of their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for more advanced systems. Moreover, further large allocations of resources to strategic forces would tighten the squeeze on other military programs. This would be particularly troubling to those military leaders who feel that the general purpose forces are now in pressing need of refurbishing and perhaps enlargement. 9. The outlook for the competition between the US and the USSR in the field of ballistic missile defense probably offers the Soviets grounds for concern. They have a system of limited effectiveness deployed at Moscow, but they evidently realize that more development work is needed before extensive deployment would be worthwhile./4/ They recognize that the US program in this field is still at an early stage and will not affect the balance of strategic power for some years, but they know that development work is going forward in the US and that deployment is planned. While the Soviets, on the basis of the extensive work they have already done, are probably confident that they can sustain the competition in this field, they may also come to believe that the net result would be a vast expenditure of economic resources without any effective return in increased security. /4/For a full discussion of the status and prospects of the Soviet antiballistic missile program, see NIE 11-3-68, "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses," dated 31 October 1968. Top Secret, Restricted Data. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-3-68 has not been found.] 10. Thus, there are incentives for the Soviets to consider more seriously now the option of negotiations to limit strategic forces. They could calculate that an agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship, or at least to slow down the competition, if achieved in the next year or two, would be the best means of preserving the improved relative position the USSR has been acquiring. They might further think that, even if no agreement was finally reached, the process of negotiation itself, because of the expectations it would arouse in the US and elsewhere, would act to slow the pace of the competition for a time.
11. Economic considerations doubtless contributed also to the USSR's decision to discuss strategic arms control. To the extent that the Soviets had been motivated by the desire to limit over-all military costs and free resources for other purposes, they would presumably continue to want to avoid provoking a new surge in arms competition. Soviet spokesmen have, over the past year, repeatedly pointed to the high level of defense expenditures in the US. Though some of these statements were probably intended as arguments for, or justification of, increases in Soviet defense outlays, others almost certainly reflected the Soviets' concern over similar rising costs in the USSR. 12. Over the past several years, the Soviets have been following a policy of expanding strategic programs and increasing investment in the consumer goods and services sectors of the economy while allowing rates of growth of investment in heavy industry to decline. This policy limits the output of producers goods and will ultimately retard the over-all rate of economic growth. Thus, the Soviet leaders probably must divert resources to the producers goods sector of the economy in the near future or risk seriously impairing future capacity for satisfying military as well as civilian objectives. The important question is which claimant is going to yield--the consumer or the military--and when? In the past, the Soviet decision would have been quite predictable: the consumer has traditionally borne the brunt of any resource bind. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the political cost of this course is greater in their society now than it used to be. Therefore, as certain strategic programs approach planned levels, some Soviet leaders might prefer to avoid heavy new expenditures for follow-on military programs. An arms control agreement could reduce the pressures for such programs. 13. It is conceivable that the new military requirements generated by the Czech crisis may aggravate the resource allocations problem and thus add to Soviet incentives to seek strategic arms limitations. The Soviets may consider that their occupation of Czechoslovakia and new uncertainties about the contributions of their allies will require further strengthening of Soviet forces in the European forward area and the reinforcement of their general purpose forces in the western USSR. These requirements, in addition to the ongoing buildup of military forces along the Chinese border, will probably lead to substantial increases in Soviet theater forces in general. The cost of meeting these demands will add to the current record high level of defense spending that already appears to be generating potentially serious economic problems. The Soviets may thus at this time be interested in strategic arms control as a way of conserving some economic resources for other military programs and also as a way of relieving strains in the economy generally. III. Factors Affecting the Course of Negotiations 14. Soviet willingness to enter into arms control talks with the US does not, of course, signify a firm commitment to strive for an agreement. In the early phases, the Soviets would probably concentrate on probing the US position. Should they decide to get down to serious business, the negotiations would inevitably be hard and prolonged. 15. The political climate at the time of talks, and developments on the international scene which might affect it for better or worse, would have a considerable bearing on success or failure. There will be the usual suspicion and mistrust on the Soviet side, and the problem of breaking through resisting layers of bureaucracy to get decisions will be particularly formidable in view of the complexity of the issues. It is likely also that there will be divisions among the top leaders, and that politicking for future place and power will figure in the positions they adopt. Thus, the obstacles to actual achievement of an agreement will be great, especially in the absence of some simultaneous advance toward resolution of the more basic East-West issues and the improved political climate so generated. 16. The Soviets will approach negotiations with one basic criterion in mind: they will want their right to equality in strategic forces acknowledged in principle. In fact, one motive they had for accepting the US invitation to negotiate was probably the belief that the US move tacitly conceded this right, or at least could be so construed by them. Acknowledgment of the claim to equality would be valued not merely on security grounds, but also because of the implication it would carry that the USSR was entitled to a political role in world affairs equivalent to that of the US. Thus, the Soviets would be sensitive to any attempt from the US side to "negotiate from strength" or to claim a permanent advantage in strategic forces. 17. What in fact constitutes equality--in view of the different composition of strategic forces on the two sides and their different geopolitical situations--would be recognized by the Soviets as a proper subject of negotiation. They would surely bargain hard and take every advantage, but would probably be willing in working out the problems of equivalence to consider trade-offs between different weapons systems of the two sides. Their view of the nature of power would lead them to weigh other ingredients than numbers of strategic weapons alone--other kinds of forces, political strengths and influence--in measuring the relative power of the two sides. Once involved in the negotiations, therefore, they would probably not be disposed to break off merely because of difficulties encountered, and they would also recognize the political costs of doing so. 18. The problem of verification which has dogged all previous disarmament negotiations will persist. The Soviets will probably continue to resist verification procedures which require the presence of foreign inspectors in the USSR. Traditionally, the Soviets have regarded such inspection arrangements as militarily disadvantageous and politically harmful. If anything, their fear of ideological contagion is currently heightened. Thus, Moscow is still unlikely to accept an arms control agreement which cannot be verified primarily through national means. 19. In sum, we believe that Moscow's incentives to try for strategic arms limitations and for stabilizing the USSR's strategic relationship with the US are stronger now than they have been. Nevertheless, the forces and institutions in the USSR with a vested interest in stalling and even blocking movement toward arms control continue to be strong, and will weigh heavily against the prospects for achieving an agreement. Moreover, the absence of a political climate of mutual trust between the US and USSR could strengthen the case of those forces in the USSR opposed to serious negotiation and, in general, hamper efforts to achieve agreement.
292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 14, 1968, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. Mr. President: Herewith an initial comment on Dobrynin's position at the lunch he initiated./2/ /2/No other record of this luncheon has been found. 1. Moscow is clearly ready to go--and eager--if you can work it out. 2. Their reasons are quite similar to our own: to create a good backdrop for the NPT in January; to keep the momentum of the work on missiles going into the next Administration; and, therefore, to avoid a long delay in both the NPT and the missile affairs. 3. Reading over the proposed joint communique statement on the missile talks,/3/ I have two reflections: /3/Presumably a reference to Document 287 or to an early U.S. draft joint statement; not found. --first, they need some staffing out by Sect. Rusk and a few others; --basically, they represent the kind of public commitment that might emerge; although the heart of the matter will lie not in the public statement of principles, but rather in the simple fact that initial positions have been exchanged between the two governments and that further rational negotiation can proceed early in the next Administration. 4. The heart of the matter, then, is not so much in the refinement of the principles, but in persuading Nixon that this is the right course for him, for the President, and for the nation. 5. With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points: --we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions; --we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government; --any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration; --a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January; --equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin and Czechoslovakia. 6. I have no doubt that there will be those who argue to Nixon that he should wait and take this matter in hand himself. I understand very well the leverage we had on him on the Vietnam matter; but I am not clear what leverage the President will have on this issue except: --his power of initiative even without Nixon's assent; --an appeal to statesmanship and self-interest. W.W. Rostow/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
293. Summary Notes of the 594th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, November 25, 1968, noon-1:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 76, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. [Here follows discussion of monetary issues, Vietnam, and current problems before the United Nations.] [Ambassador Wiggins:] d. Disarmament--The issue now is the continuation of the conference of non-nuclear powers./2/ Our position is to oppose a permanent body to deal with this issue. As to the talks on strategic arms limitations, the Soviets have made mention of these talks but we have been non-responsive. /2/See Documents 284 and 286. The President: What should we do about conducting talks on strategic arms limitation? We have the Czech situation, a new Administration coming in and there is uncertainty as to the possibility of achieving anything in such talks. Ambassador Wiggins: We should proceed with the talks. There is no problem about conducting a parallel policy--attacking the Russians for their invasion of Czechoslovakia each morning and each afternoon talking about strategic arms limitations. The President: The President-elect has slowed down Senate ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. Can we accomplish anything in strategic arms talks if we do not have the NPT ratified? Ambassador Wiggins: We can accomplish something because the Russians are eager to undertake the arms talks. The Russians are embarrassed by criticism of the Czech invasion. They want to undertake arms talks in order to draw attention away from the Czech issue. However, we should not propose a special Senate session to ratify the non-proliferation treaty. The President: Ratification to the NPT has a bearing on the strategic arms talks. The Congressional leaders will be coming here this evening to discuss whether or not to hold a special session./3/ The Germans have been softened up by recent actions in the monetary crisis but we have no leverage on them to ratify the NPT because we have not yet ratified. The same situation is involved with Israel. We have given them the Phantom airplanes but this may not be useful in getting them to accept the NPT unless we have already ratified. In India and Japan, those opposing the NPT can argue that their countries should not act on the treaty before we do. /3/No record of this conversation has been found. However, in a memorandum to President Johnson, November 25 at 11 p.m., Rostow proposed talking points for a message to President-elect Nixon. Among other things, Rostow's draft message indicated President Johnson had decided to "leave the NPT to the opening days of the next session of Congress in January, at the earliest. (Both Dirksen and Mansfield think this would be wiser than calling a special session.)" (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 108, Box 43R) Delaying ratification until the new Senate arrives may mean that the ratification of the NPT is in doubt. The composition of the Senate will be different. Senators Clark and Morse will be out and Goldwater will be in. Senator Russell is in doubt about the treaty and his doubts may grow. Unless we act in December, we may run into trouble. Ambassador Wiggins: It is embarrassing in the United Nations to be able to say only that we think we will ratify the treaty. It would be wonderful if the treaty were ratified. The President: Asked for a paper summarizing the attitudes in the UN as reported by Ambassador Wiggins./4/ Bob Murphy has been told that we believe we ought to go ahead with the NPT now./5/ It is true the Senators didn't want to come back for a special session. The Czech invasion blew up earlier plans for the arms talks. We should get started even if we handle the talks so as not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. Nixon will agree to our going ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an observer on the delegation. /4/Not further identified. /5/On November 15, President Johnson announced that President-elect Nixon had designated Robert D. Murphy, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to serve as his liaison with the White House and as observer at the Department of State. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, p. 1126. Secretary Fowler:/6/ The NATO meeting at Brussels changed the thinking of Europeans. The European situation is different after the NATO meeting as regards their doubt about bilateral or US-USSR arms talks. /6/Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury. Secretary Clifford: It is clear that NATO members do not want to return to the cold war. Their concern was that a NATO arms buildup might upset the movement toward detente. The NATO meeting was delayed almost to the point where the Soviet invasion could not be fully exploited in an effort to get them to increase their defense contribution. Most of the Soviet divisions are now out of Czechoslovakia and the threat to NATO members is, in their minds, less than it was a few weeks ago. However, NATO members would welcome US-USSR arms talks. The President: State Department officials had told him the arms talks would cause trouble with NATO members. Secretary Rusk believed that talks would trouble our allies. President-elect Nixon said we should delay the talks because of the Czech invasion. A paper was requested giving all the reasons why the talks should or should not be held which he could use in a conversation with Senator Dirksen./7/ /7/Not further identified. Secretary Clifford: The Germans and British want us to go ahead with the arms talk. They are prepared to have us take the calculated risk that things will quiet down in Czechoslovakia. The rest of the NATO members want us to go ahead but they do not want us to ask them whether we should go ahead. The President: Bob Murphy has been told that a meeting with the Russians might persuade the Soviets to pressure Egypt on the Middle East problem and Hanoi on the Vietnam problem. Secretary Clifford: As to whether a special session on the NPT should be called, we must make a very careful nose count before deciding. There is real concern that the Senate might refuse to ratify the treaty. Senators would resent a special session whereas to the arms talks, such talks would help advance in the NPT here and abroad. The President: We should tell the new Administration the facts of life and then they will have to take responsibility. [Here follows brief discussion of other U.N. issues.]
294. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) and Secretary of State Rusk/1/ November 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin. No classification marking. Ambassador Thompson was in Moscow; Secretary Rusk was in Washington. The time is apparently Washington time. I. Gromyko called me to the foreign office at 11:30 a.m. this morning and made following oral statements: "Secretary of State Rusk in a conversation with USSR Ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin, on November 25 of this year/2/ touched on a number of questions which, in the opinion of President Johnson, could be discussed in the event of his meeting with Soviet leaders. /2/At this meeting Secretary Rusk and Dobrynin explored a wide range of issues. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Country File, Europe and USSR, Dobrynin/Thompson Conversations, Box 227. Regarding the relationship between the issue of strategic missiles and a summit, "Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that he thought in regard to the ABM matter that this whole thing had been agreed in principle and there would be no need to redefine the question. The Secretary said that he agreed as far as the ABM was concerned, but he thought that what was involved was a judgment by both of them as to whether or not at this particular time a meeting would be useful." (Ibid.) A memorandum of their conversation on the nonproliferation treaty is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. "In conformity with the desire expressed by Rusk to learn the opinion of the Soviet side with respect to these questions, we would like to report the following for transmission to President Johnson: 1. We proceed from the fact that, concerning the limitation of the strategic arms race, there was agreement in the course of the preceding exchange of opinions between us, on a sufficient number of concrete propositions regarding common goals and basic principles for limiting and subsequently reducing strategic weapons, the approval of which would be completed by a discussion of this question at a possible meeting. As far as we understand, our detailed considerations on this subject, handed to the Secretary of State on October 2 of this year,/3/ were positively received on the American side. For our part we are ready as before to review the stated considerations as a basis for the achievement of an initial, principled agreement on this subject. /3/Document 287. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam.] In the event the American side has any other additional considerations which it would like to express in connection with the consideration of the question of the possible arranging of a meeting between President Johnson and the Soviet leaders, we are ready of course to hear them and to take such considerations into account before final decision on this question." II. I said that you were sending me the exchange of correspondence on missile talks, but I had not yet received it. I asked if it was Soviet idea that at possible meeting an agreement on principles to guide missile talks would be reached and embodied in some sort of declaration or communique and that this would then be followed by detailed negotiations. He said that was his understanding. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East.] IV. Dobrynin has not been able to reach Moscow because of bad weather here. I therefore told Gromyko for his background that I understood we were thinking of December 16 and 17 in Geneva. He said he was not in a position to comment. V. Indicating I was speaking without instructions I said that a two-day meeting would leave little time for any consultation by the principles with their government and that it seemed to me that the more advance preparation the better. He nodded, but did not comment. VI. You will note statement referred to Soviet leaders in the plural. I will try to find out from Dobrynin whom they have in mind.
295. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Sensitive. The date has been inserted by hand. Attached is a memorandum from Clifford to Walt Rostow, December 2, asking Rostow to forward his memorandum to the President. Rostow forwarded Clifford's memorandum to the President under cover of a December 2 note, which noted Clifford's "strong case for beginning strategic talks with the Soviets at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks," and continued: "If I may say so, the problem with working level talks (as opposed to simply exchanging positions and asking some initial clarifying questions) is: "--We will have to take some time to study throughout the government the Soviet paper; "--We are pretty well committed not to negotiate off our initial position during the life of this Administration. "Perhaps Clark's point could be met if: "--On the first day of the talks the chiefs of government presented their respective positions; "--On the second day working sessions were held to clarify the respective positions while the chiefs of government met separately on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc." (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R) SUBJECT Now that Saigon has agreed to come to Paris, I believe that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of our position on the question of holding Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we should move forward on this matter at this time, beginning with a meeting at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks. 1. If the Soviets were to accept an agreement along the lines of the one unanimously recommended to you, we would maintain a substantial part of our present strategic advantage; a year from now it will be much more difficult to devise a proposal which takes account of existing strategic forces and is in our interest. Over the next year or two, as the Soviets continue their build-up of ICBM's beyond 1200 and begin to approach parity with us in Polaris-type submarines, our edge in these areas will be eroded and a freeze at a later date could leave us without any significant advantage. Furthermore, the Soviets may well begin to deploy land-mobile systems which would greatly complicate the verification issues associated with a future agreement. 2. If US-Soviet discussions have not yet begun, it is improbable that a new Administration would initiate them immediately; but if Talks were already underway, it is unlikely to call off the negotiations. If we do not move forward now, I believe that it is almost certain that there will be a delay of a year or more while the new Administration examines this question and makes its own determination on strategic policies and force procurements. 3. If we do not initiate Talks now, any future movement on this issue might have to be over the objections of the Joint Chiefs rather than with their concurrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's concurrence in the proposal stems from a number of factors, including the freezing of our strategic advantage, which are unlikely to be repeated at any time in the future. Moreover, under a new Administration there is almost sure to be military opposition to a freeze in our strategic arms until it can be seen what forces the new Administration is prepared to buy in the absence of an agreement. 4. The Russian invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia need no longer delay our going forward with the Strategic Talks. a. Indications from our allies have been that they want the Talks to go forward; we should, of course, inform them before any public announcement of our decision to begin the Talks. The Non-Nuclear Conference which ended in Geneva on September 28 unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union to begin Strategic Talks. Both the FRG and Italy voted in favor of this resolution. And at the NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting during the first week of October, representatives from several countries reaffirmed their Government's support of this resolution, with the FRG representatives urging that such Talks begin "at an early date." Denis Healey of the UK raised the subject with me at the time of the NPG Meeting in October, expressing his belief that we should go ahead with Talks. My conversations with Schroeder and Kiesinger over the past two months persuade me that the Germans would not object if we went ahead. Foreign Minister Brandt, at the meeting of the SPD Executive Board in Bonn on November 22, is reported to have said that direct Talks between the great powers should continue on such matters as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. In my report to the NATO Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee on November 14, I referred again to the importance of strategic arms limitations. None of the NATO Defense Ministers indicated any objection to the initiation of Talks. Their comments stressed only the desirability of advance notice and continued consultation with our NATO allies as such Talks progress. While these discussions did not focus specifically on a heads of government meeting, I do not believe that our allies would object to a businesslike working meeting at that level. b. If the Talks were underway, we could use our continued participation in them as a lever against further Soviet repressive measures in Czechoslovakia, or as a way of deterring Soviet moves against other Eastern European nations. The apparent eagerness of the Soviets for these Talks makes this kind of threat seem plausible. Kosygin's remarks in his meeting with Bob McNamara two weeks ago confirmed their strong desire that such Talks be initiated. 5. Mr. Nixon's public statements after his meeting with you make it difficult for him to object to the Talks./2/ After his meeting with you on November 11, Mr. Nixon asserted his recognition of the need for continuity "on matters like Vietnam, the current possible crisis in the Middle East, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to certain outstanding matters." He said that in each of these three instances "I gave assurances . . . to the Secretary of State, and of course to the President, that they could speak not just for this Administration, but for the Nation, and that meant for the next Administration as well." Accordingly, it seems likely that he would not object to the opening of discussions. /2/For texts of President Johnson's and President-elect Nixon's remarks to the press following their November 11 meeting at the White House, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1119-1120. 6. The Heads of Government Talks should be held in Geneva and should aim at political agreement on the great importance of limiting and then reducing strategic forces. Opening the Talks at the summit will provide a momentum which will make it difficult for either side to call off Talks without first making a serious effort to reach an agreement. Moreover, agreement in principle between heads of government on the urgent need to control the strategic arms race will greatly facilitate discussions at the working level. You might want to seek agreement with Kosygin on a statement along the following lines: "The President and the Prime Minister discussed their common interest in reaching an agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic offensive missile systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. They concluded that agreement on this question would be of great value not only for the people of their two countries but for all mankind. They directed representatives of their two governments to begin meeting immediately to exchange views and proposals on this question." 7. Talks at the Foreign Minister or Head of Delegation level should begin immediately following the heads of government discussion of this issue. At these talks the U.S. side would deliver the approved initial presentation of our proposal and proceed to explain the proposal following the agreed set of Instructions to the Delegation. The Soviets would presumably table their own proposal. We could then decide how to proceed, but in any event the discussions would be well launched and the prospects for an agreement clearly established. 8. There now exists an appropriate occasion for moving ahead with missile Talks as a means of reaffirming your undiminished interest in seeking to control the nuclear arms race. In the present climate, criticism of this action, here and abroad, would be difficult to imagine. Coupled with your decision to end the bombing of North Vietnam and the start of substantive negotiations in Paris, the beginning of Strategic Talks with the Soviet Union would create a momentum towards world peace that would last for years to come. Clark M. Clifford
296. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ SR IM 68-28 Washington, December 5, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret. At the bottom of the first page of the source text is the following typewritten note: "This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence and Economic Research." Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from John P. Shaw to Bohlen, December 12, which reads: "I thoroughly commend for your reading the attached CIA analysis of Soviet motives in seeking the opening of strategic missile talks at an early date. In particular, I endorse the argument--which I have advanced on a number of previous occasions--that the consensus within the Soviet Government in favor of holding talks could well fall apart if the talks are not held soon, and that this possibility partly explains the eagerness of apparently committed Soviet leaders such as Kosygin. The recent evidence compiled by CIA reinforces my earlier conviction on this point. The CIA memorandum also contains a cogent analysis of the economic pressures which increase Soviet interest in the negotiations." Bohlen's handwritten note on this memorandum reads: "very interesting. CEB" SOVIET INITIATIVES ON ARMS TALKS SINCE THE Summary In his meeting with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 11 November, Premier Kosygin emphasized his wish to avert another round of escalation in the strategic arms race./2/ This was one of a number of official and unofficial Soviet attempts since the intervention in Czechoslovakia to assure the US that the position of the Soviet government on arms talks has not changed. Each of these attempts has stressed the Soviet wish to begin talks at the earliest possible date. /2/McNamara's conversation with Kosygin was reported in telegram 6409 from Moscow, November 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR) Kosygin's remarks on disarmament at this meeting are analyzed in Intelligence Note 874, which is a memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to the Acting Secretary, November 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R) The Soviets appear to have several reasons for favoring an early start on the talks. One of them probably is their estimate of the strategic relationship with the US--what it is now and what, in the absence of an agreement, it is likely to be. Without an agreement, the Soviets will be faced with the prospect of another round of rapid increases in arms spending just to keep up with the US. Their alternative would be to lose some of the gains in the strategic relationship recently achieved at great cost. The Soviets, moreover, may doubt that they would be able to match the timing of US technological developments in a new cycle of strategic arms increases. Some leaders may believe that the longer negotiations are delayed the more difficult it will be for the Soviet Union to affect the US deployment of new systems at the levels called for in current US planning. The economic arguments for avoiding a new round in the strategic arms race probably have particular appeal to a Soviet leader who understands the economic realities of the situation as well as Kosygin. It is unlikely that the Soviets would be able to cut other elements of defense spending sufficiently to finance large new strategic programs. Substantial investment in military research and development probably is considered mandatory, and the Czech crisis, the Arab-Israeli war, and Sino-Soviet border tensions have created pressure to beef up Soviet conventional forces. If the Soviets set out to offset fully the impact of new US programs without making compensating cuts elsewhere, annual military spending could rise 25 percent or more by the mid-1970's. This would force a cutback in the rate of growth of consumer programs and could seriously impede long-term economic growth as well. An agreement with the US on strategic arms control could make it possible for Moscow to feel that it could maintain its present strategic position without going beyond current levels of military spending. The Soviets could then continue recently expanded consumer programs and free some of the gains in future production for the badly needed modernization of the economy. At the same time, more resources could be made available for the conventional forces, a vigorous research and development program could be continued, and existing strategic weapons systems could be improved within the provisions of an arms limitation agreement. There are, however, some signs that the consensus within the leadership that led to the decision to agree to US proposals for arms talks was not a particularly strong one. If so, Kosygin may have an additional reason to wish to get the talks under way as soon as possible. He may believe that if there is no progress on this subject in the near future, other factors at home and abroad may intervene and prevent negotiations. The Soviet Initiatives 1. In a number of recent private contacts with US officials and private citizens with official contacts, spokesmen for the USSR have emphasized that the Czechoslovak crisis should not obscure the desirability of discussing strategic arms limitation or unduly delay the initiation of the talks. Publicly, the Soviets have stated in the UN their willingness to begin talks at once. 2. The recent Soviet initiatives might be interpreted as reflecting no more than a general desire to normalize relations with the US in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The frequency--there have been about half a dozen contacts since September--and general tone of urgency, however, suggest that there may be more specific reasons. The Shaky Consensus 3. It was not easy for Moscow to clear away its doubts about achieving security objectives through diplomatic means, and it apparently continues to have trouble in resolving all the diverse issues which underlie its position on arms limitation discussions. The consensus that culminated in Gromyko's June announcement of Soviet willingness to talk probably was shaky at best and recent events, notably the Czech crisis, may have subjected it to additional strains. 4. Externally, most signs point to continuity of the official position expressed in the early summer. These signs are coming primarily from officials and organs responsible to the government apparatus--principally from the foreign ministry and from Kosygin himself. Other signs from internal Soviet political and military forums suggest some continuing opposition to the idea of arms talks or to the scope of the talks as they were defined earlier this year. Lingering misgivings almost certainly remain in the minds of some Soviet political leaders and interest groups--especially the military-industrial complex and the ideological apparatus--about the desirability of achieving a strategic arms agreement with the US. 5. Since Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement in June of the Soviet agreement to discuss strategic arms limitations, the Soviet military press has frequently handled references to arms talks differently than the government and party press. The most recent example was Red Star's deletion of Gromyko's 3 October remarks in the UN on strategic arms limitations. Such editorial selectivity demonstrates the military's lack of enthusiasm for the talks, but may also reflect an attempt on the part of some in the military establishment to reopen the issue for reconsideration in Moscow's highest policy-making councils, now that the Czechoslovak crisis has held up the talks. 6. The treatment given in the Soviet press to Politburo member Mazurov's 6 November anniversary speech may also indicate that the talks--or some aspect of the scope of the negotiations--remain a sensitive issue. The party, government, and military press all deleted a statement in the broadcast version of Mazurov's speech which expressed readiness "to negotiate with the United States on the whole complex of these questions." 7. The offer to "negotiate" the basic issues was diluted by Soviet UN representative Roshchin on 28 November/3/ when he reaffirmed Soviet readiness to "start a serious exchange of opinions on this question." This weaker formulation was reported in Pravda on 29 November. Mazurov's speech had already represented a step backward in that it merely referred to "the strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons" and omitted the phrase "both offensive and defensive, including antimissile systems" found in Gromyko's statements in June and October. /3/Text of Roshchin's statement to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, November 28, is in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 739-747. 8. Although Soviet UN representative Malik repeated the more inclusive Gromyko formulation in his UN address on 13 November, the Moscow press failed to report the fact. The Kremlin's public posture on the scope of the talks, insofar as the domestic audience is concerned, has therefore shifted back to that which prevailed before the USSR had indicated its readiness to discuss the subject of strategic arms limitation. 9. Evidence of high-level byplay at a time when the official government policy is to push the talks suggests that the decision taken in Moscow six months ago to explore the US position is by no means a firm one. If so, it would explain in part the sense of urgency that Kosygin and other Soviet officials have been communicating to their US audiences. Kosygin may believe that if there is no progress on this subject soon, other factors at home and abroad may intervene and prevent negotiations. 10. However fragile the consensus may be, there appear to be good reasons, both military and economic, for diverse elements of the Soviet leadership to see potential advantages in an arms limitation agreement at this juncture. The US-Soviet Strategic Balance 11. The prospect of a decline in the Soviet strategic position relative to the US probably was a major consideration in Moscow's decision to enter into the talks. 12. As a result of concerted efforts since 1965, the relative strategic position of the USSR has improved significantly and Soviet leaders are probably confident that they now possess a secure deterrent. Programmed improvements to US strategic forces, however, threaten to increase the relative US advantage once again, a prospect which Soviet leaders probably find difficult to accept. Those favoring arms talks may consider that they have come close to strategic equality with the US and that now is the most propitious time to explore the possibility of negotiating a halt or a pause in the competition for strategic arms. 13. Should arms limitation talks fail, decisions on new programs must be made soon. Soviet leaders are aware that the US is actively developing new strategic weapons systems at a time when the major Soviet strategic deployment programs are nearing completion. The new US systems--the Minuteman III ICBM, the Poseidon SLBM,and the Sentinel ABM--are programmed for deployment over the next few years. If they wish to offset the impact of these programs, the Soviets probably would conclude that they must deploy costly new strategic systems such as MIRV's and mobile ICBM's and undertake a large ABM program. 14. The Soviets may doubt their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for advanced systems--MIRV, ABM, etc.--if they do choose to compete. They might also believe that continued delays in initiating the negotiations--while US weapons testing is continuing--could impair their ability to negotiate effectively on future levels of deployment of advanced systems. Arms and the Economy 15. Economic considerations undoubtedly provided another of the major incentives that led the USSR to agree in June to discuss strategic arms limitation with the US, and also probably lie behind its current interest in initiating the talks in the near future. It seems clear that major decisions on basic economic policy must be made soon and translated into specific plans for directing the course of the economy through the mid-1970's. Resource Allocation Issues 16. For the past several years, the Soviets have been following a policy of expanding strategic military programs and increasing investment in the consumer sector of the economy while allowing the rate of growth of investment in heavy industry to decline. 17. Following three years of relative stability in defense spending in 1963-65, military outlays began to rise sharply. Total expenditures for military and space programs increased at an average annual rate of 7 percent during 1966 and 1967. More important from the standpoint of resource allocations, most of this increase reflected growth in advanced weapons and space programs which absorb the highest quality manpower and machinery. As a result, military hardware purchases and spending for military R&D and space grew an average of 10 percent per year. 18. At the same time, investment in the consumer sector of the economy has also accelerated markedly. Since 1964, total consumer-oriented investment--including agriculture--has grown at an average rate of more than 9 percent, more than double the rate of the previous five years. 19. The expansion of consumer and strategic programs have come at the expense of investment in the heavy industry sector--i.e. at some cost to future economic growth. The average annual growth of investment in heavy industry fell to about 5 percent in the 1965-67 period, even below the low rates experienced in the early 1960's. 20. Preliminary information on the performance of the Soviet economy in 1968 suggests that the effects of this policy are beginning to show up in a decline in the rate of growth of heavy industry output. If this decline is a direct result of the slighting of investment rather than a short-term phenomenon, then the pressure on industrial growth rates could become more acute during the next year or two as the full effects of the recent investment policy take hold. In either case, the current perform-ance would give the Soviet economic planners reason for concern. 21. The Soviet leaders now appear to be faced with this prospect: they must restore a higher rate of growth of investment in heavy industry in the near future or risk impairing future capacity for satisfying military as well as civilian objectives. The important question is which claimant is going to yield--the consumer or the military--and by how much and when? In the past the choice would have been easier to predict: the Soviet consumer has traditionally borne the brunt of any resource squeeze. Now, however, the political cost of cutting back consumer programs could be greater. 22. These issues are apparently very much on the mind of Premier Kosygin in particular. Kosygin emphasized his concern for the economic aspects of the arms race in a meeting with the president of the UK Board of Trade in June, and he was apparently eager to convey a similar message to former Defense Secretary McNamara and to Senators Gore and Pell in Moscow last month./4/ /4/A memorandum of conversation between Senators Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) and Kosygin, November 19, is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. 23. As leader of the government, Kosygin is responsible for the performance of the Soviet economy. His experience and the approach he appears to take on the issues of the day would probably predispose him, more than most Soviet military planners or Communist Party leaders, to weigh military programs against long-term economic growth prospects and to look to diplomatic means to avoid unnecessary sacrifice of future strength to present power. The Outlook 24. Soviet leaders undoubtedly realize that an arms limitation agreement would not result in large immediate savings or relief from present military spending levels. They probably hope, however, that it would obviate the need for the large annual increments in outlays that a new round in the arms race would surely entail. If military expenditures could be stabilized at their current level, the entire annual growth in production would be available for other objectives. This relaxation of the military's claim on the growth in output would probably be enough to allow the Soviets to continue their increased consumer-oriented investment programs and at the same time maintain the minimum adequate investment in heavy industry. 25. The economic effects of an agreement cannot be calculated precisely under present uncertainties concerning future Soviet military programs, both with and without an agreement. A general appreciation of the magnitude of resources involved can be obtained, however, by comparing present levels of spending against what would be required if they seek to establish across-the-board equality with the US on a priority basis. Such an objective could easily raise annual Soviet defense spending by about 25 percent or 5 billion rubles by the mid-1970's. 26. Annual increases of about a billion rubles a year for 5 years would represent an annual growth in defense outlays comparable to that of 1966 and 1967. Such allocations would almost certainly force cutbacks in the rate of growth of consumer programs. Should the Soviets choose instead to continue to neglect the heavy industry sector over the next several years, they would be doing so at the cost of seriously impairing capacity for satisfying the whole range of national objectives several years hence. 27. The resources represented by 5 billion rubles are large in relation to the Soviet economic activity. For example, 5 billion rubles compares with current investment programs as follows: --It is nearly equal to current annual expenditures for construction of weapons systems sites plus purchases of all military weapons and equipment. --It is about three times as much as 1967 fixed investment in the iron and steel industry. --It is twice as much as 1967 investment in all consumer goods industries. --It is about as much as recent annual expenditures for plant and equipment for the rapidly expanding chemical and machinery sectors combined. --It equals about one-third of 1967 fixed investment in heavy industry. 28. The Soviets probably would not feel that they could cut other elements of defense spending sufficiently to finance the required new strategic programs. A continuation of their large military research and development program probably is considered mandatory to maintaining strategic strength, and recent events indicate that expenditures for general purpose forces are more likely to increase than decrease. The Czech crisis, the Arab-Israeli war, and Sino-Soviet border tensions have all created pressure for enhancing the Soviet conventional warfare capability. 29. Stabilization of defense expenditures at the current level--the highest in Soviet history--would imply a continued major commitment of economic resources to military programs. It probably would provide an adequate base for maintaining a large military research and development program, modernizing the general purpose forces, and--within the provisions of an arms limitation agreement--improving strategic weapons systems. 30. The Soviets are now drafting the next five-year economic plan, which will cover the 1971-75 period. They probably hope to have a preliminary version completed in 1969 and a final version ready by mid-1970. It will be difficult for the Soviets to proceed very far in the planning process until they have established a fairly firm view of the nature of their future strategic weapons programs. The Soviets probably believe that it will take considerable time for the substance of a final agreement to emerge, and consequently they have a strong incentive to get the talks under way soon. [Continue with the next documents]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES |